Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents

Games

P. Jean-Jacques Herings¹  Ana Mauleon² 

[1] Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands. E-Mail:;FNRS and CEREC, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 43 Boulevard du Jardin Botanique, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. E-Mail:

关键词: coalition formation;    farsighted players;    stability;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g1030286

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2010 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Switzerland.