A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks

Games

Gilles Grandjean¹  Ana Mauleon² 

[1] CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; E-Mail:;FNRS and CEREC, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 43 Boulevard du Jardin Botanique, 1000 Brussels, Belgium; E-Mail:

关键词: farsighted players;    pairwise deviations;    groupwise deviations;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g1030226

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. We first provide an algorithm that characterizes the unique pairwise and groupwise farsightedly stable set of networks under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. We then show that this set coincides with the unique groupwise myopically stable set of networks but not with the unique pairwise myopically stable set of networks. We conclude that, if groupwise deviations are allowed then whether players are farsighted or myopic does not matter; if players are farsighted then whether players are allowed to deviate in pairs only or in groups does not matter.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2010 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.