Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature

Games

关键词: coordination games;    learning;    local interactions;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g1040551

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

We survey the recent literature on coordination games, where there is a conflict between risk dominance and payoff dominance. Our main focus is on models of local interactions, where players only interact with small subsets of the overall population rather than with society as a whole. We use Ellison’s [1] Radius-Coradius Theorem to present prominent results on local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning in a local- and in a global- interactions setting.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2010 by the author; licensee MDPI, Switzerland.