Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information

Games

Ana Mauleon¹ 

[1] CORE, University of Louvain, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; E-Mail:

关键词: relative concerns;    alternating-offer bargaining;    private information;    maximal delays;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g4030329

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

We consider Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party’s relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2013 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.