Cooperation or Competition? Channel Choice for a Remanufacturing Fashion Supply Chain with Government Subsidy

Sustainability

Kangzhou Wang⁴  Yingxue Zhao¹  Yonghong Cheng³  Tsan-Ming Choi² 

[1] School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China;Institute of Textiles and Clothing, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China; E-Mail:;School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China; E-Mail:;School of Management, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, China; E-Mail:

关键词: remanufacturing supply chain;    fashion business operations;    closed-loop supply chain;    government subsidy;    channel choice;    cooperation;    competition;   

DOI  :  10.3390/su6107292

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

In this paper, we address the problem of choosing an appropriate channel for the marketing channel structure of remanufactured fashion products. To be specific, we consider a remanufacturer who has two options for selling the products: (1) provide the remanufactured products to a manufacturer, then the manufacturer sells both new products and the remanufactured products to customers, and (2) sell the remanufactured products directly to customers. Because of the relatively low acceptance of remanufactured products and environment consciousness of customers in developing countries like China, we model the two scenarios as decentralized remanufacturing supply chains, with the manufacturer being the Stackelberg leader and the government offering subsidy to the remanufacturer to incentivize remanufacturing activities. We find that the subsidy can incentivize remanufacturing activity regardless of the remanufacturer’s channel choice. A “too high” or “too low” subsidy makes the remanufacturer compete with the manufacturer, and an intermediate subsidy results in cooperation between the two members of the remanufacturing supply chain. Meanwhile, if the customers’ acceptance for remanufactured products is higher, the remanufacturer will be more likely to compete with the manufacturer. However, the remanufacturer’s optimal channel choice may be inefficient in the sense of social welfare and environmental protection.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2014 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.