Evolutionary Game Analysis of Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

Sustainability

Jian Li¹  Weihao Du²  Fengmei Yang³ 

[1] School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing 100029, China; E-Mail:;Li & Fung Limited, Beijing 101300, China; E-Mail:;School of Science, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing 100029, China; E-Mail:

关键词: remanufacturing;    closed-loop supply chain;    evolutionary game;    evolutionary stable strategies;    government subsidy;   

DOI  :  10.3390/su6096312

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

Remanufacturing is an effective means to realize energy saving and emission reduction. This paper develops an evolutionary game model with a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of manufacturers and retailers. Through analyzing evolutionary path of the game, we find that there are two possible evolutionary results affected by the profits of manufacturers. Price of remanufacturing products may be a critical factor that determines the ESS. Government subsidy is critical to promote the development of remanufacturing industry.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2014 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.