Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information

Games

Jason Olejarz¹  Whan Ghang¹  Martin A. Nowak¹ 

[1] Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; E-Mails:

关键词: indirect reciprocity;    cooperation;    evolutionary dynamics;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g6040438

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

We consider indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information. A game is offered between two players and accepted unless it is known that the other person is a defector. Whenever a defector manages to exploit a cooperator, his or her reputation is revealed to others in the population with some probability. Therefore, people have different private information about the reputation of others, which is a setting that is difficult to analyze in the theory of indirect reciprocity. Since a defector loses a fraction of his social ties each time he exploits a cooperator, he is less efficient at exploiting cooperators in subsequent rounds. We analytically calculate the critical benefit-to-cost ratio above which cooperation is successful in various settings. We demonstrate quantitative agreement with simulation results of a corresponding Wright–Fisher process with optional interactions and private information. We also deduce a simple necessary condition for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.