Countering Insurgency and the Myth of “The Cause”

Journal of Strategic Security

Ryan, Alex¹  Cox, Daniel G² 

[1]Senior Systems Advisor for the Governemnt of AlbertaSenior Systems Advisor for the Governemnt of AlbertaSenior Systems Advisor for the Governemnt of Alberta

[2]US Army School of Advanced Military StudiesUS Army School of Advanced Military StudiesUS Army School of Advanced Military Studies

关键词: Africa;    Al-Qaida;    Armed groups;    Asymmetric warfare;    Civil war and internal conflict;    Complex operations;    Counterinsurgency;    Counterterrorism;    Ethnic conflict;    Identity;    Ideology;    Irregular warfare;    National security;    Religious violence;    Small wars and insurgencies;    Southeast Asia;    Terrorism / counterterrorism;    Violent extremism;   

DOI  :  10.5038/1944-0472.8.1.1419

学科分类：建筑学

来源: Henley-Putnam University Press

【 摘 要 】

It is possible for an insurgency to develop from a single cause, for the insurgents to identify and communicate this unifying cause to the population, and for the insurgents to remain steadfastly focused even as counterinsurgents undermine their organization and redress the cause. But often the case that there is no single cause, that popular support is mobilized by appealing to multiple motivations, and that by the time counterinsurgents resolve the initial grievance, the insurgency has found alternative justifications to mobilize popular support. Since insurgent leadership is often competent and adaptive, it would be wise to consider the latter scenario against any counterinsurgency strategy. Yet, even when this is acknowledged in the counterinsurgency literature, the theory is remarkably silent how this affects the choice of operational approach This paper addresses this gap and offers a framework for more accurately mapping, understanding, anticipating, and addressing the multiple causes that draw adherents to insurgency and allow for its perpetuation.

【 授权许可】

Unknown