期刊论文详细信息
| Revista Brasileira de Políticas Públicas | |
| Anarquismo Judicial e Segurança Jurídica | |
| Ivo Teixeira Gico Jr.1  | |
| [1] UniCEUB | |
| 关键词: Judiciário; Anarquismo Judicial; Segurança Jurídica; Agente-Principal; | |
| DOI : | |
| 学科分类:社会科学、人文和艺术(综合) | |
| 来源: Centro Universitario de Brasilia | |
PDF
|
|
【 摘 要 】
By interpreting legal certainty as a form of capital, the legal capital, the social consequences of the absence of coordination mechanisms between judges to create and maintain the law is analyzed, specially the resulting judicial anarchism. A principal-agent model indicates that Brazilian judges do not have enough incentives and mechanisms to invest in legal capi-tal and to unify legal rules. The resulting legal uncertainty generates incentives for the overexploitation of courts, hence, the endemic problem of court congestion.
【 授权许可】
Unknown
【 预 览 】
| Files | Size | Format | View |
|---|---|---|---|
| RO201911300204663ZK.pdf | 1573KB |
PDF