Bidding to Commit: An Experimental Test of the Benefits of Commitment Under Moderate Degrees of Conflict

Evolutionary Psychology

Pat Barclay¹ 

关键词: commitment;    bargaining;    Battle-of-the-Sexes;    Hawk–Dove;    evolution of emotions;    Red King;    game theory;    cooperation;   

DOI  :  10.1177/1474704917690740

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: Sage Journals

【 摘 要 】

Economists and biologists have both theorized that individuals can benefit from committing to courses of action because it forces others to concede a greater share of any surpluses, but little experimental work has tested the actual benefits of such a strategy and people’s willingness to so “tie their hands.” Participants played a Battle-of-the-Sexes (Experiment 1) or Hawk–Dove game (Experiment 2), where one member of each pair could not change his or her action once played (committed), whereas the other could change actions in response (uncommitted). Committed players were more likely to achieve their preferred outcomes. When bidding to select roles, most participants preferred to be committed rather than uncommitted, though they bid slightly less than the committed role was actually worth. These results provide empirical support for people’s willingness to use commitment to their advantage and show that commitment devices (e.g., “irrational” emotions) can bring long-term benefits.

【 授权许可】

CC BY-NC