Embodied Music Cognition: Trouble Ahead, Trouble Behind

Frontiers in Psychology

Jakub R. Matyja¹ 

关键词: embodied music cognition;    embodied cognition;    music cognition;    radical embodied cognitive science;    music perception;    psychology of music;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01891

学科分类：心理学（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

These are interesting times for the Embodied Music Cognition (EMC) framework. Briefly summarized, EMC relies upon the hypothesis that embodied sensorimotor engagement is essential to both production and perception of music (Leman, 2008; Leman and Maes, 2014). This hypothesis, while suitable for accommodating different research methods used in empirical musicology (Godøy and Leman, 2010), may be regarded as inherently rather abstract. In the light of recent critical accounts on the foundations of embodied approaches to cognition as such (e.g., Goldinger et al., 2016, point out that premises like “perception is influenced by the body” are unacceptably vague), EMC hypothesis begs for further specification. Anticipating it, Leman and Maes (2014) suggested that the process of disambiguating what EMC hypothesis stands for, may take two forms. Firstly, the key would be to show that “embodiment plays a core role in an interconnected network of cognitive and emotive functions” and this network would be “further crucial in affect processing, conceptualization, tool use, and the entire array of functions needed to make sense of music” (Leman and Maes, 2014, p. 237). Second option, which as Leman and Maes (2014, p. 237) suggest “narrows down the perspective in order to find empirical evidence for a specific hypothesis,” would be to show that “the effect of action is essential to making sense of music.” In order to constructively contribute to the development of Leman and Maes' intuitions as to where EMC research should go, in what follows I will consider some challenges that may be of interests to both theoretically and empirically minded researchers.

【 授权许可】

CC BY