Commentary: Interpretations without justification: a general argument against Morgan's Canon

Frontiers in Psychology

Eduardo Mercado¹ 

关键词: comparative cognition;    anthropomorphism;    anthropocentrism;    animal psychology;    philosophy of science;    epistemology;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00452

学科分类：心理学（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

Morgan's Canon has been touted as “the most awesome weapon in animal psychology,” (Wynne and Udell, 2013, p. 14). The enemies that this century-old principle is usually employed to destroy are explanations of behavior that potentially exaggerate the cognitive capacities of nonhumans. Often, the battle is between explanations based on associative learning and explanations that invoke other “more sophisticated” psychological processes (Shettleworth, 2010; Heyes, 2012; Smith et al., 2012), where more sophisticated typically means evident in adult humans. Given the longevity and apparently foundational importance of Morgan's Canon, some comparative psychologists might be surprised to learn that philosophers have recently argued that this principle is illegitimate as a basis for choosing between competing explanations of animal behavior (Fitzpatrick, 2008; Heyes, 2012; Buckner, 2013; Starzak, 2016). Starzak (2016), in particular, suggests that Morgan's Canon should be jettisoned in favor of more general scientific principles shared by all disciplines. This commentary considers the merit of Starzak's argument against Morgan's Canon.

【 授权许可】

CC BY