Frontiers in Psychology | |
Anti-anthropomorphism and Its Limits | |
Domenica Bruni1  | |
关键词: anthropomorphism; common sense; animal rights; ethology; comparative cognition; Morgan's canon; | |
DOI : 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02205 | |
学科分类:心理学(综合) | |
来源: Frontiers | |
【 摘 要 】
There is a diffuse sentiment that to anthropomorphize is a mild vice that people tend to do easily and pleasingly, but that an adult well educated person should avoid. In this paper it will be provided an elucidation of “anthropomorphism” in the field of common sense knowledge, the issue of animal rights, and about the use of humans as a model in the scientific explanation. It will be argued for a “constructive anthropomorphism,” i.e., the idea that anthropomorphism is a natural attitude to attribute human psychological features to other individuals, no matter they are actually rational agents, or not. If we know the “grammar” of this attitude, we can avoid the risks in overestimatinasg the environmental inputs toward anthropomor-phism and, at the same time, take the heuristic advantages of anthropomor-phism in the use of human mind as a model for both everyday circumstances and scientific enterprise.
【 授权许可】
CC BY
【 预 览 】
Files | Size | Format | View |
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RO201904028207279ZK.pdf | 401KB | download |