Physician payment methods: a focus on quality and cost control

Journal of Otolaryngology-Head & Neck Surgery

Caroline Rudisill-Michaelsen³  Dominika Wranik²  Luke Rudmik¹ 

[1] Division of Otolaryngology – Head and Neck Surgery; Department of Surgery, University of Calgary, Foothills Medical Centre, South Tower suite 602, 1403 – 29th St. NW, Calgary, T2N 2 T9, AB, Canada;School of Public Administration, Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada;LSE Health, London School of Economics, London, England, UK

关键词: Pay for performance;    Fee for service;    Capitation;    Salary;    Physician remuneration;    Physician payments;   

Others  :  1143999
DOI  :  10.1186/s40463-014-0034-6

 received in 2014-01-29, accepted in 2014-07-23,  发布年份 2014

【 摘 要 】

With rising health care costs, governments must develop innovative methods to deliver efficient and equitable health care services. With physician remuneration being the third largest health care expense, the design of remuneration methods is a priority in health care policy. Otolaryngology-Head and Neck surgeons should have an understanding of the behavioural incentives associated with different physician payment methods. This article will outline the different physician payment methods with a focus on discussing the impact on quality of care and health care costs.

【 授权许可】

   
2014 Rudmik et al.

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