Stealthy false data injection attacks using matrix recovery and independent component analysis in smart grid

2017 2nd Asia Conference on Power and Electrical Engineering

能源学;电工学

Tian, Jiwei^1 ; Wang, Buhong^1 ; Shang, Fute^1 ; Liu, Shuaiqi^1

Information and Navigation College, Air Force Engineering University, Xi'an

710077, China^1

关键词: Attack strategies;    Common operations;    Communication errors;    False data injection attacks;    Independent component analyses (ICA);    Perfect informations;    Recent researches;    Topology information;   

Others  :  https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1757-899X/199/1/012034/pdf
DOI  :  10.1088/1757-899X/199/1/012034

来源: IOP

【 摘 要 】

Exact state estimation is vital important to maintain common operations of smart grids. Existing researches demonstrate that state estimation output could be compromised by malicious attacks. However, to construct the attack vectors, a usual presumption in most works is that the attacker has perfect information regarding the topology and so on even such information is difficult to acquire in practice. Recent research shows that Independent Component Analysis (ICA) can be used for inferring topology information which can be used to originate undetectable attacks and even to alter the price of electricity for the profits of attackers. However, we found that the above ICA-based blind attack tactics is merely feasible in the environment with Gaussian noises. If there are outliers (device malfunction and communication errors), the Bad Data Detector will easily detect the attack. Hence, we propose a robust ICA based blind attack strategy that one can use matrix recovery to circumvent the outlier problem and construct stealthy attack vectors. The proposed attack strategies are tested with IEEE representative 14-bus system. Simulations verify the feasibility of the proposed method.