• 已选条件:
  • × Wei Wang
  • × 心脏病和心血管学
 全选  【符合条件的数据共:7条】

The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery,2010年

Zhongming Zhang, Fang Zhang, Guangqing Cao, Ruifang Liu, Yiqian Zhang, Wei Wang, Shuming Wu

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The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery,2013年

Fang Zhang, Guangqing Cao, Ruifang Liu, Yiqian Zhang, Kai Liu, Wei Wang, Shuming Wu

LicenseType:Unknown |

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Complexity,2021年

Chi Huang, Yuning Xiong, Wei Wang

LicenseType:CC BY |

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We study the synchronization of complex networks by using event-sampling information. The nodes of the network are connected with event-triggered communication via multiple couplings. The couplings are split into several channels. Not all the channels are connected. Only a part of the states of each node can be communicated by the channels. An event detector is designed for each channel to independently determine the sampling moments. The couplings of the network are partial and event-triggered. Both features make that less information can be used for synchronization. The pinning controllers are also designed based on the sampled information. By establishing a time-dependent Lyapunov functional and utilizing an efficient event condition, we derive less conservative criteria for the synchronization of complex networks. Finally, the effectiveness of our main results is verified by an illustrative example, and comparisons are also presented to show how much conservatism can be reduced.

    Complexity,2021年

    Wei Wang, Xiao-hui Qu, Jian-Ju Du, Jia-Ming Zhu

    LicenseType:CC BY |

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    Adopting fair value measurement may bring more earnings fluctuations and induce irrational psychology and radical financing behavior of managers. Based on behavioral corporate governance theory, using the sample of Chinese A-share nonfinancial listed companies during 2007–2017, this paper empirically examines the regulatory effect of fair value measurement, that is, whether fair value measurement affects the company's financing decisions when managers have irrational psychological characteristics, i.e., overconfidence. The study found that overconfident managers of the company that have fair value measurement assets will be more aggressive for debt decisions, indicating that fair value measurement has a positively regulatory effect on overconfident managers.

      Complexity,2021年

      Wei Wang, Xiao-Hui Qu, Jian-Ju Du, Jia-Ming Zhu

      LicenseType:CC BY |

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      Adopting fair value measurement may bring more earnings fluctuations and induce irrational psychology and radical financing behavior of managers and major shareholders. Based on behavioral corporate governance theory, using the sample of A-share nonfinancial listed companies of China during 2015–2017, this paper empirically examines the regulatory effect of fair value measurement; that is, whether fair value measurement affects the company’s financing decisions when major shareholders have irrational psychological characteristics, i.e., overconfidence. The study found that overconfident major shareholders increase the probability of equity pledge and increase the proportion of equity pledge; further inspection found that if the level of accrued earnings management is higher, the adjustment effect of fair value measurement is also higher; when the risk of stock price collapse is higher, fair value measurement obviously increases the probability and ratio of overconfident major shareholders’ equity pledge. The above conclusions provide empirical evidence that fair value measurement has a positively regulatory effect on financing decisions of major shareholders.

        Complexity,2021年

        Luosong Jin, Chang He, Xiangyang Wang, Wei Wang, Panting Zhao

        LicenseType:CC BY |

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        China’s new round of power system reform has further released market vitality, making the power market more open and diversified. Meanwhile, China’s power market faces various risks and challenges incurred by this new reform, which further highlights the importance of the compliance management. However, the study on effective compliance management of China’s power market is missing, and the way to achieving effective compliance management is still unanswered. This paper tries to fill the research gap using the evolutionary game theory. We constructed a tripartite game model to analyze the strategic choices and influencing factors of power generators, compliance departments of the trading centre, and government regulatory agencies. Furthermore, simulation analysis was conducted based on evolutionary stable strategies. The results show that effective compliance management can be achieved without government supervision if the market mechanism is properly designed. In addition, the costs and profits of market participants and regulators are important factors influencing the effectiveness of compliance management. Our findings may arouse inspiration for the policy makers to construct an effective compliance management system.