


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# Market-pull policies to promote renewable energy: a quantitative assessment of tendering implementation

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## Abstract

Policymakers ideally select the support mechanism that better foments renewable energy production at the lowest cost to comply with international climate agreements. Currently, tendering is the fastest rising scheme. Yet a quantitative assessment of its performance in the literature is missing. We assess the effect of the introduction of auctions in accelerating the addition of renewable capacity through three econometric models: fixed-effects multivariate regression, statistical matching and synthetic control. The dataset includes 20 developed countries, spanning from 2004 to 2014, and both macroeconomic and policy drivers. Results show that tendering has the strongest effects to promote net renewable capacity comparing to other mechanisms like feed-in tariffs. Countries implementing tendering on average have a higher addition of net capacity of renewables in the order of 1000-2000 MW annually. The positive effect of tenders is clearer when analyzing with synthetic controls the case of Italy: while tendering enhances the deployment of renewables, policy instability jeopardizes the sustainability of tendering's impact.

*Keywords:* policy assessment; synthetic control; investment; tendering; renewable energy.

## 1        **1. Introduction**

2            Governments have been supporting the deployment of renewable energy (RE)  
3        as a way to tackle climate change and reinforce energy security. In fact, renewables  
4        are more expensive than fossil fuels in most cases because the negative externalities  
5        associated with the burn of fossil fuels largely remain absent from the prices.  
6        Therefore, the government need to support RE to become competitive in the market.  
7        In 2017, renewable energy accounted for 14.3% of the total primary energy demand  
8        (IEA, 2018). Even though this share is constantly increasing, it is doing so at a modest  
9        rate due to the persistent and significant growth in energy demand. A faster  
10       deployment rate is needed to limit global warming to 1.5°C (IEA, 2018).

11           There is a growing literature on the most efficient policy, or the right “policy  
12        mix” (e.g., Del Rio and Bleda, 2012). While the qualitative literature (e.g., Gan *et al.*,  
13        2007) argues for a positive correlation between regulation and RE deployment, the  
14        quantitative studies (i.e. panel data analysis on country level) display more ambiguous  
15        results. Marques and Fuinhas (2012) argue for the effectiveness of policies in  
16        strengthening the use of renewables. Popp *et al.* (2011) do not find a significant impact  
17        of policies on wind generation, and Aguirre and Ibikunle (2014) find a negative  
18        relationship between fiscal/financial incentives and deployment of renewable  
19        energies. When comparing the different instruments, Johnstone *et al.* (2010) find that  
20        feed-in tariffs (FiTs) are helpful for the development of less mature technologies, and  
21        Zhao *et al.* (2013) posits that FiTs are the only policy that encourages the development  
22        of renewable energy sources. Kilinc-Ata (2016) observes a positive relationship  
23        between RE deployment and FiTs or tendering. There is still a debate in the literature  
24        about the impact of the policies intended to support the investment in renewable  
25        capacity.

26           Auctions in particular are the object of a growing debate (e.g., Del Rio, 2017).  
27        On the one hand, proponents point to their advantages in terms of effectiveness (e.g.,  
28        European Commission, 2014). On the other hand, opponents argue about their risk to  
29        undermine the benefits of existing supporting mechanisms namely in terms of the  
30        effects in competition (Butler and Neuhoff, 2008) or in cost reductions (Grau, 2014).  
31        Recent assessments show that tendering may increase the effectiveness and efficiency

1 of support depending on the circumstances (e.g., Winkler et al., 2018). Winkler et al.  
2 (2018) has taken a first step in this purpose by performing a preliminary quantitative  
3 analysis on a limited number (eight) countries. However, there is a lack of a more  
4 systemic assessment of the tendering performance.

5 This paper aims to fill this gap by performing a cross-country quantitative  
6 analysis of the effect of both the introduction and implementation of auctions. It  
7 performs a comparative assessment of the policies supporting RE investment over  
8 time, with a focus on the introduction of tendering and the conditions of its  
9 implementation. For that we use a data set comprising a large and representative  
10 sample of 20 countries. The novelty of our approach consists on the study of this new  
11 dataset with the combination of three different econometric models: multivariate  
12 fixed effects regression, matching estimation, and synthetic controls. In particular,  
13 synthetic controls create a counterfactual group that controls for external factors, such  
14 as technology cost reductions, and cross-country differences, such as resource  
15 endowment, to provide more accurate effects of the policy instruments.

16 Our interest lies in the supporting policies aimed at directly increasing the share  
17 of energy generation from renewable energy sources. We therefore proceed to  
18 analyse the different factors affecting renewables deployment in order to identify  
19 which are the most effective measures the individual countries can adopt and which  
20 are the “external” factors that are not under the countries’ control but still impact  
21 investors’ decisions. Since tendering has been overcoming feed-in tariffs as primary  
22 support mechanism not only in Europe (CEER, 2018) but also worldwide (IRENA, 2015),  
23 and given the previous calls for a systematic quantitative assessment of the tendering  
24 performance (e.g., Winkler et al., 2018), this paper aims to evaluate the most recent  
25 evidence on tendering as an instrument to promote the increase of renewable energy  
26 capacity.

27 The work is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on support  
28 mechanisms—particularly tendering—of renewable energy projects. Section 3  
29 discusses the determinants of the investment in renewable energy in the literature.  
30 Section 4 presents the empirical research, namely the data and the econometric  
31 models which produce the results presented in Section 5. Section 6 analyzes the

- 1 robustness of the models and the hypothesis. Finally, Section 7 concludes by discussing
- 2 the main results and their implications.
- 3

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## 2. Renewable energy investment

### 2.1. Barriers specific to renewable energy projects

The investment in renewable energy falls into the broader category of infrastructure investment, and therefore is subject to the general barriers pertaining to this asset class. These are related to the features of infrastructure projects, such as high upfront capital requirements, long asset life, inelastic demand for services and prevalence of fixed costs. Apart from these generic risks of infrastructure investment, there are other specific issues to which renewables projects are subject. Table 1 provides an overview of the typical factors used by Standard & Poor's (2007) to determine the rating of infrastructure projects, along with the risks more specific to RE projects.

Table 1. Factors accounted for in infrastructure projects rating: common risks and specific risks to renewable energy projects

<b>Common risks to infrastructure projects</b>	<b>Project-level Risks</b>	Contractual foundation Technology, construction and operations Resource availability Competitive-market exposure Counterparty risk Cash-flow risk and debt repayment structure
	<b>Transactional Structure</b>	Special-purpose entities vs. multi-purpose entities Cash management Risk to cash flow of insolvency of related parties
	<b>Sovereign Risk</b>	Local currency risk Willingness and ability of sovereign governments to service its obligations
	<b>Business and Legal Institutional Risk</b>	Commercial laws Property rights risk
	<b>Credit Enhancement</b>	Extent of coverage of insurance policies Timeliness of payment on claims
<b>Specific risks to renewable energy projects</b>	<b>Market failures</b>	Degree of internalization of externalities (environmental, knowledge) Low market competition
	<b>Policy barriers</b>	Unstable policy commitment Regulatory access to the market
	<b>Informational barriers</b>	Develop resources (e.g. staff training) timely Availability of basic infrastructures (e.g. transmission)
	<b>Financial barriers</b>	Higher perceived risk and cost of capital

		Variable revenues while fixed costs
	<b>Socio-cultural barriers</b>	Social perception of the projects

1 Source: "Common risks" adapted from Standard & Poor's (2007); "Specific risks" own elaboration. See  
 2 text for more details.

3 Renewable energy projects have some peculiar features that can add specific  
 4 risks on top of those detailed above for traditional infrastructures. We group them into  
 5 five groups: market failures; domestic policy barriers, domestic market and  
 6 informational barriers, general financial barriers and socio-cultural barriers.

7 Market failures create an allocation of resources that, if not corrected by policy  
 8 measures, is not efficient. Specifically externalities impact RE development and tilt  
 9 energy production towards fossil fuels, as often consumers do not bear the full cost of  
 10 carbon emissions (associated with the combustion of the latter) which provokes global  
 11 warming. Sen and Ganguli (2017) point out: (i) under-priced environmental impacts,  
 12 since costs for greenhouse gas emissions are not correctly incorporated in commodity  
 13 prices; (ii) underinvestment of R&D programs, as initiators cannot benefit from  
 14 exclusive property rights; (iii) lack of competition in the energy sector (both production  
 15 and transmission/distribution) as monopolies within a given area tend to be more cost  
 16 effective; and (iv) too high initial investment cost.

17 Supporting policies can become a source of problems if not adopted with  
 18 consistency. Standard & Poor's (2010) has quantified that *longevity risk*, meaning  
 19 certainty of enforcement of related policies, is the most significant risk for low-carbon  
 20 investments. Investors are particularly concerned about the comparatively short time  
 21 frame of regulations compared to the long-term commitments of their investment (De  
 22 Jager et al., 2011). History has proved them right, as demonstrated by the sudden and  
 23 sometimes retroactive policy changes in a handful of developed markets, including  
 24 Italy and Spain, to which has followed a contraction in installations, mainly in the wind  
 25 power sector (REN21, 2017). Policies can be a barrier also in countries where the  
 26 regulatory system is designed around near-monopoly providers, preventing new  
 27 players to enter into the market (Sen and Ganguli, 2017).

1 Lack of basic infrastructures and of local competences can delay investments.  
2 These informational barriers are important factors, which need time to be addressed,  
3 and can make projects more expensive or even not economically viable. Especially in  
4 developing countries like India, the inadequacy of the transmission grid can be a huge  
5 problem since potential wind sites are often located in remote locations, far from the  
6 main consumption centres (Proparco, 2010). Furthermore, being RE site specific  
7 (unlike fossil fuels), the availability of detailed datasets (e.g. irradiation data for solar)  
8 is fundamental for the success of the projects (Sen and Ganguli, 2017).

9 Financial barriers arise from the cost and revenues profile of investments in RE  
10 capacity. Firstly, cost of capital can be significantly higher for RE projects, as they are  
11 perceived as riskier than traditional power generation projects, due mainly to: (i)  
12 higher proportion of fixed cost (which are often also paid upfront) with respect to  
13 variable costs; (ii) lack of track record of more recent technologies; and (iii) declining  
14 costs over time (e.g. average module prices of solar photovoltaics reduced 65% in  
15 France between 2013 and 2018 (IRENA, 2019) ). Secondly, while the costs of  
16 generating electricity are mostly fixed, the revenues from selling it on the free market  
17 are variable and tied to current prices, making financial viability of the projects  
18 uncertain and leading to cost-based competition.


19 Socio-cultural barriers may arise from the inadequate attention towards the  
20 climate change issue or from the social consequences of some projects (Sen and  
21 Ganguli, 2017). For example, social acceptance plays an important role, as recently  
22 shown from the ruling to overturn the installation of 14 wind turbines in Scout Moor  
23 (which would have created the biggest wind farm in England) due to its potential  
24 “significant adverse effect” on the landscape and views (Department for Communities  
25 and Local Government, 2017).

26

## 27 *2.2. Support mechanisms to renewable energy investments*

28 Domestic policies are necessary to overcome the barriers specific to the  
29 investments in RE capacity in order to meet the targets set by international  
30 agreements. These policies are typically divided into two main categories: adaptation  
31 and mitigation (see Figure 1). Adaptation measures are directed to stimulate “practical

1 steps to protect countries and communities from the likely disruption and damage that  
 2 will result from effects of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2015). They address the  
 3 consequences of climate change and not the economic issues to respect the  
 4 international agreements in order to avoid climate change, and as so, they are not part  
 5 of our empirical analysis. On the other hand, mitigation measures directly address the  
 6 economic and investment activity meant to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, namely in electricity  
 7 generation by increasing the share of RE.



8 Figure 1. Domestic Policies breakdown

9 Sources: adapted from UNFCCC (2015), Burer and Wustenhagen (2009), IRENA (2015).

10

11 Mitigation measures can be further divided in *technology-push* and *market-pull*  
 12 policies (Burer and Wustenhagen, 2009). Technology-push policies, such as  
 13 government funded R&D, are deployed with the objective of increasing the technology  
 14 “supply”. Market-pull policies, such as Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs), have the goal of increasing  
 15 the “demand” of the same technologies (Rickerson *et al.*, 2012). Both are necessary,

1 since innovation is fundamental in providing new technologies and making existing  
2 technologies more marketable as they often cannot compete on the market without  
3 policy support.

4 Technology push aims to compensate the so-called knowledge market failures  
5 (Dechezlepretre and Popp, 2015) in the early stages of research and production of a  
6 technology (e.g., new types of bioreactors for producing bio-energy from biological  
7 waste treatment (Sepehri and Sarrafzadeh, 2018)). At this point, the knowledge and  
8 experience gains have a public nature that can spill-over to other producers,  
9 preventing the innovator from getting the full benefits from them. The government  
10 can develop several instruments, such as tax incentives, grants and public funded R&D,  
11 to compensate for the insufficient incentives.


12 Market-Pull policies are important for technologies entering into a wider  
13 commercialization. They can themselves be divided into *tariff-based* instruments and  
14 *quantity-based instruments* (IRENA, 2015). Tariff-based instruments provide economic  
15 incentives for electricity production from RE sources, through subsidies or payments  
16 for the energy generated (e.g. FiTs, carbon taxes). Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs), for example,  
17 are policies designed to guarantee a certain price for a fixed amount of time for  
18 electricity generated from RE sources (Couture and Gagnon, 2009). Even though FiTs  
19 have effectively promoted RE deployment (e.g. Jenner *et al.*, 2013) and are a very  
20 popular support scheme (REN21, 2017), increasing concerns have been raised on the  
21 consequences of over dependency on incentives and lack of trust in the continuation  
22 of the policy (Antonelli and Desideri, 2014).

23 Quantity-based instruments instead provide direct control over the amount of  
24 renewable capacity installed or energy produced (e.g. Renewable Portfolio Standards  
25 or Obligations (RPSs or RPOs), cap and trade systems (CaT)). For example, Renewable  
26 Portfolio Standards (RPSs) are a policy requiring that a certain percentage of electricity  
27 generated by utilities comes from renewable sources. This creates price competition  
28 among the technologies that can promote innovation and lower the cost of renewable  
29 energy. RPSs are usually enforced through a credit trading mechanism, i.e., each MWh  
30 of electricity generated through an eligible RE source is accounted in the form of  
31 renewable energy credits (RECs). These RECs can either be traded or simply used to

1 control the producer's compliance with the RPS's requirements. The main problem  
 2 with this instrument is the unpredictable impact on the cost of compliance (Kilinc-Ata,  
 3 2016).

4 A new category of policies emerged, the so-called *hybrid instruments* or  
 5 auction-based policies (commonly called "tendering"), that combine features of both  
 6 tariff-based and quantity-based instruments in an attempt to remedy to the downsides  
 7 of both schemes. Tendering refers to "a procurement mechanism by which renewable  
 8 energy supply or capacity is competitively solicited from sellers, who offer bids at the  
 9 lowest price they would be willing to accept" (REN21, 2017). These auctions can be  
 10 classified according to their technology focus in: (i) technology-neutral, where different  
 11 projects using different technologies compete among themselves; (ii) technology-  
 12 specific, where different projects using the same technologies compete among  
 13 themselves; and (iii) project specific, where bidders compete for a particular project  
 14 selected by the government. In recent years auctions have been the fastest rising  
 15 mechanism worldwide, as shown by Figure 2.

16 Figure 2. Number of countries with renewable energy policies by type



Source: IRENA (2015)

17

18

19

20

### 2.3. Impacts of tendering on renewable energy investments

1           To understand how tendering effectively promote the investment in RE  
2 capacity, by addressing the specific barriers discussed in Section 2.1., several  
3 arguments have been risen in the literature about its strengths and weaknesses.

4           Several strengths are attributed to tendering. First and foremost, by setting the  
5 quantity in advance, auctions can be more effective than traditional price instruments  
6 to address market failures (IRENA, 2015). Theoretically, well-designed auctions are also  
7 efficient by selecting the projects with the lowest production costs (Winkler et al.,  
8 2018). Tendering fosters competition among different technologies that can lower RE  
9 prices over time, improving dynamic efficiency (Verbruggen & Lauber, 2012). Figure 3  
10 shows that tendering has been at least as efficient as other instruments in bringing  
11 down levelized costs of energy (LCOE) for onshore wind, solar photovoltaic, offshore  
12 wind and concentrating solar power in the past decade. BNEF (2015) argues that a shift  
13 from FiTs or RPS schemes to tendering lowers on average RE project tariffs by 30%. In  
14 addition, tenders are a flexible instrument, which can adapt to different jurisdictions  
15 with disparate energy sector's structure and maturity. Tenders allow to overcome the  
16 information asymmetry between regulators and RE project developers. Often  
17 policymakers do not possess the knowledge required to set the support levels at an  
18 adequate level, leading to too high or too low tariffs (Del Rio and Linares, 2014).  
19 Tendering instead, if carried out competitively and transparently, can be an effective  
20 mean of price discovery (Winkler et al., 2018). This was the case in Germany, where  
21 the first renewable energy auction held in 2015 revealed a solar PV project  
22 development cost higher than the FiT in place at the time. Finally, tendering can offer  
23 greater regulatory certainty for investors, since the result of an auction typically is the  
24 signing of a bilateral contract in which each party's commitments and liabilities are  
25 clearly stated, contributing to mitigate policy and financial risks (e.g., Verbruggen and  
26 Lauber, 2012).

27


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2

3 Figure 3. Global weighted average LCOE and percentile ranges for auctioned and non-4 auctioned projects on CSP, solar PV, onshore and offshore wind, 2010-20195 *Source: IRENA, 2019.*

6 Some weaknesses have also been pointed to tendering, as well. Transaction  
7 costs might be too large compared to the potential profits, thus discouraging potential  
8 bidders. This could especially hit smaller size projects, showing that tendering is  
9 particularly suitable for large-scale RE projects despite the benefits of smaller-scale  
10 and distributed RE generation (Grau, 2014).<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, complexity requires  
11 higher structuring costs for the regulator. These costs are nevertheless mostly linked to  
12 the learning with the initial design of the policy, and can therefore be amortized over  
13 subsequent auctions. Moreover, aggressive bidding may lead to project delays and  
14 underperformance (Winkler et al., 2018). The introduction of auctions creates  
15 additional risks, such as of penalties for non-realization and delays, that can increase  
16 financial costs. This would explain why in some cases FiT was found more efficient and  
17 resulting in larger deployment (e.g. Grau, 2014). However, these risks could be

<sup>1</sup> Generation of electricity from dispersed, small-scale systems close to the point of consumption (e.g. rooftop solar PV).

1 mitigated through an adequate contractual structure incorporating penalties and by  
2 evaluating bids on parameters other than the sole price (Del Rio and Linares, 2014).

3 Therefore, the literature is unclear about the impact of tendering on promoting  
4 RE investments. It has assessed the performance of tendering relative to other  
5 instruments in more abstract and qualitative manner (e.g., Batlle et al., 2012) or more  
6 focused on individual cases (e.g., Haufe and Ehrhart, 2018). Some studies suggest the  
7 superiority of auctions may change from case to case (e.g., Winkler, 2018). There are  
8 examples of very efficiently designed schemes turned out to be ineffective (Pollitt,  
9 2010). The implementation is also very important as policy instability and retroactivity  
10 change undermine the confidence of investors (Tiedemann et al, 2016). However,  
11 there is a lack of a systemic, cross-country comparative assessment of the tendering  
12 performance. Winkler et al. (2018) take a first step by analyzing empirical evidence for  
13 eight countries. This paper aims to fill this gap by performing a more systematic  
14 quantitative assessment of the effect of auctions introduction and implementation.

15

### 16 **3. Determinants of the investment in renewable energy**

17 New energy needs are often supplied to with traditional energy solutions, as they are  
18 typically cheaper and more rapidly implementable (Kilinc-Ata, 2016). Hence, a strong  
19 change in the incentive schemes is required to increase the use of renewable energy.  
20 Economic and finance literature already provides a guidance on the factors that affect  
21 the investment decision in favour to renewable energy. This section systematizes the  
22 previous literature by identifying eight factors that could determine the investment in  
23 new capacity of renewable energy, discussing their role to foster or hinder the  
24 investment in cleaner energy generation. Following the discussion in section 2, we  
25 group the factors into three types, encompassing socioeconomic-related aspects,  
26 country-specific features, and regarding institutional/political incentives.

27

#### 28 *3.1 Socioeconomic factors*

1 Macroeconomic variables influence the behaviour of investors, especially in high  
2 capital intensive projects such as investments in renewable energies. Some of these  
3 socioeconomic factors contribute to foster the investment (e.g., welfare, population,  
4 strength of financial markets, cost of fossil energy sources (incumbent) ), others have a  
5 negative effect (e.g., interest rates). We analyse next the impact of each one of these  
6 factors.

### 7 3.1.1 Welfare

8 Economic activity increases demand for energy and subsequently investment in the  
9 energy sector. Wealthier countries can also afford the costs of RE deployment and  
10 incentivize it with more ease. However, academic literature is torn on the welfare  
11 effect on renewable energy investment. Dong (2012) and Shrimali and Kneifel (2011)  
12 maintain that they are uncorrelated, while Aguirre and Ibikunle (2014), Carley (2009)  
13 and Chang *et al.* (2009) advocate for a positive relationship between the two. There is  
14 also no consensus of which proxy of welfare should be used: Aguirre and Ibikunle  
15 (2014) use GDP per capita, Marques *et al.* (2010) use GDP and Eyraud *et al.* (2013) use  
16 both. Thus welfare variables such as GDP should have a positive or no effect in the RE  
17 investment.

### 18 3.1.2 Population and human capital

19 Population can be representative of more than sheer size, as its growth can point to  
20 energy needs not always captured in GDP growth. However, new energy needs could  
21 be supplied with both fossil fuels and RE. Following general investment theory  
22 (Baldacci *et al.*, 2009), we still expect a population growth to positively affect RE  
23 deployment.

24 Human capital is essential for successful RE deployment. Education can also increase  
25 attention on the global warming issue. Thus the investment in RE should be positively  
26 correlated with the Human Development Index (HDI), yearly computed by the United  
27 Nations, which encompasses life expectancy, education and per capita income  
28 indicators.

### 29 3.1.3 Interest rates

1 Interest rates are theoretically the result of the equilibrium between demand and  
2 supply for funding. They have a negative effect in RE projects, which are usually  
3 financed through project finance structures comprising a higher level of debt  
4 compared with normal corporate financing (Eyraud *et al.*, 2013). In addition, project  
5 finance loans have a tenor in the life of the project which can go up to 30 years. Thus  
6 they will be more exposed to long-term interest rates rather than to the fluctuations of  
7 short-term interest rates (Eyraud *et al.*, 2013).

#### 8 3.1.4 Strength of financial markets

9 Investors need properly functioning capital markets throughout the lifetime of  
10 technologies (De Jager *et al.*, 2011). Business angels provide the first equity when  
11 demonstrations start; Venture Capital (VC) and Private Equity (PE) help overcoming the  
12 “valley of death” in the transition to market; and corporate finance, project finance  
13 and public markets assist market expansion and the full deployment of the technology  
14 (Grubb, 2004). Furthermore, the credit granted through project finance depends also  
15 on both the availability of funds and the strength of the banks’ balance sheet. Thus the  
16 investment in RE should have a positive correlation with compounded indicators like  
17 the Financial Development Index (FDI) which encompass depth (size and liquidity),  
18 access and (cost-related) efficiency for financial markets.

#### 19 3.1.5 Cost of fossil energy sources

20 Once in operation, the marginal costs of electricity production using renewable  
21 energies are stable (given the high proportion of capital costs in final costs). This  
22 contrasts with the marginal costs of electricity produced from fossil fuels (oil, gas and  
23 coal) that are dominated by the raw materials costs which are volatile. Thus  
24 renewables can shield the countries from the fluctuations in the costs of fossil fuels,  
25 particularly of oil (Awerbuch and Sauter, 2006). Moreover, an increase in fossil fuels  
26 prices—the incumbent technology—decreases the relative price of RE generation,  
27 hence making it more competitive (Popp, 2001). Thus the increase in the fossil fuel  
28 prices should have a positive effect in the RE investment.

29

#### 30 3.2 Country-specific factors

1 A second group of variables relates to the circumstances that determine the RE  
2 investment. The energy economics literature typically considers two country-specific  
3 factors: energy dependency; and renewable potential.

4

#### 5 3.2.1 Energy dependency

6 Fossil energy sources are concentrated in a limited number of areas while renewable  
7 energy sources are more widespread around the world (IRENA, 2019). By increasing  
8 the share of renewables in the national energy mix, countries can increase their energy  
9 security and create economic benefits (shielding themselves from fluctuations in  
10 energy supply and prices). Thus a high energy dependency (i.e. the ratio between net  
11 energy imports and total energy consumption) could therefore act as an impulse to  
12 develop locally generated clean energy sources (Kilinc-Ata, 2016).

#### 13 3.2.2 Renewable potential

14 Natural resources are unevenly distributed (IRENA, 2019). Factors such as hours of  
15 solar exposition, water and wind supply, wave and tidal power, all constitute a  
16 country's renewables potential, and they vary across regions and states. Some studies  
17 use as a proxy of renewables potential the geographic area of each nation (Marques *et*  
18 *al.*, 2010). This would mean that for the time frame considered we deem the potential  
19 to be time invariant. This issue has been debated by Carley (2009), who esteems the  
20 potential of renewable sources to be invariant for 9 years. Thus renewable potential  
21 should impact little on the investment in RE in the short-run.

22

#### 23 3.3 Political factors

24 Finally, the implementation of incentive mechanisms can spur the investment in RE as  
25 discussed in the energy economics and policy literature. This concerns in particular the  
26 adoption of market-pull policies. Such policies are important to accelerate the growth  
27 of emergent technologies (Burer and Wustenhagen, 2009), comprising: tariff-based  
28 instruments (e.g., feed-in-tariffs (FiTs), carbon taxes (C\_T) ); quantitative-based  
29 instruments (e.g., renewable portfolio standards (RPSs); tradable renewable energy

1 certificates (RECs), cap and trade schemes (CaT) ); and auction-based policies or  
2 “tendering”. A comparison between the different types of support mechanisms is  
3 provided in Section 2.2. Recent studies already suggest the superiority of the change to  
4 auctions in specific conditions of context (Winkler, 2018) and stability (Tiedemann et  
5 al, 2016). Thus the investment in RE should increase with the existence of incentive  
6 mechanisms.

7

### 8 *3.4 Synthesis and hypothesis*

9 The economics, finance and management literature suggest a number of determinants  
10 for the investment in renewable energies that can be grouped in socioeconomic,  
11 country-specific and institutional factors. Given that this paper addresses the benefits  
12 with the change to an auction-based instrument, we focus on the factors that drive net  
13 capacity additions including the differences between countries in terms of resource  
14 endowment and environment stability, without considering specific investor and  
15 project characteristics. These drivers of the investment in RE will serve to test  
16 empirically the significance of the following explanations:

17 **H1:** The investment in RE depends more on socioeconomic and country-specific  
18 factors.

19 **H2:** The investment in RE depends more on the policy instruments.

20 **H3:** The investment in RE increase with the change to auction-based mechanisms.

21 The last hypothesis (H3) is the central one of this study. The other hypothesis H1 and  
22 H2 are mutual exclusive and serve to clearly distinguish the most important set of  
23 drivers that increase the investment in RE. Of course, drivers from different groups of  
24 factors can determine the investment. But this strategy helps to more clearly isolate  
25 (and compare) the positive effects that can be attributed to the change of the policy  
26 (to tendering) from the impacts of contextual variables.

27 Data sources, the selection of variables and the empirical approach are explained in  
28 the next section.

29

30

## 4. Empirical analysis of tendering efficacy

### 4.1. Data

To assess the effect of the introduction of tendering mechanism on renewables' deployment, we collect data for a sample of developed countries (all OECD members). Developed countries have had an important role in the introduction of renewable energy capacity. Our sample encompasses twenty countries in the period from 2004 to 2014: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.<sup>2</sup>

Table 2 summarizes the different variables used for our analysis, providing detailed information for each one of them. Tables 3-4 show the descriptive statistics for all the variables and the correlation matrix for the independent variables, respectively.

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<sup>2</sup> These are the OECD countries represented in the top 70 of the List of countries by electricity production from renewable sources ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_electricity\\_production\\_from\\_renewable\\_sources](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_electricity_production_from_renewable_sources) last accessed in 4/7/2019). We removed the following countries from the sample because of their specificities: Norway (hydropower legacy, which represents 99% of electricity production), Chile (late arrival to OECD in 2010 in the middle of the surveyed period); Poland (small share of renewables in the mix 13,7% in 2016); Greece (financial crisis impact).

1 Table 2. Variable description and data sources

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Expected effect</b>
<b><i>Dependent Variable</i></b>				
Yearly increase in net capacity of renewables	RE_CAP	Net capacity measured in MW; includes hydropower, wind power, solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, solid and liquid biofuels, biogases, geothermal, renewable municipal waste, tidal, wave and ocean motion	IEA	
<b><i>Independent Variables</i></b>				
<b><i>Socioeconomic Factors</i></b>				
Gross Domestic Product	GDP	GDP in current US \$ billions	World Bank	Positive
Population	POP	Total population in millions	World Bank	Positive
Human Development Index	HDI	Composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators	United Nations	Positive
Country's Long-Term Interest Rates	LT_IR	10-year government bond yields	OECD	Negative
Financial Development Index	FDI	Composite statistic of financial institutions and financial markets' development indicators	IMF	Positive
Brent Price	BRT	Oil price benchmark in US \$ per barrel	BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017	Positive
National Balancing Point Price	NBP	Natural gas price benchmark in US \$ per million Btu	BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017	Positive
Northwest Europe Marker Price	COAL	Coal price benchmark in US \$ per tonne	BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017	Positive
<b><i>Country Specific Factors</i></b>				
Energy Dependency	EN_IMP	Net energy imports as a % of energy consumption	World Bank	Positive

Political Factors

Feed-in Tariffs	FIT	Dummy	REN21 reports, IEA Global Renewable Energy policies and <i>measures database</i>	Positive
Renewable Portfolio Standards	RPS	Dummy	REN21 reports, IEA Global Renewable Energy policies and <i>measures database</i>	Positive
Tradable Renewable Energy Certificates	REC	Dummy	REN21 reports, IEA Global Renewable Energy policies and <i>measures database</i>	Positive
Tendering	TDR	Dummy	REN21 reports, AURES reports	Positive
Carbon Tax	C_T	Dummy	Carbon Pricing Watch 2016 by World Bank and Ecofys	Positive
Cap and Trade Schemes	CaT	Dummy	Carbon Pricing Watch 2016 by World Bank and Ecofys	Positive

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11 Table 3. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
RE_CAP	220	1,542.25	2,551.01	-318.00	17,326.00
GDP	220	1,990.89	3,248.68	103.91	17,393.10
POP	220	46.74	67.84	4.07	318.56
HDI	220	0.89	0.03	0.79	0.94
LT_IR	220	3.64	1.51	0.52	10.55
FDI	220	0.79	0.09	0.56	1.00
BRT	220	81.75	24.23	38.27	111.67
NBP	220	7.76	2.06	4.46	10.79
COAL	220	87.95	24.93	60.54	147.67
EN_IMP	220	36.31	56.59	-192.02	93.98
FIT	220	0.74	0.44	0.00	1.00
RPS	220	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
REC	220	0.67	0.47	0.00	1.00
TDR	220	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
C_T	220	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
CaT	220	0.71	0.45	0.00	1.00

1

2

3 Table 4. Independent Variables Correlation Matrix, All Countries, 2004-2014

	GDP	POP	HDI	LT_IR	FDI	BRT	NBP	COAL	EN_IMP	FIT	RPS	REC	TDR	C_T	CaT
<b>GDP</b>	1.00														
<b>POP</b>	0.99	1.00													
<b>HDI</b>	0.17	0.10	1.00												
<b>LT_IR</b>	-0.19	-0.17	-0.35	1.00											
<b>FDI</b>	0.31	0.32	0.31	-0.19	1.00										
<b>BRT</b>	0.06	0.01	0.33	-0.22	-0.09	1.00									
<b>NBP</b>	0.04	0.01	0.22	-0.16	-0.08	0.83	1.00								
<b>COAL</b>	0.03	0.00	0.10	0.13	-0.04	0.58	0.55	1.00							
<b>EN_IMP</b>	0.00	0.05	-0.52	-0.09	-0.25	-0.01	0.00	0.00	1.00						
<b>FIT</b>	0.23	0.24	-0.03	-0.20	0.26	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.06	1.00					
<b>RPS</b>	0.36	0.37	0.02	-0.01	0.20	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.17	-0.20	1.00				
<b>REC</b>	0.17	0.15	0.19	-0.17	-0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.01	-0.07	-0.15	0.28	1.00			
<b>TDR</b>	0.23	0.22	-0.03	0.08	-0.05	0.15	0.11	0.03	-0.06	0.33	0.13	0.08	1.00		
<b>C_T</b>	-0.18	-0.22	0.24	-0.19	-0.12	0.17	0.12	0.01	-0.28	-0.01	0.06	0.22	0.17	1.00	
<b>CaT</b>	-0.07	-0.12	-0.02	-0.18	-0.25	0.41	0.32	0.14	0.34	-0.04	-0.18	0.16	0.08	0.09	1.00

4

## 4.2. Models

To assess the effect of the introduction of auctions and of the conditions of its implementation, we take a novel approach based on the combination of econometrical analysis. The first step is a multivariate regression with the objective of testing the relationship between tendering and the addition of renewable energy capacity, taking into account other policy instruments and external factors. In order to detect a possible causality between tendering and renewables' deployment, we further implement two different estimation techniques: statistical matching and synthetic control (more details next). These two models also test for country-specific conditions while controlling for external factors (e.g., technology cost decrease over time).

### 4.2.1. Multivariate Regression

We perform a multivariate regression with fixed effects in order to control for unobserved country heterogeneity (e.g., resource endowment). Our general specification is the following:

$$y_{it} = a_i + \sum_1^k \beta_k * X_{it,k} + \varepsilon_{i,k}$$

where  $y_{it}$  is the amount of net capacity of renewable energy added in year  $t$  in country  $i$ ,  $a_i$  is the intercept,  $X_i$  is a matrix of the explanatory variables described in Table 2,  $\beta$  is the coefficient matrix to be estimated, and  $\varepsilon_{i,k}$  is the error term. We are therefore testing the following model:

$$RE\_CAP = f(\text{Socioeconomic Factors, Country} \\ - \text{Specific Factors, Political Factors})$$

Where:

$$\text{Socioeconomic Factors} = (\text{GDP, POP, HDI, LT\_IR, FDI, BRT, NBP, COAL})$$

$$\text{Country - Specific Factors} = (\text{EN\_IMP})$$

$$\text{Political Factors} = (\text{FiT, RPS, REC, TDR, C\_T, CaT})$$

and  $f$  is a linear function.

1                   4.2.2. *Matching Estimation*

2                   In order to determine a possible causality between tendering and renewables'  
3 deployment, i.e., a causal treatment effect, we apply matching estimation. This  
4 method permits to control for external developments such as technology cost  
5 reductions. Formally, given a population of  $i=1, \dots, N$  individuals, and a binary treatment  
6 represented by a treatment indicator  $D_i$  that takes the value one if individual  $i$  receives  
7 treatment and zero otherwise, we are interested in computing the treatment effect  $\tau_i$   
8 on a variable of interest  $Y$ . Defining the potential outcomes for each individual  $i$  as  
9  $Y_i(D_i)$ ,  $\tau_i$  will be equal to:

$$\tau_i = Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)$$

10                  In our specific case, the population is composed by the  $i=20$  countries in our  
11 dataset, the treatment  $D$  is tendering, and the variable of interest  $Y$  is the addition in  
12 net capacity of renewables. If  $\tau_i$  was found to be positive across all countries, this  
13 would solve our quest for causality. The fundamental problem is that at a given time  
14 only one of the two potential outcomes can be observed for each individual country,  
15 making it impossible to estimate the individual treatment effect  $\tau_i$ . Matching  
16 estimation allows the creation among the nonparticipants of a *control group*,  
17 composed by individuals similar to the participants in relevant pre-treatment  
18 characteristics  $X$  (our independent variables), and compare the differences in  
19 outcomes between the participants and the control group, which can then be  
20 attributed to treatment.

21                  The effect of the treatment on the variable  $Y$  is usually quantified as the  
22 average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).  
23 Formally:

$$\tau_{ATE} = E(\tau) = E[Y(1) - Y(0)]$$

$$\tau_{ATT} = E(\tau|D = 1) = E[Y(1)|D = 1] - E[Y(0)|D = 1]$$

24                  The ATE represents the difference in expected outcomes after participation and  
25 nonparticipation. However, the ATE can sometimes be misleading as it includes the  
26 effect on individuals for whom the treatment was not designed. The solution to this is  
27 the ATT, which represents the difference in expected outcome with and without

1 treatment for those who actually were subject to the treatment. We will proceed to  
 2 estimate both parameters in order to assess the effect of tendering on net renewable  
 3 capacity addition, and we will do it using two of the most popular matching  
 4 techniques: the propensity score matching (PSM) and the nearest neighbour matching  
 5 (NNM).

6 PSM relies on the idea of solving the curse of dimensionality by using the  
 7 relevant characteristics  $X$  to compute the probability that an individual will enrol in  
 8 the treatment (Rubin and Rosebaum, 1983); this value  $p(X)$ , such that:

$$p(X) = P(D = 1|X) = E[D|X] \in [0,1]$$

9 is the so-called *propensity score*. By attributing a propensity score to each individual,  
 10 we obtain the distribution of  $p(X)$  which helps us to individuate the common support  
 11 area, i.e. the overlap between the PS distribution in the two groups. The sample will  
 12 then be restricted to the individuals that fall in the common support area.

13 Using the propensity score we can then compute our average treatment effect (ATE)  
 14 and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) as:

$$\tau_{ATE}^{PSM} = E\{E[Y(1)|D = 1, p(X)] - E[Y(0)|D = 0, p(X)]\}$$

$$\tau_{ATT}^{PSM} = E\{E[Y(1)|D = 1, p(X)] - E[Y(0)|D = 0, p(X)]|D = 1\}$$

15 We can see that the propensity score acts weighting the mean difference in outcomes  
 16 over the common support, giving a higher weight to individuals with a higher  $p(X)$ .

17 NNM works by imputing the missing potential outcome  $Y_i(1)$  or  $Y_i(0)$  by using  
 18 average outcomes for individuals with “similar” values for the covariates that have  
 19 received the other treatment level (Abadie and Imbens, 2002): hence, since both  
 20 treated and control units are matched, matching is carried out with replacement, so  
 21 that every unit can be used as match more than once. “Similarity” is accounted for by  
 22 using a weighted function of the covariates for each individual. Formally, the distance  
 23 between  $x_i \in X$  and  $x_j \in X$ , two vectors of covariates for individuals  $i$  and  $j$ , is parametrized  
 24 by the vector norm:

$$\|x_i - x_j\|_S = \{(x_i - x_j)' S^{-1} (x_i - x_j)\}^{1/2}$$

1 where  $S$  is a given symmetric, positive definite matrix. By default, Stata set  $S$  to be the  
 2 Mahalanobis scaling matrix, in which weights are based on the inverse of the  
 3 covariates' variance-covariance matrix. We can then rank each individual in terms of  
 4 "distance" based on the norm, and call  $j_m(i)$  the index of the unit that is the  $m^{th}$  closest  
 5 to individual  $i$ . We then set the desired number of matches  $M$  (in our analysis we will  
 6 use  $M=1$ ) and denote with  $J_M(i)$  the set of indices for the first  $M$  matches for unit  $i$ :

$$J_M(i) = \{j_1(i), \dots, j_M(i)\}$$

7 At this point, we can obtain an estimate for all the unobserved potential outcomes, by  
 8 using the following estimates:

$$Y_i^{NNM}(0) \begin{cases} Y_i(0) & \text{if } D_i = 0 \\ \frac{1}{M} \sum_{j \in J_M(i)} Y_j(1) & \text{if } D_i = 1 \end{cases}$$

$$Y_i^{NNM}(1) \begin{cases} \frac{1}{M} \sum_{j \in J_M(i)} Y_j(0) & \text{if } D_i = 0 \\ Y_i(1) & \text{if } D_i = 1 \end{cases}$$

9 Using these estimates, we can compute our ATE and ATT as:

$$\tau_{ATE}^{NNM} = E[Y(1) - Y(0)] = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (Y_i^{NNM}(1) - Y_i^{NNM}(0))$$

10 and

$$\tau_{ATT}^{NNM} = E[Y(1)|D = 1] - E[Y(0)|D = 1] = \frac{1}{N_1} \sum_{D_i=1} (Y_i(1) - Y_i^{NNM}(0))$$

11 with  $N_1 = \#$  of treated individuals, since if  $D_i=1$ , then  $Y_i^{NNM}(1)=Y_i(1)$ .

12 As a first step in the implementation of matching estimation, we individuate  
 13 three groups of covariates on which we will match separately, in order to control for  
 14 three different categories of covariates - namely, policy ( $X_{policy}$ ), socio-  
 15 economical/country-specific ( $X_{se/cs}$ ), and size ( $X_{size}$ ). They include:

16 -  $X_{policy}$ : Year, FiT, RPS, RECs, C\_T, CaT

17 -  $X_{se/cs}$ : Year, HDI, LT\_IR, FDI, EN\_IMP

1 -  $X_{size}$ : Year, GDP, POP.

2 The variable Year is used in each set of covariates in order to avoid a selection  
3 bias due to the use of panel data. Furthermore, implementing NNM require an exact  
4 match for the variable Year and a number of matches  $M=1$ .

5

#### 6 4.2.3. Synthetic Control

7 Synthetic control enables cross-country comparisons of the effect of auctions  
8 introduction. It provides a systematic methodology to construct control groups which  
9 can be compared against for counterfactual analysis. The proof of causality would be  
10 to obtain for an individual  $i$  that:

$$\tau_i = Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) \neq 0$$

11 or, by making variables dependent on time as well:

$$\tau_{it} = Y_{it}(1) - Y_{it}(0) \neq 0$$

12 but this is not feasible due to the possibility of observing only one of the two potential  
13 outcomes at any given time. Instead of reverting to estimate average treatment  
14 effects, synthetic control (SC) solves this issue by estimating the unobserved potential  
15 outcome for a treated individual  $i$  following the implementation of the treatment  
16 (Abadie *et al.*, 2010; Abadie & Imbens, 2016).

17 Given a treated individual  $i$  and a control group of  $j = 1, \dots, J$  untreated  
18 individuals, SC estimates  $Y_{it}(0)$  for any  $t > T_0$ , where  $T_0$  (with  $1 < T_0 < T$ ) is the period in  
19 which the treatment begins, by creating a synthetic untreated individual  $i$  as a  
20 weighted average of the untreated individuals from the control group. We suppose  
21  $Y_{it}(0)$  is given by a factor model, such that:

$$Y_{it}(0) = \delta_t + \theta_t Z_i + \lambda_t \mu_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

22 where  $\delta_t$  is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across units,  $Z_i$  is  
23 a  $(r \times 1)$  vector of observed covariates (not affected by the treatment),  $\theta_t$  is a  $(1 \times r)$   
24 vector of unknown parameters,  $\lambda_t$  is a  $(1 \times F)$  vector of unobserved common factors,  $\mu_i$

1 is an  $(F \times 1)$  vector of unknown factor loadings, and the error terms  $\varepsilon_{it}$  are unobserved  
2 transitory shocks at the region level with zero mean.

3 We also consider a  $(J \times 1)$  vector of weights  $W = (w_1, \dots, w_J)'$ , with  $J$  being the number  
4 of untreated individuals, such that  $w_j \geq 0$  for  $j = 1, \dots, J$  and  $w_1 + \dots + w_J = 1$ . Each  
5 particular value of the vector  $W$  represents a potential synthetic control, which means  
6 a weighted average of untreated individuals. The value of the outcome variable for  
7 each synthetic control indexed by  $W$  is:

$$\sum_{j=1}^J w_j Y_{jt}(0) = \delta_t + \theta_t \sum_{j=1}^J w_j Z_j + \lambda_t \sum_{j=1}^J w_j \mu_j + \sum_{j=1}^J w_j \varepsilon_{jt}$$

8 In a similar fashion to the method employed with the NNM, we look for the  $W^*$  that  
9 minimizes the distance:

$$\|X_i - X_J W\|_S = \{(X_i - X_J W)' S^{-1} (X_i - X_J W)\}^{1/2}$$

10 where  $S$  is a  $(k \times k)$  symmetric and positive definite matrix,  $X_i$  is a  $(k \times 1)$  vector of pre-  
11 treatment characteristics for the treated individual and  $X_J$  is a  $(k \times J)$  matrix containing  
12 the same variables for the untreated individuals; the characteristics taken into account  
13 can include covariates as well as pre-treatment values for the outcome of interest  $Y$ .  
14 Abadie *et al.* (2010), choose  $S$  such that the mean squared prediction error of the  
15 outcome variable is minimized for the pre-treatment period (*i.e.* the resulting synthetic  
16 control individual approximates the trajectory of the outcome variable of the treated  
17 individual in the pre-treatment period). They also show that, if the number of pre-  
18 treatment period is large compared to the size of the transitory shocks, for  $t \leq T_0$ ,  
19  $Y_{it}(0) - \sum_{j=1}^J w_j^* Y_{jt} \cong 0$ . This result suggests using as estimator of  $\tau_{it}$ , for  $t > T_0$ :

$$\tau_{it}^{SC} = Y_{it}(1) - \sum_{j=1}^J w_j^* Y_{jt}$$

20

21 The need for a sufficiently long pre-treatment and post-treatment period  
22 compels us to focus on countries which implemented tendering at a mid or late stage

1 of our time frame: therefore, we apply SC to Italy (which implemented tendering in  
2 2010).

3 The pool of donors for synthetic Italy is composed by the ten countries in our  
4 sample which did not implement tendering in the time frame considered, which are:  
5 Austria, Finland, Germany, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden,  
6 Switzerland and United Kingdom.

7

8

## 9 **5. Empirical results**

10 The findings of the multivariate regression are presented in Table 5. We report both  
11 the global regression including all the variables at the same time, and two partial  
12 regressions that isolate Political Factors from Socioeconomic Factors and Country-  
13 Specific Factors.

14

15

1 Table 5. Global and partial regressions

Variable	Global Regression	Socioeconomic & Country-Specific	Political
RE_CAP			
<b><i>Socioeconomic</i></b>			
GDP	1.33 (2.71)***	0.99 (1.93)*	
POP	164.98 (1.83)*	146.88 (1.52)	
HDI	2516.18 (0.87)	1701.72 (0.06)	
LT_IR	-152.34 (-1.22)	-22.66 (-0.18)	
FDI	997.54 (0.28)	2134.74 (0.58)	
BRT	137.03 (1.88)*	99.98 (1.28)	
NBP	-510.00 (-1.60)	-428.48 (-1.24)	
COAL	-1.69 (-0.09)	-10.14 (-0.53)	
<b><i>Country-Specific</i></b>			
EN_IMP	29.76 (2.47)**	26.83 (2.08)**	
<b><i>Political</i></b>			
FiT	344.62 (0.86)		359.43 (0.82)
RPS	592.39 (1.01)		301.78 (0.51)
REC	-879.71 (-0.94)		-696.64 (-0.70)
TDR	2172.42 (4.83)***		1233.43 (2.63)***
C_T	1197.58 (2.57)**		947.42 (1.92)*
CaT	387.04 (0.89)		1102.22 (2.36)**
Constant	-43994.74 (-1.52)	-16803.24 (-0.61)	204.26 (0.17)
Year Controls	YES	YES	YES
R <sup>2</sup>	42.04% (within)	29.39% (within)	24.67% (within)

2  
3 Annual data over 2004-2014; fixed-effects estimation; t-statistics in parenthesis; \*\*\* (\*\*, \*) indicates  
4 significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.

1

2           The global regression explains a high share (42%) of the variation in net RE  
3 capacity during the period surveyed. Among the socioeconomic factors, only GDP is  
4 positively associated with addition of renewable energy capacity in both regressions  
5 (while population is only moderately positively associated with dependent variable in  
6 the global regression), confirming that absolute size (in economic or demographic  
7 sense) is an important factor in renewables deployment. This is consistent with  
8 previous works (e.g. Marques et al, 2010) which used geographical size as proxy for  
9 resource potential. Contrary to the initial expectations, the coefficients of HDI, FDI, and  
10 NBP are not significant and negative. Oil price appears to have a positive effect on RE  
11 capacity addition (although the statistical significance is moderate), as expected:  
12 higher oil prices turn renewable electricity more competitive relative to other modes  
13 of power generation (oil, natural gas, etc.), attracting investments in renewable energy  
14 capacity.

15 Energy dependency appears to be significant in both model specifications, suggesting  
16 that the quest for energy security leads to renewables deployment. Finally, looking at  
17 the last group of variables on policies, which is also the most relevant for our study, we  
18 can see that both carbon pricing schemes are significant (even though cap and trade  
19 systems only in the partial regression), while FiTs, RPS and RECs do not show  
20 significance in our model. However, we observe that tendering has strong statistical  
21 significance (1% level). At this stage, we can support the view that tendering  
22 mechanisms are on average associated with the increase in renewables' investments  
23 but we are unable to claim – on the sole basis of this result - for a causal relationship.  
24 The coefficient of the Tendering dummy implies that having a national tendering  
25 scheme in place is associated with about 1200-2200 MW of renewables installed  
26 capacity per country annually.

27 The findings from the matching estimation are reported in Table 6. We show the  
28 results of matching on each category of covariates with both PSM and NNM.

29

30

1 Table 6. Statistical matching results<sup>3</sup>

		$X_{policy}$	$X_{se/cs}$	$X_{size}$
<b>PSM</b>	<b>ATE</b>	794.79 (2.72)***	935.97 (2.24)**	-64.98 (-0.22)
	<b>ATT</b>	1,112.01 (3.26)***	1,115.01 (2.11)**	282.79 (0.70)
<b>NNM</b>	<b>ATE</b>	744.43 (1.68)*	1,030.84 (1.81)*	245.75 (0.99)
	<b>ATT</b>	903.96 (2.17)**	434.45 (0.89)	1,152.48 (3.14)***
<b>Confirm</b>		<i>Confirmed</i>	<i>Weakly-Confirmed</i>	<i>Weakly-Confirmed</i>

2

3 Using the matching estimation, the positive impact of tendering on addition in  
4 net capacity of renewables is generally confirmed. Especially encouraging is the result  
5 by matching with the policy covariates, that is strongly confirmed and is sign that given  
6 a similar set of policies, tendering implementation has a considerable positive effect on  
7 the addition of net capacity of renewables.


8 Finally, regarding the implementation of the synthetic control method, and  
9 since large sample inferential techniques are not well suited, placebo tests are used  
10 instead by applying the SC method to every potential control in the sample (Abadie et  
11 al. 2010; 2015). Therefore, we consider whether the prediction error - when  
12 considering the actual treated country - is “unusually” large relative to the distribution  
13 of prediction errors for the countries in the donor pool. This analysis rejects the null  
14 hypothesis when the post-intervention mean squared prediction error (MSPE) for the  
15 SC estimate is greater than the post-intervention MSPE for the placebo estimates  
16 (Abadie et al., 2015).

17 Figure 4 shows the treatment, black line, and all the donors that are used to  
18 build the synthetic treatment. Figure 5 shows the effect of the treatment, when  
19 controls are aggregated.


20

<sup>3</sup> Z-statistics in parenthesis; \*\*\* (\*\*, \*) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.

1 Figure 4. Treatment and donors




2




3

1 Figure 5. Treatment effect



2



3

4

Table 7 and 8 summarizes the results of our analysis on Italy. The root mean squared error is equal to 2521.117 (not shown), while Table 8 reports (third column) the robustness check: the p-value is calculated on the basis of all placebo tests distribution, thus showing that there is a statistically significant effect.

Table 7. Synthetic Control method: the Italian case

<b>Italy</b>		
<b>Weights</b>	Germany (37.5%) Spain (62.5%)	
<b>Predictors</b>		
<b>Balance</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Synthetic</b>
GDP(log)	7.626	7.524
POP(log)	4.066	4.029
HDI	.862	.868
LT_IR	4.22	4.20
FDI	0.79	0.82
EN_IMP	82.98	70.92
FiT	0.83	1.00
C_T	0.00	0.00
CaT	0.83	0.83

Table 8. Synthetic Control method: robustness

<b>t, <math>\tau^{SC}</math></b>	<b>Effect</b>	<b>P-vals</b>	<b>P-vals std.</b>
2010	.6017612	.6	.2
2011	3.456613	.1	0
2012	1.386734	.2	0
2013	.5115796	.9	.5
2014	-.1504204	.9	.7
<b>Total <math>\tau^{SC}</math></b>	5,806		
<b>Average <math>\tau^{SC}</math></b>	1,161		

The introduction of tendering appears to have had a positive bringing an additional 6000 MW circa installed capacity in Italy (Table 7). However, the implementation of tendering lead to contrasting results in the two cases. Figure 4 shows the added capacity for synthetic Italy overcomes the value for actual Italy in

1 2014. According to the model, tendering had a negative effect on new installations in  
2 those two years. In fact, there was a strong policy change in Italy marked by a  
3 substantial cut in RE subsidies starting from 2012, including the cancellation of FiTs on  
4 solar PVs in 2013 (the so-called “conto energia”) (Tiedemann et al., 2016). These policy  
5 changes have undermined investors’ confidence in the stability of the regulatory  
6 framework (Mahalingam and Reiner, 2016). The shift in investors’ mood is obviously  
7 not captured by the model in creating the synthetic control; the countries composing  
8 synthetic Italy did not undergo a similar scale-back in RE support policies, as  
9 reflected by a more stable addition in capacity in the same years.<sup>4</sup>

10 Therefore, the implementation conditions are very important. Even though the  
11 analysis shows that tendering can have a positive impact on net RE investment, policy  
12 instability can crowd out the benefits with the introduction of auctions, as shown in  
13 the case of Italy.

14

15

## 16 **6. Hypothesis analysis**

17 The three different econometric models provide consistent and convergent  
18 results about the benefits of tendering. Despite the limitations of the analysis, the  
19 results show clear responses to the hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 stated that contextual  
20 variables, socioeconomic and country-specific factors, are the main drivers of the  
21 investment in RE. Even though the OLS model shows that the partial model with  
22 socioeconomic and country-specific factors explains a slightly higher share of the  
23 variance in the net additions of RE, their associated variables display a much lower  
24 coefficient than the political factors (policy). Furthermore, the analysis with the  
25 matching estimator reveals that policy instruments have a stronger effect, thus  
26 rejecting H1.

27 Under Hypothesis 2, the existence of policy instruments are the main  
28 determinants of the investment in RE. Conversely to H1, the results support this

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<sup>4</sup> Moreover, FiTs are aimed at a broader range of recipients, and their cancellation might have had a deep effect on the addition of small-scale/distributed capacity, which is not the policy target of tendering.

1 hypothesis, particularly in the analysis with the matching estimator. Therefore, the  
2 data shows that the political factor linked to the implementation of policy instruments  
3 increase the RE capacity.

4 Finally, Hypothesis 3 suggests that the change to an auction-based mechanism  
5 increases the investment in RE. The OLS model clearly shows the superiority of  
6 tendering in relation to the other instruments. This result is further confirmed by the  
7 application of the synthetic control model which shows that the change to tendering in  
8 average has a positive effect in the amount of RE capacity added each year. This  
9 corroborates the European Union's policy that is prompting member states to  
10 implement auctions (European Commission, 2014). Nonetheless, the conditions of  
11 tendering implementation are just as important to incentivize new capacity additions  
12 as the downturn in the investments following a major change in the auctions regime in  
13 Italy shows.

14

15

## 16 **7. Conclusion and policy implications**

17 Tendering is the fastest rising mechanism to support the increase of electricity  
18 generation from renewable sources in the past two decades. So far the literature gives  
19 an unclear picture about the advantages of tendering in comparison with other  
20 instruments. The current debate is controversial with some authors assessing the  
21 effects of switching to auctions in terms of improved effectiveness, while others  
22 considering it would rise financial risks and costs. Recent assessments show that  
23 tendering may increase the effectiveness and efficiency of support depending on the  
24 circumstances, however no systematic cross-country analysis has yet been done. This  
25 paper performs a comparative analysis of the policies supporting RE investment over  
26 time, providing in particular a quantitative assessment for the effect of the  
27 introduction of tendering and of the conditions of its implementation.

28 An innovative econometric approach combined three different models  
29 (multivariate fixed effects regression, matching estimation, and synthetic controls) to  
30 evaluate the data from a representative sample of countries. Synthetic controls in

1 particular create a counterfactual group that controls for external factors (e.g.,  
2 technology cost reductions) and cross-country differences (e.g., resource endowment).

3 Our empirical analysis confirms the advantages of tendering over other support  
4 mechanisms in promoting the investment in cleaner, renewable capacity. The model  
5 with fixed effects shows evidence that tendering has a positive effect in net additions  
6 of RE capacity. This effect is significant and higher than of the other instruments like  
7 feed-in-tariffs. The matching estimator confirmed the superiority of tendering over  
8 other mechanisms on the countries surveyed, during the period under analysis. The  
9 results also indicate good performance of auctions to deal with financial and socio-  
10 cultural barriers to RE investments. Finally, synthetic controls revealed benefits of  
11 switching to tendering but these are contingent on other factors such as policy  
12 stability. The three approaches lead to estimates of additional renewable capacity  
13 installed in the order of 1000-2000 MW per country per year.

14 The analyses still have some limitations. Data was only available for the period  
15 up to 2014. However, this already includes the beginning of recovery from the financial  
16 crisis (e.g., Italy). In the future it would be possible to perform analysis including more  
17 countries, over a longer period. On the other hand, we were only able to assess the  
18 average effects of the mechanisms in the net addition of RE capacity. In practice,  
19 tendering performance might be different by technology. These limitations are  
20 however unlikely to affect the meaningfulness and the direction of the results.

21 Two main policy implications derive from the results. Firstly, as shown by Italy's  
22 example, tendering is not a panacea for the transition to a low-carbon economy, as it  
23 can be effective only if investors trust the regulatory system in place. Here lies a lesson  
24 for policymakers, who have to design a portfolio of support schemes that is attractive  
25 for investors as well as sustainable in the long run: infrastructure investors have a time  
26 horizon that is lengthier than any legislature and lose confidence quickly in the political  
27 framework of a country. Secondly, tendering alone cannot substitute all the other RE  
28 support policies: they are specifically devised for the creation of large RE generation  
29 projects. This might be a challenge for new technologies in the early years of formation  
30 for which the size of the projects is typically smaller. In these cases, policies should  
31 gradually move from price-based mechanisms (e.g., FIT) to auctions as the new

1 technologies mature and their markets develop. More research is therefore needed to  
2 check whether tendering may be useful to encourage more granular, distributed  
3 generation (e.g. small solar PV) featuring important environmental and electricity  
4 system benefits.

5

6

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11

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