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Decision-making under Surprise and Uncertainty: Arsenic Contamination of Water Supplies

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
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1 **Decision-making under Surprise and Uncertainty: Arsenic Contamination of**
2 **Water Supplies**

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35 **Water Supplies**
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39 **Abstract**

40 With ignorance and potential surprise dominating decision making in water resources, a
41 framework for dealing with such uncertainty is a critical need in hydrology. We operationalize
42 the ‘potential surprise’ criterion proposed by Shackle, Vickers, and Katzner (SVK) to derive
43 decision rules to manage water resources under uncertainty and ignorance. We apply this
44 framework to managing water supply systems in Bangladesh that face severe, naturally occurring
45 arsenic contamination. The uncertainty involved with arsenic in water supplies makes the
46 application of conventional analysis of decision-making ineffective. Given the uncertainty and
47 surprise involved in such cases, we find that optimal decisions tend to favor actions that avoid
48 irreversible outcomes instead of conventional cost-effective actions. We observe that a
49 diversification of the water supply system also emerges as a robust strategy to avert unintended
50 outcomes of water contamination. Shallow wells had a slight higher optimal level (36%)
51 compare to deep wells and surface treatment which had allocation levels of roughly 32% under
52 each. The approach can be applied in a variety of other cases that involve decision making under
53 uncertainty and surprise, a frequent situation in natural resources management.

54 **Keywords:** water resource management; arsenic contamination; decision-making; uncertainty;
55 Shackle, Vickers and Katzner (SVK) criterion; Bangladesh.

56

57 **1. Introduction**

58 Uncertainty is pervasive in water resources and addressing uncertainty and ignorance still
59 demands a more pragmatic approach in decision making (Ganguly et al. 2015; Hollings, 1986;
60 Kalman, 1983). Water resources management often deals an inherent uncertainty in hydrologic
61 processes (Borgomeo et al. 2014), especially in information access, infrastructure, hydrologic
62 modeling, and decision making under extreme events. Uncertainties in climate change impacts,
63 water quantity (floods and droughts), water quality (emerging contaminants, eutrophication), and
64 social processes (communication and response) dominate research and decision making in water
65 resources. Knowledge of uncertainty is important for robust management of water resources in
66 order to sustain societies (Tracy, 2008). In decision making, risk (probabilities and outcomes are
67 all known) and uncertainty (probabilities are unknown but outcomes are known) (Faber et al.,
68 1992) dominate in water resource management. In many decisions, neither probabilities nor
69 outcomes are clearly known; thus, ignorance and surprise is often predominant in decision
70 making. While earlier theoretical works have made substantial progress in utilizing the
71 probability information and nature of preferences through approaches like the expected utility
72 theory, the shortcomings of such frameworks are tucked in its assumptions or in the
73 complacency of the large number theory. These models use assumptions on complete
74 information about water resource risk and have the advantage of elegance and simplicity, but are
75 less applicable to decision making under uncertainty and ignorance that is prevalent in water
76 resources. Several distinguished economists (Hayek 1945; Hicks 1976; Shackle 1972; Vickers
77 1985) have recognized this fact in analyzing uncertain choices and decisions. Metlay and
78 Sarewitz (2012) identify that such decision strategies are complex, messy problems having: (i) a
79 high degree of uncertainty linking options to outcomes; and (ii) substantial controversy over
80 tradeoffs among values.

81 The quantification of probabilities of future outcomes in water resources is often
82 constrained by the unavailability or lack of information, leading to outcomes with potential for
83 surprises. Shackle (1969) identifies that instances of surprise arise from the possibility of
84 unknown outcomes, the non-replicability of frequency based probabilistic outcomes, and
85 insufficient knowledge of future outcomes. In many cases, the existing scientific knowledge
86 cannot adequately explain the system dynamics to generate information for decisions with
87 certainty. Uncertainty and surprise also exist with respect to the sustainable use and potential
88 future benefits derived from water resource systems. Incorporating uncertainty into water
89 resource decision-making models requires a clear specification of the nature and sources of
90 uncertainty. Given that a probability-based framework has limited application in such situations
91 involving uncertainty, there is a need for alternative approaches and theories that will guide
92 water resource decision making under uncertainty (Baudry 2018; Starmer 2000). Following the
93 work of Shackle (1969), Vickers (1987), and Katzner (1998), we propose an alternative
94 framework for decision making under uncertainty and ignorance, and apply it to a pragmatic case
95 of managing water supply systems under uncertainty in Bangladesh. We incorporate non-
96 probabilistic uncertainty and surprise in decision-making to deal with the exogenous uncertainty
97 in water supplies. Our general objective is to derive and apply a framework that can guide
98 prudent decision making in such cases. Bangladesh, like many other developing nations, faces an
99 exceptionally high level of arsenic contamination in its groundwater which is leading to serious
100 public health hazards (Smith et al. 2000). The existing scientific knowledge is limited on
101 managing arsenic contamination (Yunus et al. 2016; Tsur and Zemel 1995; Tsur and Zemel
102 2004) and this study fills this gap by developing a unique operational approach to deal with
103 water resource uncertainty. Another unique contribution is that very few studies (e.g. Horan et al.
104 2002) mention the SVK framework as a possible option to model uncertainty and surprise, but do

105 not provide an operational framework. Our study is thus unique in developing an operational
106 framework to apply the SVK approach and apply it to a water resource management problem.

107 Specific objectives of this study are: (i) to review current and develop an uncertainty
108 framework for applications in water resource decisions; (ii) to optimize decisions on water
109 supplies under uncertain contamination processes; (iii) to identify strategies to apply uncertainty
110 into decision models in hydrology and water resource management. We hypothesize that: (i) the
111 SVK uncertainty framework is suited under conditions of ignorance and potential surprise; (ii)
112 diversified allocation is optimal for reducing uncertainty in water supply decisions; and (iii) there
113 is potential to improve decisions involving uncertainty in water resource management.

114

115 2. Towards an operational Framework

116 Hydrology has recognized the importance of nonstationarity in planning and decision
117 making (Milly et al. 2008; Borgomeo et al. 2014). Many policy decisions are also required to
118 recognize the competing uses of water resources. Decisions often aim at avoiding risk and are
119 made under a high degree of uncertainty (Arrow 2004). The commonly used expected utility
120 (EU) approach assigns a numerical payoff value and a probability of state-contingent outcomes
121 of decisions. However, in practice, decision makers are unwilling to apply expected utility
122 methods to important decision problems (Moskowitz 1990, Moskowitz et al. 1993). Several
123 alternative theoretical frameworks are proposed, that include reliability theory (Heiner 1983,
124 Milon and Bogess 1988), Bayesian optimization (Zhang et al 2017), robust interactive decision
125 analysis (Chu et al. 1989, Moskowitz et al. 1990), potential surprise framework (Shackle 1969;
126 Shackle 1972; Katzner 1998), multi-valued mapping (Dempster 1967), weight of evidence
127 measures (Good 1985), prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 2013; Machina 1982;
128 Quiggan 1982), regret theory (Savage 1951; Chisholm 1988; Palmini 1999), safe minimum

129 standard (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1968), multiattribute utility theory (White et al. 1984; Fishburn et al.
130 1968), robust interaction decision (Moskowitz et al. 1990), robust control framework (Roseta-
131 Palma and Xepapadeas 2004), Genetic Optimization (Tanyimboh and Czajkowska 2017; Al-
132 Jawad and Tanyimboh 2017) and intuitive probability approach (Koopman 1940).

133 The EU approach is inconsistent with predictions made about people's behavior
134 (Starmer 2000;), inefficient in modeling under low catastrophic risk (Chichilnisky 1998), and is
135 weak in applicability to natural resource management (Chisholm 1988; Woodward and Shaw
136 2006; Peterson et al. 2003)). Brock and Xapapadeus (2003) suggested incorporating Knightian
137 uncertainty (Knight 1921) to regulate natural systems with non-linear dynamics. Decision-
138 making under uncertainty facing irreversible changes also use concepts of option value
139 (Weisbrod 1951; Chisholm 1988; Cicchetti and Freeman 1971), quasi option value (Arrow and
140 Fisher 1974), and existence value.

141 The Shackle's model of decision making under non-probabilistic uncertainty and surprise
142 (Shackle 1969) has not been adequately extended for use in practice of decision making. Vickers
143 (1994) and Katzner (1998) have made considerable effort to extend Shackle's basic approach to
144 theorize decisions under uncertain environments.

145 **3. Methodology**

146 SVK Uncertainty Framework: Consider a situation where a decision maker is ignorant in
147 developing a full assessment of probabilities. This difficulty often results from poor information,
148 an imperfect perception of past and present, and unknown future. This is a scenario with a lack
149 of knowledge of occurrence, outcome, or the basis for probabilities (epistemic nature). Hence, a
150 probability $p(E)$ of the subset of states E is difficult to assert. The lack of reliable estimates of
151 $p(E)$ makes the decision-making more difficult under uncertainty, compared to that of decisions

152 under risk (in the classic Knightian sense). Following Shackle (1969), Vickers (1994) and
 153 Katzner (1998), (SVK), we assume that the decision maker imagines an incomplete collection of
 154 states of the world, say Ω , and forms a non-probabilistic judgment of belief of the occurrence of
 155 various states. The states of E are subsets of Ω , with unknown states represented by the empty
 156 set ϕ . In general, consider only the σ -field over Ω that contains all subsets of Ω (Katzner 1998)
 157 and represent it as ε . In contrast to the states of E in the Kolmogorov formulation (Tikhomirov
 158 1993) of probability analysis, the Cox formulation (Cox 1961) of probability defines E as
 159 representing hypotheses, propositions or a set of answers to questions. The residual hypothesis is
 160 a collection of unknowns represented by the null set ϕ (Katzner 1998).

161 According to SVK, the potential surprise of E in ε is the surprise the decision maker
 162 imagines now about the future occurrence of an element in E . This can also be interpreted as the
 163 degree of disbelief when contemplating the possible occurrence of E (Katzner 1998). With this
 164 definition of surprise, we can define a potential surprise function of E as $S: E \rightarrow [0, 1]$, a
 165 mapping of ε into a closed interval. When $S(E)=0$ for some E in ε , this indicates “perfect
 166 possibility” i.e., the decision maker is unable to identify any obstacle to the occurrence of an
 167 element in E . On the contrary, when $S(E)=1$, the decision maker believes in “perfect
 168 impossibility” in the sense that it is not possible to conceive of an element of E occurring. At $S(\phi)=0$,
 169 the decision maker expresses a “perfect possibility” of occurrence of something not
 170 imagined *a priori*.

171 Following the SVK approach, the $S(E)$ is defined to satisfy three axioms: Firstly, the
 172 range of $S(E)$ is represented by axiom (1).

$$173 \quad \text{For all } E \text{ in } \varepsilon, \quad 0 \leq S(E) \leq 1 \quad (1)$$

174 which is a standard condition similar to the property of a probability function. This
 175 indicates that the surprise function is nonnegative and bounded above by unity, equivalent to

176 perfect impossibility. Secondly, axiom in (2) represents that the surprise of the union of all sets is
 177 equal to the least of all surprise functions.

$$178 \quad \text{For any } \{E_i\} \neq \emptyset \wedge \{E_i\} \subset \mathcal{E}, S(\bigcup_i E_i) = \inf_i S(E_i) \quad (2)$$

179 This axiom is a counterpart of the additivity and mutual disjointness of E_i in probability
 180 axioms, replaced by “*inf*” and nonempty E_i . This is an important distinction from probability
 181 theory, where the surprise function does not follow traditionally defined distribution and density
 182 functions associated with probability theory (Katzner 1998).

183 The third axiom is that if $\{E_i\}$ is an exhaustive set of rival hypotheses, then $S(E_i) = 0$, for
 184 at least one i . This signifies that there is always some hypothesis that carries zero potential
 185 surprise. In using the Shacklean concepts for decision-making, the two components (complete
 186 collection of states and probability function) are replaced by incomplete collection Ω and the
 187 surprise function $S(E)$. For decision $x \in X$, define a utility function $u(x, \omega)$ that is defined by
 188 $X \times \omega$ that depends on decision choices and the state ω of the world. To reduce preference
 189 ordering of $u(x, \omega)$ to a single function of x for decision making, Shackle (1969) introduced an
 190 ascendancy function which was replaced by attractiveness function by Vickers (1987).

191 To derive the attractiveness function, a subset of Ψ is defined as N_x^S that consists of
 192 perfectly possible outcomes as $N_x^S = \{\psi : f_x^S(\psi) = 0\}$. This set represents a situation where the
 193 decision maker is unable to perceive a hindrance to its occurrence. Then identify some elements
 194 of N_x^S , say ψ_x^S , to distinguish potential gain spaces and loss spaces. Potential gain spaces are
 195 defined as (3) and the potential loss spaces are defined as (4).

$$196 \quad \Psi_x^+ = \{\psi : \psi \geq \psi_x^S\} \quad (3)$$

$$197 \quad \Psi_x^- = \{\psi : \psi \leq \psi_x^S\} \quad (4)$$

198 Such that $\Psi_x^+ \cap \Psi_x^- = \psi_x^s$. We use ζ to denote potential surprise values over a range E , such
 199 that $\zeta = f_x^s(\psi)$, where $\zeta = [0, 1]$.

200 Given this framework, each pair of (ψ, ζ) has an attractiveness to the decision-maker
 201 associated with decision, x . The decision maker's objective is to select $x \in X$ on pairs of (ψ, ζ)
 202 in $\psi_x^+ \times E$ and $\psi_x^- \times E$ that have maximum attractiveness, subject to the potential surprise density
 203 function (Figure 1). If attractiveness is measured in ordinal terms as real numbers, then denote it
 204 as g_x^s that map $\psi_x^+ \times E$ and $\psi_x^- \times E$ into a real line. The optimal solutions are where iso-
 205 attractiveness contours are tangential to the potential density curve. The optimization problem is
 206 to $Max g_x^s(\psi, \zeta)$, subject to $\zeta = f_x^s(\psi)$. Substituting the constraint into the objective function,
 207 one can derive $H(\psi)$ to rewrite the problem as (5).

$$208 \quad \underset{\psi}{Max} H(\psi) = g_x^s(\psi, f_x^s(\psi)) \quad (5)$$

209 The first order conditions for optima can be derived as (6).

$$210 \quad \frac{dH}{d\psi} = \frac{\partial g_x^s}{\partial \psi} + \frac{\partial g_x^s}{\partial f_x^s} \frac{\partial f_x^s}{\partial \psi} \quad (6)$$

211 and solving for $\frac{dH}{d\psi} = 0$, one could obtain (7)

$$212 \quad \frac{dg_x^s}{d\psi} + \frac{\partial g_x^s}{\partial f_x^s} \frac{\partial f_x^s}{\partial \psi} = 0 \quad (7)$$

213 Rearranging, and evaluating at the maximizing pairs of (ψ_x^-, ζ_x^-) or (ψ_x^+, ζ_x^+) , one can obtain the
 214 first-order condition for optimality as (8).

$$215 \quad \frac{\partial g_x^s}{\partial \psi} = - \frac{\partial g_x^s}{\partial f_x^s} \Big/ \frac{\partial f_x^s}{\partial \psi} \quad (8)$$

216 In translating this to decision making, the possible range of utility outcomes are considered by a
 217 typical decision maker to account for the values in the focus gain and focus loss spaces. That is,
 218 for $x \in X$, a decision maker looks at specific values in focus gain ($R(x)$ and $r(x)$) and focus loss
 219 ($L(x)$ and $l(x)$) spaces. The x with higher $R(x)$ value is of higher utility in the focus gain space and
 220 is preferred, while a higher $r(x)$ is more uncertain and is thus less desirable in this space. An x
 221 with higher $L(x)$ value is less negative and is desirable, while that with higher $l(x)$ makes the
 222 lowest utility value more surprising and thus less desirable. Thus, there are tradeoffs between
 223 each of the pairs of these four functions. These tradeoffs are addressed by a general function
 224 $Q^s(x)$, that has four arguments: (1) the highest potential return in the gain space, (2) the highest
 225 potential return in the loss space, (3) the lowest potential surprise in the gain space, and (4) the
 226 lowest potential surprise in the loss space. The decision maker combines these in a function
 227 defined for all values of $(\psi_x^+, \psi_x^-, \xi_x^+, \xi_x^-)$ arising from a constrained maximization of the
 228 attractiveness function, and is represented as $Q^s[\psi_x^+, \psi_x^-, \xi_x^+, \xi_x^-]$.

229 From the constrained optimization problem, it is expected that $\frac{\partial Q^s(x)}{\partial \psi_x^-} > 0, \frac{\partial Q^s(x)}{\partial \psi_x^+} > 0,$

230 $\frac{\partial Q^s(x)}{\partial \xi_x^+} < 0,$ and $\frac{\partial Q^s(x)}{\partial \xi_x^-} > 0.$ This result is because the potential return in loss space comes with

231 a negative sign, and attractiveness increases when Ψ_x^- increases (less negative). In general,

232 attractiveness also increases when the potential return, Ψ_x^+ increases. However, greater potential

233 surprise in the gain space is less attractive, but it is more attractive in the loss space because it is

234 less likely to occur.

235 For an unconditional uncertainty averse decision maker, $\frac{\partial Q^s(x)}{\partial \xi_x^+} < 0, \frac{\partial Q^s(x)}{\partial \xi_x^-} < 0,$

236 as the unconditional uncertainty averse decision maker wants to reduce potential surprise in both
 237 gain and loss pace. However, for an unconditional uncertainty neutral decision maker,

238 $\frac{\partial Q^s(x)}{\partial \xi_x^+} = 0$, $\frac{\partial Q^s(x)}{\partial \xi_x^-} = 0$. The signs of these derivatives by themselves may not be sufficient to

239 rank alternatives.

240 The decision maker then forms a decision index or decision function that is defined on X by

241 replacing the functional value arguments of $Q^s(x)$ with their associated functions and

242 represented as in (9) (Katzner 1998).

$$243 \quad D^s(x) = Q^s(L(x), l(x), R(x), r(x)) \quad (9)$$

244 The decision index is distinct from the attractiveness function because it is derived from different

245 cognitive process, while attractiveness function emerges from identification of what is positive

246 or alarming about various objectives of choice (Katzner 1998). This formulation is similar to that

247 of a multi-attribute utility function (Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Randhir and Shriver 2009) with

248 attributes representing attractiveness and surprise levels in focus-gain and focus-loss spaces. The

249 decision maker can maximize $D^s(x)$ over a subset of X , with budgetary restrictions for deriving

250 an unique optima.

251 **Study Area:** An exceptionally high level of arsenic is found in groundwater in Bangladesh.

252 Prior to the 1970s, the people in Bangladesh mostly relied on surface water, which has become

253 increasingly polluted. Pollution from poor sewage systems and chemical waste dumping has led

254 to cholera, diarrhea and other water-borne diseases. The mortality rates from such water borne

255 diseases were alarming. The government and donor agencies suggested the cost-effective

256 solution of digging shallow tube-wells to provide access to safe water (Patel 2001). Millions of

257 dollars were spent on digging shallow tube-wells, and massive pumping of groundwater took

258 place to meet household and agricultural demand. By 2000, almost 97% of the populations in

259 rural Bangladesh were drinking water from shallow-tube wells and 2.5 to 3 million wells existed
260 in Bangladesh (Patel 2001). Initially, no one was warned to test for arsenic. In the early 1990s, it
261 was found that most of the well water contained arsenic.

262 The current method of extracting water cannot be continued as arsenic is causing serious
263 health hazards and leading to the largest mass poisoning in history (Smith et al. 2000). More than
264 29 million people are affected by arsenic contamination, and 35-77 million are at risk of
265 exposure in Bangladesh (Rahman 2002). Due to arsenic related cancers (in liver, bladder, and
266 lung), Chen and Ahsan (2004) estimate a more than doubling of lifetime mortality risk (229.6
267 versus 103.5 per 100 000 population) in Bangladesh. The evidence of fetal loss and infant death
268 due to arsenic exposure during pregnancy has been documented by Rahman et al. (2007).
269 Maddison et al. (2005) have estimated that the aggregate willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid the
270 health impacts of arsenic in Bangladesh is \$2.7 billion/year. Given the uncertainty involved in
271 this specific water resource management case, the application of conventional cost-benefit
272 analysis would be inadequate. In this paper, we attempt to design an analytical framework for
273 future decision-making and mitigation measures for similar situations of uncertainty.

274 Most of the large arsenic contamination worldwide involves groundwater contamination
275 as a natural outcome of hydro-geological process (see Table I for details on worldwide
276 occurrences of arsenic contamination in water). There is an intense debate regarding the causes
277 of arsenic contamination in Bangladesh, a country abundant in both surface and ground water
278 (see *Science* 22 November 2002 and *Science* 25 April 2003 for a debate regarding the causes of
279 arsenic contamination in Bangladesh). A variety of factors such as geology, hydrology and the
280 structure of aquifers can be attributed to the causes of contamination. Arsenic is naturally
281 transported in the river systems in Bangladesh and adsorbed into fine-grained iron or manganese
282 oxyhydroxides. These ores were deposited in floodplains and buried in the sedimentary column

283 which later released arsenic into groundwater in certain parts of Bangladesh (see Rahman 2002).
284 Most of the highly arsenic-contaminated wells are in shallow aquifers that are 50 to 150 feet
285 below the surface, whereas deep aquifers are nearly arsenic-free (Yu et al. 2003). However, it
286 uncertain whether deep aquifers will remain arsenic-free over time. An alternative view is that
287 distribution of arsenic is related to geology rather than depth since arsenic is in aquifers with
288 newer sediments.

289 The complexity in sediment dynamics and a dearth of sediment analyses make it difficult
290 to predict whether the high arsenic zone is hydrologically separate from deep aquifers. A study
291 on natural arsenic distribution in Socorro, New Mexico (Brandvold and Frisch 2002) shows that
292 the relationship between rock type and arsenic concentration in water is not well defined in this
293 study area. In West Bengal (India), Mukherjee (2005) finds no significant relationship between
294 depth and arsenic concentration in the sedimentary sequences to apply conventional groundwater
295 modeling to locate arsenic free sites. While answers to the questions regarding the causes of
296 arsenic contamination in Bangladesh are yet to be known with certainty, it is important to
297 acknowledge the uncertainty and surprise potential involved in policy and decision making
298 regarding ground water extraction.

299 We apply the SVK framework in decision making under environmental uncertainty
300 associated with management of water resources. The uncertainty and surprise are related to the
301 surprise associated with the quality of various sources of water. Our focus is on arsenic
302 contamination of drinking water in Bangladesh. To be justified for analysis based on a non-
303 expected utility framework, Woodward and Shaw (2006) portray ‘arsenic in drinking water’ as a
304 situation where relevant probabilities are very small and the ambiguity related to outcomes due
305 to lack of information have important health implications including mortality and morbidity.
306 Thus, the behavioral anomalies that people place more weight on low probability events in gain

307 space and less weight on low probability events in loss space and also show preference towards
 308 ambiguity aversion (Camerer et al. 2004) will have significant consequences in decision making
 309 in case of arsenic contamination.

310 Optimization Model: To apply the SVK framework to this decision problem, we consider a
 311 decision maker (water manager) who is facing uncertainty in arsenic contamination of new water
 312 sources that are being developed. The water manager is considering three alternatives in his
 313 choice set, that include shallow wells (sw), deep wells (dw), and surface water treatment (swt).
 314 Let $i \in I$ denote each of these sources, where $I = \{sw, dw, swt\}$. The uncertainty involved in all
 315 these options is associated with water contamination exceeding a safety threshold long after the
 316 water supply has been developed. Figure 2 shows these three options for water collection with
 317 corresponding potential outcomes.

318 Let B be a non-empty subset of the real line $B^i = \{b^i : (0,1]\}$, such that there is a I - I
 319 correspondence, γ^i , between the decision set X^i and the real line B^i . This can be expressed as
 320 $b^i = \gamma^i(x^i)$, for all $x^i \in X^i$ and $b^i \in B^i$. Let a decision-maker (water manager) hold a belief as the
 321 potential surprise density function $f^i(\psi, b)$ of a particular source i as (10).

$$322 \quad f^i(\psi^i, b^i) = \begin{cases} \phi^i & \text{if } b^i + 1 \leq \psi^i \\ \phi^i (k_g^i \psi^i - b^i)^2 & \text{if } b \leq \psi^i \leq b + 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } -1/b^i \leq \psi^i \leq b^i \\ \phi^i (k_l^i \psi^i - 1/b^i)^2 & \text{if } b^i \leq \psi^i \leq b^i + 1 \\ \phi^i & \text{if } \psi \leq -1/b^i - 1 \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

323 Here, $\phi^i \in [0,1]$ represents a scaling factor to model the reduction in surprise resulting
 324 from treatment technologies. The constants k_g^i and k_l^i (g stands for the gain space and l for the
 325 loss space) are marginal scaling coefficients representing increased or decreased surprise

326 potential at the margin for each outcome of a decision in the gain space, Ψ_x^+ and loss space, Ψ_x^- ,
 327 respectively. The lower bound, say b_0^i , of B^i represents the boundary between more favorable
 328 $\{\psi^i : f(\psi^i, b^i) = 0\}$ and less favorable outcomes $\{\psi^i : f(\psi^i, b^i) = 1\}$. This formulation also
 329 defines various endpoints of intervals through which ψ^i vary.

330 Let $g^i(\psi^i, \xi^i)$ be the attractiveness function of the decision maker to a particular source
 331 for water augmentation, represented as (11).

$$332 \quad g^i(\psi^i, \xi^i) = \begin{cases} \alpha_g^i \psi^i - \beta_g^i \xi^i, & \text{if } \Psi_x^+ \\ -\alpha_l^i \psi^i - \beta_l^i \xi^i, & \text{if } \Psi_x^- \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

333 Here, α_g^i and α_l^i are marginal attractiveness for the outcomes resulting from a decision in
 334 gain space and loss space, respectively. Similarly, β_g^i and β_l^i are marginal attractiveness
 335 (repulsion) for increases in surprise levels in the gain space and loss space, respectively.

336 To identify optimal conditions in the gain spaces and loss spaces for each i , a constrained
 337 maximization of $g^i(\psi^i, \xi^i)$ subject to $f^i(\psi^i, b^i)$ can be specified. Using the Lagrangean theorem
 338 at interior points of focus loss and focus gain spaces, it is easier to identify attractiveness
 339 maximizing pairs in focus gain and focus loss for $b^i \in B^i$. The optimal tangency points are

340 identified using $\frac{dg^i(\psi^i, \xi^i)}{df^i(\psi^i, b^i)} = 0$ in focus gain and focus loss spaces for each $i \in I$. Thus $\psi_g^i, \psi_l^i,$

341 $\xi_g^i,$ and ξ_l^i are coordinates of the tangency between the iso-attractiveness function $g^i(\psi^i, \xi^i)$ and
 342 the potential surprise density function $f^i(\psi^i, b^i)$. Figure 3 shows these tangency points for three
 343 different options (sw, dw, swt) to develop water supply systems.

344 These coordinates are functions of b^i that can be used in the development of a decision
 345 index $D(b^i)$ defined as:

$$346 \quad D(b^i) = Q(\psi_g^i, \psi_l^i, \xi_g^i, \xi_l^i \mid \forall i \in I) \quad (12)$$

347 This decision index ($D(b^i)$) is a function of b^i obtained by substituting constrained
 348 maximization solution values, in focus loss and focus gain spaces, into $Q(\psi_g^i, \psi_l^i, \xi_g^i, \xi_l^i)$, a
 349 continuously differential function (Katzner 1998). This index could be optimized to identify
 350 optimal b^i that maximizes the combined attractiveness in the focus gain and focus loss spaces of
 351 all choice alternatives. The parameters applied in our analysis are listed in Table II. These
 352 parameters are based on insights from published information on water resources in the
 353 Bangladesh region, our experience in water management in the region and the nature of
 354 hydrologic processes in relation to water supplies (Maddison et al. 2005, Mukherjee, 2005, Khan
 355 and Haque 2010, Khan et al. 2014). The values of each parameter are discussed in detail in the
 356 following discussion.

357 The b_0^i value is the lower bound of B^i that represents the boundary between more
 358 favorable and less favorable outcomes. This boundary determines the threshold interval where
 359 the potential surprise increases. The potential surprise for deep wells (dw) could be set at earlier
 360 levels of b^{dw} as compared to sw and swt . This threshold is set at $b_0^{dw}=0.15$. A higher threshold in
 361 sw is set at $b_0^{sw}=0.3$, representing a delay before one could start observing surprises. This
 362 observation is consistent with the history of contamination of shallow wells observed in
 363 Bangladesh. The surprise associated with surface water treatment (swt) is much later than the
 364 other choice categories and is set at $b_0^{swt}=0.4$, representing potential surprises that occur with
 365 larger allocations resulting from plant malfunctions, unknown health effects, capacity
 366 obsolescence, and spikes in contamination during extreme flood events which are common in
 367 Bangladesh. The ϕ^i parameter scales the potential surprise function. For sw and dw , this is set at

368 unity indicating surprises reaching the maximum possible levels, derived from the belief that
 369 these two options are driven by hydrologic process that are difficult to predict *ex ante* to a
 370 decision. The ϕ^i value for *swt* is relatively lower (20 %) compared to *sw* and *dw* in the belief that
 371 a treatment process is controllable and within the management ability before substantial changes
 372 in concentrations are seen. The k_g^i parameter is the coefficient that increases the marginal change
 373 in the surprise in the quadratic form as (11).

$$374 \quad \frac{df^i(\psi^i, b^i)}{dx} = 2k_g^i(k_g^i - b^i) \quad \text{with } b \leq \psi^i \leq b+1 \quad (13)$$

375 The values for each *i* are based on the increase in surprise potential for increased levels of
 376 the activity.

377 The parameter values use relative levels in the belief that a marginal increase in surprise
 378 potential in *dw* is 81 % of that of the marginal increase in *sw*. This value is based on the
 379 relatively higher uncertainty and expected surprise in installing deep well compared to that of
 380 shallow well. The k_g^{swt} value is higher indicating a higher increase in marginal surprises involved
 381 in treatment malfunction. The k_l^i value reflects the marginal decrease in surprise potential in the
 382 loss spaces and can be interpreted similarly to that of k_g^i in the gain spaces. The attractiveness
 383 function $g^i(\psi^i, \xi^i)$ is specified as a linear function with marginal coefficients $(\alpha_g^i, \alpha_l^i, \beta_g^i, \beta_l^i)$
 384 representing incremental attractiveness for each marginal change in the focus gain and focus loss
 385 spaces. The coefficient α_g^i represents the marginal increase in attractiveness in a higher
 386 outcome, while β_g^i is the marginal increase from reduction in surprise potential in the focus gain
 387 space. Similarly, α_l^i and β_l^i are marginal changes in attractiveness from a reduction in loss of
 388 outcome and reduction of surprise in the focus loss space. We assume that the water manager is

389 indifferent to different sources of water with regard to tastes and some other likely attributes that
 390 do not impose any significant treatment cost.

391 The functions in the focus loss and focus gain spaces were simulated in MATHCAD
 392 software (Mathsoft, 2006) using the parameter set described above and presented in Figure 4.
 393 The optimal conditions of the constrained maximization related to the parameter set are listed in
 394 Table III. These optimal conditions are used additively in building the decision function $D(b^i)$ of
 395 the decision maker. A second optimization was conducted to maximize $D(b^i)$ subject to
 396 additional restrictions on the boundaries of b^i and a budgetary condition of the decision problem.
 397 This can be represented as

$$398 \quad \underset{b^i}{\text{Max}} D(b^i) \text{ S.T. } \sum_i c^i b^i \leq B \text{ and } b_0^i \leq b^i \leq 1 \quad (14)$$

399 where, c^i is the relative cost of developing the water source and B is the total budget
 400 constraint. The estimates for c^i are based on Ahmed (2005), and were normalized for relative
 401 costs using sw as a numeraire for optimization. This decision problem was specified and solved
 402 using the GAMS optimization software (Brooke et al. 1998) to identify optimal allocation of the
 403 water supply by the water manager.

404 4. Results and Discussion

405 Since typical cost-benefit analysis precludes addressing these types of situations, we
 406 apply the ‘potential surprise’ criterion to develop decision rules to manage natural resources
 407 under uncertainty. In our analysis, we assign a realistic pay-off structure with intuitive beliefs
 408 regarding various uncertain events. The prime focus is to operationalize the concept of ‘potential
 409 surprise’ criterion by applying it to a practical problem that water utilities face to maintain robust
 410 supply of water. Based on the parameters used, the optimal choice for the water manager is to
 411 build the capacity to collect 36.2 % of total water allocation from sw (shallow well), 32.6 % from

412 *dw* (deep well) and 31.2 % from *swt* (surface water treatment). Our findings imply that a
413 diversified allocation strategy which is often effective under risky situations may also be
414 applicable to situations under uncertainty and surprise. Thus, using the SVK approach in an
415 operational framework in the context of arsenic contamination in Bangladesh, we show that a
416 diversified approach to developing water supply systems is the optimal choice under uncertainty
417 and surprise. This is consistent with risk and uncertainty literature in identifying the role of
418 diversity in allocation to minimize overall risk in decisions.

419 There is excellent potential for using multiobjective optimization using genetic
420 algorithms in water resource studies. Tanyimboh and Czajkowska (2017) used penalty-free
421 genetic algorithms to model water distribution networks. Al-Jawad and Tanyimboh (2017) used
422 an evolutionary algorithm to model reservoir operations. Rathnayake and Tanyimboh (2015) use
423 evolutionary algorithms in control of combined sewer overflows. The focus on SVK
424 operationalize uncertainty framework and could be used in characterizing uncertain outcomes in
425 optimization studies.

426 Decision making under uncertainty and surprise is an issue of critical concern in water
427 resource management. However, a very limited number of studies attempt to model uncertainty
428 and surprise explicitly in the core decision making process. More specifically, in case of water
429 management, system managers often face uncertainty in maintaining both the desired quantity
430 and quality of water supplies. Planners and system managers often struggle with the complexity
431 of the system dynamics which provide water for daily use. The complexity of system dynamics
432 is much more prominent in underground sources of water compared to surface sources.
433 Thus, uncertainty and elements of potential surprise in decision-making are important for water
434 resource management. In recent years, arsenic contamination has become one of the high-priority
435 environmental issues due to public health concerns. Management of contaminated water

436 resources is also a challenge to developed countries such as in the U.S. because of prohibitive
437 remediation costs (NRC 1994). Budget constraints are much more severe in developing countries
438 and often depend on the flow of foreign aid for such projects. The framework, we develop is
439 crucial to make decisions regarding water supplies under environmental uncertainty and surprise
440 related to arsenic contamination.

441

442

443 **5. Conclusion**

444 The framework we propose can be a very useful tool for utility managers who can
445 incorporate subjective beliefs and expert opinions into the decision-making process to develop a
446 robust water supply system. Under potential surprise criterion, the decision rule favors decisions
447 involving low surprise and high net potential gain under unconditional uncertainty aversion.

448 Thus, a water manager can identify optimal allocation among water supply alternatives by
449 considering values of surprise density and the attractiveness of each alternative. In applying this
450 framework in the Bangladesh context, we observe that a diversified allocation with shallow
451 wells, deep wells, and surface water treatment can be the attractive policy choice in the face of
452 uncertainty and surprise. Shallow wells had a slight higher optimal level (36%) compare to deep
453 wells and surface treatment which had levels of roughly 32% each. The implication of the results
454 for future policy design is that given the uncertainties and surprise involved in such cases, the
455 decisions should favor actions that minimize surprise instead of conventional cost effectiveness.

456 The diversification of the water supply system that emerges as a robust strategy to avert
457 unintended outcomes is also along the line of evolutionary view of decision-making under
458 uncertainty which suggests actions leading to increasing diversity and adaptive flexibility
459 (Rammel and van der Bergh 2003).

460 The potential surprise criterion can be extended to other applications by using relevant
461 beliefs regarding surprise densities and attractiveness contours. Uncertainty and surprise is
462 pervasive in natural resources management (Woodward and Shaw 2006) and the potential
463 surprise criterion can be extensively utilized in decision making in this area. This approach is
464 based on subjective beliefs and needs informed judgment and understanding of the resource
465 system. Since the proposed framework is flexible to incorporate a wide range of uncertain beliefs
466 deliberative expert elicitation of beliefs (Howarth and Wilson 2006) can be used in collective
467 decision making.

468 There is immense potential to extend this study to other contaminants, especially
469 nonpoint source pollution that is uncertain over geographic space and time. There is a need for
470 further research into elucidation of surprise potential and attractiveness functions. Further
471 research could also focus on developing methods to evaluate tradeoffs and applicability of SVK
472 framework in decision making at multiple scales (Randhir, 2016). Applicability of this
473 framework to uncertainty like decisions involving climate change strategies, and policies related
474 to disasters like hurricanes, tsunamis, and earthquakes.

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747 **Table I. Worldwide Occurrences of Arsenic Contamination in Water**

748

Location	No. of Potentially exposed population	Concentration ($\mu\text{g/L}$)	Environmental conditions	Source
Argentina	2,000,000	1-2,900	Natural; volcanic rocks and thermal springs	Groundwater
Bangladesh	>29,000,000	1-4,730	Natural; alluvial sediments	Groundwater
Bolivia	50,000	N/A	Natural and anthropogenic	Surface water and groundwater
Chile	500,000	100-1,000	Natural and anthropogenic	Surface water basin lakes, thermal springs, mining
China	500	40-750	Natural; alluvial sediments	Groundwater
Greece	150,000	N/A	Natural and anthropogenic	Surface water, thermal springs and mining
Hungary, Rumania	400,000	2-176	Natural; alluvial sediments; organics	Surface water
Inner Mongolia	>400,000	1-2,400	Natural; alluvial and lake sediments; high alkalinity	Groundwater
Mexico	400,000	8-620	Natural and anthropogenic; volcanic sediments, mining	Surface water and groundwater
Nepal	N/A	N/A	Natural, alluvial sediments	Groundwater
Spain	>50,000	1-100	Natural; alluvial sediments	Surface water
Taiwan	>100,000	1-1,820	Natural	Groundwater
Thailand	15,000	1-5,000	Anthropogenic, mining	Surface water
Vietnam	>1,000,000	1-3,050	Natural; alluvial sediments	Groundwater
West Bengal, India	>1,000,000	10-3,880	Natural; alluvial sediments	Groundwater

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750 Note: 1 μg (microgram) = 1/1000 (milligram); source: Rahman (2002)

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753 **Table II. Parameter values used in the analysis of decision-making under uncertainty**

i	b_0^i	ϕ^i	k_g^i	k_l^i	α_G^i	α_L^i	β_G^i	β_L^i
sw	0.3	1	0.8	1	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.8
dw	0.15	1	0.65	1.09	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.8
swt	0.4	0.2	1.5	1.25	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.8

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
757 **Table III. Optimal tangency conditions under the constrained maximization**

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Options	Potential surprise density in the gain (g) and loss (l) space
$i = sw$	$\psi_g = 0.1953 + \frac{b^{sw}}{0.8}$ $\psi_l = -\frac{6.2}{3.6} - \frac{1}{b^{sw}}$ $\xi_g = \left[0.8 * \left(0.1953 + \frac{b^{sw}}{0.8} \right) - b^{sw} \right]^2$ $\xi_l = (-6.2/3.6)^2$
$i = dw$	$\psi_g = \frac{0.4 + 2.08b^{dw}}{1.352}$ $\psi_l = \left[0.65(0.4 + 2.08b^{dw}) - b^{dw} \right]^2$ $\xi_g = \frac{1}{4.08096} \left[-0.2 - \frac{3.774}{b^{dw}} \right]$ $\xi_l = \left\{ \frac{1.09}{4.08096} \left[-0.2 - \frac{3.774}{b^{dw}} \right] + \frac{1}{b^{dw}} \right\}^2$
$i = swt$	$\psi_g = \frac{0.4 + 0.56b^{swt}}{0.84}$ $\psi_l = \left[0.03 \left\{ \frac{0.4 + 0.56b}{0.84} \right\} - 0.2b^{dw} \right]^2$ $\xi_g = -\frac{1}{1.125} \left[0.2 + \frac{0.9}{b^{swt}} \right]$ $\xi_l = 0.2 \left\{ -\frac{1.25}{1.125} \left[0.2 + \frac{0.9}{b^{swt}} \right] + \frac{1}{b^{swt}} \right\}^2$

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
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Note: Attractiveness is maximized at the tangency point between potential surprise density and iso-attractiveness contour.

768 **Figure 1. Constrained maximization of the attractiveness function in the potential surprise**
769 **model**

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800 **Figure 2. Options for water collection with corresponding potential outcomes**

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


Figure 3. Potential surprise and attractiveness functions under three different options of shallow well (*sw*), deep well (*dw*), surface water treatment (*swt*).




Figure 4. Simulated potential surprise and attractiveness functions under three different options of shallow well (sw), deep well (dw), surface water treatment (swt).

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Highlights

- There is a need for new approaches to uncertainty in water resources decisions
- New method to incorporate surprise potential and uncertainty into decision making
- Arsenic contamination is modeled in a nonlinear optimization framework
- Optimal investments need complex hydrologic and economic information

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