Privacy-preserving routing using jointly established protocol in IoT network environment

FuZhen Zhu[1*] and ZhaoYin Jiang[1]

*Correspondence:
101619@yzpc.edu.cn

[1] School of Information
Engineering, Yangzhou
Polytechnic College,
Yangzhou 225009, China

Abstract

In this paper, network energy assesses the capacity of a node to convey messages to others. In most cases, network energy is created when two nodes interact with one another. If a node is part of the same network as the node it is connecting with, then it will be able to make an inter-network energy connection with the node it is meeting. In the case that this does not take place, there will be an accumulation of energy within the part of the network that is facing the node. A node with higher inter-network energy is considered suitable for forwarding. The energy optimisation is achieved using efficient identification of source and destination pairs. This work has considered two scenarios, i.e. lossless transmission and lossy transmission, for our experiments and evaluated the detection probability. The performance of the proposed PPM is evaluated in terms of delivery ratio, overhead and hops count performance measures. When the buffer size is set to 100 MB, PPM delivers 59% of messages with message overhead of 750 and it has a hop count of 2, which is comparable to the state-of-the-art methods. With lengthy lifetimes of IOT networks, PPM is capable of giving higher performance while maintaining the privacy of network. The detection probability for the lossy observations model is applied to a 10-node, 20-node, 30-node and 40-node IoT network.

Keywords: Privacy preserving, Detection probability, Inter-network, Intra-network, IoT network, Network energy

1 Introduction

The recent development in IoT has altered the trajectory of what the future holds for communication and service [1]. Because mobile gadgets and the people who carry them are inextricably linked, the mobile elements of users are being utilised in a variety of study disciplines [2, 3]. IoT networks leverage the store-carry-forward paradigm to deliver services without end-to-end fixed channels. IoT networks must anticipate future interactions to share data. However, the IoT network considers device characteristics to solve data routing and forwarding challenges. The IoT networks and corresponding transmission linkages between mobile devices tend to undergo more constant change.

As a result, it is very necessary to use the capabilities of mobile devices in order to arrive at more informed conclusions about forwarding.

A number of routing protocols, including [4–9], have been suggested in literature. The majority of them use the concept of 'network' as the basis for their forwarding choices. More specifically, mobile nodes may be organised into a variety of networks according to the frequency of their interactions with one another. As a result, making a choice on forwarding often depends on how to establish a network and choose appropriate forwarders. Networks in these systems may be derived from historical data such as the frequency of encounters, the duration of those encounters, and the amount of time that passes between them. However, they disregard the intrinsic links that exist between nodes. On the basis of network measurements, a number of different forwarding systems [7–9] have been presented. For instance in [9] only transmit messages if the bearers of those messages are members of the same network as the destination node.

Network attacks based on traffic analysis pose a significant risk to the users' privacy while they are using a communication system [10–12]. From the observed traffic patterns, the analytical attacks may be used to deduce sensitive contextual information such as source–destination identities, for example. This information can be obtained by analysing the patterns. Even more concerning is the fact that they may be carried out with relative ease and without arousing any suspicions in a multihop wireless network [13, 14] where the broadcasts of the nodes can be passively watched. As a result, substantial research efforts have been devoted in developing defences against assaults based on traffic analysis in wireless networks [15, 16]. Common methods for analysing traffic make advantage of characteristics such as the timings, sizes, and counts of individual packets in order to correlate traffic patterns and threaten user privacy [17, 18].

Concealing the source–destination identities of each communication is also known as unlinkability [10, 11, 18, 19] in situations. To ensure that users' privacy is protected during the transmission of data packets from their origination point to their final destination nodes through intermediate reception nodes that have been selectively selected is our current problem. Consider, for instance, the IoT network shown in Fig. 1 showing inter-network and intra-network nodes. In this IoT network, the routes that may be taken to go from the source origin node N_s to the final destination node N_d.

The proposed method has the capability to limit the publication of sensitive information about nodes which may assist to strengthen the security of IoT networks by making it more difficult for attackers to monitor and target individual nodes. This contributes to an overall improvement in network safety. The proposed method does not need any new infrastructure or hardware, which may assist to decrease the overhead of adopting it in an IoT network since it does not need any more infrastructure or gear.

There is a possibility that the use of PPM will result in a reduction in the efficiency of routing in some circumstances. This is because it may take longer to determine a route that protects the privacy of nodes. PPM framework depends on the collaboration of nodes to maintain users' anonymity; PPM may not be as dependable as other routing protocols due to its reliance on those nodes.

The privacy-preserving method (PPM) employs statistical decision-making to define network circumstances and choose the ideal route distribution that balances privacy and routing protocol usefulness (e.g. transmission cost). More fraudulent traffic may

Fig. 1 The network diagram showing inter-network and intra-network nodes

add recipient nodes to routing. The proposed work improves destination node privacy using a probabilistic technique. This work also considers lossy network observations and chooses the optimum privacy-preserving paths for each source–destination pair.

1.1 Contribution

In this paper, privacy-preserving method (PPM) is presented. Its purpose is to preserve information while simultaneously improving the efficiency of forwarding in an IoT network. This paper makes following contribution:

- In this work, the capability of a node to communicate with other nodes in a network is evaluated using a measure that is referred to as network energy. When two nodes communicate with one another, this is the most common scenario in which network energy is formed.
- It has been observed that if a node is part of the same network as the node it is connecting with, then it will be able to make an inter-network energy connection with the node it is meeting. In the case that this does not take place, there will be an accumulation of energy within the part of the network that is facing the node. So, an best forwarder is a node with more energy between networks or within networks to the target node or network.
- When compared with two common systems, the proposed PPM has superior performance in terms of the delivery of messages, the amount of overhead, and the number of hops.

- This work considers both a lossless transmission and a lossy transmission, which are the two possible outcomes. After that, an assessment of the likelihood of discovery is made. The smaller the value of this probability, the greater the degree of privacy that may be achieved.

2 Literature review

Users are able to interact across the wired internet network while maintaining their anonymity thanks to anonymity-enhancing methods such as onion routing [14] and mix-net [13]. In contrast, the onion routing strategy is more widely used since it has a shorter latency, making it more applicable to real-world situations. To our good fortune, the premise of local observability holds true even on a massive scale like the IoT. On the other hand, traffic analysis carried out by an enemy located anywhere in the world is able to more easily penetrate comparatively smaller wireless networks. The wireless broadcast medium also makes it possible for an adversary to eavesdrop on all transmissions from a wireless node without danger of being found. This is because a potential foe may be secretly listening in on the messages.

The first location privacy issue (source-location privacy problem) for wireless networks was studied by Ozturk et al. [17], which sparked the development of the discipline of location privacy. The authors proposed many flooding-based routing strategies, including one known as phantom flooding routing, to prevent local attackers from tracing a packet back to its original source. Due to its inherent inefficiency, the flooding-based approach has inspired a number of research [20, 21] that have refined and improved the random walk-based routing technique. These improvements were made in response to the flooding-based solution. A comprehensive investigation on the topic of source-location privacy is presented in [12]. It is interesting to note that the method of privacy protection with statistical assurances utilised in the study described in [15] was a periodic flooding technique. Jian et al. [22] then created a packet-tracing-resistant protocol. Route diversity decouples incoming and outgoing data at each network node. The protocol protects the receiver's location privacy.

In [23], authors considered a more powerful global attacker that may monitor network conversations. For source and receiver location secrecy, periodic collection, source simulation (dummy sources), backbone flooding, and sink simulation (dummy sinks) were advocated. Secure packet transfer [24] prevents internal intruders from seeing node routing tables. It uses fake packets and unpredictability. According to [25], the destination node sends some packets to a randomly selected neighbour node M hops distant. Against the global attacker, Koh et al. [10] employed heuristic probabilistic routing. The authors in [26] provided a cloud-based source node privacy technique, whereas [27] used symmetric-keycryptography operations and trapdoor methods to build a secure and privacy-preserving communication protocol [28]. The authors in [29] provide a privacy-preserving interest-based forwarding strategy with the goal of enhancing the forwarding efficiency of networks while also protecting sensitive information pertaining to interests. The work proposed in [29] is referred as 'Method 1' in this paper. In [30], authors provide the first approach for optimising cross-domain routing in a way that protects users' privacy while yet maintaining a level of efficiency that is usable in real-world networks.

The work proposed in [30] is referred as 'Method 2' in this paper. In [31], a unique neighbour finding algorithm lets mobile devices to dynamically alter their search speed, creating a decentralised and autonomous network while saving energy. The work proposed in [31] is referred as 'Method 3' in this paper. This algorithm also reduces the amount of time spent searching for new neighbours.

Privacy and transmission overhead cost money. The above methods primarily employ false traffic (or delays) to decrease traffic analysis, but they don't evaluate the adversary's detection probability, optimal attacking methodology, or scheme overheads. Phantom traffic (or delays) avoids traffic analysis. Thus, the privacy-preserving technique's decreased utility (or cost) should be evaluated against its improved privacy. Reference [28] devised an Internet route selection approach that maximises sender anonymity and an optimisation problem to obtain a path length distribution that maximises a system's anonymity degree. A statistical decision-making and a simpler privacy measure is applied [28].

Maintaining the anonymity and secrecy of network communications is a critical component of privacy-preserving routing between nodes in an Internet of Things (IoT) network. In order to accomplish this objective while maintaining the capacity for routing and data transmission, a number of protocols have been developed. Eavesdroppers may be deceived into thinking they do not have access to node identities or data content by the adoption of certain methods, such as source encryption, anonymous routing, and multiparty computation, for example. However, the majority of the privacy-protecting routing protocols that are now in use concentrate on either intra-network routing inside an IoT network or inter-network routing between multiple IoT networks.

3 Methodology

This section goes into more information about the design of PPM which is based on the node energy which protects users' privacy.

3.1 Privacy-preserving mechanism (PPM) in IoT network

The system model that was taken into consideration for this article is an example of a standard IoT network application scenario. Every node is considered to be equipped with mobile device. In this work, these devices are represented with the help of nodes. The purpose of the application is to devise a method for energy-efficient forwarding mechanism by making use of these mobile nodes, while simultaneously protecting the confidentiality of the users' information. Intra-network energy prediction factor tend to be more often than those of other networks in order to gather and exchange information. When it comes to the process of message propagation, there are no malevolent nodes, and all nodes work together to do so.

3.2 System model

In an IOT, wireless network source node (SN) wishes to send packets to destination node (DN). The source node routes the destination via dynamic source routing. Since the network enables wireless broadcast, all nearby nodes may receive data broadcast by a node.

3.2.1 Routing using an optimised energy approach

Energy consumption by inter-network forwarding nodes affects message delivery. Two connecting network nodes produce energy which powers data transmission between nodes. Energy will accrue throughout the network if nodes cannot communicate. Forwarding nodes provide the inter-network a lot of energy. They must continually connect with network nodes to forward messages. As it processes more messages, a forwarding node uses more energy. However, the message may be successfully conveyed despite several obstacles. A forwarding node with low energy may not forward messages as rapidly. This may impede essential communication delivery. Moreover, a forwarding node may stop forwarding messages if its energy source runs out. There exist multiple ways to reduce the impact of inter-network connection energy on message delivery. Effective message encoding schemes may reduce the amount of data transferred, reducing the energy needed to run the system.

A probabilistic privacy-preserving routing system is designed to maximise an adversary's node energy if they correctly predict the source–destination identities. This protocol was created to protect source–destination identities. Wireless networks, particularly IoT networks with battery-powered devices in remote regions with limited power, must optimise energy utilisation. Energy optimisation boosts device life, maintenance costs, and network scalability. Optimised energy routing seeks the most energy-efficient routes between devices to decrease network energy use by analysing distance, energy, and network connectivity factors. In this paper, the two observation models are considered as listed below for transmission in an IoT network.

3.2.1.1 Lossy observations   In actual practise, the network could have lossy transmission because of the lossy nature of the wireless channel or because the IoT network which has certain blind spots. Therefore, it is presumed that the observation probability $p(N_d|N_i)$ for transmission to node N_d provided that node N_i was communicated is known. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the likelihood of not detecting a particular transmission $h \in N_i$ (also known as the 'erasure probability') is $\alpha \in [0, 0.5]$, and each transmission will be observed independently. In other words, the probability $p(N_d|N_i)$ may be calculated by utilising a series of $\|N_i\|_0$ independent Bernoulli trials with a success parameter of $(1 - \alpha)$. The formula for this is $p(N_d|N_i) = (1 - \alpha)^{\|N_d\|_0} \alpha^{(\|N_i\|_0 - \|N_d\|_0)}$, where $\|.\|_0$ indicate the L0-norm, which counts all nonzero vector items.

3.2.1.2 Lossless observations   There are a few different approaches one may take to guarantee that the observations are lossless. Error-correcting codes are one method that may be used. Error-correcting codes are a method of encoding data that allows it to be decoded even if there are some faults in the transmission of the data. Utilising redundancy is another strategy for ensuring that there is no data loss from observations. The introduction of additional information, known as redundancy, is one method of reducing the risk of errors occurring during the transmission of data. If a message is delivered twice, for instance, the recipient will be able to examine both versions of the message to determine whether or not they are identical. For lossless observations, the model completely observes a series of transmissions to N_d that matches with the

real transmission. This model assumes that the opponent has perfect knowledge of the actual transmission path.

3.2.2 Efficient identification of source–destination pairs: jointly established node pairs

Let's say that the actual source–destination combination is $(S \rightarrow D)_{\text{actual}}$. When the estimate of the any source–destination pair $(S \rightarrow D)_i$ during transmission matches $(S \rightarrow D)_{\text{actual}}$, the detection has been successful and node pair is jointly established. The Bayesian maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimator is the best way to maximise the adversary's expected detection probability. Heuristic-based methods may estimate $(S \rightarrow D)_i$ such that $(S \rightarrow D)_i = \arg \max_{(S \rightarrow D)_{\text{actual}}} p(N_{\text{d}}|N_i)$, where the posterior probability is derived using [32].

Using his previous knowledge of $p(N_{\text{d}})$, the distribution $p(N_i)$, and the route distribution $p(N_{\text{d}}|N_i)$, the MAP estimator [32] provides the ability to maximise his anticipated detection rate. This is accomplished by taking into account the correlation between the two distributions. This contributes to the success of the mission of achieving the maximum detection rate that is humanly achievable. It is essential to keep in mind that the identity of the source is always the first node to transmit; thus, if there are observations that are lossless, then the identity of the source is implicitly known. Keeping this fact in mind is very crucial. On the other hand, if there are other people who are going to receive the message, the identity of the person who is going to be the destination can be concealed.

For route distribution, the MAP estimator is used to estimate the probability that a certain route will be utilised, given some previous knowledge about the routes that are available to be used. This is possible provided some prior information about the routes that are accessible. Thus, the MAP estimator may be used to choose the path that is most likely to be taken in order to maximise the adversary's estimated detection probability. This indicates that the adversary has a greater chance of discovering the communication if it is delivered via the path that has the highest probability of being travelled. MAP estimator has the potential to bring about a reduction in the total number of routes that are taken. This is because the adversary is more likely to notice the signal if it is delivered through a route that is less likely to be utilised. Using the MAP estimator there are chances to increase the number of transmissions that are transmitted over the same route. This may result in an increase in overall throughput.

To calculate how likely it is that you would correctly predict N_{d}, the following computation, which adheres to the MAP methodology, may be used. The highest value of $p(N_{\text{d}}|N_i)$ is equivalent to the expression $P(N_{\text{d}} = (S \rightarrow D)_i|N_i)$. This is the case for each separate observation N_i that is presented. As a direct consequence of this, the (anticipated) detection probability (P_{detect}) for each and every node may be calculated as follows:

$$P_{\text{detect}} = \sum_{\forall N_i} \max p(N_{\text{d}}|N_i)p(N_i) \tag{1}$$

Let's just assume it as a given for the moment that there is some degree of error at each node throughout the transmission process. Let's say that the probability of seeing N_{d} is

represented by the symbol $p(N_d|N_i)$, and let's also say that the transmission of N_s went off without a hitch. In this scenario, we'll assume that the transmission of N_s was successful. Moreover, the probability that a transmission is not detected ($P_{\text{non-detect}}$) is written as $P_{\text{non-detect}} = 1 - P_{\text{detect}}$.

Further, the detection probability of the lossy transmission may be calculated as follows:

$$P_{\text{detect}}^{\text{Lossy}} = \sum_{\forall N_i} \max_{(S \to D)_i} \sum_{\forall N_d} p(N_d, N_i, N_s) \tag{2}$$

Suppose that the transmission is lossless, i.e.,

$$p(N_d|N_i) = \begin{array}{ll} 1, & N_d = N_i = N_s \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \tag{3}$$

The detection probability of a lossless transmission may be calculated using

$$P_{\text{detect}}^{\text{Lossless}} = 1 - \sum_{\forall N_i} \max_{(S \to D)_i} \sum_{\forall N_d} p(N_d, N_i, N_s) \tag{4}$$

3.3 Energy in the IoT network

3.3.1 Energy shared between network

The collision of two nodes results in the production of a force. This force, which affects the intensity of engagement of nodes with one another, is termed inter-network energy. When a node has a higher amount of available energy, it has a greater number of possibilities to correctly send messages. The energy across network may only be created by nodes that belong to the same network. Let us assume that $d(a \leftrightarrow b, N)$ is the duration for which the nodes (a, b) were in close contact in the Nth encounter. The following equation is used to define the inter-network energy between the nodes a and b

$$E(a \leftrightarrow b, N) = \frac{d(a \leftrightarrow b, N)}{t(N-1, N)} \tag{5}$$

$t_{(N-1,N)}$ represents the duration that has elapsed from the end of the $(N-1)$-th encounter to the end of the N-th encounter. Based on real-world observations, network energy is transferable. Node a transmits energy to node b, which sends it to node c. Then, a and c provide indirect energy equivalent to [33],

$$E(a \leftrightarrow c, N) = E((a \leftrightarrow c)_{\text{old}}, N) + (1 - E((a \leftrightarrow c)_{\text{old}}, N)) \times E(a \leftrightarrow b, N) \times E(b \leftrightarrow c, N) \tag{6}$$

The nodes that had a large amount of energy in the previous period are often strong forwarders in the subsequent period. Because of this, the energy prediction [34] is defined as

$$E(a \leftrightarrow b, (N+1)) = \alpha E(a \leftrightarrow b, (N-1)) + (1 - \alpha) \times E(a \leftrightarrow b, N) \tag{7}$$

where α is the inter-network energy prediction factor.

3.3.2 Intra-network energy

The network strength of a node is quantified using number of other network nodes that it interacts with. On the other hand, taking into account the rapid movement of mobile

nodes, it is possible that network strength may vary. The average network energy is utilised to describe the intra-network energy that exists between the node a and the network i, such that

$$E_{\text{Intra}}(a \leftrightarrow i, N) = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{k=N} n}{t_N} \tag{8}$$

where n is the total number of nodes belonging to the same network i that a node meets from the first encounter all the way up to the N-th encounter, and t_N is the amount of time that has passed from the first encounter. If a does not come into contact with nodes of the network i for a significant amount of time, a's intra-network energy, $E_{\text{Intra}}(a \leftrightarrow i)$, will suffer a significant drop. In addition, to integrate the current measurements with those from the past in order to forecast the intra-network energy is a component that predicts the energy inside the network itself, such that

$$E_{\text{intra}}(a \leftrightarrow i, (N+1)) = \beta E_{\text{intra}}(a \leftrightarrow i, (N-1)) + (1 - \alpha) \times E_{\text{intra}}(a \leftrightarrow i, N) \tag{9}$$

Here, β is the intra-network energy prediction factor.

The possibility that nodes will no longer function is considered as reliable forwarders for one another if they do not come into contact with one another over an extended length of time. In order to calculate the decline of the network energy, such that.

$$E_{\text{new}} = E_{\text{old}} \times \gamma^k \tag{10a}$$

$$E_{\text{intra new}} = E_{\text{intra old}} \times \gamma^k \tag{10b}$$

where γ is the time duration factor and k denotes time intervals when maximum energy is observed.

3.4 Privacy-preserving mechanism

The privacy-preserving method for the IoT network includes the set-up of the system, authentication that protects privacy, the forwarding process, message scheduling, and buffer management techniques which have been elaborated in subsequent sections.

3.4.1 *The initialisation of the system*

Let us assume that p is a prime number, with a value of $\alpha \in Z_p^*$, and that the order of α is q, with q being a large prime factor of $p - 1$. The hash functions $H_1 : \{0,1\}^* \to Z_p^*$ and $H_2 : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^k$ are both examples of cryptographic hash functions.

The target node (TN) will produce a certificate revocation list known as RL. This list is initially empty. In order to generate the group G_l, also known as the network $l \in [1, L]$, TN will first pick $a_l \in Z_q^*$ at random, and then will calculate $y_l = \alpha^{a_l} \mod p$. The group secret key, known as msk, is then assigned to G_l as al by TN. In addition, TN will provide a group ID for G_l that is denoted by GID$_l$. TA can register a node U_i in group G_l and a certificate is created by TN, and it is sent to U_i via an authenticated private channel when it has been received. TN will choose a string at random beginning with idi and ending with $k_i \in Z_q^*$ before generating a Schnorr signature that looks like $\sigma_i = (e_i, s_i)$, where $e_i = H_1\left(\text{id}_i; \alpha^{k_i} \mod p\right)$ and $s_i = a_l e_i + k_i \mod q$. U_i certificate is cert$_i = \left(\text{id}_i, e_i, s_i, y_l\right)$. It

is important to keep in mind that the members of all the groups as well as TN are aware of y_l, but the certificate $cert_i$ is only known to U_i itself. If U_i expresses interest in leaving the group, TN will put id_i into RL.

3.4.2 Authentication: right to privacy

Assume that user U_i claims to be associated with the group G_l and that user U_j claims to be a member of the group G_z. Following the completion of authentication that protects user privacy, user U_i is able to determine if user U_j is a member of group G_z, and user U_j is able to determine whether user U_i is a member of group G_l. It is reasonable to assume that they have the same interests given that they belong to the same group.

It is assumed that the group ID for the GI that a node U_i with the identifiers (id_i, e_i, s_i, y_l) belongs to is GID_l. Consider the possibility that U_i comes across another node known as U_j, which asserts that it is connected to G_z.

U_i is able to have a conversation with U_j in order to determine whether or not U_j is connected to G_z. Specifically, U_i will carry out the steps that are as follows:

- U_i makes a choice at random amongst $b_i \in Z_q^*$. Here, $b_i \bmod q \neq 0$.
- U_i calculates $\left(Y_i = \alpha^{s_i}.y_l^{-e_i} \bmod p\right) = \left(\alpha^{k_i} \bmod p\right)$, and $B_i = \alpha^{b_i} \bmod p$.
- U_i transmits $M_i = (GID_l, id_i, Y_i, B_i)$ to U_j.

Similarly, U_j creates $M_j = \left(GID_z, id_j, Y_j, B_j\right)$, and sends it to U_i.

3.4.3 The process of forwarding

Mobile nodes will communicate with one another whenever they are within range of one another for that purpose. The method of forwarding consists of two parts: raising network awareness about energy issues and developing a message forwarding plan.

3.4.4 Handling the energy issues in IoT network

When two nodes, say N_s and N_i, come into contact with one another, they first check to see whether they are members of the same network in a manner that protects their privacy, and then they update the network energy. In the event that they are members of more than one network, they add up the network numbers and revise the information on their intra-network energy. In the first step of the algorithm, which is called message forwarding strategy. PPM revolves mostly on the strategy of message transmission. The most qualified goods forwarders for the destination may be selected with the help of the network. PPM is said to use a variety of message forwarding mechanisms, as stated by the networks of N_s, N_i, and N_d.

Consider the scenario in which one node N_s carries a message M whose destination is N_d and encounters another node N_i. In the event that N_i is not the destination node, and N_s, N_i, and N_d are all members of the same network, inter-network energy will be employed to determine forwarding choices. If N_i has a greater inter-network energy to the destination than any other network, then it will be chosen as the superior forwarder. In the event that this does not occur, N_s will cease sending and wait for a more favourable moment. There are only two scenarios in which the forwarding process may take place. In a particular instance when $I_i = I_d$, N_i is a member of the network associated

with the destination; or when N_i is not a member of the network associated with N_d, and $E_{\text{intra}}(N_s, I_d) < E_{\text{intra}}(N_i, I_d)$. In such case, the N_s will keep the message M in their possession.

After the message has been delivered to its intended location, a response message is sent out through broadcast to notify any nodes that are keeping a copy of the message that they should get rid of it. The letter ID_d represents the pseudo identity of N_d and $E_{\text{ID}_d}(M)$ is the cipher text [35] of the message M.

The message scheduling mechanism is responsible for determining the sequence in which messages are sent out to guarantee that messages may be delivered to the target node, which typically has a better chance of delivery occurring. Priority will be given to the message whose interests coincide with those of the node that is now being considered. If more messages arrive than can fit in the buffer, the method for managing the buffer will decide which ones to discard. This occurs when the buffer size hits its limit. In addition, communities are used in the buffer management scheme in the same way that they are used in the message scheduling scheme.

3.4.5 Message scheduling

The connection between N_i and N_d is an important factor to examine when N_i is selected as a message forwarder and it has a group of messages to send. In particular, the algorithm prioritises messages in the following ways: The messages whose I_i and I_d values are equal will be given precedence. The messages that fulfil this requirement will be sorted according to the energy that is shared between the networks. Messages that do not fulfil the condition that $I_i = I_d$ are suitable for intra-network transmission; hence, the intra-network energy of Ni is taken into consideration for such messages. If the inter-network energy is equal, the more recent message will be sent out first. Messages that generate a greater amount of excitement among the network will be given more importance. If the energy within the network is equal, then the more recent one will be sent before the older one.

3.4.6 Buffer management

The relationship between the message and the source node N_s is essential to the functioning of the buffer management method. It deletes the messages in the following order, which is the opposite of the order that the message scheduling sequence uses:

1. These are the messages that will be refused; the ones with destination nodes that have a wide range of interests will be the first ones to be rejected. Messages with destination nodes that have a wide variety of interests will be rejected. Under these circumstances, the messages that have the lowest level of vitality throughout the network will be replaced before any others. Because of this, we can be certain that the network will continue to operate normally. If the total quantity of energy that is stored inside the network is the same, then you need to get rid of the one that is the oldest.

2. After that, we will investigate the messages in which $I_s = I_d$ is present. When we start the process of replacing anything, we will start with the messages that have a lower energy level across all of the networks. If the whole group stays the same throughout

the process, whatever message that is communicated at a later period will be rejected as irrelevant.

4 Results and discussion

The performance of the proposed PPM is evaluated by comparing it with the subsequent techniques of routing and forwarding, including Method 1 [29], Method 2 [30] and Method 3 [31]. The delivery ratio, overhead, and hop count performance measures [36] have been used to compare different performance levels. Figure 2 presents simulation results comparison for inter-network and intra-network (a) number of live nodes vs time (b) overall energy vs time (c) throughput vs time.

The network simulator [37] is used to assess the performance of the PPM in a manner that is analogous to Method 1 [29], Method 2 [30] and Method 3 [31]. In our experiments, there are a total of four groups of IoT Netwroks taken into consideration. Every group has a total of 40 nodes. The wireless transmission environment has been considered with communication range of 75 m and a transmission rate of 8 Mb/s. Messages are only produced by the nodes of the network groups, and they do so every 50–90 s. The size of the message might be between 0.4 and 0.8 MB. The buffer size ranges from 50 to 100 MB and time to live (TTL) ranges from 400 to 1200 min.

The effectiveness of the proposed PPM is analysed in terms of its performance over a variety of buffer sizes, TTL values for messages, and simulation times. In Figs. 3, 4, and 5, respectively, the outcomes of simulation tests are provided in terms of the delivery ratio, the overhead, and the hop count, respectively. When the buffer size varies from 50 to 100 MB, the comparison of the proposed PPM scheme has been illustrated w.r.t. other three methods. When the buffer size is increased, it can be seen that this results in more messages are being sent to their respective destinations, with less unnecessary overhead being produced, and the need for fewer hops being satisfied.

The proposed PPM achieves the best results possible with regard to the delivery ratio and the overhead. For instance, when the buffer size is set to 100 MB, PPM delivers 59% of messages, which is higher than the 33% that is delivered by Method 1 [29]. PPM also has a message overhead of 750, which is lower than the 16.67% that is delivered by Method 1 [29], and it has a hop count of 2, which is comparable to the 3 that is delivered by Method 1 [29]. In contrast, Method 2 [30] and Method 3 [31] had worse performance, with a delivery ratio of 50.01% and 42.13%, respectively, an overhead of 700 and 880, respectively, and 5 and 7 in hop count experiments, respectively.

The results demonstrate the performance of the different approaches by altering the TTL, where the simulation period is set to 12,000 s and the buffer size is set to 100 MB. It has been shown that as the TTL value grows, the message delivery ratio for all schemes drops, with PPM exhibiting the highest level of performance. PPM delivers 56.89% of messages when the TTL is set to 1200, which is 30% for Method 1, 36% for Method 2 by 43% for Method 3. PPM also surpasses the competition with regard to the overhead costs. The performances of the schemes are equivalent to one another in terms of the hop count, and PPM performs at a level that is comparable to that of Method 1.

Simulation results illustrate the performance of each of these strategies changes throughout the course of the simulation (with a buffer size of 50 MB and a message

(a)

(b)

(c)

Fig. 2 Simulation results comparison for inter-network and intra-network **a** number of live nodes versus time, **b** overall energy versus time, and **c** throughput versus time

Fig. 3 Performance analysis in terms of delivery ratio **a** versus buffer size (MB), **b** versus time to live (seconds), and **c** versus simulation time (seconds)

TTL of 400 min). When the simulation duration is increased from 2000 to 12,000 s, PPM is able to obtain more information about the network's energy, which assists nodes in selecting more effective forwarders. The pattern of PPM follows a path that is comparable to that of previous schemes, but it demonstrates the advantage of the programme as a whole, as illustrated in Figs. 3, 4 and 5. As a result, one may get the conclusion that, with lengthy lifetimes of IOT networks, PPM is capable of giving higher performance while maintaining the privacy of network.

In comparison with the other three schemes, PPM obtains a better delivery ratio and lower overhead, and it produces results that are equivalent to those produced by [30–32] for the hop count measure.

In this paper, the probability P_{detect} is analysed under the proposed PPM vs other privacy-preserving schemes [32]. P_{detect} are experimented and compared by the various strategies in the context of inter-node IoT network transmission and intra-node IoT network transmission. Figure 6 presents analysis of detection probability using different nodes in network (a) inter-network and (b) intra-network. The detection probability, denoted by P_{detect}, for the lossy observations model applied to a 10-node, 20-node, 30-node and 40-node IoT network. It is assumed that jointly established node pair $(S \rightarrow D)_{actual}$ was selected uniformly at random from the set of all possible

Fig. 4 Performance analysis in terms of hop count **a** versus buffer size (MB), **b** versus time to live (seconds), and **c** versus simulation time (seconds)

node pairings. The proposed PPM protocol is able to deliver a better level of privacy keep in mind that a lower P_{detect} number refers to a better level of privacy.

In order to acquire the P_{detect}, values that are most suitable for the proposed PPM, it is ensured that the probability to be in below 0.5. In general, as the network size grows, P_{detect} increases because the undetected transmissions may belong to a wider group of probable source nodes. This is because there are more possible source nodes. In addition, a higher value for n is required in order to provide a more accurate approximation of P_{detect} for bigger values. There is an inverse connection that exists between the value of n in an estimate of the real P_{detect} that is more accurate. When there are fewer transmissions taking place, the number of potential $(S \rightarrow D)$ pairings in a grid network grows, which results in a greater performance deterioration than that which is encountered in a inter-network transmission. It is interesting to note that in our simulation, the optimum pathways of the original approach overlap with the optimal paths of the approximation method.

A random way from all of the valid paths is chosen that may serve $(S \rightarrow D)$ pairings. In the Method 1, the packets in an overzealous manner down the route are chosen that has the greatest number of recipients, for all node parings. The P_{detect} values are shown in Figs. 6a and 6b with the intra-network and internetwork transmission, respectively.

Fig. 5 Performance analysis in terms of overhead **a** versus buffer size (MB), **b** versus time to live (seconds), and **c** versus simulation time (seconds)


Fig. 6 Analysis of detection probability using different nodes in network **a** inter-network and **b** intra-network

There is a substantial difference in comparison with Method 1, Method 2, and Method 3 for the majority of the values of the detection probability. The performance of the Method 1 or Method 2 is shown to be worse than that of the Method 3 with lesser node parings. This is the case despite the fact that the Method 1 selects the route that will result in the greatest number of nodes. This suggests that an increase in the number of

receiver nodes does not always equate to improved levels of privacy. As the results demonstrate, the gap between the Method 1 and Method 2 or Method 3 may sometimes be fairly wide and have a major impact.

The proposed method will evenly choose any valid shortest route that serves $(S \rightarrow D)$ (which leaks information about the destination), but the Method 1 and Method 2 techniques prefer to choose a lower node path as their optimal solution. The P_{detect} values are shown in Fig. 6a and b for inter-network transmission, respectively. In general, the inter-network versions should attain better levels of privacy for a constant amount of incurred cost when compared to the intra-network variants, but his comes at the price of a higher level of computational cost. It would seem that the P_{detect} improvement brought about by the proposed PPM is very low, and it does not appear to have any meaningful impact on the network as the number of nodes grows. This is due to the fact that the inter-network technique has the potential to enhance privacy in circumstances in which one leaf node is talking with another leaf node located inside the same sub-tree. The destination may be readily connected to the same sub-tree when the route is constrained to just a single path since the path does not go to any other sub-trees. This drastically restricts the number of receivers and reduces the level of privacy when node parings increase.

The method that is used for the purpose of energy sharing in a wireless network is determined by the particular application. For instance, if the network is installed in a distant location that does not have access to any source of power, then energy harvesting may be the most significant method. On the other hand, if the network is installed in a location that has access to power, then other methods, such as caching and collaborative routing, may be more significant. Direct energy transfer occurs when one node directly sends energy to another node in the network. Caching involves nodes storing data that they do not need right away, with the purpose of allowing other nodes to retrieve it at a later time. If a node has a lot of energy, it may cache data that is not required immediately if it is not being used right away. Other nodes who want these data may then utilise it, but they do not have to send it over the network since it is already available. Using collaborative routing nodes cooperate with one another in order to route data in a manner that uses the least amount of energy possible. This is something that may be accomplished via the use route optimisation. If a node knows that it is about to run out of energy, it may work together with other nodes to devise a route that minimises the amount of energy that it needs to transmit the data by finding a method that uses the least amount of energy possible.

5 Conclusion

This paper offers assessing node message-transmission capacity using network energy. Two nodes interacting provide network energy. Nodes in the same network share energy and node-facing networks create energy if not. Thus, a forwarder with greater inter- or intra-network energy to the target node or network is preferable. The intrusion detection in IoT networks discovered that, with uniform deployment, the detection probability is the same for any place inside the network region. By uniformly applying privacy-protection mechanisms across network borders, the establishment of a protocol for intra-network routing and inter-network routing in conjunction with one another might offer increased privacy and security. On the other hand, such a uniform protocol would

confront additional issues relating to the integration of multiple network addressing schemes, forwarding plane methods, and varied node capabilities across IoT networks. IoT networks might benefit from energy collection and optimised energy practises. This can make IoT devices more dependable, sustainable, and environmentally friendly with further study.

Abbreviations

IoT	Internet of Things
N/W	Network
BS	Base station
PPM	Privacy-preserving mechanism
SN	Source node
DN	Destination node
MAP	Maximum a posteriori estimate
TN	Target node
RL	Revocation list
TTL	Time to live

Declarations

Competing interests
The author declares that there is nothing to declare.

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