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Master's Degree in International Development Policy

The impact of International Assistance on Security Sector Reform:

A Case Study of Sierra Leone, Haiti and Afghanistan

"What Can Yemen Learn?"

February, 2014

Program in International Development Policy

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

Adel Hamoud Hamoud Al-Sheikh

The impact of International Assistance on Security Sector Reform:

A Case Study of Sierra Leone, Haiti and Afghanistan

"What Can Yemen Learn?"

A thesis presented

by

Adel Hamoud Hamoud Al-Sheikh

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master
of International Development Policy

Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
Seoul, Korea

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The Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

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The undersigned, appointed by

The Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

Have examined the thesis entitled

The impact of International Assistance on Security Sector Reform: A Case Study of Sierra Leone, Haiti and Afghanistan "What Can Yemen Learn?"

Presented by **Adel Hamoud Hamoud Al-Sheikh**

Candidate for the degree of Master of International Studies, and hereby certify that the examined thesis is worthy of acceptance:

February 2014

Signature
Chair — Seong-Ho Sheen

Signature
Vice Chair — Taekyoon Park

Signature
Thesis Advisor — Young-Nam Cho

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ABSTRACT

The Impact of International Assistance on Security Sector Reform: A Case Study of Sierra Leone, Haiti and Afghanistan What Can Yemen Learn?

Adel Hamoud Hamoud Al-Sheikh
International Cooperation
Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

International donors have become more interested and involved in efforts related to the security sector reform (SSR) in countries emerging from conflicts, despite of the fact that this field is a relatively new as it appeared in late 1990s.

This thesis explores factors that influence the success and failure of international assistance for security sector reform in developing countries. To achieve this aim, this thesis evaluates how international assistance disbursement's practices influence SSR using internationally supported security sector reform in Sierra Leone, Haiti, and Afghanistan as case studies. It examines the practical applicability of three key principles, "coordination, local ownership, and long-term commitment", by international and local SSR stakeholders and evaluates the relationships between this applicability and the effectiveness of SSR.

Evidences from the case studies suggest that to build effective security institutions capable of providing efficient security, three principles should be followed. First, long-term political commitment of donor countries and durable disbursement of assistance are required to ensure the success of the reform process due to its lengthy nature. Second, coordination among internal agencies in donor countries and with other international and local partners is needed to overcome the conflicting reform strategies,

priorities or approaches resulted from the multicity of SSR stakeholders. Finally, assertion of national authorities over local ownership of the implemented SSR programs and projects is critical for sustainability of the process.

The thesis draws lessons and provides recommendations to Yemen, which intended to enhance the impact of international assistance on the current security sector reform in Yemen and to ensure a more effective utilization of the assistance in various SSR programs.

Key words: Security Sectors Reform, assistance, ownership, coordination, long-term commitment

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
ANA	Afghan National Army
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
CPPs	Conflict Prevention Pools
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program
DFID	Department for International Development
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HNP	Haitian National Police
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JSSR	Justice and Security Sector Reform
MINUSTAH	United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti
ANP	Afghan National Police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSB	National Security Bureau
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SLAF	Sierra Leone Armed Forces
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States

I. INTRODUCTION

Security challenges have changed and become more complex since the end of the Cold War following the demise of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the focus of international donors has been directed to stabilizing fragile states: which represent latent threats that induce regional and international instability due to the safe havens provided by these states for extremist and international criminal organizations. More international attention has been paid to the root causes of conflict and insecurity impeding development in fragile states which derive from internal rather than external factors. International political economy scholars note that failures of development in these states escalate public felling of grievances that may be misused by terrorist groups or other internal armed groups to rationalize their use of violence for political gain (McFate, 2008). It becomes clear that promoting development without taking security issues into account is an unviable option in fragile states.

Before the end of the Cold War, military and even humanitarian and developmental international assistance to the developing countries were often based on security concerns of the superpowers that aimed at consolidating their strategic relationships with key allies rather than national development of recipient countries (Hendrickson, 1999). However, since late 1990, security and development have become increasingly linked in a way acknowledged the need for a new approach to international assistance that enhances the role of security services in the economic lives of people which consequently improves the effectiveness of development assistance, as development needs security to prosper (Ball, 2010). As result, the security sector reform concept emerged with a scope that extends beyond the regular training and equipping programs to the establishment of professional security forces, and the enhancement of the civil-security relationship with effective oversight mechanisms (McFate, 2008).

Over the past 15 years, multilateral aid agencies have been working with major donors and SSR stakeholders to develop a holistic approach to SSR that consolidates their divers SSR efforts to ensure successful delivery of security assistance in a way that promotes the provision of effective, efficient, accountable, and transparent security in recipient countries which in turn makes other types of assistance more effective.

This research outlines a framework of principles that is required to be applied for international assistance directed toward SSR to achieve tangible results. Then, this framework is used to assess the characteristics of disbursement of international assistance for SSR in three case studies, Sierra Leone, Haiti, and Afghanistan to determine whether and under what conditions international donors respect these principles when provide assistance directed to SSR and what lessons can be drawn for Yemen which is currently undertaking internationally supported SSR.

Since late 1990, many SSR have been implemented in many post conflict countries. However, only few cases have demonstrated evident results while the rest of them illustrate uncertain outcome which poses challenges for the international community's future efforts in this field. Cases for this research have been chosen for their distinctive SSR outcomes, in addition to the variation in assistance patterns such as the number of major donors, the overall level of aid received and the volatility of aid flows. The cases were selected from three different regions to allow drawing of general lessons not confined to specific neighborhoods.

1.1 Objectives

This thesis will explore the impact of international assistance on Security Sector Reform in three countries. Many states failed to take advantage of international support and to utilize assistance in restructuring and reforming their security institutions such as Afghanistan and Haiti. However, Sierra Leone could succeed. Why did international support for SSR produce tangible results in Sierra Leone but not in Afghanistan and Haiti? What is the secret behind this success in Sierra Leone?

Thereafter, the thesis will explore the current SSR in Yemen and the challenges that Yemen faces in this field. The in-depth analysis of the three cases will allow drawing lessons from previous successes and failures of international support for security sector reform, through identifying common denominators (internal and external factors) by means of exploring the characteristics and strategies determinants of international assistance disbursement in the selected recipient countries.

1.2 Research Questions

- What are the main factors affecting the success and failure of international assistance on security sector reform in selected recipient countries? How do they exert influence on SSR?
- What are the challenges facing the process of security sector reform in Yemen and what kinds of lessons can Yemen get from the selected cases of recipient countries?

1.3 Analytic Framework

A set of principles, *ensuring coordination and coherence, respect of local ownership, and long-term commitments of international actors,* will be the analytic approach on which I will examine the role of international assistance in promoting security sector reform in recipient countries. These principles are used by international security and development scholars to examine the effectiveness of international assistance approaches to security and development.

These principles are identified in the internationally endorsed guidelines and best practices on security sector reform provided by the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) as the main procedural principles that international donors and SSR practitioners need to respect to ensure the success and sustainability of

security sector reform (Nikolaisen, 2011). Those principles assist relevant international donors and SSR stakeholders to implement SSR in more comprehensive and integrated ways.

1.4 Research Methodology and Data:

This is in-depth case study (qualitative) research:

- Success cases: Sierra Leone (2002-2010)
- Failure cases: Afghanistan (2002-2010) and Haiti (2004-2010)
- Application : Yemen

The periods of time have been chosen according the beginning of the SSR in each case.

For this purpose, the data for this thesis is gathered from primary and secondary sources. Official documents and date from the selected countries are obtained through official online resources. Country reports, assessments, and academic articles from government institutions, non-governmental institutions, and international institutions such as the World Bank, OECD, and the UN among others are collected. Print and online resources are also used as references.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUALIZING

2.1. Conceptualizing Security Sector Reform

The security sector comprises all public institutions mandated formally to have the monopoly over the use of legitimate coercive power and has been considered as an essential characteristic of modern nation-state. It includes the police, the armed forces, the intelligence services, and the elected and appointed authorities in charge of controlling these forces, such as the ministries of interior and the defense, in addition to judicial institutions and the parliament as oversight authorities (*Hänggi, 2004*). The Weberian modern state assumes that public security and the state monopoly over legitimate violence are essential conditions required for long-term democratic, developmental or 'human security' agendas. In such case, security sector reform has been prioritized by international donors over democratic consolidation.

Failure of security institutions to provide protection and stability to the state or its citizens with adherence to principles of good governance is considered as a dysfunction that requires remedy. Dysfunction of security sector is not limited to the ineffective or inefficient provision of security but extends to the lack of appropriate oversight mechanism. Consequently, fixing of this dysfunction through only training and provision of equipment is not sufficient to ensure that this sector performs its duties properly (Edmunds, 2002).

The (OECD)-Development Assistance Committee defines SSR in its 2005 report on SSR as a process that

> *"...seeks to increase partner countries' ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the Rule of Law. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence and policing."* (*OECD-DAC, 2005:11)*.

On the other hand, as the United Nations engages extensively in helping Member States in restoring peace and security, the organization becomes a major provider for SSR assistance through various UN peacekeeping missions to ensure the establishment of efficient and effective security institutions that are crucial for the exit strategy of the UN peacekeeping forces. The 2008 UN Secretary-General's report on SSR outlines the UN objectives and definition of this concept, which describes it as a

> *"…process of assessment, review, and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law."* (United Nations, 2008: 6).

The UN report considers that the security sector encompasses all personnel, institutions, and structures in charge of controlling, providing and monitoring of security. It recognizes that the existence of effective and accountable security sector is fundamental for sustainable development as well as for lasting peace.

In this context, both definitions set by the UN and the OECD-DAC consider SSR as a comprehensive approach that aims to minimize the lack of security caused by the dysfunction of institutions and actors. It covers transforming security institutions, demobilizing illegal forces, training and professionalizing personnel, and establishing relevant oversight mechanisms in order to make this sector able to confront threats that face the state and its people (McFate, 2008).

Security sector reform is defined in this thesis as "activities undertaken by state and its partners to strengthen and transform the security sector - institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law - in a way that is consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance" (Stanley, Jacob, and Bendix, 2009: 2 and OECD 2005: 20).

To this end, the SSR agenda endorses a holistic approach that incorporates fractional reforms of military, police, justice, and intelligence agencies as well as putting security institutions and actors under the supervision of civil democratic authorities through adopting and applying principles relevant to good governance, such as transparency and accountability, in the framework of security sector (Brzoska, 2003). In addition to that, the SSR agenda also covers the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in post conflict situations.

2.2. Literature Review

According to Michael Brzoska (2006: 10-13) the behavior of international actors influences success and failure of security sector reform. After he analyzed SSR in post conflict situations, he argues that there have been three factors that affect the success and failure of international supported SSR in post conflict situations; local ownership, capacities and commitments of international actors, and design and implementation of SSR policies and measures. He assumes that applying these factors positively can be used as criteria for evaluating success in case studies.

On the other hand, Mark Sedra (2006) argues that the success of SSR depends on the presence of several specific conditions[1]; four of them are related to international donor practices when providing assistance to states emerged from conflicts. These include shortfalls of resources which had a debilitating effect on implementation of the reform programs, the ability of local actors to take ownership of the SSR, coordination to overcome varying approaches of SSR stakeholders, and timely intervention and the adoption of long-term commitments.

[1] These conditions includes resurgence of violence, politicization and ethnicization, resourcing, economic sustainability, informalism, the rule of law, corruption, professionalization, ownership, coordination, societal integration, strategic vision, and timely intervention and long-term perspective.

2.2.1. Coordination Within Donor Countries and with Other International and Local Stakeholders

Security sector reform is a multifaceted political process that requires the interaction between wide scope of national and international actors (Sedra, 2006). The problems of coordination can be seen at different levels, coordination among internal agencies in multilateral organizations and donor countries as well as between international partners and with local stakeholders.

According to Catalina Perdomo (2006), coordinating the efforts of internal agencies of donor countries is critical to the overall process of coordination as some donors have several units that are mandated to provide SSR assistance to recipient countries through specific programs. Some countries have undertaken the institutional reforms to unify their internal agencies efforts toward drafting policies and allocating resources such as the UK, whereas other international partners have several agencies conducting SSR programs in a disorganized manner such as the US. Failure of streamlining the efforts of internal agencies in donor countries and multilateral organizations affects the overall coherence and coordination among donors community due to the different strategies and approaches being used by them in the same recipient country. Consequently, donor countries and multilateral organizations need to enhance their SSR understanding and integrate the efforts of their internal agencies mandated with SSR activities before providing security assistance to other countries (Isima, 2010).

Coordination has been recognized as a key factor for successful SSR as it eliminates competition over scarce resources, inefficient distribution of labor, and parallel chains of command (Brzoska, 2009).

2.2.2. Local Ownership

Local ownership in SSR refers to the involvement of local stakeholders in drafting, determining priorities, implementing of the reform strategy and financing projects of the reform process.

> *"The principle of local ownership of SSR means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by domestic actors rather than external actors"* (Nathan, 2007: 4).

Donors support is required for local actors to participate effectively in SSR activities from early stages of planning of SSR until assessments of the achievements. In this context, there is a consensus within international donors about the substantial role of national ownership for effective disbursement of international assistance. The OECD-DAC's ministerial meeting in 2007 highlighted the importance of taking local ownership in considerations to ensure the success of reforms:

> *"Reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained."*(OECD-DAC, 2007: 17)

On the other hand, four out of the ten principles of the United Nations for SSR are dedicated to promoting local ownership of SSR programs (United Nation, 2008), and the first of six guidelines of the US for SSR is related to fostering national ownership (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2009).

Although enforcing of SSR by donor countries might seem possible in certain cases, such as in Kosovo, international influence has demonstrated to be insufficient and counter-productive in the long run. The perception of local stakeholders that reforms are being enforced by international donors undermines legitimacy of the process and may revoke the reforms' programs when the assistance is stopped. The effectiveness of International assistance on SSR in any context depends on the degree of ownership local actors can assert over the process (Sedra, 2006).

2.2.3. The Capacities and Commitments of International Donors

Before engaging of international donors in security sector reform process, they should realize that there is no quick fix for SSR as it is a lengthy process that needs a firm and long-term political commitment in addition to a durable disbursement of assistance for the reform process to reach its maturity (Sedra, 2010). A strong political commitment of the recipient country's authorities is required too. It should be expected to take a decade rather than few years to develop adequate local capacities and ownership and to strengthen national constituencies that can offer a trustful safeguard for the success and sustainability of the SSR (Sedra, 2010).

The imperative of adopting a long-term political commitment and a substantial financial support is attributed to the prolonged nature of the SSR process which necessitates a multidisciplinary approach that involves professional staff from the police and military, experts in demobilization, technical expertise, constitutional and legal experts, and human resources management advisors (Brzoska, 2006).

The limited financial support and weak political commitment by some donor governments; in conjunction with difficult environment on the ground, compel SSR actors to follow a piecemeal approach focuses on achievable projects, which has resulted in the implementation of narrowly focused and short-term SSR programs in some recipient countries (Hendrickson, 1999).

III. Security Sector Reform in Selected Case Studies

3.1 Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone is located in western Africa on the Atlantic Ocean. It has a population of 5.48 million (2012 estimates). Sierra Leone gained independence from Britain on 27 April 1961 and adopted a parliamentary system of government. The conflict in Sierra Leone began on March 23, 1991, when the forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered into Sierra Leone from Liberia and attacked the Government of the All People's Congress, which had ruled the country for 23 years. Since that date a decade of violence devastated the country. The war finally reached a negotiated conclusion at Lomé, the capital of Togo, in July 1999. Although the Lomé Peace Agreement did not end the fighting entirely, it began a process that brought a delicate peace to the country (Truth and Reconciliation Commission Working Group, 2005).

In October 1999, the United Nations agreed to send peacekeepers to help in restoring order and disarming the rebels. The first of the 6,000-member force, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), began arriving in December. But in May 2000, when the UN forces were trying to disarm the RUF in eastern Sierra Leone, RUF's forces clashed with these forces and hijacked 500 UN peacekeepers. The hostage crisis resulted in more fighting between the RUF and the government. The situation in the country deteriorated and the British troops, which were evacuating foreign nationals, decided to take full military action to finally release the hostages. The presence of British troops and the United Nations peacekeeping force played a fundamental role in defeating the rebels and ending the conflict in the country. Violence has not relapsed in Sierra Leone since the peace was officially restored in January 2002.

3.1.1 International Assistance for Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone (2002-2010)

Sierra Leone, which witnessed a civil war from 1991 until 2002, is considered as a good example of successful international assistance in the field of security sector reform. It had conflict-free elections in May 2002, and presidential and legislative elections in July 2007 and November 2012. The international assistance to Sierra Leone presents a success story of how international donors coordinate and cooperate among themselves and with domestic authorities to prevent the relapse of violence and help in stabilizing states emerging from civil war through reforming the security sector and other key institutions.

The United Kingdom (UK) played a major role in supporting SSR in Sierra Leone which was formally started in 2002 after the presidential election. The UK has emerged as a major donor participant in SSR since late 1990s. The UK adopted a conflict prevention strategy in Sierra Leone focused on three pillars: the reintegration of ex-combatants into society, the establishment of effective, affordable and democratically accountable security agencies, and reducing the external threats from the region. The SSR process in Sierra Leone addressed some root causes of the conflict by concentrating on areas such as justice sector and corruption in the 2nd phase of the reform due to institutional and financial constrains at an early stage.

The total spending from the UK in security sector in Sierra Leone allocated for the fiscal year 2003/4 was £26.3 million. Of this, £22.25 million was on the security sector reform where it was used for training and equipping the armed forces and police of Sierra Leone and the development of the legal and institutional frameworks for national security and defense. The remainder £3.7 million was allocated to reintegration of ex-combatants through the support of two programs, the Community Reintegration Project and the React Program as illustrated in table '1' (Ginifer and Oliver, 2004). Success can be seen in terms of the reform of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, the Sierra Leone Police, and the reintegration of more than 50,000 ex-combatants by the end of 2001.

Table 1: Initial spending estimate on security sector reform in Sierra Leone by the UK (2000 – 2004 British Pound Sterling million)

	2002/03	2003/04
International Assistance Training Team (IMATT)	16.0	14.5
Op Silkman	1.5	0
FCO	0.1	0.1
SILSEP (Security Sector Reform)	0.5	0.75
Police	5.0	7.0
Reintegration	5.8	3.7
Regional (e.g.)WFD	0	0.2
Sub-total Programs	**28.9**	**26.3**
Peacekeeping assessed costs	36.2	18.0
Special Court	2.3	2.3
PeaceKeeoping non-assessed	2.1	1.8
Sub-total Peacekeeping	**40.06**	**22.1**
Total	**69.06**	**48.4**

Source: Adopted from Report prepared by Jermey Ginifer and Kaye Oliver for the Department for International Development 2004, London (Ginifer and Oliver, 2004) page 11.

The reform process was expected to reduce the strength of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (SLAF) from 14,000 personnel in 2002 to 10,500 by the end of 2007 to make it more affordable and sustainable in terms of financial expenditures (United Nations, 2002). The reduction process started in 2003 and was achieved by the end of 2006 where another reduction plan was approved to downsize the SLAF to 8,500 troops by the end of 2011 (United Nations, 2006). The targeted size of 8,500 troops of the SLAF was fulfilled by the end of 2009 which transformed the sector from being a burden on government to an asset where it successfully participated in the UN peace-keeping forces in Darfur (DFID. 2010). Current Sierra Leone Armed Forces is composed of the Army, Air Force and Navy.

Based on the 2002–2003 Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy, the Sierra Leone Police size was brought up from a force size of 6,500 in 2002 to 9,500 personnel

by the end of 2006 where it provided the overall security for the 2007 elections (United Nations, 2006). The force size was further raised to 12,500 by the 2010.

3.2 Haiti

Haiti is located in the Caribbean region with a population of 9.8 million people (2012 estimates). Haiti's instability is fueled by a long failed political and economic development. It was under an authoritarian rule by the Duvalier family for 29 years until a military coup took place in 1986. Although President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was democratically-elected in 1990, he was overthrown by another military coup in 1991. Aristide was reinstated by a US-led Multinational Force in 1994 and before the end of his presidency term he disbanded the Haitian National Army in 1995 and created a new police security force. Since that time Haiti does not have armed forces. Aristide could not participate in the presidential election in 1996 because of constitutional restrictions. However, he was reelected in 2000 after the new elected President Preval finished his 5 years presidency term. In February 2004, opponents of Aristide led by armed gangs and former military officers forced him to resign. He left the country for the second time and an interim government was established for two years until President Rene Préval was elected in February 2006 (Center for International Governance Innovation, 2009).

3.2.1 International Assistance for Security Sector Reform in Haiti (2004 – 2010):

Despite the intense international assistance for SSR programs in Haiti, the violence has been experiencing a rising tide of gang crimes and serious human rights violations in the last three years.

After the exile of Aristide in 2004, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH), by its Resolution 1542 on 29 February 2004. That resolution was mandated to create a secure and stable environment that allows democratic elections to take place and to help Haitian transitional government to undertake SSR (United Nations Security Council, 2004).

Peacekeepers arrived in June 2004 and took over U.S.-led multinational force.

Current security sector reform started after the deployment of MINUSTAH and includes programs that cover monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police (HNP), implementing a comprehensive DDR for all armed Groups, and restoration and reforming of the rule of law institutions including the justice and the prison systems (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007). There was no defense reform as the army was disbanded in 1995. The aim of SSR in Haiti was the restoration of public confidence in this sector, in addition to the provision of effective security. The HNP was part of the Haitian Army until 1995 when it became under civil control after the disbanding of the Army.

A new reform plan was introduced in August 2006 which focused on police training, the provision of equipment and the rehabilitation of security institutions. In addition to that, it set the goal of establishing 14,000 fully-equipped police forces by 2011(Crisis Group, 2008). However, the vetting of officers has been too slow as the HNP is composed of 10,700 police officers by early 2012. A new HNP development plan was adopted by the Supreme Council of National Police in 2012 to bring the HNP from 10,000 up to at least 15,000 officers by 2016 (Boutellis, 2012).

Although the increasing numbers and performance of police forces has improved, the majority of security operations are still carried out by MINUSTAH and its police units which indicates that the HNP is still not capable of assuming their responsibilities of policing and provision of security.

3.3 Afghanistan

Afghanistan is located in central Asia and is bordered by Iran to the west, Pakistan to the south and east, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the north and China to the northeast. It has a population of 29.82 million (2012 estimates). After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C, the United States attacked Afghanistan and brought down the Taliban regime and its terrorist allies. In December 2001, international actors and Afghan leaders agreed in

the Bonn Conference on a road map for state-building in Afghanistan that includes; (1) the establishment of the Interim government, (2) holding presidential elections by September 2004, and (3) parliamentary and provincial council elections by October 2005. In March 2002, the UN Security Council established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to join the international efforts dedicated for the provision of security and state-building in the country by its resolution 1401 (2002).

The establishment of Afghan parliament in December 2005 was followed by the adoption of the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006 which designed the Afghan road map from 2006-2010. However, by the time of signing of this compact, it was clear that Afghanistan returned to violence, especially in the south and southeast because of the resurgence of the Taliban and other anti-government groups that started attacking the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Security Force. The deterioration of the security situation has been compounded with an increase in opium farming and its illegal trade (Ayub, Kouvo & Wareham, 2009).

3.3.1 International Assistance for SSR in Afghanistan (2002 – 2010):

Although international donors have been investing large amount of international assistance in the security sector in Afghanistan in the last decade since the ouster of the Taliban regime, yet the Afghan government is still unable to maintain security and stability in the country as the level of violence and civilian casualties remain significantly high (Cordesman, 2012).

The establishment of an effective Afghan Security Sector was one of the first priorities of international donors. Based on the Bonn agreement, the G8 donors divided the Afghan SSR agenda at their 2002 meeting in Geneva into five pillars, each to be overseen by a lead-donor nation: police reform by Germany, military reform by US, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the ex-combatants by Japan, counter-narcotics by the United Kingdom, and Italy leading judicial reform. In 2007, the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)[2] took on training responsibility of the Afghan National Security Force (Security sector reform resource center, 2013).

Current Afghan security sector reform started at the beginning of 2002 under what is called "the lead nations approach" (2002 –2006) in which training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) witnessed a remarkable progress under the lead of the US to establish sufficient forces to enhance counter insurgency efforts. Progress of police reform was not at the same pace, although Germany rebuilt the National Police Academy and few hundreds of high rank officers graduated from it. On the other hand, Italy had made less progress in justice system reform (Ayub, et al. 2009).

The 2006 Afghanistan Compact approved a partnership approach instead of the lead nation approach of the Bonn agreement. It focused on enhancing coordination in areas such as police and justice reforms where many international agencies and donors were involved actively. In the summer of 2007, the attention has been turned to strengthening police reform as the US took the lead in this sector and authorized the US Department of Defense to replace the US Secretary of State in implementing programs related to police reform. At the same time, the European commission established the European Union Police Mission that took over Germany responsibility (Crisis Group, 2007).

In late 2008, it was realized that the ability of the ANA to fight insurgence was not as expected and the police were even worse than the Army. Consequently, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan was established and was in charge of training the Afghan Army and police with concentration on leadership's capacity building and strengthening the capacity of the Afghan ministries of Defense in order to prepare them to assume responsibility for providing security after the departure of international security forces by 2014 (table 2).

[2] The NATO has been operating in Afghanistan since 2001 and currently leads the ISAF.

Table 2: The size of Afghan National Security Forces by the end of December 2012

	Afghan National Security Forces	December 2012	Estimated by 2014
1	Afghan National Army	178,501 troops	178,000
2	Afghan Air Force	6,325 personnel & 96 aircraft	8,000 personnel & 140 aircraft
3	Afghan National Police	148,536 police officer	157,000 police officer
4	Afghan Local Police. A village-focused program	16,300	30,000
5	Afghan Public Protection Force: to replace Int. Private Security companies	14,000 guards	30,000 guards

Source: constructed by author using data from NATO 2012 data base, accessed on July 19, 2013.
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120516_media_backgrounder_ANSF_en.pdf

IV. FACTORS AFFECT SUCCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

4.1. Coordination Within Donor Countries and with Other International and Local SSR Stakeholders

Security Sector reform is a political process that requires the implementation of complex interrelated arrangements and tasks by different local and international stakeholders. The multicity of actors may cause conflicting reform strategies, priorities or approaches as a result of the different perspectives, capacities and political interests (Sedra, 2006). In addition to that, the limited SSR experience among international stakeholders coupled with the fact that SSR is a recent approach and many donors are unfamiliar with it, undermine the reform process outcomes. In order to avoid such consequences, donor countries need to establish mechanisms, at the beginning of the process, to strengthen the coherence and coordination of their actions and the sequencing of implementation of the reform strategy (Sedra, 2006).

States that have emerged from conflicts seldom have adequate institutional capacity to coordinate, manage or monitor SSR activities. Consequently, they have to resort to international partners to be able to initiate and implement the SSR process. In such instances, transferring of skills to national actors is required to minimize the effects of the limited local capacity which should not be an excuse to ignore the role of local leadership in coordinating and putting the priorities and needs of their citizen in the SSR strategy; nor should it substitute local oversight mechanisms which offer a guarantee against the predominance of interests of international stakeholders in the reform process (United Nations, 2013).

As the SSR is a comprehensive process which involves security and development programs, the integration of the complex aspects of the SSR programs and projects necessitates the existence of an effective coordination mechanism between all internal security and development agencies in donor countries to avoid conflicting administrative regulations, policies and interests of those agencies and the competing among them for resources and labor. For example, the differentiation between what

military assistance is and what SSR assistance is. While the security agencies may insist that the provision of arms should be endorsed as its part of SSR programs to enhance the capability of the security sector, the development and foreign affairs agencies may assume that such assistance is military and it might divert the resources form development programs (Perdomo, 2006).

Coordination of international assistance programs for SSR through the establishment of a national mechanism - to serve as a focal point that monitors the activities of all SSR stakeholders - promotes local ownership and the sustainability of the reform process. Such effective mechanism requires the enhancement of local capacity from the outset of the process. The existence of this mechanism in post-conflict situations is a real challenge which faces international donors due to the fact that many post-conflict countries lack the institutional capacity which can deal with various dynamics of SSR and accommodate the allocated assistance. Not to mention the ability to coordinate the efforts of different stakeholders who implement several SSR programs and projects simultaneously. In such case, the lack of national coordination mechanism at the beginning of reform process is expected. In this context, international donors should focus from the outset of the process on building local capacity; otherwise, it may take a long time for national coordination mechanism to be set in among key local stakeholders who have to take the real responsibly of the reform process (Isima, 2010).

To that end, effective coordination of SSR activities at the level of internal agencies of donor countries, multilateral organizations, among international partners, and with national actors is crucial to ensure that resources are spent in the right palace as well as to avoid duplication of efforts and programs which slow the progress of the reform process.

4.1.1. Sierra Leone

The UK-Department for International Development (DFID) played a significant role in coordinating international efforts toward SSR in Sierra Leone and

promoting joint SSR approaches among international community. In 2000, the UK government recognized that the concept of SSR contains issues cutting across various internal departments. It had launched a wide review of its conflict prevention efforts, to identify approaches of effective delivery of security assistance, which was followed by the establishment of the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) in April 2001 to unify the efforts of DFID, Ministry of Defense and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The CPPs became the agency responsible of managing and funding of the UK's SSR efforts. It consists of two pools the first deals with conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), while the second covers other parts of the world, the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (Foreign and commonwealth Office, 2013). The establishment of the CPPs plays a significant role in improving the effectiveness of the security assistance delivered by the UK government as it promotes the integration of policy making, resources and expertise of its all internal agencies directed to SSR (Ball, 2004).

The UK security assistance to Sierra Leone was one of the first formal Britain coordinated initiatives. The ACPP was in charge of coordinating the UK's SSR assistance to Sierra Leone. It served as a focal point for cooperation and coordination between key UK stakeholders and with other donor partners.

An evaluation of the work of ACPP in Sierra Leone, prepared in 2004 for the DFID, has founded many evidences that show the relevance of the ACPP initiative in Sierra Leone (Ginifer and Oliver, 2004), including:

- Two ACPP-supported programs were directed towards strengthening the security sector and the reintegration of ex-combatants.
- Sequences of SSR policy implementation were facilitated by the creation of one ACPP strategy for SSR.
- Coordination between ACPP in Sierra Leone and the UN mission was strong. Regular formal meetings with UNAMSIL were a key part of the SSR strategy, which facilitated mainstreaming the SSR programs and activities at the multilateral level.

- Coordination between various UK stakeholders dealing with SSR became more effective than before the creation of CPPs in 2001.

4.1.2. Haiti

The UN provides SSR assistance to Haiti through its Peace-keeping Mission in the field. The UN has been helping many countries in post conflict situation in area of security sector reform; however, the efforts of the organization has remained limited during the period 2004-2008 as inter-agency coordination was found to be inefficient. Most responsibilities related to SSR activities were scattered and fragmented internally in various sections of the UN mission and at headquarters level (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007).

In 2006, an Inventory made by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations identified 12 UN entities (departments, programs, funds) at the headquarters level that have capacity in security and justice reform. Most of the SSR activities were performed by the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) both at headquarters level and in the field until the establishment of an inter-agency SSR support unit at headquarters in 2007, the Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR) unit which is managed by a Task Force co-chaired by UNDP and DPKO to serve as a system-wide focal point and technical resource (United Nations, 2012). Despite such efforts to enhance UN inter-agency coordination for supporting SSR activities, the cooperation between the UNDP and DPKO has often been tied up by bureaucratic obstacles and perceptions of the missions having a short-term vision of DPKO to prevent violence as opposed to the longer-term developmental goals of UNDP (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007).

Moreover, coordination between international stakeholders in the field in Haiti were inconsistent and insufficient to make fundamental changes as approaches differed depending on donor's unilateral strategies, particularly program implementation. In the justice reform, for example, France tried to implement a model

similar to its judicial model. Additionally, the United States advanced a framework identical to the US judicial system, but the US pattern had no foundation in Haitian judicial law, so it was later ignored. In terms of police reform, donors had different plans toward reform of the police sector which was addressed without considering other sectors like prison and justice system (Crisis Group, 2008). This clearly illustrates the lack of effective coordination between donors which added extra burden on the reform process. In addition to that, the coordination between international donors and national actors in Haiti was poor in some sectors. The Security Council calls on the government of Haiti, in its resolution 1892 (2009), "…*in coordination with the international community to further reform the justice system*…", which did not progress at the same pace (United Nations Security Council, 2009). The international donors demanded substantial reform in the justice system, whereas the Haitian government was more reluctant to reform it based on a plan proposed by the international donors without taking into account the needs of Haitian society (Center for International Governance Innovation, 2009).

Although the UN mission in Haiti is an integrated mission, coordination has not been effective as various parts of the reform process were covered separately by individual experts. This might be attributed to the different mandates of various organs of the UN involved in the reform process. For example, the UNDP experience and mandate are limited when it comes to the police reform (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007).

The UN and donor countries established several structures to facilitate coordination with each other in the field and with the Haitian government such as the Interim Cooperation Framework. However, it was ineffective because of the limited meeting it organized and the excluding of civil society. The poor coordination caused duplication of efforts that took part in delaying the reform process. One example of the poor coordination is the refusal of the US to share the information with the HNP or MINUSTAH of vetting Haitian police participants in police training courses until late 2006. It did not give any explanation for the cause why some individuals were not accepted to participate in the training courses. Another example is the duplication of an

early police reform plan by the Canadian and the UN mission where each of them designed its own plan without consulting each other (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007).

4.1.3. Afghanistan

Coordination among international donors has been a challenging issue at various phases of the security sector reform process in Afghanistan. At an early stage, the lack of coordination was attributed to the outcome of the Bonn Conference 2001 which was followed by the G8 (2002) Geneva meeting that yielded what is called "individual nation leadership" based on distributing responsibilities for financing and implementing of various SSR activities to the five major donors (Fields & Ahmed, 2001). The United Nations avoided leading the international effort in Afghanistan as it chose a light footprint role from the beginning of the process although the UN established a trust fund for Law and Order to channel aid for the police reform, in conjunction with the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan by Security Council Resolution 1401(2002).

The idea behind adopting "individual nation approach" was to give donors a direct role in implementing the reform activities to ensure their sustainable support in the long-term. Despite of that, this model of distributing responsibilities among the lead donors undermined the collaboration between the five pillars of the reform activities and the coherence of the process. It caused competition over resources at the inter-agency level, aid overlap, deprived the reform process of cross-sectoral leadership, impeded, joint planning of stakeholders, and caused divisions at the intra-governmental level (Sedra, 2006). These adverse effects resulted from the differences in competencies, political interests, available resources, socio-cultural approaches to security, and methodology of the reform among the lead nations. The absence of a single leadership was critical in losing the unity of vision of the reform process in Afghanistan.

The justice sector was severely affected by the lack of coordination due to

the existence of many national and international actors participating in its reform and their competition over the right to draft the course of the reform strategy of this sector (Sedra, 2006).

The reform of the police sector was also severely affected by the limited coordination of international efforts to establish a well trained Afghan National Police (ANP). Germany was the lead nation for implementing ANP reform activities. It implemented a strategy directed to enhancing community based policing. For that purpose, it concentrated on reforming the ministry of interior, in addition to implementing long-term training programs for senior officers. The German approach did not train enough police forces to support the ongoing efforts against the insurgence as was expected by the US (Crisis Group, 2007). The slow pace of achievements in this sector prompted the United States to support training of the ANP. The US strategy was based on creating a sector that is capable of fighting against the insurgence so it supported training programs for low level officers. The inconsistency and incoherence between both approaches produced ineffective and confused results (Mackay, Sedra, and Burt, 2011). Moreover, in 2007, the United Nations, the United States, the Afghan government, and the European Union established the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) to coordinate all efforts related to ANP reform programs being funded by the UN Law of Order Fund, but the Board did not perform at full capacity until 2009. The IPCB does not cover bilateral agreements between donor countries and the Afghan Ministry of Interior which resulted in duplication of efforts and overlapping of programs (William, Caldwell, and Finney, 2010).

The slow pace of implementing activities of the reform process was due to a coordination gap. It pushed the U.S. in 2006 to provide the largest financial assistance to three of the five pillars of the reform process. This was not sufficient to improve the poor coordination issues as other lead nations did not like the US intervention in programs they were managing. The controlling role of the U.S. in implementing most of the SSR activities in Afghanistan has been considered by some scholars as one of the reasons that led to the failure of the Afghan reform process (Sedra, 2007).

4.1.4. Summary of Coordination of Case Studies

The establishment of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool for Sierra Leone unified the efforts of all UK internal agencies that were mandated to provide SSR assistance, as well as it helped in the coordination of programs and activities of different local agencies in the host country. At the same time, it enhanced the cooperation with the other donor partners.

While in Haiti, coordination among the UN's internal agencies and with other international and national stakeholders dealing with SSR activities have met some problems which negatively affected the implementation of many reform programs in DDR, police, prison, and justice system. The existence of several structures dedicated for enhancing coordination among SSR stakeholders in the case of Haiti did not serve the purpose for which they were established because those structures have not operated properly.

In the case of Afghanistan, the lack of coordination in the early stages of the reform process and the fragmentation of responsibilities among lead nations implementing reform programs have led to uneven progress in the five pillars of the security sector reform process. Although a committee serving under the Afghan National Security Council was established to monitor and coordinate all security sector strategies, a coordination gap still exists in the SSR international efforts because this committee is not endowed with sufficient resources or the authority to perform its objectives, in addition to the burden added by another gap at the operational level (Sedar, 2005).

4.2. National Ownership

The international assistance for SSR should be designed as demand-driven to meet the needs and priorities of citizens of recipient country (Brzoska, 2006). It should also be designed to take local social backgrounds, cultural backgrounds, and legal framework into considerations to ensure its sustainability. Consequently, one format will not fit all recipient countries, as conditions determining SSR differ significantly from one state to another.

Lack of ownership, due to donor driven-programs and funding, alters agent-principle accountability relationship between local government and private contractors who implement the reform projects (Panarelli, 2010). International donors become the principle in this relationship, and control the oversight mechanism rather than national authorities and their citizens.

When local actors have conflicting concepts and priorities, insufficient resources for the reform process, and limited capacity and technical skills to design the security reform strategies, international donors find it difficult to promote local ownership at the onset of the process. Hence, they undertake drafting and planning of the reform programs alone without involving local actors in this stage. Predominance of international actors' agenda on the process may be inevitable in this case and the resulting strategy may not be suitable for domestic circumstances, especially if programs are financially beyond the national capability and unsustainable without international assistance. Additionally, they may be turned down in the future by the local people. In order to avoid such consequences, international donors should start at an early stage focusing on the development of a common domestic vision among local stakeholders about the reform process to ensure their future support and engagement in the implementation of reform programs. Initiation of national dialogue among all local stakeholders - elites, minorities, and civil society - is required to build up a national consensus on the fundamental outlines of the security reform strategy. This dialogue helps in identifying priorities and realities on the ground and helps in promoting the support of local stakeholders for implementing the reform programs (Panarelli, 2010).

Participation of local stakeholders must be ensured in the planning and the implementation stages to facilitate the designing of a realistic strategy that takes into account the size of security forces, institutions, and the capability of the national government to provide sufficient resources after the cessation of international assistance. Moreover, enhancing national capacity is required to enable local actors to sustain reform after the withdrawal of international advisors.

4.2.1. Sierra Leone

Five years after the end of civil war, Sierra Leone conducted a peaceful general election in 2007 without international peacekeeping assistance for the first time in two decades. This is considered as a clear evident of the success of the SSR in Sierra Leone. While external financial assistance and international advisor support were fundamental for the success in this country, Sierra Leonean national ownership saved the reform process during difficult times. The memorandum of understanding between the UK and Sierra Leonean Government sets out the latter government's commitments in the security sector reform, along with UK commitments on technical and financial support (Ginifer and Oliver, 2004).

There has been a strong and concrete commitment to the reform process from the Sierra Leonean president and other senior civil officials who played a significant role in promoting public support for the SSR. Sierra Leone citizens as well as political leaders realizing the importance SSR in preventing conflict is one of the main reasons that illustrated the cause behind why the SSR process remained on track in Sierra Leone. On the other hand, there has been a core group of operational actors in Sierra Leone, senior military and police officials, who have effectively kept managing the reform process consistently with the help of international experts (Albrecht, & Jackson, 2009). When the international advisers were changing frequently, Sierra Leone officials remained stable.

4.2.2. Haiti

The limited financial resources in Haiti strongly affected the government's ability to implement security sector reform programs without the help of the UN, the US, France, and Canada. However, it was clear at an early stage that there has been a lack of Haitian ownership over the reform programs. In February 2006, a plan for Haiti National Police reform was written by the UN mission without the participation of Haitian authorities and society. This plan was not accepted by national police officers as it gave broad mandate to the UN mission, so the plan failed and was declared annulled. A new reform plan was approved by the government on the 8th of August in 2006 (*Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007)*. However, the implementation of this plan has been subjected to financial constrains and relied heavily upon international donors. The failure of the first police reform plan illustrates the national ownership is a fundamental key for the sustainability of the reform process.

Officials from Haiti have been considering that the reform process was being driven by international donors with a limited role left for the Haitian government - in addition to the tendency of international donors to implement reform's strategies that do not take into account local realties, as well as the insufficient understanding of donors of government priorities. The Haitian officials have shown hesitancy towards programs implementation. Moreover, the civil society in Haiti believes that the reform agenda is imposed by the external actors without considering the needs of the Haitian community (Center for International Governance Innovation, 2009).

4.2.3. Afghanistan

The Afghan government has not received support of the international community to play a substantial role in setting the priorities and drawing the broad lines of the security reform process. A former Afghan Interior Minister pointed out that the Bonn agreement should have ensured more Afghan ownership and made Afghan government the lead nation with the donor countries as supporting partners (Jalali,

2006).

One example of the lack of ownership is the strategy for DDR, which was one of the most urgent sectors of the reform process to be achieved. It was prepared by the lead nation, Japan, and the UN without participation of the Afghanistan government which went along with this plan due to its limited financial resources (Nathan, 2007). The donor-driven strategy together with the limited capacity of the Afghan security force, which was in charge of implementing DDR on the ground, added extra complexity of achieving any progress in disarmament of the armed groups.

Another example is the reform of the ANA. In the first two years of the SSR, the role of the Afghan Ministry of Defense was limited in terms of planning, implementing, and prioritizing the reform of the Army which was driven by the United States because of the mistrust in the Defense Minister at that time, Mohammed Fahim. The appointment of a new Minister in December 2004 encouraged the United States to change its approach and allowed the Afghan authorities to participate in the ANA reform (Sedra, 2006).

Another example is the allocation of funds for SSR which does not go through the Afghan national budget, but each one of the lead nations directly disburses aid to the pillar it manages or through private contractors. This undermines the government institutional capacity which is required to be enhanced to ensure sustainability of the process. In addition to that, it caused uneven distribution of funds on different pillars of the SSR where the ANA received the biggest share of the assistance spending while the justice and police pillars got a less share of funds. As a consequence of this the army forces were being paid more than the police which resulted in police protests (Nathan, 2007).

Although the SSR in Afghanistan has been designed and directed as donor-based approach for long time due to of the limited capacity of the Afghan security authorities, the lead nations did not pay attention to develop this capacity afterward, because of the rampant corruption of the Afghan institutions. In this context, a viable exit strategy for international forces from this country necessitates the existence of

strong national institutions capable of providing security for citizens and to fight against insurgence.

4.2.4. Summary of Ownership of Case Studies

The strong Sierra Leonean leadership and the existence of a national core team were crucial in asserting local ownership and guiding the reform process which in turn has enhanced the role of the Sierra Leonean in decision-making throughout the whole period of SSR. On the other hand, the absence of strong and stable political system in Haiti and its limited capacity undermined the assertion of local ownership of the reform process being implemented under the umbrella of international donors whose agenda prevailed over local interests.

While in Afghanistan, the SSR short-term vision of the lead nations for quick fixes and restore immediate stability obscured an important fact that local ownership and fostering national capacity are the only guarantee for long-term sustainability of process. International donors did not consult Afghan leaders throughout different stages of the reform process which undermined Afghan local ownership. In addition to that, about 82 percent of the total international assistance is disbursed through parallel programs that bypass the regular government budget system which further weakens the national oversight mechanism and the capacity of the local authorities to choose reform programs according to their national priorities.

4.3. The Capacities and Commitments of International Donors

The process of security sector reform involves institutional transformation and societal engineering that requires a long duration of time before positive outcomes can be seen. Thus, it needs a long-term commitment in terms of political support from all stakeholders, local and international, in conjunction with extensive financial support to succeed. The structural reform and societal engineering of the SSR enhance state-building efforts and prevent political crisis relapses in post-conflict situations that

ultimately help to achieve a lasting peace and stability. Taxpayers of donor countries and citizen of recipient countries should be informed about the prolonged nature of the SSR and not to give the impressions of having unrealistic quick and high expectations that can cause early destabilization of the reform process (Sedra, 2010). In addition to that, effective implementation of donor commitments requires enough financial resources backed out by professional human resources empowered with a wide range of knowledge to ease the SSR multidisciplinary approach. Hence, the weakness of the international donor's SSR capacity and the dearth of experts who had been involved in reform programs and projects affect the implementation of SSR projects and the empowering of experienced local reformers (Ball & Hendrickson, 2005).

DDR programs offer a good example of long-term perspectives of SSR. Reintegration of former combatants into peacetime society requires a lengthy commitment of international donors through their investments in recipient countries' trust funds for a prolong duration to ensure the success of the process. However, donors prefer cutting down the size of military forces or they tend to provide support for other SSR programs rather than continuing funding DDR projects for long time (Hendrickson, 1999). Hence, the engaging of international donors in SSR entails a change in their approaches and policies to ensure the achievement of the reform process's goals.

In addition to the strong political commitment, long-term support of international donors should go beyond mere pledges to substantial disbursements of financial assistance until local stakeholders create sustainable funding resources and become capable enough to finance, manage and monitor their own security sector. Otherwise, unfulfilled expectations of local stakeholders can undermine the wider goals of the reform process (*Bryden, & Hänggi, 2005)*.

The international assistance committed in a given year is usually disbursed over several years. Disbursements reflect the level and amount of assistance actually made available to recipient countries in any given year. Effective implementation of various SSR projects and programs requires steady and predictable international

assistance, because unanticipated shifts in aid flows undermine budget management and threaten effective delivery of basic services and can damage weak public sectors in recipient countries. The unpredictability of assistance further complicates the ability of SSR stakeholders to implement long-term programs and projects; and instead they follow piecemeal approaches that may avoid addressing the underlying causes of conflicts in the recipient countries.

Moreover, extreme volatility in international assistance levels complicates the ability of governments to create long-term SSR plans, let alone its damaging impact on ongoing projects. Any increments in SSR progress, such as increased soldiers enrollment or judicial reform, during the years that the assistance is steady are offset by decreases in other years when the country is subjected to aid volatility. The lack of coordination among donors may further lead to volatility of assistance flows to recipient countries. In this context, the OECD-DAC has stressed the importance of donor's cooperation to enhance aid predictability to enable recipient governments to manage and plan their budget more effectively. Such cooperation covers a broad range of actors, including those involved in peacekeeping and post-conflict advisors, with domestic and international donor agencies such as the World Bank as well as non-governmental organizations (Hendrickson, 1999).

4.3.1. Sierra Leone

There has been a strong consensus amongst international donors to assist Sierra Leone to become a stable country and on the appropriate approach needed to address this aim (OECD, 2010). The donors' commitment is reflected in a consistently high level of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Sierra Leone. The total ODA net disbursement to Sierra Leone exceeds donors' pledges in almost every year during 2001 -2007 (table 3)


Table 3: Official Development Assistance to Sierra Leone (2001-2007, USD million)

Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
ODA total net Disbursements	334.54	383.13	337.09	376.06	339.66	337.22	539.92
ODA total net Commitments	275.66	263.75	440.04	277.77	317.15	244.03	545.27

Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

International support for Sierra Leone was consolidated because of the lead role played by the UK that fostered international efforts dedicated to SSR in this country, and built a common understanding of the complexities associated with the reform process of the security sector with a strong emphasis on the fear of a relapse of the civil war that ended in 2002. This support has been a critical factor in providing the financial assistance and the technical expertise required for success of the reform process. Data from the OECD shows that the total ODA net disbursement used for the SSR in Sierra Leone exceeded donors' commitments in various phases of the reform process during the period 2002-2011(Figure 1).

Figure 1: Total ODA for Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone (2002-2011, USD million)



Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

Moreover, joint strategies were developed by major donors to align their efforts to the broad government reform agenda that tackled the root causes of the conflict. Those strategies included: the Joint Vision for Sierra Leone of the United Nations Family, the European Commission/DFID Joint Assistance Strategy, and the African Development Bank/World Bank Joint Assistance Strategy. In this context, it was agreed that the UK government would concentrate first on supporting the progress on security and developing the main capacities of the state to promote peace (table 1). Service delivery and support of economic growth was considered to be enhanced in the second phase of the reform.

Consequently, the focus of major donors during the period of 2000-2005 was on both conflict prevention and peace-building challenges. ODA Statistics from the OECD (table 4) show that expenditure on Peace-building process was equivalent to 79% of the total ODA received by Sierra Leone in 2000-2005 (OECD, 2008). Furthermore, Sierra Leone was the first country to benefit from a formally agreed United Nations Peace-building Co-operation Framework and an Integrated UN Peace-building Mission (UNIPSIL).

Table 4: Peacekeeping expenditures in Sierra Leone (2000-2005, USD million)

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total	% of ODA
Peace-keeping expenditures	521	618	603	449	265	86	2542	79%

Source: OECD (2008), *Annual OECD Report on Resource Flows to Fragile States*, OECD, Paris. Retrieved from this link *www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/14/43293581.pdf.*

4.3.2. Haiti

4.3.2.1. Capacity of International Donors

Although the UN has been helping many countries in the field of security sector reform, including Haiti, the SSR capacity of the organization has remained limited during the period of 2004-2008 as human resources capacity was found to be inefficient, scattered, and fragmented at the mission and headquarters levels. This was attributed to the absence of a dedicated SSR inter-agency unit at the UN Headquarters in charge of providing institutional memory (knowledge, lessons learned, and examples of best practice) and putting general guidelines on how SSR units should operate on the ground (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*. This institutional gap undermined the ability of the organization to coordinate between inter-agencies and with other international stakeholders as well as to assess the effectiveness of the assistance provided for SSR projects in the field.

In terms of efforts on the ground, the UN mission's capacity related to SSR activities was limited due to many factors, such as the lack of empowered dedicated sections or units in the mission to cover these activities. Besides that, SSR activities have been fragmented across various sections of the UN country team in Haiti. There has been lack of sufficient staff and SSR advisors in the mission as mandated by the Security Council Resolutions, which further complicated and weakened the performance of the mission and the UN in this field. Even when the issue of understaffing in the mission is resolved, the short period for UN staff to serve on the ground caused loss of institutional memory[3], which is another limitation of the SSR support provided by the UN mission in Haiti (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*.

According to a Canadian observer who participated in many joint Haitian National Police projects financed by Canada, the UN might not be the best option to implement the SSR needs because of the short-term deployments of peacekeeper officers, different backgrounds of UN advisors, and its recruitment process (Center for

[3] The period for UN staff to serve on the ground does not exceed on year per assignment.

International Governance Innovation, 2011: 9). Moreover, in December 2006, the Justice Section of the UN mission, MINUSTAH, was operating at less than half percent of its required advisors and the police section had less than that percentage which affected negatively the capability of the mission in addressing the reform process in a holistic way (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*. In addition to that, the lack of advisors who speak the French language is also a burden to be taken in consideration.


4.3.2.2. Financial Resources for Security Sector Reform

The UN depends on assessed financial contributions by Member States to cover the human resources in peacekeeping missions. However, SSR projects are funded through trust funds which depend on voluntary contributions. Furthermore, although the UNDP is one of the UN key agencies being involved in the SSR activities, many of the SSR projects do not qualify for assistance from the UNDP due to the fact that certain aspects of several SSR projects, such as restructuring and training of military forces, are excluded from the developmental assistance according to the OECD perspective (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*. The overall result is that the amount of financial resources available for UN's SSR projects is limited. As a result of this, SSR projects supported by the UN in Haiti were designed to be low cost to ensure that the available resources would cover those projects, which subsequently have modest impacts on the community.

On the other hand, assistance is not fairly disbursed amongst various aspects of the SSR in Haiti. Projects in some areas, such as the police, are given more resources by donors than other areas like judicial and prison systems (Center for International Governance Innovation, 2009). As of December 2006 there was no judicial reform had taken place, which is attributed to the mistrust between the international donors and the transitional government in Haiti at that time. Furthermore, reform of the judicial sector at a later stage was severely affected by the limited resources available for the UN mission to implement projects related to this sector due to the scarce of substantial funding from the international donors over the past ten

years (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*. Another example is the implementation of the DDR which was weakened by the intermittent release of funds by donors. A grant in the amount of $3.7 million was approved in 2005, but it was released one month before the new budget of following year (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*.

Figure 2: Official Development Assistance to Haiti (2003-2011, USD million)



Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

According to OECD statistics, the total net ODA disbursement in Haiti is less than donors' pledges during 2003-2011, which show the financing gap that the Haitian government had to face. This gap severely increased after 2010 earthquake (figure 2).

Table 5: Net ODA Disbursements for all sectors compared ODA for SSR in Haiti (2004-2011, USD million)

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total ODA for all sectors	255.15	512.76	530.38	596.09	802.45	1976.96	3895.39	1698.24
Total ODA for SSR	2.64	22.19	31.93	32.90	91.63	71.41	108.44	119.13

Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

The failure of donor countries to fulfill their commitments affected the progress of the security reform process because of the share of SSR from the disbursed assistance was dramatically affected as priorities were given to humanitarian and development needs (table 5). In addition to that, the total ODA net disbursement to SSR programs and projects is less than donors' pledges during the period 2004-2011 (table 6).

Table 6: Net ODA for Security Sector Reform in Haiti (2004-2011, USD million)

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total Commitments	22.5	27.4	46.3	52.9	124.7	61.1	139.1	212.7
Total Gross Disbursements	2.6	22.2	31.9	32.9	91.6	71.4	108.4	119.1

Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

4.3.3. Afghanistan

4.3.3.1. Capacity of Donor Countries

The separated SSR responsibilities of lead nations set up in the Bonn agreement created conflicting views of the reform of various pillars of SSR among those nations who interpreted their responsibilities in different ways. Moreover, the limited capacity and poor experience of some lead nations in implementing reform in the relevant pillars undermined the progress of the reform of those pillars. For example, Germany was the lead nation for police reform. As discussed in the previous section, Berlin adopted a long-term approach of reforming the police sector where it understood its mandate was only to coordinate the reform of this sector, not to build it from the bottom-top (Serchuk, 2006). Consequently, Germany reopened the police academy in 2002 for the training of high rank police officers and had never focused on training of low rank officers. Berlin only deployed about 40 German police advisors which were far from the actual need to implement a comprehensive approach of mentoring the new police as the United States did with the army. In terms of funds, Germany disbursed €70 million between 2002 and 2006. The outcome of this limited capacity was the graduation of 251 Afghan officers from the academy in August 2005 (Crisis Group, 2007).

The blurred strategic vision of Germany, lack of resources, and the need for deployment of larger number of well trained police forces in 2003 pushed the United States to engage in the reform of police programs. The U.S. Department of Defense was authorized to implement U.S. supported police programs in Afghanistan because the U.S. does not have a national police force or police advisors to be sent abroad. Because of the limited capacity of the Department of Defense in terms of police training, it depended on a private contractor, DynCorp, to train the Afghan police officers (Serchuk, 2006). The U.S. disbursed around at $2.1 billion to support police training programs between 2003 and 2006. On the other hand, the European Council authorized the European Union Police Mission to assume responsibility of police


reform instead of Germany in the summer of 2007, but the small numbers of its forces in addition to the poor coordination hindered its role in this sector (Crisis Group, 2007).

4.3.3.2. Financial Resources for Security Sector Reform

A successful SSR necessitates a long-term commitment of international donors alongside the disbursement of a durable assistance. However, in the Afghanistan case, donors have implemented a short-term SSR approach in funding, equipment and training programs. This undermined the effectiveness of the reform process and caused a slow capacity building of the Afghan government.

The amount of annual ODA increased form a total of $3.2 billion in commitment in early 2002 to $16.8 billion by the end of 2010. Furthermore, 2010 witnessed a peak increased in assistance commitment. However, the total amount of actual assistance disbursed has only been $ 10.9 billion (figure3), which represents 65% of commitments (Afghan Ministry of Finance, 2010).

Figure 3: Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan (2002-2010 USD billion) Commitments vs. actual disbursement



Source: Afghan Development Cooperation Report 2010 p.18

In terms of the volume of the disbursed ODA, the United States has been the largest donor, followed by Japan, and then the European Union since 2002 (table 7). The U.S. Department of Defense has disbursed $29.05 billion as security assistance between 2002 and 2011 (Afghan Ministry of Finance, 2012).


Table 7: Top 10 international donors (2002 -2011, USD billion) in Afghanistan

Rank	Donor	2002-2011 Commitment	2002-2011 Disbursement
1	United States of America	57,383	47,524
2	Japan	3,821	3,821
3	European Union/European Commission	3,077	2,816
4	United Kingdom	2,574	2,578
5	Germany	2,435	978
6	Asian Development Bank	2,400	1,129
7	World Bank	2,378	1,852
8	India	1,588	759
9	Canada	1,371	1,371
10	Netherlands	1,109	1,110

Source: Afghan Development Cooperation Report 2012 p.48

The failure of international donors to fulfill their committed assistance has represented a persistent obstacle. International donors have paid $57 billion out of their commitment ($69 billion) by the end of 2010, although 82% of this amount was disbursed directly by donors through parallel channels that bypass the Afghan budget. Furthermore, 51% of the $57 billion was spent on security reform programs between 2002 and 2010 and the remaining 49% was allocated to development programs distributed on different sectors (Afghan Ministry of Finance, 2010). On the other hand, in 2011, 68% of total aid disbursed was allocated to security sector, 95% of it was given by the US, 3% by Japan, and 1% by EU. Figure (4) shows aid disbursement according to sectors in 2011 (Afghan Ministry of Finance, 2012).


Figure 4: ODA disbursement according to sectors in Afghanistan 2011



Source: Afghan Development Cooperation Report 2012 p.14

A comparison between international assistance allocated for counterinsurgency and assistance directed towards security sector reform in Afghanistan shows $242.9 billion and $16.1 billion respectively during the period 2002-2009 (figure 5) (Poole, 2011). This illustrates that the international community focuses on a quick fix the insecurity in Afghanistan more than its concentration on the reform of the security sector, which is vital for ensuring stability and counterinsurgency in long-term perspective.

Figure 5: Security and Military Expenditures in Afghanistan (2002–2009 USD billion)




Source: Poole, Lydia. 2011 "Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002-2010," Development Initiatives, January 2011, accessed on 24 June 2011 at http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/afghanistan-tracking-major-resource-flows-2002-2010 page 2

Although massive amounts of assistance flowed to Afghanistan in the last decade, much of it was wasted due to the ineffective management of many reform programs. The limited governmental absorptive capacity, rampant corruption, and the deteriorated security situation that hinders the implementing of projects may justify the failing of donors to deliver on committed aid. To address this persistent problem, many international conferences have been organized since the Bonn Conference in December 2001. The last one was hold in Tokyo in 2012 which stressed the need for donors to fulfill their commitments.

Uneven allocation of assistance to the five pillars of SSR was clear. Police and justice were the most affected pillars. According to the World Bank, 60% of the

SSR spending was on the army between 2002 and 2005, 28% on police and 3% on justice in the same period (World Bank, 2005) (figure 6). In addition to the lack of resources, the slow pace of reform of the justice sector can also be attributed partially to the lack of competence and low expertise of Italy, the lead nation of this sector, in terms of implementing justice programs in post-conflict countries (Goodhand, and Bergne, 2004).

Figure 6: Composition of Security Expenditures in Afghanistan, 2002-2005



Source: adopted form World Bank, 2005, "Afghanistan, Managing Public Finances for Development", vol. I, Improving Public Financial Management in the Security Sector (34582-AF), World Bank, 22 December 2005, p. 43

The long-term success of the SSR in Afghanistan would be determined by the ability of the Afghan Government to provide security to its citizens after the departure of foreign troops in 2014. Although international donors have pledged to continue assisting Afghanistan in the future, the Afghan government needs to raise domestic revenue to be able to pay for the security expenditures it faces, especially with the

failure of donors to fulfill their commitments during the previous period and the diminishing tendency of aid. This will put the government under huge fiscal burden in the coming years as decreasing international assistance and the lack of resources would deeply harm the security sector (Sedra, 2007).

4.3.4. Summary of Capacity and Commitment of Case Studies

The UK government's long-term political commitment to continue security assistance to Sierra Leone was critical for consolidating the efforts of international donor partners to reform the Security Sector in the country. At the same time, the UK government's financial assistance was strong and steady during all phases of the reform process.

While in the case of Haiti, the overall UN capacity in providing SSR assistance to the Haitian government was limited during the period of this study. Even when required capacity exists, it remains scattered, fragmented, and poorly coordinated. The creation of a joint JSSR unit at the UN headquarters in 2007 was not associated with a similar initiative in the UN mission in Haiti. This further undermined the UN capability to provide the required assistance for the reform process in the country, especially with existence of the large numbers of departments and agencies on the ground which cover the SSR activities. In addition to that, the lack of sufficient resources allocated to justice system and DDR, as well as the volatility of disbursement of financial assistance to programs of police reform, hindered the progress of the overall implementation of the SSR process.

In Afghanistan, despite the intense international assistance that has been disbursed on the security sector reform over the past ten years, the Afghan government was not able to provide effective security and stability in areas outside provincial capitals. Several factors contributed to the failure to achieve the envisaged reform which includes; (i) ineffective management of assistance allocation and disbursement by international donors; (ii) uneven distribution of assistance on the five pillars of SSR;

(iii) the limited governmental absorptive capacity; and (iv) the rampant corruption among Afghan officials. There were also limited capacity of government officials and poor experience of some lead nations in implementing reform programs in the related pillars which consequently undermined the progress of the process as a whole.

V. SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN YEMEN

Yemen witnessed a popular uprising inspired by the Arab spring, demanding that President Ali Abdullah Saleh step down in 2011. A political compromise had been reached on 23 November 2011 under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) after more than 10 months of public uprising. The GCC-Initiative forced a power transfer deal through the election of the vice President, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, as consensus president on the 21st of February 2012. It also instituted a two-year political transition process that should end in February 2014. The country launched a National Dialogue Conference on the 18th of March 2013 which represents a unique chance for establishing a new constitutional order, implementing fundamental reforms in state's institutions and improving the quality of governance.

5.1. Current security situation in Yemen

Since the reunification of Yemen in May 1990, the country has been experiencing number of serious security challenges that undermined its capacity to deliver basic services to people, in addition to the loss of monopoly over legitimate violence by the state. Yemen currently confronts simultaneous political, security, and economical crises.

Security threats include terrorist groups that have been attacking state's institutions since 2000. Al-Qaeda's branches in Yemen and Saudi Arabia merged in January 2009 and formed al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). It spread throughout the country, has engaged in a powerful fight against the state's military forces since 2011, and took over several towns in the southern part of the country. Although the state's security forces recaptured areas that had fallen under Al-Qaeda control in June 2012, terrorist elements have fled into major cities where they have been attacking several military and political targets, which constitute a serious threat on security and stability in the country. Furthermore, AQAP threats are not limited to

Yemen, where it claimed responsibility for the attempt to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight over the U.S. in December 2009 (Crisis Group, 2012).

On top the spread of Al Qaeda, the northern part of Yemen has witnessed a serious conflict as a result of the growing of the Houthi movement and its control over a large portion of that region since 2004. The Huothi movement led to the outbreak of six wars with the state's security forces and, yet, a resolution of this conflict has not been reached.

In the south, another movement, known as the Hiraak, started in 2007 as a rights-based popular protest demanding land reform and equal access to public offices and services. The government was ignoring this movement until 2009 when it began to call for the separation of the southern part and the return of the situation to what it was before the reunification. The failure of the government to address the root causes of this movement as soon as possible will escalate the deteriorated situation in this region of the country that ultimately may lead to the eruption of violence.

In addition to these three major security challenges, Yemen suffers from tribal conflicts that undermine state's authority outside major cities. The monopoly of power in Yemen is not confined to the state and its security forces, but extends to other local actors such as armed tribesmen as well as the Jihadist elements affiliated to al-Qaeda. It is resulted from the state's inability to control over all regions of the country, which is exacerbated by the widespread availability of weapons in the hands of citizens.

Kidnapping of foreigner tourists is another challenge to security forces in the country which is carried out by armed tribesmen who ask for ransom. The tribesmen have demands related to the development of their regions, or exert pressure on the government to release members of their tribes who have been arrested by the state. Also, the piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden at the southern gate of Yemen poses a significant threat to the lives of Yemeni fisherman and the maritime shipment to Yemen ports.

5.2. Security Institutions in Yemen[4]

The reunification of Yemen was followed by the merging of the security institutions and forces of the North and the South which were contradictory in military and intellectual doctrines as well as they were different professionally. The united security forces suffered from split of loyalties, which is not limited to the North and South but extends to the personal and tribal level. Besides that, the new security forces became inflated - in terms of large number of institutions and soldiers - that added extra financial burden on the state, let alone the overlapping of functions and mandates of various security apparatuses, and the lack of professionalism (Al-Mikhlafi, & Al Rahabi, 2012).

Moreover, there has been a rampant corruption in security institutions due to the ineffective performance of the state's oversight mechanisms and the loss of transparency in managing security expenditures, because the parliament approves it as unclassified expenditures (Al-Mikhlafi, & Al Rahabi, 2012). A country-wide survey was conducted early this year to examine public perception of security forces in Yemen. The survey reveals that 71.5% of the participated peoples perceive security institutions as ineffective if not absent (Yemen Polling Center, 2013).

There has been poor coordination between the ministries of interior, justice, and defense which resulted in overlapping and duplication of functions between the army and police that caused ineffective provision of security in urban areas and limited policing in rural areas and borders (Sayigh, 2009).

While Yemen was in the midst of the popular uprising, the military-security forces became divided on March 21st, 2011 after Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmer[5], the commander of 1st Armored Division, announced that his troops would protect protesters. Other commanders, including some in the air force joined Mohsen in

[4] In Yemen the term "security institutions" only covers Ministry of Interior and its affiliated entities but not Military forces and Ministry of Defense. This thesis uses security sector or institutions in this chapter to refer to military-security sector and institutions as it refers in other part of the thesis.

[5] Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmer is the commander of 1st Armored Division and North West Military Region who was a long-time ally of the President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

supporting the uprising. On the other hand, the well-trained and equipped Republican Guard under the president's son continued its loyalty to the President. The fragmentation of the Army made the security situation more complicated. Although a GCC-brokered political compromise was signed in November 2011, the security institutions have remained divided for a long time after the election of a new President in February 2012 who later issued a series of presidential decrees aimed at ending this fragmentation.

The current structure of the security institutions in Yemen consists of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and intelligence agencies that include the National Security Bureau (NSB) and the Central Agency for Political Security. There are around 100,000 police officers in the Ministry of Interior and the subsidiary apparatuses that operate under its authority, mainly the Special Security Agency, the General Security Agency, and the General Administration to Counter Terrorism and Organized Crime which assumes responsibilities of combating terrorism (Al-Mikhlafi, & Al Rahabi, 2012). The Ministry of Defense controls the military forces and institutions. The hierarchy of Yemeni Armed Forces is composed of seven military districts corresponding to geographical regions of the country. The Armed forces has around 138,000 personnel (Nation master, 2013).

5.3. Security Sector Reform in Yemen

Reform of the security sector in Yemen is one of the main obligations of the GCC-Initiative to restore stability in the country, where it states that the transitional government should *"create the necessary conditions and take the necessary steps to integrate the armed forces under unified, national and professional leadership in the context of the rule of law"* (Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, 2011, article 17).

The reform process started two months after the inauguration of the elected President Hadi's in February 2012. The first step of the process intended to unify the fragmented security sector and abolish the influence of powerful military figures through the reassignment and removal of the prominent commanders affiliated to the

previous president Ali Saleh and his opponent, Ali Mohsen. On December 19th, 2012, another Presidential decree was issued and aimed at the dissolution of the First Armored Division and the Republican Guard which were responsible for the fragmentation of the Army. At the same time, the decree stated that the military forces consisted of five branches: the Army, Air Force, Navy and Border Guards, and the Strategic Reserve Force (Saba news, 2012).

The latest key step of the reform process took place by another set of presidential decrees on April 10th, 2013, which implemented a further step in breaking up patronage networks, enhancing their loyalty to the state rather than to persons or tribes, and professionalizing and reorganizing the Army forces. Many former military commanders were removed, which promotes de-personalization of the military structure (Yemen Times, 2013). This set of decrees increased the military district to seven instead of five which limits the troops subordinate to any commander which minimizes any potential opportunities for any single commander to have enough force that could pose a threat to the state as it previously happened during the political turmoil in 2011. Regarding police apparatuses, President Hadi issued a presidential decree aimed at restructuring the Ministry of Interior in February 2013. The reform plan was developed by a Yemeni team assisted by European and Jordanian experts (Yemen Fox, 2013).

5.3.1. International Assistance for SSR in Yemen


Growing international interest in Yemen reflects concerns about a new zone of instability that acts as a host to a core of trained militants who are hostile to the United States and its allies (Healy & Hill, 2010). After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the United States increased its security assistance to Yemen which focused on military, intelligence cooperation, counter terrorism, and border control. The United States informally lead the reform process in Yemen to enhance the capacity of Yemeni Forces to fight against al Qaeda (AQAP) where America's strategy considers Yemen as a front-line state in the war on terrorism (Sayigh, 2009).

The United States assisted in the establishment of the NSB and provided it with the necessary equipment such as modern data-collection systems. It also provided assistance for the newly established Counter-Terrorism Unit in the Ministry of Interior as well as surveillance systems at main airports. The United Kingdom complemented the US efforts through supporting the Counter-Terrorism unit, NSB, and Coast Guard. In addition to that, France and Italy provided some equipment for the Coast Guard such as a boat and vessel-tracking system in 2002-2006. The European Commission allocated €7.5 million as support for Police Academy modernization program in 2009 (Sayigh, 2009).

5.3.2. Security Sector Reform Challenges in Yemen

Yemen has not been a major recipient of Official Development Assistance, receiving a total of $5.5 billion USD between 1995 and 2009 (Development Initiatives, 2011). International donors, including Europe, China, the U.S. and Gulf Arab states, pledged $7.9 billion in aid to Yemen in September 2012. So far, about 1.8 billion dollars has been disbursed, including a deposit of one billion dollars in the central bank of Yemen to stabilize the local currency Figure (7) (Friends of Yemen statement, 2013).


Figure 7: Total Official Development Assistance to Yemen (2002 -2011, USD million)



Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

Regarding assistance to security sector reform, the total ODA net disbursement to SSR activities in Yemen, according the OECD-DAC data, is less than the donor countries' pledge during the period 2002 – 2011, Figure (8).

Figure 8: Total Official Development Assistance to SSR Yemen (2002 -2011, USD million)



Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

Most of the SSR assistance is disbursed on training programs that require international experts and are designed according to donor priorities as well as on purchasing military and security equipment from the donor countries (Sayigh, 2009). This undermines the ownership of the government in designing the reform process in line with the priorities and needs of the Yemeni citizens such as modernization of law enforcement agencies. Disbursement of the assistance through the regular state budget can negate this effect.

The reform of the security sector in Yemen faces a particular challenge. The focus of international donors on counter-terrorism has hindered the progress of reform in other parts of the security sector, such as the community policing and justice system that are in urgent need for enhancement in their performance and capacity to enforce court decisions as well as the elimination of corruption in the security sector. In

addition, providing assistance by international donors for certain agencies in charge of counter-terrorism operations leads to a concentration of power in a limited number of agencies that might be used by the authorities to suppress regime opponents, especially with the ineffective oversight mechanisms (Sayigh, 2009).

There is a need to integrate and restructure the fragmented security apparatuses on national foundations based on the Constitution to enhance the state authority and capacity of providing effective security and justice as well as its ability to face challenges of legitimacy from rival non-state actors such as Al-Huthi movement, armed tribesmen, and the Jihadist militants. In this context, President Hadi has initiated the process of restructuring the fragmented military-security apparatuses. However, it is still early to assess the impact of these decisions to bring about substantial structural reforms that go beyond the mere removal of prominent commanders to the implementation of long-term reform programs to ensure the provision of effective security to Yemeni citizens, rather than consolidating the president authority in these apparatuses (Albrecht, 2013).

None of the security forces are subjected to effective civilian oversight, such as the parliament's oversight mechanism, to ensure the adherence of this sector to principles of good governance, accountability and transparency (Crisis Group, 2013). Despite that, the current SSR in Yemen does not tackle this issue. There is also lack of reform programs that are aimed at the strengthening of authority in the Central Organization for Control and Accounting. This would be to audit the security sector to eliminate the rampant corruption which is one of the most notable challenges to establish an efficient security force. In this context, improving of the salaries of the Yemeni security forces and providing them with a decent life would positively affect anti-corruption measures (Al-Mikhlafi, & Al Rahabi, 2012). In turn, this necessitates a direct budgetary assistance that need a strong and long-term support of the international donors.

Reform of Yemeni security sector lacks a comprehensive strategy as prescribed by international SSR principles. Efforts should be made to lay the

foundations for a holistic strategy that take into consideration the ending of the inflated size of security forces, the overlap and duplication in their structures and competencies, and to establish an effective oversight mechanism that includes the parliament, the judicial system, and the civil society (Al-Mikhlafi, & Al Rahabi, 2012). This strategy should also outline donor's responsibilities and the role of Yemeni authorities in leading and coordinating the implementation of the reform processes.

5.4. What can Yemen Learn From the Selected Cases' Experience?

The study reveals that the impact of international assistance on security sector reform varies from case to case depending on the pattern of behavior of international donors and recipient countries in applying certain principles and measures while providing assistance and conducting the reform process.

The success of security sector reform in the Sierra Leone case illustrates the importance of the existence of a strong and coherent political leadership. The presence of a domestic team to lead the reform process and to ensure local ownership through the active participation of designing and implementing reform programs and projects that take into considerations local priorities and realties in turn guarantee the long-term sustainability of the process. On the other hand, the absence of stable political systems in Haiti and Afghanistan, in addition to the prevailing of international donors' interests from the beginning of the reform process, undermined the ability of the national governments to assert local ownership which resulted in weak SSR outcomes in both countries.

In this context, as Yemen is approaching the end of the transitional period in February 2014 where it will culminate in the election of a new parliament and political leadership. It would be in a better position to assert local ownership over the reform process, especially with its need for international assistance to sustain the implementation of the reform programs. Although Yemen has established a national committee to oversee the reform process in the security sector, there is a need to set up an empowered technical team, that encompasses experts from all security branches, in

order to manage and monitor the reform programs, and to build up the local institutional memory from the current best practices of security sector reform.

In the case of Afghanistan, the unbalance attention of international donors toward implementing a quick fix approach to fight against insurgency rather than focusing on security sector reform and other local priories was one of the main causes of slow progress in the SSR process. Yemen should take a good lesson from this case as most of its international supported security reform programs have been focusing on counter-terrorism and not reflecting the priorities of the Yemeni people who prefer to implement reform programs dedicated to enhance the capacity of the law enforcement agencies and community policing, or at least to give it adequate attention.

The failure of donor countries to fulfill their financial commitments, the volatility of international assistance, and the unbalanced disbursement of assistance impeded the progress of SSR process in Haiti. While in Sierra Leone the situation is different, where the financial and technical assistance allocated to security sector reform was not intermittent or volatile as a result of the fulfillment of donors their financial pledges. Furthermore, the disbursed assistance exceeded donors' commitments in several years, which consequently promoted the success of SSR in Sierra Leone. In this context, although Yemen has set up an "executive board on accelerated absorption of international assistance", the government of Yemen should engage in a constructive dialogue with international donors to earmark the pledges related to SSR and to accelerate assistance disbursement in due time to enable the government to complete the reform programs and to avoid the failure that occurred in Haiti.

The Afghan SSR is a donor-driven process which focused on counter-insurgency operations and the establishment of adequate army troops and police officers to fight terrorism at the expense of neglecting capacity building of the Afghan government. This is needed to sustain their financial expenditures in the long-term when assistance is ceased. As a result, the sustainability of the reform process is at stake. In this context, Yemen should bear in mind that a successful SSR necessitates

the restructuring of the overlapped apparatuses and the reduction of the already inflated size of security forces in line with security and economic challenges it faces.

Afghanistan has received a great amount of international assistance for SSR. However, the absence of a single leadership for the reform process and the differences in competencies, political interests, and available financial resources of individual donor countries undermined the advantage of abundant assistance. Without effective coordination, advances made in one part of the reform process could be negated by inaction or failures in another (Lilly, luckham, & Page, 2002). In the case of Haiti, the lack of effective coordination of SSR activities between international donors, national authorities, and the UN and its inter-agencies caused duplication of SSR programs and caused waste of scarce resources. While in the case of Sierra Leone, the UK, with its African conflict Prevention Pool, played a substantial leading role in consolidating the international SSR efforts that ultimately resulted in acceptable outcome. In this regard, as there have been several donor countries assisting Yemen to reform the security sector, Yemen should establish a strategic unit that serves as focal point for coordination and cooperation between local and international SSR stakeholders to avoid overlapping of programs and projects to reduce the operating costs and to collect and disseminate best practices related to SSR. At the same time, it is advisable that Yemen signs a memorandum of understanding with donor countries that outlines the aspects of cooperation in a definite timeframe to finish the reform process.

VI. CONCLUSION

The assessment of case studies illustrates that to build effective security institutions capable of providing efficient security, three principles should be followed. First, long-term political commitment of donor countries and durable disbursement of assistance are required to ensure the success of the reform. Second, coordination among internal agencies in donor countries and of the donor countries with other international and local partners is needed to overcome the conflicting reform strategies, priorities, or approaches resulted from the multicity of SSR stakeholders. Finally, an assertion of national authorities over local ownership of the implemented SSR programs and projects is critical for sustainability of the process.

The significant role of local ownership in the case of Sierra Leone was evident in granting of sustainability of security sector reform process. The consolidated leadership and the existence of a strong domestic team were critical for driving the reform process and saving the peace, especially as the team remained constant when international experts were being continuously changed.

The lack of Haitian ownership over the reform programs was clear at an early stage of the reform process. It is attributed to the scarce financial resources, limited capacity, and the absence of strong and stable political system in Haiti. Furthermore, the insufficient understanding of international donors for the needs of the domestic society and their inclination to implement the reform's strategies that do not take into account local realties undermined the already weak Haitian's local ownership over the reform process.

On the other hand, in the case of Afghanistan, SSR was a donor-driven process starting from the design of the strategy to the implementation and assessment due to of the limited capacity and corruption of the Afghan security authorities. Although international donors have not consulted Afghan leaders throughout various stages of the reform process and have not taken local realities and priorities into considerations, the Afghan government went along with it because of its scarce

resources. The quick fix approach of donors that focused on counter-insurgency prevailed over other local priorities and building of national capacity which is required for the sustainability of the reform process. In addition to that, the parallel systems of assistance disbursement that bypasses the government budget system further undermined the role of the local authorities in managing and implementing reform projects and programs according to their needs.

The remarkable commitment provided by the UK government and other international donor partners to prevent conflict in Sierra Leone was clear through their fulfillment of the financial obligations in due time toward the reform process in that country. The steady and continuous flow of financial aid and technical assistance ensured the viability of the reform process and enabled it to achieve its objectives.

While in Haiti case, although the United Nations has committed to implement SSR activities in Haiti, the overall capacity of the UN in providing SSR assistance was limited during the study period. The International Organization only adopted the "UN principles for SSR" in 2008 and launched the "United Nations integrated technical guidance manual on security sector reform" in March of 2013, which illustrates the absence of what is called "one United Nations approach to SSR" and a lack of a common framework for guiding UN support to SSR efforts during 2002-2010. Consequently, the existence of large number of scattered, fragmented, and poorly coordinated UN internal departments and inter agencies implementing SSR activities have undermined the UN SSR efforts at the Headquarter and Mission levels. In addition to that, international assistance was not fairly channeled to various aspects of SSR, such as the police training programs which were given more resources by donors than other areas like judicial and prison systems as international and domestic actors have been poorly coordinated. Furthermore, the volatility of international assistance to police reform programs hindered the progress of the overall SSR process.

In the case of Afghanistan, donors' short-term commitments toward counterinsurgency operations obscured the long-term security sector reform which is more critical for both provision of security and counterinsurgency in the long-term

perspective. The disbursement of most of the international assistance was channeled to army and police training programs designed for supporting counterinsurgency operations while the needs of community policing and other pillars of security sector reform, such as justice system, were under-resourced relative to the army and police. In addition to that, the limited SSR experience and the lack of resources from some donors hindered implementing reform programs in the related pillars which consequently affected the progress of the process as a whole. Furthermore, although the established large number of Afghan National Security Forces is required for fighting insurgency, it is beyond the ability of the Afghan government to sustain their salaries and expenditures in future without long-term supply of financial resource from the international donors.

Coordination among internal UK governmental agencies in charge of security sector reform in Sierra Leone was augmented by adopting a consistent approach amongst its domestic relevant stakeholders, the ACPP, which served as a focal point that enhanced the communication, resource management, policy making, and information sharing. The early engagement in the reform process and the establishment of ACPP give the British government the lead in coordination and allowed for sharing of the best practices with other international donor partners.

While in the Haiti case, the absence of a strategic unit at the UN headquarters and its mission left an integrated approach to implement SSR activities which undermined the UN SSR efforts at the headquarters and mission levels. Consequently, inter-agency cooperation and coordination were found to be inefficient, as most responsibilities related to SSR activities were scattered and fragmented internally in various sections of the UN mission in Haiti. This affected the implementation of SSR on the ground negatively. Furthermore, the coordination efforts between international stakeholders in the field in Haiti were inconsistent and insufficient to enhance the reform process as approaches differed depending on donor's unilateral strategies and capacities. This would result in duplication of efforts that took part in delaying the reforms. In addition to that the establishment of several structures dedicated to

enhancing coordination among SSR stakeholders in Haiti did not serve the purpose for which they were established because those structures have not operated properly.

In the Afghanistan case, coordination and cooperation of international donors have been challenging issues at various phases of the reform process. The absence of a single leadership for the whole reform process, which resulted after the adoption of distributing responsibilities among lead donor nations, was critical in losing the unity of vision of SSR stakeholders. It also undermined the collaboration between the five pillars of security reform activities and the coherence of the process as it triggered competition over resources, aid overlap, and divisions at the intra-governmental level. Moreover, the differences in competencies, political interests, available resources, socio-cultural approaches to security, and methodology of reform among the lead nations have resulted in inconsistency and incoherence between reform approaches that further produced ineffective and confused results which led to duplication of efforts and overlapping of programs.

Yemen needs international assistance to continue SSR to build an effective security sector that is capable of providing efficient security and stability in the country. Yemen should establish an empowered national technical team to monitor and manage the reform programs and to help the political leadership to effectively assert local ownership over the process. At the same time, a strategic coordination unit should be set up to harmonize the SSR cooperation between various local and international stakeholders engaging in the reform process.

The case studies demonstrate the negative impact arising from the absence of long-term commitments of donor countries to ensure the sustainability of the reform process, hence the government of Yemen should convince international donors to fulfill their pledges and to accelerate the release of assistance to avoid the falling in problems experienced by Afghanistan and Haiti resulted from donors' short-term approaches.

Most international assistance in the security sector in Yemen is spent on training and equipping the military for fighting terrorism, whereas other sections of this

sector are not participating directly in counter-terrorism and receive less assistance. Yemen needs to develop a holistic SSR strategy that covers all parts of the military-security sector equally, reflects priorities and the local realities, and propose a realistic vision for the appropriate size of the already inflated security force in conformity with security and economic challenges it faces. In doing this, Yemen should benefit from the experiences of countries that have long practice in this area, such as the United Kingdom.

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ABSTRACT

The Impact of International Assistance on Security Sector Reform: A Case Study of Sierra Leone, Haiti and Afghanistan What Can Yemen Learn?

Adel Hamoud Hamoud Al-Sheikh
International Cooperation
Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

International donors have become more interested and involved in efforts related to the security sector reform (SSR) in countries emerging from conflicts, despite of the fact that this field is a relatively new as it appeared in late 1990s.

This thesis explores factors that influence the success and failure of international assistance for security sector reform in developing countries. To achieve this aim, this thesis evaluates how international assistance disbursement's practices influence SSR using internationally supported security sector reform in Sierra Leone, Haiti, and Afghanistan as case studies. It examines the practical applicability of three key principles, "coordination, local ownership, and long-term commitment", by international and local SSR stakeholders and evaluates the relationships between this applicability and the effectiveness of SSR.

Evidences from the case studies suggest that to build effective security institutions capable of providing efficient security, three principles should be followed. First, long-term political commitment of donor countries and durable disbursement of assistance are required to ensure the success of the reform process due to its lengthy nature. Second, coordination among internal agencies in donor countries and with other international and local partners is needed to overcome the conflicting reform strategies,

priorities or approaches resulted from the multicity of SSR stakeholders. Finally, assertion of national authorities over local ownership of the implemented SSR programs and projects is critical for sustainability of the process.

The thesis draws lessons and provides recommendations to Yemen, which intended to enhance the impact of international assistance on the current security sector reform in Yemen and to ensure a more effective utilization of the assistance in various SSR programs.

Key words: Security Sectors Reform, assistance, ownership, coordination, long-term commitment

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
ANA	Afghan National Army
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
CPPs	Conflict Prevention Pools
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program
DFID	Department for International Development
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HNP	Haitian National Police
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JSSR	Justice and Security Sector Reform
MINUSTAH	United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti
ANP	Afghan National Police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSB	National Security Bureau
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SLAF	Sierra Leone Armed Forces
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States

I. INTRODUCTION

Security challenges have changed and become more complex since the end of the Cold War following the demise of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the focus of international donors has been directed to stabilizing fragile states: which represent latent threats that induce regional and international instability due to the safe havens provided by these states for extremist and international criminal organizations. More international attention has been paid to the root causes of conflict and insecurity impeding development in fragile states which derive from internal rather than external factors. International political economy scholars note that failures of development in these states escalate public felling of grievances that may be misused by terrorist groups or other internal armed groups to rationalize their use of violence for political gain (McFate, 2008). It becomes clear that promoting development without taking security issues into account is an unviable option in fragile states.

Before the end of the Cold War, military and even humanitarian and developmental international assistance to the developing countries were often based on security concerns of the superpowers that aimed at consolidating their strategic relationships with key allies rather than national development of recipient countries (Hendrickson, 1999). However, since late 1990, security and development have become increasingly linked in a way acknowledged the need for a new approach to international assistance that enhances the role of security services in the economic lives of people which consequently improves the effectiveness of development assistance, as development needs security to prosper (Ball, 2010). As result, the security sector reform concept emerged with a scope that extends beyond the regular training and equipping programs to the establishment of professional security forces, and the enhancement of the civil-security relationship with effective oversight mechanisms (McFate, 2008).

Over the past 15 years, multilateral aid agencies have been working with major donors and SSR stakeholders to develop a holistic approach to SSR that consolidates their divers SSR efforts to ensure successful delivery of security assistance in a way that promotes the provision of effective, efficient, accountable, and transparent security in recipient countries which in turn makes other types of assistance more effective.

This research outlines a framework of principles that is required to be applied for international assistance directed toward SSR to achieve tangible results. Then, this framework is used to assess the characteristics of disbursement of international assistance for SSR in three case studies, Sierra Leone, Haiti, and Afghanistan to determine whether and under what conditions international donors respect these principles when provide assistance directed to SSR and what lessons can be drawn for Yemen which is currently undertaking internationally supported SSR.

Since late 1990, many SSR have been implemented in many post conflict countries. However, only few cases have demonstrated evident results while the rest of them illustrate uncertain outcome which poses challenges for the international community's future efforts in this field. Cases for this research have been chosen for their distinctive SSR outcomes, in addition to the variation in assistance patterns such as the number of major donors, the overall level of aid received and the volatility of aid flows. The cases were selected from three different regions to allow drawing of general lessons not confined to specific neighborhoods.

1.1 Objectives

This thesis will explore the impact of international assistance on Security Sector Reform in three countries. Many states failed to take advantage of international support and to utilize assistance in restructuring and reforming their security institutions such as Afghanistan and Haiti. However, Sierra Leone could succeed. Why did international support for SSR produce tangible results in Sierra Leone but not in Afghanistan and Haiti? What is the secret behind this success in Sierra Leone?

Thereafter, the thesis will explore the current SSR in Yemen and the challenges that Yemen faces in this field. The in-depth analysis of the three cases will allow drawing lessons from previous successes and failures of international support for security sector reform, through identifying common denominators (internal and external factors) by means of exploring the characteristics and strategies determinants of international assistance disbursement in the selected recipient countries.

1.2 Research Questions

- What are the main factors affecting the success and failure of international assistance on security sector reform in selected recipient countries? How do they exert influence on SSR?
- What are the challenges facing the process of security sector reform in Yemen and what kinds of lessons can Yemen get from the selected cases of recipient countries?

1.3 Analytic Framework

A set of principles, *ensuring coordination and coherence, respect of local ownership, and long-term commitments of international actors,* will be the analytic approach on which I will examine the role of international assistance in promoting security sector reform in recipient countries. These principles are used by international security and development scholars to examine the effectiveness of international assistance approaches to security and development.

These principles are identified in the internationally endorsed guidelines and best practices on security sector reform provided by the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) as the main procedural principles that international donors and SSR practitioners need to respect to ensure the success and sustainability of

security sector reform (Nikolaisen, 2011). Those principles assist relevant international donors and SSR stakeholders to implement SSR in more comprehensive and integrated ways.

1.4 Research Methodology and Data:

This is in-depth case study (qualitative) research:

- Success cases: Sierra Leone (2002-2010)
- Failure cases: Afghanistan (2002-2010) and Haiti (2004-2010)
- Application : Yemen

The periods of time have been chosen according the beginning of the SSR in each case.

For this purpose, the data for this thesis is gathered from primary and secondary sources. Official documents and date from the selected countries are obtained through official online resources. Country reports, assessments, and academic articles from government institutions, non-governmental institutions, and international institutions such as the World Bank, OECD, and the UN among others are collected. Print and online resources are also used as references.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUALIZING

2.1. Conceptualizing Security Sector Reform

The security sector comprises all public institutions mandated formally to have the monopoly over the use of legitimate coercive power and has been considered as an essential characteristic of modern nation-state. It includes the police, the armed forces, the intelligence services, and the elected and appointed authorities in charge of controlling these forces, such as the ministries of interior and the defense, in addition to judicial institutions and the parliament as oversight authorities (*Hänggi, 2004*). The Weberian modern state assumes that public security and the state monopoly over legitimate violence are essential conditions required for long-term democratic, developmental or 'human security' agendas. In such case, security sector reform has been prioritized by international donors over democratic consolidation.

Failure of security institutions to provide protection and stability to the state or its citizens with adherence to principles of good governance is considered as a dysfunction that requires remedy. Dysfunction of security sector is not limited to the ineffective or inefficient provision of security but extends to the lack of appropriate oversight mechanism. Consequently, fixing of this dysfunction through only training and provision of equipment is not sufficient to ensure that this sector performs its duties properly (Edmunds, 2002).

The (OECD)-Development Assistance Committee defines SSR in its 2005 report on SSR as a process that

> *"...seeks to increase partner countries' ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the Rule of Law. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence and policing."* (*OECD-DAC, 2005:11)*.

On the other hand, as the United Nations engages extensively in helping Member States in restoring peace and security, the organization becomes a major provider for SSR assistance through various UN peacekeeping missions to ensure the establishment of efficient and effective security institutions that are crucial for the exit strategy of the UN peacekeeping forces. The 2008 UN Secretary-General's report on SSR outlines the UN objectives and definition of this concept, which describes it as a

> *"…process of assessment, review, and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law."* (United Nations, 2008: 6).

The UN report considers that the security sector encompasses all personnel, institutions, and structures in charge of controlling, providing and monitoring of security. It recognizes that the existence of effective and accountable security sector is fundamental for sustainable development as well as for lasting peace.

In this context, both definitions set by the UN and the OECD-DAC consider SSR as a comprehensive approach that aims to minimize the lack of security caused by the dysfunction of institutions and actors. It covers transforming security institutions, demobilizing illegal forces, training and professionalizing personnel, and establishing relevant oversight mechanisms in order to make this sector able to confront threats that face the state and its people (McFate, 2008).

Security sector reform is defined in this thesis as "activities undertaken by state and its partners to strengthen and transform the security sector - institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law - in a way that is consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance" (Stanley, Jacob, and Bendix, 2009: 2 and OECD 2005: 20).

To this end, the SSR agenda endorses a holistic approach that incorporates fractional reforms of military, police, justice, and intelligence agencies as well as putting security institutions and actors under the supervision of civil democratic authorities through adopting and applying principles relevant to good governance, such as transparency and accountability, in the framework of security sector (Brzoska, 2003). In addition to that, the SSR agenda also covers the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in post conflict situations.

2.2. Literature Review

According to Michael Brzoska (2006: 10-13) the behavior of international actors influences success and failure of security sector reform. After he analyzed SSR in post conflict situations, he argues that there have been three factors that affect the success and failure of international supported SSR in post conflict situations; local ownership, capacities and commitments of international actors, and design and implementation of SSR policies and measures. He assumes that applying these factors positively can be used as criteria for evaluating success in case studies.

On the other hand, Mark Sedra (2006) argues that the success of SSR depends on the presence of several specific conditions[1]; four of them are related to international donor practices when providing assistance to states emerged from conflicts. These include shortfalls of resources which had a debilitating effect on implementation of the reform programs, the ability of local actors to take ownership of the SSR, coordination to overcome varying approaches of SSR stakeholders, and timely intervention and the adoption of long-term commitments.

[1] These conditions includes resurgence of violence, politicization and ethnicization, resourcing, economic sustainability, informalism, the rule of law, corruption, professionalization, ownership, coordination, societal integration, strategic vision, and timely intervention and long-term perspective.

2.2.1. Coordination Within Donor Countries and with Other International and Local Stakeholders

Security sector reform is a multifaceted political process that requires the interaction between wide scope of national and international actors (Sedra, 2006). The problems of coordination can be seen at different levels, coordination among internal agencies in multilateral organizations and donor countries as well as between international partners and with local stakeholders.

According to Catalina Perdomo (2006), coordinating the efforts of internal agencies of donor countries is critical to the overall process of coordination as some donors have several units that are mandated to provide SSR assistance to recipient countries through specific programs. Some countries have undertaken the institutional reforms to unify their internal agencies efforts toward drafting policies and allocating resources such as the UK, whereas other international partners have several agencies conducting SSR programs in a disorganized manner such as the US. Failure of streamlining the efforts of internal agencies in donor countries and multilateral organizations affects the overall coherence and coordination among donors community due to the different strategies and approaches being used by them in the same recipient country. Consequently, donor countries and multilateral organizations need to enhance their SSR understanding and integrate the efforts of their internal agencies mandated with SSR activities before providing security assistance to other countries (Isima, 2010).

Coordination has been recognized as a key factor for successful SSR as it eliminates competition over scarce resources, inefficient distribution of labor, and parallel chains of command (Brzoska, 2009).

2.2.2. Local Ownership

Local ownership in SSR refers to the involvement of local stakeholders in drafting, determining priorities, implementing of the reform strategy and financing projects of the reform process.

> *"The principle of local ownership of SSR means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by domestic actors rather than external actors"* (Nathan, 2007: 4).

Donors support is required for local actors to participate effectively in SSR activities from early stages of planning of SSR until assessments of the achievements. In this context, there is a consensus within international donors about the substantial role of national ownership for effective disbursement of international assistance. The OECD-DAC's ministerial meeting in 2007 highlighted the importance of taking local ownership in considerations to ensure the success of reforms:

> *"Reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained."*(OECD-DAC, 2007: 17)

On the other hand, four out of the ten principles of the United Nations for SSR are dedicated to promoting local ownership of SSR programs (United Nation, 2008), and the first of six guidelines of the US for SSR is related to fostering national ownership (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2009).

Although enforcing of SSR by donor countries might seem possible in certain cases, such as in Kosovo, international influence has demonstrated to be insufficient and counter-productive in the long run. The perception of local stakeholders that reforms are being enforced by international donors undermines legitimacy of the process and may revoke the reforms' programs when the assistance is stopped. The effectiveness of International assistance on SSR in any context depends on the degree of ownership local actors can assert over the process (Sedra, 2006).

2.2.3. The Capacities and Commitments of International Donors

Before engaging of international donors in security sector reform process, they should realize that there is no quick fix for SSR as it is a lengthy process that needs a firm and long-term political commitment in addition to a durable disbursement of assistance for the reform process to reach its maturity (Sedra, 2010). A strong political commitment of the recipient country's authorities is required too. It should be expected to take a decade rather than few years to develop adequate local capacities and ownership and to strengthen national constituencies that can offer a trustful safeguard for the success and sustainability of the SSR (Sedra, 2010).

The imperative of adopting a long-term political commitment and a substantial financial support is attributed to the prolonged nature of the SSR process which necessitates a multidisciplinary approach that involves professional staff from the police and military, experts in demobilization, technical expertise, constitutional and legal experts, and human resources management advisors (Brzoska, 2006).

The limited financial support and weak political commitment by some donor governments; in conjunction with difficult environment on the ground, compel SSR actors to follow a piecemeal approach focuses on achievable projects, which has resulted in the implementation of narrowly focused and short-term SSR programs in some recipient countries (Hendrickson, 1999).

III. Security Sector Reform in Selected Case Studies

3.1 Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone is located in western Africa on the Atlantic Ocean. It has a population of 5.48 million (2012 estimates). Sierra Leone gained independence from Britain on 27 April 1961 and adopted a parliamentary system of government. The conflict in Sierra Leone began on March 23, 1991, when the forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered into Sierra Leone from Liberia and attacked the Government of the All People's Congress, which had ruled the country for 23 years. Since that date a decade of violence devastated the country. The war finally reached a negotiated conclusion at Lomé, the capital of Togo, in July 1999. Although the Lomé Peace Agreement did not end the fighting entirely, it began a process that brought a delicate peace to the country (Truth and Reconciliation Commission Working Group, 2005).

In October 1999, the United Nations agreed to send peacekeepers to help in restoring order and disarming the rebels. The first of the 6,000-member force, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), began arriving in December. But in May 2000, when the UN forces were trying to disarm the RUF in eastern Sierra Leone, RUF's forces clashed with these forces and hijacked 500 UN peacekeepers. The hostage crisis resulted in more fighting between the RUF and the government. The situation in the country deteriorated and the British troops, which were evacuating foreign nationals, decided to take full military action to finally release the hostages. The presence of British troops and the United Nations peacekeeping force played a fundamental role in defeating the rebels and ending the conflict in the country. Violence has not relapsed in Sierra Leone since the peace was officially restored in January 2002.

3.1.1 International Assistance for Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone (2002-2010)

Sierra Leone, which witnessed a civil war from 1991 until 2002, is considered as a good example of successful international assistance in the field of security sector reform. It had conflict-free elections in May 2002, and presidential and legislative elections in July 2007 and November 2012. The international assistance to Sierra Leone presents a success story of how international donors coordinate and cooperate among themselves and with domestic authorities to prevent the relapse of violence and help in stabilizing states emerging from civil war through reforming the security sector and other key institutions.

The United Kingdom (UK) played a major role in supporting SSR in Sierra Leone which was formally started in 2002 after the presidential election. The UK has emerged as a major donor participant in SSR since late 1990s. The UK adopted a conflict prevention strategy in Sierra Leone focused on three pillars: the reintegration of ex-combatants into society, the establishment of effective, affordable and democratically accountable security agencies, and reducing the external threats from the region. The SSR process in Sierra Leone addressed some root causes of the conflict by concentrating on areas such as justice sector and corruption in the 2nd phase of the reform due to institutional and financial constrains at an early stage.

The total spending from the UK in security sector in Sierra Leone allocated for the fiscal year 2003/4 was £26.3 million. Of this, £22.25 million was on the security sector reform where it was used for training and equipping the armed forces and police of Sierra Leone and the development of the legal and institutional frameworks for national security and defense. The remainder £3.7 million was allocated to reintegration of ex-combatants through the support of two programs, the Community Reintegration Project and the React Program as illustrated in table '1' (Ginifer and Oliver, 2004). Success can be seen in terms of the reform of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, the Sierra Leone Police, and the reintegration of more than 50,000 ex-combatants by the end of 2001.

Table 1: Initial spending estimate on security sector reform in Sierra Leone by the UK (2000 – 2004 British Pound Sterling million)

	2002/03	2003/04
International Assistance Training Team (IMATT)	16.0	14.5
Op Silkman	1.5	0
FCO	0.1	0.1
SILSEP (Security Sector Reform)	0.5	0.75
Police	5.0	7.0
Reintegration	5.8	3.7
Regional (e.g.)WFD	0	0.2
Sub-total Programs	**28.9**	**26.3**
Peacekeeping assessed costs	36.2	18.0
Special Court	2.3	2.3
PeaceKeeoping non-assessed	2.1	1.8
Sub-total Peacekeeping	**40.06**	**22.1**
Total	**69.06**	**48.4**

Source: Adopted from Report prepared by Jermey Ginifer and Kaye Oliver for the Department for International Development 2004, London (Ginifer and Oliver, 2004) page 11.

The reform process was expected to reduce the strength of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (SLAF) from 14,000 personnel in 2002 to 10,500 by the end of 2007 to make it more affordable and sustainable in terms of financial expenditures (United Nations, 2002). The reduction process started in 2003 and was achieved by the end of 2006 where another reduction plan was approved to downsize the SLAF to 8,500 troops by the end of 2011 (United Nations, 2006). The targeted size of 8,500 troops of the SLAF was fulfilled by the end of 2009 which transformed the sector from being a burden on government to an asset where it successfully participated in the UN peace-keeping forces in Darfur (DFID. 2010). Current Sierra Leone Armed Forces is composed of the Army, Air Force and Navy.

Based on the 2002–2003 Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy, the Sierra Leone Police size was brought up from a force size of 6,500 in 2002 to 9,500 personnel

by the end of 2006 where it provided the overall security for the 2007 elections (United Nations, 2006). The force size was further raised to 12,500 by the 2010.

3.2 Haiti

Haiti is located in the Caribbean region with a population of 9.8 million people (2012 estimates). Haiti's instability is fueled by a long failed political and economic development. It was under an authoritarian rule by the Duvalier family for 29 years until a military coup took place in 1986. Although President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was democratically-elected in 1990, he was overthrown by another military coup in 1991. Aristide was reinstated by a US-led Multinational Force in 1994 and before the end of his presidency term he disbanded the Haitian National Army in 1995 and created a new police security force. Since that time Haiti does not have armed forces. Aristide could not participate in the presidential election in 1996 because of constitutional restrictions. However, he was reelected in 2000 after the new elected President Preval finished his 5 years presidency term. In February 2004, opponents of Aristide led by armed gangs and former military officers forced him to resign. He left the country for the second time and an interim government was established for two years until President Rene Préval was elected in February 2006 (Center for International Governance Innovation, 2009).

3.2.1 International Assistance for Security Sector Reform in Haiti (2004 – 2010):

Despite the intense international assistance for SSR programs in Haiti, the violence has been experiencing a rising tide of gang crimes and serious human rights violations in the last three years.

After the exile of Aristide in 2004, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH), by its Resolution 1542 on 29 February 2004. That resolution was mandated to create a secure and stable environment that allows democratic elections to take place and to help Haitian transitional government to undertake SSR (United Nations Security Council, 2004).

Peacekeepers arrived in June 2004 and took over U.S.-led multinational force.

Current security sector reform started after the deployment of MINUSTAH and includes programs that cover monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police (HNP), implementing a comprehensive DDR for all armed Groups, and restoration and reforming of the rule of law institutions including the justice and the prison systems (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007). There was no defense reform as the army was disbanded in 1995. The aim of SSR in Haiti was the restoration of public confidence in this sector, in addition to the provision of effective security. The HNP was part of the Haitian Army until 1995 when it became under civil control after the disbanding of the Army.

A new reform plan was introduced in August 2006 which focused on police training, the provision of equipment and the rehabilitation of security institutions. In addition to that, it set the goal of establishing 14,000 fully-equipped police forces by 2011(Crisis Group, 2008). However, the vetting of officers has been too slow as the HNP is composed of 10,700 police officers by early 2012. A new HNP development plan was adopted by the Supreme Council of National Police in 2012 to bring the HNP from 10,000 up to at least 15,000 officers by 2016 (Boutellis, 2012).

Although the increasing numbers and performance of police forces has improved, the majority of security operations are still carried out by MINUSTAH and its police units which indicates that the HNP is still not capable of assuming their responsibilities of policing and provision of security.

3.3 Afghanistan

Afghanistan is located in central Asia and is bordered by Iran to the west, Pakistan to the south and east, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the north and China to the northeast. It has a population of 29.82 million (2012 estimates). After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C, the United States attacked Afghanistan and brought down the Taliban regime and its terrorist allies. In December 2001, international actors and Afghan leaders agreed in

the Bonn Conference on a road map for state-building in Afghanistan that includes; (1) the establishment of the Interim government, (2) holding presidential elections by September 2004, and (3) parliamentary and provincial council elections by October 2005. In March 2002, the UN Security Council established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to join the international efforts dedicated for the provision of security and state-building in the country by its resolution 1401 (2002).

The establishment of Afghan parliament in December 2005 was followed by the adoption of the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006 which designed the Afghan road map from 2006-2010. However, by the time of signing of this compact, it was clear that Afghanistan returned to violence, especially in the south and southeast because of the resurgence of the Taliban and other anti-government groups that started attacking the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Security Force. The deterioration of the security situation has been compounded with an increase in opium farming and its illegal trade (Ayub, Kouvo & Wareham, 2009).

3.3.1 International Assistance for SSR in Afghanistan (2002 – 2010):

Although international donors have been investing large amount of international assistance in the security sector in Afghanistan in the last decade since the ouster of the Taliban regime, yet the Afghan government is still unable to maintain security and stability in the country as the level of violence and civilian casualties remain significantly high (Cordesman, 2012).

The establishment of an effective Afghan Security Sector was one of the first priorities of international donors. Based on the Bonn agreement, the G8 donors divided the Afghan SSR agenda at their 2002 meeting in Geneva into five pillars, each to be overseen by a lead-donor nation: police reform by Germany, military reform by US, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the ex-combatants by Japan, counter-narcotics by the United Kingdom, and Italy leading judicial reform. In 2007, the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)[2] took on training responsibility of the Afghan National Security Force (Security sector reform resource center, 2013).

Current Afghan security sector reform started at the beginning of 2002 under what is called "the lead nations approach" (2002 –2006) in which training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) witnessed a remarkable progress under the lead of the US to establish sufficient forces to enhance counter insurgency efforts. Progress of police reform was not at the same pace, although Germany rebuilt the National Police Academy and few hundreds of high rank officers graduated from it. On the other hand, Italy had made less progress in justice system reform (Ayub, et al. 2009).

The 2006 Afghanistan Compact approved a partnership approach instead of the lead nation approach of the Bonn agreement. It focused on enhancing coordination in areas such as police and justice reforms where many international agencies and donors were involved actively. In the summer of 2007, the attention has been turned to strengthening police reform as the US took the lead in this sector and authorized the US Department of Defense to replace the US Secretary of State in implementing programs related to police reform. At the same time, the European commission established the European Union Police Mission that took over Germany responsibility (Crisis Group, 2007).

In late 2008, it was realized that the ability of the ANA to fight insurgence was not as expected and the police were even worse than the Army. Consequently, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan was established and was in charge of training the Afghan Army and police with concentration on leadership's capacity building and strengthening the capacity of the Afghan ministries of Defense in order to prepare them to assume responsibility for providing security after the departure of international security forces by 2014 (table 2).

[2] The NATO has been operating in Afghanistan since 2001 and currently leads the ISAF.

Table 2: The size of Afghan National Security Forces by the end of December 2012

	Afghan National Security Forces	December 2012	Estimated by 2014
1	Afghan National Army	178,501 troops	178,000
2	Afghan Air Force	6,325 personnel & 96 aircraft	8,000 personnel & 140 aircraft
3	Afghan National Police	148,536 police officer	157,000 police officer
4	Afghan Local Police. A village-focused program	16,300	30,000
5	Afghan Public Protection Force: to replace Int. Private Security companies	14,000 guards	30,000 guards

Source: constructed by author using data from NATO 2012 data base, accessed on July 19, 2013.
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120516_media_backgrounder_ANSF_en.pdf

IV. FACTORS AFFECT SUCCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

4.1. Coordination Within Donor Countries and with Other International and Local SSR Stakeholders

Security Sector reform is a political process that requires the implementation of complex interrelated arrangements and tasks by different local and international stakeholders. The multicity of actors may cause conflicting reform strategies, priorities or approaches as a result of the different perspectives, capacities and political interests (Sedra, 2006). In addition to that, the limited SSR experience among international stakeholders coupled with the fact that SSR is a recent approach and many donors are unfamiliar with it, undermine the reform process outcomes. In order to avoid such consequences, donor countries need to establish mechanisms, at the beginning of the process, to strengthen the coherence and coordination of their actions and the sequencing of implementation of the reform strategy (Sedra, 2006).

States that have emerged from conflicts seldom have adequate institutional capacity to coordinate, manage or monitor SSR activities. Consequently, they have to resort to international partners to be able to initiate and implement the SSR process. In such instances, transferring of skills to national actors is required to minimize the effects of the limited local capacity which should not be an excuse to ignore the role of local leadership in coordinating and putting the priorities and needs of their citizen in the SSR strategy; nor should it substitute local oversight mechanisms which offer a guarantee against the predominance of interests of international stakeholders in the reform process (United Nations, 2013).

As the SSR is a comprehensive process which involves security and development programs, the integration of the complex aspects of the SSR programs and projects necessitates the existence of an effective coordination mechanism between all internal security and development agencies in donor countries to avoid conflicting administrative regulations, policies and interests of those agencies and the competing among them for resources and labor. For example, the differentiation between what

military assistance is and what SSR assistance is. While the security agencies may insist that the provision of arms should be endorsed as its part of SSR programs to enhance the capability of the security sector, the development and foreign affairs agencies may assume that such assistance is military and it might divert the resources form development programs (Perdomo, 2006).

Coordination of international assistance programs for SSR through the establishment of a national mechanism - to serve as a focal point that monitors the activities of all SSR stakeholders - promotes local ownership and the sustainability of the reform process. Such effective mechanism requires the enhancement of local capacity from the outset of the process. The existence of this mechanism in post-conflict situations is a real challenge which faces international donors due to the fact that many post-conflict countries lack the institutional capacity which can deal with various dynamics of SSR and accommodate the allocated assistance. Not to mention the ability to coordinate the efforts of different stakeholders who implement several SSR programs and projects simultaneously. In such case, the lack of national coordination mechanism at the beginning of reform process is expected. In this context, international donors should focus from the outset of the process on building local capacity; otherwise, it may take a long time for national coordination mechanism to be set in among key local stakeholders who have to take the real responsibly of the reform process (Isima, 2010).

To that end, effective coordination of SSR activities at the level of internal agencies of donor countries, multilateral organizations, among international partners, and with national actors is crucial to ensure that resources are spent in the right palace as well as to avoid duplication of efforts and programs which slow the progress of the reform process.

4.1.1. Sierra Leone

The UK-Department for International Development (DFID) played a significant role in coordinating international efforts toward SSR in Sierra Leone and

promoting joint SSR approaches among international community. In 2000, the UK government recognized that the concept of SSR contains issues cutting across various internal departments. It had launched a wide review of its conflict prevention efforts, to identify approaches of effective delivery of security assistance, which was followed by the establishment of the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) in April 2001 to unify the efforts of DFID, Ministry of Defense and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The CPPs became the agency responsible of managing and funding of the UK's SSR efforts. It consists of two pools the first deals with conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), while the second covers other parts of the world, the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (Foreign and commonwealth Office, 2013). The establishment of the CPPs plays a significant role in improving the effectiveness of the security assistance delivered by the UK government as it promotes the integration of policy making, resources and expertise of its all internal agencies directed to SSR (Ball, 2004).

The UK security assistance to Sierra Leone was one of the first formal Britain coordinated initiatives. The ACPP was in charge of coordinating the UK's SSR assistance to Sierra Leone. It served as a focal point for cooperation and coordination between key UK stakeholders and with other donor partners.

An evaluation of the work of ACPP in Sierra Leone, prepared in 2004 for the DFID, has founded many evidences that show the relevance of the ACPP initiative in Sierra Leone (Ginifer and Oliver, 2004), including:

- Two ACPP-supported programs were directed towards strengthening the security sector and the reintegration of ex-combatants.
- Sequences of SSR policy implementation were facilitated by the creation of one ACPP strategy for SSR.
- Coordination between ACPP in Sierra Leone and the UN mission was strong. Regular formal meetings with UNAMSIL were a key part of the SSR strategy, which facilitated mainstreaming the SSR programs and activities at the multilateral level.

- Coordination between various UK stakeholders dealing with SSR became more effective than before the creation of CPPs in 2001.

4.1.2. Haiti

The UN provides SSR assistance to Haiti through its Peace-keeping Mission in the field. The UN has been helping many countries in post conflict situation in area of security sector reform; however, the efforts of the organization has remained limited during the period 2004-2008 as inter-agency coordination was found to be inefficient. Most responsibilities related to SSR activities were scattered and fragmented internally in various sections of the UN mission and at headquarters level (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007).

In 2006, an Inventory made by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations identified 12 UN entities (departments, programs, funds) at the headquarters level that have capacity in security and justice reform. Most of the SSR activities were performed by the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) both at headquarters level and in the field until the establishment of an inter-agency SSR support unit at headquarters in 2007, the Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR) unit which is managed by a Task Force co-chaired by UNDP and DPKO to serve as a system-wide focal point and technical resource (United Nations, 2012). Despite such efforts to enhance UN inter-agency coordination for supporting SSR activities, the cooperation between the UNDP and DPKO has often been tied up by bureaucratic obstacles and perceptions of the missions having a short-term vision of DPKO to prevent violence as opposed to the longer-term developmental goals of UNDP (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007).

Moreover, coordination between international stakeholders in the field in Haiti were inconsistent and insufficient to make fundamental changes as approaches differed depending on donor's unilateral strategies, particularly program implementation. In the justice reform, for example, France tried to implement a model

similar to its judicial model. Additionally, the United States advanced a framework identical to the US judicial system, but the US pattern had no foundation in Haitian judicial law, so it was later ignored. In terms of police reform, donors had different plans toward reform of the police sector which was addressed without considering other sectors like prison and justice system (Crisis Group, 2008). This clearly illustrates the lack of effective coordination between donors which added extra burden on the reform process. In addition to that, the coordination between international donors and national actors in Haiti was poor in some sectors. The Security Council calls on the government of Haiti, in its resolution 1892 (2009), "…*in coordination with the international community to further reform the justice system*…", which did not progress at the same pace (United Nations Security Council, 2009). The international donors demanded substantial reform in the justice system, whereas the Haitian government was more reluctant to reform it based on a plan proposed by the international donors without taking into account the needs of Haitian society (Center for International Governance Innovation, 2009).

Although the UN mission in Haiti is an integrated mission, coordination has not been effective as various parts of the reform process were covered separately by individual experts. This might be attributed to the different mandates of various organs of the UN involved in the reform process. For example, the UNDP experience and mandate are limited when it comes to the police reform (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007).

The UN and donor countries established several structures to facilitate coordination with each other in the field and with the Haitian government such as the Interim Cooperation Framework. However, it was ineffective because of the limited meeting it organized and the excluding of civil society. The poor coordination caused duplication of efforts that took part in delaying the reform process. One example of the poor coordination is the refusal of the US to share the information with the HNP or MINUSTAH of vetting Haitian police participants in police training courses until late 2006. It did not give any explanation for the cause why some individuals were not accepted to participate in the training courses. Another example is the duplication of an

early police reform plan by the Canadian and the UN mission where each of them designed its own plan without consulting each other (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007).

4.1.3. Afghanistan

Coordination among international donors has been a challenging issue at various phases of the security sector reform process in Afghanistan. At an early stage, the lack of coordination was attributed to the outcome of the Bonn Conference 2001 which was followed by the G8 (2002) Geneva meeting that yielded what is called "individual nation leadership" based on distributing responsibilities for financing and implementing of various SSR activities to the five major donors (Fields & Ahmed, 2001). The United Nations avoided leading the international effort in Afghanistan as it chose a light footprint role from the beginning of the process although the UN established a trust fund for Law and Order to channel aid for the police reform, in conjunction with the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan by Security Council Resolution 1401(2002).

The idea behind adopting "individual nation approach" was to give donors a direct role in implementing the reform activities to ensure their sustainable support in the long-term. Despite of that, this model of distributing responsibilities among the lead donors undermined the collaboration between the five pillars of the reform activities and the coherence of the process. It caused competition over resources at the inter-agency level, aid overlap, deprived the reform process of cross-sectoral leadership, impeded, joint planning of stakeholders, and caused divisions at the intra-governmental level (Sedra, 2006). These adverse effects resulted from the differences in competencies, political interests, available resources, socio-cultural approaches to security, and methodology of the reform among the lead nations. The absence of a single leadership was critical in losing the unity of vision of the reform process in Afghanistan.

The justice sector was severely affected by the lack of coordination due to

the existence of many national and international actors participating in its reform and their competition over the right to draft the course of the reform strategy of this sector (Sedra, 2006).

The reform of the police sector was also severely affected by the limited coordination of international efforts to establish a well trained Afghan National Police (ANP). Germany was the lead nation for implementing ANP reform activities. It implemented a strategy directed to enhancing community based policing. For that purpose, it concentrated on reforming the ministry of interior, in addition to implementing long-term training programs for senior officers. The German approach did not train enough police forces to support the ongoing efforts against the insurgence as was expected by the US (Crisis Group, 2007). The slow pace of achievements in this sector prompted the United States to support training of the ANP. The US strategy was based on creating a sector that is capable of fighting against the insurgence so it supported training programs for low level officers. The inconsistency and incoherence between both approaches produced ineffective and confused results (Mackay, Sedra, and Burt, 2011). Moreover, in 2007, the United Nations, the United States, the Afghan government, and the European Union established the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) to coordinate all efforts related to ANP reform programs being funded by the UN Law of Order Fund, but the Board did not perform at full capacity until 2009. The IPCB does not cover bilateral agreements between donor countries and the Afghan Ministry of Interior which resulted in duplication of efforts and overlapping of programs (William, Caldwell, and Finney, 2010).

The slow pace of implementing activities of the reform process was due to a coordination gap. It pushed the U.S. in 2006 to provide the largest financial assistance to three of the five pillars of the reform process. This was not sufficient to improve the poor coordination issues as other lead nations did not like the US intervention in programs they were managing. The controlling role of the U.S. in implementing most of the SSR activities in Afghanistan has been considered by some scholars as one of the reasons that led to the failure of the Afghan reform process (Sedra, 2007).

4.1.4. Summary of Coordination of Case Studies

The establishment of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool for Sierra Leone unified the efforts of all UK internal agencies that were mandated to provide SSR assistance, as well as it helped in the coordination of programs and activities of different local agencies in the host country. At the same time, it enhanced the cooperation with the other donor partners.

While in Haiti, coordination among the UN's internal agencies and with other international and national stakeholders dealing with SSR activities have met some problems which negatively affected the implementation of many reform programs in DDR, police, prison, and justice system. The existence of several structures dedicated for enhancing coordination among SSR stakeholders in the case of Haiti did not serve the purpose for which they were established because those structures have not operated properly.

In the case of Afghanistan, the lack of coordination in the early stages of the reform process and the fragmentation of responsibilities among lead nations implementing reform programs have led to uneven progress in the five pillars of the security sector reform process. Although a committee serving under the Afghan National Security Council was established to monitor and coordinate all security sector strategies, a coordination gap still exists in the SSR international efforts because this committee is not endowed with sufficient resources or the authority to perform its objectives, in addition to the burden added by another gap at the operational level (Sedar, 2005).

4.2. National Ownership

The international assistance for SSR should be designed as demand-driven to meet the needs and priorities of citizens of recipient country (Brzoska, 2006). It should also be designed to take local social backgrounds, cultural backgrounds, and legal framework into considerations to ensure its sustainability. Consequently, one format will not fit all recipient countries, as conditions determining SSR differ significantly from one state to another.

Lack of ownership, due to donor driven-programs and funding, alters agent-principle accountability relationship between local government and private contractors who implement the reform projects (Panarelli, 2010). International donors become the principle in this relationship, and control the oversight mechanism rather than national authorities and their citizens.

When local actors have conflicting concepts and priorities, insufficient resources for the reform process, and limited capacity and technical skills to design the security reform strategies, international donors find it difficult to promote local ownership at the onset of the process. Hence, they undertake drafting and planning of the reform programs alone without involving local actors in this stage. Predominance of international actors' agenda on the process may be inevitable in this case and the resulting strategy may not be suitable for domestic circumstances, especially if programs are financially beyond the national capability and unsustainable without international assistance. Additionally, they may be turned down in the future by the local people. In order to avoid such consequences, international donors should start at an early stage focusing on the development of a common domestic vision among local stakeholders about the reform process to ensure their future support and engagement in the implementation of reform programs. Initiation of national dialogue among all local stakeholders - elites, minorities, and civil society - is required to build up a national consensus on the fundamental outlines of the security reform strategy. This dialogue helps in identifying priorities and realities on the ground and helps in promoting the support of local stakeholders for implementing the reform programs (Panarelli, 2010).

Participation of local stakeholders must be ensured in the planning and the implementation stages to facilitate the designing of a realistic strategy that takes into account the size of security forces, institutions, and the capability of the national government to provide sufficient resources after the cessation of international assistance. Moreover, enhancing national capacity is required to enable local actors to sustain reform after the withdrawal of international advisors.

4.2.1. Sierra Leone

Five years after the end of civil war, Sierra Leone conducted a peaceful general election in 2007 without international peacekeeping assistance for the first time in two decades. This is considered as a clear evident of the success of the SSR in Sierra Leone. While external financial assistance and international advisor support were fundamental for the success in this country, Sierra Leonean national ownership saved the reform process during difficult times. The memorandum of understanding between the UK and Sierra Leonean Government sets out the latter government's commitments in the security sector reform, along with UK commitments on technical and financial support (Ginifer and Oliver, 2004).

There has been a strong and concrete commitment to the reform process from the Sierra Leonean president and other senior civil officials who played a significant role in promoting public support for the SSR. Sierra Leone citizens as well as political leaders realizing the importance SSR in preventing conflict is one of the main reasons that illustrated the cause behind why the SSR process remained on track in Sierra Leone. On the other hand, there has been a core group of operational actors in Sierra Leone, senior military and police officials, who have effectively kept managing the reform process consistently with the help of international experts (Albrecht, & Jackson, 2009). When the international advisers were changing frequently, Sierra Leone officials remained stable.

4.2.2. Haiti

The limited financial resources in Haiti strongly affected the government's ability to implement security sector reform programs without the help of the UN, the US, France, and Canada. However, it was clear at an early stage that there has been a lack of Haitian ownership over the reform programs. In February 2006, a plan for Haiti National Police reform was written by the UN mission without the participation of Haitian authorities and society. This plan was not accepted by national police officers as it gave broad mandate to the UN mission, so the plan failed and was declared annulled. A new reform plan was approved by the government on the 8th of August in 2006 (*Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007)*. However, the implementation of this plan has been subjected to financial constrains and relied heavily upon international donors. The failure of the first police reform plan illustrates the national ownership is a fundamental key for the sustainability of the reform process.

Officials from Haiti have been considering that the reform process was being driven by international donors with a limited role left for the Haitian government - in addition to the tendency of international donors to implement reform's strategies that do not take into account local realties, as well as the insufficient understanding of donors of government priorities. The Haitian officials have shown hesitancy towards programs implementation. Moreover, the civil society in Haiti believes that the reform agenda is imposed by the external actors without considering the needs of the Haitian community (Center for International Governance Innovation, 2009).

4.2.3. Afghanistan

The Afghan government has not received support of the international community to play a substantial role in setting the priorities and drawing the broad lines of the security reform process. A former Afghan Interior Minister pointed out that the Bonn agreement should have ensured more Afghan ownership and made Afghan government the lead nation with the donor countries as supporting partners (Jalali,

2006).

One example of the lack of ownership is the strategy for DDR, which was one of the most urgent sectors of the reform process to be achieved. It was prepared by the lead nation, Japan, and the UN without participation of the Afghanistan government which went along with this plan due to its limited financial resources (Nathan, 2007). The donor-driven strategy together with the limited capacity of the Afghan security force, which was in charge of implementing DDR on the ground, added extra complexity of achieving any progress in disarmament of the armed groups.

Another example is the reform of the ANA. In the first two years of the SSR, the role of the Afghan Ministry of Defense was limited in terms of planning, implementing, and prioritizing the reform of the Army which was driven by the United States because of the mistrust in the Defense Minister at that time, Mohammed Fahim. The appointment of a new Minister in December 2004 encouraged the United States to change its approach and allowed the Afghan authorities to participate in the ANA reform (Sedra, 2006).

Another example is the allocation of funds for SSR which does not go through the Afghan national budget, but each one of the lead nations directly disburses aid to the pillar it manages or through private contractors. This undermines the government institutional capacity which is required to be enhanced to ensure sustainability of the process. In addition to that, it caused uneven distribution of funds on different pillars of the SSR where the ANA received the biggest share of the assistance spending while the justice and police pillars got a less share of funds. As a consequence of this the army forces were being paid more than the police which resulted in police protests (Nathan, 2007).

Although the SSR in Afghanistan has been designed and directed as donor-based approach for long time due to of the limited capacity of the Afghan security authorities, the lead nations did not pay attention to develop this capacity afterward, because of the rampant corruption of the Afghan institutions. In this context, a viable exit strategy for international forces from this country necessitates the existence of

strong national institutions capable of providing security for citizens and to fight against insurgence.

4.2.4. Summary of Ownership of Case Studies

The strong Sierra Leonean leadership and the existence of a national core team were crucial in asserting local ownership and guiding the reform process which in turn has enhanced the role of the Sierra Leonean in decision-making throughout the whole period of SSR. On the other hand, the absence of strong and stable political system in Haiti and its limited capacity undermined the assertion of local ownership of the reform process being implemented under the umbrella of international donors whose agenda prevailed over local interests.

While in Afghanistan, the SSR short-term vision of the lead nations for quick fixes and restore immediate stability obscured an important fact that local ownership and fostering national capacity are the only guarantee for long-term sustainability of process. International donors did not consult Afghan leaders throughout different stages of the reform process which undermined Afghan local ownership. In addition to that, about 82 percent of the total international assistance is disbursed through parallel programs that bypass the regular government budget system which further weakens the national oversight mechanism and the capacity of the local authorities to choose reform programs according to their national priorities.

4.3. The Capacities and Commitments of International Donors

The process of security sector reform involves institutional transformation and societal engineering that requires a long duration of time before positive outcomes can be seen. Thus, it needs a long-term commitment in terms of political support from all stakeholders, local and international, in conjunction with extensive financial support to succeed. The structural reform and societal engineering of the SSR enhance state-building efforts and prevent political crisis relapses in post-conflict situations that

ultimately help to achieve a lasting peace and stability. Taxpayers of donor countries and citizen of recipient countries should be informed about the prolonged nature of the SSR and not to give the impressions of having unrealistic quick and high expectations that can cause early destabilization of the reform process (Sedra, 2010). In addition to that, effective implementation of donor commitments requires enough financial resources backed out by professional human resources empowered with a wide range of knowledge to ease the SSR multidisciplinary approach. Hence, the weakness of the international donor's SSR capacity and the dearth of experts who had been involved in reform programs and projects affect the implementation of SSR projects and the empowering of experienced local reformers (Ball & Hendrickson, 2005).

DDR programs offer a good example of long-term perspectives of SSR. Reintegration of former combatants into peacetime society requires a lengthy commitment of international donors through their investments in recipient countries' trust funds for a prolong duration to ensure the success of the process. However, donors prefer cutting down the size of military forces or they tend to provide support for other SSR programs rather than continuing funding DDR projects for long time (Hendrickson, 1999). Hence, the engaging of international donors in SSR entails a change in their approaches and policies to ensure the achievement of the reform process's goals.

In addition to the strong political commitment, long-term support of international donors should go beyond mere pledges to substantial disbursements of financial assistance until local stakeholders create sustainable funding resources and become capable enough to finance, manage and monitor their own security sector. Otherwise, unfulfilled expectations of local stakeholders can undermine the wider goals of the reform process (*Bryden, & Hänggi, 2005)*.

The international assistance committed in a given year is usually disbursed over several years. Disbursements reflect the level and amount of assistance actually made available to recipient countries in any given year. Effective implementation of various SSR projects and programs requires steady and predictable international

assistance, because unanticipated shifts in aid flows undermine budget management and threaten effective delivery of basic services and can damage weak public sectors in recipient countries. The unpredictability of assistance further complicates the ability of SSR stakeholders to implement long-term programs and projects; and instead they follow piecemeal approaches that may avoid addressing the underlying causes of conflicts in the recipient countries.

Moreover, extreme volatility in international assistance levels complicates the ability of governments to create long-term SSR plans, let alone its damaging impact on ongoing projects. Any increments in SSR progress, such as increased soldiers enrollment or judicial reform, during the years that the assistance is steady are offset by decreases in other years when the country is subjected to aid volatility. The lack of coordination among donors may further lead to volatility of assistance flows to recipient countries. In this context, the OECD-DAC has stressed the importance of donor's cooperation to enhance aid predictability to enable recipient governments to manage and plan their budget more effectively. Such cooperation covers a broad range of actors, including those involved in peacekeeping and post-conflict advisors, with domestic and international donor agencies such as the World Bank as well as non-governmental organizations (Hendrickson, 1999).

4.3.1. Sierra Leone

There has been a strong consensus amongst international donors to assist Sierra Leone to become a stable country and on the appropriate approach needed to address this aim (OECD, 2010). The donors' commitment is reflected in a consistently high level of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Sierra Leone. The total ODA net disbursement to Sierra Leone exceeds donors' pledges in almost every year during 2001 -2007 (table 3)


Table 3: Official Development Assistance to Sierra Leone (2001-2007, USD million)

Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
ODA total net Disbursements	334.54	383.13	337.09	376.06	339.66	337.22	539.92
ODA total net Commitments	275.66	263.75	440.04	277.77	317.15	244.03	545.27

Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

International support for Sierra Leone was consolidated because of the lead role played by the UK that fostered international efforts dedicated to SSR in this country, and built a common understanding of the complexities associated with the reform process of the security sector with a strong emphasis on the fear of a relapse of the civil war that ended in 2002. This support has been a critical factor in providing the financial assistance and the technical expertise required for success of the reform process. Data from the OECD shows that the total ODA net disbursement used for the SSR in Sierra Leone exceeded donors' commitments in various phases of the reform process during the period 2002-2011(Figure 1).

Figure 1: Total ODA for Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone (2002-2011, USD million)



Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

Moreover, joint strategies were developed by major donors to align their efforts to the broad government reform agenda that tackled the root causes of the conflict. Those strategies included: the Joint Vision for Sierra Leone of the United Nations Family, the European Commission/DFID Joint Assistance Strategy, and the African Development Bank/World Bank Joint Assistance Strategy. In this context, it was agreed that the UK government would concentrate first on supporting the progress on security and developing the main capacities of the state to promote peace (table 1). Service delivery and support of economic growth was considered to be enhanced in the second phase of the reform.

Consequently, the focus of major donors during the period of 2000-2005 was on both conflict prevention and peace-building challenges. ODA Statistics from the OECD (table 4) show that expenditure on Peace-building process was equivalent to 79% of the total ODA received by Sierra Leone in 2000-2005 (OECD, 2008). Furthermore, Sierra Leone was the first country to benefit from a formally agreed United Nations Peace-building Co-operation Framework and an Integrated UN Peace-building Mission (UNIPSIL).

Table 4: Peacekeeping expenditures in Sierra Leone (2000-2005, USD million)

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total	% of ODA
Peace-keeping expenditures	521	618	603	449	265	86	2542	79%

Source: OECD (2008), *Annual OECD Report on Resource Flows to Fragile States*, OECD, Paris. Retrieved from this link *www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/14/43293581.pdf.*

4.3.2. Haiti

4.3.2.1. Capacity of International Donors

Although the UN has been helping many countries in the field of security sector reform, including Haiti, the SSR capacity of the organization has remained limited during the period of 2004-2008 as human resources capacity was found to be inefficient, scattered, and fragmented at the mission and headquarters levels. This was attributed to the absence of a dedicated SSR inter-agency unit at the UN Headquarters in charge of providing institutional memory (knowledge, lessons learned, and examples of best practice) and putting general guidelines on how SSR units should operate on the ground (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*. This institutional gap undermined the ability of the organization to coordinate between inter-agencies and with other international stakeholders as well as to assess the effectiveness of the assistance provided for SSR projects in the field.

In terms of efforts on the ground, the UN mission's capacity related to SSR activities was limited due to many factors, such as the lack of empowered dedicated sections or units in the mission to cover these activities. Besides that, SSR activities have been fragmented across various sections of the UN country team in Haiti. There has been lack of sufficient staff and SSR advisors in the mission as mandated by the Security Council Resolutions, which further complicated and weakened the performance of the mission and the UN in this field. Even when the issue of understaffing in the mission is resolved, the short period for UN staff to serve on the ground caused loss of institutional memory[3], which is another limitation of the SSR support provided by the UN mission in Haiti (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*.

According to a Canadian observer who participated in many joint Haitian National Police projects financed by Canada, the UN might not be the best option to implement the SSR needs because of the short-term deployments of peacekeeper officers, different backgrounds of UN advisors, and its recruitment process (Center for

[3] The period for UN staff to serve on the ground does not exceed on year per assignment.

International Governance Innovation, 2011: 9). Moreover, in December 2006, the Justice Section of the UN mission, MINUSTAH, was operating at less than half percent of its required advisors and the police section had less than that percentage which affected negatively the capability of the mission in addressing the reform process in a holistic way (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*. In addition to that, the lack of advisors who speak the French language is also a burden to be taken in consideration.


4.3.2.2. Financial Resources for Security Sector Reform

The UN depends on assessed financial contributions by Member States to cover the human resources in peacekeeping missions. However, SSR projects are funded through trust funds which depend on voluntary contributions. Furthermore, although the UNDP is one of the UN key agencies being involved in the SSR activities, many of the SSR projects do not qualify for assistance from the UNDP due to the fact that certain aspects of several SSR projects, such as restructuring and training of military forces, are excluded from the developmental assistance according to the OECD perspective (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*. The overall result is that the amount of financial resources available for UN's SSR projects is limited. As a result of this, SSR projects supported by the UN in Haiti were designed to be low cost to ensure that the available resources would cover those projects, which subsequently have modest impacts on the community.

On the other hand, assistance is not fairly disbursed amongst various aspects of the SSR in Haiti. Projects in some areas, such as the police, are given more resources by donors than other areas like judicial and prison systems (Center for International Governance Innovation, 2009). As of December 2006 there was no judicial reform had taken place, which is attributed to the mistrust between the international donors and the transitional government in Haiti at that time. Furthermore, reform of the judicial sector at a later stage was severely affected by the limited resources available for the UN mission to implement projects related to this sector due to the scarce of substantial funding from the international donors over the past ten

years (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*. Another example is the implementation of the DDR which was weakened by the intermittent release of funds by donors. A grant in the amount of $3.7 million was approved in 2005, but it was released one month before the new budget of following year (*Hänggi, & Scherrer, 2007)*.

Figure 2: Official Development Assistance to Haiti (2003-2011, USD million)



Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

According to OECD statistics, the total net ODA disbursement in Haiti is less than donors' pledges during 2003-2011, which show the financing gap that the Haitian government had to face. This gap severely increased after 2010 earthquake (figure 2).

Table 5: Net ODA Disbursements for all sectors compared ODA for SSR in Haiti (2004-2011, USD million)

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total ODA for all sectors	255.15	512.76	530.38	596.09	802.45	1976.96	3895.39	1698.24
Total ODA for SSR	2.64	22.19	31.93	32.90	91.63	71.41	108.44	119.13

Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

The failure of donor countries to fulfill their commitments affected the progress of the security reform process because of the share of SSR from the disbursed assistance was dramatically affected as priorities were given to humanitarian and development needs (table 5). In addition to that, the total ODA net disbursement to SSR programs and projects is less than donors' pledges during the period 2004-2011 (table 6).

Table 6: Net ODA for Security Sector Reform in Haiti (2004-2011, USD million)

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total Commitments	22.5	27.4	46.3	52.9	124.7	61.1	139.1	212.7
Total Gross Disbursements	2.6	22.2	31.9	32.9	91.6	71.4	108.4	119.1

Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

4.3.3. Afghanistan

4.3.3.1. Capacity of Donor Countries

The separated SSR responsibilities of lead nations set up in the Bonn agreement created conflicting views of the reform of various pillars of SSR among those nations who interpreted their responsibilities in different ways. Moreover, the limited capacity and poor experience of some lead nations in implementing reform in the relevant pillars undermined the progress of the reform of those pillars. For example, Germany was the lead nation for police reform. As discussed in the previous section, Berlin adopted a long-term approach of reforming the police sector where it understood its mandate was only to coordinate the reform of this sector, not to build it from the bottom-top (Serchuk, 2006). Consequently, Germany reopened the police academy in 2002 for the training of high rank police officers and had never focused on training of low rank officers. Berlin only deployed about 40 German police advisors which were far from the actual need to implement a comprehensive approach of mentoring the new police as the United States did with the army. In terms of funds, Germany disbursed €70 million between 2002 and 2006. The outcome of this limited capacity was the graduation of 251 Afghan officers from the academy in August 2005 (Crisis Group, 2007).

The blurred strategic vision of Germany, lack of resources, and the need for deployment of larger number of well trained police forces in 2003 pushed the United States to engage in the reform of police programs. The U.S. Department of Defense was authorized to implement U.S. supported police programs in Afghanistan because the U.S. does not have a national police force or police advisors to be sent abroad. Because of the limited capacity of the Department of Defense in terms of police training, it depended on a private contractor, DynCorp, to train the Afghan police officers (Serchuk, 2006). The U.S. disbursed around at $2.1 billion to support police training programs between 2003 and 2006. On the other hand, the European Council authorized the European Union Police Mission to assume responsibility of police


reform instead of Germany in the summer of 2007, but the small numbers of its forces in addition to the poor coordination hindered its role in this sector (Crisis Group, 2007).

4.3.3.2. Financial Resources for Security Sector Reform

A successful SSR necessitates a long-term commitment of international donors alongside the disbursement of a durable assistance. However, in the Afghanistan case, donors have implemented a short-term SSR approach in funding, equipment and training programs. This undermined the effectiveness of the reform process and caused a slow capacity building of the Afghan government.

The amount of annual ODA increased form a total of $3.2 billion in commitment in early 2002 to $16.8 billion by the end of 2010. Furthermore, 2010 witnessed a peak increased in assistance commitment. However, the total amount of actual assistance disbursed has only been $ 10.9 billion (figure3), which represents 65% of commitments (Afghan Ministry of Finance, 2010).

Figure 3: Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan (2002-2010 USD billion) Commitments vs. actual disbursement



Source: Afghan Development Cooperation Report 2010 p.18

In terms of the volume of the disbursed ODA, the United States has been the largest donor, followed by Japan, and then the European Union since 2002 (table 7). The U.S. Department of Defense has disbursed $29.05 billion as security assistance between 2002 and 2011 (Afghan Ministry of Finance, 2012).


Table 7: Top 10 international donors (2002 -2011, USD billion) in Afghanistan

Rank	Donor	2002-2011 Commitment	2002-2011 Disbursement
1	United States of America	57,383	47,524
2	Japan	3,821	3,821
3	European Union/European Commission	3,077	2,816
4	United Kingdom	2,574	2,578
5	Germany	2,435	978
6	Asian Development Bank	2,400	1,129
7	World Bank	2,378	1,852
8	India	1,588	759
9	Canada	1,371	1,371
10	Netherlands	1,109	1,110

Source: Afghan Development Cooperation Report 2012 p.48

The failure of international donors to fulfill their committed assistance has represented a persistent obstacle. International donors have paid $57 billion out of their commitment ($69 billion) by the end of 2010, although 82% of this amount was disbursed directly by donors through parallel channels that bypass the Afghan budget. Furthermore, 51% of the $57 billion was spent on security reform programs between 2002 and 2010 and the remaining 49% was allocated to development programs distributed on different sectors (Afghan Ministry of Finance, 2010). On the other hand, in 2011, 68% of total aid disbursed was allocated to security sector, 95% of it was given by the US, 3% by Japan, and 1% by EU. Figure (4) shows aid disbursement according to sectors in 2011 (Afghan Ministry of Finance, 2012).


Figure 4: ODA disbursement according to sectors in Afghanistan 2011



Source: Afghan Development Cooperation Report 2012 p.14

A comparison between international assistance allocated for counterinsurgency and assistance directed towards security sector reform in Afghanistan shows $242.9 billion and $16.1 billion respectively during the period 2002-2009 (figure 5) (Poole, 2011). This illustrates that the international community focuses on a quick fix the insecurity in Afghanistan more than its concentration on the reform of the security sector, which is vital for ensuring stability and counterinsurgency in long-term perspective.

Figure 5: Security and Military Expenditures in Afghanistan (2002–2009 USD billion)




Source: Poole, Lydia. 2011 "Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002-2010," Development Initiatives, January 2011, accessed on 24 June 2011 at http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/afghanistan-tracking-major-resource-flows-2002-2010 page 2

Although massive amounts of assistance flowed to Afghanistan in the last decade, much of it was wasted due to the ineffective management of many reform programs. The limited governmental absorptive capacity, rampant corruption, and the deteriorated security situation that hinders the implementing of projects may justify the failing of donors to deliver on committed aid. To address this persistent problem, many international conferences have been organized since the Bonn Conference in December 2001. The last one was hold in Tokyo in 2012 which stressed the need for donors to fulfill their commitments.

Uneven allocation of assistance to the five pillars of SSR was clear. Police and justice were the most affected pillars. According to the World Bank, 60% of the

SSR spending was on the army between 2002 and 2005, 28% on police and 3% on justice in the same period (World Bank, 2005) (figure 6). In addition to the lack of resources, the slow pace of reform of the justice sector can also be attributed partially to the lack of competence and low expertise of Italy, the lead nation of this sector, in terms of implementing justice programs in post-conflict countries (Goodhand, and Bergne, 2004).

Figure 6: Composition of Security Expenditures in Afghanistan, 2002-2005



Source: adopted form World Bank, 2005, "Afghanistan, Managing Public Finances for Development", vol. I, Improving Public Financial Management in the Security Sector (34582-AF), World Bank, 22 December 2005, p. 43

The long-term success of the SSR in Afghanistan would be determined by the ability of the Afghan Government to provide security to its citizens after the departure of foreign troops in 2014. Although international donors have pledged to continue assisting Afghanistan in the future, the Afghan government needs to raise domestic revenue to be able to pay for the security expenditures it faces, especially with the

failure of donors to fulfill their commitments during the previous period and the diminishing tendency of aid. This will put the government under huge fiscal burden in the coming years as decreasing international assistance and the lack of resources would deeply harm the security sector (Sedra, 2007).

4.3.4. Summary of Capacity and Commitment of Case Studies

The UK government's long-term political commitment to continue security assistance to Sierra Leone was critical for consolidating the efforts of international donor partners to reform the Security Sector in the country. At the same time, the UK government's financial assistance was strong and steady during all phases of the reform process.

While in the case of Haiti, the overall UN capacity in providing SSR assistance to the Haitian government was limited during the period of this study. Even when required capacity exists, it remains scattered, fragmented, and poorly coordinated. The creation of a joint JSSR unit at the UN headquarters in 2007 was not associated with a similar initiative in the UN mission in Haiti. This further undermined the UN capability to provide the required assistance for the reform process in the country, especially with existence of the large numbers of departments and agencies on the ground which cover the SSR activities. In addition to that, the lack of sufficient resources allocated to justice system and DDR, as well as the volatility of disbursement of financial assistance to programs of police reform, hindered the progress of the overall implementation of the SSR process.

In Afghanistan, despite the intense international assistance that has been disbursed on the security sector reform over the past ten years, the Afghan government was not able to provide effective security and stability in areas outside provincial capitals. Several factors contributed to the failure to achieve the envisaged reform which includes; (i) ineffective management of assistance allocation and disbursement by international donors; (ii) uneven distribution of assistance on the five pillars of SSR;

(iii) the limited governmental absorptive capacity; and (iv) the rampant corruption among Afghan officials. There were also limited capacity of government officials and poor experience of some lead nations in implementing reform programs in the related pillars which consequently undermined the progress of the process as a whole.

V. SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN YEMEN

Yemen witnessed a popular uprising inspired by the Arab spring, demanding that President Ali Abdullah Saleh step down in 2011. A political compromise had been reached on 23 November 2011 under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) after more than 10 months of public uprising. The GCC-Initiative forced a power transfer deal through the election of the vice President, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, as consensus president on the 21st of February 2012. It also instituted a two-year political transition process that should end in February 2014. The country launched a National Dialogue Conference on the 18th of March 2013 which represents a unique chance for establishing a new constitutional order, implementing fundamental reforms in state's institutions and improving the quality of governance.

5.1. Current security situation in Yemen

Since the reunification of Yemen in May 1990, the country has been experiencing number of serious security challenges that undermined its capacity to deliver basic services to people, in addition to the loss of monopoly over legitimate violence by the state. Yemen currently confronts simultaneous political, security, and economical crises.

Security threats include terrorist groups that have been attacking state's institutions since 2000. Al-Qaeda's branches in Yemen and Saudi Arabia merged in January 2009 and formed al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). It spread throughout the country, has engaged in a powerful fight against the state's military forces since 2011, and took over several towns in the southern part of the country. Although the state's security forces recaptured areas that had fallen under Al-Qaeda control in June 2012, terrorist elements have fled into major cities where they have been attacking several military and political targets, which constitute a serious threat on security and stability in the country. Furthermore, AQAP threats are not limited to

Yemen, where it claimed responsibility for the attempt to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight over the U.S. in December 2009 (Crisis Group, 2012).

On top the spread of Al Qaeda, the northern part of Yemen has witnessed a serious conflict as a result of the growing of the Houthi movement and its control over a large portion of that region since 2004. The Huothi movement led to the outbreak of six wars with the state's security forces and, yet, a resolution of this conflict has not been reached.

In the south, another movement, known as the Hiraak, started in 2007 as a rights-based popular protest demanding land reform and equal access to public offices and services. The government was ignoring this movement until 2009 when it began to call for the separation of the southern part and the return of the situation to what it was before the reunification. The failure of the government to address the root causes of this movement as soon as possible will escalate the deteriorated situation in this region of the country that ultimately may lead to the eruption of violence.

In addition to these three major security challenges, Yemen suffers from tribal conflicts that undermine state's authority outside major cities. The monopoly of power in Yemen is not confined to the state and its security forces, but extends to other local actors such as armed tribesmen as well as the Jihadist elements affiliated to al-Qaeda. It is resulted from the state's inability to control over all regions of the country, which is exacerbated by the widespread availability of weapons in the hands of citizens.

Kidnapping of foreigner tourists is another challenge to security forces in the country which is carried out by armed tribesmen who ask for ransom. The tribesmen have demands related to the development of their regions, or exert pressure on the government to release members of their tribes who have been arrested by the state. Also, the piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden at the southern gate of Yemen poses a significant threat to the lives of Yemeni fisherman and the maritime shipment to Yemen ports.

5.2. Security Institutions in Yemen[4]

The reunification of Yemen was followed by the merging of the security institutions and forces of the North and the South which were contradictory in military and intellectual doctrines as well as they were different professionally. The united security forces suffered from split of loyalties, which is not limited to the North and South but extends to the personal and tribal level. Besides that, the new security forces became inflated - in terms of large number of institutions and soldiers - that added extra financial burden on the state, let alone the overlapping of functions and mandates of various security apparatuses, and the lack of professionalism (Al-Mikhlafi, & Al Rahabi, 2012).

Moreover, there has been a rampant corruption in security institutions due to the ineffective performance of the state's oversight mechanisms and the loss of transparency in managing security expenditures, because the parliament approves it as unclassified expenditures (Al-Mikhlafi, & Al Rahabi, 2012). A country-wide survey was conducted early this year to examine public perception of security forces in Yemen. The survey reveals that 71.5% of the participated peoples perceive security institutions as ineffective if not absent (Yemen Polling Center, 2013).

There has been poor coordination between the ministries of interior, justice, and defense which resulted in overlapping and duplication of functions between the army and police that caused ineffective provision of security in urban areas and limited policing in rural areas and borders (Sayigh, 2009).

While Yemen was in the midst of the popular uprising, the military-security forces became divided on March 21st, 2011 after Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmer[5], the commander of 1st Armored Division, announced that his troops would protect protesters. Other commanders, including some in the air force joined Mohsen in

[4] In Yemen the term "security institutions" only covers Ministry of Interior and its affiliated entities but not Military forces and Ministry of Defense. This thesis uses security sector or institutions in this chapter to refer to military-security sector and institutions as it refers in other part of the thesis.

[5] Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmer is the commander of 1st Armored Division and North West Military Region who was a long-time ally of the President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

supporting the uprising. On the other hand, the well-trained and equipped Republican Guard under the president's son continued its loyalty to the President. The fragmentation of the Army made the security situation more complicated. Although a GCC-brokered political compromise was signed in November 2011, the security institutions have remained divided for a long time after the election of a new President in February 2012 who later issued a series of presidential decrees aimed at ending this fragmentation.

The current structure of the security institutions in Yemen consists of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and intelligence agencies that include the National Security Bureau (NSB) and the Central Agency for Political Security. There are around 100,000 police officers in the Ministry of Interior and the subsidiary apparatuses that operate under its authority, mainly the Special Security Agency, the General Security Agency, and the General Administration to Counter Terrorism and Organized Crime which assumes responsibilities of combating terrorism (Al-Mikhlafi, & Al Rahabi, 2012). The Ministry of Defense controls the military forces and institutions. The hierarchy of Yemeni Armed Forces is composed of seven military districts corresponding to geographical regions of the country. The Armed forces has around 138,000 personnel (Nation master, 2013).

5.3. Security Sector Reform in Yemen

Reform of the security sector in Yemen is one of the main obligations of the GCC-Initiative to restore stability in the country, where it states that the transitional government should *"create the necessary conditions and take the necessary steps to integrate the armed forces under unified, national and professional leadership in the context of the rule of law"* (Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, 2011, article 17).

The reform process started two months after the inauguration of the elected President Hadi's in February 2012. The first step of the process intended to unify the fragmented security sector and abolish the influence of powerful military figures through the reassignment and removal of the prominent commanders affiliated to the

previous president Ali Saleh and his opponent, Ali Mohsen. On December 19th, 2012, another Presidential decree was issued and aimed at the dissolution of the First Armored Division and the Republican Guard which were responsible for the fragmentation of the Army. At the same time, the decree stated that the military forces consisted of five branches: the Army, Air Force, Navy and Border Guards, and the Strategic Reserve Force (Saba news, 2012).

The latest key step of the reform process took place by another set of presidential decrees on April 10th, 2013, which implemented a further step in breaking up patronage networks, enhancing their loyalty to the state rather than to persons or tribes, and professionalizing and reorganizing the Army forces. Many former military commanders were removed, which promotes de-personalization of the military structure (Yemen Times, 2013). This set of decrees increased the military district to seven instead of five which limits the troops subordinate to any commander which minimizes any potential opportunities for any single commander to have enough force that could pose a threat to the state as it previously happened during the political turmoil in 2011. Regarding police apparatuses, President Hadi issued a presidential decree aimed at restructuring the Ministry of Interior in February 2013. The reform plan was developed by a Yemeni team assisted by European and Jordanian experts (Yemen Fox, 2013).

5.3.1. International Assistance for SSR in Yemen


Growing international interest in Yemen reflects concerns about a new zone of instability that acts as a host to a core of trained militants who are hostile to the United States and its allies (Healy & Hill, 2010). After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the United States increased its security assistance to Yemen which focused on military, intelligence cooperation, counter terrorism, and border control. The United States informally lead the reform process in Yemen to enhance the capacity of Yemeni Forces to fight against al Qaeda (AQAP) where America's strategy considers Yemen as a front-line state in the war on terrorism (Sayigh, 2009).

The United States assisted in the establishment of the NSB and provided it with the necessary equipment such as modern data-collection systems. It also provided assistance for the newly established Counter-Terrorism Unit in the Ministry of Interior as well as surveillance systems at main airports. The United Kingdom complemented the US efforts through supporting the Counter-Terrorism unit, NSB, and Coast Guard. In addition to that, France and Italy provided some equipment for the Coast Guard such as a boat and vessel-tracking system in 2002-2006. The European Commission allocated €7.5 million as support for Police Academy modernization program in 2009 (Sayigh, 2009).

5.3.2. Security Sector Reform Challenges in Yemen

Yemen has not been a major recipient of Official Development Assistance, receiving a total of $5.5 billion USD between 1995 and 2009 (Development Initiatives, 2011). International donors, including Europe, China, the U.S. and Gulf Arab states, pledged $7.9 billion in aid to Yemen in September 2012. So far, about 1.8 billion dollars has been disbursed, including a deposit of one billion dollars in the central bank of Yemen to stabilize the local currency Figure (7) (Friends of Yemen statement, 2013).


Figure 7: Total Official Development Assistance to Yemen (2002 -2011, USD million)



Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

Regarding assistance to security sector reform, the total ODA net disbursement to SSR activities in Yemen, according the OECD-DAC data, is less than the donor countries' pledge during the period 2002 – 2011, Figure (8).

Figure 8: Total Official Development Assistance to SSR Yemen (2002 -2011, USD million)



Source: OECD statistics data as 26/6/2013, available at the link http://stats.oecd.org/

Most of the SSR assistance is disbursed on training programs that require international experts and are designed according to donor priorities as well as on purchasing military and security equipment from the donor countries (Sayigh, 2009). This undermines the ownership of the government in designing the reform process in line with the priorities and needs of the Yemeni citizens such as modernization of law enforcement agencies. Disbursement of the assistance through the regular state budget can negate this effect.

The reform of the security sector in Yemen faces a particular challenge. The focus of international donors on counter-terrorism has hindered the progress of reform in other parts of the security sector, such as the community policing and justice system that are in urgent need for enhancement in their performance and capacity to enforce court decisions as well as the elimination of corruption in the security sector. In

addition, providing assistance by international donors for certain agencies in charge of counter-terrorism operations leads to a concentration of power in a limited number of agencies that might be used by the authorities to suppress regime opponents, especially with the ineffective oversight mechanisms (Sayigh, 2009).

There is a need to integrate and restructure the fragmented security apparatuses on national foundations based on the Constitution to enhance the state authority and capacity of providing effective security and justice as well as its ability to face challenges of legitimacy from rival non-state actors such as Al-Huthi movement, armed tribesmen, and the Jihadist militants. In this context, President Hadi has initiated the process of restructuring the fragmented military-security apparatuses. However, it is still early to assess the impact of these decisions to bring about substantial structural reforms that go beyond the mere removal of prominent commanders to the implementation of long-term reform programs to ensure the provision of effective security to Yemeni citizens, rather than consolidating the president authority in these apparatuses (Albrecht, 2013).

None of the security forces are subjected to effective civilian oversight, such as the parliament's oversight mechanism, to ensure the adherence of this sector to principles of good governance, accountability and transparency (Crisis Group, 2013). Despite that, the current SSR in Yemen does not tackle this issue. There is also lack of reform programs that are aimed at the strengthening of authority in the Central Organization for Control and Accounting. This would be to audit the security sector to eliminate the rampant corruption which is one of the most notable challenges to establish an efficient security force. In this context, improving of the salaries of the Yemeni security forces and providing them with a decent life would positively affect anti-corruption measures (Al-Mikhlafi, & Al Rahabi, 2012). In turn, this necessitates a direct budgetary assistance that need a strong and long-term support of the international donors.

Reform of Yemeni security sector lacks a comprehensive strategy as prescribed by international SSR principles. Efforts should be made to lay the

foundations for a holistic strategy that take into consideration the ending of the inflated size of security forces, the overlap and duplication in their structures and competencies, and to establish an effective oversight mechanism that includes the parliament, the judicial system, and the civil society (Al-Mikhlafi, & Al Rahabi, 2012). This strategy should also outline donor's responsibilities and the role of Yemeni authorities in leading and coordinating the implementation of the reform processes.

5.4. What can Yemen Learn From the Selected Cases' Experience?

The study reveals that the impact of international assistance on security sector reform varies from case to case depending on the pattern of behavior of international donors and recipient countries in applying certain principles and measures while providing assistance and conducting the reform process.

The success of security sector reform in the Sierra Leone case illustrates the importance of the existence of a strong and coherent political leadership. The presence of a domestic team to lead the reform process and to ensure local ownership through the active participation of designing and implementing reform programs and projects that take into considerations local priorities and realties in turn guarantee the long-term sustainability of the process. On the other hand, the absence of stable political systems in Haiti and Afghanistan, in addition to the prevailing of international donors' interests from the beginning of the reform process, undermined the ability of the national governments to assert local ownership which resulted in weak SSR outcomes in both countries.

In this context, as Yemen is approaching the end of the transitional period in February 2014 where it will culminate in the election of a new parliament and political leadership. It would be in a better position to assert local ownership over the reform process, especially with its need for international assistance to sustain the implementation of the reform programs. Although Yemen has established a national committee to oversee the reform process in the security sector, there is a need to set up an empowered technical team, that encompasses experts from all security branches, in

order to manage and monitor the reform programs, and to build up the local institutional memory from the current best practices of security sector reform.

In the case of Afghanistan, the unbalance attention of international donors toward implementing a quick fix approach to fight against insurgency rather than focusing on security sector reform and other local priories was one of the main causes of slow progress in the SSR process. Yemen should take a good lesson from this case as most of its international supported security reform programs have been focusing on counter-terrorism and not reflecting the priorities of the Yemeni people who prefer to implement reform programs dedicated to enhance the capacity of the law enforcement agencies and community policing, or at least to give it adequate attention.

The failure of donor countries to fulfill their financial commitments, the volatility of international assistance, and the unbalanced disbursement of assistance impeded the progress of SSR process in Haiti. While in Sierra Leone the situation is different, where the financial and technical assistance allocated to security sector reform was not intermittent or volatile as a result of the fulfillment of donors their financial pledges. Furthermore, the disbursed assistance exceeded donors' commitments in several years, which consequently promoted the success of SSR in Sierra Leone. In this context, although Yemen has set up an "executive board on accelerated absorption of international assistance", the government of Yemen should engage in a constructive dialogue with international donors to earmark the pledges related to SSR and to accelerate assistance disbursement in due time to enable the government to complete the reform programs and to avoid the failure that occurred in Haiti.

The Afghan SSR is a donor-driven process which focused on counter-insurgency operations and the establishment of adequate army troops and police officers to fight terrorism at the expense of neglecting capacity building of the Afghan government. This is needed to sustain their financial expenditures in the long-term when assistance is ceased. As a result, the sustainability of the reform process is at stake. In this context, Yemen should bear in mind that a successful SSR necessitates

the restructuring of the overlapped apparatuses and the reduction of the already inflated size of security forces in line with security and economic challenges it faces.

Afghanistan has received a great amount of international assistance for SSR. However, the absence of a single leadership for the reform process and the differences in competencies, political interests, and available financial resources of individual donor countries undermined the advantage of abundant assistance. Without effective coordination, advances made in one part of the reform process could be negated by inaction or failures in another (Lilly, luckham, & Page, 2002). In the case of Haiti, the lack of effective coordination of SSR activities between international donors, national authorities, and the UN and its inter-agencies caused duplication of SSR programs and caused waste of scarce resources. While in the case of Sierra Leone, the UK, with its African conflict Prevention Pool, played a substantial leading role in consolidating the international SSR efforts that ultimately resulted in acceptable outcome. In this regard, as there have been several donor countries assisting Yemen to reform the security sector, Yemen should establish a strategic unit that serves as focal point for coordination and cooperation between local and international SSR stakeholders to avoid overlapping of programs and projects to reduce the operating costs and to collect and disseminate best practices related to SSR. At the same time, it is advisable that Yemen signs a memorandum of understanding with donor countries that outlines the aspects of cooperation in a definite timeframe to finish the reform process.

VI. CONCLUSION

The assessment of case studies illustrates that to build effective security institutions capable of providing efficient security, three principles should be followed. First, long-term political commitment of donor countries and durable disbursement of assistance are required to ensure the success of the reform. Second, coordination among internal agencies in donor countries and of the donor countries with other international and local partners is needed to overcome the conflicting reform strategies, priorities, or approaches resulted from the multicity of SSR stakeholders. Finally, an assertion of national authorities over local ownership of the implemented SSR programs and projects is critical for sustainability of the process.

The significant role of local ownership in the case of Sierra Leone was evident in granting of sustainability of security sector reform process. The consolidated leadership and the existence of a strong domestic team were critical for driving the reform process and saving the peace, especially as the team remained constant when international experts were being continuously changed.

The lack of Haitian ownership over the reform programs was clear at an early stage of the reform process. It is attributed to the scarce financial resources, limited capacity, and the absence of strong and stable political system in Haiti. Furthermore, the insufficient understanding of international donors for the needs of the domestic society and their inclination to implement the reform's strategies that do not take into account local realties undermined the already weak Haitian's local ownership over the reform process.

On the other hand, in the case of Afghanistan, SSR was a donor-driven process starting from the design of the strategy to the implementation and assessment due to of the limited capacity and corruption of the Afghan security authorities. Although international donors have not consulted Afghan leaders throughout various stages of the reform process and have not taken local realities and priorities into considerations, the Afghan government went along with it because of its scarce

resources. The quick fix approach of donors that focused on counter-insurgency prevailed over other local priorities and building of national capacity which is required for the sustainability of the reform process. In addition to that, the parallel systems of assistance disbursement that bypasses the government budget system further undermined the role of the local authorities in managing and implementing reform projects and programs according to their needs.

The remarkable commitment provided by the UK government and other international donor partners to prevent conflict in Sierra Leone was clear through their fulfillment of the financial obligations in due time toward the reform process in that country. The steady and continuous flow of financial aid and technical assistance ensured the viability of the reform process and enabled it to achieve its objectives.

While in Haiti case, although the United Nations has committed to implement SSR activities in Haiti, the overall capacity of the UN in providing SSR assistance was limited during the study period. The International Organization only adopted the "UN principles for SSR" in 2008 and launched the "United Nations integrated technical guidance manual on security sector reform" in March of 2013, which illustrates the absence of what is called "one United Nations approach to SSR" and a lack of a common framework for guiding UN support to SSR efforts during 2002-2010. Consequently, the existence of large number of scattered, fragmented, and poorly coordinated UN internal departments and inter agencies implementing SSR activities have undermined the UN SSR efforts at the Headquarter and Mission levels. In addition to that, international assistance was not fairly channeled to various aspects of SSR, such as the police training programs which were given more resources by donors than other areas like judicial and prison systems as international and domestic actors have been poorly coordinated. Furthermore, the volatility of international assistance to police reform programs hindered the progress of the overall SSR process.

In the case of Afghanistan, donors' short-term commitments toward counterinsurgency operations obscured the long-term security sector reform which is more critical for both provision of security and counterinsurgency in the long-term

perspective. The disbursement of most of the international assistance was channeled to army and police training programs designed for supporting counterinsurgency operations while the needs of community policing and other pillars of security sector reform, such as justice system, were under-resourced relative to the army and police. In addition to that, the limited SSR experience and the lack of resources from some donors hindered implementing reform programs in the related pillars which consequently affected the progress of the process as a whole. Furthermore, although the established large number of Afghan National Security Forces is required for fighting insurgency, it is beyond the ability of the Afghan government to sustain their salaries and expenditures in future without long-term supply of financial resource from the international donors.

Coordination among internal UK governmental agencies in charge of security sector reform in Sierra Leone was augmented by adopting a consistent approach amongst its domestic relevant stakeholders, the ACPP, which served as a focal point that enhanced the communication, resource management, policy making, and information sharing. The early engagement in the reform process and the establishment of ACPP give the British government the lead in coordination and allowed for sharing of the best practices with other international donor partners.

While in the Haiti case, the absence of a strategic unit at the UN headquarters and its mission left an integrated approach to implement SSR activities which undermined the UN SSR efforts at the headquarters and mission levels. Consequently, inter-agency cooperation and coordination were found to be inefficient, as most responsibilities related to SSR activities were scattered and fragmented internally in various sections of the UN mission in Haiti. This affected the implementation of SSR on the ground negatively. Furthermore, the coordination efforts between international stakeholders in the field in Haiti were inconsistent and insufficient to enhance the reform process as approaches differed depending on donor's unilateral strategies and capacities. This would result in duplication of efforts that took part in delaying the reforms. In addition to that the establishment of several structures dedicated to

enhancing coordination among SSR stakeholders in Haiti did not serve the purpose for which they were established because those structures have not operated properly.

In the Afghanistan case, coordination and cooperation of international donors have been challenging issues at various phases of the reform process. The absence of a single leadership for the whole reform process, which resulted after the adoption of distributing responsibilities among lead donor nations, was critical in losing the unity of vision of SSR stakeholders. It also undermined the collaboration between the five pillars of security reform activities and the coherence of the process as it triggered competition over resources, aid overlap, and divisions at the intra-governmental level. Moreover, the differences in competencies, political interests, available resources, socio-cultural approaches to security, and methodology of reform among the lead nations have resulted in inconsistency and incoherence between reform approaches that further produced ineffective and confused results which led to duplication of efforts and overlapping of programs.

Yemen needs international assistance to continue SSR to build an effective security sector that is capable of providing efficient security and stability in the country. Yemen should establish an empowered national technical team to monitor and manage the reform programs and to help the political leadership to effectively assert local ownership over the process. At the same time, a strategic coordination unit should be set up to harmonize the SSR cooperation between various local and international stakeholders engaging in the reform process.

The case studies demonstrate the negative impact arising from the absence of long-term commitments of donor countries to ensure the sustainability of the reform process, hence the government of Yemen should convince international donors to fulfill their pledges and to accelerate the release of assistance to avoid the falling in problems experienced by Afghanistan and Haiti resulted from donors' short-term approaches.

Most international assistance in the security sector in Yemen is spent on training and equipping the military for fighting terrorism, whereas other sections of this

sector are not participating directly in counter-terrorism and receive less assistance. Yemen needs to develop a holistic SSR strategy that covers all parts of the military-security sector equally, reflects priorities and the local realities, and propose a realistic vision for the appropriate size of the already inflated security force in conformity with security and economic challenges it faces. In doing this, Yemen should benefit from the experiences of countries that have long practice in this area, such as the United Kingdom.

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