



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

국제학석사학위논문

**Dreaming of a Different China:**  
The Changing China Policy under the  
Democratic Party of Japan

일본 민주당 정권의 대중정책 변화

2016년 8월

서울대학교 국제대학원  
국제학과 국제지역학전공  
김 원 민

# Abstract

Over the course of the three periods of Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rule, the features of the DPJ's China policy gradually disappeared. Consistency with regard to strategy toward China was lacking within the party. During the Hatoyama regime, Japan's China policy reflected the effort to develop ties with China while pursuing a more equal US-Japan alliance. The Kan regime returned to the LDP's traditional China policy, engaging China and developing a strong US-Japan alliance. The Noda regime went beyond the LDP's China policy, creating conflict with China and clinging to the strong US-Japan alliance.

The policy directions of each of the DPJ regimes corresponded to perceptions to China: the Hatoyama regime perceived China as a beneficial partner, while the Kan and Noda regimes perceived China as a threat. Through these analyses, two implications are deduced. First, Japan and China each "dreamed of a different China" and this led to limitations in closer Sino-Japanese relations. The disparity in perceptions pertaining to the intentions of China led to conflicts. Given the fact that this situation is not hugely changed at the present time, the limits of further developing Sino-Japanese relations seem poised to remain for the near future. Second, the United States plays a significant role in Sino-Japanese relations. During the periods of DPJ rule, China demonstrated that it reacts assertively with respect to Japan when US-Japanese relations deteriorate.

**Keywords:** Democratic Party of Japan, DPJ's China policy, Sino-Japanese relations, US-Japan relations, Perception, System effects

**Student Number:** 2014-24233

# Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>i</b>
<b>Table of Contents</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>List of Figures</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>List of Tables</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>Chapter 1. Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1. Context of the Research Question .....	1
1.2. Research Question .....	3
<b>Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework</b> .....	<b>5</b>
2.1. Literature Review .....	5
2.2. Theoretical Framework.....	10
<b>Chapter 3. The Hatoyama regime: Pivot toward China</b> .....	<b>11</b>
3.1. The Hatoyama regime’s China Policy .....	11
3.2. The Hatoyama regime’s perception of China.....	22
3.3. China’s perception of Japan and its reaction .....	32
<b>Chapter 4. The Kan regime: Turning Back to Traditionalism</b> ...	<b>36</b>
4.1. The Kan regime’s China Policy.....	38
4.2. The Kan regime’s perception of China.....	56
4.3. China’s perception of Japan and its reaction .....	60
<b>Chapter 5. The Noda regime: Beyond Traditionalism</b> .....	<b>65</b>
5.1. The Noda Regime’s China policy .....	71
5.2. The Noda regime’s perception of China.....	78
5.3. China’s perception of Japan and its reaction .....	83
<b>Chapter 6. Conclusion</b> .....	<b>88</b>
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	<b>90</b>
국문초록.....	97

## **List of Figures**

Figure 1. The Change in the system of Submarine Units .....	50
Figure 2. Example Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Aircraft to which Scrambles Responded.....	70
Figure 3. the number of Chinese government and other vessels that entered Japan's contiguous zone or intruded into territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands .....	74
Figure 4. Japanese Public Sentiment toward China in 2011.....	83

## **List of Tables**

Table 1. Comparison of DPJ China policy features by regime.....	3
---	---

# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Context of the Research Question

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) accomplished regime change in August 2009 through the landslide victory in the lower house election conducted on August 30th, 2009. As the new ruling party, the DPJ reexamined the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s policies and attempted to implement new ones. In the case of diplomatic policies, the DPJ criticized the LDP's dependent foreign policy and sought to form a new approach to East Asian countries including China. In this regard, the DPJ's initial China policy features are: strengthening the Sino-Japanese ties in the context of the East Asian Community idea and establishing a more equal US-Japan alliance. When it comes to defining the DPJ's China policy, its policy toward the United States should be included because the Japanese regime's stance toward the United States and the proximity of US-Japan relations significantly influences China's perception of the authenticity of Japan's attempt to have closer relations with China.

In fact, past LDP Prime Ministers such as Tanaka, Fukuda, and Ohira emphasized the importance of having amicable relations with East Asian countries, including China. In January 2002, when visiting Southeast Asian countries past LDP leader Koizumi proposed an idea to make "a community that acts together and advances together."<sup>1</sup> In 2004, when Koizumi still held the prime ministership, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan published the Issue Papers, which were presented to the ASEAN+3 Foreign

---

<sup>1</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), 106-126. P. 115

Ministers' meeting in July 2004.<sup>2</sup> However, even though the LDP leaders also put emphasis on their relations with East Asian countries including China, the DPJ particularly represented a pro-Asian and pro-Chinese regime, derived from the fact that the DPJ not only tried to develop ties with China but also tried to have a more equal alliance with the US. Therefore, the uniqueness of the DPJ's China policy can be defined as 1) enhancing Sino-Japanese ties along with 2) having a more equal US-Japan alliance.

However, this policy direction gradually faded away with regime change, as table 1 shows. Prime Minister Hatoyama pursued both the East Asian Community (EAC) Idea and a more equal US-Japan alliance. Prime Minister Kan, on the other hand, showed limited interest in the EAC and attempted to restore the US-Japan alliance. Finally, Prime Minister Noda did not try to implement the EAC and endeavored to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. As the LDP's traditional diplomatic direction lay in developing and sustaining a strong US-Japan alliance and having amicable relations with other East Asian countries, the features of the first DPJ regime disappeared in the second Kan regime, and the conservative features became even stronger than the LDP during the Noda regime.

---

<sup>2</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asia/easia/index.html>. (accessed on 3 April 2016)

Regime	Hatoyama	Kan	Noda
Period	Sept. 16th, 2009 - June 2nd, 2010	June 4th, 2010 - Aug. 26th, 2011	Aug. 30th, 2011 - Dec. 26th, 2012
East Asian Community Idea	O	Limited interest	X
More Equal US- Japan Alliance	O	X	X

<Table 1> Comparison of DPJ China policy features by regime

## 1.2. Research Question

In other words, continuity in each regime's China policy was lacking; the policy gradually changed with each prime minister. This is a remarkable fact given that the LDP sustained a relatively consistent direction in its China policy. Thus, this paper investigates why the DPJ's China policy varied along with cabinet changes across three regimes, advancing three arguments. First, simultaneous with the periods of DPJ rule, a new international structure took form with the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. Second, the new policy toward China advanced by the DPJ was but a part of an overall new diplomatic strategy, which ultimately failed due to the fact that its initial features ultimately disappeared and became similar to those of the LDP. Therefore, investigating the reasons for the failure of the DPJ's China policy can finally contribute to understanding the future direction of Japan's China policy amid a new international structure shaped by the rise of China and the relative decline of the

United States.

The paper is organized as follows. The subsequent chapter presents a literature review examining possible variables explaining the reasons for the changes in the DPJ's China policy. It also elaborates the factors this paper will focus on to explain the DPJ regime's shift in China policy as well as the theoretical frameworks it will apply. The third, fourth, fifth sections investigate the DPJ's policy toward China across three regimes and the factors and dynamics underpinning affecting its formation. Lastly, the sixth sections will deal with the conclusion of this paper.

## **Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

### **2.1. Literature Review**

Previous studies suggest three variables related to the changes in the DPJ's strategies toward China between 2009 and 2012: the international structure, the fact that the DPJ is a catch-all party, and the perceptions of political leaders. These three variables will be critically reviewed in this chapter.

*The change in international structure: the relative decline of the US and Japan and a rising China*

Mifune analyzes changes in Japanese foreign policy toward China.<sup>3</sup> The author points out the changes in the international structure, meaning the relative decline of the US and the rise of China, as one of the reasons for the changes in Japan's China strategies. The author argues that China surpassed Japan in terms of trade share. When it comes to trade share in Japan, China surpassed the United States as well. In addition, ASEAN countries and the US chose China as the most influential country according to an opinion poll conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. By using this evidence, the author argues that these shifts in power balance among the United States, Japan and China affected Japan's policy toward China.

---

<sup>3</sup> Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

There are two more authors who deal with external factors to analyze the background of the DPJ's shift in their strategies toward China. Cho examines external factors such as the power shift in the international order, the United States' influence on Japan, and China's influence on Japan<sup>4</sup>. Yoshimatsu also applies the intertwined causality between the international structure and the DPJ leaders' perceptions, preferences in accordance with external factors.<sup>5</sup>

This neorealist perspective emphasizes the role of polarity in determining state behavior in international politics. Polarity itself, however, does not solely explain the reasons for the changes in the DPJ's strategies toward China. China's rise began to garner particular attention as it sidestepped the effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In fact, China even took an active role in resolving the crisis. Shifts in polarity became apparent when China overcame the global financial crisis in 2008 as the United States struggled, overburdened by offshore balancing strategies.<sup>6</sup> This power shift affected the Hatoyama regime's strategy toward China. However, it did not play a significant role for the Kan or Noda regimes because it occurred beforehand. In this regard, the changes in international structures show that a country can form a different foreign policy under the same international structure, and thus changes in international structure cannot be a main reason for the changes in the DPJ regimes' China policy.

---

<sup>4</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원. (in Korean)

<sup>5</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), 106-126.

<sup>6</sup> Wu Xinbo. (2009) "Chinese Perspectives on Building an East Asian Community in the Twenty-first Century," in Michael Green and Bates Gill, eds. *Asia's New Multilateralism* (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 56-58

*The DPJ as a catch-all party and the absence of a coherent principle related to strategies toward China*

Guibourg and Mifune claim that the inconsistency of the DPJ's strategies toward China derived from the fact that the DPJ is a catch-all party.<sup>7</sup> Mifune deals with Japan's strategies toward China under the DPJ regimes and argues the DPJ's foreign policies were rooted in no concrete and coherent principle as well as that the DPJ politicians could not achieve agreement on their foreign policies due to the fact that the DPJ consisted of a hodgepodge group of politicians. DPJ politicians varied across the political spectrum from the left to the right. This feature led to inconsistency in their strategies toward China.<sup>8</sup>

Guibourg asks why the DPJ could not make a distinctive change in their foreign policy even though they declared they would compose policies, including foreign policy, antithetical to the LDP. This research question resonates with the one proposed in this paper. This is because the drastic changes in the DPJ's strategies toward China within the DPJ reveal that their strategies toward China received their distinguishable features based on the fact they were different from those of the LDP. Those features, however, gradually disappeared and eventually became analogous with those of the

---

<sup>7</sup>Guibourg Delamotte (2012) Japan's Foreign Policy beyond Short-term Politics, *Asia-Pacific Review*, 19:2, 46-61, DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2012.739496; Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 213-245

<sup>8</sup>Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 213-245. P. 237

LDP. Returning to Guibourg's argument, the author claims that DPJ politicians' are situated on a wide ideological spectrum, though overall the party's ideology is more similar to that of the LDP than the Socialist Party ever was. Hence the author argues that the DPJ could not accomplish a change in Japan's foreign policies as the ideologies of DPJ and LDP politicians were not clearly distinguishable.

Nevertheless, the fact that the DPJ is a catch-all party cannot itself elaborate the reasons for the lack of continuity in the DPJ regimes' strategies toward China. For instance, Ozawa led the party under the aim of regime change from 2006 to 2009, despite the persistence of its varied ideological spectrum.<sup>9</sup> It is conceivable that the various ideologies would cause incoherence in the DPJ's policies. However, the fact that the DPJ gathered under the same policy line for a particular objective shows that it was able to overcome such ideological cleavages. As this point contrasts with Mifune and Guibourg's argument, one can say that the DPJ's wide ideological spectrum cannot fully explain the absence of consistency in the DPJ's strategies toward China.

*Political leaders' perceptions of diplomatic counterparts in accordance with their political preferences*

First of all, Mifune argues Japanese political leaders concerned the China's rise and the following power shift in Asia as well as the power shift among the United States, Japan, and China.<sup>10</sup> This led to a modification of Japan's strategies toward

---

<sup>9</sup> Shim, Mi Jung. (2013). From the Intra-party Conflicts to Party-switching: A Research on Ozawa's Defection from the DPJ

<sup>10</sup> Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security*

China. Cho also argues that political leaders' perception, ideology, and political aims affect foreign policies along with external factors.<sup>11</sup> Yoshimatsu elaborates the DPJ leader's perception of the external environment and preferences affecting the changes in the DPJ regimes' strategies toward China.<sup>12</sup>

A leader's perception influences a country's diplomatic strategies. For example, Yoshimatsu and Cho evaluate Prime Minister Hatoyama is an idealist.<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kan introduced himself as a realist at the inauguration speech of his prime ministership. Finally, Prime Minister Noda's nationalistic comments related to territorial and historic disputes were an issue even before his accession to the prime ministership.

As mentioned above, the three DPJ regimes' strategies toward China changed from engagement to balancing. This change in strategy shows the connection between the three leaders' perceptions of China. In this regard, the political leaders' perception clearly mattered for the DPJ regimes' China policy.

---

*concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, P. 237

<sup>11</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철휘 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원 (in Korean)

<sup>12</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2),

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. 115; 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철휘 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원, P. 231 (in Korean)

## 2.2. Theoretical Framework

Jervis's system effect theory most greatly reflects the reality of international politics. The theory of international relations is divided into three analytical levels: the individual level, the state level, and the structural level.<sup>14</sup> For example, neorealism focuses on structural level analysis, while realism focuses on state level analysis.

In reality, relations between nation-states are not defined by a single factor. However, these relations are indeed formed by interactions between actors. These are the interactions between actors form Jervis's "system." The system refers to: (1) "a set of units or elements interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system"; and (2) "the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts."<sup>15</sup>

More interestingly, Jervis investigates why a country's diplomatic strategy often fails to produce the intended outcomes, arguing that the respective perceptions of counterparts, and the influence of third-party actors' leads to such results.

The three periods of DPJ rule are exemplary of this theory. Thus, this paper will focus on Japan and China's perception of each other as well as the influence of third-party actors on Sino-Japanese relations.

---

<sup>14</sup> Mingst, K. (2011). *Essentials of international relations* / Karen A. Mingst. (5th ed.). New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 68-69

<sup>15</sup> Jervis, R. (1997). *System effects: Complexity in political and social life* / Robert Jervis. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p. 6

## Chapter 3. The Hatoyama regime: Pivot toward China

The DPJ pledged to open a new era for both domestic and international Japanese politics. More specifically, Hatoyama Yukio, the first DPJ Prime Minister, made a promise to have better relations with Asian countries and to have a more equal alliance with the United States, tasks the LDP had failed to see through. The Hatoyama regime's China policy was formed in this regard. The specific policies are as follows.

### 3.1. The Hatoyama regime's China Policy

#### *Fraternity-based East Asian Community and the equal US-Japan alliance*

Prime Minister Hatoyama made it clear that the establishment of an East Asian Community was the main pillar of his diplomatic strategies.<sup>16</sup> He emphasized the importance of the East Asian Community Idea in numerous public speeches. However, East Asian Community building amounted more or less to rhetoric or a fanciful vision, as the Hatoyama regime could not suggest concrete strategies to embody the idea. The regime published specific strategies to implement the East Asian Community building at the very end of Prime Minister Hatoyama's premiership, just one day before his resignation. However, the plan was criticized because the contents were not new but

---

<sup>16</sup> アジア外交の柱である「東アジア共同口」構想は「貿易・投資」「金融」「環境」「エネルギー」「災害救援」「教育」「人の交流」「感染症対策」など可能な分野から開放的で透明性の高い地域協力を積み重ねた先に実現することを目指している。

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaike/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaike/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html). (accessed on 15 April 2016)

rather a rough-and-ready aggregation of an existing idea.<sup>17</sup> The specific contents of the Hatoyama regime's plan for East Asian Community building are as follow.

- 1 Developing economic ties
  - 1.1 Concluding and progressing EPA/FTA and building a smooth business environment within the region
    - 1.1.1 Restarting the early negotiations for the Korea-Japan EPA, concluding EPA with India, starting negotiations for FTAAP
  - 1.2 Building smooth business environment within the region
    - 1.2.1 Building a trade system
    - 1.2.2 Utilizing and developing the Chiang Mai Initiative, building the Asian bond market
    - 1.2.3 Proceeding with investment treaties, taxation conventions, and the revision of legislation within the region
  - 1.3 Strengthening regional connectivity
    - 1.3.1 Building hard and soft infrastructure for solving issues in Asia
      - 1.3.1.1 Enhancing ASEAN's connectivity by utilizing the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) or making a masterplan
      - 1.3.1.2 Building a social security net to solve social gaps, environmental problems, poverty, and to proceed with sustainable development
- 2 Coping with the Climate Change problem at the regional level
  - 2.1 Making use of Japan's experience and technology in order to support Asian countries in solving the climate Change problem

---

<sup>17</sup> 朝日新聞 6月2日

- 3 Cooperation for prevention of disasters and infectious diseases
  - 3.1 Expand ARF disaster relief exercise<sup>18</sup> to build Asian-wide disaster relief cooperation
  - 3.2 Support development of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre)
  - 3.3 Strengthening a network for infectious diseases
  - 3.4 Strengthening Japan-ASEAN Counter-Terrorism talks
- 4 Making a ‘Sea of Friendship’, starting from cooperation in Anti-piracy measures and salvage
  - 4.1 Utilizing and developing the ARF maritime security ISM meeting which was held in spring of 2010 among Japan, Indonesia, and New Zealand
  - 4.2 Building a crisis management mechanism between Japan and China by using the Japan-China Maritime contact mechanism
- 5 Enhancing Cultural exchange
  - 5.1 Enhancing interaction among students by using the ‘Campus Asia Program’, a dual or triple degree program among Japan, South Korea, and China
  - 5.2 Exchange and interaction among young generations and skilled labors<sup>19</sup>

In this manner, even though Prime Minister Hatoyama was ambitious in striving to implement a new diplomatic policy, the specific plans for this vision were a hodge-podge of existing plans and were superficial. Nevertheless, there are two points which distinguish Prime Minister Hatoyama’s East Asian Community building idea. First, it

---

<sup>18</sup> 災害救援実動演習共催（日本とインドネシアが共催して2011 実施準備中）

<sup>19</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. [http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201006/\\_icsFiles/afeldfile/2010/06/01/koso\\_east\\_asia.pdf](http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201006/_icsFiles/afeldfile/2010/06/01/koso_east_asia.pdf). (accessed on 6 May 2016)

was unique insofar as its philosophy of fraternity.<sup>20</sup> Prime Minister Hatoyama inherited the concept of fraternity from his grandfather, Ichiro Hatoyama, who was the first LDP President, from 1954 to 1956. Ichiro Hatoyama borrowed “fraternity” from Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, an Austrian diplomat who supported European integration in its initial stages. Fraternity refers to “co-existence and harmony among actors having different characteristics and values in society.”<sup>21</sup>

This is reflected in Hatoyama’s speech at the UN general assembly. He stated that Japan desired to be a bridge for connecting East Asian countries and that, in order to accomplish this goal, Japan desired to overcome its historical wrongdoings.<sup>22</sup>

Second, unlike LDP leaders, the Hatoyama regime’s East Asian Community building idea did not aim to encircle China. In fact, the East Asian Community Idea was initiated during a period of LDP rule. Previous prime ministers, such as Koizumi, Tanaka, Fukuda, and Ohira, had suggested East Asian Community building.<sup>23</sup> The LDP leader’s East Asian Community building idea, however, was based on a close US-Japan alliance and aimed to enhance the US presence in the Asian region and to encircle China via international order.

On the contrary, the Hatoyama regime’s East Asian Community idea did not aim to encircle China. Rather, it considered China as a partner and was based on the

---

<sup>20</sup> Fraternity is 友愛 (yu-ai) in Japanese.

<sup>21</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), p. 115

<sup>22</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.

[http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200909/ehat\\_0924c.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200909/ehat_0924c.html). (accessed on 6 May 2016)

<sup>23</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철휘 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원, p. 238 (in Korea)

institutional-liberal idea of repeated interaction among countries eventually leading to trust. There are two points which support this argument. First, the DPJ leaders could not reach consensus over whether to include the US in the East Asian Community or not. While Prime Minister Hatoyama emphasized the importance of US-Japan relations and affirmed the United States as a member of the East Asian Community, foreign Minister Katsuya Okada publicly mentioned that the United States was not included in the Hatoyama regime's plan for the East Asian Community.<sup>24</sup> This shows that the purpose of the East Asian Community building did not totally aim to encircle China.

Moreover, Prime Minister Hatoyama conducted five summit meetings with China during his tenure, and he requested China's cooperation for East Asian Community building at two of those five summit meetings. Moreover, during the summit meetings with Chinese president Hu Jintao, when both leaders attended the Nuclear Security Summit on April 12th, 2010, Prime Minister Hatoyama mentioned that he wanted Japan and China to play a core role in the East Asian Community building together.<sup>25</sup>

#### *Attempts to establish close diplomatic ties*

The East Asian Community Idea indirectly affected the Hatoyama regime's strategies related to having amicable relations with China. For example, Prime Minister Hatoyama suggested increasing interaction among intellectuals,<sup>26</sup> universities,<sup>27</sup> and

---

<sup>24</sup> 朝日新聞 10月8日

<sup>25</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter2/chapter2\\_01\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter2/chapter2_01_02.html). (accessed on 3 April 2016)

<sup>26</sup> また、鳩山総理大臣から、東アジアでの共同体構築や協力について、日中が中核となって努

youth<sup>28</sup> in Japan, China, and South Korea in the context of building the East Asian Community. These attempts led to the implementation of practical plans such as the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) suggested by South Korea's president Lee Myung-bak and the Campus Asia program.

Also, the regime made numerous direct efforts to develop close diplomatic relations with China. The regime succeeded previous regimes' stances toward China, which encompassed a strategic, mutually beneficial relationship and tried to develop relations via direct contact between senior leaders.<sup>29</sup> During Hatoyama's prime ministership, summit meetings were organized five times, and foreign ministers' meetings were conducted seven times.<sup>30</sup> An anecdote also shows Prime Minister Hatoyama's efforts to foster good relations with China. When Xi Jinping visited Japan in 2009 as vice president of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Hatoyama offered exceptional treatment to Xi. In order to have a meeting with the Japanese emperor, it is necessary to negotiate the date at least one month before. However, Xi did not follow this convention and thus he was not supposed to meet the Japanese

---

力していきたい旨述べるとともに、東シナ海資源開発問題について国際約束締結交渉を早期に開始するよう求めた。

Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.

<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/10JCKkyoudou.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016)

<sup>27</sup> 朝日新聞 10月10日

<sup>28</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter2/chapter2\\_01\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter2/chapter2_01_02.html). (accessed on 3 April 2016)

<sup>29</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), p. 114

<sup>30</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter2/chapter2\\_01\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter2/chapter2_01_02.html);

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter2/chapter2\\_01\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter2/chapter2_01_02.html). (accessed on 14 April 2016)

emperor. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Hatoyama extended a special privilege to Xi so that he was able to meet the Japanese emperor. Other politicians disagreed with Prime Minister Hatoyama's decision but he pushed ahead anyway. During the Hatoyama period, terrorism, pirates, and nuclear weapons issues were the primary security threats to Japan. This means that the Hatoyama regime did not perceived China as a threat.

The Hatoyama regime's efforts to build amicable relations with China brought about several outcomes with respect to delicate issues. First, Japan and China made an agreement on initiation of early negotiations for international commitments regarding Cooperation for the Development of East China Sea Resources and establishing a hotline at the last summit meeting from May 30th to June 1st, 2010 with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.<sup>31</sup> And this agreement led to the first director-general meeting to discuss the signing of a cooperative treaty on joint development of oil resources in the East China Sea in July 2010. Japan and China also agreed to cooperate for the Development of East China Sea Resources in 2008.<sup>32</sup> However, the two governments could not agree on how to demarcate the sea line, and the Chinese government was especially reluctant with respect to cooperation for the Development of East China Sea Resources due to the Chinese public's negative sentiment toward Japan. As there was no progress in the agreement for around two years, this was the limit of the Hatoyama regime's diplomatic achievement in endeavoring to build amicable relations with China.

---

<sup>31</sup> 朝日新聞 5月31日

<sup>32</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), p. 114

Second, Prime Minister Hatoyama and Chinese president Hu Jintao agreed to establish a hotline at the last summit meeting from May 30th to June 1st, 2010 including Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.<sup>33</sup> Third, economic ministers of China, Japan, and South Korea agreed to organize a joint study that would discuss the formation of a trilateral free trade agreement, and its first meeting was held in Seoul in May 2010.<sup>34</sup> Fourth, important cooperative moves emerged in the security field. In November 2009, the Japan–China Defense ministers’ meeting was held in Tokyo, and the ministers agreed on the first joint training exercise.<sup>35</sup> Although the exercise was relevant to search and rescue at sea, it could be regarded as an important step in deepening security relations.<sup>36</sup>

*The More Equal US-Japan alliance and the Futenma Air base relocation issue*

On the other hand, Prime Minister Hatoyama sought a more equal US-Japan alliance. Three strategies embodied this political aim. First, the issue of relocating the US Marine Corps Airbase in Futenma was the biggest issue between the United States and Japan during the Hatoyama regime. The LDP government and the United States finally made an agreement, which was part of the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation agreed in May 2006, to relocate the US Marine Corps

---

<sup>33</sup> 朝日新聞 5月31日

<sup>34</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), p. 114

<sup>35</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. [http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2011/2011/index.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2011/2011/index.html). (accessed on 24 May 2016)

<sup>36</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), p. 114

Airbase in Futenma to Henoko after around sixteen years of negotiations since the 1990s. The negotiation necessarily included not only the United States and Japanese national governments but also Japanese municipal governments. The relocation of the Futenma base was demanded due to the urbanization of Futenma which rendered airfield operation unsafe.<sup>37</sup>

However, when Hatoyama visited Okinawa for his election campaign, he pledged that the agreement related to the relocation of Futenma airbase would be revised and claimed the airbase should be relocated at least out of the Okinawa prefecture<sup>38</sup> and if possible out of Japan.<sup>39</sup> This was an attempt at abrogation of the agreement already made between Japan and the United States. Hatoyama's electoral pledge was criticized not only by the United States but also domestically. The Japanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, politicians and bureaucrats who were aware of the complexity of the base issues, and cities which were mentioned by Prime Minister Hatoyama as alternatives of Henoko criticized his irresponsible pledge. The US wanted to maintain the agreement made with the LDP leaders, and US-Japan relations started to deteriorate.<sup>40</sup> The Futenma Airbase Relocation Issue eventually became the main

---

<sup>37</sup> Yoichiro Sato. (2013) *Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated "Change". The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, P. 89

<sup>38</sup> Both of Futenma and Heonoko is cities in the Okinawa prefecture.

<sup>39</sup> 国分良成, 添谷 芳秀, 高原 明生, 川島 真. 2013. 日中関係史. 東京: 有斐閣.

<sup>40</sup> Yoichiro Sato. (2013) *Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated "Change". The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, P. 89

reason for Prime Minister Hatoyama's resignation.<sup>41</sup>

Second, Prime Minister Hatoyama appointed Katsuya Okada as Foreign Minister of his regime.<sup>42</sup> Katsuya had a reputation as opposed to the US-Japan alliance. When he was appointed, the United States showed their concerns related to this decision and became suspicious both of Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Katsuya about their views toward the future of the US-Japan alliance. Third, Prime Minister Hatoyama was against an extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and in this context he was opposed to extending Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces' refueling support of the United States in the Indian Ocean, which was related to the United States' operations in Afghanistan. During the Hatoyama's prime ministership, the DPJ regime officially terminated the refueling support and did not extend the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.<sup>43</sup>

In brief, the Hatoyama regime questioned US-led globalism and the unequal US-Japan alliance. This was an attempt to overcome Cold War mentality. By depending less on the United States and implementing more proactive diplomacy with respect to Asian countries, the Hatoyama regime pursued a path conducive to coping with globalism and protecting Japan's security by building a more cooperative regional order in Asia.<sup>44</sup> As China's power and presence grew in Asia, it became a central objective of the Hatoyama regime to build amicable relations with China. Then what

---

<sup>41</sup> 朝日新聞 6月2日

<sup>42</sup> 朝日新聞 9月16日

<sup>43</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.

<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200909/26naigai.html>. (accessed on 23 march 2016)

<sup>44</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), pp. 116-117

factors shaped the features of Hatoyama regime's China policy?

*International Context: The Rise of China and Relative Decline of the US*

The period before and during the Hatoyama regime was one in which the world began to take serious notice of China as a rising power and the relative decline of the United States. After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, China began to be considered a rising power on the global stage. While other economically powerful countries struggled to overcome the effects of the financial crises, China was resilient. Therefore, one can say that the potential power of China began to be perceived as a threat. That is, China was seriously regarded as a rising power which might surpass the power of the United States following the two financial crises.<sup>45</sup>

On the other hand, there were some changes in Sino-Japanese relations before the Hatoyama regime. During the Abe, Fukuda, and Aso regimes, there was positive progress in Sino-Japanese relations.<sup>46</sup> This progress was possible because both Japanese and Chinese leaders realized that having amicable relations with each other was better than having bad relations with each other. As well, it was possible due to the character of Chinese leaders at that time. Hu Jintao led China during the DPJ regime. Overall, contemporary Chinese leaders' stances toward Japan can be divided into two groups: the Hu Jintao group and the Jiang Zemin group. The Hu group was close and

---

<sup>45</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원, p. 196 (in Korea)

<sup>46</sup> 五百旗頭真. 2014. 『戦後日本外交史』. 東京: 有斐閣. (in Japanese)

friendly to Japan and was basically interested in Japan. On the other hand, the Jiang group was composed of hard-liners with regard to Sino-Japanese relations.<sup>47</sup>

Based on this feature, President Hu Jintao succeeded in achieving the major objectives of China's foreign policy established in the Deng Xiaoping period. Those objectives were securing a peaceful environment in order to ensure the modernization of China's economy and taking actions when China's vital interest is in danger of violation. China's vital interests are sovereignty, territory, and its political system. Based on these basic objectives, the Hu Jintao regime added another direction to foreign strategy: assuaging neighboring countries' concerns related to the rise of China. Chinese leaders attempted to quell neighboring countries' threat perceptions related to China by pursuing amicable relations with neighboring countries.<sup>48</sup> Thus, China's attempt to reassure its neighbors and the LDP's attempts to improve Sino-Japanese resonated well with each other.<sup>49</sup>

### **3.2. The Hatoyama regime's perception of China**

Before and during the Hatoyama regime, the rise of China became a *fait accompli* in the world. Meanwhile, Sino-Japanese relations showed some progress, especially compared to Sino-Japanese relations during the Koizumi period. Even while this was an objective feature of the regional situation, how Japanese leaders perceived and

---

<sup>47</sup> 国分良成, 添谷 芳秀, 高原 明生, 川島 真. 2013. 日中関係史. 東京: 有斐閣, P. 245 (in Japanese); 朝日新聞 12月15日

<sup>48</sup> 五百旗頭真. 2014. 『戦後日本外交史』. 東京: 有斐閣, P. 268 (in Japanese)

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.; 国分良成, 添谷 芳秀, 高原 明生, 川島 真. 2013. 日中関係史. 東京: 有斐閣 (in Japanese)

utilized this situation for their strategies were apt to change this. The current section deals with the political aims of the DPJ leaders and how they perceived the prevailing circumstances.

The Hatoyama regime accomplished a landslide victory in the lower house election conducted on August 30th by putting forward policies antithetical to those of the LDP. In other words, the DPJ was elected by criticizing the LDP. Owasa Ichiro, who was Secretary-General during the Hatoyama regime, and Prime Minister Hatoyama agreed on this strategy when they conducted the election campaign as well as subsequent to the DPJ ascent to power. Thus, the DPJ was able to draw public support.<sup>50</sup> Prime Minister Hatoyama expresses this view in the following passage:

The recent worldwide economic crisis resulted from a way of thinking based on the principle that American-style free-market economics represents a universal and ideal economic order—and that all countries should modify the traditions and regulations governing their own economy in order to reform the structure of their economic society in line with global standards (or rather American standards). In Japan, opinion was divided on how far the trend toward globalization should go. Some people advocated the active embrace of globalism and supported leaving everything up to the dictates of the market. Others favored a more reticent approach, believing that effort should be made instead to expand the social safety net and protect our traditional economic activities. Since the administration of Prime Minister

---

<sup>50</sup> 박철희. 2014. 「일본 민주당의 정책대립축 이행과 정당 간 경쟁의 역전」. 박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원, pp. 28-30 (in Korean); Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), pp. 116-117

Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006), the Liberal Democratic Party has stressed the former while we in the Democratic Party of Japan have tended toward the latter position.<sup>51</sup>

This shows that Prime Minister Hatoyama criticized the LDP regimes, especially the Koizumi regime, for their blind following of US-led globalism. Thus, the DPJ proposed to implement policies antithetical to those of the LDP in order to alleviate problems in Japanese society derived from globalization.

The public initially supported Prime Minister Hatoyama's East Asian Community building idea, considering the enhancement of US-Japan relations, which lacked balance especially in terms of security. Related to the Relocation of Futenma Airbase issue, people sympathizing with Okinawa also supported Prime Minister Hatoyama, as long as the relocation to the Japanese mainland did not happen.<sup>52</sup>

The Hatoyama regime's China policy also displayed antithetical traits in terms of the following: the regime pledged to enhance cooperation with China and to make the US-Japan alliance equal. The traditional direction of foreign policy under the LDP consisted of developing and maintaining a strong US-Japan alliance and taking proactive actions with respect to Asia-Pacific countries based on this alliance.

However, even though DPJ leaders criticized US-led globalism and the unequal US-Japan alliance and desired to cope with US-globalism through cooperation among

---

<sup>51</sup> Hatoyama, Y. (2010). Japan: Shifting Away from American-led Globalization. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 27(1), 23, p. 23

<sup>52</sup> Yoichiro Sato. (2013) *Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated "Change"*. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 97-98

Asian countries, they were aware of the significance of the presence of the United States in Japan, especially pertaining to security. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that the US-Japan alliance was the core of Japan's security numerous times and this view was reflected in government documents as well.<sup>53</sup> Nonetheless, the DPJ failed to manage the balance between reality and its election strategies and thus aroused suspicion from the United States as well as from Japanese people regarding their intentions with respect to the US-Japan alliance.<sup>54</sup>

Moreover, the DPJ leaders surmised that the reason for the party's short-lived hold on power in 1993 was the lack of legitimacy of the anti-LDP coalition. Therefore, the Hatoyama regime attempted to legitimate the DPJ by making policies antithetical to those of the LDP and stuck to implementing them in order to legitimate the DPJ regime as a ruling party and consolidate power.<sup>55</sup>

All in all, the Hatoyama regime was aware of the importance of the presence of the United States in Japan especially in terms of security, but it was focused on establishing a platform opposed to the LDP and thus established the policies mentioned above. Meanwhile, these political strategies combined with the perceptions of the Hatoyama leadership, leading to a particular China policy.

What were the perceptions of the Hatoyama regime toward China, the international structure, and the US? The perceptions of Prime Minister Hatoyama and

---

<sup>53</sup> Hatoyama, Y. (2010). Japan: Shifting Away from American-led Globalization. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 27(1), 23.

<sup>54</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), pp. 116-117

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117

Secretary-General Ozawa's perceptions will be dealt with in this section because they were the two main figures that established the policies of the Hatoyama regime. Ichiro Ozawa was a campaign strategist for the DPJ, who became President of the DPJ from April 2006 to May 2009 and the Secretary-General from September 2009 to June 2010.<sup>56</sup> Before dealing with the details of each leaders' perceptions, the features of Japan's perception toward China in the contemporary era will be elaborated.

In general, Japan's perception toward China can be defined in terms of two opposing views: "China as a threat" and "China as an opportunity." In 2001, China entered the WTO, and economic relations between Japan and China began to earnestly improve. China occupied Japan's exports 6.3 percent in 2000 and the amount increased to 19.7 percent in 2011. Also, China was fourth biggest importing country to Japan in 2000 and it became the biggest in 2009.<sup>57</sup> Since the 1990s, Japanese customers have enjoyed the modest prices of Chinese products and Japanese companies opened factories in China due to low labor costs.<sup>58</sup> In this manner, Japan considered China an opportunity rather than a threat. Since the development of economic relations with China became vivid around the Hatoyama period, it is possible to surmise that the Hatoyama regime was influenced by this change, and thus put more emphasis on "China as an opportunity" rather than "China as a threat." This view is reflected in the diplomatic blue book of the Hatoyama regime:

---

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., pp. 115-116

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan.  
<http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/kaigaizi/index.html>. (accessed on 27 June 2016)

<sup>58</sup> Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 219-221

China is enhancing their presence in political and economic spheres in Asia by rapid economic development. China stable growth with cooperation along with international society is an opportunity for Japan and neighboring countries. Japan expects China's responsible role in international society.<sup>59</sup>

Accordingly, Prime Minister Hatoyama did not perceive a rising China as a danger. However, the leaders of the Hatoyama regime did admit that the lack of transparency in China's military modernization was a potential problem. On the other hand, they argued that China simply would not revise the existing international order because since it was one of its greatest beneficiaries; China was rising within the existing international order rather than revising it.<sup>60</sup>

In addition, Prime Minister Hatoyama expressed his aspiration to develop cooperation with Asia. He advocated multilateral security talks among Asian countries beginning in the 1990s.<sup>61</sup> Also, during the Japan-China-Korea summit in Beijing in October 2009, Prime Minister Hatoyama stated, "Japan has excessively depended on the United States. The US-Japan alliance is important, but I would like to suggest

---

<sup>59</sup> 中国は急速な経済発展を背景に、東アジア地域を含め、国際社会の中で政治的・経済的なプレゼンスを高めている。中国が国際社会と協調しつつ安定的に発展することは、日本や地域の国々にとっても一つの機会であり、日本は中国が国際社会でより一層責任ある役割を果たすことを期待している。

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaike/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaike/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html). (accessed on 7 May 2016)

<sup>60</sup> 진창수. 2015. 「중일관계의 쟁점과 인식」. 진창수 편 『중일관계: 인식, 쟁점, 그리고 한국의 대응』. 서울: 세종연구소, p. 14 (in Korean)

<sup>61</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), P. 114

policies focusing on Asia.”<sup>62</sup> His entire advocacy for cooperation with Asian countries suggested the importance of China for cooperation, given China’s growing power and presence in the Asian region.

On the other hand, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s cooperative stance toward China and Asian countries could be interpreted as derived from his philosophical concept of fraternity. As mentioned before, fraternity refers to co-existence among actors having different values. Since Asian countries have various political systems, religions, cultures, and degrees of economic development, especially compared to the European Union which already accomplished regional integration, the concept of fraternity is well suited to Prime Minister Hatoyama’s aspiration of cooperation among Asian countries. The DPJ regime’s emphasis on fraternity is reflected in the party’s philosophy, as follows:

We shall establish international relations in the fraternal spirit of self-reliance and mutual coexistence, and thereby restore the world’s trust in Japan.<sup>63</sup>

Japan has been excessively dependent on the US and will proceed with Asia-centric policies from now on.<sup>64</sup>

Additionally, the Secretary-General Ozawa was a pro-China politician. The DPJ’s

---

<sup>62</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.

<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/10JCKkyoudou.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016)

<sup>63</sup> Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). [http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/about\\_us/philosophy.html](http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/about_us/philosophy.html). (accessed on 10 May 2016)

<sup>64</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/10JCKkyoudou.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016)

Secretary-General, Ichiro Ozawa, visited Beijing in December 2009 with around 600 delegates, including 143 Diet members and one third of the DPJ politicians. Ozawa mentioned that the DPJ pursued an equidistant relationship among the United States, Japan, and China when he met Chinese president Hu Jintao.<sup>65</sup> Based on an affirmative stance to a rising China, Prime Minister Hatoyama and Secretary-General Ozawa were more open to acknowledging the changing international structure, which meant a rising China and relatively declining United States. This group's basic thought was that Japan should overcome its excessive reliance on China and compensate for the role of the United States by enhancing cooperation with Asian countries.<sup>66</sup> Hatoyama expresses this thought in his article in 2010:

The recent financial crisis has suggested many people that the era of American unilateralism may come to an end. It has also made people harbor doubts about the permanence of the dollar as the key global currency. I also feel that as a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis, the era of US-led globalism is coming to an end and that we are moving away from a unipolar world toward an era of multipolarity. However, at present, there is no one country ready to replace the US as the world's most dominant country. Neither is there a currency ready to replace the dollar as the world's key currency. Although the influence of the US is declining, it will remain the world's leading military and economic power for the next two to three decades. Current developments show clearly that China, which has by far the world's largest population, will become one of the world's leading economic nations,

---

<sup>65</sup> 朝日新聞 12月15日

<sup>66</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철휘 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원, p. 227 (in Korean)

while also continuing to expand its military power. The size of China's economy will surpass that of Japan in the not-too-distant future.<sup>67</sup>

Meanwhile, Ichiro Ozawa, who insisted on equidistant diplomacy with Japan, the United States, and China, heavily influenced Prime Minister Hatoyama.<sup>68</sup> Ozawa anticipated that Japan should be aware of the importance of China, which might enhance its influence over Japan. Ozawa paid attention to the decline of Japan's presence in Asian countries in the context of the decline of the United States and a rising China leading to the so-called G-2 formation. Ozawa mentioned this in an interview: "What worries me the most is that Japan is now taken very lightly in the minds of the United States and China. I am chagrined at such a thought. To the United States or China, Japan probably looks as if 'it would eventually follow us.'"<sup>69</sup> Thus, the Hatoyama regime acknowledged the relative decline of the United States and a rising China and tried to seek a way for Japan to protect its interests in ways different from the LDP.

Based on the perception of China as an opportunity, Prime Minister Hatoyama and Ozawa criticized US-led globalism, the unequal US-Japan alliance, and Japan's excessive reliance on the United States. The reason for dealing with the contents is owing to the relations that distancing from the United States led to Japan's more

---

<sup>67</sup> Hatoyama, Y. (2010). Japan: Shifting Away from American-led Globalization. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 27(1), 23, pp. 25-26

<sup>68</sup> Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 238

<sup>69</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), pp. 115-116

proactive and cooperative stance to China. Additionally, this tendency could play a role in precipitating the Hatoyama regime's departure from the US over China policy.

Basically, Prime Minister Hatoyama insisted that Japan should pursue a US-Japan alliance without US military bases in Japan.<sup>70</sup> This means that Prime Minister Hatoyama considered the present form of the US-Japan alliance as problematic. In the case of Ozawa, he mentioned that Japan could manage its defense with the support of the U.S. Navy 7th Fleet. This claim indicated that other US forces in Japan were redundant.<sup>71</sup> Additionally, Ozawa was also against the extension of antiterrorist legislation related to the continuation of refueling support in the Indian Ocean.<sup>72</sup> This shows that Ozawa also had the same stance toward the Indian Ocean support mission. Prime Minister Hatoyama expresses his criticism toward the United State in his article:

In the post-Cold War period, Japan has been continually buffeted by the winds of market fundamentalism in a United States-led movement that is more usually called globalization...The economic order or local economic activities in any country are built up over long years and reflect the influence of each country's traditions, habits and national lifestyles. However, progressed without any regard for various non-economic values, nor for environmental issues or problems of resource restriction. If we look back on the changes in Japanese society that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, I believe it is no

---

<sup>70</sup> Yoichiro Sato. (2013) *Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated "Change"*. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, P. 89

<sup>71</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), pp. 115-116

<sup>72</sup> Brendan M. Howe and Joel R. Campbell. (2013) Continuity and Change: Evolution, Not Revolution, in Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ. *Asian Perspective* 37, p. 112

exaggeration to say that the global economy has damaged traditional economic activities and destroyed local communities.<sup>73</sup>

In this sense, the leaders of the Hatoyama regime, especially those who had power to establish the party's diplomatic strategies, tended to be pro-China and desired to ameliorate dependence on the United States. Of course, nearly the whole of Japanese society had this perspective, but as these are the perceptions of people who directly shape China policy, it is obvious that this would be a major factor affecting counterpart perception.

### **3.3. China's perception of Japan and its reaction**

Even though the Hatoyama regime made efforts to draw China's support for its East Asian Community building idea, China did not make clearly cooperative actions. This is because China could not clearly perceive how serious Japan is was about East Asian Community building or what the future of the US-Japan alliance would be like. Thus, Japan's relations with the US affect Sino-Japanese relations.<sup>74</sup> Japan has been the United States' representative ally in East Asia, and the United States has led the containment and encirclement of China. Therefore, the proximity of US-Japan relations

---

<sup>73</sup> Hatoyama, Y. (2010). Japan: Shifting Away from American-led Globalization. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 27(1), 23, pp. 23-24

<sup>74</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2); 石井修 外. 2010. 「民主党政権1年の外交」. 『外交』 vol.1. 東京 (in Japanese); Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

is important to China in terms of testing Japan's intentions with regard to East Asian Community building and whether it aims to encircle or cooperate with China.

Regarding the ambiguity of Hatoyama regime's China policy, the rough contents of the East Asian Community building idea were introduced above. As well, Prime Minister Hatoyama's stance toward the US was also ambiguous. Scrutiny of Hatoyama's discourse and articles reveals ambiguity and inconsistency in his stance toward the United States. As mentioned above, Hatoyama criticized US-led globalism and the unequal US-Japan alliance. Additionally, he attempted to abrogate the agreement made between the United States and Japan in 2006 about the relocation of the Futenma Airbase and terminated the refueling support mission. All of these criticisms and actions gave the impression that Hatoyama desired to put distance between Japan and the United States.

However, he also stressed the importance of the United States to Japan in terms of security. When Hatoyama had a meeting with US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in mid-October 2009, he mentioned that the Japan-U.S. alliance was the main pillar of Japanese diplomacy. As well, he mentioned that Japan desired to strengthen the alliance upon marking the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, he wrote in a paper that the US-Japan alliance was critical to Japan's diplomacy: "Of course, the Japan-US security pact will continue to be the cornerstone of Japanese diplomatic policy. Unquestionably, the Japan-US

---

<sup>75</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/gates\\_0910/s\\_hk.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/gates_0910/s_hk.html). (accessed on 19 June 2016)

relationship is an important pillar of our diplomacy.”<sup>76</sup>

Evidently, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s stance toward the United States was ambivalent. Moreover, he and Foreign Minister Okada could not come to a consensus regarding a stance toward the United States. Most importantly, they had different views regarding the inclusion of the United States in the East Asian Community. Prime Minister Hatoyama conceived of an East Asian Community including the United States. However, Foreign Minister Okada’s design excluded the United States.<sup>77</sup> It is not so unique that a prime minister and a cabinet minister might differ on an issue. However, East Asian Community building was the core of the DPJ’s China policy and the stance toward the United States. Meanwhile, its clarity and consistency was the key to gaining the trust of China. Thus, the disagreement between the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was enough to discourage the trust of China.

All in all, the Hatoyama regime pursued a China policy of developing ties with China via East Asian Community building along with pursuing a more equal US-Japan alliance, as represented by the regime’s attempt to change the 2006 agreement related to the relocation of the Futenma Airbase. The motivations for this policy line was: the combination of the Hatoyama regime’s goal of accomplishing regime change and consolidating the legitimacy of the DPJ by criticizing the LDP’s policies and pursuing policies antithetical to those of the LDP and Prime Minister Hatoyama’s idealistic disposition represented by his political philosophy of “fraternity.” Also, Ozawa, who

---

<sup>76</sup> Hatoyama, Y. (2010). Japan: Shifting Away from American-led Globalization. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 27(1), 23, p. 25

<sup>77</sup> 朝日新聞 10月8日

assumed the position of Secretary-General during the Hatoyama regime and played a significant role in forming the DPJ's election strategy for the 2009 lower house election conducted on August 30th, shared the similar notion that Japan should develop ties with China and become more independent from the United States. This led to Japan's perception of China as an opportunity and partner.

However, China did not actively welcome the Hatoyama regime's China policy due to a lack of consistency in Japan's stance toward the United States. The United States has engaged in "soft balancing" China via international norms and systems, and Japan has been their closest ally in East Asia. Thus, the proximity of Japan and the United States affected China's trust in the intention of Japan's engagement policy toward China. As the Hatoyama regime could not convince China of the authenticity of the East Asian Community idea, China's perception of the Hatoyama regime was consequently unstable.

## Chapter 4. The Kan regime: Turning Back to Traditionalism

Prime Minister Hatoyama resigned from the prime ministership taking responsibility for exacerbated US-Japan relations and a corruption scandal,<sup>78</sup> and Naoto Kan succeeded him as Prime Minister of Japan.

### *International Context*

Following the Hatoyama regime, US-Japan relations deteriorated. Subsequent to Prime Minister Hatoyama's speech at the UN general assembly on September 24th, 2009, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Japan in October 2009 to request a conclusion to the Futenman base relocation issues. On December 21st, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton complained of the postponed conclusion to Ambassador Fujisaki. And when Foreign Minister Okada visited the US on March 29th, 2010, Gates criticized Japan once again.<sup>79</sup>

In this manner, US-Japan relations deteriorated just prior to the Kan regime, causing concerns both internationally and domestically. Japanese society criticized Hatoyama severely regarding exacerbated US-Japan relations.<sup>80</sup> Meanwhile, what was worse was that China did not actively welcome the Hatoyama regime's cooperative China policy. Finally, Sino-Japanese relations had continued to exhibit a subtle tension

---

<sup>78</sup> 朝日新聞 6月2日

<sup>79</sup> 朝日新聞 4月8日

<sup>80</sup> 石井修 外. 2010. 「民主党政権1年の外交」. 『外交』vol.1. 東京 (in Japanese)

with the accession of Prime Minister Kan, who indicated a return to a strong US-Japan alliance.<sup>81</sup>

The US also indicated the desire to for Japan to take more proactive action with regard to the alliance. In order to contain China, the US needed to maintain its influence over the Asia Pacific region, and the US-Japan alliance was the main tool for accomplishing this objective. The US therefore encouraged Japan to strengthen the alliance.<sup>82</sup> In this respect, the interests of Japan and US synchronized. The Obama administration's determination to sustain and develop a US military presence in the Asia Pacific is present in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review:

With Japan, we will continue to implement the bilateral Realignment Roadmap agreement that will ensure a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam, the westernmost sovereign territory of the United States, into a hub for security activities in the region. The United States will develop a more adaptive and flexible U.S. and combined force posture on the Korean Peninsula to strengthen the alliance's deterrent and defense capabilities and long-term capacity for regional and global defense cooperation...In Northeast Asia, DoD [Department of Defense] is working closely with key allies Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to implement our agreed-on plans and shared visions to build a comprehensive alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope; realign our force postures; restructure allied security roles and capabilities; and strengthen our collective deterrent and

---

<sup>81</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철휘 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원, p. 204 (in Korean)

<sup>82</sup> Department of Defense of the United States. <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1002QDR2010.pdf>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)

defense capabilities.<sup>83</sup>

In China, the confidence of the CCP increased over the course of the Hu Jintao period. China's GDP had been increasing annually by an average of 9.4% from 1980 to 2004 and GDP per capita by an average of 8.1%. Moreover, China emerged from the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 relatively unscathed. Finally, China's GDP surpassed that of Japan in 2010. This rapid economic growth formed the foundation for China's newfound confidence. Despite rapidly enhanced national power, however, the CCP did not have enough experience dealing with concern for China's growing power among surrounding countries. This led to China's occasionally assertive behavior regarding its vital interests, even though the Hu Jintao claimed to desire to assuage the threat perceptions of neighboring countries.<sup>84</sup>

#### **4.1. The Kan regime's China Policy**

Naoto Kan became the second DPJ prime minister. At the beginning of Kan's accession to the prime ministership, his diplomatic policies focused on restoring the deteriorating US-Japan alliance while maintaining amicable relations with Asian countries including China. However, this basic policy direction changed following the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes.

---

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철휘 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원, pp. 239-240 (in Korean)

### *Strengthening the US-Japan alliance*

Unlike Hatoyama, Prime Minister Kan stressed his will to restore the US-Japan alliance in the 2010 election platform of the DPJ.<sup>85</sup> The first pledge of foreign policy was to reinvigorate deteriorated US-Japan relations. Especially, this was clearly antithetical to the policies of the Hatoyama regime, which had made building an East Asian Community its first priority.<sup>86</sup> The following passage relates the contents of the 2010 DPJ election platform in terms of strengthening the US-Japan alliance:

Deepen the Japan-U.S. alliance by strengthening bilateral ties in the areas of comprehensive national security, economics, and culture and the like.

Regarding the relocation of the Futenma Air Station, make all possible efforts to reduce the burden on Okinawa in line with the Japan-U.S. agreement.

Propose the revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement as a step toward building close and equal Japan-U.S. relations.<sup>87</sup>

Kan revealed comparable contents at his inauguration speech on June 8th, 2010. This shows that Kan pursued the revitalization of the US-Japan alliance from the very outset of the regime. Additionally, Kan also revealed his stance toward the relocation

---

<sup>85</sup> Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto.html>. (accessed on 10 May 2016)

<sup>86</sup> Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). <https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2009.pdf>. (accessed on 10 May 2016)

<sup>87</sup> Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). <https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2010.pdf>. (accessed on 10 May 2016)

of the Futenma Airbase at his inauguration speech. As this issue was the reason for exacerbated US-Japan relations during the Hatoyama regime, it was important to show a clear stance related to this issue. He stated that the regime would follow the agreement made in May 2010, meaning that the Futenma Airbase would be moved to Hanoko as planned.<sup>88</sup>

During his tenure, Kan emphasized the importance of the US-Japan alliance numerous times.<sup>89</sup> Thus, it seems that Kan considered US-Japan relations as the key to stability amid a changing world order. This fact was revealed at a press interview on July 10th, 2010, in which Kan stated that the world order was changing and the means to safely navigate this change was US-Japan-ROK security cooperation.<sup>90</sup>

#### *Lack of interest in East Asian Community*

Along with the Kan regime's strategy to strengthen the US-Japan alliance, the regime attempted to continue the previous regime's strategy toward East Asian countries and strengthen ties with them. This policy direction was reflected in the 2010 election platform of the DPJ as well as the prime minister's speeches. For example, the manifesto prepared for the upper-house election in July 2010 clarified the DPJ's stance, rendering it consistent with the previous regime's policy toward East Asia: "Make all

---

<sup>88</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006/08kaiken.html>. (accessed on 25 June 2016)

<sup>89</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006/27G8G20naigai.html>:  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006//11syosin.html>. (accessed on 25 June 2016)

<sup>90</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201007/30kaiken.html>. (accessed on 25 June 2016)

possible efforts to establish mutual relations of trust with China, South Korea, and other Asian countries as a step toward creating an ‘East Asian Community.’”<sup>91</sup> At his inauguration speech as well as a speech on June 11th, 2010, Kan mentioned he would continue the East Asian Community idea.<sup>92</sup>

However, even though government documents and Kan’s speeches made clear the intention to pursue an East Asian Community in cooperation with China, South Korea, and other East Asian countries, Kan’s actual interest in the idea seems to be less than that of Hatoyama. This point is exemplified in a phone conversation he had with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on June 14th, 2010. This was the first summit conversation between Japan and China following Kan’s accession to the prime ministership. Kan expressed his interest in implementing negotiations for the development of a gas line and establishing a hotline between each country’s leaders. However, he did not mention anything about the East Asian Community Idea.<sup>93</sup> This contrasts with Prime Minister Hatoyama’s explicit requests for China’s support regarding the East Asian Community on several occasions amid conversations with Chinese leaders.

In this regard, the Kan regime’s foreign policy was analogous to that of the LDP from its inception, which meant maintaining and strengthening the US-Japan alliance and developing ties with East Asian countries based on this alliance. Thus, the DPJ

---

<sup>91</sup> Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). <https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2010.pdf>. (accessed on 10 May 2016)

<sup>92</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.

<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006/08kaiken.html>:

<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006/11syosin.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016)

<sup>93</sup> 朝日新聞 6月14日

regime lost its initial foreign policy direction as early as its second term in power. The impetus for this change, at least in part, can be said to be the 2010 incident over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

*The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands incident: a watershed in DPJ China policy*

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are eight rocks in the East China Sea between Taiwan and Okinawa. China, Taiwan, and Japan each claims sovereignty over the islands. China claims sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands based on historical records of the Ming Dynasty (1368 to 1644). It says that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were recorded in a book in 1403. In addition, China claims that Japan returned Chinese territory it had annexed according to the 1943 Cairo Declaration. On the other hand, Japan's claim to sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is based on the 1895 Shimonoseki Treaty. According to this treaty, Taiwan and its surrounding islands, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were ceded to Japan and the United States returned administrative rights of the islands along with the areas including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 1972. Japan and China have different views as to the demarcation of the East China Sea as well. China argues that the demarcation should be based on a "natural prolongation" of the continental shelf. Japan claims that the demarcation should be based on a "median line" division of the continental shelf.<sup>94</sup>

Under such conditions, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute occurred in 2010. On

---

<sup>94</sup> Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger & Tao Wang (2016) Popular Nationalism and China's Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands protests, 2012–2013, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25:98, 264-276, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1075714, p. 268

September 7th, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with a Japanese patrol boat. The Japanese Coast Guard asked the boat to stop but it did not follow this order. Therefore, the Japanese Coast Guard detained the captain, Zhan Qixiong, and the boat's crew for obstructing official duties.<sup>95</sup> Regarding this issue, the Kan regime's initial stance was that there are no territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are part of Japanese territory. Thus, the incident would be evaluated based on Japanese domestic law.<sup>96</sup> For example, Foreign Minister Okada commented, "This incident will be evaluated according to Japanese domestic law because the Senkaku islands are Japanese territory," on the day following the incident.<sup>97</sup> The Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku also stated, "Japan will not offer special diplomatic consideration to China on this issue and will maintain strict procedures."<sup>98</sup>

The Hu Jintao regime decisively reacted to Japan's stance on this issue. On the day following the boat collision incident, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs summoned Japanese ambassador Niwa and pressed him to stop Japan's illegal behavior.<sup>99</sup> During the aftermath of this incident, Japanese ambassador Niwa was summoned five times in total and it was demanded that Japan release the Chinese captain unconditionally.

On September 10th, the deputy report bureau chief Jiāng Yù said that the Chinese government sent a patrol boat. This was perceived as an activity tantamount to

---

<sup>95</sup> 朝日新聞 9月8日

<sup>96</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), p. 119-120

<sup>97</sup> 朝日新聞 9月8日

<sup>98</sup> 朝日新聞 9月8日

<sup>99</sup> 朝日新聞 9月8日

claiming sovereignty. The Chinese Foreign Minister summoned Japanese ambassador Niwa again on September 11th.<sup>100</sup> On September 13th, the Kan regime announced they would release fourteen of the boat's crew, excluding the captain.<sup>101</sup> However, the Chinese government did not suspend protest toward Japan. They were not satisfied with the release of the boat's crew. The deputy report bureau Chief Jiāng Yù announced that the CCP was determined to protect Chinese territory, indicating the party's attempt to appeal to the popular will of the Chinese people.<sup>102</sup> The CCP intensified their protest against Japan and postponed negotiations for a treaty concerning joint gas field development in the East China Sea.<sup>103</sup> On September 19th, the CCP announced that they wanted to halt the interaction at ministerial and higher levels. Also, they stopped negotiations for increasing air routes.<sup>104</sup> On September 21st, the deputy report bureau Chief Jiāng Yù announced that China would deny a summit meeting with the Japanese leader when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao attended the UN General Assembly.<sup>105</sup> The Chinese Foreign Ministry commented that Japan had seriously damaged Sino-Japanese relations and the CCP suspended vice-ministerial level visits to Japan.<sup>106</sup> The CCP kept insisting on the captain's unconditional release.

On September 19th, the Naha District Public Prosecutors Office located in

---

<sup>100</sup> 朝日新聞 9月11日

<sup>101</sup> 朝日新聞 9月13日

<sup>102</sup> 朝日新聞 9月14日

<sup>103</sup> 朝日新聞 9月16日

<sup>104</sup> 朝日新聞 9月20日

<sup>105</sup> 朝日新聞 9月22日

<sup>106</sup> 朝日新聞 9月22日

Okinawa Prefecture announced a decision to prolong the detention of the captain.<sup>107</sup> Meanwhile the Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku maintained his stance that this issue should be dealt with based on Japanese domestic law, and he suggested open high-level talks in order to solve the problem on September 22nd at a press interview.<sup>108</sup> On September 23rd, Japan was aware that the CCP implemented an embargo on rare earths to Japan. Moreover, they realized that China was considering implementing various economic sanctions on Japan such as banning travel to Japan, the cancellation of the joint development of a gas field in the East China Sea, and private level exchange programs.<sup>109</sup> Two day after Sengoku's press interview, the prosecutors' office decided to release the captain due to the fact that it could not determine whether the captain had collided with the Japanese patrol boat on purpose.<sup>110</sup>

This incident was exceptional from both a Japanese and Chinese perspective. From Japan's perspective, it was very rare that the Chinese government should summon a Japanese ambassador five times related to a single issue.<sup>111</sup> Additionally, the high-level rank of the CCP officials summoning the Japanese ambassador was exceptional as well. On September 12th, the Deputy Premier Dai Bingguo called the Ambassador Niwa. Compared to this, the Foreign Minister had been the highest-ranking official to summon the Japanese ambassador, occurring when Koizumi visited

---

<sup>107</sup> 朝日新聞 9月19日

<sup>108</sup> 朝日新聞 9月22日

<sup>109</sup> 朝日新聞 9月24日

<sup>110</sup> 朝日新聞 9月24日

<sup>111</sup> 朝日新聞 9月13日

the Yasukuni shrine.<sup>112</sup> On the other hand, the Kan regime's stance toward this issue was exceptional as well. The Chinese government expected Japan to extend special diplomatic consideration to China. In March 2004, seven Chinese activists landed on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the Koizumi regime deported them without charge, which would have consistent with Japanese domestic law. The Hu Jintao regime wanted the same treatment from the Kan regime.<sup>113</sup> All in all, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute was an unusual conflict between Japan and China. This incident changed the direction of the Kan regime's China policy.

#### *The Kan regime's China policy after the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute*

After the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, the Kan regime's China policy focused on balancing China internally and externally. The Kan regime enhanced Japan's defense capabilities by reforming the National Defense Program Guidelines and strengthening the US-Japan alliance.

#### *Enhancing military ability (introduction of Dynamic Defense forces and development of defense forces)*

In December 2010, the Ministry of Defense of Japan published the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond (NDPG)." The main change after publication of NDPG was in the essential conception of Japanese security.

---

<sup>112</sup> 朝日新聞 9月14日

<sup>113</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), pp. 119-120

Exclusive defense (*senshu boei*) was the basic concept underlying defense, which the Japanese government had held up until the publication of the 2011 NDPG. The Cabinet approved the Basic Policy for National Defense in 1957, confirming the principle of Japan's national defense policy. The details of this policy are clearly written in the "Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper)" by the Ministry of Defense:

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.<sup>114</sup>

With the limitations set forward in Article 9, Japan's military capability has been limited up to exclusive defense regardless of the right of self-defense. Because of this exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan has had to arm itself only for the purpose of defense, so any attack on other countries is prohibited by the Constitution.<sup>115</sup> Also, Japan is not allowed to possess offensive weapons such as intercontinental range ballistic missiles, attack aircraft carriers, long-range strategic bombers, and so on. Such equipment provide typical examples of the kinds of offensive weapons prohibited in

---

<sup>114</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/d\\_policy/dp02.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp02.html). (accessed on 15 June 2016)

<sup>115</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. [http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/1976/w1976\\_02.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1976/w1976_02.html). (accessed on 15 June 2016)

the Annual White Paper, which limits the purchases of weapons to those meant for defense.<sup>116</sup>

Under the current trends of the security environment, building defense forces that can effectively respond to security challenges is important... To this end, Japan needs to achieve greater performance with its defense forces through raising levels of equipment use and increasing operations tempo, placing importance on dynamic deterrence, which takes into account such an operational use of the defense forces... For these reasons, Japan's future defense forces need to acquire dynamism 1) to effectively deter and respond 2) to various contingencies, and 3) to proactively engage in activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific and to improve the global security environment. Japan should no longer base its defense on the traditional defense concept, "Basic Defense Force Concept," which places priority on ensuring deterrence through the existence of defense forces per se.<sup>117</sup>

The concept of exclusive defense changed to Dynamic Defense with the publication of NDPG. Based on the Dynamic Defense force concept, the Kan government expressed in the NDPG that Japan would strengthen its defense forces. In doing so, the Self Defense Forces (SDF) would ensure regular cooperation with relevant organizations. This notion emphasizes the importance of effectively coping with contingency. Dynamic Defense Force emphasizes not only the presence but also

---

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2011/chuuki.html>. (accessed on 15 June 2016)

the utilization of self-defense force. Additionally, self-defense forces were stationed in a balanced way under exclusive defense but now they were stationed in a more strategic way with consideration for Japan's security threat and regions where they have territorial disputes.<sup>118</sup> Finally, when it comes to the motivation for the change in the basic notion of defense, the document described that an increase in the issues related to the grey zone led to the changes.<sup>119</sup> This shows that the change in the basic security notion was targeting China.

In this manner, the 2010 NDPG was the first official document devised specifically to protect Japan from China's assertiveness in the East China Sea.<sup>120</sup> As reform of NDPG is performed periodically, however, this does not mean that China was the absolute motivation for modification of the NDPG. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that many contents of the NDPG were targeted at China for the reasons mentioned above. Thus, even while the NDPG was undergoing modification before the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, it is clear that it was heavily affected by the conflict.

In the context of the new NDPG, the Kan regime especially enhanced maritime defense capability. For example, the number of naval convoys increased from 47 to 48 and the number of submarine from 16 to 22.<sup>121</sup> Also, the regime changed the

---


<sup>118</sup> Kei Koga (2016): The rise of China and Japan's balancing strategy: critical junctures and policy shifts in the 2010s, *Journal of Contemporary China*, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2016.1160520

<sup>119</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. [http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2011/2011/index.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2011/2011/index.html). (accessed on 15 June 2016)

<sup>120</sup> Kei Koga (2016): The rise of China and Japan's balancing strategy: critical junctures and policy shifts in the 2010s, *Journal of Contemporary China*, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2016.1160520, p. 13

<sup>121</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. [http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2011/2011/index.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2011/2011/index.html); [http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2011/2011/index.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2011/2011/index.html). (accessed on 15 June 2016)

configuration of submarines in the East China Sea.<sup>122</sup> Even while the 2011 defense white paper did not describe specific information about the new arrangement, especially with regard the changes in the number of submarine, a change can nevertheless be discerned, as shown in figure 1.



<Figure 1> The Change in the system of Submarine Units<sup>123</sup>

Based on the change in the basic notion of security, Prime Minister Kan emphasized

<sup>122</sup> 潜水艦部隊については、引き続き東シナ海および日本海の海上交通の要衝などに潜水艦を配備するとともに、南西方面をはじめわが国周辺における常時継続的な情報収集・警戒監視を平素から広域にわたり実施し、情報優越を確保し、各種の兆候を早期に察知できる態勢を強化するため、作戦海域と基地との地理的關係などを考慮して、22隻保有することとしている。

Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. [http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2011/2011/index.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2011/2011/index.html). (accessed on 15 June 2016)

the importance of strengthening Japan's maritime security.<sup>124</sup> Meanwhile, Japan planned to utilize international norms in order to demarcate the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Japan and China based on the coastline. Japan and China could not agree on how to demarcate the EEZ and this was a problem when the two countries negotiated matters related to the Cooperation for the Development of East China Sea Resources. Japan argued that the coastline should be a standard for measurement and China argued for the continental shelf.<sup>125</sup> Thus, the fact that Japanese Maritime forces were moving to the southwestern region shows that the strategy was targeting China.<sup>126</sup>

#### *Strengthening the US-Japan alliance*

After the boat collision incident, Prime Minister Kan appointed Maehara Seiji as the new Minister of the Foreign Affairs in a cabinet reshuffle on September 17th.<sup>127</sup> Basically, Maehara had a reputation as a security specialist and advocated for the US-Japan alliance. He argued that the US-Japan alliance should be developed to the level of the US-UK alliance and thus balance a rising China. In order to do so, he argued that Japan should change its constitution to exercise its right of collective self-defense.<sup>128</sup> Maehara also mentioned that the US-Japan alliance was the foundation for building

---

<sup>124</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2012/0911kunji.html>; <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2012/1014kunji.html>; (accessed on 15 June 2016)

<sup>125</sup> 朝日新聞 6月1日

<sup>126</sup> Kei Koga (2016): The rise of China and Japan's balancing strategy: critical junctures and policy shifts in the 2010s, *Journal of Contemporary China*, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2016.1160520, p.10

<sup>127</sup> 朝日新聞 9月18日

<sup>128</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」.

박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원 (in Korean)

prosperity in the Asia Pacific region when he was the DPJ's president.<sup>129</sup> And regarding TPP, he consistently supported Japan's entry.<sup>130</sup> Finally, he argued that Japan should strengthen the US-Japan alliance because of a rising China and its military modernization. When he visited the United States in December 2005 and made a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), he mentioned that China's military modernization was a serious concern for Japanese security.<sup>131</sup>

After Maehara became Foreign Minister, he visited the US on September 24th, 2010 and met Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton stated that the standard US line regarding the defense treaty applies to all areas under Japanese administration. They made an agreement that the US-Japan alliance was for the public good of East Asia and thus that the US and Japan would deepen their alliance.<sup>132</sup>

Along with his pro US stance, Maehara displayed a decisive stance toward China regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute. When Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism, he stated, "The Japan Coast Guard coped with the incident that occurred in Japanese territorial waters in light of Japan's domestic laws" on September 10th, 2010, three days after of the incident.<sup>133</sup> He maintained this stance at

---

<sup>129</sup> Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/051029/04.html>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)

<sup>130</sup> Yoichiro Sato. (2013) *Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated "Change"*. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 99-100

<sup>131</sup> Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/051215/01.html>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)

<sup>132</sup> 朝日新聞 9月24日

<sup>133</sup> Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism of Japan. <http://www.mlit.go.jp/report/interview/daijin100910.html>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)

the first press conference as Foreign Minister.<sup>134</sup>

Prime Minister Kan also met President Obama on September 24th, 2010 and the two agreed that Japan and the United States would pay attention to the development of the situation and closely cooperate over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue.<sup>135</sup> Related to the relocation of the Futenma Air base, the Kan regime made it clear that they would follow the agreement made in 2006.<sup>136</sup> Also, the US and Japan made an agreement regarding the modernization of the army, developing reciprocal operations, and developing new technologies with the introduction of the Dynamic Defense Force of Japan on June 21st, 2011 at the 2+2 meeting.<sup>137</sup>

The interest in joining TPP was also part of the regime's attempt to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. Prime Minister Kan declared that this regime would initiate negotiations for joining TPP.<sup>138</sup> As TPP was a US-centered economic agreement strongly advocated by President Obama, Japan's declaration of joining TPP can be assessed as a part of enhancing the US-Japan alliance.<sup>139</sup>

The Kan regime started to explore joining the TPP negotiation after the United States showed expressed interest in the TPP in 2010. During the Bush administration the United States focused on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) more than

---

<sup>134</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g1009.html#5-B>. (accessed on 19 June 2016)

<sup>135</sup> 朝日新聞 9月24日

<sup>136</sup> 朝日新聞 9月24日

<sup>137</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/pdfs/joint1106\\_01.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf). (accessed on 19 June 2016)

<sup>138</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006//11syosin.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016)

<sup>139</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」.

박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원. (in Korean)

on TPP. However, following China's marked growth, the United States started to consider TPP as a means to increase the US presence in the Asian regions. Naturally, this affected Japan's stance toward the TPP as well. In fact, the DPJ was basically against TPP; it criticized the LDP's policies and especially the Koizumi regime's emphasis on globalization. The Kan regime, however, changed the DJP's stance with the intention of strengthening US-Japan relations, despite the fact that TPP might negatively affect Japanese farmers. Additionally, a portion of the Japanese public supported this decision out of concern that Japan might be left out of the US-dominated global order.<sup>140</sup> After the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, Prime Minister Kan put more efforts into joining TPP, consistently mentioning TPP in his speeches.<sup>141</sup> On November 9th, the cabinet made a decision to start negotiations with interested countries.<sup>142</sup>

### *The East Asian Community Idea*

<sup>140</sup> Yoichiro Sato. (2013) *Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated "Change". The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 99-100

<sup>141</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html). (accessed on 19 June 2016); Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201010/01syosin.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201010/08siji.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/11g20speech.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/13ceosummit.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/14speech.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/14speech.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/14kaiken.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201101/04nentou.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201101/20speech.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201101/24siseihousin.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016)

<sup>142</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/13ceosummit.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016)

Prime Minister Kan did not totally abandon the East Asian Community idea after the boat collision incident in the East China Sea. The diplomatic blue book shows that the Kan regime would maintain the East Asian Community idea.<sup>143</sup> However, it is true that following the boat collision incident and the development of conflicts between Japan and China, the frequency by which Prime Minister Kan mentioned the East Asian Community markedly decreased. On the other hand, Kan conducted a summit meeting with the Chinese leader five times during his term and did not suspend the summit meeting despite deteriorated bilateral relations.<sup>144</sup>

From the inauguration of his prime ministership, Kan emphasized the importance of restoring US-Japan relations and his interest in the East Asian Community building was less than that of Prime Minister Hatoyama. In addition, even though it was only around three months before the boat collision incident occurred, Prime Minister Kan did not implement or suggest a clear China policy. Under these conditions, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute precipitated the character of the Kan regime's China policy.

After the conflict with China, the Kan regime completed revision of NDPG, delayed during the Hatoyama regime, which contained various contents aimed at balancing China. Meanwhile, the regime enacted concrete steps toward improving Japanese maritime forces. This shows that Kan was attempting to internally balance

---

<sup>143</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html). (accessed on 19 June 2016)

<sup>144</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter2/chapter2\\_01\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter2/chapter2_01_02.html). (accessed on 19 June 2016)

China. On the other hand, as Japan desperately wanted the help of the United States to counter China's notion of exclusive defense, the revision of Japan's basic notion of defense served to strengthen the US-Japan alliance, functioning as a form of external balancing

## **4.2. The Kan regime's perception of China**

Prime Minister Kan attempted to alter the previous regime's idealistic vision of China to a more realistic one. Kan mentioned he was a realist at the inauguration press interview; he wanted to pursue diplomacy based on realism. In addition, Kan stressed the importance of the US-Japan alliance. Thus, his regime would pursue Sino-Japanese relations based on a strong US-Japan alliance. He also mentioned that Japan's cooperation with China still possessed some limitations, especially in terms of security.<sup>145</sup> This basic stance only intensified following the Senkaku/Diaoyou disputes.

Subsequent to the boat collision incident in the East China Sea, the Kan regime began to consider China a major threat. Kan mentioned after the incident that now was the critical moment because of the changes in the balance of power and insisted that Japan take a more active role in its defense, though emphasizing the importance of the US-Japan alliance.<sup>146</sup>

Foreign Minister Maehara made another speech at CSIS in January 2011, mentioning that a stable US-Japan alliance would be the cornerstone of Japan's

---

<sup>145</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.

<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006//11syosin.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016)

<sup>146</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201010/01syosin.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016)

security as well as peace in the Asian region.<sup>147</sup> The Ministry of Defense emphasized China's growing confidence, increasing violence in Japanese territory maritime territory, and its lack of transparency pertaining to military modernization.

The Defense White paper communicated concerns regarding the increases in China's defense budget and China's assertive activities in maritime areas, stipulating that China was arousing concern in neighboring countries.<sup>148</sup> This was an implicit reference to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes.<sup>149</sup> The diplomatic blue book also described the difficult new circumstances Japan faced for procuring security considering the rise of China. It also described the instability and uncertainty unfolding in Asia. This manner of description was newly added by the Kan regime. Finally, the book described China as domineering regarding issues related to incompatible interests with neighboring countries.<sup>150</sup> This shows that China was considered a threat to Japan's security. Finally, as mentioned above, the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines also described China as a threat to Japan's security. It stated that China's military modernization and increased naval activities were a concern for neighboring countries as well as international society.

Overall, Prime Minister Kan paid more attention to domestic politics rather than

---

<sup>147</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/juk>. (accessed on 15 June 2016) [1101/speech1101.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/juk)

<sup>148</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. [http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2010/2010/index.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2010/2010/index.html). (accessed on 15 June 2016)

<sup>149</sup> Brendan M. Howe and Joel R. Campbell. (2013) Continuity and Change: Evolution, Not Revolution, in Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ. *Asian Perspective* 37, p. 117

<sup>150</sup> 厳しい

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html). (accessed on 3 April 2016)

diplomacy and was cautious regarding diplomatic issues, excepting TPP.<sup>151</sup> Considering his political career, this fact is not so surprising. Kan began as a civil society activist and eventually assumed ministerial posts such as the Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy and the Minister of Health and Welfare.<sup>152</sup> Thus, in contrast with Prime Minister Hatoyama, Kan did not maintain any philosophical ideas regarding diplomacy at the beginning of his prime ministership. He presented the notion of affection as the basis of his diplomacy at a national assembly speech on January 24th, 2011, but this was eight months after inauguration.<sup>153</sup> Thus, unlike Prime Minister Hatoyama, who delineated a clear philosophical notion of fraternity right from the outset of his prime ministership, Kan was not very active regarding diplomatic issues.

The fact that the Kan regime put more emphasis on domestic politics rather than diplomacy led to its ineffective treatment of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute. In a word, the Kan regime was indecisive. Its initial stance toward the issue was to deal with it based on Japanese domestic laws as the incident took place in Japanese territory. However, when the Chinese government intensified countermeasures and eventually

---

<sup>151</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원 (in Korean); Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 238; Brendan M. Howe and Joel R. Campbell. (2013) Continuity and Change: Evolution, Not Revolution, in Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ. *Asian Perspective* 37, p. 113

<sup>152</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), pp. 118-119

<sup>153</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201101/24siseihousin.html>. (accessed on 6 May 2016)

banned the export of rare earth to Japan, the regime changed its stance and released the captain. The sudden change in the Kan regime's stance to this incident shows it was unable to skillfully assess the situation from the start and could not cope when conflicts escalated.<sup>154</sup>

More specifically, the Kan regime could not carry out diplomatic bargaining with China due to a lack of cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The weak ties with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had much to do with the DPJ's political aspirations, which was to consolidate electoral victory. The DPJ had criticized bureaucratic-dominant policymaking during the LDP period and appealed to the public by claiming that the DPJ would move toward a politician-dominant system.<sup>155</sup> This pledge was suggested in the 2009 election platform: "A shift from bureaucratic-dominant to politician-led politics" was the first pledge for the election.<sup>156</sup> The DPJ regime established administrative bodies which might embody a politician-led system such as the National Policy Unit and Government Revitalization Unit. Also it consolidated posts for politicians such as the senior vice-ministers and vice-ministers. These were the DPJ's efforts to enhance politicians' power and reduce bureaucrats' power in policy making.

Fundamentally, however, the efforts to realize politician-led politics resulted in the mere exclusion of bureaucrats from policymaking and it was impossible to

---

<sup>154</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), pp. 120-122

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). <https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2010.pdf>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)

compensate for the vacuum with DPJ politicians. Thus, the exclusion of bureaucrats caused problems in solving various troubles that the Kan regime faced, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes. Given the fact that diplomacy requires artful negotiation through reason and persuasion based on accumulated intelligence and information, the lack of collaboration between the DPJ and the bureaucracy led to confusion in dealing with the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes.<sup>157</sup>

### **4.3. China's perception of Japan and its reaction**

In that case, how did China perceive Japan's China policy? Why did China assertively react to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes? The important fact is that China sustained rapid economic growth during this period, and this enhanced the confidence of both the government and the public.<sup>158</sup> Notably, China's GDP surpassed that of Japan in August 16th of 2010. This occurred just ahead of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes on September 7th, 2010. China's enhanced economic presence consequently impeded China's efforts to peacefully rise. After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, Barry Buzan, who had described China's rise as peaceful, commented, "China is at a turning point bigger than any since the late 1970s," arguing that the successful policies China had adopted for the thirty years prior would no longer be

---

<sup>157</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), pp. 120-122

<sup>158</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원 (in Korean)

effective. He concluded that China's "'peaceful rise' is going to get more difficult."<sup>159</sup>

The 2008 Global Financial Crisis exacerbated the situation, and the CCP became a victim of its own propaganda. The CCP convinced the Chinese people that China had become economically superior vis-à-vis the West and Japan through the crises. After the 1997 Asian Financial Crises China's economic power gained attention regionally and after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it gained attention globally. Chinese nationalists thus came to demand more deference from neighboring countries and the West and this led to pressure on the government to act tough in order to command the respect of the West.<sup>160</sup> For example, dozens of Chinese protested in front of the Japanese embassy on September 8th, right after of the incident occurred.<sup>161</sup>

The Chinese people's demand for deference also derived from a patriotic education. The CCP initiated such education in the 1990's, instilling the Chinese people with a sense of pride in Chinese sovereignty and territory.<sup>162</sup> Therefore, when the conflicts intensified after the boat collision incident, Chinese netizens demanded stronger countermeasures from their government and some even insisted on the use of force.<sup>163</sup> As a response to such public opinion, the deputy report bureau Chief Jiāng Yù announced that "the CCP has made it clear that it will protect Chinese territory" on

---

<sup>159</sup> Zhongqi Pan and Zhimin Chen. (2013) "*Peaceful rise, multipolarity, and China's Foreign Policy Line*". *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 63

<sup>160</sup> Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger & Tao Wang (2016) Popular Nationalism and China's Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands protests, 2012–2013, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25:98, 264-276, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1075714, p. 275

<sup>161</sup> 朝日新聞 9月8日

<sup>162</sup> 朝日新聞 9月22日

<sup>163</sup> 朝日新聞 9月14日

September 13th. The purpose of this announcement was to appeal to the Chinese public.<sup>164</sup>

Combined with the spread of nationalism in China, domestic politics also influenced China's new assertive posture. In October 2010, the CCP planned to hold the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the main agenda was power transition in 2012 and whether Xi Jinping would become the Central Military Commissioner or not. As this was a politically sensitive moment, the CCP needed to control the nationalism of the Chinese people for the sake of stabilizing Chinese society amid power transition. Thus, they assertively responded to Japan's perceived provocation.

In this context, deteriorated US-Japan relations only served to exacerbate China's assertiveness. China adjusted its assertiveness on issues related to its core interests vis-à-vis Japan based on the proximity of Japan and the United States. Yoshimatsu and Ishii argues that the relative lack of US presence in Japan led to the boat collision incident.<sup>165</sup> The former Secretary of State Armitage also understood the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes in terms of China testing how much its assertiveness would be accepted by Japan when US-Japan relations were deteriorating, expressing this view at a press interview in Tokyo.<sup>166</sup> As mentioned above, during the Hatoyama regime US-Japan relations deteriorated due to the Futenma Air base relocation issue.

---

<sup>164</sup> 朝日新聞 9月14日

<sup>165</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2); 石井修 外. 2010. 「民主党政権1年の外交」. 『外交』vol.1. 東京

<sup>166</sup> 朝日新聞 9月16日

As Japan could not attack other countries, the US-Japan alliance was the main means of maintaining Japanese security. In this context, as US-Japanese relations were under stress, China considered that Japan might not strongly react its assertive behavior.

By observing Japan's reaction and the state of US-Japan relations, China gradually prepared to assert its sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. On December 8th, 2008, two Chinese government vessels intruded into Japan's territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands. This incident implies that the CCP vessels intruded into Japan's sea territory with the purpose of violating the sovereignty of Japan, attempting to alter the status quo by using force or coercion.<sup>167</sup> Subsequently, China enacted the Island Protection Law at the end of 2009. With the implementation of this law, China increased the dispatch of patrol boats to the sea around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Japan argues that territorial conflict between Japan and China has worsened since this period. This shows that China has gradually prepared to assert sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, making a move as US-Japan relations weakened. Additionally, Japanese scholars argue that China's recent obsession with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is related to its strategy toward the US. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located in a strategic position, where China should pass by when dispatching PLA to the Ocean.

To sum up, the Kan regime pursued a China policy endeavoring to cooperate with China but also at the same time strengthening ties with the US. This was a return to the traditional China policy of the LDP. On the other hand, after the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu

---

<sup>167</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e\\_000021.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html). (accessed on 7 May 2016)

islands disputes, the Kan regime focused on internal balancing vis-à-vis China by initiating the Dynamic Defense force security notion and improving SDF and external balancing by strengthening the US-Japan alliance. Prime Minister Kan's realist perspective regarding international policies functioned as the primary impetus of this policy. As Japan was constrained from engaging in offensive action by the constitution, the US-Japan alliance functioned as the core of Japan's security. At the same time, as China's power grew, it was better to offset risks via a hedging strategy. However, when China became a tangible threat to Japan, it was inevitable that Japan would engage in balancing this threat. Overall, then, the Kan regime perceived China as a threat.

On the other hand, China's reaction to the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes was assertive even though the Kan regime tried to have peaceful relations with China upon ascending to power. The reason for this seems to be derived from the deteriorated US-Japan alliance. During the Hatoyama regime, the US-Japan relations deteriorated due to the relocation issue of the Futenma Airbase. Amid the deterioration of US-Japan relations, China enacted the Island protection law at the end of 2009. There is no clear evidence that the CCP was directly involved in the 2010 boat collision but it is true that the CCP's reaction after was assertive.

Following the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes and the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, however, the US-Japan alliance regained its original vigor. Thus, it was only prior to those incidents, when US-Japan relations were unstable, that China seemed to test the limits of asserting itself against Japan.

## Chapter 5. The Noda regime: Beyond Traditionalism

After the situation pertaining to the Fukushima nuclear disaster began to stabilize in fall of 2011, Prime Minister Kan resigned due to declining popularity and Yoshihiko Noda assumed the third DPJ prime ministership, lasting from August 30th, 2011 to December 26th, 2012.

### *International Context*

The deteriorated US-Japan relations were alleviated during the Kan regime following the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes and the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. After the boat collision incident, Japan sought to rely on the United States as a counter to China's assertiveness. Responding to this hope, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mentioned that "the United States started to have a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea" at the ministerial meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010. This statement referred to the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, in other words, targeting China.<sup>168</sup> Also, Philip Crowley, the State Department spokesman of the United States, demonstrated the United States' support for Japan, mentioning that the US considered the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territory, provided for by the US-Japan alliance.<sup>169</sup> Finally, the United States actively helped

---

<sup>168</sup> Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), pp. 120-122

<sup>169</sup> U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147836.htm>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)

Japan with respect to the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, conducting the joint disaster relief Operation *Tomodachi*.

Meanwhile, the double disasters in March 2011 of the magnitude 9 earthquake and the resulting meltdown of the nuclear reactors at Fukushima Number One Power Plant served to bring the Japanese people together in support of the US-Japan alliance. While more than fifty countries were involved in disaster relief assistance for Japan, the United States' support was among them. Including the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), the United States dispatched 20 naval vessels, 140 aircrafts, and 12,750 military personnel. The Tomodachi mission searched for missing people, rebuilt damaged cities, provided food, and also investigated the nuclear meltdown.<sup>170</sup> The scope of this operation is reflected in the following passage:

The combined force of the US military and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) immediately mobilized in the Operation *Tomodachi* in order to respond to the extraordinary scale of destruction caused by the earthquake, tsunami, and the nuclear disaster. Effectiveness of the US troops in cleaning up the tsunami-washed rubble and reopening the Sendai Airport to smooth shipment of the relief supplies into the northeastern region was complemented by equally successful reconstruction of devastated roads by the Japanese troops. The rapid recovery of the transportation infrastructure was possible only with contributions from the well-prepared engineering corps troops, which enabled other humanitarian relief operations by themselves and later increasingly by civilian governmental

---

<sup>170</sup> 박철희. 2014. 「일본 민주당의 정책대립축 이행과 정당 간 경쟁의 역전」. 박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원, p. 187 (in Korean)

agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Japanese people's perception about the SDF and the US-Japan alliance has steadily improved over the past decade and a half, and the 2011 earthquake removed much of the remaining skepticism.<sup>171</sup>

Also, the earthquake and the Fukushima incident offered an excuse for the Kan regime to proceed with the relocation of Futenma Airbase in a manner favorable to the United States. The importance of the US-Japan alliance was propagated through the Operation *Tomodachi* (friendship) joint disaster relief mission and the United States and the Kan regime each had the incentive to belittle the Futenma issue for the time being.<sup>172</sup> This operation increased Japanese society's appreciation of the United States, enhanced the presence of the United States in Japan, and also increased Japan's reliance on the United States.<sup>173</sup>

Over the course of its tenure, the Kan regime had to handle two unprecedented taxing incidents: the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes and the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. And the United States showed itself to be indispensable in each of these situations. Thus, the presence of the United States and Japan's reliance on the United States naturally increased before the Noda regime. Why, then, was the United States so willing to support Japan? This is related to the United States' strategy toward a rising China.

---

<sup>171</sup> Yoichiro Sato. (2013) *Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated "Change"*. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, P. 90

<sup>172</sup> Ibid. P. 89

<sup>173</sup> 森本敏. 2012. 「米国のアジア重視政策と日米同盟」. 『国際問題』 No.609. 東京

At its outset the Obama administration implemented a hedging strategy vis-à-vis China. As dealt with in the previous chapter, the United States asked Japan to play a more active role in the US-Japan alliance in order to contain a rising China. But also at the same time, the Obama administration attempted to build amicable relations with China. Owing to this effort, the Sino-American relationship appeared amicable in 2009. The Obama administration made two major concessions, postponing the meeting with the Dalai Lama when the Tibetan religious leader visited Washington DC, and deferring the announcement of arms sales to Taiwan. However, this state of relations was short-lived. As China accepted the US' cooperative stance as a sign of weakness, it insisted on more and more concessions. This led to an adjustment in policy by the Obama administration, or the so called "pivot to Asia." The main motivations of the policy were the failure to convince Beijing to embrace positive engagement, China's assertive behavior in the wake of the global financial crisis, and the increase in China's assertive actions in the Senkaku dispute. Overall, the US was anxious over China's reemergence in the 21st century. As a result the US shifted to a hedging strategy.<sup>174</sup> On January 31st, 2012, President Obama declared the US would actively engage in the Asia Pacific region under the "pivot to Asia." This meant that the US also desired Japan's cooperation regarding its strategy, to render it as effective as possible.<sup>175</sup>

On the other hand, Sino-Japanese relations continued to deteriorate prior to the

---

<sup>174</sup> Suisheng Zhao (2012) Shaping the Regional Context of China's Rise: how the Obama administration brought back hedge in its engagement with China, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 21:75, 369-389, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2011.647428


<sup>175</sup> Robert G. Sutter. (2010) *U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present* (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), "Introduction," and "Outlook," pp. 1-14, 267-277

Noda period. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CCP implemented various assertive countermeasures to Japan's reaction to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, such as an embargo on rare earths to Japan, postponement of negotiations for a treaty concerning joint gas field development in the East China Sea, suspension of interaction at ministerial and higher levels, and negotiations for increasing air routes. In addition to this, the CCP increasingly violated Japan's territorial waters and contiguous zones and this intensified Japan's threat perception of China.

Before the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes, China had violated the territorial Sea of Japan just once. On December 8th, 2008, two Chinese government vessels suddenly intruded into Japanese maritime territory around the Senkaku Islands. The Japan Coast Guard warned the boats off and Japan protested to China through diplomatic channels but the Chinese vessels hovered inside Japanese territorial waters for around nine hours. However, after the boat collision in 2010, China dispatched vessels twenty-four times into contiguous zones. Even though China had periodically violated Japan's contiguous zones in the past, the number of intrusions surged right after the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes, and the average number of intrusion was more than before the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes.<sup>176</sup>

---

<sup>176</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e\\_000021.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html). (accessed on 7 May 2016)



**<Figure 2> Example Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Aircraft to which Scrambles Responded<sup>177</sup>**

China increased such activity not only at sea but also in the air. Instances in which

<sup>177</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. [http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2015/press\\_pdf/p20150522\\_01.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2015/press_pdf/p20150522_01.pdf) (accessed on 15 June 2016)

the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) of Japan scrambled in reaction to Chinese airplanes surged after the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes. Occurring thirty-eight times in 2009, the number rose to ninety-six in 2010 and 156 in 2011. Moreover, China's aerial maneuvering was conducted around the East China Sea, as indicated in Figure 2. It seems that China increased intrusions into Japan's airspace for the purpose of protesting Japan's treatment over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute and also to insist on its sovereignty over the disputed area.<sup>178</sup> In this regard, the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute brought about Chinese maneuvers in both maritime and airspace in the East China Sea, which Japan perceived as China's strategy to assert sovereignty over disputed territory and change the status quo.<sup>179</sup> Thus, Sino-Japan relations deteriorated and this fomented and exacerbated negative sentiment in Japan regarding China.

## **5.1. The Noda Regime's China policy**

### *Nationalization of the Senkaku islands*

The 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute and the following deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations was likely that which prompted Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara's decision to attempt to purchase some of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.<sup>180</sup> Ishihara was

---

<sup>178</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. [http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2015/press\\_pdf/p20150522\\_01.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2015/press_pdf/p20150522_01.pdf). (accessed on 15 June 2016)

<sup>179</sup> Kei Koga (2016): The rise of China and Japan's balancing strategy: critical junctures and policy shifts in the 2010s, *Journal of Contemporary China*, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2016.1160520, p. 10

<sup>180</sup> Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger & Tao Wang (2016) Popular Nationalism and China's Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands protests, 2012–2013, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25:98, 264–276, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1075714, P. 266

representative of the far right wing in Japan. He insisted that Japan should have and strengthen its own defense ability in order to counter a rising China. As well, Ishihara maintained that Japan should contain rather than cooperate with neighboring countries such as China and Korea .<sup>181</sup>

Ishihara had quietly continued discussion with the Japanese private owner of the islands before suddenly opening a public discussion about the issue in a speech at the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington DC in April 2012; he was going to have the Tokyo government purchase one of the Senkaku islands from a private Japanese owner.<sup>182</sup> As Ishihara argued that ownership of the islands should be transferred to a public organization and that fishery infrastructure should be developed and SDF deployed to the area,<sup>183</sup> the Noda regime was concerned that if the Tokyo municipal government purchased the islands, Ishihara might initiate activities that China would hold Japan responsible for. In other words, China would see it as a ploy for Japan to consolidate its control of the islands. The Noda regime thought that this would only worsen conflicts between China and Japan and thus decided to choose the second best option to preserve the status quo by attaining national control over the islands instead of Tokyo. The Noda regime's stance to this issue was to nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in order to maintain the status quo of the area and check

---

<sup>181</sup> 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」.

박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원, pp. 226-227 (in Korean)

<sup>182</sup> Yoichiro Sato. (2013) *Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated "Change". The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry.* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 95-96

<sup>183</sup> 朝日新聞 7月4日

Japan's right-wingers attempts to land or build facilities on the islands.<sup>184</sup>

The Noda regime started discussion with China in order to avoid further conflicts. However, Japan and China could not reach a compromise. China insisted on the status quo, while Japan thought this would be difficult due to Ishihara's resolve. Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, met Dai Bingguo, State Councilor of China, on August 31st, 2012 and the two discussed Sino-Japanese relations and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue. However, the negotiations did not result in an agreement or compromise.<sup>185</sup> The Noda regime named islands in Senkaku in order to strengthen the administration of the islands.<sup>186</sup> Accordingly, ownership of three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Uotsuri, Kitakojima and Minamikojima, was transferred from private citizens to the Japanese government on September 11th, 2012.<sup>187</sup>


---

<sup>184</sup> Kei Koga (2016): The rise of China and Japan's balancing strategy: critical junctures and policy shifts in the 2010s, *Journal of Contemporary China*, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2016.1160520, pp. 11-12

<sup>185</sup> 朝日新聞 9月1日

<sup>186</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2012/24kaiken.html>. (accessed on 15 June 2016)

<sup>187</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e\\_000021.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html). (accessed on 19 June 2016)



<Figure 3> the number of Chinese government and other vessels that entered Japan's contiguous zone or intruded into territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands<sup>188</sup>

In response to the Noda regime’s decision to nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands on September 11th, 2012, the CCP and Chinese public protested to Japan, the scale of which even surpassed that after the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes. Initially, from September 14th, the Chinese government began to protest. Chinese vessels intruded into Japan’s contiguous zone almost daily. Moreover, they violated Japan’s territorial sea about five times per month. Figure 3 shows the clear surge in the number of times Chinese vessels intruded into Japan’s territorial waters and contiguous zone

<sup>188</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000170838.pdf>. (accessed on 19 June 2016)

after the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.<sup>189</sup> In the air, the number of times Japan scrambled aircraft to respond to Chinese aircraft around the East China Sea also increased: from ninety-six times in 2009, to 156 times in 2010, 306 times in 2011, and 415 times in 2012.<sup>190</sup>

Diplomatically, high-level political interactions were almost completely sustained after the Japan–China Foreign Ministers Meeting on 26 September 2012 to 24 September 2014, when they had the second-round meeting of the Japan–China High Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs.<sup>191</sup> Also, Chinese netizens were outraged both by Japan and their government. They boycotted Japanese products and protested against Japan and the CCP, though mainly against Japan, starting in the middle of August, and the situation quickly spread throughout China. Meanwhile, Japanese shops and products were destroyed in Chengdu, Shenzhen, Suzhou, Qingdao, Beijing and so forth.<sup>192</sup>

### *Strengthening the US-Japan alliance*

Prime Minister Noda was the first DPJ's prime minister who visited Washington for an official bilateral meeting. He met the US president Obama on April 30<sup>th</sup> of 2012 and shared following ideas.

---

<sup>189</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e\\_000021.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html). (accessed on 19 June 2016)

<sup>190</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan. [http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2014/press\\_pdf/p20140423\\_02.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2014/press_pdf/p20140423_02.pdf). (accessed on 15 June 2016)

<sup>191</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/visit/index.html>. (accessed on 19 June 2016)

<sup>192</sup> Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger & Tao Wang (2016) Popular Nationalism and China's Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands protests, 2012–2013, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25:98, 264-276, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1075714, pp. 269-270

(1) Shared Vision

Prime Minister Noda stated that he was of the belief that the Japan-U.S. Alliance was the linchpin of Japan's diplomacy...Both leaders shared the view that they would continue to share visions and work to further deepen and develop the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

(2) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region

Prime Minister Noda explained recent Japan-China relations and stated his intention to realize strategic dialogue between Japan, the United States, and China... Both leaders shared the view that they expected China to play an active role in the international society.

(3) Japan-U.S. Security

Prime Minister Noda stated Japan is committed to enhancing the security of areas shared by the international society, such as the high seas, space, and cyber-space. He also stated Japan intends to further develop operational cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Forces including joint exercises.<sup>193</sup>

This statement shows that the Noda regime focuses on the US-Japan alliance very much especially due to the fact that they want the United State to take an action when Japan can have a strategic dialogue with China. The fact that the United States is raised as another actor which asked to join in bilateral talks between Japan and China shows the reliance of the Noda regime to the United States. Also, Prime Minster Noda

---

<sup>193</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pm1204/meeting1205\\_pm.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pm1204/meeting1205_pm.html). (accessed on 19 June 2016)

showed their will to expand Tokyo's role in regional security. This was a major shift for a country which is constrained by pacifist constitution. In coordination with the US strategy of focusing on the Asia Pacific region, the Noda regime also attempted to enhance its defense posture in the area<sup>194</sup>.

#### *The end of the East Asian Community Idea*

Contrary to the two previous DPJ prime ministers, Prime Minister Noda did not display any interest in East Asian Community building. Regarding Sino-Japanese relations, Noda only emphasized a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.<sup>195</sup> On the other hand, Noda suggested his own concept related to Japan's East Asian policy, seemingly the opposite of Prime Minister Hatoyama's East Asian Community idea.

Japan's presence in the Asia-Pacific region was reduced. In order to reinvigorate Japan's status in the region, Noda undertook a new diplomatic maneuver, devising the Pacific Ocean Charter in January 2012. The Pacific Ocean Charter refers to the building of comprehensive rules beyond the East Asian Community concept, such as with regard to the constant economic development of the Asia Pacific region. This concept seeks to strengthen ties across the whole Asia-Pacific region vis-à-vis security

---

<sup>194</sup> Hayashi, Y. (2012, April 30). World News: Japan's Premier to Pledge Expanded Role in Region. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A.9.P.1

<sup>195</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2012/html/chapter2/chapter2\\_01\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2012/html/chapter2/chapter2_01_02.html). (accessed on 19 June 2016)

and economy within an APEC framework.<sup>196</sup>

As concrete plans for the embodiment of this concept, the Noda regime suggested increasing the scale of TPP, making it part of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) until 2020. In terms of security, the regime suggested plans to generate a comprehensive framework based on international law related to freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Additionally, it put forth the idea of drawing China and Russia into this framework based on the Japan-US alliance.<sup>197</sup>

Prime Minister Noda planned to announce this idea and ask support from the relevant countries but never actually followed through. This was because Japan did not possess the capability by which it might enjoy leadership in the security sphere. Also, there was no economic framework by which to implement the Pacific Ocean Charter's economic plan.<sup>198</sup> Overall, the motivation behind the idea seemed to be to absorb China into the liberal international order with the United States at the center. Besides the fact that this was very likely unfeasible, it can be seen as but an attempt to strengthen the US-Japan alliance.

## **5.2. The Noda regime's perception of China**

Prime Minister Noda displayed a nationalistic tendencies. Before his accession to the prime ministership, he expressed his opinion in 2005, for instance, that those

---

<sup>196</sup> Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 239-240

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

judged in the past to be A-class war criminals were not in fact war criminals.<sup>199</sup> On the other hand, Noda was pro-American, as he made clear at his inauguration speech by emphasizing the importance of the US-Japan alliance.<sup>200</sup> From the beginning of the inauguration of his premiership, Prime Minister Noda emphasized the importance of the US-Japan alliance. He stated that the security environment of the Asia Pacific region is changing due to the rising power and the US-Japan alliance is the linchpin of Japan's diplomatic policy.<sup>201</sup> This perception toward issues are as follows.

Asia: China's military modernization is a threat to Japan and neighboring countries.

The United States: The US-Japan alliance is the core of Japan's security and thus this should be intensified.

A-class war criminals: people who are called A-class war criminals are not war criminals. This thought is not changed.

SDF: In contingency, Japan cannot help but evoke the right to collective Self-Defense.<sup>202</sup>

Aside from this, the Noda regime perceived the security environment of Japan is in danger. In the diplomatic blue book, the Noda regime described the surroundings of

---

<sup>199</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2011/0902kaiken.html>. (accessed on 18 June 2016)

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> 新興国が台頭し `世界は多極化しています °アジア太平洋を取り巻く安全保障環境は大きく変動しつつあります °こうした中で `時代の求めに応える確かな外交 `安全保障政策を進めなければなりません °その際に軸となるのは `私はやはり日米 関であると思いますし `その深化・ 発展を遂げていかなければならないと考えています。

Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> 朝日新聞 2011年8月31日

Japan became more dangerous.<sup>203</sup> This shows that the Noda regime felt a keen awareness that Japan's security was threatened by China. The regime also added a chapter on the maritime situation, introducing Demarcation of EEZ according to UN maritime law.<sup>204</sup> The diplomatic blue book emphasized the need for building and maintaining order based on democracy as well. This is analogous with the LDP's foreign policy direction pertaining to the Asia-Pacific region.

Contrary to the previous DPJ prime ministers, Prime Minister Noda made numerous speeches for the SDF. The contents of which mainly expressed his concern related to a rising China and the changing power balance in the Asia-Pacific region, stressing the importance of conducting operation based on the dynamic defense force.<sup>205</sup> This shows that the Noda regime put emphasis on strengthening their defense ability.

Unlike Prime Minister Hatoyama, both Prime Ministers Kan and Noda generally put much more emphasis on domestic politics rather than diplomacy.<sup>206</sup> As Noda's power base was vulnerable political stability was his core purpose. Noda sought to remain in the prime minister's position by satisfying the demands of the US and the

---

<sup>203</sup> 厳しさを増している

Ministry of Defense of Japan.

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2012/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2012/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html). (accessed on 27 June 2016)

<sup>204</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan.  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2012/html/chapter3/chapter3\\_01\\_04.html#h02](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2012/html/chapter3/chapter3_01_04.html#h02). (accessed on 27 June 2016)

<sup>205</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Office.  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2011/1016kunji.html>;

<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2012/0911kunji.html>. (accessed on 18 July 2016)

<sup>206</sup> Brendan M. Howe and Joel R. Campbell. (2013) Continuity and Change: Evolution, Not Revolution, in Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ. *Asian Perspective* 37, p. 113

Ministry of Finance to the greatest extent possible after he came to office. His policy toward China was mainly designed to restrain China amid the United States' "pivot."<sup>207</sup> This political preference, also affected by nationalistic politicians and public sentiment, led the Noda regime to follow the United States' pivot to Asia. Thus, Noda pursued a policy of containing China.

For example, the process of the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands reveals the Noda regime's weak political power and lack of effective central government control. As mentioned above, the right-winger Ishihara urged the Noda regime to adopt a stronger posture and consolidate Japan's control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. This was a position with which Maehara also concurred, who asserted that Japan should purchase the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Conservative politicians, along with Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto, echoed Ishihara's exhortation. Ishihara eventually joined Hashimoto's Osaka Restoration party, attaining a chance to enter national politics during the December 2012 lower house election. Ultimately, due to such pressure from conservatives, the Noda regime carried out the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.<sup>208</sup> If the Noda regime had maintained a strong power base, the conservative politicians would not have swayed it.

Meanwhile, these conservative and nationalistic ideas were pervasive among the Japanese public as well. As mentioned above, prior to Noda's tenure, Sino-Japanese

---

<sup>207</sup> Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 239

<sup>208</sup> Yoichiro Sato. (2013) *Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated "Change"*. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 95-96


relations deteriorated and public sentiment toward China turned negative, as reflected in a public opinion survey conducted by Cabinet Office of Japan. This survey asked whether Japanese people felt close to China. As figure 4 shows, Japanese public opinion toward China was positive during the Hatoyama regime; 38.5% of Japanese answered that they felt close to China.<sup>209</sup> On the other hand, only 20% said they felt close to China after the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute.<sup>210</sup> This indicated a more than 18% decrease in Japanese people's feelings of closeness to China. Before the inauguration of the Noda regime, 26.3 % answered that they felt close to China. This was around a 6% increase in Japan's positive sentiment toward China. However, this is still around 12% lower than the percentage of people who felt close to China when compared with the Hatoyama period. As well, this was the second lowest rate of positive sentiment to China during the last seven years.

---

<sup>209</sup> Heisei(平成) 21 in Japanese year is comparable to 2009 in Western year.

<sup>210</sup> This survey is conducted October of every year.

図10 中国に対する親近感



<Figure 4> Japanese Public Sentiment toward China in 2011<sup>211</sup>

Thus, public sentiment toward China was negative, a stance which the Noda regime was obliged to appeal to. This, however, accorded well with Prime Minister Noda’s disposition.

### 5.3. China’s perception of Japan and its reaction

After the Noda regime’s nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, China’s assertive reactions to Japan intensified even more than after the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu island disputes. One of the possible explanations for China’s assertive reaction after the nationalization of the Senkakau islands was the influence of the relations between

<sup>211</sup> Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h23/h23-gaiko/zh/z10.html>. (accessed on 19 July 2016)

Chinese nationalism and the CCP. Chinese nationalists were numerous both online and in the real world, and this led to the CCP's assertive reaction to the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.<sup>212</sup>

Diplomatically, the CCP did not implement very assertive countermeasures when the Noda regime expressed its plan to nationalize the islands. However, the public's nationalistic sentiment was reflected in street demonstrations and criticism of both Japan and the CCP online. Chinese netizens criticized their government's weak countermeasure and the criticism soon grew to encompass CCP corruption. After this, the CCP decisively reacted to Japan and pledged nationalist countermeasures.<sup>213</sup> Before the Chinese public's criticism of the CCP, Chinese vessels violated Japan's territorial waters four times and contiguous zone seven times.<sup>214</sup> After the nationalization and elevated nationalistic sentiment, the number of Chinese vessels intruding into Japan's territorial waters and contiguous zone explosively increased, as is shown in Figure 3.

The regime's pursuit of legitimacy was the key to explaining the correlation between popular nationalism and China's stance toward Japan. Given China's political system, the CCP could not procure legitimacy via elections, a situation made especially worse in an era when democracy forms the majority of the world's political systems. Moreover, as the power and presence of communist ideology faded in China,

---

<sup>212</sup> Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger & Tao Wang (2016) Popular Nationalism and China's Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands protests, 2012–2013, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25:98, 264–276, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1075714, pp. 268–275

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.* p. 275

<sup>214</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000170838.pdf>. (accessed on 19 July 2016)

discontent among the people regarding CCP corruption and violation of human rights increased. The fact that Chinese people protested in 2012 against not only Japan but also the CCP shows discontent regarding their leaders.<sup>215</sup>

Thus, the CCP increasingly resorted to nationalist credentials to rule and assuage the Chinese people. In this context, the CCP declared to the Chinese people that it would make China rich and restore deference to China from international society.<sup>216</sup> However, this maneuver caused the CCP to become stuck between the rock of domestic nationalism and the hard place of international politics. The kind of assertive diplomatic politics demanded by nationalists could negatively affect China's foreign relations and, moreover, undermine the Hu Jintao regime's foreign policy objective, which was making the surrounding environment of China peaceful in order to achieve the economic and military modernization of China while reassuring global perception considering the rise of China as a threat.<sup>217</sup> In this manner, domestic nationalist pressure prevented the CCP from dealing with the conflicts with Japan diplomatically.<sup>218</sup>

In conclusion, the Noda regime strived to balance China by strengthening and maintaining a strong US-Japan alliance. Just like the Kan regime, the Noda regime attempted to strengthen Japan's defense capability and also strengthen the US-Japan

---

<sup>215</sup> Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger & Tao Wang (2016) Popular Nationalism and China's Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands protests, 2012–2013, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25:98, 264-276, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1075714, p. 275

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Avery Goldstein. (2001) "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice," *China Quarterly* 168, pp. 835-864

<sup>218</sup> Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger & Tao Wang (2016) Popular Nationalism and China's Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands protests, 2012–2013, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25:98, 264-276, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1075714, p. 276

alliance. Meanwhile, it nationalized the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. This was an even more assertive China policy direction than that of the traditional LDP. The motivation for this policy line was the combination of Prime Minister Noda's nationalistic disposition and the demand to secure Japan from China emanating from conservative politicians as well as the public.

On the other hand, the CCP's reaction to the purchase of the islands was relatively less assertive compared to its reaction after the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes, even though the former amounted to a revision of the status quo. Following the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, China imposed an embargo on rare earths to Japan, postponed negotiations for a treaty concerning joint gas field development in the East China Sea, halted interaction at ministerial and higher levels, stopped negotiations for increasing air routes, and increased intrusions into Japan's territorial waters and contiguous zone. Following nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, however, the number of Chinese vessels intruding into Japan's territorial water and contiguous zone surged, but little else occurred. Moreover, the intrusions increased only after the public pressed the CCP to retaliate against Japan. Before such pressure and while the CCP leaders and Japanese leaders conducted negotiations regarding the nationalization of the islands, the CCP expressed disagreement to Japan's idea but did not conduct any tangible countermeasures. This implies that the CCP itself wanted to refrain from countermeasures but could not sustain such a course of action due to pressure from the Chinese public.

This reticence to react can be explained by the reinvigoration of the US-Japan

alliance. The United States' support for Japan amid the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes and the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami signaled the restoration of the US-Japan alliance. As China's grand strategy was at a standstill during the Hu Jintao regime, the changes in the proximity of the United States and Japan can explain the reason for the shifts in the CCP's assertiveness.

## Chapter 6. Conclusion

The Hatoyama regime conducted a cooperative China policy. The Kan regime returned China policy to the traditional LDP direction, engaging China and strengthening the US-Japan alliance. Eventually, this stance shifted to a strategy of balancing after the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute. Finally, the Noda regime went beyond even the traditional LDP policy direction, balancing China and heavily emphasizing the US-Japan alliance.

Through these analyses, two implications are deduced. First, the DPJ regimes “dreamed of a different China” with respect to each other as well as China and this led to limitations in closer Sino-Japanese relations. The Hatoyama regime dreamed of a cooperative China. The Kan regime dreamed of a China interested in maintaining peaceful relations but also that might be contained by the US-Japan alliance. The Noda regime dreamed only of a China contained by the US-Japan alliance. The expression ‘dream’ here refers to each of three DPJ regimes’ perception of China and its expected reaction to this perception. On the other hand, the Hu Jintao regime sustained its own image of China growing in power and trying to form peaceful surroundings for economic and military modernization, but also acting decisively when it came to issues related to core interests. In this regard, the Kan period was the moment when Japan and China could achieve mutual objectives but failed due to the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute. As there was no synchronization of Japan and China’s ‘dream’ about China, this led to conflicts. Given the fact that this stance is not hugely changed at present, the limits of further developing of Sino-Japanese relations look to remain.

Second, the United States plays a significant role in Sino-Japanese relations. During the periods of DPJ rule, China showed a willingness to react assertively to Japan when US-Japan relations deteriorated. For example, China's countermeasures against Japan following its reaction to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute were unprecedented. China imposed an embargo on rare earths to Japan, postponed negotiations for a treaty concerning joint gas field development in the East China Sea, halted interaction at ministerial and higher levels, stopped negotiations for increasing air routes, and increased intrusions into Japan's territorial waters and contiguous zone. On the other hand, after the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, merely the number of Chinese vessels intruding into Japan's territorial waters and contiguous zone surged. Moreover, this was only after the public pressed the CCP to retaliate. Before this pressure and while the CCP leaders and Japanese leaders conducted negotiations for the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the CCP expressed disagreement to Japan's idea but did not conduct tangible countermeasures. This means that the CCP itself wanted to refrain from employing countermeasures, but could not sustain such a direction due to pressure from the Chinese public. This demonstrates that the proximity of the United States and Japan affected China's degree of assertiveness.

# Bibliography

## References in English

- Avery Goldstein. (2001) "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice," *China Quarterly* 168, pp. 835-864
- Brendan M. Howe and Joel R. Campbell. (2013) Continuity and Change: Evolution, Not Revolution, in Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ. *Asian Perspective* 37, 99–123
- Emi Mifune. (2013). Japanese Policy toward China. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 213-245
- Guibourg Delamotte (2012) Japan's Foreign Policy beyond Short-term Politics, *Asia-Pacific Review*, 19:2, 46-61, DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2012.739496
- Hatoyama, Y. (2010). Japan: Shifting Away from American-led Globalization. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 27(1), 23.
- Hayashi, Y. (2012, April 30). World News: Japan's Premier to Pledge Expanded Role in Region. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A.9.
- Jervis, R. (1997). *System effects: Complexity in political and social life* / Robert Jervis. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Johnston, A. (2013). How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness? *International Security*, 37(4), 7-48.
- Kei Koga (2016): The rise of China and Japan's balancing strategy: critical junctures and policy shifts in the 2010s, *Journal of Contemporary China*, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2016.1160520
- Mingst, K. (2011). *Essentials of international relations* / Karen A. Mingst. (5th ed.). New York: W. W. Norton. pp. 68-69
- Peter Hays Gries, Derek Steiger & Tao Wang (2016) Popular Nationalism and China's Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands protests, 2012–2013, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25:98, 264-276, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1075714

- Robert G. Sutter. (2010) *U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present* (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), “Introduction,” and “Outlook,” pp. 1-14, 267-277
- Shim, Mi Jung. (2013). From the Intra-party Conflicts to Party-switching: A Research on Ozawas Defection from the DPJ
- Suisheng Zhao (2012) Shaping the Regional Context of China's Rise: how the Obama administration brought back hedge in its engagement with China, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 21:75, 369-389, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2011.647428
- Wu Xinbo. (2009) “Chinese Perspectives on Building an East Asian Community in the Twenty-first Century,” in Michael Green and Bates Gill, eds. *Asia's New Multilateralism* (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 55-77
- Yoichiro Sato. (2013) *Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated “Change”*. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 87-105
- Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Japan's China Policy in Domestic Power Transition and Alliance Politics. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39(2), 106-126.
- Zhongqi Pan and Zhimin Chen. (2013) “Peaceful rise, multipolarity, and China's Foreign Policy Line”. *The troubled triangle: Economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan, and China* [edited by] Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

## References in Korean

- 박영준. 2014. 「일본민주당정권의 대미 정책: ‘대등한 동맹관계 구축’의 모색과 좌절」. 박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원
- 박철희. 2014. 「일본 민주당의 정책대립축 이행과 정당 간 경쟁의 역전」. 박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울: 서울대학교출판문화원
- 조양현. 2014. 「동아시아 파워밸런스 변화와 일본 외교: 일본 민주당정권하의 중일관계」. 박철희 편 『일본 민주당정권의 성공과 실패』. 서울:

서울대학교출판문화원

진창수. 2015. 「중일관계의 쟁점과 인식」. 진창수 편 『중일관계: 인식, 쟁점, 그리고 한국의 대응』. 서울: 세종연구소

## References in Japanese

朝日新聞

五百旗頭真. 2014. 『戦後日本外交史』. 東京: 有斐閣

石井修 外. 2010. 「民主党政権1年の外交」. 『外交』 vol.1. 東京

国分良成, 添谷 芳秀, 高原 明生, 川島 真. 2013. 日中関係史. 東京: 有斐閣.

森本敏. 2012. 「米国のアジア重視政策と日米同盟」. 『国際問題』 No.609. 東京

## Online Resources

### Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (外務省)

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asia/easia/index.html>. (accessed on 3 April 2016)

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html).

(accessed on 15 April 2016)

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter2/chapter2\\_01\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter2/chapter2_01_02.html). (accessed on 3 April 2016)

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter2/chapter2\\_01\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter2/chapter2_01_02.html). (accessed on 3 April 2016)

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html). (accessed on 3 April 2016)

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter2/chapter2\\_01\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter2/chapter2_01_02.html) ;

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter2/chapter2\\_01\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter2/chapter2_01_02.html) (accessed on 14 April 2016)

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html). (accessed on 7 May 2016)

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e\\_000021.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html). (accessed on 7 May 2016)

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e\\_000021.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html). (accessed on 7 May 2016)

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/gates\\_0910/s\\_hk.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/gates_0910/s_hk.html). (accessed on 19

June 2016)  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html).  
(accessed on 19 June 2016)  
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/visit/index.html>. (accessed on 19 June 2016)  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/pdfs/joint1106\\_01.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf). (accessed on 19  
June 2016)  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g\\_1009.html#5-B](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_1009.html#5-B). (accessed on 19  
June 2016)  
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000170838.pdf>. (accessed on 19 July 2016)  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2010/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html).  
(accessed on 19 June 2016)  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e\\_000021.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html). (accessed on 19 June 2016)

**Prime Minister of Japan and His Office (首相官邸)**

[http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201006/\\_icsFiles/afieldfile/2010/06/01/koso\\_east\\_asia.pdf](http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201006/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2010/06/01/koso_east_asia.pdf). (accessed on 6 May 2016)  
[http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200909/ehat\\_0924c.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200909/ehat_0924c.html). (accessed  
on 6 May 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201010/01syosin.html>. (accessed on 6 May  
2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006//11syosin.html>. (accessed on 6 May  
2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/10JCKkyoudou.html>.  
(accessed on 6 May 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200909/26naigai.html>. (accessed on  
23 march 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/10JCKkyoudou.html>.  
(accessed on 6 May 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/10JCKkyoudou.html>.  
(accessed on 6 May 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006//11syosin.html>. (accessed on 6 May  
2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201101/24siseihousin.html>. (accessed on 6  
May 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006/08kaiken.html> ;  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006//11syosin.html>. (accessed on 6 May  
2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2012/0911kunji.html> ;  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2012/1014kunji.html>; (accessed on 15  
June 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006/08kaiken.html>. (accessed on 25

June 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006/27G8G20naigai.html> ;  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006/11syosin.html>. (accessed on 25  
June 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201007/30kaiken.html>. (accessed on 25  
June 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201010/01syosin.html>. (accessed on 6 May  
2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201010/08siji.html>. (accessed on 6  
May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/11g20speech.html>.  
(accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/13ceosummit.html>. (accessed on 6  
May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/14speech.html>.  
(accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/14speech.html>. (accessed on 6 May  
2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201011/14kaiken.html>. (accessed on  
6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201101/04nentou.html>.  
(accessed on 6 May 2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201101/20speech.html>. (accessed on 6 May  
2016); <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201101/24siseihousin.html>.  
(accessed on 6 May 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2011/0902kaiken.html>. (accessed on 18  
June 2016)  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2011/1016kunji.html> ;  
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2012/0911kunji.html>. (accessed on 18 July  
2016)

#### Ministry of Defense of Japan (防衛省)

[http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2010/2010/index.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2010/2010/index.html). (accessed on 15  
June 2016)  
[http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/d\\_policy/dp02.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp02.html). (accessed on 15 June 2016)  
[http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/1976/w1976\\_02.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1976/w1976_02.html). (accessed on 15  
June 2016)  
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2011/chuuki.html>. (accessed on  
15 June 2016)  
[http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2011/2011/index.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2011/2011/index.html);  
[http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2011/2011/index.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2011/2011/index.html). (accessed on 15  
June 2016)  
[http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2011/2011/index.html](http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2011/2011/index.html). (accessed on 15  
June 2016)  
[http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2015/press\\_pdf/p20150522\\_01.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2015/press_pdf/p20150522_01.pdf). (accessed on  
15 June 2016)

[http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2015/press\\_pdf/p20150522\\_01.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2015/press_pdf/p20150522_01.pdf). (accessed on 15 June 2016)  
[http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2014/press\\_pdf/p20140423\\_02.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2014/press_pdf/p20140423_02.pdf). (accessed on 15 June 2016)  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2012/html/chapter0/chapter0\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2012/html/chapter0/chapter0_01.html). (accessed on 27 June 2016)  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2012/html/chapter3/chapter3\\_01\\_04.html#h02](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2012/html/chapter3/chapter3_01_04.html#h02). (accessed on 27 June 2016)

**Democratic Party of Japan (民主党)**

[http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/about us/philosophy.html](http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/about%20us/philosophy.html). (accessed on 10 May 2016)  
<https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2010.pdf>. (accessed on 10 May 2016)  
<http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto.html>. (accessed on 10 May 2016)  
<https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2009.pdf>. (accessed on 10 May 2016)  
<https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2010.pdf>. (accessed on 10 May 2016)  
<http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/051029/04.html>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)  
<https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2010.pdf>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)

**Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (内閣部)**

<http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h23/h23-gaiko/zh/z10.html>. (accessed on 19 July 2016)

**Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism of Japan (国土交通省)**

<http://www.mlit.go.jp/report/interview/daijin100910.html>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)

**Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (経済産業相)**

<http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/kaigaizi/index.html>. (accessed on 27 June 2016)

**Department of Defense of the United States**

<http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1002QDR2010.pdf>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)

**U.S. Department of State**

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147836.htm>. (accessed on 20 July 2016)

## 국문초록

일본 민주당 정권이 세 번 바뀌는 동안 일본 민주당 고유의 대중정책의 특징이 상실되어갔다. 같은 정당 내에서 정책의 연속성이 결여된 것이다. 하토야마 정권은 중국과 긴밀한 관계를 추구하였고 보다 동등한 미일동맹을 추구했다. 칸 정권은 일본 자민당의 전통적 대중정책으로 회귀하여 중국과 전략적 호혜관계를 유지하고 미일동맹을 강화하려 하였다. 노다 정권은 중국을 견제하였으며 미일동맹을 더욱 강화하려 하였다. 이는 일본 자민당의 전통적인 대중정책의 성격을 뛰어넘는 보수적 성향을 띠는 정책이었다.

각각의 일본 민주당 정권의 대중정책 기조는 당시 일본 민주당 정권의 대중인식 변화에 상응하여 변천했다. 하토야마 정권은 중국을 이익이 되는 파트너로 인식하였으나 칸과 노다 정권은 중국을 위협으로 인식했다. 본 논문은 이러한 분석을 통하여 두 가지 함의를 제시한다. 첫째, 일본 민주당의 집권시기의 일본과 중국은 각각 ‘다른 중국’을 꿈꿨다. 이러한 인식의 불일치는 일중관계의 발전에 한계로 작용하였다. 둘째, 미국은 일중관계에 큰 영향을 미친다. 일본 민주당의 집권 기간 동안 중국의 공세적 태도는 미일동맹이 약화되었을 때 두드러졌다.

**주요어:** 일본민주당, 일본민주당의 대중정책, 일중관계, 미일동맹

**학번:** 2014-24233