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Master's Thesis of Political Science

**Failure of the Muslim Brotherhood
after 2011 Revolution in Egypt
- Concerning the Ideational Factors of the
Brotherhood Leading to its Political Isolation -**

**2011 이집트 혁명 이후 무슬림 형제단의 실패
- 무슬림 형제단의 정치적 고립을 야기한
아이디어적 요소에 대해서 -**

February 2017

**Graduate School of Political Science and
International Relations
Seoul National University
Political Science Major**

Hyerin Seo

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Hyeong-ki Kwon

Submitting a master's thesis of Political Science

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**Graduate School of Political Science and
International Relations
Seoul National University
Political Science Major**

Hyerin Seo

Confirming the master's thesis written by

**Hyerin Seo
February 2017**

Chair	<u>Euiyoung Kim</u>	(Seal)
Vice Chair	<u>Won-taek Kang</u>	(Seal)
Examiner	<u>Hyeong-ki Kwon</u>	(Seal)

Abstract

In January 2011, a huge scale of public protest for democratization was held in Egypt. The opposition groups made a coalition and managed to end the authoritarian regime led by President Mubarak, and democratic transition took place – in these processes, it was the Muslim Brotherhood that took the governing position. The Muslim Brotherhood, the biggest and oldest opposition group in Egypt, established a legal political party of Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and won the serial public elections of parliament and presidency. However, the public support for the Brotherhood quickly dropped and one year after the inauguration of President Morsi from FJP, the Brotherhood regime was ousted by civil protests and the following military coup. This paper deals with the reason for this quick rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, questioning why the newly-elected opposition party lost its legitimacy to complete the democratic transition.

In order to answer this research question, it starts with the review of the past democratization theories. The researches about democratization phases of various states in various eras have suggested different factors for the procedures and results of democratization – including the economic condition, the class politics, cultural backgrounds, and institutions. However, the Egyptian case was found difficult to be explained by using those factors. The unique identity of the Muslim Brotherhood as a religious group put it in the different position with the usual economic classes, and the cultural or institutional backgrounds of Egypt did not show outstanding changes during the political dynamics in recent years. For

these reasons, the ideational factors are suggested as the main reason to cause the political failure of the Brotherhood. After the 2011 Revolution, the Brotherhood was given the role to provide the political ideology for the new Egypt, but the Brotherhood-specific ideas about religion and politics could not remain the support from the Egyptian public.

The ideas of the Brotherhood that are shown in its political activities and announcements are analyzed in three categories. First, the Brotherhood leaders came up with their religious ideology in the Egyptian political realm. They used the Islamic slogans to earn the public support in several elections, and presented their own concept of democracy based on the Islamic values. These religion-oriented ideas in politics gave the threat of radical Islamization to other democratic activists and the Egyptian public, which is reflected in the new terminology of '*Ikhwanization*' (Brotherhoodization). Second, the Brotherhood leaders were concerned with the conflicts against the military officers in government. Their perception toward the military quickly turned from the revolutionary partner to the biggest political enemy. The leading group of the Brotherhood, however, failed to justify and persuade their perceived threat to other political actors, while the military maintained its public confidence. Third, the leaders of the Brotherhood did not manage to coordinate the internal factions with different ideas. The Reformists and youth groups with different ideologies about religion and democracy defected from the group and provided political alternatives to the Egyptian public, further weakening the support basis of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood leaders were obsessed with the internal solidarity and unity of the whole Muslim Brotherhood, considering the ones with different ideologies as 'foreigners'. As these ideas were

did not gain support from the political actors and Egyptian public, other sectors of the political activists built a coalition against the Brotherhood to organize the Tamarrod (rebellion) to oust the regime.

Those ideas of the Brotherhood shown in the recent years, on the other hand, stemmed from the historical experiences and old ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood. First of all, the Muslim Brotherhood began as a social, religious organization to propagate the Islamic values to the ordinary Egyptian citizens. For this reason, the leaders were limited in interpreting political activities and political concepts. When the concept of democracy entered the Egyptian society, the leaders accepted it to avoid the criticism as radical Islamists, and developed their own concept quoting their holy texts of Quran and Sunna. Second, as the oldest opposition group in Egypt, the Brotherhood has the longest history of suppression from authoritarian regimes. The Brotherhood members reacted to the oppression in two ways – directly fighting against and complying with the governing regime – both of which caused the distrust toward the officers and lack of political experience. Last, the Brotherhood leaders historically refused to coordinate different ideas inside the group. The leaders, usually senior members of the group, also had the position of religious preachers, given the bigger authority in the group. The Islamic value of obedience and consensus made the inner objection difficult, and the Brotherhood leaders emphasized group unity and ideational consolidation.

Keyword: Muslim Brotherhood, Islam, idea, religion, democracy, politics

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Chapter 1. Introduction

The Arab Spring, starting with surprise in January 2011, brought a large trend of democratic demonstrations and resulting transitions in several nations around the Middle East Area. While the actual 'success' of the demonstration, managing to end the authoritarian regime and erecting a new government through democratic means, was limited in the whole Arab countries, Egypt was listed among the few successful cases from the first. The large size of popular protests barred the aim of Mubarak to retain the power and to bequeath it to his son, Gamal Mubarak. The oppositional political power built a strong alliance for the revolution and a lot of civilians protested on Tahrir Square for the same purpose of revolution. Afterwards, competitive public election was held to establish a new democratic regime. The voter turnout was more than twice compared to the previous fraudulent elections held during the authoritarian regime and the procedures of the elections were under surveillance of several civil society groups. Through the fair, popular election, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) from the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the legitimate single majority party in the parliament. One year after, Mohammad Morsi from the FJP was elected as the new president with public support. It seemed like an ordinary democratic transition phase, kicking out the dictator with public protests and erecting a new government with popular elections, the leading opposition powers given the governing position to secure democratization.

However, the story of Egyptian politics changed in an unprecedented way

just in a few years. The Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party quickly lost the support of the Egyptian people and with another round of mass demonstrations and the following military coup, President Morsi of the FJP was kicked out of the office in just one year of reign. The head of the coup Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ran as the sole candidate of the presidential election after the coup and was elected with an absolute agreement from the public. The new regime led by al-Sisi labelled the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group and most of its prominent activists and former politicians are in prison or in exile. What is the reason that the Muslim Brotherhood lost its support from the Egyptian population in such a short time, failing to continue the democratization processes after the public demonstration? What caused the quick reverse of the position that the Muslim Brotherhood had in Egyptian society? Why the same people who allied with or supported the Muslim Brotherhood for democratization had to turn back from the group? What functioned as the factors of those quick changes in Egypt after the Arab Spring in 2011?

This paper tries to tackle these research questions with consideration of the ideas that the major political actors of Egypt – especially the leading group of the Muslim Brotherhood – had. Those ideas include perception and interpretation about the current situation, labeling of political enemies and friends, and deeper ideologies about democracy and religion. These ideas have been showing dynamic changes during the transitional period in relations with others actors, enabling and disturbing political coalitions and appeals to the public. In case of the Muslim Brotherhood, what mattered most after the democratic transition was the underlying identity of the group as an Islamist group. The religious basis which

resurged after the Brotherhood members entered the political arena contained a unique, but mistaking interpretation about the system of democracy and the public support for the revolution. Those ideational factors made the Brotherhood mishandle political allies and rivalries, concluding in the public perception toward them as radical Islamists who were hijacking the democratic revolution.¹ With the quickly shrinking support basis composed of a limited group of people and the breakdown of the allies in Egyptian politics, the Brotherhood became isolated in the political realm and in the end, it was kicked out of the office by a military coup.

This paper starts with the literature review of the previous researches and theories about the democratic transition and democratization. Various studies about the democratization in different parts of the world have established the theoretical basis to analyze the causes and consequences of the democratic transition. Departing from the early modernization theories to the recent case studies of the democratization in Latin America and post-communist countries, I would like to summarize their theoretical structures and check their applicability to the Egyptian

¹ This argument does not imply that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood regime of the short period was a flawlessly democratic. The major reason to claim that the democratic transition of Egypt was interrupted by ousting of the Brotherhood regime is the fact that the Morsi regime was the first one established by the fair and competitive public election relatively free from the state intervention, and that it did not resign by the same means of election but was forcefully kicked out by coup led by military. The Brotherhood was limited in making the country democracy – with the limited understanding of social and cultural democratic values that would be shown in later part of this paper – but the peaceful change of regime via popular election still had a deep meaning in the process of democratization, which became impossible with the interruption of military coup and authoritarian domination of power by al-Sisi government. This view is in line with that of Brownlee (2014). He claims that *'Egypt's transition was thwarted as its elected legislature and presidency were abrogated by agents of the state – the judiciary in the former case, the military in the latter.'*

case. For the limitations they contain in analyzing the quick overturn of the Egyptian democratic transition, I would lastly mention the necessity to focus on the ideational aspects of the actual actors, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the next part, it follows the trajectories of the Brotherhood after the 2011 revolution. This would include the detailed description of the political alliance they made, the campaign strategies they chose in the two successive elections, and official and unofficial announcement they produced to appeal different players in the Egyptian political arena. The limitations of those strategies and misinterpretation of the Brotherhood leaders are stated in three categories – the resurgence of religiosity, improper power struggle with the military, and mishandling of the defectors from the Brotherhood's internal factions. These three interrelated factors of the Brotherhood ideas operated as the determinant causes of the group's political failure after the revolution.

The concrete strategies and the ideas of the Brotherhood, however, are not grown from nowhere. They are affected from the group's old history and experience with the past Egyptian authoritarian regime, which is going to be shown in the following section. Historical viewpoints with path-dependency of the traditional ideologies and their identity starting from its foundation as the social religious group are included in this part to provide the clues of the actions and ideas the Brotherhood showed in recent years. With a short summary and the prospects of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the paper would be concluded.

Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Before suggesting the theoretical basis for the analysis, I would review some previous theories concerning the subjects of democratic transition and democratization. As the issue of democracy and democratization is covered in various subfields in political science, it is hardly possible to investigate the utility and suitability of all the related theories to the Egyptian case. In this part, however, I tried to figure out the big current of the theoretical development regarding the democratization in different parts of the world and on which factors the researches concentrated to explain the institutional changes toward democracy – those factors include economic conditions, structural characteristics, cultural backgrounds and so on.

To analyze the quick fall of Muslim Brotherhood after the democratic revolution, I would suggest the actor-oriented constructivism with ideational approach. In this theoretical frame, what matters the most in the process of democratization is the ideas that the individual actors are holding, and those ideas are not fixed – rather, they keep changing in relation with others as the process goes on, and the ideational changes in turn affect the strategies used in the political scene and shape the situation itself. As the Egyptian case after the democratic revolution in 2011 has shown dynamic changes around the composition of political power, I would argue that the ideational variables are more directly related with the political dynamics than the rather settled variables such as institutional structures

or economies. In addition, with the unique position and influence that the religion – a typical ideational factor – has in Muslim countries including Egypt, the necessity to consider the ideas of the actual agents even grows.

2.1. Literature Review of Democratization Theories

2.1.1. Modernization Theories

The researches on the causes of the democracy and democratization first developed in relation with the economic conditions of the democratic countries. The outbreak of these theories were categorized as modernization theories, as the main subject was that the certain level of economic development, modernization, would lead to the political democratization, originated from the contrast of Western developed democracy and non-Western, underdeveloped authoritarian nations. In their quantitative researches about the correlation between the economic development and political democracy, Cutright and Wiley (1969) provided some actual evidence for the correlation between the two factors with a substantial amount of quantitative data of different political systems.² Although the reasons of that correlation were not sufficiently analyzed in the research – containing only some untested hypothesis – it succeeded to empirically show the positive correlation of economic development and democratic development.

² Cutright and Wiley (1969), pp.27-36

This trend of researches, later attempted to find the causality of how the economic development and modernization had generated political democracy. The most outstanding researcher of this academic flow was Lipset (1959), who focused on the existence of a sizeable middle class in the developed countries. He argued in his book that because the middle class has a high literacy rate, long education span and moderate ideologies, the existence of the middle class contributes to the development of political and social democracy. The economic development affects to the development of democracy in the way that the improved economic conditions cultivate the middle class in size and power.³ The causality he found, however, was based on the contrast of two different types of countries at a certain time, where either democracy or authoritarianism was already settled and no transition was taking place. As a consequence, it was still limited to prove the causation between the two related factors, not to mention the dynamic processes of political transitions such as democratization or authoritarian roll-back.

The research about the relationship between economic development and political democracy continued after the Third Wave of democratization in the late 20th century. The typical example was the empirical research of Przeworski et al. (2000), in which they analyzed the two variables of regime durability and GDP per capita. With a lot of exemplar cases of democratization and rollback in the third world, they concluded that there exists a line of the economic development that divides whether democracy could be consolidated or not.⁴ Another empirical evidence was suggested by Boix and Stokes (2003). They contained the cases of

³ Lipset (1959), pp.75-92

⁴ Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000), pp.96-103

European states which went through democratization several centuries ago in their analysis, and concluded that the economic growth actually brings democracy to non-democratic countries.⁵ The development found in their research was that good economic conditions do not only help keep democratic system consolidated, but also increase the possibility of democratization.

However, those researches were still limited in explaining the dynamic processes of the democratization. It is undeniable that their extensive case studies dug out the correlation between economic and democratic development, but their analysis does not fully explain how the correlation worked as a causality in the actual processes – which is the independent and which is the dependent variable. Moreover, Haggard and Kaufman (2016) claimed in their recent paper that not few states actually maintained democracy despite their poor economic conditions – such as Benin (since 2001), El Salvador (since 1990) and Dominican Republic (since 1994). They added that some countries – Bolivia, Sri Lanka, and so on – which experienced authoritarian rollback with poor economic development, turned back to democracy in a short term.⁶ In case of Egypt, the economic condition was far below the baseline for democratization suggested in Przeworski et al. (2000) when the public protests for democracy occurred in 2001, and what is more, it did not get better until the military coup by al-Sisi.⁷ In short, without any tangible economic development, the Egyptian people went through the procedures from

⁵ Boix and Stokes (2003), pp.20-21

⁶ Haggard and Kaufman (2016), pp.129-130

⁷ According to the World Bank dataset, the GDP per capita of Egypt in 2011 was about 2,800 in current USD, and in 2013 was about 3,200. Considering the currency and inflation rate, the growth of GDP per capita during that period was actually slightly below 0.

public demonstration to authoritarian rollback by military coup. As a consequence, the variable of economic development has a clear limitation to answer the research question of this paper about the quick rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood regime.

It can be argued, in this sense, that the economic development functions as a conditional variable affecting the perception and ideas of the people shaping the democratization process. Suffering for poor economic situation, the Egyptian public protested against the authoritarian regime and wanted to erect a democratic regime. At that time, the hope they had for the new system and new government was huge – according to the Global Attitude Project by Pew Research Center, more than half of the Egyptians just after the revolution expected that the Egyptian economy would improve in one year. That was more than twice of whom with the same reply in 2010.⁸ In that situation, it can be inferred that the continued underdevelopment by the Brotherhood regime gave a harsher depression to the Egyptian people with their expectation betrayed. For this reason, the economic condition later could operate as one of the many reasons for the loss of public support to the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, I maintain that what matters in the dynamic process of democratization is not the objective condition of the state's economy – rather, it is the actors' ideas who shape the economic conditions and who have to live in the economies; and by concentrating on the ideas of several parties, it would be easier to figure out the causality between the economic development and democracy. Although the economic condition of Egypt itself is not fully tackled in

⁸ Pew Research Center (2011), p.17. In 2010, only 25% of the interviewees replied that the economic condition of Egypt would improve. In 2011, 56% gave the same answer.

this paper, as it was not a direct factor of the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the democratization process, I would claim that ideational variable is more effective in explaining the Egyptian case than the modernization theories.

2.1.2. Cultural Approach

The modernization theories, on one hand, developed to the cultural approach of democratization – it finds the source of democratization in the cultural backgrounds of the certain nations. Earlier researches in this theoretical flow actually overlapped in many cases with the modernization theories, as they started from finding the common cultural characteristics of the democratic countries and non-democratic countries at a certain period of time. The argument of Tocqueville (1835) that the American culture was favorable to liberty, freedom and democracy opened the door for this kind of cultural approach toward the source of democracy and democratization.⁹ In this sense, the Middle East countries with strong Islamic culture were not suitable for democracy from the origin – their culture of religiosity, compared with the secularism in Western countries, was perceived as the barrier to afford the democracy of liberty and equality. If the Egyptian case would be explained by this cultural approach about democratization, the main problem would be not how the elected government of Muslim Brotherhood was kicked out in less than 2 years, but how the Egypt could oust authoritarian regime and erect

⁹ Tocqueville, 1835, republished in 2003

new government by public election. The mass demonstration for democratization and the end of authoritarian regime falls under the category of abnormality, while the back-slide to the military-led regime by al-Sisi would rather be described natural. This could not fit to explain the quick fall of the Brotherhood, the distinctive case of Egypt, nor the differences in sequences and results of the Arab Spring in various states sharing the similar Islamic culture.

However, as time passed by from the Tocquevillian era, there emerged a lot of researches which directly oppose the viewpoint that the Islamic culture could not afford democracy. They, in line with the cultural approach, insist that the culture of religious Islam is not incompatible to democracy – rather, they claim that the Islamic tradition contains democratic values, even from the earlier age before the ‘Western’ type of democracy developed. The researchers with this theoretical view often quote the *shura* (which means ‘consultation’ in Arabic) from Quran to assert that the decision-making processes in the governing body were traditionally democratic. Plus, according to Quran, the Muslims determined the *caliphs* from the votes of tribal leaders after death of the Prophet Mohammed, far before the concept of election appeared in Western Europe. What those researchers claim with these references is that there existed the democratic values in the traditional Islam though they have a different form with the Western democracy.

With these two confronting ideas, it could be inferred that there are varieties in interpreting the same culture. It would not be an overstatement to argue that the main point of culture is not whether it objectively fits democracy, but how the culture is interpreted by different actors in relation with the political democracy. In the actual case of Egypt, the biggest cultural characteristic of the Egyptian

society, the religion of Islam, was at the center of the controversy during the political transition. The Brotherhood has tried for several decades to coalesce the value of Islam to the democratic system and the Brotherhood politicians claimed themselves as democratically representing the Muslim Egypt; the military, on the other hand, criticized the Brotherhood for hijacking the democratization revolution toward radical Islamist state. The undeniable Egyptian cultural element of Islam and the Islam identity of the Muslim Brotherhood went through varying interpretation by different actors, and the meaning of Islam and democracy continued to change. Shown in this circumstance, what mattered in the political dynamics around the democratization was how the Egyptian political actors interpreted the meaning, and whether they could persuade the others of those meanings and justifications for their viewpoints. It can be even argued that it would be improper to label a certain culture if it supports democracy or not, as the meaning of the democracy and cultural aspect itself could be changed by the actors.

2.1.3. Power Politics of Economic Classes

Another flow of academic attempts to figure out the factors of democratization was to focus on the power politics in a state during the process of founding democracy. The researches of Moore (1966), Skocpol (1973) and Rueschemeyer (1992) are included in this trend of analysis. Their common characteristic is that they perceived the political transition either to democracy or non-democracy as a result of the power struggles between the economic classes

with the experience of democratization of the European democratic countries. Moore emphasized the role of pro-democratic urban bourgeoisies against anti-democratic landlords, claiming that the class winning the power in the political struggle would determine the formation of the political structure.¹⁰ Rueschemeyer, on the contrary, argued that the most pro-democratic force was the working class and the preference of the bourgeoisies would be varied according to the background conditions of possible alliance with either working or governing classes.¹¹

It is true that the actual political area could not be free from the power struggles, and whether the pro-democratic forces could earn the power or not is determinative in the phases of democratic transition. What can be problematic when applying those class politics to the case of Arab democratization, however, is that the class composition of the Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, is quite different from that of the European countries. As those theories are based on the democratic transition in Western Europe, which could be traced back to more than two centuries ago, the class structures of those countries reflect the specific form of the industrialization era. When a state was turning from the agricultural economy to the industrialized economy, it was relatively easy to divide the classes into landlords, working class, and new bourgeois. On the contrary, the Middle Eastern states that experienced the wave of democratization in recent years, did not go through the same industrialization procedures – a high percentage of those states actually had a unique economic system of rentier state with the rent from oil

¹⁰ Moore, 1966

¹¹ Rueschemeyer, 1992

occupying the biggest part of the states' GDP. In case of Egypt, the elite group of the economy is mostly composed of the military officers. Egyptian military, as the most privileged group of the society, have retained a wide range of power not only in political arena but also in economy, complying with the authoritarian regimes.¹² In this sense, the Egyptian military officers possess a very unique characteristic that makes it difficult to categorize them as the capitalists or bourgeois. The Muslim Brotherhood, the biggest opposition power in Egypt winning the reign after thwarting the authoritarian regime, is also hard to be confined in the economic classification as they include a variety of different classes in its extensive network with its religious identity. In this situation, it can be traced that it is rarely possible to apply the traditional division of the classes to the Egyptian case.

Plus, the theories of class politics have the limitation of premising that the actors' preference about political system, whether pro- or anti-democratic, is determined by the economic classes. This problem is also discovered in the recent research about the relation between democracy and economic classes. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggested another way to divide the economic classes to elites and citizens, and the inequality problems and class struggles to solve those problems shape the democratization processes and results. However, they confined that those classes think and act only according to their economic incentives, following the rules of game theory, with their preferences toward political systems depending on their economic position.¹³ This could pause a series problem especially in explaining the Arab politics as the factor of religious identity has a

¹² Albrecht and Bishara (2011), pp.13-15

¹³ Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), pp.xi-xii

high influence over the different fields of the society, including the attitude toward the political system. The Muslim Brotherhood group managed to expand its power and to survive under authoritarian regime with its religious identity and its dedication to Islam, and the issue of religion – how to reflect sharia to Egyptian constitution, whether democracy is compatible with Islam, for example – was critical in political arena. With this background, sources of those preferences are so complicated that it is hardly possible to judge if a certain actor would be pro- or anti-democratic just by the basis of economic classification.

Moreover, the preference and incentive of the actors, I would argue, are not fixed; rather, those are constantly recomposed by their experience and perception even when there are no actual changes in their economic position. The privileged class of Egyptian military actually has made coalition with the authoritarian regime for decades to defend their prerogatives, and this continued until the early days of the protests in January 2011. However, they suddenly turned favorable toward the protesters after noticing the political crisis of Mubarak regime, and their stance to the Muslim Brotherhood varied continuously without any noticeable loss in their economic class privilege. The Egyptian people, as mentioned above, also withdrew their support for the Muslim Brotherhood although their economic conditions and class composition did not change much after the revolution. Accordingly, I would conclude that when we settle that the political preference of the actors is predisposed by the economic classes, it would be difficult to explain the dynamics of Egyptian politics in recent years. As a consequence, this paper puts more emphasis on the complex procedures of the ideational changes of the major players in the Egyptian democratic transition,

maintaining that those changes are the more direct reasons of the thwarted transition of democracy in Egypt than the economic class politics.

2.1.4. Institutionalism and Neo-institutionalism

The researches about the relation between economic conditions and changes of the political system, with the advance of politico-economic researches, are also led to the development of several branches of institutionalism. While the institutional theories are centered on the economic institutions, the themes and structures from these researches are also applicable to the cases of the democratization of Arab Spring. The biggest characteristic of those institutionalism and neo-institutionalism is that they were attempts to explain the continuity and change of the institution. While the exact meaning of the institution was varied for different researchers, they typically premised the institution as a persistent, long-lasting, comprehensive system of the society which is difficult to be changed. As the institution usually continues for a long period of time, the change of the institution was an ‘unusual incident’ caused by an exogenous factor outside the institution itself. Without those outside factors, the institution remains the same by inner processes – whether they are called self-reinforcing socialization, historical path-dependency, or equilibrium by rational choice.¹⁴

It is true that some issues of the Egyptian democratization could be

¹⁴ Katznelson and Weingast, 2005

explained with the theories of institutionalism. The breakthrough of the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution – putting aside the analysis how the Jasmine Revolution at first occurred inside Tunis – could be explained to function as the exogenous shock to undermine the institutional equilibrium of Egypt and to cause political transitions. If we admit this argument, however, it would be difficult to figure out the reasons why the other Middle Eastern countries, experiencing the same external factor of Tunisian Revolution, went through different phases of change. It could be argued then that the original institutional characters of each state determined the way to import the outer event, emphasizing the persistency of institution. Yet, what lies at the end of this argument is in a clear contradiction to the premise of the institutionalism – that whether an institution would change or not basically depends on the endogenous elements of the institution itself. In consequence, it is interpreted that the institutional changes of a country to democracy would be predetermined by the former institution and the external variable would lose its power for explanation. In this sense, the institutionalism theories could not be applied in intact form to analyze the case of Egypt after 2011.

Moreover, the past institutionalism has limitations in explaining the path that the new institutional changes would take. Even it is possible to explain the eruption of protests in Egypt and victory of the Muslim Brotherhood with the external factor and institutional frames, how could the quick fall of the same actor of Brotherhood be explained with those variables? The external shock could hardly pave the way of the new possible form of institution after the breakdown; while, I would argue, the ideas and strategies of the inner actors can. This is actually the way that the institutionalism has been developed in order to find other factors

affecting the process and results of institutional changes: the researchers included the variable of ideas, meanings, and discourses in their analysis of institution, which is in line with the theoretical basis of this research.

As the representative research of ideational, discursive institutionalism, Schmidt (2008) pointed out that the meaning of institution is relentlessly changing with dynamic perceptions and interpretations of the actors inside, and therefore, that the institution is never persistent. He claimed that the institution is constructed by the flow of meanings and discourses that ideas are transmitted, and in this theory, the most influential variable of the institutional change is the active ideas of the actual players in a given society.¹⁵ Blyth (2002) appointed another role of ideas during the institutional changes. As criticized by a lot of researchers, he claimed, the institutionalism and neo-institutionalism fell short of explaining the path that the new institution would take after the crackdown by an external shock. Therefore, he suggested that it is the leading ideas in the society that pave the way for the new institution to take place. He introduced the concept of ‘Knightian uncertainty’ in institutional changes: it means that the inner actors could not distinguish not only the solutions for the current problem in the society, but the problem itself. In this chaotic, uncertain situation, the different ideas in different societies give the blueprint of the consequential form of the institutional transition.¹⁶

From this line of institutionalism, the function of ideas during and after the democratization processes is at the center of the analysis in this paper. With the ideas in dynamics, Egypt after ousting of Mubarak first chose the Islamist power,

¹⁵ Schmidt (2008), pp. 313-317

¹⁶ Blyth (2002), pp.28-49

and then quickly reversed to military regime similar to that of Mubarak. This twofold instance cannot be resulted only by the external shock of Jasmine Revolution nor historical path-dependency, and that is the reason why the consideration of ideas is necessary to analyze the causality in the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and the uncompleted democratic transition.

2.1.5. Structural Explanation

Another way to explain the background of democracy and democratization is to focus on the societal and anthropological structure of the nation, which is uncontrollable by individuals. This approach was substantially functional in recent researches about the Arab Spring. One typical way to interpret the breakthrough of the Arab Spring was to stress the high rate of youth in the Middle Eastern countries. The Middle Eastern states show the highest youth rate in the world and with the poor economic conditions continuing, the youth unemployment rate was also at the top. The big group of poor, young citizens was the most dissatisfied with the repressive authoritarian regime in their own country, and the most open to the Western culture and values – such as democracy, liberalism and democracy. The researches in this perspective emphasize the role of the youth in the Arab countries to lead the public protests using new methods of social network services like Facebook and Youtube.¹⁷

¹⁷ Haas and Lesch, 2013, pp.3-5

Other researches also concentrated on the anthropological topics – the proportion of the people in the nation by religious factions (the proportion of Sunni and Shia Muslims), ethnicities (Arabic and non-Arabic), and so on. Those factors contributed to the comparative researches about the difference in size and effect of the democratization revolutions in different Arab countries, especially in case where the role of powerful Shia opposition groups was important. In the researches about the Gulf countries during and after the Arab Spring, it was suggested that the public protests against the monarchy were harsher in the states where Shia population occupies a substantial portion than the states where the Sunni Muslims retain the dominant size and authority – Bahrain and Kuwait corresponding to the former case, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar to the latter.¹⁸ With the increasing sectarian conflict between the Sunni and Shia Muslims, it is written in those analysis that the proportion of different religious groups was a determinant factor to the occurrence of public protests against current regime.

However, these factors cause serious problems when trying to explain the case of Egypt – those structural factors either help to explain the only breakout of mass demonstration against the regime or the rise of Muslim Brotherhood, but not both at the same time. In case of Egypt, the large group of youth, with a high unemployment rate, had taken the leading role in organizing the popular protests from early 2000s, using internet networks. They had a huge dissatisfaction toward the regime, and it is also true that they were evaluated as more open to secular, liberal and democratic values imported from the West. However, this same factor

¹⁸ Lynch (2013), pp.13-17

could not be put to explain the reason that a traditional, long-lasting religious group of Muslim Brotherhood was elected as the governor after the protests. Plus, Egypt had a relatively united religious and ethnic background – the Shia population was just a minority, and the Coptic Christians have been relatively well merged with the Muslim society. There were not reported any harsh sectarian conflicts between religions in Egypt. Rather, the Sunni Muslims have kept their dominant position in the society, and according to the several survey results about their attitudes toward religion and politics, it is easy to see that the Muslim values were widespread in every aspect of life and Egyptian people were accepting that. This factor helps to support the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood with Sunni Muslim identity could win the serial elections after thwarting the former regime, but is useless when trying to explain the uprising itself and the quick failure of the Brotherhood.

Another problem of the structural factors when analyzing the Egyptian case is the fact that they could not be radically changed in few years. As those factors are hardly changeable nor controllable by individual actors, they lack the accountability to explain the dynamic changes that actually occurred in Egypt after the revolution. In about three years, while the population or sectarian proportions remained almost untouched, the position of the Brotherhood changed from the leader of democratization protests to a terrorist group. If only those structural factors are put in consideration, the situation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt would be dealt in this way: while the independent variables did not change, only the resulting dependent variables turned different. It, in other words, means that it is unexplainable by those factors.

For this reason, I would claim that it is necessary to focus on the real

agents working in the Egyptian political fields. It could not be denied that those uncontrollable factors and structures are affecting how the individuals in a certain country think and move. Nevertheless, as seen in the Egyptian case, the popular ideas and ideologies could go through dynamic changes while the structural conditions remain the same, from which the need of actor-oriented approach is derived. The actors actively perceive those factors, interpret the meanings of the structure around them, and make use of the given conditions for their changing interests. In these ever-changing processes, the factors which seem settled could have a completely different meaning to other actors even though they share the same structural background. In reality, the strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood to use the identity of Islam in election had different influence to the electorate as their perception and evaluation of the Brotherhood changed.

2.1.6. Past Case Studies of Democratization

The recent research on the democratization was the one started with the active democratization attempts which appeared in Latin America and post-communist countries from the 1970s. As those authoritarian regimes started to break down and the opposition powers with democratic ideologies grappled the reign, the academy of political science put efforts on the analysis of the phenomenon and its causes. The consequence of this research flow was a newfound theory of democratic transition. This theory focused on the electoral revolutions by the oppositional powers, and conceived that the reason for their success in the

dynamic interactions between the opposition and the incumbents. The researchers in the democratic transition theory argued that what matters in the democratization are the strategies of the actors in the regime and in the opposition (the 4 major actors of regime soft-liners and hard-liners, oppositional moderates and radicals), and when the ‘pact’ of democracy was made between the regime and the opposition, the democratic transition is completed in a certain nation.¹⁹

This transitional theory concentrated on the roles and strategies of the actual agents in the political arena, undermining the effects of the structural factors – such as the economic development or the rate of middle class mentioned in the previous modernization theory. Although the criticisms toward the democratic transition theories, tackling the color revolution or the democratization of post-communist countries in late 90s and early 2000s, again focused on the factors of regime structure and opposition unities²⁰, the utility of the agent-oriented theories of the major political actors in the phases of the democratization is still acknowledgeable. The transitional theories pointed out that with the dynamic interactions and the different political strategies used in the different time and places, the result of the democratic transition could be in different forms. They recognized the role of the actual players in the game of democratization to grasp the dynamics which could not be explained with the structural factors in those past authoritarian countries.

As this paper is centered on the role and actions of the Muslim Brotherhood in the transitional phases of Egypt, posing the agent-oriented views, it

¹⁹ O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986; Rustow, 1970

²⁰ McFaul2005; Bunce and Wolchik, 2006; Way, 2008

has similarities with the democratic transition theories. However, there is one factor that I would add to analyze the Egyptian case – the ideational change of the actors while the transition is still taking place. In the democratic transition theories, the types of the actors are usually divided into four – regime hard-, and soft-liners; and the moderates and radicals in the opposition – and the division of those actor types is fixed during the whole processes of democratic transition. However, I would claim that this categorization is not settled nor pre-determined, but goes through dynamic changes. The agents in the political dynamics could alter not only their strategies but also their positions and underlying ideologies, leading to different forms of alliance and frames during or after the ‘pact’ is compromised. Analyzing the Algerian case in the 90s, Waterbury (1994) pointed that because their peculiar ideology of and dedication to religion, the religious political groups could not be simply categorized as neither democrats nor non-democrats, and their perception is changed over time and with political experiences.²¹ In case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, they coalesced with the liberal and secular opposition groups when the demonstration was at peak, and stood in line with the remaining regime and military officers when the parliamentary election was taking place. As the situations changed, the perception of the Brotherhood about the democracy in Egyptian politics and the categorization of hard- and soft- liners became ambiguous. With these in mind, this paper aims for a deeper and more thorough description of how the Muslim Brotherhood changed its position, ideas and strategies to explain the actual dynamics shown in the transitional period after the

²¹ Waterbury, 1994, p.39

2011 revolution.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

As mentioned above, this paper contains the idea-oriented approach to explain the quick fall of the elected government led by Muslim Brotherhood and uncompleted democratic transition in Egypt. While a lot of factors – not only the main actors in the Egyptian politics but also the institutional structures, anthropological backgrounds, and international relations – actually mattered in the processes and results of the 2011 revolution, there still remains the need to focus on the actual agents continuously interacting and changing their interest and ideologies in the dynamic transitional period. Among the several major actors in Egyptian politics – past regime, military, the Muslim Brotherhood, liberal and secular opposition activists, and so on – I would claim that the most important actor was the Muslim Brotherhood, thus centering the debate in this paper on the ideas and strategies of the Brotherhood.

The reason to pinpoint on the Muslim Brotherhood rests not only on the convenience of analysis; rather, this reflects the importance of the ‘role’ that the Brotherhood was given after the revolution. The basis that I insist the Egyptian case as an uncompleted democratic transition is the fact that the publicly-elected government of Muslim Brotherhood was thwarted by the military coup. This, in turn, means that the Brotherhood was empowered as the governor of the Egyptian

politics after the revolution, responsible to show the direction of the democratic transition that Egypt would go through. Pargeter (2013), in this sense, argued in her book that because the Arab Spring itself was essentially a protest against the old regimes and the status quo, not about ideas, it tossed the role to suggest the alternative ideas after the regime breakdown to the Brotherhood's hands.²² In this very moment after the public demonstration, when the society was filled with uncertainty similar with the situation of 'Knightian Uncertainty' suggested by Blyth (2002), the new leader was given the role to show a blueprint about the new state. This was actually what the public and other political actors anticipated to the Muslim Brotherhood after the election which was held in the political confusion after the revolution; in other words, there appeared another expected idea (or perception) toward the Muslim Brotherhood, basically different from the one before the uprising.

The Brotherhood, I suggest, could adapt to and wrap up those flowing ideas and suggest a political alternative that the democratic activists called for in the protests. However, it was the Brotherhood-specific way of thinking about the religion and politics which made this scenario unrealized. When they became able to enter the political arena without the interruption by the authoritarian state, the Brotherhood leaders came up with their religiosity and Islamist identity. It was based on their perception about the Egyptian politics and calculation about their support in the election. This, however, caused another round of ideational changes of other actors toward the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood leaders suggested their

²² Pargeter 2013, p.244

own ideas for the new Egyptian state after the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the idea from the Brotherhood failed to earn the support from the majority of Egyptian public. In the dynamic interrelation between various actors in Egyptian politics, those ideas and strategies kept continuous changes. This was in contrast with the other factors suggested in different theological analysis – such as the institution, economic condition, class composition, or cultural background – which stayed almost the same for recent years in Egypt. For this reason, those factors are difficult to be applied in the analysis of the quick rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood – the only thing that changed was the ideas that the Brotherhood showed in the political realm, and that the Egyptian public and political actors had toward the Muslim Brotherhood. In short, the ideational factors of the Muslim Brotherhood which worked when they grabbed the political opportunity in return caused the change of the ideas that other actors had in relation with the Brotherhood, in result leading to the failure of the Brotherhood regime.

On the other hand, the perception and ideas of the agents including the Muslim Brotherhood were influenced by historical experiences and past institutions, and this tone of argument is also reflected in the later part of this paper. In this sense, it could be stated that this paper also adapts part of the logic of the historical institutionalism or the cultural researches – that the institutional or cultural background shapes the result of the democratization. However, this paper concentrates more on the historical path of the ideational development than the direct effect of those historical factors on the democratization – how the ideas of the members were shaped and changed through the different eras with different background. This approach gains more importance considering the fact that the

leading group of the Brotherhood is composed of its senior members, maintaining the membership as a Muslim Brother for decades. Their experience and relations in the past affected the viewpoint that they now have, and resulting choices they make in the recent incidents.

In the following part, a short summary of the institutional and political background of Egyptian revolution is suggested first. With the trajectories of the Brotherhood during and after the 2011 revolution and the ideational factors which led to their political tackled, the historical clues for those ideas would be explained in order.

Chapter 3. Background of the Egyptian Revolution

Before entering the main discourse, a short summary about the backgrounds of the Egyptian 2011 Revolution would be suggested. These backgrounds include the indirect factors for the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, giving clues for the outbreak of the uprising and understandings about the Egyptian politics.

3.1. Authoritarian Political System of Egypt

After the declaration of the Egyptian Republic in 1953, the Egyptian political institution has remained the presidential system with the two houses of the parliament. However, the presidential system of Egypt was actually limited in the level of 'nominal', allowing the dominant power for the historical presidents. Before the 2011 Revolution erupted, in reality, Egypt has had only four presidents – including the first president Muhammad Naguib who was forced to resign in just 1 year of inauguration – in its republican history of more than a century. Those presidents remained their seats for decades although the term limit of twice was for a long time identified in the constitution. For a quick illustration, President Mubarak was holding the reign for 30 years from 1981 when he was ousted by the protests in 2011. For this reason, Egyptian political system was rather depicted as semi-presidential, semi-authoritarian, authoritarian, or even pharaonic system than democracy or republic.

In the reigns of these authoritarian presidents, the power of opposition or other political activists was harshly restricted. First of all, the presidential election rules in Egypt did not allow any other candidates who were not from the governing party. From 1952, the governing party of the parliament appointed the sole candidate for the president, and the Egyptian people would only mark “yes” or “no” in the public referendum to elect their president. As the Egyptian presidents, mostly from the military, had a dominant political background in the parliament, no candidates who were not the incumbent was nominated in the election. All those presidents in Egyptian history were actually exchanged with the force resignation or death (even assassination) of the predecessor. In 2005, President Gamal Mubarak, for the first time in the history of Egyptian Republic, had changed the election laws to the multi-candidate rule to allow the political competition, but this action was also unveiled as a token improvement for democracy. Although a political rival to Mubarak, Ayman Nour, came up with his declaration for running the presidency, the parliament with the majority party of National Democratic Party of President Mubarak had imprisoned him twice during the election campaign. The judiciary, also in line with the governing power, sentenced him years of imprisonment for the falsified document, which is still unclear to be guilty.²³ Moreover, Egypt has been under the Emergency Law from 1967 until 2012 decreed by the serial presidents, extremely limiting the political freedom of the Egyptian citizen. As seen in these cases, the presidents of Egypt enjoyed a dominant, authoritarian political power, even though the Egyptian constitution regulated the

²³ Williams, Daniel, “Egypt Frees An Aspiring Candidate – Presidential Hopeful Is Released on Bail”, Washington Post, March 13, 2005

division of executive, legislation, and the judiciary from its amendments in 1971.²⁴

With these continued reign of the authoritarian system, the Muslim Brotherhood, representing itself as a religious group could survive for a long history of several regimes. However, as the dissatisfaction toward the regime suppression and reported political tortures, frauds, corruption and violence perceived by the Egyptian citizens, the calls for the political freedom and democracy were strengthened at the 21st century – such as the youth movements like Kefaya or April 6 Movement.²⁵

On the other hand, the Egyptian military has remained the dominant authority in the politic. It was the military coup which thwarted the monarch and changed the political system to presidency – in 1952, the military officers who named themselves as the ‘Free Officers’ led the Revolution to end the monarch and erect the new political system.²⁶ After that, all the historical presidents of Egypt had experiences of serving as the high generals of Egyptian army, and possessed the political support background of the military. With the success of the 1952 Revolution, the military was the main actor of shaping the new form of political system and constitution, and relentlessly increased its influence in all aspects of the

²⁴ Horitski (2012), p.8

²⁵ Both are the name of activist groups found in early 2000s, usually led by young activists with liberal and secular ideologies. As they were organized under the suppression of authoritarian regime from the first, they were small and dispersed networks of a small size. Most members were the same youth generation of Egypt, and they made use of the internet networks and other technologies for propaganda and mobilization. In opposition with the Muslim Brotherhood, they argued for the radical revolution to establish a democratic state, and openly maintained anti-governmental, anti-Mubarak stance. The name of the movement *Kefaya* means ‘enough’ in Arabic, which reflects the meaning that the reign of Mubarak was now enough.

²⁶ Horitski (2012), p.12

Egyptian society. For this reason, the military officers at the time of the 2011 Revolution were composing the most privileged class in Egypt, and they were considered as the “deep state” by some of the opposition activists. With the unique position of the Egyptian military in the political realm, the military officers also took a determinant role in the processes from the 2011 Revolution to the coup in 2013, in which the military again erected an interim president and later came up with a sole candidate of al-Sisi to become the another president from the military clique.

3.2. Deterioration of Economic Conditions

With the continued authoritarian regime by President Mubarak, the economic condition in Egypt was also not in a very good mood. According to the World Bank database, even though the total GDP of Egypt was growing fast, the GDP per capita was only around 10,000 USD in the PPP value with the big population and high inflation rate of over 10 percent per year. The bigger problem was, however, the severe inequality and the economic hardships of the Egyptian public. In the financial year of 2008, over 21 percent of the Egyptians were under the poverty line, with 2.5 million living on with less than 1.25 USD a day.²⁷ The number of Egyptian public in extreme poverty was increasing at a high rate for decades, while the total GDP of Egypt was exceeding a trillion US dollars. In this situation, the price of grains soared in the world market from the year of 2008 and

²⁷ UNDP Egypt (2010), pp.21-29

a lot of workers with low wages had to suffer even more. The problem of children malnutrition was on the rise, with around 7 percent of the children under age 5 reported to be underweight.²⁸

On the other hand, the Egyptian youth had another economic problem – unemployment. As the sources of wealth in economy were very limited in Egypt, with a big portion of GDP coming from oil and tourism, there were not enough workplaces for the young educated Egyptians in the domestic economy. For the previous policies of Mubarak had increased both the birth rate and education level in the society, the intelligent youth population without jobs were exceptionally huge in Egypt. Among the 2.5 million of the unemployed, more than one third had the level of university or higher education, and in Cairo, more than half of the unemployed were educated in this level.²⁹ For this reason, the youth groups were the foremost to feel the gaps between the ideal and reality, and they actually became the most radical critics toward the Mubarak regime. With pointing out the little trickle-down effect, the problem of corruption among the political and economic elites was publicized by those activists. Although the government suppression continued to control the dissatisfaction from erupting, the economic threat shared among the ordinary Egyptian public was also one of the factors to withdraw the support from the Mubarak regime.

From several years before the Egyptian Revolution started in 2011, these dissatisfactions and wrath were bursting out on the streets. It was the trade unions of several economic fields to set the fire of resistance, organizing serial strikes and

²⁸ Noueihed and Warren (2012), p.100

²⁹ *op.cit.*, p.38

demonstrations to call for the governmental solutions of low wages, high inflation, and high prices of basic goods. What could be noticed here is that although the authoritarian regimes had historically put all of their efforts to contain the political activities in opposition with the governing power, those workers out of the factories shouted for the regime changes. They trampled the campaign posters of Mubarak, called for his resignation, and burned the banners and flags of the National Democratic Party.³⁰ The trade union of the textile workers ignited the economic and at the same time political protests, and in the processes by the government to oppress them, the Egyptian security forces killed eleven protesters and arrested hundreds of them. However, the voices with the piled dissatisfaction continued and expanded to other regions of the country, which showed the hint for the size and speed of public mobilization in January 25 Revolution.

3.3. Ethnical and Religious Unity

Egypt has been a relatively united country in its ethnical and religious background. More than 90 percent of the population are ethnically Egyptians, and most of the minorities are also composed of the Arabic from different states or small tribes. Egypt has only one official language of Arabic, while there are differences between the sub-types of the Arabic and various dialects. As most of the population has the same ethnical and language background, the united identity of Egyptian was quite strong.

³⁰ Noueihed and Warren (2012), p.100

Furthermore, the religious identity is also unified with the major religion of Sunni Islam. Islam is the national religion of Egypt, with almost 90% of the Egyptians are Sunni Muslims. About 10 percent is Coptic Christians and less than 1 percent is composed of other minor branches of Christians or Jews. The religion of Islam usually possesses a huge influence in Middle Eastern countries, and it was also the same in Egypt. The *sharia*, which means the Islamic law, is identified in the constitution as the source of Egyptian laws and actually a number of articles dealing with the matters of family affairs such as marriage, divorce or inheritance, and the Coptic Christians were treated as an exception – those issues for the Coptic Christians followed the rules from their churches.³¹ It is true that there were official and unofficial discrimination between the Muslims and non-Muslims, the dominant majority of one religion made it difficult for the religious minority to resist the governing regime. The other religion accounted only 10 percent of the whole population, and they had never been in the ruling position. While the Coptic Christians in Egypt have formed their own community, they were still geographically dispersed and were not organized enough to lead any opposing movement. With this composition and power-division among the different religion populations, the Sunni Islam has functioned as the comprehensive basis for the Egyptian identity and cultural rules.

On the other hand, the dominance of one denomination of Sunni was also an important factor of the religious landscape in Egypt. The two main sects in Islam, Sunni and Shia, have maintained the historical rivalry relationship since they

³¹ Noueihed and Warren (2012), p.124

were divided – as a result, the Islam states in the Middle East were usually categorized as either Sunni or Shia countries according to the major and governing denomination. The relation between the two powers has been deteriorating in recent years as seen in the diplomatic conflicts between the leading countries of Sunni (Saudi Arabia) and Shia (Iran) Muslims, and violent clashes among the radical activists. These so-called ‘sectarian’ conflicts also operated as an independent factor in shaping the formation and characteristic of the domestic democratization protests during the 2011 Arab Spring. In the countries where these sectarian conflicts were harsh with each accounting a substantial portion of the population, the protest itself in 2011 had the feature of the religious clash. The typical example was Bahrain: it was categorized as Sunni country with the governing royalty from a Sunni tribe, but the Shia Muslims comprise about 40 percent of the whole population. With the deprived rights of the governing power and historical discrimination, the Shia Muslims were the most active protesters in the anti-governmental demonstrations in 2011, calling for the oust of the Sunni royal families. On the contrary, the Shia Muslims in Egypt were few and this kind of sectarian movements or conflicts did not occur inside Egypt. The Egyptian opposition powers gathered and made a united front against the Mubarak regime, managing to speak out in one voice for democracy. This coalition in the opposing position took an important role to kick out the long-lasting authoritarian regime and erect a new government with public elections.

In this circumstances of Egypt in recent years before the revolution started in 2011, the opposition forces were organized with the angry public standing

behind. The dissatisfaction toward the Mubarak regime and the united identity of Egyptians paved the way for the eruption of the large-scale protests. In the next part, the detailed trajectories of the demonstration itself and how the actors with different ideas actually moved in those backgrounds would be tackled, centered on the political movements of the biggest oppositional organization of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Chapter 4. Democratic Transition and Quick Backlash

This part states how the democratic transition was started and ended in incompleteness after the January 25 Revolution in 2011, centered on the detailed trajectories of the leading group of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the Brotherhood earned public support and was elected as the first legitimate regime after ousting the 30-year reign of Mubarak, their misperception about the political reality and wrong choices of political strategy made the Brotherhood leaders isolated. This part suggests that the source of this Brotherhood's failure in managing the democratic transition of Egyptian politics is their underlying ideas and the changes of those ideas during the transitional period. Moreover, it is shown in this part how the ideas and perceptions of the other actors toward the Brotherhood shaped the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics. After shortly reviewing the political success of the Brotherhood, the ideational factors leading to their loss of political support are adduced in three categories – resurgence of religious ideology, obsession to power struggle with military, and obstinacy against internal factions with different political perspectives.

4.1. Democratic Revolution and Politicization of the Muslim Brotherhood

The steps toward the Egyptian democratic transition started with the mass public protests against the Mubarak regime, the authoritarian regime which was lasting for more than 30 years. A series of protests to kick out Mubarak, however, did not from the first begin as anti-governmental revolution. It originally started in January 2011 as a resistance against the harsh repression of the Egyptian police to young activists, and the target of criticism by the protesters was security forces, not the president. Although they had known that the president and Egyptian security forces were inseparable, what I would claim here is that they did not demand the resignation of Mubarak; rather, they wanted to show opposition against the severe repression of police. That was the reason why the mobilizing force of used the phrase of “We Are All Khaled Said” on the Facebook webpage for propaganda, and why they chose the date of 25 January for their protest.³² Mohamed Adel, Executive Director of April 6 Movement, highlighted that the January 25 demonstration was intended to expose the ruling regime's repression and horrifying crimes against the Egyptian people especially with regard to Islamic law, disregard for human rights and plundering public funds.³³

Nevertheless, the size and range of the protest quickly grew, with tens of

³² Khaled Said was a young protester's name who was discovered dead after interrogation by Egyptian police. The trace of torture and violence was marked on his corpse. On the other hand, the date of January 25 was 25, a national holiday honoring the Egyptian police who battled the forces of the British occupation in 1952. (Wickham 2015, p.15)

³³ Ikhwanweb, “Politicians: January 25 Demonstration Is not a Prelude to National Uprising”, January 24, 2011

thousands people shouting for the resignation of Mubarak and the establishment of a new democratic government. The meaning of the civil protests quickly changed to the protesters themselves, the regime and all other actors in and out of Egypt. According to the interviews from several fields, any activists who organized the prior demonstrations had never expected that situation; they replied that they had anticipated the protest of January 25 would have no difference with the past experience, only tens or hundreds of people gathering and finally quelled by the security forces.³⁴ However, the size and level of the protests by far surpassed their expectation, and it quickly grew even more as time passed. In this process, the participants in the anti-governmental demonstration were not limited to the leading group with progressive and liberal ideology, incorporating the folks from various fields.

On January 28, three days after the beginning of the revolution, the Brotherhood leaders for the first time ordered its members to participate. On that day, which is later called as the “Day of Rage”, it was estimated that more than 100,000 Egyptians were drawn to the protests around the country by the Muslim Brotherhood.³⁵ From this point, the leading group of the Brotherhood became active both in mobilizing people and in supporting the protesters behind the scene – such as providing relief supplies and medical service to the protesters – using their well-organized traditional network. With a lot of members under a centralized control system, the Brotherhood members managed to direct the move of the

³⁴ Al-Saleh (2015), pp.52-83

³⁵ Tammam, Hossam and Haenni, Patrick, “Islam in the Insurrection”, Al-Ahram Weekly, no.1037, March 3-9, 2011

protesters to avoid the oppression by Egyptian police as long as possible, for the organization could surveil the area around Tahrir square and keep contacts among its members. In the regional area, the local offices and networks of the Muslim Brotherhood, the biggest opposition power of Egypt, worked effectively to expand the demonstration. While the leading group of the Brotherhood did not organize nor participate in the protests from the first, their activities during the protests were outstanding.

What is noticeable here is that the Brotherhood managed to form a coalition between different players with different ideas in the opposition sector in this extreme situation of a large scale of protests. The Brotherhood leaders refrained from using Islamist slogans or presenting its old aim of establishing Islamic state based on Sharia. They continuously stressed that the Brotherhood members were standing on the square as Egyptians, not as Islamists.³⁶ One mentioned that they sought to establish “a civil state and an Islamic democracy, where the people are the source of authority and sovereignty” through this public uprising.³⁷ On its official website, the Brotherhood continuously ensured that “the Egyptian protests are not an ‘Islamic’ uprising, but a mass protest against an unjust autocratic regime”.³⁸ While the core Islamist identity of the Muslim Brotherhood had never disappeared, they showed conformity to the bigger group and its ideas of democratic revolution of the movement.

³⁶ Wickham 2015, p.167

³⁷ International Crisis Report 2011, p.23

³⁸ “Egypt’s Revolution Is a People’s Revolution with No Islamic Agenda”, <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/>, February 5, 2011, translated in and quoted from Wickham 2015, p.168

As a result of the protests, President Mubarak announced official resignation and the authoritarian regime was collapsed. In this critical moment to establish a new democratic regime, the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the biggest and most organized opposition power than any other activist groups. While the young social networks such as Kefaya movement and April 6 Movement who led the organization of the January 25 revolution were all new, dispersed and lacking political experience³⁹, the Muslim Brotherhood had its firm organizational networks and sufficient popular awareness to earn the public support enough to get the political power. With this background, they actively put steps forward to enter the political realm of Egypt which was a sort of ‘power vacuum’ after the authoritarian president and his successor were suddenly gone. About 10 days after Mubarak’s resignation, the leading group of the Brotherhood announced foundation of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) which later achieved the legal status for a political party.

After reorganizing the constitution and establishing the rules to erect a new parliament (People’s Assembly, which means the lower house of the parliament), the public election to choose the parliament members was held from November 2011 to January 2012. It was the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party that emerged as the civil legislative power after that election,

³⁹ Actually these characteristics of the networks in the January 25 Revolution had positive effects to the success of the revolution. As they did not have strong political lines, it could be grow in size including various sectors, and the dispersed network without fixed organization or hierarchy made it possible to easily mobilized people. However, the same characteristics that worked during the protests were not as effective in the state politics, of which the basic frameworks and orders remained after the protest with the same powerful state and military actors.

accounting for 216 seats, 43.4% of the assembly.⁴⁰ What should be emphasized here is that the longstanding opposition power finally became able to earn the legitimate governing power by fair public election. Although there continuously existed regular election for the parliament and presidency during the 30-year reign of Mubarak, they were usually filled with election frauds – elimination of opponent candidates, ballot-rigging and other corruption cases during the campaign and counting, to list a few. On the contrary, the serial elections after the revolution showed different aspects. The candidates from more than 80 legal political parties could freely participate in the election without state repression, and several civil society organizations could watch the processes of collecting and counting the ballots.⁴¹ The situation was not much different in the case of presidential election in the following year. It is true though that there happened some incidents which could be called as state interruption before the election – such as disqualification of the Brotherhood candidate Khayrat al-Shatir for his previous conviction records by past authoritarian regimes and dissolution of the parliament just 2 days before the second round of the presidential election, both of which were led by the Security Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).⁴² Nonetheless, it was again the Muslim Brotherhood, not the candidate from military power, who won the presidential position. Mohammed Morsi from FJP gained the presidency through a justified,

⁴⁰ “Results of Egypt’s People’s Assembly Elections”, guide to Egypt’s Transition, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

⁴¹ “2012 Egyptian Parliamentary Elections”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 22, 2015

⁴² Roll 2016, p.29

democratic way of competitive election with the public votes.⁴³

From these political results, it seems that the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party did not have any problems in managing the democratic transition after the mass protests and revolution at first glance. The Brotherhood won serial public elections using democratic means and grasped the power of both legislation and administration. It seemed that the Egypt was at that time progressing to another system of Muslim democracy, while it had more ways to develop in a complete form. It was interpreted that the eagerness of Egyptian people to be free from authoritarianism and to pave the Muslim way of democracy was reflected in the popular support to the Brotherhood, which officially claimed the coalition of democracy and Islam. However, in opposition to these expectations, another round of public protests calling for Morsi's resignation occurred just 1 year after his inauguration. It was unveiled that the past political alliance that the Brotherhood had made with other political actors in the revolutionary days was already broken. What happened in the Egyptian politics in this short period after the nation-wide revolution? What caused the Brotherhood to suddenly rise as the political leader and to sink down again?

In this paper, I would suggest that the reason for this quick reverse of situation lies in the ideational factors of the Brotherhood and other actors. The

⁴³ It is actually the major reason to state that the FJP regime was the still the first step to democratic transition which was uncompleted by the military coup – it was the first one established by the fair and competitive public election relatively free from the state intervention, and that it did not resign by the same means of election but was forcefully kicked out by coup led by military. This view is also in line with that of Brownlee (2014). He claims that 'Egypt's transition was thwarted as its elected legislature and presidency were abrogated by agents of the state – the judiciary in the former case, the military in the latter.' Quoted from Brownlee, Jason et al. *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform*. Oxford University Press, USA, 2014. P.14

ideas of different players made them to perceive and interpret the situation differently, and in the political confusion, they could not keep consistency of their own ideas in dynamic interrelation with each other, operating as the catalysis for the quick political transitions after the revolution. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, its old identity of religious group directed the mainstream of the ideology running through the group when there were no political guidelines to follow; and this difference of the Brotherhood's ideas seemed to stand out in the eyes of many former opposition leaders when they had no common regime to oppose. It could be deduced that this underneath flow of the ideational changes after the January 25 Revolution in Egypt streamed down to the isolation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the public opinion against them, enabling mass protests and military coup to thwart the Brotherhood regime.

4.2. Ideational Factors of the Brotherhood Leading to its Failure

In this section, the ideational factors of the Brotherhood leaders which resulted in the mass protest against the Brotherhood regime and regime collapse are explained in detail. Those ideational factors listed here are divided into 3 categories – the resurgence of religious ideology, obsession to power struggle with military and obstinacy against its internal factions. They are not completely separated, but actually interrelated with each other. The reason I categorized the was to extract the

most outstanding and important issues of each ideas – they were representing the identity of the Muslim Brotherhood; they shaped the strategies not only of the Brotherhood but other political actors; and they had a determinant influence to the resulting fall of the Brotherhood regime.

4.2.1. Resurgence of the Religious Ideology of Islamist

4.2.1.1. Returning to religious identity in political realm

It is already mentioned in the former part that the Muslim Brotherhood during the protests restrained its longstanding Islamist identity. The leaders stressed that they were participating in the revolution for the Egyptian people and not for the purpose of their Islamic *da'wa* (means 'religious mission' in Arabic). However, as soon as the demonstrations were over and Mubarak was ousted, the Islamic identity and ideology of the Brotherhood re-emerged in the official announcement and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party of the Freedom and Justice Party.

The most instant case to show that the Brotherhood members brought the ideas of Islam and Muslim organization was the controversy around the first constitutional amendment in March 2011. After the revolution, constitutional amendment was proposed by the previous state actors (usually military generals in Security Council of Armed Forces and judges) and public referendum was held for the approval of it. The Brotherhood leaders wanted the constitution to be settled as

soon as possible for several reasons: first, they traditionally preferred stability to revolution, as shown in the non-participation in the protests from the beginning and in the argument for gradual changes; second, they did not judge that the current constitution of Egypt needed an overall reformation to develop a democratic system; and third, there was the calculation about political incentives that it would be favorable for them to finish the reformation process quickly, not giving enough time for the other opposition parties to be organized before the election. For those reasons, they sought for the ‘yes’ votes for the constitutional amendment. This was actually in opposition with those young, secular and liberal activist groups who led the January 25 revolution – they thought that to settle the constitution at that time was too early, and preferred to take time to build the actual revolutionary and democratic system.

When the Muslim Brotherhood propagated for the placet to the electorate, however, they started arguing that the vote against the constitution meant against Islam.⁴⁴ This is the way that they came up with their Islamic identity in the political realm. In the electoral voting offices, what the Brotherhood members urged to the voters was to opt for the green spot – and the color green is the symbolizing color of Islam, which meant ‘yes’ in the referendum. Using this symbols of religion, the Muslim Brotherhood told people that to mark the green color was to be in favor of Islam, and to mark the black color – which meant ‘no’ to the constitutional amendments – was to take the un-Islamic path.⁴⁵ The other opposition powers that were not dedicated to Islamist ideology started to cast

⁴⁴ Wickham 2015, p.171

⁴⁵ Tadros (2012), p.41

doubts about the ideas of the Brotherhood about the path that Egypt ought to take after the public revolution, as the demonstration itself did not break out with the religious commitment but with the eagerness for the democratic transition. At this time, they were wary of what the Brotherhood was really intended for, and some of them disagreed to the Brotherhood's stance to put the religious issue in the politics through improper means. The rather secular, liberal activists and civil groups actually held street demonstrations to criticize the Brotherhood for 'exploiting' their religion for political interest.⁴⁶ Some even called them as 'traders in religion', using religion for personal gain.⁴⁷

The same strategy of the Brotherhood to use Islam in political arena, however, was continued in the following parliamentary election from November 2011 to January 2012. They called for the unity of the true, dedicated Muslims to vote for the Freedom and Justice Party to realize the 'right' way of revolution. A candidate of the liberal Ghad party who were under the electoral list of the Democratic Alliance led by the Freedom and Justice Party described the Muslim Brotherhood rally like this:

"When the ones before me spoke, their entire message was about religion or how they're religious men. So I thought maybe they would need another voice, something else [as] this is a political rally [...] I picked up the mike and started talking about politics. I didn't get a single cheer. [...] It's like doing stand-up

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Monier and Ranko (2013), p.116

*comedy and nobody's laughing.*⁴⁸

This idea and strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood was actually successful to gain their aimed results. The constitution amendment was passed through the referendum with 77% of “yes” votes⁴⁹, and the Freedom and Justice Party became the single dominant party after the parliamentary election. At this time, the ideational coalition of Islam and democracy suggested by the Brotherhood for years was not repulsed by the majority of Egyptian public. The major population of Sunni Muslims in Egypt ordinarily did not want to import the secularism nor to discard their religion; rather, they had beliefs that the religion of Islam and political democracy could peacefully coexist when they expelled the authoritarian government. In addition, they not only accepted the correlation between religion and politics, but in reality, agreed that the politics should reflect the value of religion as the Islam builds the core identity of Egypt and Egyptian people. According to the public survey by the Pew Research Center in 2011, 62% of Egyptians replied that the laws should strictly follow the teachings of Quran, which means their support for sharia; 27% said it was not necessary for the laws to strictly follow Quran but should follow the values and principles of it, while only 5% answered that the laws should not be influenced by Quran.⁵⁰ This idea was in line with what the Muslim Brotherhood had proposed before the January 25 Revolution

⁴⁸ Interview of the author with Shadi Taha, November 20, 2011, quoted from Hamid 2014, p.18

⁴⁹ Brumberg (2014a) p.100

⁵⁰ Pew Research Center (2011), p.20

and the leading group of the Brotherhood was actually aware of this. With their success of religious strategies shown in the public ballots, they became confident that their idea to keep the religious identity and ideas in the politics of revolutionized Egypt was consistent with the preferences of the Egyptian majority.⁵¹

This resurgence of religious ideas in the Brotherhood after the revolution, however, caused severe criticisms from the more revolutionary, secular, and liberal activists. They were the original organizers of the protests from the past experience of democratization movement Kefaya, and started thinking that the Brotherhood group who became involved in the middle was surreptitiously hijacking the revolution for their own sake. The clear illustration of this changed perception toward the Muslim Brotherhood after thwarting the Mubarak regime is the newfound word of '*Ikhwanization*' (Brotherhoodization).⁵² The secular and liberal parties in the minority interpreted Brotherhood actions and appeal of the Islamist ideas as their willingness to monopolize the state and to drive the Egyptian politics into radical Islamization. The terminology of '*Ikhwanization*' was later spread out not only among the major political actors but also among the public who were wary of the Islamist way of power gathering shown in the cases of radical Islamist groups such as *Da'sh* (ISIS) or Al-Qaeda. Although it is true that most of the Egyptians were Sunni Muslims, it did not mean that the majority of the Egyptians supported the radical Islamists. In the same sense, the quick fall of the public support for the Brotherhood does not mean that the Egyptian public turned

⁵¹ Wickham (2011), p.207

⁵² The *Ikhwan* means Brotherhood in Arabic

radically secular in one day, throwing away their religion and becoming atheist.⁵³ They still supported the idea of coalition of Islam and democracy, but what they started to doubt was whether the Brotherhood was actually trying to do that, or to erect an Islamic authoritarian system instead of democracy. With this changed perception toward the Brotherhood, several factions of Egyptian public began to withdraw their support to the group, and the cleavage of different interpretation between the supporters and non-supporters emerged and deepened.

This resurgence of the original religious identity and ideas about politics of the Brotherhood deconstructed the temporary coalition against the authoritarian regime of Mubarak during the revolution. This is shown in the quick shrinking in membership of the ‘Democratic Alliance’ that the FJP formed in June 2011 with the smaller secular and liberal parties for the parliamentary election. Considering that only the strong Islamists were dominating the electoral lists, most of the secular parties officially left the ally even before the election started.⁵⁴ They started to perceive the Brotherhood as a different branch of group with incompatible ideas about how the Egyptian politics should develop after the revolution, and to put distance with the Muslim Brotherhood. This phenomenon means that the

⁵³ Actually the secularist in Egypt was not that secular considering the concept of secularism in Western culture. They did not argue that Egypt has to abandon Islam to be democratic; they were secular in that they insisted the separation of politics and religion. The separation, however, was not complete as even the most secular party of Egypt did not oppose to the constitutional provision which claims that sharia (Islamic law) is the primary source of the Egyptian constitution. They criticized the direct influence of religion to politics like radical Islamist of ISIS or Iranian theocratic system, but they did not deny that the religious identity and values were the basis of Egypt, including the political arena. It can be inferred here that the ordinary word we know could be being used with a different meaning in different context.

⁵⁴ “Democratic Alliance for Egypt”, Egyptian Election Watch, November 18, 2011, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/>, translated in and quoted from Wickham 2015, p.249

underneath ideological discords now floated to the surface as soon as their common enemy was gone. During the Mubarak era, the dominant cleavage was not between the religious and the secular, but between the authoritarian regime and those opposed to it.⁵⁵ As a consequence, the ideational and ideological differences at that time were not the main problem that the opposition powers were facing; rather, they had to and actually were able to form the common front of ‘opposition’ to their current authoritarian regime. On the contrary, after the regime to oppose was gone, the former partnership during the revolutionary period broke down and the differences in themselves functioned as the main cleavage to divide the Egyptian society. This ideational gap between the Muslim Brotherhood and other secular, liberal activists was widened, polarizing the supporters of each side. It later caused the formation of National Salvation Front (NSF) and Tamarrod (means ‘rebellion’ in Arabic) by the opposition powers toward the Brotherhood regime.⁵⁶

4.2.1.2. Islam-oriented idea about political democracy

What should be kept in mind here is that the resurgence of the Islamist identity of the Muslim Brotherhood did not actually mean that they completely turned into the radical Islamist as Salafist or IS (Islamic State, *Da'ish*) as the other activists were worried. The typical radical Islamist oppositionists in Egypt were

⁵⁵ Esposito and Shahin eds. (2013), p.488

⁵⁶ Housden (2013), p.72

called ‘Salafists’ as the word literally shows.⁵⁷ They demanded the narrow version of a “return” to the religious orthodoxy of the Egyptian society, and denied any “interpretation” (*ijthad*) of their holy texts in their current context.⁵⁸ As the way of Islam was complete in its original form, they argued that the words from Quran or Sunna (the records of sayings, actions, approvals and attributes of Prophet Muhammad) should be applied without amendments. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the contrary, did not officially insist this radical way of returning to Islam, even though they preached the Islamic values and tried to apply them in Egyptian politics. In many speeches and documents, the Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party supported democracy and claimed that the Islamic values were in harmony with democratic system through interpretation. It is true that both of the parties were categorized in a broad meaning of ‘Islamist power’, but the concrete ideas about religion and politics – both of which are critical when concerning the ideational factors of those political actors with religious identity – were different. In actual case of the parliamentary election in 2011, the Salafists’ party of Al-Nour (which means ‘light’ in Arabic) party organized its own electoral faction of “Islamic Alliance”, refusing to join the “Democratic Alliance” led by the Freedom and Justice Party of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood side also perceived the Salafists as a rival of the election, taking the votes from the conservative Muslims with excessively radical rhetoric of Islam. The leading group of the Muslim Brotherhood did not align with those Salafist arguments; on the contrary, they even

⁵⁷ The Arabic word *salaf* means forefather or predecessor. The salafists are those who argued to return to the traditional way of Islam, exactly as their “forefathers” of Islam did in old days.

⁵⁸ El Alaoui (2014) p.70, in Diamond and Plattner eds. (2014)

warned the Salafists to ‘tone down their harsh speech’, fearing that such negative Islamist rhetoric would hurt their ‘moderate’ Islamist approach during the election campaign period in October 2011.^{59 60}

Although the ideational cleavage emerged between the Islamists and non-Islamists after the thwart of Mubarak regime, among the Islamists did the differences exist. Although it was common for the Islamists to bring the Islam values to the political realm, the Brotherhood was more flexible in interpreting the religious doctrines and they mentioned that they would propel the democratic political system after they won power in many official speeches and documents. In the victory speech in Tahrir Square, June 29, 2012, President Mohammad Morsi from the Freedom and Justice Party spoke of the revolution like this:

“[...] let us remain steadfast, men of the revolution, boys and girls, men and women. I am one of you – that is how I was; I still am; and will always be. During the revolution, in this place, we used to say that the revolution is led by its own objectives. Well, the revolution continues to achieve its objectives. It is reshaping to reflect the free will the Egyptian people, with an elected president steering the ship home, leading this revolution, standing in front of patriotic

⁵⁹ Farag (2012), p.221

⁶⁰ The Salafists and the Brotherhood later forms alliance in the parliament after the election was over under the same identity Islamist. However, their ideational difference cause continuous conflicts between two parties and afterwards, the Salafist party of Al-Nour Party later breaks its coalition with the FJP. They criticized the Brotherhood not dedicated enough to Islamist mission, in the viewpoint of the traditional, orthodox Islamists activists. They later come to say that they would never form alliance with the Brotherhood for the reason of fundamental differences of doctrine, and join the National Salvation Front with secularists and liberalists to protests against the Brotherhood regime. (Elyan, Tamim, and al-Yamani, “Egypt’s Salafists Want no Pact with Muslim Brotherhood”, Reuters, December 4, 2011)

*revolutionaries, leading them on the path to full democracy, and doing all he can to achieve all the objectives of the great revolution. [...]*⁶¹

As shown in this speech, the Muslim Brotherhood did not completely discard the goals of the revolution and democracy while they were re-generating their Islamist identity in politics. Then, why the doubt and distrust toward the Brotherhood continued, followed by the dissolution of the coalition formed for the democratic revolution? What mattered was, I would argue, that the meaning of democracy that the Brotherhood leaders had was different with that of other revolutionary agents, and this difference caused the others to see the Brothers as radical Islamist not accepting democracy. Before and during the protests, democracy was identified with ‘freedom from the authoritarian regime’ under the suppression of a clearly ‘undemocratic’ government. This broad and vague concept of democracy, however, was not considered problematic at that time for it could include various ideational sectors all around the Egyptian society to make the revolution success, and the refinement of the concept was prolonged. When the ‘undemocratic’, authoritarian regime was gone and the new political actors were to erect a new democratic system, the issue of which kind of democracy they had aimed for was on debate. Although the former protesters, whether Islamist or not, were constantly shouting for democracy, the ‘democracy’ that the religious Muslim Brotherhood mentioned was different from what the others usually sought for; in the viewpoints of some, it was not democracy at all. As a result, the call of

⁶¹ Ikhwanweb, “President Mohamed Morsi’s Speech in Tahrir Square”, Friday June 29, 2012.

democracy by the Brotherhood sounded in vain, even as deceptive to the former protest partners.

Then what concept of the Muslim Brotherhood had about democracy, in relation to their resurging identity of religious, Islamist organization? The core characteristic of the concept for them was that the Muslim Brotherhood considered the political democracy and religious Islam not compatible, but indivisible. The call for democracy in Egypt was valid only on the basis of the Muslim majority, and if the majority was given the political right to decide the state affairs, when the democracy was realized in other words, it was natural in the Brotherhood's eye that Egypt inclined toward a more Islamist state. When the Egyptian people became free from the authoritarian regime and held democratic elections, the Islamist would hold power with a wide-ranging popular support.⁶² One of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders did not even presume that the Muslim majority of Egypt would vote for secular laws, which shows their underlying faith that introducing democracy in Egyptian politics should bring about more Islamic state as a matter of course.⁶³ In this sense, their interpretation of democracy is better to be depicted as only the sole politics 'of people', emphasizing the procedural aspects of democracy; and the democratic decision by the Muslims in Egyptian society should follow the lines of the holy texts, as their Allah guides his people. Therefore, the Brotherhood leaders thought that their reign and the application of Islam to politics were all natural because it was the very form of Egyptian democracy, where the majority

⁶² Monier and Ranko (2013), p.114

⁶³ Interview with Essam El-Erian by the author, Cairo, October 2001, quoted from Bayat, 2013, p. 219

Muslims of Egypt freely chose the Islam governance by themselves. This is why the Brotherhood leaders stated their election victory as a ‘gift’ that rewarded the group for its past sacrifices which came after their successive religious appeal in the campaign.⁶⁴ The form of Egyptian democracy, framed as a civil state with an Islamic reference, is described in the platform of the Freedom and Justice Party like this:

“It is the Ummah (religious community) where the people who have the right to elect the ruler through free popular will. The difference between an Islamic state and other states is the Islamic Shari’a reference which is based on the creed of the vast majority of the Egyptian people and the Shari’a is in its nature an addition to the worship and ethical dimensions which govern different elements of the life of the Muslims. It organizes them in general roles and comprehensive principles and then leaves the details to ijthad and legislation in accordance with what is suitable for every age and for different environments and with what achieves truth, justice.”⁶⁵

In this sense of democracy, the value and teaching of Islam is still above the popular will – the religious rule of sharia is the guideline of politics, and the majority Muslims should, and necessarily will, adopt that as basic values. This was what the leaders of the Brotherhood to write the party platform perceived as harmony of Islam and democracy.

⁶⁴ El-Sherif, 2014a, p.6

⁶⁵ Tadros (2012), p.54

As a result of this religion-oriented idea about democracy, there was little consideration in the leading group of the Muslim Brotherhood about democracy of social, cultural, liberal and plural meaning which a large proportion of the revolution participants were actually crying for. The lack of acceptance about the broad meaning of democracy is reflected in various announcements and documents of the Brotherhood. It was prohibited for the Brotherhood members to join any parties except FJP, even though the Freedom and Justice Party declared itself as “a civil party with an Islam frame of reference” in the party platform.⁶⁶ Moreover, women and non-Muslims were not allowed to run for the presidential election as the Egyptian democracy is only valid on the basis of the majority of male Muslims. Plus, although the FJP included Coptic Christians in its founding members, claiming that they party did not isolate non-Muslims, the conversion from Islam was still a taboo which was most harshly punished.⁶⁷ This clearly shows that the doctrines of the Brotherhood and its party were violating the very basic principles of political and religious freedom, which is the necessary condition for ‘democracy’ to the liberal and secular activists in Egypt. With these aspects shown in the Brotherhood’s statements and strategies, it was criticized by a substantial number of specialists and activists to only support the procedures of democracy without having internalized its core values, such as the principle of gender equality and endorsement of the full range of individual liberties guaranteed to the citizens in

⁶⁶ Eleiba, Ahmed. “Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Praises Egypt’s Revolution for Bringing about Fair Elections”, Al-Ahram Weekly, August 6, 2011.

⁶⁷ Wickham 2015, p.124

the Western democratic systems.⁶⁸ However, as the leaders of the Brotherhood was confident of their governance using Islam values in the political realm when they won the governing position of Egypt, they did not seriously consider these criticisms and were stuck with their own ideas.

In short, the Brotherhood leaders could only accept the democratic political system which could function on the ground of Sunni Muslim majority of the Egyptian public. This limited meaning of democracy as the ‘Muslim majoritarianism’ ignited resistance from the opposition groups of all sectors who could not agree to the concept of democracy that the Brotherhood regime suggested. They began to perceive the Muslim Brotherhood’s call for democracy futile, and concluded that the Brotherhood leaders were actually pursuing the radical form of Islamic state.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Wickham (2011), p.207

⁶⁹ While I stated that the religious identity and ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood caused criticism from other oppositional sectors, it does not necessarily mean that the Brotherhood leading groups should discard the Islamist identity at all. They could have developed an alternative way of combining liberal democracy and traditional Islam which could satisfy both the liberalists and Islamists, securing their regime until the next election comes. That kind of efforts has already been put for several decades, both in academic and political arenas in many Arab countries. However, intoxicated with victory and wrong interpretation of the election results, and later busy with power struggle against the military, the leading group of the Brotherhood was negligent in developing the new alternative form of Islamic democracy.

4.2.2. Obsession to Power Struggle with the Military

4.2.2.1. Political conflict with the state military officers

The next ideational change of the Muslim Brotherhood was its rivalry and enmity with military, represented as the Security Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). After the collapse of Mubarak regime, they began to perceive each other as hijacking the revolution for their own sake, and competed for the limited political power. The problem of these processes was that, in competition with SCAF, the Brotherhood leaders only sought to earn the ‘realpolitik’ power, falling short of justification for their actions and of forming political coalition because of their ideational limitations. This also reflects the lack of political experience of the Brotherhood for being the opposition power for a long time, and consequential shortcomings in their understanding about political strategy.

The relationship between the Brotherhood and SCAF was actually not that bad during the first phase of the transition; rather, they actually shared the same interest about managing the political confusion after the revolution and running the new parliament. On February 6, five days before the resignation of President Mubarak, the Vice President Omar Suleiman convened opposition leaders of the protests to make a political compromise between the two sides, pre-supposing that Mubarak would remain in the president position. And the leading group of the Brotherhood was one among the few who participated in this negotiation with the

government and military officers of Mubarak regime.⁷⁰ The other sectors of the protesters, usually from the April 6 Movement or Kefaya, refused to accept any compromise with the Mubarak regime. Their requirement was the only one – to kick out the dictatorship of President Mubarak and his son – and they thought that this could be achieved by no other means than the revolution. On the contrary, the leaders of the Brotherhood preferred gradual changes – it was best for them to gradually reform the authoritarian government to democracy without the revolution of all at once. What they had in mind was to gradually end the Mubarak regime (without succession of reign to his son) and the opposition powers including themselves to participate in the process of improving the Egyptian politics toward a more democratic one. This was seemingly in accordance with the aims of the military, most of whom were positioned in the state offices with a dominant political, administrative, and economic influence. They wanted to keep their power after the Mubarak regime was gone and their political activities for this purpose were mainly led by the SCAF.

The coordination between the SCAF and the Brotherhood continued for a short time after the resignation, in the issue of the constitutional amendments. As the SCAF was given the role by the Vice President Omar Suleiman in the official announcement of Mubarak's resignation, the SCAF members started the political reform of Egypt – they dissolved the parliament which was dominated by the National Democratic Party, the party of Mubarak, and set the amendments of the constitution. What they proposed was to settle the constitution first to enable the

⁷⁰ Wickham 2015, p.170

parliamentary election based on the secure rule of law. The faction of liberal, progressive protesters, however, argued that it was not democratic for the military to amend the constitution and that the parliamentary members who would be elected via public votes should have the right to do it.⁷¹ It was the Muslim Brotherhood, as mentioned before, that actively supported the position of the SCAF to pass the constitution quickly and proceed to the parliamentary election. This reflected the same preference of those two actors and their cooperative relationship shaped the early transitional scene of the Egyptian politics after the revolution.

Yet, the situation changed with the parliamentary election coming. In the days of revolution, the security forces tried to differentiate themselves with the Mubarak regime and formed coalition with the civil actors; among them, the Muslim Brotherhood who was less revolutionary to prefer gradual changes was the best option for SCAF. As time passed, however, both actors became keen to perceive the political opportunity, or in other words, ‘power vacuum’ appearing in the Egyptian politics. In a competition to grab the limited power with the chance to be free from the suppression from the regime, their perception toward each other became increasingly deteriorated. The leaders of the Brotherhood and FJP started to consider the military as the biggest political enemy rather than other parties, assuming the military as the legacy of the past authoritarian regime. On the other hand, the military interpreted the Brotherhood as entering the political arena with

⁷¹ Their argument was not completely neglected though. After the parliamentary was composed in March 2012 through the public election, they were called to form the constituent council and to begin another round of constitutional amendments, which would be mentioned below.

eager for dominating the political power, planning to build up the Islamist authoritarian state. They both considered themselves as the only legitimate leader of post-revolutionary Egypt, and the other as hijacking the revolution for its own interest.

To begin with the strategies and actions of SCAF to contain and even to increase its political power, the clear example would be the Selmi Document. As the date of parliamentary election was being delayed, SCAF maintained the authority to rule Egypt given from the former vice president, contemplating the situation that the Brotherhood was recalling their Islamist identity an ideology to earn the popular support. The SCAF members, as the other factions of the protesters, were also wary of the Islamist domination in politics, in which they considered that they would be excluded for not being Islamist. In this circumstance, the security officers sought to maintain its interests related to the governance of the state, and this idea was presented in the document usually called the Selmi Document. Announced by the Deputy Prime Minister Ali Al-Selmi, the document included two articles which clearly gave substantial political power to the military – one, the SCAF, not the parliament, would be the only authority responsible for military budget and expenditures; two, the armed forces would be the guarantors of the constitutional order.⁷² Although the document became invalidated by the parliamentary members after the election was over, this was significant in two meanings – first, it was an obvious instance to show the longing for power of SCAF; and second, the other actors, especially the Brotherhood, became aware of

⁷² Awad 2013, p.285

that.

The influence of the military officers continued after the parliament was established. Concerning the constitutional amendment, it influenced the process of organizing the ratio of each party in the Constituent assembly and it later rebuffed the constitutional declaration by the parliament, arguing that the right for it should be reserved to the legitimate president. It also dominated the administrative government and the cabinet, which was far to overwhelm the power of the FJP-led parliament.⁷³ Moreover, they made use of the longstanding relations with the judiciary from the authoritarian era to form their own alliance against the Brotherhood and to prevent *Ikhwanization* in the Egyptian politics. That alliance of the military and judiciary had the biggest influence in organizing and holding the presidential election from 2012. The Supreme Presidential Election Committee (SPEC), which was responsible for the overall phases of managing the election processes, was composed of SCAF-appointed judges and disqualified the Brotherhood candidate Khayrat al-Shatir for his previous conviction records by past regimes. After the first round of the presidential election, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), the group of judges with a substantial political influence, ruled part of the laws of the last parliamentary election was unconstitutional, therefore judging the election results invalid. With this cooperation of the judiciary, SCAF dissolved the parliament just 2 days before the second round of the presidential election.⁷⁴ This action stemmed from the military's perceived threat because it was Muhammad Morsi from FJP who took

⁷³ Wickham 2015, p.254

⁷⁴ Roll 2016, p.29

the winning position on the first round, defeating the candidate whom the military supported. To invalidate the parliament led by the Brotherhood was, therefore, intended by the SCAF and judiciary to bar the Islamist influence in the state affairs even if the election result would give the executive authority to the Islamists. The efforts of SCAF to block the Brotherhood even went further during the second round of the presidential election period. The SCAF announced supplementary articles to the constitution, claiming its increased authority over the issues of national defense and constitutional amendments – the SCAF, not the president, was absolutely accountable for controlling security issues including all tasks of Ministry of Defense; SCAF and the judiciary council had veto powers to any provisions of the constitution built by parliament and constituent committee; and if the committee failed to reach agreement about constitutional reforms until the deadline set by SCAF, the SCAF could organize a new committee for that task.⁷⁵ Anticipating Morsi’s victory in the election, the SCAF with its partner of judiciary officials tried to retain its power as the governing players of the Egyptian state.

4.2.2.2. Failure of the Brotherhood’s political strategy

According to the trajectories that SCAF had taken after the revolution, it is true that not all the actions of the SCAF could be democratically justified. It

⁷⁵ “Media Brief Update” of June 18, 2012, Carter Center, quoted from Wickham 2015, p.261

exerted power in judiciary and legislation⁷⁶, invading the rules of the power separation, and sometimes exercised the political right which was originally given to the president.⁷⁷ Plus, it could not be denied that most of the officers in SCAF were actually maintaining the power that was given by the previous authoritarian regimes. In this sense, the leading group of the Muslim Brotherhood interpreted the action of SCAF as the “deep state” was back in power. They considered the army as the same repressive power as the past Mubarak regime, eager to keep their position, and thought that the military would not yield the authority to the Brotherhood in spite they were legitimately elected by Egyptian people. Those ideas were reflected in their continuous argument that the SCAF in the administrative board was against the revolution, and that the military had to ‘handover’ its power to legitimate civil actors.⁷⁸

However, the Muslim Brotherhood was short of spreading this idea in the Egyptian society and justifying their actions to oppose the military power. The leaders of the Brotherhood thought that now they were the only legitimate power of the state and the SCAF was despoiling the political authority through unjust means succeeding from the old regimes, but they could not break the widespread frame of *Ikhwanization*. It was only their loyal supporters who agreed to the point that the

⁷⁶ The SCAF established the election control tower of Higher Electoral Commission (HEC), composed of judges and state officials. The framework of the election – when to hold the elections in certain districts, how to divide the number of the members elected by PR or simple majority rules and so on – was mainly directed by SCAF.

⁷⁷ SCAF appointed 10 parliamentary members on its own. (“Preliminary Report on All Three Phases of the People’s Assembly Elections”, Carter Center Election Witnessing Mission, Egypt 2011/2012 Parliamentary Elections, January 24, 2012)

⁷⁸ Ikhwanweb, “In Exclusive Interview With Al-Jazeera, Al-Shater: Egyptians Will Defend Their Revolution If SCAF Doesn’t Handover Power”, October 24, 2011; Ikhwanweb, “FJP: We Reject Selmi Principles and Insist on a Constitution for all Egyptians”, October 31, 2011

Brotherhood made, and the bigger portion of political actors and Egyptian public were wary of the Islamist domination of power, perceiving the military as a legitimate power to constrain the Islamists. This flow of ideas could be probed from the strategies of the Brotherhood in the political realm and how those actions were interpreted. In short, it was the self-mate of the Brotherhood to yearn for the ‘realpolitik’ power to fight against SCAF.

The typical example of their strategy to gain the power sources was the Brotherhood’s decision to run for the presidential election. As the SCAF had the governing power in the administrative office, and was overwhelming the power of the parliament where the FJP was the majority party, the Brotherhood leaders decided to get the reign by erecting a Brotherhood president. Muhammad Morsi, the leader of the FJP and later became the presidential candidate, answered to the interview about that decision like this:

*“We have witnessed obstacles standing in the way of parliament to take decisions to achieve the demands of the revolution. [...] We have therefore chosen the path of the presidency not because we are greedy for power but because we have a majority in parliament which is unable to fulfill its duties in parliament.”*⁷⁹

In addition, it could be noticed that in the Brotherhood was the feeling of being threatened by the containment actions of SCAF. While they were seemingly in competition for the political influence, both of them interpreted the situation as a

⁷⁹ Awad and El Madani, “In U-turn, Egypt’s Brotherhood names presidential candidate”, Reuters, March 31, 2012

matter of survival: if they were to be defeated in this power struggle, there would be no place for them in Egypt. This was why the Brotherhood harshly reacted to any attempt of SCAF to enter the realm of the Egyptian parliament, which the Brotherhood leaders considered as their final position. Muhammad Badi, the Brotherhood's Supreme Guide, declared in March 2012 that there were those who threaten to call for the dissolution of the parliament, pointing the military officers in the government.⁸⁰ To secure its position in the parliament, the leaders of the Brotherhood determined to take the power in the government through the presidency and fielded their candidate from the Freedom and Justice Party.

Yet, the problem was that to run a candidate for the presidency, the Brotherhood had to renege its earlier pledge not to seek the presidency. As the leading group of the Brotherhood was also aware of the concerns of their political participation and of the *Ikhwanization*, they had made a promise to Egyptian public not to seek a majority in parliament or to field a presidential candidate just after the revolution.⁸¹ Nonetheless, the Freedom and Justice Party from the Muslim Brotherhood became the single majority party in the parliament, and with the Salafist party taking around a quarter, the worries of the Islamist domination was heightened. In this situation, the leaders of the Brotherhood continuously emphasized that they would never run for the presidential election, even ejecting a popular activist who proposed the presidential candidacy, to eradicate the threat of *Ikhwanization* and to deny that they did not desire the domination of power. In the end, however, the same governing board of the Brotherhood and FJP reversed its

⁸⁰ Brownlee et al. 2014, p.116

⁸¹ Pargeter (2013), p.221

decision again to secure its position. Although the Brotherhood, as mentioned above, justified that it was in order to protect the legitimate authority, the others political actors and Egyptian public were not persuaded enough. The strategy of the Brotherhood was considered as a mere flip-flopping by other political actors who were already concerned about the threat of Ikhwanization in the Egyptian politics. While the Brotherhood still managed to win the election, the difference between two candidates was marginal, with only 3.4% in the second round of the presidential election;⁸² and in the first round the Brotherhood gained less than a quarter, and all the other outstanding candidates of the second, third, and fourth position were non-Islamist.

Furthermore, this power strategy of the Brotherhood continued even after the inauguration of president Morsi. He immediately stepped in the power competition with SCAF and the first thing he did was to nullify the previous dissolution of parliament by SCAF. In the presidential decree announced on July 8, he declared himself as the guardian of the people's will and on behalf of that, he reinstated the parliament. On August 12, 2012, Morsi implemented a large scale of replacement in the military office. The high senior officers in the Egyptian army, navy and air force, including the Minister of Defense Mohammad Hussein Tantawi, were replaced by younger commanders. Plus, he nullified the supplemented articles by the SCAF in June, which granted a decisive power to SCAF.⁸³ Three month later, Morsi released another presidential decree which positioned himself above

⁸² Morsi finally gained 51.7% of votes, while Shafiq 48.3%. (Wickham 2013, p.264)

⁸³ Fahim, Kareem, "In Upheaval for Egypt, Morsi Forces Out Military Chiefs", New York Times, August 12, 2012

the laws, in order to prevent the interruption from the judiciary in the process of amending constitution.⁸⁴ This action of the president was to detain the influence of the judiciary directly connected to the SCAF in the political arena, but he failed to stretch his claim for legitimacy to a wider public.⁸⁵ It seemed to many as an undeniable power monopoly by the Islamists because the Brotherhood was trying to control the jurisdiction even though they were capturing the power of two main bridges of the state's affairs, the legal and the administrative. In their viewpoints, it was the Islamists domination of the whole governance and violation of the democratic principle of the power separation. The parliamentary members from the FJP relentlessly argued that they were actually powerless in their legal offices because of the SCAF's intervention, but their voices were only heard to a handful of the Brotherhood's loyal supporters. This was followed by the perception of many Egyptians that Morsi was not a president for all Egyptians but only for the Brotherhood.⁸⁶

During this power struggle between the two, it could be inferred that the SCAF was more experienced with the political strategy to secure its position. They knew how to appeal to other factions of political actors to spread their ideas, using the values of democracy that the ordinary Egyptians believed. In the conflict with President Morsi, what they highlighted was that the legitimacy of judiciary was improperly interrupted by the new president. Their strategy to emphasize the

⁸⁴ Hubbard and Kirkpatrick, "Sudden Improvements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi." *New York Times*, July 10, 2013

⁸⁵ Al-Awadi (2013), p.546

⁸⁶ Al-Anani (2015), p.538

violation of democracy by the Brotherhood regime enabled them to make coalition with other political actors with shared threat of *Ikhwanization*. As a result, an opposition power to control the Brotherhood was organized with the coalition of SCC, the State Council, the Judges Club, and the lawyers' syndicate, which later developed as the anti-Brotherhood movement.⁸⁷

On the other hand, the military officers were quick in justifying their political actions in relation to the meaning of the revolution perceived by the protesters. It was reported that the main narrative of the SCAF's public statements in the transitional period was based on the idea that the army was the protector of the revolution; hence, it was a partner of the people.⁸⁸ When the military was ordered to stop the protesters from Mubarak during the periods of harsh protests, they refused to follow the order of suppressing the civilians with violence. It was depicted in many reports and articles that on the protesting squares, the soldiers and the protesters were "exchanging smiles and embraces, proffering cigarettes, offering sweets, posing for photos, and dressing their children in army fatigues when taking them to protests".⁸⁹ At the end of January, the spokesman from SCAF officially announced that they would not be against the civil protesters and mentioned the protest as "legitimate demands" of the people.⁹⁰ In this serial events, the military confirmed that it had a different stance with the political governors including Mubarak and that they were rather standing at the side of the people,

⁸⁷ Esam El-Din, Gamal, "Inching Towards a Showdown?", Al-Ahram Weekly, July 12-18, 2012, no.1106, translated in and quoted from Wickham 2015, p.267

⁸⁸⁸⁸ Said (2012), p.424

⁸⁹ International Crisis Group Report, 2011, p.6, quoted from Wickham 2013, p.164

⁹⁰ Wickham 2013, p.164

protecting and seeking for the value of democracy and civil state that the activists were calling for. Based on this sidelining, the military could maintain the historical confidence from the public. The military had been considered as the warrior to fight against the British colonial power and according to the Pew Research result done recently, the military remained the position of the most trusted organization in the government even after the 2011 revolution with an outstanding credibility of over 90%. This is sharply contrasted with that of the Muslim Brotherhood, of which credibility from the Egyptian public keeps decreasing from 2011.⁹¹ It was also reported that “many secular and Christian Egyptians, even those who participated in the revolution, have come to see the military as a guarantor against Islamist excess, a role the military has claimed for itself”.⁹² As seen in this situation, the SCAF managed to secure its position as the legitimate successor of the revolution with forming a knit alliance with other political powers; and on the contrary, the Brotherhood was rather framed as a radical Islamist, monopolizing power that was trying to hijack the democratization revolution.

I would not claim that only the Muslim Brotherhood was a victim to be unfairly criticized by the intrigue of SCAF. Both parties of the Brotherhood and the military had the various aspects of democracy and non-democracy in their words, movements and strategies, and neither was completely democratic in seeking for what they thought as legitimate. There were also conflict, hostility and violence in these phases of rivalry. However, while the Brotherhood leaders were obsessed to

⁹¹ Pew Reserch Cetner, 2013

⁹² Nordland, Rod. “Egypt’s Islamists Tread Lightly, but Skeptics Squirm”, New York Times, July 28, 2012.

secure its governing position with gaining more and more sources of real power, from legislation, administration and to judiciary, the SCAF was carefully building the ground to justify its political actions in order to bar the Islamization by the Brotherhood's monopoly. The Brotherhood, it could be argued, was rather confined in their own ideas about democracy and religion, hindering the efforts to compromise with other players thinking differently. This failure of political strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood after they entered the arena of political competition was led to the loss of public support for the Brotherhood and resulted in the isolation in Egyptian politics.

4.2.3. Obstinacy against Internal Factions of the Brotherhood

4.2.3.1. Defection of the youth factions from the Brotherhood

Last but not least, the ideational changes of the Muslim Brotherhood originated the defections of its various internal factions. As the Brotherhood is the biggest social oppositional organization in Egypt, it contained a lot of factions with different ideas. Although they were united under the ideology of Islam, the ideational differences among the members floated over the surface as the Brotherhood officially entered the political realm. However, the leading group lacked the ability to accommodate those different ideas and fell to obstinacy of conservatism.

With the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a religious organization,

it contained a variety of different ideas about other sectors – economy, politics, foreign affairs⁹³, and so on. Therefore, they officially stood in ambiguity concerning a lot of important issues in Egypt. This was the reason that the Muslim Brotherhood was sometimes called as an umbrella organization, including a variety of opinions, objectives and ideologies.⁹⁴ This characteristic of ambiguity actually functioned as a source of the Brotherhood power, as it could embrace different groups of people from old, rural farmers to young, liberal, educated students. The leading group of the Brotherhood kept its religious solidarity with internal education and preaches of Islam, fostering the inner socialization among the different members with the commonality of religion. This worked effectively in January 25 Revolution, as seen in the scale of the mobilization led by the Brotherhood.

However, the problems from the differences of inner ideas appeared after the leading group of the Brotherhood established the Freedom and Justice Party and entered the political arena as the biggest opposition power. For the party to restrain the political and social freedom as mentioned before – prohibiting the members from joining other political parties except the FJP, limiting some sorts of political participation of non-Muslims and women and so on – the youth group (*shabab*) of the Brotherhood was the first to oppose to the leading group. They were in their 20s and 30s, tech-savvy and educated, living in urban areas, and usually taking important roles in the revolution before the Muslim Brotherhood

⁹³ The exceptional case is the affairs of Israel and Palestine. As other Islamist groups, it maintained hostility to Israel for decades.

⁹⁴ Wickham (2015), p.285

officially announced participation. They were ideologically more close to other liberal, progressive opposition sectors with the common experience of active movement in the protests from several years ago, which started with the Kefaya movement of democratic demonstrations. As a result, they soon turned against the passive attitude of the leaders toward the state reformation in the Egyptian politics and traditional decision-making processes that could not reflect their ideas. One young activist in the Brotherhood compliant that “We want root change. By contrast, the Brotherhood wants stability”.⁹⁵ Their call for revolution to democracy was much stronger, and the movement of the Brotherhood leaders afterwards did not meet their expectation.

The young members actually had claimed the changes of the ideological and religious doctrines in the Brotherhood before the January 25 Revolution in 2011, as they began to be engaged in the other democratization movements like Kefaya and April 6. Although they remained in the Brotherhood until the Mubarak regime collapsed, their dissatisfaction to the leading group had been compiling. On the early days of the January 25 Revolution, when the Muslim Brotherhood was not officially participating, the young activists had already refused to follow the order by the Guidance Bureau, which was one of the most serious violation of the Brotherhood rules. The leading group of the Guidance Bureau was actually composed of the seniors, with a long membership of the group, and the virtue of obedience to the seniors was emphasized as an Islamic value in teachings by the Brotherhood leaders. Nevertheless, the youth groups of the Brotherhood joined the

⁹⁵ Shukrallah, Salma, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Struggles to Contain Cracks”, July 19, 2011

January 25 Revolution from the first, disobeying the order from the leading group to leave the Tahrir Square and following their own judgment of the situation and beliefs. They later claimed that they did not regret their actions of defiance, and that they still believed that had they followed the instructions of the Guidance Bureau, Mubarak would still be in power today.⁹⁶

After the revolution was over with the thwart of Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood announced the politicization to establish a party, the young Brotherhood members found that their arguments were being marginalized in the group's decision-making.⁹⁷ It was mostly shown in the processes of developing the party platform for the Freedom and Justice Party. The Brotherhood had previously published the draft for the party platform in 2007, and that was criticized from the younger members as it contained the restrictions of political freedom and pluralism that they supported. Moreover, the processes to write the platform were dominated by the senior members in the governing Guidance Bureau, without going through enough debates and consultation among the various factions in the Brotherhood. In the party platform printed out in 2011, however, had the same limitations with that of 2007 and it was also the same that the youth factions could not take part in the processes of writing it.⁹⁸ What was the most annoying to them was that it was prohibited for them to join any other parties than FJP even though they could not agree to the platform and political positions that the FJP had taken. In this situation, a lot of youth activists defected the Muslim Brotherhood and made coalitions with

⁹⁶ Tadros (2012), p.38

⁹⁷ Milton-Edwards (2016), p.38

⁹⁸ Wickham 2013, p.124

other sectors, sometimes willingly and sometimes not.

After the defection of the younger members of the Brotherhood, a lot of new parties were found by them in coalition with the other activists who cooperated before and during the protests. Some defection was made voluntarily, and some was forced by the leading group for their disobedience to or expression of discontents about the decision that the leaders of the Brotherhood made. The new parties established by the defected youth from the Brotherhood were the Renaissance (*Nahada*) Party, the Justice (*Adl*) Party, and the Egyptian Current (*Al-Tayyar al-Misri*) Party, to name a few. Departing from the group of the Brotherhood, the founders of those parties claimed to be more liberal and to support the democratic reform, not bounded by the value of Islam. According to the interview with the founding members of the Justice Party, led by a young, ex-Brotherhood member who was an active blogger during the procedures of April 6 and January 25 Revolution, the party claimed to be at the center between the liberal and religious forces of the Egyptian political scene. The difference with the Brotherhood and FJP could be noticed in their support for the equal rights to all civilians in Egypt. Ahmed Shokyr, a founding member of the Justice Party answered to the newspaper (*Al-Masry al-Youm*) interview about the party ideology like this:

“We support a civil state with respect to the important role religion plays in the Egyptian society but completely reject the flagrant religious interference in politics. [... The] party supports and encourages women to enter the presidential

race, [as] more than half of the party's members are women."⁹⁹

In addition, the Egyptian Current Party, formed with coalition of young Brotherhood defectors and activists outside the group¹⁰⁰, emphasized their identity as an Egyptian civil party than the party for the Muslim Brotherhood youth. Not all of its founding fathers were from the Brotherhood, and further, they did not mention the *sharia* as its frame of reference in their manifesto. The party members declared that because it was not an Islamist party, it would be improper to refer to the Islamic *sharia*.¹⁰¹ This was a big leap from the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for even the former Brotherhood members turned to the most secular perspective about the Egyptian politics after the protests.

Another big inner faction than the youth groups [*shabab*] of the Muslim Brotherhood also showed a substantial size of defection – it was the faction called Reformists. They were not in their youth, but usually in the middle ages. They were the most active members in politics during 1970s and 80s, participating in elections and various professional's syndicates with a rich experience in various field of politics with a high popularity. Although some of the Reformists had already left the group and established their own political party of Wasat (means 'center' in Arabic) party at the end of the 20th century – which would be analyzed in detail in later part of this paper – the collapse of Mubarak regime and politicization of the

⁹⁹ Khazbak, Ranan, "Adl Party Seeks to Displace Brotherhood from Center Ground of Egyptian Politics", Egypt Independent, May 24, 2011.

¹⁰⁰ Wickham 2015, p.180

¹⁰¹ Farag (2012), p.219

whole Brotherhood group caused another round of separation in the Brotherhood. The biggest event in these serial defections was the expulsion of Abdel Moneim Abul Futouh, a remarked activist of the reformist sector. He was the one who declared in 2011 that he was considering running for the president candidate, which was against the official standpoint of the Brotherhood that the group would not aim for winning the presidential position. He mentioned that attempting for the presidency was one of his “duty to the youth of the revolution” and that he would enlist as an independent candidate because he would “represent Egypt, not the Brotherhood”.¹⁰² In his statement, it can be inferred that his perception of the revolution and politics was quite different with that of the leaders in the Brotherhood.

4.2.3.2. Consolidation of conservatism by the Brotherhood leaders

When this kind of ideational splits was floating over the group of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, the leaders did not attempt to coordinate the difference of ideas and ideologies that the inner factions of the group had. As mentioned earlier, the leading board kept on delivering the peremptory orders to the youth group during the period of the popular demonstrations, and punished those of defiance with the means of expulsion. The decision of the whole group was kept in secrecy with only a limited number of the senior leaders and no

¹⁰² Wickham (2015), p.93

objection was admitted when the decision was handed down. The young leaders who took the main role in directing the youth members of the Brotherhood in January 25 Revolution were forced to resign from the leading position in the group. When Abul Futouh declared that he was considering running the presidential election, one of the leading figure of the Muslim Brotherhood strictly warned that he would “pay the price for what he said,”¹⁰³ and about one month later, the Shura Council of the Brotherhood – the top decision making body composed of old guard leaders – imposed his expulsion for not following the principle of the Freedom and Justice Party.¹⁰⁴ This caused further leaves of the younger Brotherhood members who were supporting Abul Futouh and the Reformist wings of the Brotherhood.

This serial defection of younger and reformist members from the Brotherhood, in the end, contributed to the ideational consolidation of the whole group because those remaining in the group were only whom agreed to the ideology of the leaders without objection. There were still a few voices calling for the internal reform of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the dynamic interactions between the inner factions of the group actually shrank after the protests and the Brotherhood’s entrance to the political realm. As a result of the lack of inner dynamics and varieties, the ideational position of the Muslim Brotherhood was determined by those senior ruling group. In this visible declining of the membership, however, the leaders of the Brotherhood became more centered on strengthening the internal unity of the group. They perceived the inner factions that

¹⁰³ El Waziry, Hany and Ramzy, Mahoud, “Muslim Brotherhood Member Mulls Running for Presidency”, Egypt Independent, April 5, 2011

¹⁰⁴ Wickham 2015, p.180

were critical to the decision or ideas of the group as spoiling the harmony and solidarity of the Brotherhood, giving a bad impression about the Islam itself as the value of completeness and harmony was emphasized in its holy texts. As the leaders cling to the meaning of the Islam, they preferred to remain its original identity of a religious group even after it established the political party. They owned their original concept of democracy in relation to Islam, and those ideas and identity were their uniqueness to differentiate themselves with other political actors. This is why they preferred to kick out the members critical to the decision by the leading group than to embrace them by reformation of their ideas – it was a sort of purification to maintain the Brotherhood’s identity and unity. Plus, the leading group of the Brotherhood was short of perceiving this situation of defection as a threat to the whole group. They were still able to earn the major support from the public, and the liberal parties established by their past-defectors could not get sufficient results in the parliamentary election. This outcome gave the Brotherhood leaders confidence that they were qualified and eligible for the political dominance even after the defection of the young and liberal members. It was analyzed that the leading groups of the Brotherhood became oblivious to discontents, interpreting the popular mandate as a universal approval from the whole Egyptian society.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, the domination of conservative senior leaders of the Brotherhood with lack of internal transformative attempts later resulted in the ideational and political isolation of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party.

The consequence of this obstinacy against internal factions and defection

¹⁰⁵ Milton-Edwards (2016), p.48

of the related activists is shown in the changes between two elections – the parliamentary election from November 2011 and the presidential election in the following year. As the Brotherhood and FJP stood in line with the protesters with a great mobilizing power and relief supplies, the public showed hospitality for their politicization, as seen in the results of parliamentary election. However, with the broken political allies and defected sectors, the Egyptian people with different ideas and ideologies now came to find it easier to opt for political alternatives meeting their own needs.¹⁰⁶ While the Brotherhood leaders were still in confusion with the concept of democracy and their position in politics, the activists with more political experiences and clear political ideology could suggest various choices of different political ideas. It is observed that in the first round of the presidential election in March 2012, all four notable candidates gained similar percentage of votes – Morsi of the Brotherhood 24.7%, Shafiq in the military sector 23.6%, Hamdeen Sabahi, a secular Nasserist, 20.7% and Abul Futouh, the liberal activist expelled from the Brotherhood, 17.4%.¹⁰⁷ What can be inferred from here is that around 40% of the Egyptian electorate chose the candidates who were different with the Islamist and the former regime. As mentioned above, Abul Futouh suggested a more liberal and open concept of the democracy as the leading activists of the January protests, and Sabahi claimed the reformation of Egyptian politics with the Arab nationalism which was first raised by the previous president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This shows how the perception of the Egyptians toward the

¹⁰⁶ Esposito and Shahin eds. (2013), p.496

¹⁰⁷ “Morsi, Shafiq officially in Egypt's presidential elections runoffs”, Ahram Online, 28 May 2012

politics and political actors changed. In the parliamentary election, the Muslim Brotherhood could emerge as the majority party for they were considered as representing the revolutionary power, as seen in the leading role of the Freedom and Justice Party in the Democratic Alliance during the election campaign. In later days, however, the Egyptian people became aware of the fact that they could vote for others who were representing alternative solutions to the revolutionized Egypt with the serial defection and expulsion of activists from the Brotherhood.

There were attempts in the Muslim Brotherhood to reform the Islam-oriented concept of political democracy suggested by younger and reformist members of the group. However, their voices were deprived of the chances to be reflected in the political activities of the Brotherhood by the senior conservative leaders, and the ideology of the group became more consolidated. The leaders emphasized internal unity of the group with the common identity and ideas of Islam, and the defectors managed to organize their own power as more and more time passed. The public support for the Muslim Brotherhood which suddenly flew in after the revolution was gradually flushed away with this courses of defection and ideational consolidation.

4.3. Tamarrod and the End of the Brotherhood Regime

The ideational changes in the Muslim Brotherhood during the transition period led to the loss of support for the Brotherhood and its political isolation,

giving rise to the organized opposition movement against the Brotherhood and FJP regime. When President Morsi announced the decree to put the president authority over the laws in November 2011, as mentioned in the previous part, the liberalists, nationalists (Nasserists) and the progressive leftists were all gathered to form the National Salvation Front (NSF).¹⁰⁸ However, the Brotherhood leaders could not perceive this movement as a serious threat. They had confidence in public support from the two election victories, and the internally consolidated with their conservative Islamist ideologies. It was unimaginable for them that the Muslim public of Egypt would kick out the legitimate Muslim regime. One member of the guidance bureau said, “Under Morsi we have had 25 major opposition demonstrations. This will be the 26th, and nothing will change.”¹⁰⁹

Nevertheless, the opposition power grew in size and range so that the Tamarrod movement emerged in April 2013. The members of Tamarrod included those of NSF, and later Salafists, businessmen, Coptic Christian churches, the state organization of Islam (*al-Azhar*) and even the armies.¹¹⁰ With a great scale of public supporters, they planned a national protest against President Morsi to call his resignation on June 30, the first anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration.¹¹¹ It is ironic that the protest calling for Morsi’s resignation was held at the same place with the protests for Mubarak’s resignation in 2011, on Tahrir Square in Cairo. The

¹⁰⁸ “Sabahi, El-Baradei Launch National Front to Fight Morsi’s Decrees”, Ahram Online, November 24, 2011

¹⁰⁹ Author’s interview with a Brotherhood guidance bureau member, July 2013, El-Sherif 2014b, p.25

¹¹⁰ Pioppi 2013, p.65

¹¹¹ Tabaar 2013, p.731

protests showed a fierce opposition to the Morsi regime, and as more soldiers including the Minister of Defense al-Sisi declared participation, it was transformed into a military coup which consequently ousted Morsi on July 3, 2013. Afterwards, the military and SCAF took the leading role of managing the country, and Adly Mansour, the head of the SCC, was appointed as the interim president by SCAF until al-Sisi won the presidential election in the following year.¹¹² It was in May 2014 that al-Sisi inaugurated as a legitimate president of Egypt with a reported 96% of votes, which was later evaluated by many specialists as a restoration of the pre-revolutionary status quo.¹¹³

With those ideational changes implementing bad effects on the support basis of the Brotherhood, President Morsi was ousted and the new regime erected after the revolution ended, leaving the democratic transition in Egypt incomplete. One specialist summarized this failure of the Brotherhood as:

“Morsi and the Brotherhood made almost every conceivable mistake [...] they alienated potential allies, ignored rising discontent, focused more on consolidating their rule than on using the tools that they did have, and used rhetoric that was tone deaf at best and threatening at worst.”¹¹⁴

¹¹² Roll 2016, p.33

¹¹³ “Sisi Sworn in as President of Egypt”, Egyptian State Information Service, June 8, 2014. Available at <http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=2848#.U6rwFo1dXGE>. Translated in and quoted from Brownlee et al. 2014, p.99

¹¹⁴ Brown 2013, p.57

These political strategies of the Brotherhood were based on its dynamic changes of their perception toward its political friends and enemies, and the interpretation they had about religion and political system. The ideas of the Brotherhood leaders broke the revolutionary alliances, caused defection of inner factors and ideational consolidation among the remnants, and finally enabled the mass protest against the regime with all oppositional parties united.

Then, why did the leading group of the Muslim Brotherhood come up with the religious identity and hostility toward the military, failing to adjust to the changed situation after the revolution? What did the ideas of the Brotherhood leaders stem from? In the next part, we could find the clues of the current Brotherhood's ideas in its historical experiences and longstanding ideologies.

Chapter 5. Historical Approach to the Ideas of the Brotherhood

Existing for almost a century, the Muslim Brotherhood has experienced several regimes in Egyptian politics, making different relationship with different actors. In these processes, some of the ideologies and ideas of the Brotherhood were changed, some remained, and inner factions with different perspectives about politics or religion emerged and disappeared. This part aims to look back those historical experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood group to find the sources of the ideational and strategic changes which happened during the democratic transition period after 2011. From the foundation as a social, religious organization and through the courses of state repression and internal division, the leading group of the Brotherhood erected the ideologies of the group and built the ground for the political choices.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Although this paper draws the reasons for the Brotherhood action from its historical experiences, it does not mean that the choices and strategies are all pre-determined with path dependency. On the contrary, as mentioned in the former parts, it is presumed that the strategies of the actors and underlying ideas can continuously change in dynamic relations with other actors. What this analysis is seeking for is to find out the reasons of the 'wrong' decisions facing the transitional processes and to understand why the Brotherhood leaders at that time in that situation chose to do in a certain way. It could be criticized as a mere ex-post claims to justify the strategies already taken, for this explanation can only be stated after those choices came out. However, digging for the reasons of the ideas and strategies of the major political actors like the Muslim Brotherhood is never useless, as it provides the framework to understand the meaning of their actions and helps to expect their future strategies. Looking back the processes of decision making derived from their ideologies, it is also possible to draw lessons about political choices of which should be and not be done. In this sense, this analysis is on the purpose of finding the clues for the Brotherhood actions and ideas from its past experiences.

5.1. Foundation and Development as Islamic Organization

5.1.1. Foundation as a Social Group Based on Islam

In 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood¹¹⁶ was founded by Hasan al-Banna, a school teacher and religious activist with a relatively conservative view of Islam.¹¹⁷ It started as a social group to propagate the Islamic values – which is called as the Brotherhood mission of *da'wa* – and the main activities of the group were held in such places of schools, mosques, and coffee houses. It was considered as just one of several religious organizations seeking to reinforce popular adherence and dedication to Islam¹¹⁸. The main ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood led by al-Banna was the well-known catchphrase of Muslim Brotherhood, “*Islam Is the Solution*”. Al-Banna and early Brotherhood members perceived the origin of all the problems in current Egypt was the secularism and Western culture prevailing in Egyptian society, and they asserted that the Egyptians return to the traditional Islamic values to solve those problems. The Brotherhood in its early days was critical even to democracy or pluralism, as they had an oppositional position to the secular government of Egypt which presented the Western values of politics. It does not mean, however, that the Muslim Brotherhood was a radical movement against the system to topple the government through revolution. Al-Banna and the

¹¹⁶ The full name is the Society of the Muslim Brothers (*Jami'ah al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* in Arabic)

¹¹⁷ Wickham, 2015, p.20

¹¹⁸ Wickham, 2015, p.21

leading members of the group aimed to change the society from below to internalize Islamic values, and their ultimate purpose of establishing the religious state of the believers based on *sharia* would be achieved in the long run.

As seen in the foundational ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, it was neither political nor revolutionary organization from the first. While the Brotherhood members had the anti-governmental perspectives, they did not claim to collapse the regime and build a new one, because they believed that the ideal form of Islamic state would be naturally realized if the ordinary Egyptian people became the true Muslims dedicated to Islamic values. The founding father al-Banna actually had a negative opinion about political partisanship itself for the reason that the sacred and broad purpose of the Brotherhood should not be restricted in a smaller boundary of politics¹¹⁹. Although he later tried to field candidates for parliamentary election from the Brotherhood, including himself, the interruption and election fraud by the state followed by poor election results made the old members of the Brotherhood more alienated from politics.¹²⁰ As a result, the basis of the Muslim Brotherhood was its religious identity, and it was better to be depicted as a social movement organization based on the Islamic value than a political interest group or political party.

On the other hand, it is true that the Muslim Brotherhood members expanded their participation in various parts of Egyptian politics, running for the

¹¹⁹ According to the al-Banna's risala (letter) of "Between Yesterday and Today", he wrote that,

"... you are not a benevolent organization, nor a political party, nor a local association with strictly limited aims. ..." (Wendell 1978, p.36)

¹²⁰ Mitchell 1993, pp.32-33,

parliamentary elections and actually entering the People's Assembly with the affiliation in the Brotherhood. Those political activities were justified with the same value of Islam which claimed to be comprehensive, all-encompassing throughout the whole society including the politics.¹²¹ When the political opportunities were opened in the Sadat regime in 1970s, several reputed activists in the leading group of the Brotherhood managed to be elected. However, the members of the Brotherhood had never discarded their identity as religious activists; rather, the political activities were just one of the means to achieve their final goal of promoting religion. It was possible for al-Banna, therefore, to withdraw his candidacy to the parliament when the government in the early 20th century offered a further restriction of prostitution and alcohol.¹²² Plus, when the Brotherhood managed to enter the parliament through election, they put efforts to promote the *sharia* rule (Islamic rule) as the basis for the state's legislative principle. Their main argument was in twofold: first, to amend Article 2 of the Constitution about the status of *sharia* from "a primary source" (implying parity with other sources) to "the primary source" of legislation; and second, to repeal the laws violating *sharia* principles immediately.¹²³ In this case, it is clear that the Brotherhood members in the parliament were more concerned in progressing their

¹²¹ Ranko (2014), p.59; Plus, in the same risala of Al-Banna, he also states that,

"[...] If you are told that you are a political, answer that Islam admits no such distinction. We believe the provisions of Islam and its teachings are all inclusive, encompassing the affairs on the people in this world and the hereafter. And those who think that these teachings are concerned only with the spiritual or ritualistic aspects are mistaken in this belief because Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation and a nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed, holy text and sword. [...]" (Moaddel (2005), p.97)

¹²² Ranko (2014), p.81

¹²³ Wickham 2015, p.31

religious mission than in the general domestic affairs of the Egyptian state.

With this religious identity and Islamic mission as a secure pillar in their mind, the concept of democracy interpreted in a different way when it came into Egypt. They showed limitations in accepting the Western concept of democratic system, not only because it was first considered as the antithesis of Islam, but also because the rule of Ala could never be surpassed by the rule of people in the traditional Islamist thinking. Although the old Brotherhood leaders were elected by public, they stressed that it did not imply their support for democracy. Sheikh Abu Isma'il, one of the Brotherhood members at that time, explained like this:

“One cannot say that we are part of a democratic system, as there is a huge difference between democracy which grants absolute authority to the majority, and shura [consultation] in Islam, which does not intervene in the domain over which God rules, [...] If democracy grants sovereignty to the people, then we must mobilize the believing majority so that they are the decision-makers, and at that time, personal opinion will not butt horns with the text of the Sharia but rather prostrate itself before it.”¹²⁴

This clearly illustrated how the Brotherhood members started to interpret the meaning of democracy. It is easily argued that ideological actors possess certain redlines that could not be crossed¹²⁵, and for the Muslim Brotherhood, that redline was the religious dedication to their absolute God. From this perspective, the

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Schwedler 2011, p.358

specific interpretation of the Brotherhood about democracy is drawn, which is not sharing the values of liberalism or pluralism.

5.1.2. Application of Democracy to Islamic Values

Then why did the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood become to accept the democracy, and how did the processes of conceptual adaptation go? It is true that the concept of democracy entered the Egyptian society and gained popularity, and that the Brotherhood also felt the necessity to adapt itself to its members. It is analyzed, however, that the biggest reason for the Brotherhood was to survive under the authoritarian regime. In the era of Mubarak's reign, the Muslim Brotherhood was already the biggest and strongest opposition power with an extensive network in and out of the country, winning the second most seats in parliament after the ruling party of National Democratic Party. As a part of the strategy to contain the Brotherhood power, Mubarak divided the Islamists as "good" or "bad", or in other words, as "moderate" or "radical".¹²⁶ In this frame by the regime, the Brotherhood tried to avert from the criticism that it was a radical Islamist organization trying to erect a religious state through a revolution. This was the issue of survival to the leaders of the Brotherhood as it had experienced already and would be given a harsh, violent suppression by the ruling regime when labelled

¹²⁶ Springborg (1989), p.226

as “radical”.¹²⁷ Another researcher of Egyptian politics points the critiques from the secularists toward the Brotherhood in the same period. As the secularists also condemned the Muslim Brotherhood as a radical Islamists group to erect a theological state, which was considered as an improper criticism to the Brotherhood leaders, they modified the meaning of their goal of religious state, accepting the concept of democracy and civil state that the secularists sought for.¹²⁸ In both contexts, one thing is for sure – the leaders of the Brotherhood changed their ideas about democracy and religious state in relation with other political actors.

In the processes of adapting the concept of democracy and civil society with their own religious identity, the Brotherhood leaders did not discard their religious identity and values; rather, they made quotation from their holy texts to interpret the meaning of democracy in their own viewpoint. The typical example was the concept of *shura* (means ‘consultation’ in Arabic), often mentioned as the character of democracy in Quran. As the *shura* was written as a principle of decision-making, Umar al-Tilmisani, the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood from 1973, emphasized the meaning of *shura* in political arena. The *shura* also presupposed the freedom of opinion and speech of ordinary people, and al-Tilmisani argued that it was a duty of the political leader to open and hold the *shura* and accept what was stated during the consultation courses.¹²⁹ What should be pointed here is, however, that this concept of *shura* was not identical with the

¹²⁷ Author’s interview with a former member of the Brotherhood in 2010, Ranko (2014), p.79

¹²⁸ Tadros (2012), p.52

¹²⁹ Ranko (2014), p.102

democracy that is ordinarily interpreted. Even though the opinion of the civilians should be reflected in the decision of the political leaders, the rule of *sharia*, the principles from Quran and Sunna was still higher than the will of people; and the leader's responsibility before God is drastically higher than the responsibility of his citizens, implicating the inequality between the ruler and the ruled.¹³⁰ As following the principle of *sharia* was the highest goal of the state, the ruler should manage the consultation of the people and finally implement the *sharia* rule to the society. In this sense, although the consultation was permitted to the people, any opinions which were out of the *sharia* rule of Islam could not be heard by the ruler. The same limitation of the Brotherhood democracy is also depicted in other sources. The Islamist theorists who tried to develop the 'Islam-oriented' concept of democracy, and who established the basis of the Brotherhood interpretation of the democratic state, argued about the difference of Islamic democracy and Western democracy as:

*“Islam does not concern itself with [the will of] the majority where there is a clear ruling in the Quran and the Sunna, as opposed to the Western democratic system which gives the majority the absolute right that its opinion is the law and the law is reformed if it is in violation of its opinion.”*¹³¹

In other words, the difference in opinions and the result of consultation is only meaningful when it follows the bigger principle of *sharia*, which is above the

¹³⁰ al Timisani, *al-Islam wa-l-Hukuma al-Diniya*, p.19, quoted from Ranko (2014), p.102

¹³¹ Tadros (2012), p.59

decision of the people. This interpretation of democracy fundamentally restricted the actual freedom of political participation of the Egyptian civilians, still giving the sovereignty to their God, not to the people.¹³²

Following this logic, the meaning of representative system and election was also different in the Muslim Brotherhood. As the ruler had an upper position in following *sharia*, it was natural for the Brotherhood members, who were the most compliant to *sharia*, would be chosen as the leader of the Muslim state when a fair public election was to be held. They derive their power with their religious dedication and knowledge of sharia and therefore are entitled to represent the people, which is in opposition with the representative democracy where the rulers are given the authority to represent the people only because the people with sovereignty elected them to do that.¹³³ This ideology of religion and democracy of the Muslim Brotherhood was far distant from what the secularists or liberal activists had called for in a series of democratic protests; but with the same purpose of thwarting the Mubarak regime, those differences were not debated often during the periods of the January 25 Revolution.

After Mubarak was kicked out from the office, however, the ideas of the Brotherhood about democracy floated as an issue – as the Brotherhood officially entered the political realm, they needed their own Brotherhood-specific ideas about politics, and the one combining Islam and democracy was their natural choice. They also had confidence that this idea would work and that the ‘Muslim’ Egyptians would ‘democratically’ elect the ‘Muslim’ party of FJP, as they were the

¹³² Tadros (2012), p.66

¹³³ Tadros (2012), p.60

most qualified to be the ruler of the Muslim Egypt, eligible to follow the principles of sharia and to spread them to the whole society. As a result, they considered that to return to their Islamic identity when participating in politics would be the best way to reach the biggest part of the Egyptian public. However, as time passed, the former partners of the protests could easily find out the civil state and democracy that the Brotherhood was presenting was not democracy as far as they perceived. It seemed to those activists that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party was ideationally closer to radical Islamism than themselves and those perception was strengthened as the period of Brotherhood reign continued, making them turn their back on the Muslim Brotherhood and organize demonstrations to change the regime.

The religious identity has functioned as the support and mobilization basis of the Muslim Brotherhood for a long time. The Islamic ideas and purposes of the Brotherhood were the original source of their membership that enabled the group to grow as the biggest and oldest social organization in opposition to the authoritarian regime. This worked as the reason for the Brotherhood leaders to come back to this religious identity when they needed to buy support from the public after Mubarak was gone and political competition emerged between the opposition powers. As the actors of past coalition were running for the limited number of parliament seats with different ideas and ideologies, the Brotherhood and FJP leaders had to decide on the strategies to use for election victory, which highlighted their different interpretation about democracy and religion with that of other opposition actors. This Islam-oriented concept of democracy and Egyptian politics later isolated the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP in the political arena, with increasing concerns of

the domination by the radical Islamism – named as ‘*Ikhwanization*’.

5.2. State Repression and the Brotherhood Reaction

As the oldest and biggest opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood was the one fronting the longest state repression from authoritarian regimes. Against the repression such as election fraud and actual violence, the Brotherhood reacted in two ways – direct fights against the state with using another violent method; and compliance to the regime, searching for moderate ways of change and displaying it as the group slogan. Either way has led to the distrust of the Brotherhood toward the state and military and to the lack of political experience and strategies for the Brotherhood to rule the state when it was in the position after the 2011 revolution.

The governmental repression to the Muslim Brotherhood started in its early days. While the Brotherhood was considered as just one of several religious societies seeking to reinforce popular adherence to Islam¹³⁴, the size and influence of the group expanded more quickly than anyone had expected. With growing supports of the public to the Brotherhood, who claimed criticism toward the current modern state of Egypt, the government started to perceive the group as a source of threat to its reign. The Egyptian regimes from 1940s, as a result, tried to control the Brotherhood to maintain their power, using various means. The typical way of the government was to block the Brotherhood members from the political realm. For

¹³⁴ Wickham, 2015, p.21

example, when the founder al-Banna and other leaders of the Brotherhood tried candidacy in the parliamentary election, they were all defeated by the government intervention in constituencies where they had been certain of victory.¹³⁵ This was reported as the most obviously dishonest election in Egypt, and it clearly showed that the authoritarian regime at that time had no notion to allow for the Brotherhood to be in the governance. The oppression from the government to the Brotherhood did not always take the form of political means – the authoritarian regime used violence to disperse their assembly, stop their own publication, and close their offices or regional branches. The founder of the Brotherhood Hassan al-Banna was actually sniped to death by a government agent 4 years after that failure of the parliamentary election.¹³⁶

5.2.1. Radical Reaction Directed toward the Regime

With this state repression growing, the Brotherhood at first reacted with using another means of radical violence. From the late 1930s, the leaders of the Brotherhood established paramilitary factions and secret apparatus, and those factions conducted radical and violent actions such as attacks on the police and foreign armies, participation in Palestine War against Israel, and assassination of high rank officers of the state.¹³⁷ This kind of physical clash between government

¹³⁵ Mitchell, 1993, p.33

¹³⁶ Mitchell 1993, pp.62-69

¹³⁷ Wickham 2015, p.26

and Brotherhood soldiers continued for decades, although most of the incidents were veiled below the surface.¹³⁸ Going through the harsh experiences of government oppression, an Islamist activist to line up these radical activities inside the Brotherhood during the Nasser regime (from 1952) started to gain support – it was Sayyid Qutb, whose ideology later became the norm for the radical Islamist wing. He, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, claimed the clear dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the necessity of a revolution to turn the ‘state of ignorance’ (*jahiliyya*) to the state of God’s sovereignty (*hakimiyya*).¹³⁹ The core of this ideology was that when the government is not following the right way of *hakimiyya*, radical revolution to correct it was the role given to the true Islamists. This idea about the current regime and mission of the Brotherhood group functioned as a way to justify the use of violence to meet their sacred goal. This flow of radical reaction in a certain part of the Brotherhood was reflecting the historically established perception of the state and the military – which was in front to oppress the Brotherhood activists –as the enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁴⁰ As the Qutbists – the activists who were following the doctrine of Sayyid Qutb – performed radical and violent actions against the regime, the government reacted with another round of harsh suppression. A lot of the Brotherhood members were hanged and imprisoned, labeled as terrorists who were

¹³⁸ Although there was a short period when Sadat regime and the Brotherhood cooperated, as Sadat used appeasement policy toward the Brotherhood to absorb the Islamist legitimacy, it soon ended with another round of harsh repression when the Brotherhood members opposed to the foreign policies of the regime with Israel. (Kassem 2004, pp.141-142)

¹³⁹ Wickham 2015, p.28

¹⁴⁰ Kepel 1993, p.41

trying to confuse the Egyptian state, and the group of the Muslim Brotherhood was categorized as an illegal organization. From this history of violent conflicts with the government and suppressive crackdown to their group, distrust toward the regime was piled up among the members and they learned only to fight against the violence with using another power.

5.2.2. Moderate Compliance to Avoid Repression

However, not all the members rebelled against the government repression radically by using violence. Another method to counteract the authoritarian state power, used more often by the major governing group of the Muslim Brotherhood, was compliance to the regime. They stuck to the religious mission of gradual reform and relentlessly asserted that they had no intention to turn over the current regime, in purpose of persuading the government that the Brotherhood would not be a threat. Hassan al-Hudeibi, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood succeeding al-Banna, stressed the moderate and gradualist route of the actions for the Brotherhood members, criticizing the Qutbist ideology. In his book of ‘Preachers, Not Judges’ (*Du’ah La Qudah*), he argued that it was unnecessary “[to] reduce [the meaning of] Islamic government to the implementation of an essentialist view of law under the pretext of God’s sovereignty”, opposing the political resistance and revolutionary ideology of Qutbists.¹⁴¹ When they started

¹⁴¹ Zollner 2007, pp.422-423

fielding candidates in the parliament during the Mubarak regime, led by the strong eagerness of the Supreme Guide al-Tilmisani, the Brotherhood leading group continuously maintained that the purpose of Muslim Brotherhood was never changed from “to spread Islamic values and ideas to Egyptian society”, the *da’wa* mission, and the political participation was one of the ways to achieve the goal. In several official statements, the leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood made it clear that political power nor political victory was not what they were seeking for.¹⁴² Here comes the unique strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood used in the parliamentary elections: to claim that they would not compete for the entire seats but only for 30% or 50% of the whole parliament.¹⁴³ It was aimed to reassure the state that although the Brotherhood members participate in the politics, they would never try to change the governing power.

This strategy of compliance by the Muslim Brotherhood was analyzed that the group was “tamed” by the government. With the threat of suppression always standing behind the back, and with their personal experiences of the violent crackdown, the mainstream members of the Brotherhood became not to show a direct criticism toward the authoritarian regime; they rather followed the “rules of the game”, not trying to change the rules for themselves however the rules were unfair.¹⁴⁴ They were aware that although they could “contest for power in elections, but never attain it”.¹⁴⁵ To be rebellious to the regime was the matter of survival for

¹⁴² Wickham 2015, p.48

¹⁴³ Brown 2012, pp.4-7

¹⁴⁴ Hamid (2014), p.117

¹⁴⁵ Springborg (1989), p.210

the Brotherhood members, so they instead sought for the ways to only make voices for gradual changes in the existing system.¹⁴⁶ This long history of repression and exclusion from the governing regime shaped the ideas of the Brotherhood leaders about state actors and political participation. The Brotherhood activists did not possess any experience of ruling in the governing position, and they could not even think of it. One Brotherhood member stated about their experience during the Mubarak regime as:

“We were always treated as second-class citizens under Mubarak. If you are a member in the Muslim Brotherhood, you will not join the army, become a minister or a governor.”¹⁴⁷

5.2.3. Perception of the Brotherhood as “Deep State” was Back

After the January 25 Revolution and collapse of the Mubarak regime, however, the opposition powers including the Muslim Brotherhood perceived that they were finally freed from the harsh suppression. Enlistment of more than 80 political parties in the first parliamentary election in November 2011 illustrates the political liberty that those activists were feeling. In this situation, the Brotherhood leaders came to think that they did not need to restrain themselves not to stimulate

¹⁴⁶ Hamid (2014), p.7

¹⁴⁷ Al-Anani (2015), p.539, Interview by the author with Muhamad Mustafa, head of a local chapter (shu’ba) of the Muslim Brotherhood, March 25, 2012, Zagazig, Egypt

the state and to worry about state interruption and violence. Betraying the Brotherhood expectation, however, SCAF and the military started to use the policy of the past authoritarian regimes, such as disqualifying the Brotherhood candidates, and it was natural for the Brotherhood to consider them as “deep state” of the previous authoritarian regime was back. With this perception about the military officers, their historically-shaped enmity rolled back even though they were now in the position of ruler. The problem was that the leading group of the Brotherhood still acted like the biggest opposition power – they still interpreted the action of military as a threat of existence and only tried to fight back. The officers from the former regime were the enemy who were relentlessly trying to crack down the Brotherhood, never a political rival fairly competing for the legitimate authority. One young Brotherhood member stated that after the reign of the Brotherhood, the military, police, judiciary, and bureaucracy all had become vicious toward the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁴⁸ In this situation, the leaders of the Brotherhood were short of using political strategies to justify their position to the whole Egyptian public and to secure enough political allies; it was reported that the Brotherhood was still acting as if it was an opposition power fighting against a potentially repressive regime.¹⁴⁹ This limitation of the Brotherhood’s political experience and strategies, influenced by the authoritarian regimes that they have long opposed to, was later followed by the group’s isolation in the Egyptian politics and loss of support from the public.

¹⁴⁸ Brown and Dunne (2015), p.11

¹⁴⁹ Hamid (2014), p.163

5.3. Division of the Internal Factors with Different Ideas

As the Muslim Brotherhood is a huge organization, a lot of internal factions emerged during its history. Among those factions, the Reformist group and the youth group had a great influence during and after the 2011 Revolution, holding different political ideas with the leaders of the Brotherhood. In this section, it would be analyzed that how those inner factions developed, how their ideas were different with the mainstream, and how the leading group reacted to those factions. These historical phases functioned as the reason for the Brotherhood leaders to allow a substantial number of defectors, stuck to their original conservative Islamic ideas.

5.3.1. Emergence of the Reformists and Reaction of the Leading Group

From the end of 1970s, young Brothers at that time started to expand their activities in another political area. They strengthened relationship with student groups in universities and built coalition with professional syndicates. Those syndicates were composed of professionals such as scientists, doctors, and lawyers and the members debated a wide range of topics about the nation – freedom, housing policy, and domestic economics – not just being restricted to the issue of religion.¹⁵⁰ This movement of professional syndicates affected the young

¹⁵⁰ Wickham 2015, p.62

Brotherhood members participating in those groups, contributing to the formation of the Reformist faction in the Muslim Brotherhood, which was in contrast with the relatively conservative faction of “old guards”. They often argued for the reformation of the Brotherhood along the stream of the Egyptian society and in relation to other activists in and out of the country.

The participation of young members of the Muslim Brotherhood in diverse syndicates with different interests, ideas, and ideologies opened a wide view to those enclosed with the Islamist principles. As the students and the professionals in the syndicates were usually the intelligent groups, they were relatively more Westernized, secularist, and open to the liberal values such as democracy, pluralism, and freedom. In addition, because none of the syndicates were gathered for religious purposes, some members were not even Muslim. The interaction with those civil activists influenced the Brotherhood youth to reinterpret themselves and to accept diversities in their own nation, which could be easily found in their own statements. One argued about their ideational changes in the interview like this:

“Those of us in the new generation, we studied and read widely and we interacted with those outside the circles of the Islamic movement. This had a huge effect on our thinking. We talked about human rights, respect for human life, democracy, and freedom. ... Through our readings, through our travels, and through our participation in public life, we asked questions, we investigated, and we realized that the problem of the system was that it was not democratic. And when we reviewed the legacy of Muslim political thought, we found no

contradiction between democracy and Islam.”¹⁵¹

However, the leading group, composed of the older, rather conservative members, showed critical reactions to the younger, reformist group. They had experience of harsh state repression in early days and claimed that they owned the originality and legitimacy to direct the group. One even mentioned that the reformists were ‘foreigners (*khawajat*)’ to the Brotherhood, enjoying youth when the older founders were in prison.¹⁵² This kind of reaction toward those whom had different view with the leading group was not new in the Brotherhood. When the radical activists increased their influence with the emergence of Sayyid Qutb, disagreeing with the doctrine of its founder Hassan al-Banna, most of the Brotherhood members in the leading position considered them as the outliers of the group.¹⁵³ Their different ideas and ideologies were not accepted nor coordinated in the decision of the Brotherhood. The decision-making process of the Muslim Brotherhood was a centrist, hierarchical top-down form, which was usually kept in secrecy. Decision-making with a very limited number of the leaders was following the traditional way of ruling by Islamic caliphs on one hand, and also a way to avoid the state intervention and repression.¹⁵⁴

Meanwhile, it is also possible to find the reasons that the Brotherhood leaders were short of accepting and coordinating the different ideas of the inner

¹⁵¹ Wickham 2015, p.65, Interview of the author with Ibrahim Bayoumi Ghanim, March 10, 2004

¹⁵² Wickham 2015, p.66

¹⁵³ Milton-Edwards (2016), p.25

¹⁵⁴ Al-Awadi (2013), p.548

factions of the group in their religious identity. The leaders of a religious group were usually taking the role of preachers – therefore, they had a different personal position with that of the civil society leaders. The relationship of the Brotherhood members was not completely equal; rather, the leaders were religious educators, who had more knowledge about the religious doctrines and as a result, more authority than the ordinary members who had to be educated. The Muslim Brotherhood, for this reason, maintained a long period of training for a Muslim to join the group and the child of the Brotherhood members had to receive the religious education from the Brotherhood in their early years. This culture of the Brotherhood enabled the leaders to keep the unity of the organization's ideas, which was following the ideas of the small ruling group. Moreover, the Islamic notion of consensus (*ijma*) made the members find it extremely difficult to raise objection when the decision was arrived. Once the decision about the group was consulted by the members, mainly by the leading members only, any questions or disobedience were hardly possible.¹⁵⁵ According to the majority rule followed by the *ijma*, what was decided by majority should be obeyed by all after the decision was made, and because of the preaching and education system of the Brotherhood, those who had different ideas were always the minority. As a minority, their ideologies were not accepted by the leading group, and the option they had was to be silent or to defect the Brotherhood.

¹⁵⁵ Ranko (2014), p.133

5.3.2. Reformists Defection and Consolidation of the Brotherhood

In 1996, a dozen of years after the Reformist faction emerged inside the Brotherhood, a group of Reformists left the group to establish the Wasat (means ‘center’ in Arabic) Party. The outstanding feature of the party was that women and non-Muslims (Coptic Christians) were included in the founders and that it contained the norms of democracy and pluralism in its official party platform.¹⁵⁶ It defined itself as “a civic platform based on the Islamic faith, which believes in pluralism and the alternation of power”, and set its purpose on establishing the Islamic form of civil, pluralistic public order.¹⁵⁷ According to an interview, the leader of the Wasat Party, a defector from the Muslim Brotherhood and the leader of Engineering Syndicate, the party members privileged modern democracy over Islamic *shura*.¹⁵⁸ The defectors who erected the party criticized the authoritarianism of the Brotherhood and the way that the Islamists were acting in politics. As a result, they emphasized pluralism than their religiosity and argued ideological compliance to the modern civil society that Egypt should be. This positioning of the Wasat Party clearly shows that the founding members had different ideas with those of the Brotherhood leaders, and they could seek their goal by defecting the group.

After the establishment of Wasat Party, its progressive and pro-democratic

¹⁵⁶ Stacher 2002, p.422

¹⁵⁷ Documents of Wasat Party in Egypt (Awraq Hizb al-Wasat al-Misri) 1998, p.24, translated in and quoted from Wickham 2015, p.83

¹⁵⁸ Bayat (2013), p.218, Interview of the author with Abu-Alaa Maadi, Cairo Times, August 2-8 2001

features in the Islamic idea were complimented in media, leading to a further criticism toward the Muslim Brotherhood. In this situation, the governing conservatives tried to keep its internal solidarity by emphasizing its old identity and historic mission of the Brotherhood. The official statement titled “The Virtues of Hardship (*Fawaid Min al-Shadaid*)” contained the message about duty of obedience and loyalty of traditional Muslims at its base, in purpose of preventing future conflicts in the group and keeping its self-restraint stance.¹⁵⁹ Seen in this past case of Reformists, the leaders of the Brotherhood were limited in accepting the different ideas with internal factions and coordinating them into the decision making of the group. Rather, with the establishment of Wasat party by the Reformist defectors, the leading groups of the Brotherhood perceived them as a rival or even threat to their existence. They interpreted the new ideas of the Reformists had a possibility to ruin the solidarity of the whole Brotherhood, and reacted with consolidation of the traditional and conservative Islamism in the group. Although there remained part of the Reformists group in the Brotherhood calling for the inner ideological changes, not leaving the group to join the Wasat party, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood did not put efforts to coordinate them with the governing ideology.

¹⁵⁹ Op.cit., p.93

5.3.3. Repeated after the Revolution with Political Opening

This was what happened in similar way with the young Brotherhood members in 2000s. In their 20s and 30s, they formed a different faction separated with both conservatives and Reformists. They claimed for the progressive reform of the political system of the Egyptian state and were usually critical to both the conservatives and reformists for not being revolutionary enough.¹⁶⁰ They sometimes even crossed the line of religious identity as a member of an Islamic organization, and cooperated with liberals and seculars for the purpose of realizing democracy and social freedom. With the emergence of a new internal faction, the leading group of the Brotherhood again became passive in accommodating different ideas in the movement. The clear illustration of this was the process of writing the draft for party platform, announced in the flow of the enhanced democratization movement of Kefaya. Although the young factions were the most active participants in Kefaya movement in alignment with the secular, liberal activists, the party platform draft was only drawn by the conservative governing group without enough debates and consultation about the political direction that the Brotherhood party had to take. As a result, it was not welcomed by media nor even by the members of the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁶¹ The inner dissatisfaction of the young members grew as time passed, and when they became freed from the authoritarian government, it burst out as the form of serial defection by the Brotherhood youth. During the authoritarian reign, the scope of non-state and non-

¹⁶⁰ Wickham 2015, p.142

¹⁶¹ Op.cit., p.124

governmental organization was harshly restricted and there was little political arena for the young members other than the Muslim Brotherhood. This lack of exit options made them to remain the membership of the Brotherhood even though they did not agree to the leaders.¹⁶² However, with the political freedom and opportunity newly open, they quickly came out of the Brotherhood to join other activists or to make their own parties, meeting their ideational needs.

In this situation, the Brotherhood leaders did not try to coordinate the ideational differences of inner faction; rather they reacted as they had done in the past – considering them as foreigners or outliers, and kicking them out to maintain the solidarity of the group identity and ideology. Even after the defection of the young members and establishment of new parties by them, the leading group of the Brotherhood could not accept them as political partners. They were another sort of rivals or even enemies, because they were giving threat to their Islamic orientation of the Brotherhood, criticizing the doctrine of the group and harming the authority both of the Brotherhood and Islam. In this perception about their former members, the leading group became more and more obsessed by the goal of consolidation and traditional Islamic identity, which later caused the ebb of the supports from the Egyptian public.

¹⁶² Esposito and Shahin eds. (2013), p.480

Chapter 6. Conclusion

The democratic transition of Egypt started with the mass protests against the authoritarian regime of Mubarak, and the Egyptian people selected the Muslim Brotherhood as the legitimate governor to manage the transition through fair public election. However, as the ideas the Brotherhood leaders showed in the political arena changed in dynamics of the transition period, the public support earned by the revolution started to shrink quickly. I suggested the research question about the reasons for these radical changes that happened in recent years, and analyzed how the ideational factors of the Brotherhood leaders affected on their political position and allies with other agents. Those ideas – some of which were changed with their interpretation of the situation; some of which were resurged from the past experiences of the Brotherhood; and some of which were shaped in relation with other political actors – of the Brotherhood resulted in the breakdown of the revolutionary coalition and loss of public support. In this paper, the ideational factors are analyzed in the three interrelated categories – resurgence of religiosity, obsession to power struggle with SCAF, and inability to accept the difference of internal factions. The ideas of the Brotherhood leaders had its basis on the historical experience of the group, paving the way for the ideational development and strategic habituation.

Nowadays, the headquarter of the Muslim Brotherhood is expelled from Egypt, and the Brotherhood itself is labeled as a terrorist group by al-Sisi regime. Despite the loss of the political status and restarted state repression, however, the

Brotherhood is still maintaining its large amount of influence. Although the Brotherhood members are deprived of the rights to participate in Egyptian politics, the local basis of the Brotherhood as a social movement group is remaining, and it also possesses a lot of foreign branches still working in other Arab countries. In exile from Egypt, it is reported that the leaders are analyzing the reasons of their political failure after the public protests against President Morsi and the military coup, including self-criticism for not being revolutionary enough. The level of change that the Brotherhood could take afterwards is unsure, with the fundamental ideology and identity as a religious organization still strong. As a consequence, it would be necessary to keep an eye on how they would go through another round of changes in the new political dynamics.

At last, I would mention the shortcomings of this research. As it concentrates on the ideational and constructive theories as its theoretical basis, it has the same limitations that those theories originally contain. For they are relatively new and short of verification, the basis of the theories itself is not fully established yet. The ideational or constructivist theories are sometimes criticized as they are not 'theories' for the reason that they do not suggest a clear structure for their explanations, and this research could not be completely free from the same criticism. In spite of these probable critiques, I still claim that it is still a useful way of analysis for the dynamics in Egyptian politics, as it could overcome certain limitation of the other theories as mentioned above, and figure out the subtle changes of the actors and the real causes of their strategies.

The next arguable limitation of this research is that because the case of Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood is too specific, it is hard to generalize the case

to a broader boundary of political science. This is undeniable as the first and foremost reason of the research question comes from the uniqueness of the Egyptian case: that the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood regime was kicked out just less than two year of reign, which is not seen in the previous examples of democratization the in the third world states. The dynamic whirlwind of the Egyptian politics after the 2011 revolution was quite noticeable even when compared to other Middle Eastern countries affected by the Arab Spring, full of unexpectedness. For this uniqueness and solitude of the Egyptian case, it is true that the experience of Egypt and Muslim Brotherhood would not be easy to apply to other states.

Notwithstanding, the difficulty of generalization does not directly lead to the meaninglessness of the research. While it would be hard to use the Egyptian case to neither explain nor predict other cases in other countries, it could still give some lessons to other major players and researchers. The Islamic groups of similar ideas with the Muslim Brotherhood – and even plenty of foreign branches of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood – are still active in various political and social fields in Arab countries. For them, the processes that the Brotherhood lost its authority and support in Egypt with its misled perception can be a useful lesson to hold their own power. Written in latter part, the Brotherhood also showed its lack of ability to successfully combine Islamic ideology and democracy, and from this exemplar failure, it could pose another way of combination between the two. Last but not least, the Brotherhood members did not manage to adapt properly to the changed situation from the opposition to governing power. This could also function as a historical lesson when we witness another case of the opposition power suddenly

rising to the official governing status. It gives the implication that in which point it could be difficult for them to make accommodation, and in which aspects they would need careful changes in their own ideologies not to thwart the democratic transition in their own country.

The last limitation of this research on the Muslim Brotherhood with the ideational, constructivist theory is the relative incompleteness of information. Substantial part of the internal debates and decision-making processes of the Brotherhood are hidden from the public and even from the members. In addition, while it could be applied to any ideational researches, there is no guarantee that the official statements, public announcements or written documents always reflect the genuine idea of the leading elites of the group, not to mention that of the numerous rank and file sub-factions. Plus, this research usually derives its sources from the second materials, not from the direct interviews done by the author. This was an unavoidable challenge from the restriction of time and place but it is still true that this method of research has a clear limitation in figuring out the ideas of the real actors in Egyptian context.

I could not deny that this points of criticism is valid and that this research has far much ways to develop. To remedy these shortcomings, nonetheless, I tried to find as many actual changes of their actions seen in the fields, which could directly imply the changes of ideas underneath. Plus, although a lot of second reading sources are used in this paper, I tried to quote as many as the direct interview reports from the Brotherhood members from those articles. With the words that the actors exactly used in the interviews or announcement, it would be possible to draw the clues of their ideas about Egyptian politics, democracy, and

religion.

From these limitations, the research about how the Muslim Brotherhood would work in the context of Egyptian politics has still much way to go on. With the new government erected, they are now facing another round of political competition, anguishing the means to survive and to resurrect their position in Egyptian society. In this process, the Brotherhood ideas have full potential of further changes, increasing the necessity and importance of the continuous follow-up studies about the ideational factors driving the strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood.

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Abstract

2011년 1월, 이집트에서는 대규모의 민주화 시위가 발생했다. 이집트 내부의 반대 세력들은 결집하여 무바라크 대통령의 권위주의 정권을 축출하였으며, 민주화로의 이행이 시작되었다. 그 과정에서 가장 주도적인 위치를 얻은 조직이 바로 무슬림 형제단이었다. 이집트의 최고(最古), 최대의 반대 조직인 무슬림 형제단은 이후 자유정의당을 설립하여 선거에 출마하였으며, 차례로 이루어졌던 총선과 대선 모두에서 승리를 거두었다. 그러나 무슬림 형제단에 대한 대중들의 지지는 빠르게 감소하여, 무슬림 형제단 출신의 모르시 대통령은 취임 1년 만에 시민들의 반대 시위 및 쿠데타로 물러나게 된다. 이 논문은 이와 같은 무슬림 형제단의 정치적 흥망의 이유를 다루고 있으며, 민주화 시위 이후 새로이 선출된 반대파의 정당이 급격히 정당성 및 권위를 상실한 원인에 대해 탐구하고자 한다.

위와 같은 연구 질문에 대답하기 위하여 본 논문에서는 우선 민주화 과정에 대한 기존 문헌 및 이론의 검토를 진행하였다. 여러 시기의 국가들의 민주화 과정을 분석한 기존의 연구에서는 민주화의 과정 및 결과에 영향을 미치는 요소로 경제적 조건, 계급 정치, 문화적 배경, 제도 등을 들고 있으나, 본 논문에서는 위의 요소들이 이집트의 사례를 설명하는 데에 한계가 있다고 판단하였다. 종교 집단으로서의 독특한 정체성으로 인해 무슬림 형제단은 계급 정치의 틀 내에서의 분류가 어려우며, 최근의 사례에서 무슬림 형제단이 빠른 부침을 겪는 동안 문화 및 제도적 요인은 크게 변하지 않은 것으로 분석된다는 것이 그 이유이다. 이에 본 논문에서는 무슬림 형제단의 정치적 실패의 가장 큰 원인으로 아이디어적 요소를 제시한다. 2011년의 민주화 혁명 이후 무슬림 형제단은 새로운 이집트를 위한 정치적 이데올로기를 제시하는 역할을 부여 받았으나, 무슬림 형제단이 종교 및 정치에 대해 지니고 있었던 아이디어는 이집트 시민들로부터의 지지를 유지하지 못했다는 것이다.

본 논문에서는 무슬림 형제단의 정치적 행동 및 성명 등에서 나타나는 아이디어를 세 종류로 나누어 분석한다. 첫째, 무슬림 형제단의 지도자들은 정치적 영역에 그들의 종교적 이데올로기를 도입하였다. 이들은 선거 등에서 지지를 호소하기 위해 이전의 이슬람 슬로건을 이용하였으며, 이슬람 가치에 기반한 민주주의 개념을 설파하였다. 그러나 이러한 종교 기반의 정치적 아이디어는 여타 정치적 행위자들에게 극단적 이슬람화라는 위협을 주게 되었으며, 이러한 위기 인식은 빠르게 확산된 '형제단화(*Ikhwanization*)' 이라는 용어에서도 잘 드러나고 있다. 둘째,

무슬림 형제단은 군사 세력과의 갈등에 매몰된 모습을 보였다. 군사 세력에 대한 이들의 인식은 혁명의 파트너에서 최대의 정적으로 변화하였고, 무슬림 형제단의 지도자들은 군사 세력과의 정치적 경쟁에서 이기기 위해서 다양한 권력을 추구하게 된다. 그러나 이 과정에서 무슬림 형제단은 군사 세력에 대한 이들의 정치적 위기 인식을 정당화하는 데에 실패하였고, 군사 세력은 반대로 극단적 이슬람화를 저지하는 위치를 확립하면서 이집트의 여론은 이들에게 기울게 되었다. 셋째, 무슬림 형제단의 지도자들은 다른 아이디어를 지닌 내부 파벌들을 조정하지 못했으며, 이들 혁명가(Reformist) 및 젊은이들의 파벌은 무슬림 형제단을 탈퇴하면서 무슬림 형제단의 지지 기반을 더욱 약화시켰다. 무슬림 형제단의 지도자들은 이들을 '외부자'로 간주하며 내부 단결에만 집중하였고, 이러한 세 가지 측면의 무슬림 형제단의 아이디어적 요소들은 대중들이 지지를 철회하게 하는 원인으로 작용하였다. 이에 정치적 행동가들은 반 무슬림 형제단 연합을 조직하여 2013년 무슬림 형제단 정권을 축출하였다.

한편 무슬림 형제단이 최근의 정치적 상황에서 보인 이러한 아이디어는 이들의 역사적 경험 및 이데올로기에 기반을 두고 있다. 우선, 무슬림 형제단은 일반 대중에게 이슬람 가치를 설파하는 종교적 사회 단체로 설립되었으며, 이에 정치적 활동 및 정치적 개념에 대한 이해가 부족하였다. 이후 민주주의 개념이 이집트 사회에 도입되었을 때 이들은 극단적 이슬람주의라는 비판을 피하기 위해 개념을 선택적으로 수용하게 되는데, 이 때 이들의 종교적 정체성을 기반으로 이슬람 경전의 단어를 인용한 특유의 민주주의 개념을 발전시켰다. 또한 이집트 내에서 가장 오래된 반대 조직으로 무슬림 형제단은 권위주의 정권으로부터 여러 형태의 억압을 받은 역사를 지니고 있다. 이러한 억압에 맞서 무슬림 형제단의 지도자들은 폭력을 이용해 맞서 싸우는 방식과 정권에 순응하는 방식의 두 가지 대응을 나타내게 되는데, 이 과정에서 정치적 경험을 쌓지 못했을 뿐 아니라 정부 및 군사 세력에 대한 불신이 증가하게 되었다. 마지막으로 무슬림 형제단의 지도자들은 전통적으로 이견을 지닌 내부 집단을 거부하였다. 무슬림 형제단의 지도자 집단은 주로 연장자들로 구성되었으며, 이들은 종교지도자의 지위를 동시에 보유하고 있었으므로 집단 내부에서 일반적으로 최고의 권위를 지니고 있었다. 또한 복종과 내부 단결에 대한 이슬람 가치는 내부적 반발을 어렵게 하였으며, 지도자들은 지속적으로 내부의 아이디어적 통합을 중시하게 되었다.

주요어: 무슬림 형제단, 이슬람, 아이디어, 종교, 민주주의, 정치

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