

THE SOCIAL USES OF SELF-DEFINING MEMORIES AT WORK

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by

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THE SOCIAL USES OF SELF-DEFINING MEMORIES AT WORK

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SUMMARY

A fundamental part of human experience is self-continuity, or the sense of me extended across time, yet these processes that give rise to this temporal extension have remained largely understudied in the work psychology literature. Self-defining memories provide one mechanism for beginning to understand the role of an individual's unique past on their present moment, and when shared with others they provide a vivid and succinct snapshot to convey a part of the individual's extended self. In this paper, I outline the memory sharing process from the sharer to the listener. In Study 1, workers were asked to recall a self-defining or everyday memory to explore the associated phenomenological memory characteristics and the language used to describe and share that memory. In Study 2, workers were asked to read memory vignettes provided in Study 1 to explore how the information contained in the shared memories are used by the memory listener to inform affective (e.g., likability, affective trust, and empathy) and informational (e.g., meaningfulness, insight, and cognitive trust) outcomes. Results indicate that self-defining memories, compared to everyday memories, are shared using self-focused and causal language that reflects achievement and power drives. When shared with the memory listener, self-defining memories are perceived as more affectively intense and central to the sharer's sense of self, suggesting that the language used to share the memory can communicate phenomenological information to the listener. Finally, the listener's perception of the shared memory is related to affective and informational outcomes. Specifically, perceived self-centrality was positively related to likability, affective trust, empathy, work meaningfulness, and insight. By studying the memory sharing process of

self-defining work memories, we can begin to understand how the sharing of the temporally extended self with others can influence work-related processes and outcomes.

CHAPTER 1. THE SOCIAL USES OF SELF-DEFINING MEMORIES AT WORK

A fundamental aspect of the sense of self is a sense of self-continuity, or a sense of me over time. Indeed, this may be the most fundamental aspect of the sense of self, yet it has received comparatively little research when compared to other aspects of the experience of self, such as regulation, efficacy, self-evaluations, or identity (see Chang, Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012; Lord, Diefendorff, Schmidt, & Hall, 2010; Ashforth & Schinoff, 2016). These orientations have focused on the self as an object to be evaluated and have largely ignored the mental processes that give rise to feelings of unity and coherence over time (Prebble, Addis, & Tippet, 2013).

Certainly, the study of work experiences over time has received much attention. However, we should make a clear distinction between research paradigms that study the person *moving through time* compared to orientations of the person *embedded in time* (see Figure 1). While the problem of time has become increasingly incorporated into our understanding of the person at work, theoretical and empirical work has been limited to the person *moving through time* (see Figure 1). Models are increasingly moving from assessing individuals at a single moment to longitudinal models that investigate people changing over years, months, days, or even minutes. However, these models have stopped short of looking at the individual *embedded in time* (see Figure 2). We experientially know that life is not experienced as a series of disjointed moments. Instead, our personal past and aspirations for the future constitute our present and give meaning to the challenges and opportunities we face. By beginning to understand the person embedded in time and the processes that give rise to self-continuity, we can begin to study how a person's unique past and

experiences are brought to bear on affective, behavioral, and cognitive processes in the present moment.




Figure 1 - Depiction of a person moving through time in traditional IO/OB measures. The person is assessed at multiple time points and is presumed to change across time.




Figure 2 - Depiction of a person embedded in time as proposed by the current paper on phenomenological and semantic continuity. Individuals' present experiences are grounded by their personal past and future aspirations.

Episodic memories are a critical component for establishing this phenomenological continuity, or the subjective feeling of “mineness” of experiences through time (Zahavi, 2005). These memories are recollectively experienced, meaning that the remembering is accompanied by sensory-perceptual and affective detail that allows the past to be re-experienced in the present moment (Conway, 2009). This recollective or autonoetic remembering (Tulving, 1985, 2002) contributes to the feeling of “mineness” that tags a memory as a personally experienced memory. For example, I know information about myself (e.g., my birthdate) and about my coworkers (e.g., she went camping in the mountains last weekend), but this information is not tagged with the phenomenal sense of “mineness” that connects it to my personal experience. However, I remember sitting by the fire at Red Top Mountain State Park while camping with my friends. This feeling of “mineness” of experience is a fundamental component of phenomenological continuity that allows the individual to “perceive the present moment as both a continuation of their past and as a prelude to their future” (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997, p. 335). Neuroimaging and aging research supports this claim, finding that the autonoetic and imagery component of episodic memory allows individuals to connect past experience to the present and project themselves forward into an imagined future (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Addis, Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009; Addis & Tippett, 2008; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007). Thus, studying an individual’s episodic memories provides an opportunity to begin to understand the mechanisms that lead to self-continuity, or the person embedded in time.

Under the umbrella of episodic memories, self-defining memories provide vivid recollections of personally meaningful past events. Specifically, self-defining memories are a subset of episodic memories characterized by “affective intensity, vividness, high levels of rehearsal, linkage to similar memories, and connection to an enduring concern or unresolved conflict” (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004, p. 504; Singer & Salovey, 1993). These vivid, emotional memories are experience-near records of past events, or records characterized by great detail and mental “reliving” of the event, and are also strongly connected to individuals’ long-term goals and sense of self. It is this connection to long-term goals that differentiates self-defining memories from other common, everyday memories. In preparation for this study, a brief pilot was conducted to explore the ability of individuals to report self-defining memories about their work. From this pilot, a participant reported the following self-defining memory describing her first promotion:

I recall this day very well. I was called into my boss's office unexpectedly. At first, I thought that there may be a problem, that I made an error or that there would be a layoff. When my boss began to explain the reason for the unexpected meeting, I couldn't stop smiling almost giggly as I learned that I was being promoted. I came from an extremely underprivileged background.... I wanted a better life for myself so I really had to learn a lot about self-discipline and dedication. I knew in the long run that it would pay off but there were many times that I felt like I couldn't go on. During times that I really felt overwhelmed I would fall behind on my class work, then force myself to get caught up again. No matter how troubled I was, I was determined to change my life and make a difference for myself and my family. I took a long time and sometimes it felt like it would never end. Even after I

graduated and had my college degree I felt the same, like nothing really changed. I got a new job and that was nice but didn't make me feel like I had made it. I continued to learn and take classes in my field while working at my new job, in my mind to make it I had to be the best. I thought that once I felt like I was the best then I would be deserving, then I could demand better wages and benefits. I never expected that my boss would see how hard I was trying because no one really had before. I was completely shocked by the promotion and more importantly that my boss and company felt that I was qualified and could perform the duties of the new position. Twenty-one years ago, I started on my path and at thirty-three years old I finally made it. I will never forget that day and how much it meant to me.

This memory is a vivid and emotional memory of her first promotion. She “recalls this day very well” and remembers being “called into [her] boss’s office unexpectedly.” During this meeting, her anxiety turned to excitement and she “couldn’t stop smiling” and became “almost giggly” upon learning about her promotion. Perhaps most importantly, this memory is connected to her sense of self and her struggle to “make it” professionally and financially. Coming from an underprivileged background, she worked and sacrificed for years, and this promotion felt like the successful culmination of those efforts. She was “completely shocked by the promotion and... that [her] boss and company felt [she] was qualified.” This promotion represents the moment that she “finally made it,” and she will “never forget that day and how much it meant to [her].” This vivid memory serves as an enduring connection between the individual’s past and present, constructing a sense of continuity across time.

In addition to constructing phenomenological continuity, self-defining memories also provide a quick snapshot of personal experience that is easily shared with others. They are self-contained episodes of a single event that connect to the individual's long-term goals or aspirations. Thus, these memories can provide an easy and constrained way to share "who I am" with others.

In an ideal world, our memories could be recalled and communicated to others with perfect clarity, as with the magical Pensieve in J.K. Rowling's fictional novels (Rowling, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007). The Pensieve is a magical device that allows individuals to recall memories with perfect detail, enabling them to step into a memory and experience it in full. Furthermore, the Pensieve allows others to enter and experience another's memory firsthand. Of course, the memory sharing process is much more limited outside of this fictional world. Notably, the memory sharing process is limited by the constraints of the memory sharer's recall, the language used to communicate that memory, and the perceptions and interpretations of the shared memory by the listener. These limitations derive primarily from the fact that despite the interactions between the sharer and listener during the memory sharing process, their personal experiences are necessarily distinct.

Within the memory sharing process, the experience of the memory sharer begins with the recall of a specific memory. This memory may be characterized by many phenomenological characteristics that may be communicated to others using linguistic strategies that emphasize those experiential elements. Based on this communication, the memory listener interprets the memory and the information contained in the memory influences their perceptions of the memory sharer. This reciprocal process of sharing information and changing evaluations is depicted in Figure 3. It is this process of sharing

and hearing self-defining memories that is the focus of this paper. Specifically, I will explore (a) how individuals use language to share aspects of their temporally extended selves with others and (b) how others perceive those communications and incorporate that shared information into their understanding of the sharer. In the following sections, I will address in detail the distinct experiences of the memory sharer and memory listener.




Figure 3 - Depiction of the memory sharing process from sharer to listener and perceptual changes from the listener of the sharer.

1.1 Sharing Self-Defining Memories

The sharing of self-defining memories may be a particularly efficacious way for sharing aspects of the temporally extended self. Broadly, self-defining memories contain personally meaningful information that is vividly recollected in the moment. This personally meaningful information coupled with the vivid and immersive nature of these memories suggest that self-defining memories may be an important avenue for sharing the temporally extended self with others. When these memories contain information about an individual's work, they may be particularly effective for conveying useful information

about “who I am” to coworkers. In this section, I will focus on the experience of the memory sharer. Specifically, I will address (a) the phenomenological characteristics of recalled self-defining compared to everyday memories, and (b) the linguistic strategies used to communicate those memories to others.

1.1.1 Phenomenological Memory Characteristics

As episodic memories are records of individuals’ personal past and are therefore almost necessarily a unique record (although some research has begun to investigate the social reconstruction of shared memories in groups; Pasupathi, 2001; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012), it quickly becomes apparent that a nearly infinite number of memories can be recollected. While the content of specific autobiographical memories may vary widely from person to person, I contend that the phenomenological characteristics of these memories provide a mechanism for exploring memory outcomes irrespective of their content. Some memories may be very vivid recollections of experience, while others may become dulled with time and forgetting. By describing memories along these phenomenological dimensions, I can find common themes in recollected memories despite the unique nature of personal experience.

The phenomenological characteristics of episodic memories not only provide useful dimensions to describe specific memories, but also contain information that impacts the perceived veracity and utility of the memory. Research on reality monitoring addresses this relationship and indicates that memories characterized by high levels of perceptual detail were perceived as more real (compared to imagined) than memories with low levels of perceptual detail (M. K. Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; M. K. Johnson & Raye,

1981). A natural extension of this finding would suggest that the reality judgments of a recollected memory should influence the validity of the information contained within the memory, with memories judged as imagined being less efficacious for conveying information than memories judged as real.

This influence of phenomenological characteristics on the perceived veracity of memories is of critical importance for conveying information to the memory remember and, potentially, to others with whom this memory is shared. For example, think of a mundane memory of turning off the stove (or oven, hairdryer, curling iron, hotplate, etc.) after making tea in the morning. Depending on the day, I may have two different memories of turning off the stove. First, I know I turned off the stove because I turn it off every morning. Or second, I remember turning off the stove because I tripped over my dog while reaching for the dial. The second memory is characterized by perceptual and autonoetic detail, lending my memory more credibility and providing higher confidence that I did turn off the stove this morning. Similarly, my significant other is more likely to believe that I turned off the stove if I share the second memory with the vivid phenomenology of tripping over my dog than the first memory devoid of specifics. This suggests that highly vivid memories may more efficiently convey information to the memory listener. In this section, I will extend this basic idea and address the memory characteristics of (a) sensory-perceptual detail, (b) emotionality, (c) autonoesis, and (d) centrality.

1.1.1.1 Sensory-perceptual detail

Specific autobiographical memories are characterized by a host of vivid sensory-perceptual information that contributes to the feeling of reliving the original event. In his

basic systems approach, Rubin (2006, 2012) suggests that specific autobiographical memories are multimodal and can involve experiential elements from all the senses (i.e., vision, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and kinesthesia) in addition to varying in spatial, temporal, emotional, and narrative content. Furthermore, he proposes that these rich memories are constructed through the interactions of basic systems that serve the various experiential elements. For example, the vivid imagery in a specific memory is constructed from information held in the basic visual system, auditory elements from the basic auditory system, etc. The coordination of these systems produces a rich, specific autobiographical memory.

Of course, not all memories are experienced the same. Some may be accompanied by sharp visual imagery while others are more auditory. Generally, memories with more pronounced sensory-perceptual characteristics are judged by the individual recollecting the memory as providing more “real” information than memories with muted sensory information (M. K. Johnson, 2006; M. K. Johnson et al., 1988; M. K. Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; M. K. Johnson & Raye, 1981). These judgments are an important component of daily functioning as they allow individuals’ to “exert control over [their] own opinions and beliefs” (M. K. Johnson et al., 1993, p. 3). For example, memories that are confidently rated as real (not imagined) or confidently sourced (I remember reading this in the New York Times, not the National Enquirer) may be perceived as providing more credible information. Furthermore, these sensory-perceptual characteristics tend to covary, suggesting that some memories are, on average, more immersive than others (Takahashi & Shimizu, 2007). As self-defining memories are vivid recollections of goal attainment or goal failure, they should contain more sensory-perceptual characteristics than

everyday memories. An initial study comparing autistic and normal adults supports this proposed relationship, finding that self-defining memories were rated as more vivid than everyday memories (Crane, Goddard, & Pring, 2010). Extending this to a working population, I propose that self-defining work memories contain more sensory-perceptual details than everyday work memories.

H1: Self-defining work memories are characterized by higher levels of sensory-perceptual details than everyday work memories.

1.1.1.2 Emotionality

Emotional memories are phenomenologically different from non-emotional memories. Memory emotionality is related to memory vividness, with emotional memories being more vivid than non-emotional memories (Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004). In addition to memory vividness, emotional memories are also recalled from different perspectives than non-emotional memories. Memories for emotional events are more likely to be recalled from a field perspective (i.e., from the original point of view where the individual is looking out on the scene as it unfolds) while unemotional memories are more likely to be recalled from an observer perspective (i.e., from the perspective of an observer watching the scene; (Berntsen, 1996; D'Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). This emphasis on the first-person experience for an emotional memory, compared to the third-person experience in an unemotional memory, suggests that the emotionality of a recollected memory may be particularly important for memory phenomenology.

Furthermore, self-defining memories may be more emotional than everyday memories. As self-defining memories are records of long-term goal attainment or failure, they may be particularly emotional records of past experience. This is supported by research comparing memory recall in autistic and normal adults, which found that self-defining memories were rated as more emotional than everyday memories (Crane et al., 2010). Once again extending this effect to a working population, I propose that self-defining work memories are more emotional than everyday work memories.

H2: Self-defining work memories are characterized by higher levels of emotionality than everyday work memories.

1.1.1.3 Autonoesis

Autonoesis refers to “the special kind of consciousness that allows us to be aware of subjective time in which events happened” (Tulving, 2002, p. 2) and allows for mental time travel. This phenomenon allows the rememberer to travel back in time and consciously re-experience his or her past in the present moment when recalling an episodic memory. This re-experiencing of the past through autonoesis is perhaps best captured by the remember-know paradigm (Tulving, 1985). Stated most simply, we know many facts about our world and ourselves. For example, I *know* I was born in North Carolina, attended a four-year university, and applied for graduate school during a hectic senior year. I know these things *about myself* similar to how I know my colleague took a gap year before graduate school. Each of these are known as a semantic fact, not as a remembered experience. However, I *remember* my first acceptance to graduate school. I remember where I was standing (in my small, college-apartment kitchen), I remember the phone

ringing (hearing the sound and waiting a couple of seconds before answering to take a deep breath), and I remember the emotional component of the event (the overwhelming relief of finally being accepted into a program). The key distinction is that “I” do not just *know* I was accepted. I *remember* this in all its vivid, emotional detail.

Of course, not all memories are experientially recollected. In his seminal paper, Tulving (1985) distinguishes between autonoetic and noetic consciousness. While autonoetic memory is associated with episodic memory or the episodic elements of autobiographical memories (Conway, 2009), noetic memory is associated with known information in semantic memory. In a series of studies, Tulving (1985) demonstrates changes in autonoetic consciousness, suggesting that memories for an event can be characterized by varying levels of autonoetic and noetic remembering. More recently, D'Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008) found that autobiographical memories vary in the extent to which they are re-experienced. Specifically, they found that memories for positive events were associated with higher levels of re-experiencing than memories for negative events. Continuing in this vein, I posit that self-defining work memories will be characterized by greater autonoetic remembering than everyday work memories. While self-defining and everyday memories may contain episodic elements (Conway, 2009), the emotional and goal-relevant nature of self-defining work memories may make them particularly suited to autonoetic remembering.

H3: Self-defining work memories are characterized by higher levels of autonoetic recollection than everyday work memories.

1.1.1.4 Centrality

In addition to the phenomenological characteristics of sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, and auto-noesis, self-defining and everyday memories may also differ along how central the memory is to their sense of self. Self-defining memories, as discussed above, are records of progress towards long-term goals. However, these memories are more than just summary records, but contain information that has been incorporated into the person's sense of self. In a study of self-defining memories and personal strivings, 98% of reported memories were related to at least one personally generated striving (Moffitt & Singer, 1994). Breaking this down into more generalizable categories, Sutin and Robins (2005) found that the valence of self-defining memory is related to memory motivation, such that negative self-defining memories are related to power motivations while positive self-defining memories are related to achievement and intimacy motivations. These studies demonstrate the importance of self-defining memories in understanding individuals' motivations.

Additional research has looked not only at the relationship between self-defining memories and motivation, but how self-defining memories are incorporated into an integrative understanding of the self extended in time. Research has indicated that the perceived impact of a self-defining memory is related to the amount of meaning-making associated with an affective response to the memory (Wood & Conway, 2006). This meaning-making, or autobiographical reasoning, refers to the "self-reflective thinking or talking about the past that involves forming links between elements of one's life and the self in an attempt to relate one's personal past and present" (Habermas & Bluck, 2000, p. 749). This process allows self-defining memories, or "key scenes" as they are referred to in the narrative literature (McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001), to be

integrated into an individual's life story where they are thematically organized. The themes uncovered in these key scenes have been related to well-being and attitude evaluations of life and the self. Specifically, key scenes characterized by personal redemption (McAdams et al., 2001) and growth (Bauer & McAdams, 2004; Bauer, McAdams, & Sakaeda, 2005) are associated with high well-being. Similarly, redemptive themes in life-narrative episodes were associated with higher life satisfaction, higher self-esteem, and lower levels of depression. The integration of these self-defining memories into larger life narratives indicates that these memories may be important components of an individual's sense of self. Everyday memories, on the other hand, are unlikely to be incorporated into narrative understandings of the self or be strongly connected to individuals' long-term motivations. The construction of a work narrative is an important component of identity work, and self-defining work memories may be an important component of that constructive process (Ibarra & Barbulescu, 2010; Singer, Blagov, Berry, & Oost, 2013). This suggests that self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, are characterized by higher centrality to an individual's sense of self.

H4: Self-defining work memories are characterized by higher levels of centrality than everyday work memories.

In this section, I have described the characteristics of recollected memories. Specifically, I have posited that recollected self-defining memories are characterized by higher sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, auto-noesis, and self-centrality than everyday memories. In general, I posit that shared self-defining memories are potent conveyors of information because of the immersive and vivid nature of these memories. However, recollecting a vivid memory is only the first step in the memory sharing process.

In the next section, I will describe how the characteristics of recollected memories may be shared with others using language during the memory sharing process.

1.1.2 Linguistic Properties of Shared Memories

When sharing personal experience with others, we are limited by the words we use to describe and convey those memories. Therefore, the words used in memory sharing are likely particularly important for conveying information from the sharer to the listener. As discussed above, the phenomenological characteristics of memories are an important component of a recollected memory that can influence judgments of the credibility of the memory (M. K. Johnson et al., 1988; M. K. Johnson et al., 1993; M. K. Johnson & Raye, 1981). Similarly, I suggest the phenomenological characteristics of shared memories may influence the perceived credibility of the memory for the listener. Memories that are shared using linguistic strategies that highlight the vivid and immersive experience of the memory may be more efficacious conveyors of information.

Researchers have begun to explore the role of language in conveying underlying psychological processes using validated dictionaries from the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC, Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) program. The LIWC method uses a word count strategy that assesses “the content (what is being said) and style (how it is being said)” of text to uncover psychological information (Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003, p. 550). Applying this to the memory sharing process, the linguistic strategies used in memory sharing may convey information about the phenomenological characteristics of the shared memory. In this section, I will review the use of (a) perceptual process words,

(b) emotional tone, (c) first-person pronouns, and (d) authentic tone during the memory sharing process.

I have already proposed reliable differences between self-defining and everyday work memories and their associated phenomenological characteristics. Thus, the linguistic strategies used to share self-defining and everyday memories should, broadly, be divided along these lines. However, I also recognize that there may be a great deal of variability in the phenomenological characteristics of recollected memories within these broad self-defining and everyday categorizations. As I am interested in the ability of language to convey these recollected phenomenological characteristics, I will organize my hypotheses not along the self-defining and everyday memory divide, but along the general phenomenology continuum. Memories that are recollected as high on sensory-perceptual detail, regardless of the delineation between self-defining and everyday work memories, are likely to be shared using linguistic strategies that emphasize that detail.

Specifically, for sensory-perceptual detail, the use of perceptual process words in memory sharing may be related to the number of sensory-perceptual details in the recollected memory. The perceptual process words dictionary describes words related to seeing, hearing, and feeling and contains words such as look, heard, and feeling (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015). Memories that contain more sensory-perceptual details contain information related to what the memory sharer saw, heard, felt, etc. Thus, these memories are likely to be described using words that convey that information.

H5: Memories characterized by high levels of sensory-perceptual detail will be shared using more perceptual process words than memories characterized by low levels of sensory-perceptual detail.

Similarly, emotional memories are likely to be described using words that convey greater emotional tone. Bohanek, Fivush, and Walker (2005) found that narratives of positive emotional events contained more positive emotion words while narratives of negative emotional events contained more negative emotion words. This pattern of effects was replicated by Kahn, Tobin, Massey, and Anderson (2007), who found that amusing autobiographical memories were described using more positive feeling words while sad autobiographical memories were described using more negative emotion words. Taken together, this suggests that highly emotional memories will be shared using more emotion tone words than unemotional memories.

H6: Memories characterized by high levels of emotionality will be shared using more emotional tone words than memories characterized by low levels of emotionality.

The use of first-person pronouns may be related to autonoetic reliving of a recollected memory. Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010) argue that function words, such as personal pronouns, can reflect the allocation of attention in the speaker. Thus, individuals who are more focused on personal experience are likely to use more first-person pronoun words. This position is supported by research indicating that depressed individuals used more first-person singular pronouns than individuals who had never been depressed, presumably because of the increased self-focus associated with depression (Rude, Gortner,

& Pennebaker, 2004). Memories that are characterized by strong autooetic characteristics may be associated with increased self-focus due to the mental reliving of the event. An unpublished dissertation found that autobiographical memories were characterized by significantly more first-person pronouns than intentionally fabricated autobiographical memories (Justice, 2012). As intentionally fabricated memories cannot be autooetically recollected because they did not occur, this suggests that the use of first-person pronouns can approximate the amount of mental reliving of a memory. Extending this to the current study, I posit memories characterized by high levels of autooesis will be shared using more first-person pronouns.

H7: Memories characterized by high levels of autooesis will be shared using more first-person pronouns than memories characterized by low levels of autooesis.

Finally, the centrality of the recollected memory to the sharer's sense of self may also be communicated using a more authentic linguistic style. Authentic language is used in texts that are rated as more honest, personal, and disclosing (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015). Memories that are perceived as more central to an individual's life story may therefore be conveyed using language that emphasizes the personal nature of the memory. The relationship between memory centrality and authenticity has received tangential support in a study of nostalgic memory. Specifically, the researchers found that individuals rated nostalgic memories as leading to stronger feelings of authenticity compared to positive or ordinary memories (Stephan, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012). Extending this to the memory sharing process, I posit that memories high on self-centrality will be shared using a more authentic linguistic style.

H8: Memories characterized by high levels of self-centrality will be shared using more authentic tone words than memories characterized by low levels of self-centrality.

1.1.3 Summary of Memory Sharer Experience

The memory sharing process is composed of two primary players: the memory sharer and the memory listener. In this section, I have reviewed the experience of the memory sharer. First, the recall of a specific episodic memory can be broadly categorized into self-defining and everyday memories. Following this broad categorization, these memories can be further described by their phenomenological characteristics of sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, autoevidence, and self-centrality. Finally, these memories can be shared with others using linguistic strategies that emphasize and communicate these phenomenological characteristics to others. This process from recall to language describes the memory sharing process from the perspective of the memory sharer. In the following section, I will transition from the experience of the memory sharer to the memory listener.

1.2 Hearing Self-Defining Memories

The second critical piece of the memory sharing process is the listener's perspective when hearing a self-defining memory. It is an obvious yet important point that the sharing of a memory from the sharer to the receiver is limited by the listener's perspective of the shared memory. While a recollected memory may be highly vivid, emotional, and autoevident, the listener cannot access those recollective characteristics directly. Unlike the Pensieve in J.K. Rowling's novels, we are unable to enter others' memories to experience them for ourselves (Rowling, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007). Thus, the memory sharing process

is limited by the perceptions of the memory receiver. In this section, I will address the memory sharing process from the listener's perspective, focusing on the influence of (a) hearing self-defining memories on work-related outcomes and (b) the perceived phenomenological characteristics of the shared memory on memory efficacy.

1.2.1 Self-defining memories and work outcomes

The sharing of self-defining memories provides a mechanism for sharing aspects of the temporally extended self with others. When these memories are heard by others, the communicated information may influence the development of affective connections with the sharer and perceptions of work experience for the sharer. While research has focused primarily on why individuals share memories with others (Alea & Bluck, 2003), in this section I will focus on the experience of the memory receiver. Specifically, I will outline how hearing self-defining memories can (a) elicit affective connections of likability, affective trust, and empathy and (b) influence perceptions of work meaningfulness, insight, and cognitive rust in the receiver for the sender.

1.2.1.1 Elicit affective connections

Theoretical models of autobiographical memory sharing have posited that individuals share memories to aid in the development and maintenance of affective connections (Alea & Bluck, 2003). In this section, I will delve into how the social sharing of self-defining memories can elicit likability, affective trust, and empathy across the listener-sharer dyad. Specifically, I will explore how hearing a self-defining memory will aid in the development of affective connections *in* the listener *for* the sharer.

1.2.1.1.1 Likability

As workers develop affective connections with coworkers and supervisors, they often aim to be viewed, at the most basic level, as likable. Indeed, a central component of impression management research delves into how individuals try to enhance their work image to be viewed as more likable and effective employees (Bolino, Klotz, & Daniels, 2014). Being viewed as likable by peers and supervisors does have its benefits, particularly when ratings are subjective. For example, impression management strategies used to enhance likability are positively related to career success (Judge & Bretz Jr, 1994), job performance (Ferris, Judge, Rowland, & Fitzgibbons, 1994), organizational citizenship behaviors (Bolino, Varela, Bande, & Turnley, 2006), and ratings of contribution in a student group (Weisband & Atwater, 1999).

The sharing of self-defining memories may be a particularly potent way to establish affective bonds, such as likability, through increased self-disclosure. As self-defining memories are records of personally meaningful and emotional events (Singer & Salovey, 1993), the sharing of these memories may be seen as a type of self-disclosure to others. The self-disclosure associated with memory sharing may be an important component of developing likability across the sharer-listener dyad. A meta-analytic review of self-disclosure suggests that people who engage in intimate self-disclosure were more liked than individuals who self-disclosed less intimate details about their life (Collins & Miller, 1994). As the sharing of self-defining memories may be a particularly intimate form of self-disclosure, hearing a self-defining memory may lead to increased perceptions of likability for the memory sharer.

H9: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, will increase perceptions of likability for the sharer.

1.2.1.1.2 Trust

Trust, defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395), has long been considered a vital part of working relationships. It has been related to important attitudinal and behavioral outcomes, such as job satisfaction, extra-role behaviors, and team performance (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; De Jong, Dirks, & Gillespie, 2016; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Affective views of trust, compared to cognitive views of trust, rely upon notions of emotional bonds that arise from individual and social interaction (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). I propose that the hearing of self-defining memories can facilitate the development of affective trust.

As suggested above, self-defining memories may be a particularly compelling form of self-disclosure. Furthermore, previous research has found a positive relationship between self-disclosure and trust, with conscious disclosure and greater amount of disclosure related to increased trust (Wheless & Grotz, 1977). Extending these findings to the memory sharer, this suggests that the hearing of self-defining work memories can help facilitate the development and maintenance of emotional bonds that are required for affective trust among coworkers.

H10: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, will increase perceptions of affective trust for the sharer.

1.2.1.1.3 Empathy

In addition to aiding the development of trust, the hearing of self-defining memories can facilitate the development of empathy. Empathy is the affective response resulting from “one’s perceptions (directly experienced or imagined) and understanding (cognitive empathy) of the stimulus emotion, with recognition that the source of the emotion is not one’s own” (Cuff, Brown, Taylor, & Howat, 2016, p. 150). Essentially, empathy is the matching of affective feelings to the stimulus emotion. This congruent affective experience allows for the vicarious sharing of others’ positive or negative emotions (Morelli, Lieberman, & Zaki, 2015; Morelli, Rameson, & Lieberman, 2014). A crucial component of this empathic reaction is the ability to take another’s perspective (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012), especially for emotional experiences that require a context to be understood. For example, an unambiguous pain event, such as cutting your finger, does not require a context to understand and can generate empathy automatically (Morelli et al., 2014). However, more complex emotions, such as anxiety or happiness, typically require a context to understand. Affective reactions at work are rarely as unambiguous as physical pain, suggesting that the context of an affective event is important to the development of empathic reactions.

The importance of empathic connections with others has been widely recognized in the social work and medical fields (Raab, 2014), but these connections may be just as important in ‘normal’ workplaces. In fact, empathy has been related to increased prosocial behavior (Morelli et al., 2014), work engagement and extra-role performance (Bakker, 2007), improved social interactions (Gruhn, Rebucal, Diehl, Lumley, & Labouvie-Vief, 2008), and decreased burnout (Miller, Stiff, & Ellis, 1988; Wagaman, Geiger, Shockley, &

Segal, 2015). Furthermore, leader and manager empathy has been related to higher quality exchange relationships (Mahsud, Yukl, & Prussia, 2010) and lower levels of somatic complaints (Scott, Colquitt, Paddock, & Judge, 2010) with subordinates. This suggests that empathic connections are an important social feature in work relations. Initial research has found that sharing autobiographical memories can elicit empathy for a fictitious individual describing chronic back pain in a vignette (Bluck, Baron, Ainsworth, Gesselman, & Gold, 2013). Along this vein, I propose that the hearing of self-defining work memories provides the information needed for the listener to understand the sharer's perspective and enable empathy among coworkers.

H11: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, will increase feelings of empathy for the sharer.

1.2.1.2 Convey personal information

In addition to eliciting affective connections, the sharing of memories can be used to convey important information to others (Alea & Bluck, 2003). In this section, I will describe how the hearing of self-defining memories can convey personally relevant information about work meaningfulness, insight, and cognitive trust. Similar to the elicitation of affective connections above, I propose that shared memories influence the listener's perceptions of the sharer. As hearing a self-defining memory can influence affective connections in the listener for the sharer, hearing memories can convey personal information to the listener about the sharer.

1.2.1.2.1 Meaningfulness

Self-defining memories may be particularly informative for conveying work as meaningful. As defined by Rosso, Dekas, and Wrzesniewski (2010), I use the term “meaningful” or “meaningfulness” to refer to work that has significance (p. 95). In their seminal paper, Rosso et al. (2010) argue that the self is the source of meaningful work and suggest that “individuals’ values, motivations, and beliefs influence their perceptions of the meaning of work” (p. 95). I posit that self-defining memories contain information that influences perceptions of work meaningfulness through these same channels. Work that is aligned with an individual’s higher order values, motivations, and beliefs can contribute to the perception of work meaningfulness. In this section, I will demonstrate that self-defining memories contain information related to these processes and argue that the connection of self-defining memories to long-term goals will influence perceptions of work meaningfulness.

First, self-defining memories contain information about individuals’ work values. Work values are defined as “the end states people desire and feel they ought to be able to realize through working” (Nord, Brief, Atieh, & Doherty, 1990, p. 21). This emphasis on long-term goals in work values is reflected in self-defining memories, which contain records of goal attainment/failure towards long-term goals (Singer & Salovey, 1993). Furthermore, the salience of goals can allow self-defining memories to serve as motivators. Specifically, Pillemer (2001) describes memories related to starting points or turning points in long-term goal progress. The recollection of these memories can serve as continued motivation by making salient instances of goal attainment or goal failure during recollection. Finally, self-defining memories contain information that helps establish the

beliefs people have about their work. Specifically, a single memory can serve as an “enduring reminder of how the world works” and can provide “persistent affirmation of what is valuable or continued warning of what to avoid” (Pillemer, 2001, p. 128). These vivid memories contain valuable information that extends beyond the constraints of the original situation and the repeated remembering provides continued grounding of the belief system.

Work self-defining memories connect instances of work events to long-term goals in the temporally extended self. Furthermore, these memories contain information that informs individuals’ values, motivations, and beliefs, which are thought to be foundational for crafting perceptions of meaningful work. The sharing of these memories with others may be a particularly potent mechanism for developing work meaningfulness in the sharer due to the information conveyed and subsequent sensemaking (Rosso et al., 2010). Interpersonal sensemaking describes the “critical role played by others in the organization in the valuing and devaluing of the work that employees do, the roles employees hold, and the people employees are” (Wrzesniewski, Dutton, & Debebe, 2003, p. 95). When employees engage in interpersonal sensemaking, they interpret the cues provided by others to understand the significance of their job, role, and self at work. Thus, hearing a self-defining work memory will influence perceptions of the memory sharer’s work meaningfulness by conveying personally meaningful information that highlights the connection between the memory sharer’s long-term goals and their work.

H12: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, will increase perceptions of the memory sharer’s work meaningfulness.

1.2.1.2.2 Insights

The hearing of self-defining memories may also allow for vicarious learning in the listener. The recollection and sharing of self-defining memories prioritizes the role of personal experience. Research has begun to explicitly recognize the importance of experience-based learning that prioritizes experience for individual and organizational learning (Andresen, Boud, & Cohen, 2000; Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Carroll, Rudolph, & Hatakenaka, 2002). However, simply having an experience is not sufficient for learning to occur. Reflection over the experience is a critical component of learning (Daudelin, 1996). While learning does focus on the “immediate personal experience [as] the focal point for learning” (Kolb, 1984, p. 21), it requires subsequent observation and reflection to create abstract concepts and generalizations from the experience. I propose that the recollection and sharing of self-defining memories are particularly suited to convey insights gleaned from previous experience.

As already discussed, self-defining memories are vivid records of goal attainment or goal failure. This goal-relevant information can be educational for future behavior and can potentially be generalized beyond the initial memory encoding context. Pillemer’s (2001) discussion of analogous events directly addresses this educational perspective of self-defining memories. Specifically, he posits that analogous events inform future behavior by connecting a specific memory with themes that can be extended to new contexts. This allows a single memory to provide information that can be applied to diverse life events. For an example, a college student describes being caught taking a shortcut on a class project:

A second influential experience that I can recall involved an Art History paper. I wrote about a sculpture from a picture I had, rather than going to the museum to view it as we had been instructed. When I received the paper back it had no grade, but instead a note which said "see me." Upon meeting with the instructor I was informed that the piece about which I wrote was currently being restored. Since I had not followed instructions and written about a piece I had seen, I was required to write another paper. In addition to being extremely embarrassed, I learned a valuable lesson about not taking shortcuts. (Pillemer, Picariello, Law & Reichman, 1996, p. 331; also cited in Pillemer, 2001)

This memory describes a single event, but also contains information that can be generalized to other aspects of the student's life. In fact, the student even indicated that the specific memory is recalled "when the temptation to take a shortcut is present" (Pillemer, 2001, p. 128), demonstrating the utility of a single vivid memory to apply to a variety of thematically similar situations and influence behavior. This suggests that self-defining memories can contain insights that can be generalized to diverse situations.

Preliminary research has begun to investigate the role of self-defining memories in learning. Specifically, self-defining memories have been compared to lesson learning or insightful learning (Thorne, McLean, & Lawrence, 2004). Lessons refer to the concrete learning that can be applied in the future to a similar situation while insightful learning refers to the "broader meanings that extend to other parts of the self beyond those indicated in the narrated event" (McLean & Pratt, 2006, p. 715). Thorne and colleagues (2004) found that self-defining memories were more likely to contain insights than lessons, especially if the self-defining memories were achievement-oriented. Furthermore, subsequent analyses found that shared memories containing insights were perceived by the sharer as being more

positively received than shared memories containing lessons. While this does not directly address learning, it does convey two important points: (a) self-defining memories can contain insightful information and (b) the sharing of this information is generally positively received.

Extending this to the memory receiver, hearing self-defining memories may lead to learning in the listener. This vicarious learning has already been noted by Orr (1986), who described the sharing of “war stories” among copier technicians. These “war stories” describe examples of difficult diagnoses of broken copiers. These stories are shared presumably to communicate valuable information to other technicians. Specifically, Orr (1986) suggests that the social sharing with “one’s associates constitutes the mechanism for incorporating the diagnostic experience into the community expertise” and “these anecdotes are often remembered and used or referred to during the diagnosis of other difficult problems” (p. 62). The sharing of these memories can provide information to coworkers as well as an avenue to vicariously learn from the successes and failures of others. While these “war story” memories address relatively mundane diagnostic problems, the sharing of self-defining memories can be used to communicate insights with others and allow them to learn broader life lessons from the successes and failures of coworkers. Thus, I suggest that the hearing of self-defining work memories will lead to higher perceptions of insightfulness in the listener for the sharer.

H13: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories will increase perceptions of the sharer’s insightfulness.

1.2.1.2.3 *Cognitive trust*

Finally, the sharing of self-defining memories may aid in the development of cognitive trust. Cognitive trust is based primarily on the perception that the individual is reliable (D. Johnson & Grayson, 2005; McAllister, 1995). As self-defining memories are vivid recollections of goal progress or goal failure, the sharing of these memories may provide the listener with information on how the sharer handles a work success or work failure. This information, in turn, may decrease the perceived variability around potential behavioral responses to work events, leading to increased perceptions of reliability and cognitive trust.

H14: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, will increase perceptions of the sharer's cognitive trust.

1.2.1.3 Summary of outcomes.

Self-defining memories provide personally meaningful information about the temporally extended self. Hearing these memories can influence the development of affective connections and convey personally meaningful information to others. More specifically, hearing self-defining memories can lead to the development of trust and empathy and influence perceptions of work meaningfulness and insight in the listener for the sharer. Of course, not all shared memories are identical. In the next section, I will address how the perceived phenomenological characteristics of shared memories may influence the memory-sharing efficacy.

1.2.2 *Perceived Phenomenological Characteristics and Memory Efficacy*

Thus far, I have suggested that hearing self-defining memories, compared to everyday memories, will influence the development of affective connections and perceptions of work experience. However, not all memories are equally influential. As I addressed in my discussion of the memory sharer, recollected memories can be characterized by varying levels of phenomenological characteristics. Namely, memories may be described by their sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, auto-noesis, and self-centrality. Furthermore, these phenomenological characteristics can be shared with others using specific linguistic strategies. Extending this to the memory receiver, I suggest that the perceived phenomenological characteristics of a shared memory may influence the efficacy of that memory to serve its affective and informational outcomes.

The perceived phenomenological characteristics of shared memories may contain additional informational weight beyond the content of the memory. Previous research has indicated that the phenomenology of a recollected memory can influence the perceived credibility of the memory. Specifically, individuals are more likely to rate their memories as real if they contain more perceptual and emotional detail (M. K. Johnson, 2006; M. K. Johnson et al., 1988). This suggests that the phenomenological characteristics of a memory can have important implications for how the information contained in the memory is used. If a memory is judged to be imagined, the information contained in the memory may not be used by the remember. If, on the other hand, the memory is judged as real, then the information contained in the memory may be used to inform future attitudes and behaviors.

Extending this to the memory sharing process, shared immersive memories may be more efficacious for influencing outcomes. The phenomenological characteristics of the memory may influence perceptions of the shared memories' credibility or veracity, thereby

influencing how the information contained in the memory is used by the memory listener. Just as recalled memories are rated as more real when they are characterized by more pronounced sensory-perceptual details (M. K. Johnson, 2006), shared memories that emphasize perceptual processes will be viewed as more credible providers of information. An experimental study on interpersonal reality monitoring supports this claim, as vignettes with more perceptual detail were rated as more believable (M. K. Johnson, Bush, & Mitchell, 1998). Additional work on eyewitness testimony found that laypeople rated accounts with more congruent emotion as more credible than accounts with incongruent or no emotion (Wessel, Drevland, Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2006). These vivid and emotional memories are perceived as more credible, suggesting they are better able to convey information from the sharer to the listener. Extending this to memory sharing at work, this suggests that immersive memories generally will be more efficacious for influencing affective and informational outcomes when shared with others (see Figure 4).




Figure 4 - Depiction of the memory listener process where affective and informational outcomes are influenced by memory type and memory immersion.

H15a-c: The effect of memory type on affective memory outcomes is moderated by memory immersion, such that highly immersive self-defining work memories are related to higher ratings of (H15a) likability, (H15b) affective trust, (H15c) empathy for the memory sharer than non-immersive self-defining work memories.

H15d-f: The effect of memory type on informational memory outcomes is moderated by memory immersion, such that highly immersive self-defining work memories are related to higher ratings of (H15d) work meaningfulness, (H15e) insight, and (H15f) cognitive trust for the memory sharer than non-immersive self-defining work memories.

1.2.3 Summary of memory receiver experience

The second half of the memory sharing process addresses the memory listener, or the person who is hearing the memory from the memory sharer. In this section, I have focused on the experience of the memory listener in the memory sharing process. First, I overviewed how hearing a self-defining memory from a coworker may influence the development of affective connections and inform perceptions of work experience for the coworker. Specifically, hearing self-defining work memories may lead to higher levels of likability affective trust, and empathy, while enhancing perceptions of work meaningfulness, insight, and cognitive trust in the memory listener for the memory sharer. Of course, the phenomenological characteristics may also influence the efficacy of the memory sharing process. I also overviewed how highly immersive shared memories may be better able to influence affective and informational outcomes.

CHAPTER 2. METHOD

To explore the social uses of self-defining memories at work, two studies were conducted to investigate the role of the memory sharer and memory listener. The first study, focusing on the memory sharer, investigated the phenomenology of a recalled memory and the linguistic strategies used to share the memory. The second study, focusing on the memory listener, addressed the perceived phenomenology of the shared memory and its influence on affective and informational outcomes. Each study will be addressed in greater detail below.

2.1 Study 1: Sharing Self-Defining Memories

This study addresses the experience of the memory sharer in the memory sharing process by exploring the recall of a specific memory, the phenomenological characteristics of the memory, and the linguistic strategies used to share the memory with others. Recollected self-defining and everyday memories are hypothesized to be characterized by different phenomenological characteristics, with self-defining memories described by stronger (H1) sensory-perceptual detail, (H2) emotionality, (H3) autonoetic, and (H4) self-centrality characteristics. Furthermore, memories will be described and shared using language that reflects this memory phenomenology. Specifically, memories characterized by high levels of sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, autonoesis, and self-centrality will be shared using more (H5) perceptual process words, (H6) emotional tone words, (H7) first-person pronouns, and (H8) authentic tone words, respectively. By focusing on the memory sharer exclusively, I can explore how a recollected memory is translated from experience to words in the memory sharing process.

To address these hypotheses, participants were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk to complete a study on work-relevant memories. Participants were asked to complete a writing task describing a work-relevant memory (self-defining or everyday memory) and complete a series of questionnaires addressing the phenomenological characteristics of their recollected memory. The recollected memory text was subjected to linguistic analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC, Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) program to assess how the memories are shared through language. The specifics of the method are shared in greater detail below.

2.1.1 Participants.

Participants were full-time employees (working 30+ hours per week) living in the United States collected through Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk is a crowdsourcing platform for recruiting and compensating people for completing a variety of tasks, including participation in online experiments. Many researchers still harbor concerns about the validity and reliability of results collected from a Mechanical Turk sample, despite evidence that Mechanical Turk samples perform similarly to other convenience samples. Specifically, Mechanical Turk samples (a) met or exceeded the psychometric standards for individual difference measures associated with published research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), (b) exhibited high test-retest reliability (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013), and (c) performed similarly to a subject sample pool on a variety of tasks (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). This suggests that a Mechanical Turk sample may provide data of a

similar quality to other more traditional convenience research samples, such as student participant pools, other Internet samples, or snowball samples (Landers & Behrend, 2015).

An RMSEA power analysis was conducted to determine the proposed sample size for a path analysis (Preacher & Coffman, 2006). In the power analysis, acceptable model fit was defined as $RMSEA < .05$. For the desired power level of $1-\beta = .80$, a total sample size of 147 participants was needed. To account for possible participant attrition, a target sample size of 160 participants was set.

Responses from a total of 163 participants were collected. Responses from six participants were discarded for providing inappropriate memories (e.g., memories that were completely unrelated to work or memories that were less than 500 words long) or failing attention check items, resulting in a sample size of 157 participant responses. The sample is 39% male with a mean age of 34.8 years ($SD = 9.11$ years) and a mean job tenure of 6.14 years ($SD = 6.86$ years). The sample largely identified as white/Caucasian (73.25%) and reported an average household income between \$50,000 and \$59,999. All respondents reported a high school degree or an equivalent, with 32% of participants reporting a bachelor degree and 22% of participants reporting some college, but no degree. These sample characteristics largely match characteristics of a 2,896 participant Mechanical Turk sample, suggesting that the current sample is representative of Mechanical Turk workers generally. Participants took, on average, 41 minutes to complete the survey ($SD = 22$ minutes).

2.1.2 Protocol.

Participants were randomly assigned to the self-defining memory task (experimental condition) or the everyday memory task (control condition; Singer & Blagov, 2002). Participants were required to describe their memory using a minimum of 500 words. This narrative was subsequently subjected to linguistic analysis using the dictionaries provided by LIWC, as described above.

In addition to the memory task, participants were also asked to self-report the phenomenological characteristics of their recollected memory using the Memory Experience Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007) and the Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). Finally, participants were asked to provide demographic information. Each piece of the protocol will be described in greater detail below.

2.1.3 Memory manipulation.

An autobiographical memory manipulation was used to elicit self-defining and everyday memories (Singer & Blagov, 2002). This memory manipulation is based upon the memory manipulation originally used by Singer and Moffitt (1991-1992) to investigate memory specificity. The self-defining memory manipulation has been used in various memory studies over the years, ranging from developmental (McLean & Thorne, 2003; Thorne et al., 2004), clinical (Crane et al., 2010; Goddard, O'Dowda, & Pring, 2017; Nandrino & Gandolphe, 2017; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005), and cognitive research areas (Blagov & Singer, 2004; Liao, Bluck, & Westerhof, 2017; Moffitt & Singer, 1994).

While research has primarily focused on self-defining memories, some studies have explored the complementary role of everyday memories. Thus, the everyday memory component of the autobiographical memory task has also been used to elicit everyday

memories as a comparison to self-defining memories (Crane et al., 2010; Goddard et al., 2017; Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992). These studies have found that self-defining memories were more likely to be summary memories (27% of recollected memories) compared to everyday memories (8% of recollected memories), reflecting a broader generalization to the life story for self-defining memories (Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992). Furthermore, these self-defining memories were rated as more important to the memory sharer and contained more explicit references to self-discovery or self-understanding than everyday memories. A subsequent study found that healthy participants reported self-defining memories that were more emotionally intense, self-revealing, more well-remembered, more vivid, more important, and thought about more frequently than everyday memories (Crane et al., 2010; Goddard et al., 2017). This suggests that the self-defining and everyday memory prompts can elicit meaningfully different autobiographical memories.

The autobiographical memory task was adapted for this study in two ways. First, the self-defining and everyday memory tasks were adapted to be identical in every respect except the attribute referring to “an enduring theme, issue or conflict from your life” (for the self-defining memory task) or a memory that is “personally experienced, i.e., not a memory that a parent or sibling described to you, nor something that you read about or heard about through the media” (for the everyday memory task). The original memory manipulations manipulated several memory dimensions at once, such as the importance, emotionality, and rehearsal of the recollected memory. As such, it is impossible to discern if the self-defining and everyday memories differ because of these ancillary manipulations, or if they differ meaningfully along their connection to enduring life concerns. Since the

connection to long-term life goals is definitional to a self-defining memory, this attribute was kept while the others were controlled in the adapted memory manipulation.

Second, the self-defining and everyday memory manipulations were adapted to refer to work-related memories. This adaptation was included as this study is interested in how self-defining memories serve work-related processes. Therefore, self-defining and everyday memories about work were collected.

The specific changes made for the self-defining and everyday memory manipulations are described in greater detail below.

2.1.3.1 Self-defining memory task.

In the Self-Defining Memory Task, participants were asked to describe a memory that fulfills the following prompt (Singer & Blagov, 2002):

To understand best what a personal memory is, imagine you have just met someone you like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of you is very committed to helping the other get to know yourself. In the course of the conversation, you describe a work or professional memory that you feel *conveys powerfully how you have come to be the worker/professional you currently are* [emphasis added]. It is precisely this memory, which you tell the other person, that constitutes a personal memory.

In addition to the prompt, a list of six attributes were also included to describe a self-defining memory. As discussed above, this memory task was adapted in two ways (see Appendix A for original and adapted task). First, the memory attributes were changed to

match the everyday memory attributes in every way except for the connection to “an enduring theme, issue, or conflict from your life” (see Appendix A, Attribute #1). These changes were made to experimentally manipulate only one piece of a self-defining memory – the connection to an enduring theme, issue, or conflict. The remaining attributes were made neutral to match the everyday memory manipulation (e.g., It is a memory that is either important or unimportant to you) to prevent the prompt from manipulating multiple memory dimensions at once. Second, the following attribute was added to address work-relevant self-defining memories: “It is a memory about work. The memory does not need to have occurred at work, but it should be about work in some way” (see Appendix A, Attribute #6).

2.1.3.2 Everyday memory task.

Participants assigned to the everyday memory task, on the other hand, were asked to recall a generic memory. In this memory task, participants are asked to respond to the following prompt (see Appendix B):

To understand best what a personal memory is, imagine you have just met someone you like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of you is very committed to helping the other get to know yourself. In the course of the conversation, you describe a work or professional memory that you *personally experienced* [emphasis added]. It is precisely this memory, which you tell the other person, that constitutes a personal memory.

The italicized words in the prompt above highlight where the everyday memory prompt differs from the self-defining memory prompts. This prompt is an adaptation of the

self-defining memory prompt to make the two memory manipulations as similar as possible on every dimension except the connection to an enduring theme, issue, or concern (Singer & Blagov, 2002; see Appendix B for original and adapted task) . In addition to this memory prompt, participants are also given a list six attributes of everyday memories. All the attributes, included the added work attribute discussed above, were identical to the self-defining memory prompt except for the attribute referring to a personal memory. Specifically, this attribute read “It is a memory that was personally experienced, i.e., not a memory that a parent or sibling described to you, nor something that you read about or heard about through the media” (see Appendix B, Attribute #1).

After picking their self-defining or everyday memory, all participants were asked to describe their memory narrative. Specifically, participants were asked to provide the following information:

Please describe your work-related memory. In your description, please include a caption for the event, your age at the time of the event, whom you were with, what happened, and how you and any others present responded to the event. Please include details that would help an imagined friend see and feel as you did.

2.1.4 Self-report measures.

The following self-report measures were included in the study to determine if the memory manipulation was effective and assess the phenomenological memory characteristics: (a) manipulation check items, (b) the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007), and (c) the Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).

Demographic information was also collected via self-report. The complete scales are included in Appendix C.

2.1.4.1 Manipulation checks.

Six single-item manipulation checks were included to ascertain that the self-defining vs. everyday memory manipulation was eliciting appropriate memories from participants. These items asked participants to rate the extent to which the recalled memory (a) is an important memory to them, (b) represents the “real” them, (c) is thought about regularly, (d) describes an important theme from their life, (e) is an emotional memory about their life, and (f) reflects who they are as a person. While the dimensions of importance, emotionality, and rehearsal of the recollected memory were not experimentally manipulated in this study (see above for a discussion of adaptations to the autobiographical memory task), manipulation check items assessing these dimensions were included. This was used to ascertain if the adapted memory manipulation was still eliciting self-defining memories that are more important, emotional, and thought about more regularly than everyday memories.

2.1.4.2 Memory Experiences Questionnaire.

The phenomenological memory characteristics of autonoesis, sensory-perceptual detail, and emotionality were assessed using facets from the Memory Experience Questionnaire (MEQ, Sutin & Robins, 2007) . Currently, there are three scales that are commonly used to assess memory phenomenology: the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; M. K. Johnson et al., 1998), the Autobiographical Memory

Questionnaire (AMQ; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003), and the Memory Experience Questionnaire (MEQ; Sutin & Robins, 2007).

The MCQ is the classic memory phenomenology questionnaire, composed of 39 items assessing constructs ranging from the amount of visual detail to relative spatial arrangement of objects in the memory (M. K. Johnson et al., 1988). The AMQ is a more recent measure of memory phenomenology that is composed of 19 items assessing constructs ranging from story coherence to memory distortion (Rubin et al., 2003). However, these scales suffer from several measurement limitations. First, the scale construction procedures for these measures were not guided by item or factor analysis, and the even subsequent studies have failed to report robust and replicable factors (Suengas & Johnson, 1988; Takahashi & Shimizu, 2007). Indeed, the interitem reliability for the MCQ scales, when reported, is below acceptable levels (Schaefer & Philippot, 2005). Second, the MCQ and AMQ scales rely on single-item measurements for some important constructs or simply do not assess other constructs of interest. For example, the MCQ does not have items addressing the visual perspective and the AMQ relies on a single item to address the emotionality of a recollected memory with no reference to the emotional valence. Finally, these scales do not contain any reverse-scored items. While not inherently a problem, the lack of reserve-scored items coupled with the online data collection lead to concerns about response sets or mindless responding from participants.

The MEQ, in contrast, contains ten factor analyzed facets of memory phenomenology assessing the various dimensions with a minimum of five items (Luchetti & Sutin, 2016; Sutin & Robins, 2007). The facets exhibit acceptable interitem reliability ($\alpha > .70$) and contain reverse-scored items, allowing for the detection of mindless

responding in participants. Furthermore, the MEQ has been related to individual differences in remembering and the type of memory recalled. Specifically, the MEQ has differentiated between individuals high/low on psychological distress and self-esteem and their subsequent memory phenomenology (Sutin & Gillath, 2009; Sutin & Robins, 2007). Perhaps more importantly, the MEQ can detect phenomenological differences based on the type of memory recalled. Specifically, past memories, near self memories, and memories with a first-person perspective were associated with stronger phenomenological characteristics than imagined future memories, memories about friends, and third-person perspective memories, respectively (Gryzman, Prabhakar, Anglin, & Hudson, 2013; Sutin & Robins, 2010). Due to the demonstrated reliability and validity of this scale for capturing meaningful variability in memory phenomenology, the MEQ was used in this study.

Autonoesis was assessed with seven items addressing visual perspective (e.g., “I see the experience in the memory through my own eyes”). Sensory-perceptual detail was assessed using eight items from the sensory detail subscale (e.g., “I can bodily ‘feel’ myself in this memory”). Emotionality was assessed using six items from the emotional intensity subscale (e.g., “The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions”). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agree with each item (1 – Strongly disagree, 5 – Strongly agree). In addition to the three facets of the MEQ addressed above, the remaining 7 facets were also included in this study for exploratory analyses.

2.1.4.3 Centrality of events scale.

The phenomenological characteristic of self-centrality was assessed using the Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). This 20-item scale assessed how

central an event is to a person's life story (e.g., "This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the world"). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agree with each item (1 – Strongly disagree, 5 – Strongly agree). This scale has a one-factor solution and demonstrates high reliability ($\alpha > .90$; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). Traditionally, this scale has been used in conjunction with post-traumatic stress events, but it has also been used with normal populations assessing the relationship between positive and negative event memories and the subsequent centrality of the memory to the participant's life story (Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 2011; Boals, 2010; Pinto-Gouveia & Matos, 2011). Furthermore, the self-centrality of a memory has been related to the memory phenomenological characteristics, with highly self-central memories related to increased vividness and emotional intensity (Boals, 2010).

2.1.4.4 Linguistic measures.

Finally, the provided memories were subjected to linguistic analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC, Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) program. The LIWC program is a word count method that divides words into psychologically meaningful categories (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). The computer program is accompanied by a set of predefined dictionaries that assess style words (e.g., pronouns, prepositions, auxiliary verbs, etc.) and content words (e.g., nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc.). Style words reflect how people are communicating while content words reflect what they are saying. LIWC is a "probabilistic system" (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010, p. 30), meaning it codes words according to their typical usage. For example, the phrase "I'm mad at him" and "He's mad as a hatter" will both code "mad" as an anger word, ignoring the context of the phrase. However, this is a limitation of most linguistic analysis tools.

LIWC pre-defined dictionaries were used in this study. Specifically, the perceptual process dictionary contains words such as “look, heard, feeling” while the first-person pronoun dictionary contains words such as “I, me, mine” (Pennebaker, Boyd, et al., 2015). The summary variables of authentic language and emotional tone are proprietary variables that are not accompanied by open dictionaries. These variables are derived from published findings (Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker, 2004; Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2003). These summary variables represent percentile rank scores of authenticity and emotional tone based on large comparison samples.

In addition to the hypothesized linguistic variables described above, the remaining style and content linguistic variables were also calculated through the LIWC program for exploratory analyses. Examples of words from the requisite dictionaries can be found in the LIWC manual (Pennebaker, Boyd, et al., 2015).

2.2 Study 2: Hearing Self-Defining Memories

This study addresses the experience of the memory listener in the memory sharing process. Specifically, this study investigates how the type of memory (self-defining vs. everyday memory) and the immersion of the memory (high immersion vs. low immersion) influences the efficacy of the shared memory for affective and informational outcomes. Specifically, shared self-defining memories are thought to elicit stronger affective connections of (H9) likability, (H10) affective trust, and (H11) empathy for the memory sharer the everyday memories. Similarly, shared self-defining memories are thought to elicit stronger informational connections of (H12) perceived work meaningfulness, (H13) insight, and (H14) cognitive trust with the memory sharer than everyday memories. Finally,

the relationship between memory type and informational and affective outcomes is hypothesized to be moderated by memory immersion. Specifically, self-defining memories that are characterized by strong phenomenological memory characteristics (e.g., high sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, auto-noesis, and self-centrality) are thought to be more efficacious conveyors of information, leading to higher ratings of (H15a) likability, (H15b) affective trust, (H15c) empathy, (H15d) perceived work meaningfulness, (H15e) insight, and (H15f) cognitive trust. In this study, I will focus on the experience of the memory listener and explore how shared memories, and their associated phenomenology, inform affective and informational work outcomes.

To address these hypotheses, four representative vignettes were selected from Study 1 to manipulate memory type (self-defining vs. everyday memory) and memory immersion (high vs. low). Participants recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and asked to read the assigned vignette. Specifically, participants were given the following instructions:

This part of the experiment involves the sharing of a personal memory. On the next page, you will be asked to read a real memory shared by a real individual. Please read this memory carefully, and imagine this person is a coworker telling you a story about their work.

After reading this personal memory, you will be asked a series of questions about the memory and the person sharing the memory.

Following the reading task, participants were asked to rate the perceived phenomenology of the memory for the memory sharer and rate the imagined memory

sharer along the affective and informational dimensions. Finally, participants were asked to respond to an open-ended question asking them to describe the memory they read and provide demographic information.

2.2.1 Participants.

Responses from a total of 119 participants were collected from Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Responses from six participants were discarded for failing attention checks or being unable to describe the shared memory, resulting in a sample size of 113 participants. Participants were full-time employees (working 30+ hours per week) living in the United States. The sample is 50% male with a mean age of 37.0 years ($SD = 10.20$ years) and a mean job tenure of 6.84 years ($SD = 5.72$ years). The sample overwhelming identified as white/Caucasian (77.9%) and reported an average household income of \$40,000 - \$49,999. All but one respondent reported a high school or an equivalent, with 45% of participants reporting a bachelor degree and 22% of participants reporting some college, but no degree.

2.2.2 Protocol.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: self-defining memory – high immersion, self-defining memory – low immersion, everyday memory – high immersion, everyday memory – low immersion. Participants were asked to read a de-identified memory that was shared in Study 1, rate the memory for its phenomenological characteristics, and evaluate the imagined memory sharer for their perceived affective connection (i.e., likability, affective trust, empathy) and information connection (i.e.,

meaning, insight, cognitive trust). Finally, participants self-reported demographic information.

2.2.3 *Vignettes.*

The goal of vignette selection was to select self-defining and everyday memories that were shared using language reflecting high or low memory immersion. To that end, vignettes were selected from Study 1 based on (a) their inclusion in the self-defining or everyday memory elicitation manipulation and (b) a combination of their linguistic characteristics. As this study is focused on the experience of the memory listener, the vignettes were chosen based on the linguistic characteristics of the vignette instead of the self-reported phenomenological characteristics of the memory sharer. While it was hypothesized in Study 1 that perceived phenomenology would influence linguistic characteristics, these hypotheses were largely unsupported. While it is possible that the phenomenal characteristics were communicated using linguistic strategies I did not assess, the vignettes were selected based on linguistic characteristics that would be communicated to the memory sharer instead of self-reported phenomenology that may or may not be communicated. Specifically, memories were chosen based on their linguistic achievement, affect, visual perceptual processes, and first-person singular pronouns.

The linguistic property of achievement was chosen because it positively related to the phenomenological characteristic of self-centrality. Memories that were rated as more central to the sharer's sense of self were shared using more achievement words ($b = .29$, $t = 2.65$, $p < .01$). Therefore, high immersion memories were selected that were in the upper

quartile of achievement words and low immersion memories were selected from the lower quartile of achievement words.

The remaining phenomenological characteristics of emotional intensity, sensory-perceptual detail, and auto-noesis were not related to any interpretable linguistic strategies. This may be due, at least in part, to the psychometric difficulties associated with the assessment of these characteristics. Therefore, the linguistic strategies of affect words, visual perceptual process words, and first-person singular pronouns were chosen to approximate the communication of these phenomenological characteristics through language. The selected high/low immersion vignettes are, on average, two standard deviations apart on linguistic affect words, 1 standard deviation apart on first-person singular pronouns, and .75 standard deviations apart on visual perceptual process words. The high immersion memories contain more affect words, first-person singular pronouns, and visual perceptual process words than low immersion memories. The selected vignettes are in Appendix D.

2.2.4 Self-report measures.

The following measures were included to assess affective and informational outcomes and perceived memory phenomenology: (a) manipulation checks, (b) likability, (c) affective trust, (d) empathy, (e) work meaningfulness, (f) insight, (g) cognitive trust, (h) Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007), (i) Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), and (j) likelihood of sharing a memory with the memory sharer. All the measures were adapted in various ways to refer to the imagined memory sharer.

Specific information on the memories, and how they were adapted, is included below. The complete scales are included in Appendix E.

2.2.4.1 Manipulation checks.

Participants were asked to respond to six manipulation check items to ascertain if the memory manipulation was eliciting the appropriate types of memory. These manipulation check items were adapted from Study 1 to refer to the imagined memory sharer. Specifically, these items address (a) an important memory for the sharer, (b) representative of the “real me” for the sharer, (c) thought about regularly by the sharer, (d) describing an important theme for the sharer, (e) an emotional memory for the sharer, and (f) reflective of the memory sharer as a person.

2.2.4.2 Likability.

Likability was assessed with eight items from the Reysen Likability Scale (Reysen, 2005). Three items were discarded as they were not relevant to this study. Specifically, one item was discarded because it addresses similarity and one item was discarded because it addresses roommates. A final item was discarded as it addressed physical attraction. A sample item is “This person is likable.” This scale exhibits accepted inter-item reliability and shows appropriate convergent and discriminant validity (Reysen, 2005). Participants are asked to rate how strongly they agree with each statement (1 –Strongly disagree, 5 – Strongly agree).

2.2.4.3 Affective trust.

Listeners' affective trust of the memory sharer was assessed with five items from an interpersonal trust measure assessing affect-based trust (McAllister, 1995). Items were adapted to refer to the memory sharer instead of a specific coworker. An example item is "I believe I would be able to talk freely to this individual about difficulties I am having at work and know that (s)he will want to listen." The scale exhibits appropriate interitem reliability and is related to peer interaction frequency and citizenship behavior, indicating appropriate convergent validity (McAllister, 1995). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statements regarding their imagined coworker (1 – Very strongly disagree, 7 – Very strongly agree).

2.2.4.4 Empathy.

Empathy was assessed with a list of five adjectives. Participants were asked to report how sympathetic, warm, compassionate, soft-hearted, and tender they feel towards their imagined coworker (1 – Not at all, 5 – Extremely). This empathy index has been used in previous interpersonal studies of empathy (Batson, 1987; Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995; DeWall & Baumeister, 2006). The five adjectives have acceptable interitem reliability and have been related to social exclusion (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006).

2.2.4.5 Meaningfulness.

Meaningfulness was assessed using 10 items from two measures of work meaningfulness (Bunderson & Thompson, 2009; May, Gilson, & Harter, 2004). The items were adapted to refer to the perceived work meaningfulness of the memory sharer. The two scales were combined they appear to be tapping in to different but related aspects of the work meaningfulness construct (e.g., work meaningfulness as it relates to the individual

and work meaningfulness as it relates to the broader societal context). One item was discarded because it was essentially the same across both scales. The scales exhibit appropriate interitem reliability and are related to occupational identification, job enrichment, and work role fit (Bunderson & Thompson, 2009; May et al., 2004). An example item is “The work this person does on this job is worthwhile.” Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agree with each statement (1 – Very strongly disagree, 7 – Very strongly agree).

2.2.4.6 Insight.

Perceived insight was assessed using items developed from definitions of insights within autobiographical learning (McLean & Thorne, 2001; McLean & Thorne, 2003; Thorne et al., 2004). As described above, insight refers to learning that extends beyond the immediate event and to experience broadly. I developed five questions that ask participants to rate the perceived insightfulness of the memory sharer. An example item is “My coworker knows ‘life lessons’ that can apply to life broadly.” Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agree with each statement (1 – Very strongly disagree, 7 – Very strongly agree).

2.2.4.7 Cognitive trust.

Listeners’ cognitive trust of the memory sharer was assessed with six items from an interpersonal trust measure assessing cognitive-based trust (McAllister, 1995). Items were adapted to refer to the memory sharer instead of a specific coworker. An example item is “I believe this person approaches his/her job with professionalism and dedication.” The scale exhibits appropriate interitem reliability and is related to improved decision

outcomes (McAllister, 1995; Parayitam & Dooley, 2009). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statements regarding their imagined coworker (1 – Strongly disagree, 5 – Strongly agree).

2.2.4.8 Memory Experiences Questionnaire.

The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007) was used again to assess the perceived memory phenomenology for the memory sharer. Specifically, the memory listener was asked to rate how vivid, emotional, etc. the shared memory was for the memory sharer. While the MEQ exhibited psychometric issues in Study 1 associated with ceiling effects, this measure was kept for Study 2 (a) to maintain consistency across studies and (b) because an acceptable alternative does not exist. Once again, all 10 facets of the MEQ were included in this study, and the items were adapted to refer to the memory sharer's experience instead of "my" experience. A sample item is "This person's memory for this event is clear." Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statements regarding their imagined coworker (1 – Strongly disagree, 5 – Strongly agree).

2.2.4.9 Centrality of Events Scale.

The Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) was used to assess the perceived self-centrality of the shared memory for the memory sharer. The items were adapted to refer to the memory sharer's experience instead of "my" experience. A sample item is "This event tells a lot about who this person is." Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statements regarding their imagined coworker (1 – Strongly disagree, 5 – Strongly agree).

CHAPTER 3. RESULTS

The following analyses will address the experiences of the memory sharer and the memory listener. Study 1 addresses the recall of a self-defining or everyday memory, its associated phenomenological characteristics, and the language used to describe and share that memory. Study 2 extends the memory sharing process to the memory listener and explores how shared memories are used to inform interpersonal affective and informational outcomes, and how the phenomenological characteristics of the memory influence the strength of that relationship.

3.1 Study 1: Memory Sharer Results

The first piece of the memory sharing process addresses the memory experience of the memory sharer for the recollection of a self-defining or everyday memory, the phenomenological characteristics of the memory, and the language used to describe and share the memory with others. Prior to investigating the hypotheses, it is first important to ascertain that the memory manipulation is working correctly. Therefore, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to explore the effect of the memory manipulation on the extent to which the memory was rated as (a) important, (b) representing the “real” me, (c) thought about regularly, (d) describing an important theme from my life, (e) emotional, and (f) reflecting who I am as a person. The multivariate test revealed a significant effect of memory type on the manipulation check items, $F(6, 150) = 4.38$, Pillai’s Trace = .15, $p < .01$, therefore post-hoc univariate tests were conducted.

A Holm-Bonferroni correction was used to set target alpha levels for the multiple comparisons (Holland & Copenhaver, 1988; Holm, 1979). A Holm-Bonferroni, compared

to a traditional Bonferroni correction, changes the target alpha level for each additional test. This approach appropriately constrains Type I error rates while providing sufficient power to detect meaningful effects. The univariate tests revealed a significant effect of memory type across all six manipulation check items (see Table 1). Specifically, self-defining memories were rated as more (a) important, (b) representing the “real” me, (c) thought about regularly, (d) describing an important theme form my life, (e) emotional, and (f) reflecting who I am as a person than everyday memories. These analyses suggest that the memory manipulation could elicit self-defining and everyday memories (see Figure 5).

Table 1 - Univariate tests of memory sharer manipulation check items.

Manipulation Check Item	Everyday Memory		Self-defining Memory		<i>F</i>	P-value	Target alpha
	M	SD	M	<i>SD</i>			
1. To what extent does this memory reflect who you are as a person?	3.15	1.11	3.94	1.00	21.57	0.000*	0.008
2. This memory describes an important theme from my life.	3.37	1.31	4.11	1.03	15.64	0.000*	0.010
3. This is an emotional memory about my life.	3.47	1.24	4.05	1.00	10.35	0.002*	0.013
4. This memory is an important memory for me.	3.90	1.10	4.35	0.08	9.12	0.003*	0.017
5. This memory represents the “real” me.	3.65	1.24	4.09	1.02	5.81	0.017*	0.025
6. I think about this memory regularly.	3.18	1.25	3.59	1.20	4.52	0.035*	0.050

* Significant effect compared to Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha.




Figure 5 - Effect of memory type on manipulation check items for the memory sharer.

The following analyses are divided into four parts. First, I will explore the relationship between memory type (self-defining vs. everyday memory) and phenomenological memory characteristics. Second, I will address the relationship between memory phenomenology and the linguistic strategies used to share those memories. Third, I will provide an overview of a path model of memory sharing that addresses memory type, memory phenomenology, and linguistic strategies. Finally, I will cover additional exploratory analyses not explicitly addressed in the hypotheses. Each of these sections will be addressed in detail below. For the following analyses, outliers were discarded in a pairwise fashion. Outliers were defined as responses 1.5 times the interquartile range below/above the first/third quartile (Tukey, 1977). This interquartile method was used as it is more robust to extreme scores than the traditional standard deviation approach.

3.1.1 Phenomenological characteristics of self-defining and everyday memories.

After ascertaining that the memory manipulation was eliciting appropriate memories from the participants, additional analyses were conducted to investigate memory phenomenology (see Table 2 for descriptive and correlational statistics). However, an inspection of the distributions reveals severe ceiling effects for the MEQ facets of sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, and auto-noesis (see Figure 6). This lack of normality is concerning and potentially limits the generalizability of the results. Despite these ceiling effects, the following analyses were conducted to test for the hypothesized effects of memory type on memory phenomenology.

Table 2 - Descriptive and correlational statistics for memory sharer phenomenological memory characteristics.

	n	M	SD	α	1.	2.	3.	4.
Memory Type	157	.50	.50	--	--			
Sensory-perceptual detail	156	4.11	.63	.78	-.01	--		
Emotionality	156	4.30	.71	.87	.15	.68**	--	
Autonoesis	157	4.14	.81	.82	-.09	.34**	.25**	--
Self-centrality	153	4.54	1.28	.95	.38**	.20*	.37**	-.07

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$




Figure 6 - Distribution of responses for phenomenological sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, auto-noesis, and self-centrality.

Specifically, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to investigate if self-defining memories, compared to everyday memories, are characterized by (H1) more sensory-perceptual detail, (H2) more emotionality, (H3) stronger auto-noesis, and (H4) more self-centrality. The MANOVA results indicate a significant difference in phenomenological characteristics for self-defining and everyday memories, $F(4, 147) = 7.32$, Pillai's Trace = .17, $p < .01$.

Planned post-hoc comparisons were conducted to further investigate the role of memory type on specific phenomenological characteristics. A significant difference between self-defining and everyday memories was not found for sensory-perceptual detail, $F(1, 150) = 0.00$, $p = .99$, emotionality, $F(1, 150) = 3.21$, $p = .08$, or auto-noesis, $F(1, 150) = 1.17$, $p = .28$. A significant effect of memory type was found for self-centrality, such that self-defining memories were rated as being more central to their sense of self than everyday memories, $F(1, 150) = 27.12$, $p < .01$. The univariate results and group means are presented in Table 3. These results indicate that self-defining memories are perceived as more central to the sharer's sense of self than everyday memories (H4, supported), but do not differ along the phenomenological characteristics of sensory-perceptual detail (H1, not supported), emotionality (H2, not supported), or auto-noesis (H3, not supported).

Table 3 - Univariate tests of memory sharer phenomenological characteristics and memory type.

Phenomenological Characteristics	Everyday Memory		Self-defining memory		F	Hypothesis
	M	SD	M	SD		
Sensory-perceptual	4.11	0.68	4.11	0.58	0.00	H1
Emotionality	4.19	0.78	4.40	0.63	3.21 ^t	H2
Autonoesis	4.21	0.81	4.07	0.80	1.17	H3
Self-centrality	4.06	1.29	5.04	1.06	27.12**	H4

^t < .10, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

3.1.2 *Linguistic strategies and phenomenological characteristics.*

After investigating the phenomenological characteristics of recalled memories, a series of analyses were conducted to explore the linguistic strategies used in the sharing of these memories. Prior to investigating the hypotheses, a MANOVA was conducted to determine if self-defining and everyday memories were shared using similar control language metrics. Specifically, a MANOVA was conducted to determine if self-defining and everyday memories were shared using similar (a) number of words, (b) words per sentence, (c) words greater than six letters, and (d) dictionary words. A significant effect of memory type was not found on these language metrics, Pillai's Trace = 0.04, $F(4, 152) = 1.55$, $p = .19$ (see Table 4 for group means). This suggests that self-defining and everyday memories were not shared using different language metrics, providing initial evidence that these memories are not substantially different along irrelevant dimensions, such as the number of words used to describe the memory. This suggests that any differences in linguistic strategies are likely due to the type of memory being recalled, not unrelated language dimensions.

Table 4 - Univariate tests of memory sharer control linguistic characteristics across memory type.

Linguistic characteristic	Everyday Memory		Self-defining memory	
	M	SD	M	SD
Word count	598.06	107.51	590.89	114.08
Words per sentence	20.57	6.26	21.87	9.76
Words greater than six letters	15.75	3.34	16.77	4.28
Dictionary words	91.25	3.75	91.82	3.36

A series of linear regressions were used to determine if phenomenological memory characteristics were shared using specific linguistic strategies (see Table 5 for descriptive and correlation statistics). Specifically, regressions were used to determine if high sensory-perceptual detail was shared using more perceptual process words (H5), high emotionality was shared using more emotional tone words (H6), high autonoesis was shared using more personal pronouns (H7), and high self-centrality was shared with more authentic tone (H8). A significant effect of memory phenomenology on linguistic characteristics was not found for any of the hypothesized relationships (see Table 6). Phenomenological sensory-perceptual detail was unrelated to perceptual process words (H5, not supported), emotionality was not related to emotional tone words (H6, not supported), autonoesis was not related to personal pronouns (H7, not supported), and self-centrality was not related to authentic tone words (H8, not supported).

Table 5 - Descriptive and correlational statistics for memory sharer linguistic characteristics.

	n	M	SD	1	2	3	4
1. Memory Type	157	0.50	0.50	--			
2. Perceptual process words	156	2.09	1.02	0	--		
3. Emotional tone words ^a	157	21.3	12.94	0.03	0.1	--	
4. First-person singular pronouns	157	7.39	3.08	0.16*	0.15	0.13	--
4. Authentic tone	156	70.44	22.63	0.04	-0.03	0.04	0.62**

^a Emotional tone variable is transformed so that 0 represents a neutral tone and 50 represents a more emotional tone

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 6 - Linear regressions for memory sharer linguistic strategies.

	Model 1: Perceptual process words			Model 2: Emotional tone ^a			Model 3: First- person singular pronouns			Model 4: Authentic language		
<i>Phenomenological Characteristics</i>	b	SE	t	b	SE	t	b	SE	t	b	SE	t
Sensory-perceptual detail	.18	13	1.35									
Emotional tone				.89	1.45	.61						
Autonoesis							-.13	.31	.66			
Self-centrality										2.38	1.42	1.68

^a Emotional tone variable is transformed so that 0 represents a neutral tone and 50 represents a more emotional tone

3.1.3 *Path model of memory sharing.*

In addition to the analyses described above, a path analysis was conducted to investigate the role of memory type, phenomenological memory characteristics, and linguistic strategies in one complete model. This allows for a test of a general model fit instead of exploring each relationship separately. Furthermore, a path model allows for the carrying through of variance from memory type through phenomenological characteristics to linguistic strategies, allowing for a more precise test of these mediating mechanisms.

An initial model was tested exploring the effect of memory type through phenomenological memory characteristics to linguistic strategies (see Figure 7). This model exhibited very poor model fit, $\chi^2 (22, 149) = 161.56$, $p < .001$, CFI = .39, RMSEA = .21. An investigation of modification indices suggests that correlating error terms among the phenomenological characteristics would improve model fit. Therefore, a second model was examined with correlated error terms (see Figure 8). This model exhibited greatly improved fit, $\chi^2 (16, 149) = 26.41$, $p = .05$, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .07. At risk of overfitting the model, analyses were halted at this point.




Figure 7 - Initial path analysis for memory type, phenomenological characteristics, and linguistic strategies. $\chi^2 (22, 149) = 161.56$, $p < .001$, CFI = .39, RMSEA = .21




Figure 8 - Final path analysis for memory type, phenomenological characteristics, and linguistic strategies with correlated error terms. $\chi^2 (16, 149) = 26.41, p = .05, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .07$

As the second model exhibited moderate fit, the path coefficients in this model were examined. The results from the path analysis largely mirror the results described above in the separated analyses. Memory type (self-defining vs. everyday memories) was unrelated to sensory-perceptual detail (H1, not supported), emotion (H2, not supported), and autooiesis (H3, not supported). Memory type was significantly related to self-centrality (H4, supported). The variance from phenomenological characteristics did not carry through to linguistic strategies. Sensory-perceptual detail was unrelated to perceptual process words (H5, not supported), phenomenological emotion was unrelated to emotional tone (H6, not supported), autooiesis was unrelated to first-person singular pronouns (H7, not supported), and self-centrality was unrelated to authentic language (H8, not supported).

These results do not support the proposed model of memory type (self-defining vs. everyday memories) leading to reliable phenomenological memory characteristics that are conveyed to others through reliable linguistic strategies. Self-centrality is the only phenomenological characteristic that is reliably related to memory type, and the linguistic strategies were largely unrelated to their hypothesized phenomenological memory characteristics. In the following section, I will branch out beyond the hypothesized relationships discussed above and conduct exploratory analyses to investigate phenomenological and linguistic strategies more broadly.

3.1.4 Exploratory analyses.

Additional analyses were conducted to explore the phenomenological and linguistic differences among self-defining and everyday memories that were not accompanied by specific hypotheses. For the following analyses, MANOVAs and, where permitted, post-

hoc univariate comparisons were conducted. Target alpha levels for the post-hoc univariate comparisons were calculated using the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holland & Copenhaver, 1988; Holm, 1979).

As a first step, additional analyses were conducted among the subscales for the Memory Experience Questionnaire (MEQ; Sutin & Robins, 2007) . The MEQ contains subscales that address memory (1) vividness, (2) coherence, (3) accessibility, (4) time perspective, (5) sharing, (6) distancing, and (7) valence in addition to the hypothesized subscales of (8) sensory detail, (9) visual perspective or autonoesis, and (10) emotional intensity (see Table 7 for descriptive and correlation statistics). An inspection of the distribution of responses reveals strong ceiling effects for many of the subscales of the MEQ (see Figure 9). While it is possible that all participants recollected their memories with exceptionally strong vividness, coherence, emotionality, etc., it also seems plausible that the scale was unable to capture meaningful variation in memory phenomenology.

Table 7 - Descriptive and correlation statistics for Memory Experience Questionnaire subscales.

	1	M	SD	α	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
1. Vividness	157	4.71	0.40	0.84	--								
2. Coherence	157	4.57	0.46	0.80	0.54**	--							
3. Accessibility	157	4.42	0.61	0.70	0.38**	0.37**	--						
4. Sensory-perceptual detail	156	4.11	0.63	0.78	0.58**	0.54**	0.45**	--					
5. Emotional intensity	156	4.30	0.71	0.87	0.55**	0.32**	0.36**	0.68**	--				
6. Visual perspective	157	4.14	0.81	0.82	0.26**	0.30**	0.34**	0.34**	0.25**	--			
7. Time perspective	157	4.09	0.90	0.84	0.40**	0.33**	0.34**	0.50**	0.38**	0.06	--		
8. Sharing	157	3.39	1.16	0.93	0.38**	0.22**	0.29**	0.39**	0.42**	0.06	0.28**	--	
9. Distancing	157	2.14	0.96	0.86	-0.19*	-0.26**	-0.23**	-0.33**	-0.24**	-0.16*	-0.25**	-0.20*	--
10. Valence	157	3.12	1.51	0.97	0.02	-0.15	0.04	0.04	-0.04	-0.07	0.07	0.18*	-0.19*

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$




Figure 9 - Distribution of responses for the Memory Experience Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007) phenomenological memory facets.

Despite these ceiling effects, a MANOVA was conducted to determine if any phenomenological differences exist between self-defining and everyday memories. The phenomenological characteristics of sensory detail, visual perspective, and emotional intensity were not included in these analyses as they were already tested above. An omnibus F-test revealed no significant difference in memory phenomenology between self-defining and everyday memories, $F(7, 139) = 1.23$, Pillai's Trace = .06, $p = .29$. This suggests that self-defining and everyday memories do not differ along their self-reported phenomenological characteristics.

In addition to the phenomenological characteristics, exploratory analyses were also conducted for the linguistic strategies individuals used to describe and share their memories (see Table 8). The analyses were conducted in iterations that grouped similar linguistic dimensions together for multivariate analysis. While some differences are expected between self-defining and everyday memories from some of these linguistic groupings, other groupings should not differ between memory types. Specifically, group differences are expected for (a) summary variables, (b) personal pronoun usage, (c) affective processes, (d) cognitive processes, (e) perceptual processes, (f) drives, and (g) personal concerns. Each of these groupings will be discussed in detail below.

Table 8 - Descriptive statistic for linguistic dimensions.

	n	M	SD		n	M	SD
Summary variables				Drives			
Analytic thinking	157	58.47	19.16	Affiliation	153	2.07	1.45
Clout	155	45.14	20.54	Achievement	152	2.29	0.96
Authentic language	156	70.44	22.63	Power	152	2.97	1.18
Emotional tone	157	21.30	12.94	Reward	156	1.53	0.68
Personal pronouns				Risk	152	0.49	0.37
I	157	7.39	3.08	Personal concerns			
We	150	0.95	1.03	Work	157	5.41	2.30
You	145	0.19	0.30	Leisure	149	0.73	0.64
She/he	156	1.93	1.95	Home	152	0.44	0.44
They	153	0.74	0.58	Money	157	0.96	1.18
Affect							
Positive emotion	153	2.50	1.03				
Negative emotion	154	1.50	0.78				
Social processes							
Social	156	8.86	3.37				
Family	146	0.22	0.32				
Friend	149	0.19	0.24				
Cognitive processes							
Insight	156	2.36	0.92				
Cause	154	1.49	0.64				
Discrepancy	157	1.72	0.85				
Tentative	156	2.10	0.81				
Certainty	153	1.62	0.71				
Differentiation	153	2.59	0.90				
Perceptual processes	156	2.09	1.02				
See	154	0.63	0.45				
Hear	154	0.59	0.52				
Feel	154	0.63	0.47				

For the linguistic groupings with an expected relationship, a series of MANOVAs reveal group differences in memory type for the LIWC (a) summary variables, (b) personal pronouns, (c) affective processes, (d) cognitive processes, (e) perceptual processes, (f) and drives (see Table 9 for MANOVA results). A significant MANOVA was not found for personal concerns. Univariate post-hoc tests with Holm-Bonferroni alpha corrections revealed significant group differences for the following linguistic dimensions: clout, first-person plural pronouns (e.g., we), second person pronouns (e.g., you), positive emotion, causal cognitive processes, visual perceptual processes, and achievement and power drives (see Table 10). Self-defining memories are higher than everyday memories on the linguistic properties of second person pronouns, positive emotion, causal cognitive processes, achievement drives, and power drives. Self-defining memories are lower on the linguistic properties of clout, first-person plural pronouns, and visual perceptual processes (see Figure 10).

Table 9 - MANOVA results for memory sharer linguistic strategies.

	Numerator df	Denominator df	F-value	Pillai's Trace	p
Summary variables	4	149	2.75	.07	.03*
Personal pronouns	5	128	8.06	.24	.000**
Affective processes	2	147	3.34	.04	.038*
Cognitive processes	6	137	3.11	.12	.007**
Perceptual processes	3	144	3.85	.07	.011*
Drives	5	133	4.79	.15	.000**
Personal concerns	4	139	1.81	.05	.131

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 10 - Univariate tests of LIWC variables with expected differences.

	Everyday Memories		Self-defining memories				
Linguistic variables	M	SD	M	SD	F	P- value	Target p-value
Summary variables							
Analytic thinking	61.01	18.11	55.97	19.95	2.74	0.100	0.017
Clout	49.96	20.75	40.25	19.25	9.11	0.003*	0.013
Authentic language	69.46	24.05	71.40	21.27	0.28	0.60	.025
Emotional tone	20.91	11.99	21.69	13.87	0.14	0.71	.050
Personal pronouns							
I	6.89	2.93	7.89	3.17	4.22	.04	0.017
We	1.30	1.22	0.57	0.56	21.52	0.000*	0.010
You	0.10	0.17	0.27	0.36	13.59	0.000*	0.013
She/he	2.13	2.13	1.72	1.73	1.69	0.196	0.025
They	0.71	0.55	0.77	0.61	0.30	0.585	0.050
Affect							
Positive emotion	2.31	1.00	2.70	1.02	5.69	0.018*	0.025
Negative emotion	1.49	0.77	1.52	0.80	0.07	0.793	0.050
Cognitive processes							
Insight	2.27	0.93	2.46	0.91	1.63	0.204	0.050
Cause	1.35	0.56	1.62	0.68	7.42	0.007*	0.008
Discrepancy	1.59	0.79	1.85	0.90	3.63	0.059	0.017
Tentative	2.00	0.74	2.21	0.87	2.73	0.100	0.025
Certainty	1.48	0.72	1.75	0.67	5.81	0.017	0.010
Differentiate	2.42	0.80	2.75	0.98	5.16	0.025	0.025
Perceptual processes							
See	0.74	0.50	0.52	0.37	9.33	0.003*	0.017
Hear	0.56	0.48	0.62	0.55	0.55	0.460	0.050
Feel	0.57	0.43	0.68	0.50	2.16	0.144	0.025
Drives							
Affiliation	2.31	1.66	1.83	1.14	4.30	0.040	0.017
Achievement	2.03	0.85	2.54	0.99	11.66	0.001*	0.010
Power	2.69	0.85	3.23	1.37	8.44	0.004*	0.013
Reward	1.48	0.75	1.58	0.62	0.74	0.391	0.050
Risk	0.44	0.32	0.53	0.40	2.61	0.108	0.025




Figure 10 - Effect of memory type on linguistic characteristics of the shared memories.

The exploratory analyses indicate that while self-defining and everyday memories are not differentiated by self-reported phenomenological characteristics, they are shared using distinct linguistic strategies. In the next section, I will discuss how these findings inform our understanding of the memory sharer's experiences and how they may influence the perceptions of the memory listener.

3.1.5 Summary of results for the memory sharer.

Overall the hypotheses for Study 1 were not supported. Self-defining memories were not related to increased phenomenological sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, or autooiesis, although self-defining memories were rated as more central to the sharer's sense of self than everyday memories. The severe ceiling effects of the phenomenological memory scales are concerning, suggesting that there may be an issue with the sample, memory manipulation, or measurement of these constructs. The significant effect associated with self-centrality is also not particularly novel as self-centrality is a definitional part of self-defining memories. Furthermore, phenomenological characteristics did not influence the languages used to share the self-defining and everyday memories. This suggests that memory phenomenology may not be communicated from the sharer to the listener through language, or at least through the style and content of words used.

Despite the lack of hypothesized effects, exploratory analyses indicate that self-defining memories are shared using distinct linguistic strategies compared to everyday memories. These specific strategies, and the associated interpretations, will be reviewed in detail in the discussion section.

3.2 Study 2: Memory Listener Results

The second piece of the memory sharing process addresses the memory listener. Specifically, this piece explores how self-defining and everyday memories influence the development of affective and informational work outcomes, and if memory characteristics moderate the strength of this relationship. Prior to hypothesis testing, the manipulation checks were first assessed to determine if self-defining (compared to everyday) memories and high immersion (compared to low immersion) memories were perceived differently by the memory listeners. A MANOVA revealed a significant main effect of memory type, $F(6, 104) = 3.27$, Pillai's trace = .16, $p < .01$, and a significant main effect of memory immersion, $F(6, 104) = 4.66$, Pillai's trace = .21, $p < .01$. A significant interaction was not found between memory type and memory immersion, $F(6, 104) = .56$, Pillai's trace = .03, $p = .76$, so the interaction term was excluded in subsequent univariate tests. The univariate tests revealed, after Holm-Bonferroni correction, a significant effect of memory type such that self-defining memories (compared to everyday memories) were rated as (a) more emotional, (b) more important, and (c) shared more regularly. A significant main effect for memory immersion was also found, such that high immersion memories (compared to low immersion memories) were rated as (b) more reflective of who the memory sharer is as a person, (b) more emotional, and (c) more important. See Table 11 for a summary of the univariate tests and Figure 11 for a depiction of the univariate effects.

Table 11 - Univariate tests of memory listener manipulation check items

Manipulation Check Item	Memory Type			Memory Immersion		
	F	alpha	Target alpha	F	alpha	Target alpha
To what extent does the shared memory reflect who this person is?	0.36	0.548	--	13.12	.000*	0.005
The shared memory describes an important theme from this person's life.	4.97	.028	--	5.55	.020	--
The shared memory is an emotional memory about this person's life.	10.82	.001*	0.005	8.79	.004*	0.006
The shared memory is an important memory for this person.	3.27	.006*	0.006	4.66	0.000*	0.004
The shared memory represents the "real me" for this person.	0.70	0.40	--	0.06	0.80	--
This person thinks about the shared memory regularly.	7.85	.006*	0.007	1.18	0.28	--

* Significant effect compared to Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha.




Figure 11 - Univariate effects of memory type and memory immersion for manipulation check items.

The results indicate that, overall, the vignettes appear to be appropriately representing self-defining and everyday memories to the memory listeners. Furthermore, it does appear that the language used to share the memory also influences how the memory is perceived by memory listeners. Memory type and memory immersion were unrelated to the manipulation check items for representing an “important theme” and the “real me”. However, these manipulation check items may be appropriate for an online study where participants have no background information on the memory sharer. Connecting a memory to a theme in a person’s life or their “real self” may require additional information about who the sharer is as a person, making these manipulation checks, at best, a stab in the dark. Excluding these items, it does appear the vignettes are appropriate representing the memories to the memory listeners. In the following analyses, I will explore how these shared memories influence (a) perceptions on memory phenomenology and (b) affective and informational outcomes for the memory listener.

3.2.1 Perceptions of shared memory phenomenology.

In Study 1, I explored the memory sharer’s self-reported ratings of memory phenomenology. In this section, I will address the perceived memory phenomenology of the memory listener. This perceived phenomenology addresses the ability to convey phenomenological information through words from the memory sharer to the memory listener. As additional manipulation checks, the following analyses will address the subscales of the adapted MEQ and the self-centrality scales (see Table 12 for descriptive and correlational statistics).

Table 12 - Memory sharer perceived phenomenological characteristics descriptive and correlation statistics.

	n	M	SD	α	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Vividness	105	4.63	0.45	0.88										
2. Coherence	108	4.31	0.50	0.78	0.59**									
3. Accessibility	109	4.14	0.53	0.66	0.47**	0.40**								
4. Sensory-perceptual detail	109	4.03	0.60	0.82	0.50**	0.31**	0.51**							
5. Emotionality	112	3.76	1.03	0.94	0.37**	0.15	0.34**	0.56**						
6. Visual perspective	113	4.21	0.68	0.81	0.45**	0.37**	0.44**	0.39**	0.15					
7. Time perspective	112	4.18	0.75	0.87	0.51**	0.48**	0.42**	0.41**	0.25**	0.29**				
8. Sharing	111	3.42	0.86	0.90	0.22*	-0.04	0.16	0.36**	0.52**	0	0.17			
9. Distance	113	1.94	0.77	0.85	-0.40**	-0.39**	-0.29**	-0.35**	-0.01	-0.30**	-0.37**	-0.15		
10. Valence	107	3.58	1.33	0.97	-0.01	0.14	0.01	-0.20*	-0.24*	0.04	0.14	-0.03	-0.17	
11. Self-centrality	112	4.51	1.45	0.96	0.13	-0.1	0.08	0.27**	0.63**	-0.12	0.08	0.49**	0.20*	0.08

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

A MANOVA was conducted on the ten facets of the adapted MEQ. The results indicated a significant main effect of memory type, $F(10, 78) = 12.50$, Pillai's trace = .62, $p < .01$, memory immersion, $F(10, 78) = 22.77$, Pillai's trace = .74, $p < .01$, and a significant interaction term, $F(10, 78) = 8.31$, Pillai's trace = .52, $p < .01$. Therefore, follow-up univariate tests were conducted with a Holm-Bonferroni correction to account for the 30 subsequent tests. As shown in Table 13, (a) a main effect of memory type was found for the sensory-perceptual and sharing facets, (b) a crossover interaction with no main effects was found for coherence and distance, and (c) an interaction with significant main effects was found for emotional intensity and valence. Each of these results will be described in detail below.

Table 13 - Univariate tests of perceived memory phenomenology.

	Memory Type			Memory Immersion			Interaction		
	F	alpha	Target alpha	F	alpha	Target alpha	F	alpha	Target alpha
1. Vividness	5.09	0.03	--	2.41	0.12	--	5.19	0.02	--
2. Coherence	0.02	0.9	--	1.00	0.32	--	18.51	0.000*	0.002
3. Accessibility	3.16	0.08	--	2.54	0.11	--	0.00	0.95	--
4. Sensory-perceptual detail	11.62	0.001*	0.002	3.14	0.08	--	1.46	0.23	--
5. Emotionality	46.37	0.000*	0.002	9.82	0.0022*	0.0024	11.59	0.001*	0.002
6. Visual perspective	0.11	0.74	--	0.02	0.9	--	0.00	0.95	--
7. Time perspective	0.00	0.95	--	0.13	0.72	--	1.15	0.29	--
8. Sharing	25.12	0.000*	0.002	2.35	0.13	--	0.33	0.57	--
9. Distance	0.01	0.92	--	2.51	0.12	--	9.89	0.0021*	0.0023
10. Valence	50.16	0.000*	0.002	116.14	0.000*	0.002	46.41	0.000*	0.002

* Significant effect compared to Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha.

A significant main effect of memory type was found for sensory-perceptual detail and memory sharing, such that self-defining memories were rated as containing more sensory-perceptual detail and being shared more regularly than everyday memories (see Figure 12).




Figure 12 - Main effect of memory type for phenomenological sensory detail and sharing.

A crossover interaction was found for memory coherence and memory distance (see Figure 13). These crossover interactions reveal that the level of memory coherence and distance depend simultaneously on the memory type and level of memory immersion. Memory coherence, for instance, is high when a self-defining memory is shared using high immersion language and when an everyday memory is shared using low immersion language. Similarly, distance from the memory is lower when a self-defining memory is shared using high immersion language and when an everyday memory is shared using low immersion language.




Figure 13 - Crossover interaction for memory coherence and distance.

Finally, an interaction with main effects was found for emotional intensity and valence (see Figure 14). Participants rated self-defining memories as more emotionally intense and as less positive compared to everyday memories. High immersion memories were rated as more emotionally intense and more positive than low immersion memories. Furthermore, a significant interaction was found. Figure 14 shows that self-defining memories were rated as emotionally intense regardless of the memory immersion, while everyday memories were rated as more emotionally intense when described using highly immersive language. Interestingly, everyday memories were rated as generally positive regardless of the level of memory immersion, while self-defining memories were rated as very positive or very negative depending on their level of memory immersion. These results indicate that participants could detect a meaningful difference in memory phenomenology based on the memory type and level of memory immersion.




Figure 14 - Interaction of memory type and memory immersion for emotional intensity and valence.

After investigating the facets of the Memory Experience Questionnaire, an additional ANOVA was conducted on the self-centrality scale, revealing a significant main effect of memory type, $F(1, 108) = 32.39, p < .01$, a significant main effect of memory immersion, $F(1, 108) = 31.05, p < .01$, and a significant interaction, $F(1, 108) = 5.60, p = .02$. As depicted in Figure 15 everyday memories were rated as less central to the sharer's sense of self than self-defining memories. This effect was exacerbated when the shared memory was also low immersion.




Figure 15 - Interaction of memory type and memory immersion for self-centrality.

These results provide evidence for how shared memories are perceived by listeners. The results indicate that self-defining memories are perceived as containing more sensory-perceptual detail and being shared more regularly than everyday memories. Perceived coherence and distance of the memory depends on a crossover interaction between memory type and memory immersion, and the perceived emotional intensity and emotional valence are exacerbated in self-defining memories regardless of the level of memory immersion. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, perceived self-centrality is highest in self-defining memories, with the decrease in self-centrality for everyday memories exacerbated in the low immersion condition. As self-centrality is a key definitional part of the distinction between self-defining and everyday memories, this provides additional confidence that the memory manipulations were working as expected.

3.2.2 Affective outcomes.

In this section, I will address how memory type and memory immersion influence the conveyance of information to the memory listener to inform the affective outcomes of (a) likability, (b) affective trust, and (c) empathy (for descriptive and correlations, see Table 14). As this study is emphasizing the memory listener's experience, perceived centrality will be included as a covariate in the following analyses. While I expect, and have initial evidence supporting, that self-defining and high immersion memories will be viewed as more central to the sharer's sense of self, there is still likely a great deal of variability in how the listener perceives a memory. As it is this perception that I am interested in, perceived self-centrality will be included to parse out the unique effects of memory type, memory immersion, and self-centrality on affective outcomes.

Table 14 - Affective and informational outcomes descriptive and correlation statistics.

	n	M	SD	α	1	2	3	4	5
Affective trust	113	3.88	0.54	0.83	--				
Empathy	113	3.69	0.77	0.89	0.48**	--			
Likability	113	4.13	0.52	0.91	0.66**	0.54**	--		
Insight	113	3.64	0.39	0.81	0.58**	0.25**	0.63**	--	
Meaning	113	4.17	0.70	0.95	0.20*	0.39**	0.33**	0.46**	--
Cognitive trust	113	4.18	0.45	0.82	0.34**	0.32**	0.48**	0.45**	0.33**

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

To that end, a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted to explore the effects of memory type, memory immersion, and perceived self-centrality on likability, affective trust, and empathy. The results indicate a significant main effect of memory type, $F(3, 106) = 7.65$, Pillai's trace = .18, $p < .01$, and a significant main effect of perceived self-centrality, $F(3, 106) = 14.11$, Pillai's trace = .29, $p < .01$. A significant effect was not found for memory immersion, $F(3, 106) = 2.18$, Pillai's trace = .06, $p = .10$, or the interaction between memory type and memory immersion, $F(3, 106) = .47$, Pillai's trace = .01, $p = .70$ (H15a, H15b, H15c, not supported). Therefore, these terms were not included in the follow-up univariate tests. These results indicate that memory immersion did not moderate the relationship between memory type and affective outcomes.

The follow-up tests reveal that, after Holm-Bonferroni correction, perceived self-centrality is a significant predictor of likability, affective trust, and empathy (see Table 15). Specifically, when memories were rated higher on self-centrality, the imagined memory sharer was rated as more likeable, more affectively trustworthy, and eliciting more empathy (see Figure 16). After Bonferroni-Holm corrections to control for Type I error rates, memory type was not related to any of the affective outcomes (H9, H10, H11, not supported). This suggests that it is the perceived self-centrality of the shared memory, not the memory type per se, that influences ratings of affective outcomes.

Table 15 - Univariate tests for affective outcomes.

	Memory Type			Self-centrality		
	F	alpha	Target alpha	F	alpha	Target alpha
Affective trust	1.03	0.310	--	49.39	0.000*	0.008
Empathy	4.68	0.033	--	12.12	0.001*	0.013
Likability	4.52	0.036	--	22.61	0.000*	0.010

* Significant effect compared to Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha.




Figure 16 - Influence of self-centrality on affective connections of affective trust, empathy, and likability.

3.2.3 *Informational outcomes.*

Finally, the influence of shared memories on the informational outcomes of insight, meaningful work, and cognitive trust was investigated (see Table 14 for descriptive and correlation statistics). As discussed above, perceived self-centrality was included as a covariate in the following analyses. The results of a MANCOVA reveal a significant main effect of memory type, $F(3, 106) = 6.74$, Pillai's trace = .16, $p < .01$, memory immersion, $F(3, 106) = 21.23$, Pillai's trace = .38, $p < .01$, and perceived self-centrality, $F(3, 106) = 14.54$, Pillai's trace = .29, $p < .01$. Finally, a significant interaction was between memory type and memory immersion was also found, $F(3, 106) = 6.65$, Pillai's trace = .16, $p < .01$. Therefore, all four of these terms were included in the follow-up univariate tests (see Table 16).

Table 16 - Univariate tests for informational outcomes.

	Memory Type			Memory Immersion			Self-centrality			Interaction		
	F	alpha	Target alpha	F	alpha	Target alpha	F	alpha	Target alpha	F	alpha	Target alpha
Insight	1.31	0.26	--	7.5	0.007	--	31.99	0.000*	0.005	3.34	0.070	--
Meaning	9.24	0.003*	0.006	60.68	0.000*	0.004	13.07	0.000*	0.005	4.334	0.040	--
Cognitive trust	0.001	0.97	--	2.72	0.102	--	0.544	0.463	--	5.353	0.023	--

* Significant effect compared to Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha.

After Holm-Bonferroni correction, a significant effect of memory type, memory immersion, and perceived self-centrality was found for work meaningfulness (see Figure 17). Specifically, imagined memory sharers who shared a self-defining memory were rated as having more meaningful work than those who shared everyday memories (H12, supported). Similarly, imagined memory sharers who shared high immersion memories were rated as having more meaningful work than those who shared low immersion memories. A significant interaction between memory type and memory immersion was not found (H15d, not supported), suggesting that an additive effect between memory type and memory immersion did not occur. Finally, when memories were rated as high on self-centrality, the imagined memory sharer was also perceived as having more meaningful work than those who shared memories low on self-centrality.




Figure 17 - Influence of memory type, memory immersion, and self-centrality on informational outcome of work meaningfulness.

After Holm-Bonferroni correction, a significant effect of self-centrality was found on ratings of memory sharer's insight, such that when memories are rated as high on self-centrality, the imagined memory sharer is perceived as more insightful (see Figure 18). No effect of memory type or memory immersion was found on perceived insight (H11, H15e, not supported).




Figure 18 - Influence of self-centrality on informational outcome of insight.

Finally, memory type, memory immersion, and perceived self-centrality did not relate to cognitive trust (H14, H15f, not supported).

3.2.4 Exploratory analyses.

In addition to the primary hypotheses addressed above, three additional questions were asked to assess future behavioral intentions. Specifically, the memory listener was asked about their likelihood to share an (a) personal memory, (b) emotional memory, and (c) important memory with the imagined memory sharer. The results of a MANOVA reveal a significant main effect of perceived self-centrality on memory sharing likelihood, $F(3, 106) = 3.77$, Pillai's trace = .10, $p = .01$. Subsequent univariate analyses revealed that perceived self-centrality was positively related to all three items (see Table 17), such that memories perceived to be high on self-centrality led to higher likelihood ratings for sharing a personal, emotional, and important memory with the memory sharer (see Figure 19).

Table 17 - Univariate tests for likelihood of sharing own memory.

	Self-centrality		
	F	alpha	Target alpha
Likely to share a personal memory.	7.489	0.007*	0.050
Likely to share an emotional memory.	14.12	0.000*	0.025
Likely to share an important memory.	14.62	0.000*	0.017

* Significant effect compared to Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha.




Figure 19 - Influence of self-centrality on likelihood of sharing a personal, emotional, and important memory with the memory sharer.

3.2.5 *Summary of results for the memory listener.*

Overall, the hypotheses for Study 2 were not supported. Self-defining memories were not reliably related to affective or informational outcomes, high immersion memories were not more effective at conveying memory information to influence those outcomes. However, exploratory analyses did reveal some interesting effects. First, memory type and memory immersion did influence some perceptions of memory phenomenology for the memory listener. This suggests that shared memories can communicate some phenomenological characteristics from the memory sharer to the memory listener. Second, while memory type and memory immersion were unrelated to affective and informational outcomes, the perceived self-centrality of the shared memory was significantly related to all affective and most informational outcomes.

CHAPTER 4. GENERAL DISCUSSION

The sharing of self-defining memories provides a mechanism for individuals to share a small, personal piece of their temporally extended self with others. These memories contain vivid and emotional records of goal attainment or goal failure that are tied to ongoing life concerns. By sharing these memories with others, individuals can break off a self-contained piece of important, meaningful self-experience and share it with another. From the listener's perspective, the hearing of work self-defining memories provides a vivid snapshot of others' lives that provides valuable information about who that individual is as a professional. This information can then be used to inform a variety of affective and informational outcomes and even affect the likelihood of future memory sharing within the dyad. While the memory sharing process is undoubtedly complex, these studies provide a first step to understanding the role of sharing self-defining memories, and more broadly the temporally extended self, with others at work. In this section, I will discuss (a) the memory sharing process from the memory sharer to the memory listener, (b) limitations of these studies, and (c) future directions of research for self-defining memories in the workplace.

4.1 The Memory Sharer

The first piece of the memory sharing processes addresses the experience of the memory sharer. Specifically, it addresses the recall of a specific memory (self-defining or everyday memory), the accompanying phenomenology of the recollected memory, and how that memory is communicated through language to others. It is this communication of the memory from the sharer to the listener that is of interest in Study 1. Personal

experiences are inherently unique; I will never fully understand another's experience as I cannot live it myself. As such, language is often the best mechanism we have to share our unique experiences with others, and the words we use are tasked with conveying the emotional, meaningful, and vivid (or dispassionate, trivial, and mundane) nature of our experiences to others. Therefore, in Study 1, the communication of memory characteristics through language is of primary interest.

In this study, participants are asked to recall a self-defining memory (i.e., "a memory about an enduring theme, issue, or conflict from your life") or an everyday memory (i.e., "a memory that was personally experienced"). Subsequently, they are asked to rate their recollected memory on a host of phenomenological characteristics. It was hypothesized that self-defining memories are characterized by greater phenomenological (H1) sensory-perceptual detail, (H2) emotionality, (H3) autonoesis, and (H4) self-centrality than everyday memories. However, these hypotheses were largely unsupported. Specifically, self-defining and everyday memories did not differ in the amount of sensory-perceptual detail (H1, not supported), emotionality (H2, not supported), and autonoesis (H3, not supported). However, self-defining memories were characterized by higher levels of self-centrality than everyday memories, providing support for Hypothesis 4. As self-centrality is a definitional part of self-defining memories, however, this finding is not particularly novel.

More concerning is the lack of significant findings associated with phenomenological sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, and autonoesis, as assessed by the MEQ. The lack of findings for the phenomenological characteristics of sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, and autonoesis may be due to a combination of four things:

(1) the participants were providing poor responses that are obscuring the effect, (2) self-defining and everyday memories do not differ on these phenomenological variables and are equally immersive, (3) the updated memory manipulation was not eliciting appropriate memories or (4) the scale was unable to capture the differences in these phenomenological characteristics.

The first option of poor participant responses seems unlikely. While the sample of Mechanical Turk workers may be cause for concern, there is not substantial evidence suggesting the participants were responding mindlessly. First, participants in the study had to successfully pass three attention check items for inclusion in the final sample (e.g., Please select “Agree”). Second, participants had to complete a 500-word writing task, which was read to ascertain that (a) the writing was intelligible and (b) the memory was on-topic. While six participants were discarded from the final sample for failing these checks, the remaining 157 participants passed these cutoffs. This suggests that, at the very least, participants were reading the instructions and survey items with enough detail to respond appropriately. Additionally, the internal consistency for the MEQ facets was quite high ($\alpha \geq .70$, see Table 7) despite the presence of reverse-scored items. This provides additional evidence that participants were not responding with biased response sets (e.g., responding “Strongly agree” to every item) and were reading the items with enough attention to catch the change in directionality. Furthermore, multiple studies have found that Mechanical Turk workers perform similarly to other internet and laboratory convenience samples (Crump et al., 2013; Horton et al., 2011; Paolacci et al., 2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), suggesting that the lack of effects may not be attributable, entirely, to the sample. While it is, of course, possible that the Mechanical Turk sample was

inappropriate for this study, it seems unlikely. Thus, this potential explanation will be discarded.

Second, the lack of significant phenomenological differences may be simply because my hypotheses are wrong, and self-defining and everyday memories do not differ appreciably in phenomenology. However, I am not yet ready to concede this point, despite the lack of significant findings. Other studies have found that self-defining memories are rated as more vivid, emotional, self-revealing, and important than everyday memories comparing normal and autistic adults (Crane et al., 2010; Goddard et al., 2017). Furthermore, it is an intuitive and definitional part of self-defining memories that they are characterized by “affective intensity, vividness, high levels of rehearsal, linkage to similar memories, and connection to an enduring concern or unresolved conflict” (Conway, Singer, Tagini, 2004, p. 504). While some everyday memories may also be idiosyncratically vivid, autonoetic, and emotional, many of them should be comparatively mundane. If self-defining and everyday memories are not distinguishable along these phenomenological dimensions, then this poses a substantial problem for the field and requires a new definition of self-defining memories that does not rely on memory phenomenology. However, the linguistic analysis does not support this interpretation, indicating that self-defining and everyday memories are shared using different language. The linguistic differences between self-defining and everyday memories will be discussed in greater detail below. However, for now, the explanation that self-defining and everyday memories do not phenomenologically differ will be set aside.

The third potential explanation for the lack of phenomenological findings is that the adapted memory manipulation was unable to elicit appropriate memories. This

explanation has mixed support. First, the manipulation check items reveal that self-defining memories are more (a) important, (b) representing the “real” me, (c) thought about regularly, (d) describing an important theme from my life, (e) emotional, and (f) reflecting who I am as a person for the memory sharer than everyday memories. This suggests that the manipulation could appropriately elicit self-defining and everyday memories. Second, the changes to the memory manipulation were primarily to the self-defining memory task to remove extraneous manipulations (e.g., changing an attribute from “the only aspect is that it leads to strong feelings” to “it can be a memory that evokes little or no emotion”). While these changes may have the effect of dampening the self-defining memory characteristics, that does not appear to have happened. The average scores for the self-defining memory group on phenomenological sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, and autoecesis were all above a 4 on a 1 to 5 scale (see Table 3). If there was a dampening of phenomenological characteristics by the adapted task, its effect was minimal.

However, an additional change was made to the everyday memory task. Specifically, the writing prompt of sharing a personal memory with a person you just met was included in the everyday memory task to make it identical to the self-defining memory task (see Appendix B). While this prompt was edited to remove language referring to the “Real You” and “not trying to play a role or to strike a pose” (see Appendix A), this writing prompt may have influenced the types of memories recalled for the everyday memory condition. Specifically, it may have led to the recall of more vivid, emotional, and autoecetic memories than intended, thus leading to the insignificant effects. However, the changes in the memory manipulation do not appear to account for the entire problem.

Finally, the lack of significant results may be attributable, at least in part, to psychometric issues associated with the MEQ. As depicted in Figure 8, all 10 facets suffered from ceiling or floor effects. However, the CES did not suffer from similar issues and follows an approximately normal distribution. This suggests that the MEQ may be suffering from psychometric issues unique to this scale. Furthermore, the psychometric issues may be influenced, at least in part, by the adaptation of the memory manipulation. Self-centrality was directly manipulated in the self-defining and everyday memory tasks while the other phenomenological characteristics were controlled in the manipulation. This adapted memory manipulation and the psychometric issues with the MEQ may be working in concert to contribute to the lack of significant effects. Of course, it is still possible that self-defining and everyday memories do not actually differ along these phenomenological dimensions, but it seems more likely that manipulation and scaling issues contributed to the non-significant findings. Future research should explore this possibility by testing different adaptations to the memory manipulations and assessing phenomenology with an adapted MEQ or a different phenomenological scale entirely.

However, an alternative interpretation of the lack of significant findings for memory type on sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, and autonoesis paints these findings in a more promising light. As addressed above, the memory manipulation was adapted to be equal between the self-defining and everyday memory conditions in all ways except for the connection to an enduring theme, issue, or conflict in the sharers life. The level of vividness, emotion, and rehearsal were not manipulated between memory types. Thus, the lack of significant differences between self-defining and everyday memories on these phenomenological characteristics may be viewed as successful controlling for

ancillary nuisance variables. As the connection to the sense of self is the primary component of a self-defining memory, these findings may also suggest that the memory manipulation successfully affected this critical dimension while holding ancillary phenomenological characteristics constant.

Despite the largely insignificant effects for phenomenological sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, auto-noesis, and self-centrality for self-defining and everyday memories, additional analyses were conducted exploring the linguistic strategies used to share memories. Specifically, it was hypothesized that (H5) memories high on sensory-perceptual detail would be shared using more perceptual process words, (H6) memories high on emotionality would be shared using more emotional tone words, (H7) memories high on auto-noesis would be shared using more personal pronouns, and (H8) memories high on self-centrality would be shared with more authentic tone words. These hypotheses were not supported. In regression and path analyses, sensory-perceptual detail was unrelated to perceptual process words (H5, not supported), emotionality was unrelated to emotional tone words (H6, not supported), auto-noesis was unrelated to personal pronouns (H7, not supported), and self-centrality was not related to authentic tone words (H8, not supported). This lack of findings may be due, in part, to the psychometric issues associated with the MEQ discussed above. The lack of meaningful variability in the sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, and auto-noesis scales may have precluded them from relating to any linguistic strategies. However, the CES did not suffer from these psychometric issues and was still unrelated to authentic tone words. As such, it is possible that the wrong linguistic strategies were investigated.

While the hypothesized linguistic strategies were unrelated to memory type, many other linguistic strategies differed across self-defining and everyday memories. Self-defining memories were characterized by less first-person plural pronouns (e.g., we) and more second person pronouns (e.g., you). If pronoun usage is taken to reflect the allocation of attention of the memory sharer (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010), this suggests that shared self-defining memories are more focused on the individual's personal experience. An overview of common "you" phrases in participant responses also reveals an emphasis on the self. In the shared memories, the word "you" is often referring to things that could or did happen to the memory sharer. For example, one individual describes the dangers of working in a kitchen.

"Being alone in a situation like a kitchen can get pretty dicey (pardon the pun).

There are tons of things on which you can injure yourself. You can set yourself on fire, you can cut yourself, drop something heavy on yourself, or simply slip on the tile flooring that nearly every kitchen incorporates so as to aid easy cleanup at the end of the day. I've done each of these things at least once in my career and a few of them multiple times." Male, Age 35, Kitchen Manager.

Another participant describes meetings she has with her team lead.

"Team leads in my company frequently have what we call 'touch-bases,' which are brief meetings of reflection and discussion of your recent performance and what you have been doing to achieve your goals and what you could do better to get to where you want to be." Female, Age 25, Retail Manager.

These examples demonstrate the use of "you" as a linguistic device, also referred to as the "generic-you" (Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, 2017). The use of a generic-you is typically used

to express norms, which can then be compared to personal experience to derive insights and engage in meaning-making about self-experience. This memory making process is evidenced by the following participants' experience in a touch-base meeting, as a continuation of the vignette described above.

“I went into the meeting with my store manager with supreme confidence and the self-assurance... When I got into the office with them though, things slowly unraveled to portray a different story than what my perception of reality was.... They voiced that they felt there was some kind of disconnect between my performance and my confidence/amount of time I had been working in the store and where I should actually be. This was a pivotal moment for me because I realized I had to put myself in check. I can be confident, yes, but confidence and cockiness are two different things and I was leaning more towards the latter rather than the former and it was hindering me from true success. I was too focused at the time on how good I thought I was versus being able to recognize what I can improve on.... It was after this somewhat harsh wakeup call that I was able to realize my true potential, and in using my newfound ability of perspective taking I found myself promoted to a management position for the highest volume department in the store after only a couple of months.” Female, Age 25, Retail Manager.

Thus, the increased use of generic-you in self-defining memories reflects an emphasis on the self and engagement in meaning-making processes to contextual past experiences. This contrasts with the increased use of personal plural pronouns (we) in everyday memories. The use of personal plural pronouns reflects an emphasis on social or professional groups

in everyday memories, while self-defining memories focus on the personal experience of the memory sharer.

Self-defining memories are also characterized by more positive emotion and more causal words. Self-defining memories typically contain descriptions of the memory sharer overcoming some hurdle at work. Furthermore, self-defining memories are characterized by stronger achievement and power drives. The increased achievement and power drives similarly describe the movement towards some end goal. For example, this individual describes their decision to leave their job for a leadership position in a new agency.

“So, after talking the issues through with my family, friends, and work family, I did the only thing I could do: I left.... While I still am an attorney for the government, I took a leadership position in another agency. It was somewhat difficult leaving legal areas in which I was an acknowledged expert and it was very difficult leaving my old work family, but, as I just passed the one-year anniversary of that decision, I believe I can say that I made the right decision for both my career advancement and for my personal mental health. In the year since I left, I have received not one, but TWO raises after several years with no raise as a result of budget conditions. And I am now recognized as the expert in a couple of other areas of the law. Perhaps most importantly, I am back on the path to achieving my ultimate career ambitions. I even still see my old work family decently regularly and my awesome old work wife very often. So, while the change I made was difficult, in the end, it has paid off well. Change is inevitable and sometimes is the harbinger of better things.” Male, Age 37, General Counsel.

This memory demonstrates the general theme in self-defining memories of overcoming a hurdle. This individual caused a positive change in his life that allowed him to move on to bigger and better things.

Finally, self-defining memories are associated with decreased use of clout and visual perceptual process words. This was in the opposite direction than expected. Clout refers to the confidence and expertise characterizing the language, with high clout reflecting more confidence and low clout reflecting a more tentative or humble communication style (Pennebaker, Booth, et al., 2015). The inverse effect of clout may be due to the comparative ambiguity associated with self-defining memories compared to everyday memories. A self-defining memory is connected to a long-term, higher order goal, which is typically less concrete than a common, everyday memory. This may have led to the decreased confidence in the descriptions of self-defining memories. The inverse effect of visual perceptual process words may be explained by the focus of attention for the memory sharer. Self-defining memories are typically memories of achievement that focus on how this memory is important to the sharer's life, and these memories were shared using language that reflected that focus. Everyday memories, on the other hand, typically lacked that connection to a higher order goal. Lacking that connection, the language used to describe those memories reflects a more immediate and sensory focus. For example, see the following memory of a mistake made while loading a semi-truck trailer.

“I hopped back into my tractor, push the clutch in and slide into 2nd gear to start the trailers slow roll. My tractor starts to roll forward with me looking to my right to gauge my turn radius and BOOM! I look back half scared to death and I see that my trailer has slid off of my tractor and slammed on the floor! My first

thought was, "There goes my job." With the help of my adrenaline, I jump out and use all my strength and weight to crank the legs on the trailer to get it up to the height of the tractor before anyone can notice my embarrassing rookie mistake. After about 20 grueling cranks it was high up enough to let the air out of my tractors rear bags to lower the fifth-wheel and slide underneath the trailer again with my windows rolled down this time to make sure I hear the click of the lock. I wiped the sweat and water from my forehead and drove off like nothing happened." Male, Age 25, Truck Driver

The focus of this memory on the immediate timeframe in which the memory occurred contrasts starkly with the previous self-defining memory of changing jobs. The self-defining memory described the repercussions of that decision broadly, while this everyday memory describes in detail what happened during the memory event. The increased use of visual process words in everyday memories may reflect this increased focus on the memory event and decreased focus on the larger repercussions of the event for the individual's life.

Taking these linguistic characteristics, these findings indicate that self-defining memories are shared using language that is more self-focused and reflecting a positive and causal orientation towards achievement and power drives. This paints a picture of self-defining memories representing movements from bad to good and achieving higher order goals. This suggests that self-defining memories, compared to everyday memories, may reflect redemption narratives where individuals overcome some obstacle and obtain a measure of success (McAdams et al., 2001)

In summary, this study has focused on the recollection and sharing of self-defining and everyday memories. The hypotheses for this study were largely unsupported. Self-defining and everyday memories did not reliably relate to different phenomenological characteristics, and memory phenomenology did not influence linguistic strategies for the shared memory. Despite the lack of significant effects, exploratory analyses did reveal that self-defining and everyday memories were shared using different linguistic strategies. This suggests that, despite the lack of significant hypothesized results, self-defining and everyday memories are communicated differently to others. In the next section, I will focus on the receiver of this communication to determine if (a) memory type and level of memory immersion influences the conveyance of information to the memory listener and (b) if this information is used to inform affective and informational outcomes.

4.2 The Memory Listener

The second piece of the memory sharing process addresses the experience of the memory listener. Specifically, it addresses how (a) a shared memory is used to influence affective and informational outcomes for the memory listener and (b) how the phenomenological characteristics of the shared information affect the strength of that relationship. Self-defining memories contain personal and meaningful information about the self. Sharing this information with others may aid in the development and maintenance of affective bonds (Alea & Bluck, 2003). Furthermore, the personal information conveyed in self-defining memories can also influence the development of informational connections between the sharer and listener. Finally, the phenomenological characteristics of shared memories may influence the efficacy of memory communication, such that highly

immersive memories may be better equipped to develop affective and informational connections than low immersion memories.

Real memory vignettes were selected from Study 1 for inclusion in this study based on their memory type (self-defining or everyday memory) and memory immersion (high or low immersion). Vignettes from Study 1 were used because they reflect real memories, not artificial vignettes with manufactured phenomenology. The high and low immersion memories were selected based on their linguistic characteristics of achievement, affect, visual perceptual processes, and first-person singular pronouns. These dimensions were chosen to attempt to select memories that could communicate high or low phenomenological immersion to the memory listener.

The manipulation check items generally indicate that these vignettes were communicating meaningful information about the self from the memory sharer to the memory listener. Specifically, self-defining and high immersion memories were rated more emotional and important. Furthermore, self-defining memories were perceived to be shared more regularly and high immersion memories were thought to be more reflective of the person. This suggests that the self-defining vignettes were perceived as more self-defining, and high immersion memories could more efficaciously communicate that information. An interactive effect was not found, suggesting that memory immersion did not lead to synergistic effects in conveying self-defining information.

Interestingly, memory type and memory immersion were unrelated to manipulation check ratings of the extent to which the memory reflected an important theme or the sharer's "real me." This may be due to the impoverished communication between the

sharer and listener in this study. The listener is only given one memory with no additional information about the memory sharer, making it difficult to place the memory within the broader context of the sharer's life. Ratings of the "real me" and connections to life themes may require more background information of the memory sharer to be reliably assessed. Thus, these ratings may be more informative of the memory sharing process between known coworkers or acquaintances. Despite these limitations, the manipulation checks provide initial evidence that the vignettes were perceived by the memory listeners as providing self-defining information based on the memory type and level of memory immersion.

A main premise of this study is that the language used to share memories will influence perceptions of the memory phenomenology, such as a memory being shared with more perceptual process words being perceived as containing more sensory-perceptual detail. This proposition was partially supported as the shared memories were perceived by the memory listener to have different phenomenological characteristics. Notably, self-defining memories were rated as containing more sensory-perceptual information and being shared more regularly than everyday memories. This contrasts with Study 1, where no phenomenological differences were found across self-defining or everyday memories as rated by the memory sharer. The significant effect of memory type of sensory-perceptual detail is particularly interesting, as it suggests that self-defining memories are perceived as more detailed and containing more sensory information than everyday memories. Interestingly, no effect was found for memory immersion on perceptions of sensory-perceptual detail. This suggests that there is something about self-defining memories generally that is driving this perception.

Crossover effects were also found for the phenomenological characteristics of coherence and distance, such that the high immersion self-defining memory and low immersion everyday memory were rated as more coherent and less distance than their counterparts. While initially unintuitive, this may reflect a departure from the memory listener's expectations for the shared self-defining and everyday memories. As hypothesized in Study 1, self-defining memories are thought to be, on average, more immersive than everyday memories. When the memory conforms to this expectation (e.g., a high immersion self-defining memory or a low immersion everyday memory), the memory is rated as more coherent and less distant. When the memory does not conform to expectations, such as a low immersion self-defining memory or a high immersion everyday memory, the memory is rated as less coherent and more distant. This suggests that listeners have preconceived expectations about how a particular type of memory is shared, and departures from that conception lead to the memory being perceived as less coherent and more distant.

Furthermore, an interaction was found for memory type and memory immersion on emotional intensity and emotion valence, suggesting that the relationship between self-defining memories and affective intensity is exacerbated by high immersion. Specifically, everyday memories are rated as less emotionally intense than self-defining memories, and this effect was exacerbated by low memory immersion. Similarly, everyday memories were perceived as generally positive, with the self-defining memories being perceived as either very positive or very negative, depending on the level of memory immersion. This further reflects the affectively intense nature of self-defining memories.

Finally, a significant interaction was found for perceived self-centrality. While self-defining memories were rated as more central to the sharer's sense of self than the everyday memories, this effect was exacerbated by high immersion. This interactive effect of memory type and memory immersion on perceived self-centrality is of importance. As discussed above in the section on the memory sharer, the centrality of the memory to the sharer's sense of self is definitional to a self-defining memory. The influence of memory immersion on self-centrality suggests that highly immersive memories are better able to communicate that self-central information to the memory sharer, and the effect is exacerbated when paired with a self-defining memory. This suggests that memory type and memory immersion can communicate meaningful information about the sharer's self to the memory listener.

These findings provide tentative support for the proposition that shared memories can communicate memory phenomenology to the memory sharer. These results contrast with Study 1, where memory phenomenology as reported by the memory sharer was unrelated to memory type. Of course, the vignettes in this study were selected based on their linguistic characteristics, which likely influenced the perceptions of the memory listener. However, these results provide initial evidence that memory type and memory immersion contribute to different aspects of perceived memory phenomenology for the memory listener.

In addition to contributing to the perceived memory phenomenology, this study explored if sharing memories with others contributed to the development of affective connections. Specifically, it was hypothesized that self-defining memories, compared to everyday memories, increased (H9) likability, (H10) affective trust, and (H11) empathy for

the memory sharer. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that memory immersion would moderate the relationship between memory type and (H15a) likability, (H15b) affective trust, and (H15c) empathy. As this study is focused on the perceptions of the memory listener, perceived self-centrality was also included in these analyses to determine if the listener's perceptions of the shared memory affected its influence on affective outcomes. These hypotheses were not supported. Specifically, memory type is unrelated to ratings of likability (H9, not supported), affective trust (H10, not supported), and empathy (H11, not supported). Similarly, an interaction effect is not found between memory type and memory immersion for likability (H15a, not supported), affective trust (H15b, not supported), and empathy (H15c, not supported). However, perceived self-centrality is positively related to the affective outcomes of likability, affective trust, and empathy. This suggests that it is not the type of memory or the level of immersion that is informative, but the listener's perception of the shared memory. This further emphasizes the importance of the listener's experience in the memory sharing process for understanding how the information contained in the memory is used.

In addition to these affective outcomes, the effect of memory type and memory immersion informational outcomes was also explored. Specifically, it was hypothesized that the self-defining memories would lead to higher perceptions of (H12) work meaningfulness, (H13) insight, and (H14) cognitive trust. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that memory immersion would moderate the effect of memory type on (H15d) work meaningfulness, (H15e) insight, and (H15f) cognitive trust. These results received partial support. A significant main effect of memory type is found for ratings of work meaningfulness, suggesting that self-defining memories convey information about the

memory sharer's meaningful work (H12, supported). However, a significant moderating effect of memory immersion was not found (H15d, not supported). The remaining hypotheses addressing insight and cognitive trust were not supported. Specifically, self-defining memories did not lead to higher ratings of insight (H13, not supported) or cognitive trust (H15, not supported), and the relationship between memory type and insight and cognitive trust was not moderated by memory immersion (H15e, H15f, not supported).

However, perceived self-centrality was related to ratings of work meaningfulness and insight, once again highlighting the importance of the listener's experience in the memory sharing process. Perceived self-centrality was not related to cognitive trust, but an inspection of the cognitive trust items reveals that the measure is unlikely to be influenced by a single instance of memory sharing. For example, it is unlikely that a single shared memory will influence perceptions of the sharer's "competence and preparation for the job" or beliefs that the sharer "approaches his/her job with professionalism and dedication." Instead, these ratings are more likely influenced by a history of working together and shared experiences where an individual's behavior can be directly observed. It is possible that memory sharing may have a larger impact on cognitive trust when it is done in the context of a working relationship instead of a single shared memory with minimal contextual and personal information.

In addition to affective and informational outcomes, exploratory analyses were conducted to determine if sharing memories with others influenced the likelihood of future behaviors. Specifically, perceived self-centrality was positively related to the likelihood of the memory listener sharing their own personal, emotional, and important memory with the memory sharer. This once again illustrates the importance of the memory listener's

experience for understanding how the information contained in a shared memory is used to inform various outcomes.

While the hypothesized relationships in the study were largely unsupported, these findings highlight the importance of considering the listener's perspective in the memory sharing process. When considering how the listener will use the information contained in a shared memory, it is more important to consider how the listener interprets the memory than how the sharer perceives their own memory. While memory type (self-defining vs. everyday memory) did not reliably influence affective or informational outcomes, the listener's perception of the shared memory did. As already discussed, memory sharing is an imperfect process that is limited by our ability to communicate through words. This study highlights a complementary, yet less obvious, limitation. Not only is memory sharing limited by the words the sharer uses to describe the memory, but is also limited by how the listener interprets the shared memory. Memories that are perceived by the listener as more central to the sharer's sense of self are better able to develop affective and informational outcomes than memories perceived as less central or auxiliary to the sharer's sense of self.

4.3 Memory Sharing Process.

The memory sharing process involves the sharing of a memory from the sharer to the listener through language. In these studies, I break down the memory sharing process into two distinct pieces: the experience of the memory sharer and the experience of the memory listener. Broadly, these studies provide evidence that self-defining and everyday memories are shared with others using different linguistic strategies. Furthermore, the

listener's perception of the shared memory influences how the memory is used by the memory listener to develop affective and informational outcomes with the memory sharer.

These studies in conjunction provide evidence for the utility of studying the social sharing of self-defining memories at work. The workplace is undoubtedly a social space, and individuals are increasingly required to work with others in team settings. Sharing self-defining memories provides one mechanism for developing and maintaining these affective connections. The practical implications of this study are potentially widespread and can have implications for organizations at multiple levels. At the team level, self-defining memory sharing interventions could be used as an easy, inexpensive way to jumpstart the development of affective connections among team members. Team members can be encouraged to share personally meaningful information about themselves early in the life of a team to increase affective trust and likability, which is related to several desirable team outcomes (Colquitt et al., 2007; Costa, 2003; Schaubroeck, Lam, & Peng, 2011).

Continuing in this vein, these findings may shed light on how leaders can convey information about themselves and their work to followers. The self-disclosing nature of self-defining memories can aid develop of affective and informational outcomes in the follower for the leader. These enhanced connections, in particular, may lead to the development of a transformational leadership style. By effectively communicating meaningful, and potentially curated, information about the self to others, leaders can use memory sharing to elicit affective connections and convey personally meaningful information about themselves and their work to enhance interpersonal connections. Managers can share memories central to their sense of self to convey personal information such as insight or work meaningfulness to subordinates, or elicit these memories from

employees to better understand their self-experience. Finally, any worker can share a meaningful memory with a coworker to develop affective connections or convey personal information.

From a theoretical perspective, these studies demonstrate the importance of personal, unique experiences for understanding workplace processes. Organizational research has typically shied away from idiosyncratic constructs in favor of broader dimensions, yet these studies provide initial evidence that even unique personal memories can be characterized according to phenomenological and linguistic characteristics that relate to organizationally relevant outcomes. Furthermore, these studies demonstrate the importance of the temporally extended self in work processes. Not only should researchers be concerned with the individual in the present moment and the individual over time, but also with the individual embedded in time. By explicitly addressing the experiences that constitute individuals sense of self, we can begin to understand how the individual came to be the person they are now.

4.4 Limitations

Of course, these studies are not without limitations. Most notable is the separation of the memory sharer and memory listener into two separate studies. This separation did allow for increased control over the memory sharing process for both individuals in the dyad, but it also led to an impoverished communication channel. During normal memory sharing, the sharer would be receiving feedback from the listener in the form of verbal and nonverbal cues. Furthermore, the listener would also be able to influence the direction of the memory sharing by asking questions, providing commentary, nodding along, etc. By

separating the memory sharer and listener, all this reciprocal information was lost. However, this separation did allow for increased precision in the memory sharing process. For example, shared memories were precisely chosen for the memory listener, potentially removing additional noise from the affective and informational outcomes that would occur if every listener heard a unique memory. Furthermore, this allowed for an experimental test of the role of memory immersion.

For Study 1 addressing the memory sharer, two severe limitations are the adapted memory manipulation and the psychometric issues associated with the MEQ. First, as addressed above, the adapted memory manipulation may be eliciting memories that are uniformly vivid, emotional, autonoetic, etc. While the linguistic analyses do not uniformly support this conclusion, future research should continue to explore adaptations to this manipulation to ascertain which attributes are most important for eliciting self-defining and everyday memories. Second, the MEQ suffers from severe ceiling effects, which may be obscuring meaningful differences in memory phenomenology for self-defining and everyday memories. Future work should adapt this scale to be more psychometrically sound for use associated with this memory manipulation or choose a scale better suited to addressing memory phenomenology.

For the second study, one limitation is the idiosyncratic nature of the selected vignettes. While these vignettes were real memories shared by real people, they did contain various idiosyncratic characteristics that may have influenced listener's perceptions of the memory and subsequent use in informing affective and informational outcomes. Furthermore, the vignettes manipulated various linguistic characteristics at once under the umbrella of memory immersion. While this was done in an attempt to understand how

shared memories are interpreted and used at a broad level, future research could explore this problem with greater precision by manipulating a single linguistic variable at a time.

Additionally, the affect confound in the selected memory vignettes represents an additional limitation. The vignettes were selected for high/low immersion memories based on their affect words, with high immersion memories containing more affect words than low immersion memories. The high immersion memories are both memories containing more positive words than low immersion memories. While this had the effect of excluding a potential confound of negative emotion for the current study (e.g., positive high immersion self-defining memory and negative high immersion everyday memory, or vice versa), it does limit the generalizability of the results. A follow-up study should explore if these effects hold for self-defining memories that are negatively valenced in addition to self-defining memories that are positively valenced.

4.5 Future Directions.

Even as the current studies suffer from several limitations, they also provide avenues for future research. These studies represent a first step in the understanding of self-defining memory sharing at work. Future research can extend these findings in several interesting ways. First, researchers could continue to precisely manipulate memory characteristics and explore how they relate to memory sharing outcomes. As already discussed above, research is needed to determine if negative self-defining memories similarly influence affective and informational outcomes. In addition to this, researchers could construct vignettes that are identical except along one phenomenological dimension to test the effect of specific memory phenomenology on sharing outcomes in isolation. In

this study, memory immersion was tested broadly as a predictor of memory outcomes, but a great deal of research can be done breaking this immersion variable out into its specific facets.

As an alternative, researchers could also opt for less experimental control but more real-world generalizability and pursue studies using less impoverished communication channels. Instead of testing the memory sharer and memory listener in isolation, researchers could allow the memory sharing process to unfold between individuals as a natural conversation. This would allow for an exploration not only of how the memory sharer influences the memory listener, but of reciprocal communicative effects across the dyad.

Finally, self-defining memory research can extend beyond the memory sharing process. The self-defining memories an individual holds may inform many personally relevant variables. At the individual level, self-defining memories play an important role in establishing coherent and unified self-experience by informing the attitudes and beliefs an individual holds (Bauer & McAdams, 2004; Bauer et al., 2005; Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; McAdams et al., 2001; Pillemer, 2001). Extending this to the workers, attitudes and beliefs are of direct interest to many organizations (e.g., job satisfaction, justice beliefs, etc.) and have important repercussions for subsequent behaviors (e.g., turnover intentions, compliance, adherence to rules, etc.). Furthermore, self-defining memories contain goal-relevant information that can inform present and future behavior (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Glück, 2004; Pratt, Norris, Arnold, & Filyer, 1999). The recollection of these memories highlights instances of goal attainment/failure (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and allows individuals to adjust their behavior in the present

accordingly. For example, self-defining memories can shed light on workers' motivation for continued goal striving engagement, self-regulation, resiliency, long-term goals, values, and aspects of their decision-making.

More broadly, this research project is consistent with calls for a more first person, experiential emphasis within work psychology. Our memories, how they are reflected upon and communicated to others, and particularly those memories connected to who we think we are, are at the core of subjective, first person experience. Research on self-defining memories, more generally, can touch upon numerous domains within the Industrial/Organizational Psychology literature. Specifically, self-defining memories and their associated autobiographical reasoning processes (Habermas & Bluck, 2000) may be informative for selection and performance processes. When faced with adversity, how individuals overcome that adversity and how they incorporate the event into their sense of self may have important implications workplace performance and selection. Individuals who incorporate adverse events into redemptive narratives where they were able to learn and grow past the adversity, for example, may be better suited for certain jobs than individuals who see adversity solely as an obstacle. Research using self-defining memories can begin to explicitly explore how autobiographical reasoning processes influence a variety of work outcomes.

4.6 Conclusion

From the memory sharer to the memory listener, the sharing of self-defining and everyday memories provides an important mechanism for understanding the development of affective connections and conveyance of personal information at work. These memories

provide emotional records of past experience that are central to the individual's sense of self. Sharing these memories with others allows for the communication of a small piece of the temporally extended self.

APPENDIX A. SELF-DEFINING MEMORY TASK

A.1 Adapted Self-Defining Memory Task (changes highlighted).

This part of the experiment concerns the recall of a **personal memory about work**. A **personal memory about work** has the following attributes:

1. It is a memory about an enduring theme, issue, or conflict from your life. It is a memory that helps explain who you are as an individual and might be the memory you would tell someone else if you wanted that person to understand you in a profound way.
2. It is at least 1 year old.
3. It is a memory **that is either important or unimportant to you**.
4. It is a memory that can be positive or negative, or both, in how it makes you feel, **or it could be a memory that evokes little or no emotion**.
5. It is memory that has been thought about many times or rarely.
6. **It is a memory about work. The memory does not need to have occurred at work, but it should be about work in some way.**

To understand best what a **personal memory** is, imagine you have just met someone you like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of you is very committed to helping the other get to know **yourself**. In the course of the conversation, you describe a **work or professional memory** that you feel conveys powerfully how you have come to be the **worker/professional** you currently are. It is precisely this memory, which you tell the other person, that constitutes a personal memory.

Please describe your **work-related** memory. In your description, please include a caption for the event, your age at the time of the event, whom you were with, what happened, and how you and any others present responded to the event. Please include details that would help an imagined friend see and feel as you did.

A.2 Original Self-Defining Memory Task (changes highlighted)

This part of the experiment concerns the recall of a special kind of personal memory called a self-defining memory. A self-defining memory has the following attributes:

1. It is a memory about an important enduring theme, issue, or conflict from your life. It is a memory that helps explain who you are as an individual and might be the memory you would tell someone else if you wanted that person to understand you in a profound way.
2. It is at least 1 year old.
3. It is a memory from your life that you remembered very clearly and that still feels important to you even as you think about it.
4. It may be a memory that can be positive or negative, or both, in how it makes you feel. The only important aspect is that it leads to strong feelings.
5. It is a memory that you have thought about many times. It should be familiar to you like a picture you have studied or a song (happy or sad) you have learned by heart.
6. It is a memory linked to other similar memories that share the same theme or concern.

To understand best what a self-defining memory is, imagine you have just met someone you like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of you is very committed to helping the other get to know the “Real You”. You are not trying to play a role or to strike a pose. While, inevitably, we say things that present a picture of ourselves that might not be completely accurate, imagine that you are making every effort to be honest. In the course of the conversation, you describe a memory that you feel conveys powerfully how you have come to be the person you currently are. It is precisely this memory, which you tell the other person and simultaneously repeat to yourself, that constitutes a self-defining memory.

Please describe your self-defining memory. In your description, please include a caption for the event, your age at the time of the event, whom you were with, what happened, and how you and any others present responded to the event. Please include details that would help an imagined friend see and feel as you did.

APPENDIX B. EVERYDAY MEMORY TASK

B.1 Adapted Everyday Memory Task (changes highlighted).

This part of the experiment concerns the recall of a **personal memory about work**. A **personal memory about work** has the following attributes:

1. It is a memory that was personally experienced, i.e., not a memory that a parent or sibling described to you, nor something that you read about or heard about through the media.
2. It is at least 1 year old.
3. It is a memory that is either important or unimportant to you.
4. It is a memory that can be positive or negative, **or both**, in how it makes you feel, or it could be a memory that evokes little or no emotion.
5. It is memory that has been thought about many times or rarely.
6. **It is a memory about work. The memory does not need to have occurred at work, but it should be about work in some way.**

To understand best what a personal memory is, imagine you have just met someone you like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of you is very committed to helping the other get to know yourself. In the course of the conversation, you describe a work or professional memory that you personally experienced. It is **precisely this memory, which you tell the other person, that constitutes a personal memory.**

Please describe your **work-related** memory. In your description, please include a caption for the event, your age at the time of the event, whom you were with, what happened, and how you and any others present responded to the event. Please include details that would help an imagined friend see and feel as you did.

B.2 Original Everyday Memory Task (changes highlighted).

This part of the experiment concerns the recall of an **autobiographical memory**. An **autobiographical memory** has the following attributes:

1. It is a memory that was personally experienced, i.e., not a memory that a parent or sibling described to you, nor something that you read about or heard about through the media.
2. It is at least 1 year old.
3. It is a memory that is either important or unimportant to you.
4. It is a memory that can be positive or negative in how it makes you feel, or it could be a memory that evokes little or no emotion.
5. It is a memory that has been thought about many times or rarely

Please describe your **autobiographical** memory. In your description, please include a caption for the event, your age at the time of the event, whom you were with, what happened, and how you and any others present responded to the event. Please include details that would help an imagined friend see and feel as you did.

APPENDIX C. STUDY 1 MEASUREMENTS

C.1 Manipulation check items

Stem: Please answer the following questions regarding the memory you just described. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 - Somewhat disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 - Somewhat agree, 5 - Strongly agree)

1. This memory is an important memory for me.
2. This memory represents the "real" me.
3. I think about this memory regularly.
4. This memory describes an important theme from my life.
5. This is an emotional memory about my life.
6. To what extent does this memory reflect who you are as a person? (1 - Not at all, 2 - A little, 3 - A moderate amount, 4 - A lot, 5 - A great deal)

C.2 Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007)

Stem: Please answer the following questions regarding the memory you just described. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 - Somewhat disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 - Somewhat agree, 5 - Strongly agree).

1. Memory Vividness
 1. My memory for this event is clear.
 2. My memory for this event is very vivid.
 3. My memory for this event is very detailed.
 4. My memory for this event is dim.
 5. My memory for this event is very vague.
 6. My memory for this event is sketchy.
2. Coherence
 1. The order of events in the memory is clear.
 2. When I recall this memory, the sequence of events seems realistic.
 3. This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events.
 4. I recognize the setting in which my memory takes place.
 5. The order of events in the memory is confusing.
 6. This memory comes back to me in bits and pieces, not as a logical, coherent story.
 7. This memory is a blending of many similar, related events rather than a specific memory about a particular event.
 8. I have a difficult time remembering the event in a coherent manner.
3. Accessibility
 1. This memory just sprang to my mind when I read the instructions.

2. This memory was easy for me to recall.
3. It was difficult for me to think of this memory.
4. I had to think for a while before I could recall this event.
5. I really had to search my “memory bank” for this experience.
4. Sensory detail
 1. As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind.
 2. As I remember the event, I can feel now the emotions that I felt then.
 3. I can bodily “feel” myself in this memory.
 4. When I recall this event, I think the same things I thought when the event originally happened.
 5. When I recall this memory, I do not feel the same feelings I felt when the event originally happened.
 6. When I recall this event, it does not really feel like I am reliving the experience.
 7. My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information (sounds, smells, tastes, etc.).
 8. As I remember the event, I have a difficult time recalling the particular physical reactions and sensations I had during the experience.
5. Emotional intensity
 1. As I am remembering the experience now, my feelings are very intense.
 2. My emotions are very intense concerning this event.
 3. The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions.
 4. I do not remember having particularly strong emotions at the time of this event.
 5. I do not have strong emotions about this memory.
 6. This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me.
6. Visual perspective
 1. I see the experience in the memory through my own eyes.
 2. In my memory, I see this experience through my own eyes.
 3. When I visualize this memory, I clearly see this event from my own perspective.
 4. I view this memory as if I was an observer to the experience.
 5. In my memory, I see this experience through the eyes of others.
 6. As I remember this event, I feel like an observer watching myself.
7. Time perspective
 1. My memory for the year when the event took place is clear.
 2. My memory for the day when the event took place is clear.
 3. My memory for the hour when the event took place is clear.
 4. My memory for the year when the event took place is vague.
 5. My memory for the day when the event took place is vague.
 6. My memory for the hour when the event took place is vague.
8. Sharing
 1. I often share this memory with friends or family.
 2. Since it happened, I have talked about this event many times.
 3. I frequently think about or talk about this event with others.
 4. I rarely tell others about this memory.

5. I do not feel the need to share this memory with others.
6. I do not think about this memory often.
9. Distancing
 1. I don't have much in common with the person in the memory.
 2. I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than who I am today.
 3. When I recall this memory, I think, "that's not me anymore."
 4. My behavior in this memory is consistent with my personality.
 5. I feel like I am the same person in the memory as I am today.
 6. This memory is consistent with who I think I am today.
10. Valence
 1. The overall tone of the memory is positive.
 2. The experience described in this memory is positive.
 3. My feelings at the time were positive.
 4. The overall tone of the memory is negative.
 5. The experience described in this memory is negative.
 6. My feelings at the time were negative.

C.3 Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a)

Stem: Please answer the following questions regarding the memory you just described. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Somewhat disagree, 4 - Neither agree nor disagree, 5 - Somewhat agree, 6 – Agree, 7 - Strongly agree)

1. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand new experiences.
2. I automatically see connections and similarities between this event and experiences in my present life.
3. I feel that this event has become part of my identity.
4. This event can be seen as a symbol or mark of important themes in my life.
5. This event is making my life different from the life of most other people.
6. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the world.
7. I believe that people who haven't experienced this type of event think differently than I do.
8. This event tells a lot about who I am.
9. I often see connections and similarities between this event and my current relationships with other people.
10. I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story.
11. I believe that people who haven't experienced this type of event, have a different way of looking upon themselves than I have.
12. This event has colored the way I think and feel about other experiences.
13. This event has become a reference point for the way I look upon my future.

14. If I were to weave a carpet of my life, this event would be in the middle with threads going out to many other experiences.
15. My life story can be divided into two main chapters: one is before and one is after this event happened.
16. This event permanently changed my life.
17. I often think about the effects this event will have on my future.
18. This event was a turning point in my life.
19. If this event had not happened to me, I would be a different person today.
20. When I reflect upon my future, I often think back to this event.

APPENDIX D. STUDY 2 MEMORY MANIPULATIONS

D.1 Self-defining memory – High immersion

I was 28 at the time. I worked about 60 hours a week as a teacher making sure that everything my students needed would be available to them to ensure that they were getting the education that they deserve. But, I was burnt out. While I made sure not to express my frustrations at work, when I was at home I was depressed and I was distant towards my family members constantly wondering if I was doing a good job. They were understanding and I am grateful to them because of this. But, at work I didn't feel appreciated. I worked hard, did what was asked of me, but I didn't feel appreciated. Sure, my students were wonderful, we got along well and rarely did I have problems with them. But, I felt that my work was ignored. Still, I kept it to myself and continued to do the work that was expected of me. I didn't want my students' work to falter because I was feeling this way.

Then one day during an awards ceremony at the end of the school year, my supervisor with my boss standing beside her started giving their final speech towards the children. But, all of a sudden, it shifted towards the teachers. They started thanking us for our hard work. They even apologized to us for making it seem like they didn't care. Just like we were busy they were -they didn't say it but it was enough to understand this. They took a few moments to say a small speech about each and every one of the teachers. Explain their strong points and why they were so cherished. But, what they did after brought me to tears so that I couldn't even get up from my seat and accept the award and tickets for an all-expense paid cruise vacation for me and my family. I still remember when the principal walked up to me and hugged me, telling me that I do good work and to never doubt myself. That even if she can't say it all the time she does appreciate what I do.

It was at that moment I felt refreshed and ready to take on a new year. I knew what I was capable of and I was completely sure that the work that I did was good and beneficial to my students and it was impacting them in a positive way. I honestly wasn't expecting any of this. There are moments when I doubt myself. I guess I just needed to hear "good work" every once in a while. But, my boss went the extra mile. It was one of the best vacations I had in a long time and it was the first time in 3 years working with my school where I was very eager to get to work and continue to show them that I am capable of doing a good job all year round. I guess I should have realized it at the time. That if my students are happy and I was working in a good environment with little trouble to the point where my bosses had little interaction with me, then it meant that I was doing a good enough job that I didn't need constant supervision.

D.2 Self-defining memory – Low immersion

I'm a dog walker and about a year and a half ago I experienced for the first time working with a dog that I could not handle. I was 21 at the time. I had been asked to start walking a dog 5 days a week. I was immediately uncomfortable upon meeting this dog because he

was extremely large and aggressive. I told myself that things would get better. As the days went on, things got worse.

When I went to walk him, he would growl and bark at me and not let me get close. Luckily, his owners were home sometimes and they would put his collars and leash on for me. I began to dread going over there every day and my heart rate would be very high during the entire half hour. This dog was about 150 pounds and had never been trained. He wore a shock collar and I was supposed to carry a remote to shock him when he did bad things. This felt really cruel to me so I didn't want to do it. He had so many triggers that our walks were total nightmares every day. He hated other dogs and he hated people. They lived across the street from a large park that was unfenced. People would let their dogs off leash and there would be no control if their dogs decided to run up to us. I would have no choice except to grab the dog and run away as quickly as possible. Sometimes people would try to approach us and ask to pet the dog, and I had to tell them no because I knew the dog would just attack them.

One time a man kept following us closely even though I was clearly trying to get away and the dog was getting more agitated the closer he got. I had to take him in and out on the elevators and around tight hallways, and it always gave me a lot of anxiety not knowing if a person and another dog could pop out at any moment.

One day, I went over and the owners were not home. They left me treats to give the dog because they thought that would help. The dog was so angry with me that he didn't care about the treats. He ended up sitting in front of the door so that I couldn't even leave. I left a note for the owners telling them that I was unable to take him on a walk that day since I couldn't even approach him. After he left the door alone, I was able to run out quickly. I told my boss that day that I just could not walk him anymore, and she told me that I never had to go back there.

I've never been scared of dogs. I love bigger dogs and I hate the discrimination that some breeds face. I felt like it was partially my fault. My boss got a different girl to take over for me and I always wonder what ever happened, if she still walks him or if the same thing happened to her.

D.3 Everyday memory – High immersion

This was my first teaching experience. It was in the Fall of 2016 and I had to teach integral calculus. I had taught, before but it was always 2-3 students at a time. I had no experience of classroom teaching. So, I was more than a little worried. My university had a pretty extensive TA training program which ran for an entire week. I attended all the workshops religiously, took notes, read and reread the TA manual. Still I found myself ill-prepared. With hindsight, my lack of confidence was pretty natural but at that point I was super-scared to face my students.

Anyway, the appointed hour came and I had no choice but to go on. I introduced myself, asked each one of them to do a brief introduction and got down to business. Fortunately, it

was a worksheet session and so I didn't have to do much. The students were well prepared - most of them had done AP calculus. The first day was a success.

As the quarter went by I found the work more and more easygoing. All I had to do was go to the class and do a bunch of integrals on the board. So, I was lax and stopped preparing the homework problems beforehand. After all, I don't need to prepare for freshman integration problems. How wrong I was!

One day we were doing surfaces of revolution. I used to do them in a different way than it was taught in the text. The textbook is very formal - they set up the problem nicely and then solve it by following a specific algorithm. I tried to do the first problem but it wasn't very easy and I had to step back and think for five minutes before the solution came to me. To the credit of my students, no one showed any signs of impatience in the meantime.

I was halfway through writing and explaining my solution when someone politely asked for a clarification. Then it hit me - they are not following anything because I was doing this problem in a completely different method. I tried to make them understand but it was hopeless. What I was doing didn't have any relation with the stuff they have seen in the professor's lecture or in the text. So, I asked them just to copy it down for now and promised to come up with a better solution next time. I was feeling doubly uncomfortable because it was a day of observation by the TA mentor.

Other than that, I didn't have much trouble with my class. It was a refuge for me - whenever I was stuck with differential geometry or algebra, I would think about the class I was teaching. It was very comforting to know that there is at least one class which I could ace. I learned a lot about teaching after this course. In my view, teaching is like a performing art. No amount of reading or attending workshops will prepare you for the challenge. You only get better with practice.

D.4 Everyday memory – Low immersion

Our company had just moved offices during the previous summer. Before moving to our current place in the woodsy suburbs, not far from the mall, we were in the city limits. I preferred our old location because it was much closer to my apartment, making it a shorter commute on city streets and not the expressway, and also I liked how there were lots of good lunch places nearby. But it was a larger and newer office, and I often saw wildlife out the window when I was making copies.

It was December, and we'd only had snow a couple of times so far that winter. I was coping with the drive but still not liking it. This particular day, a Monday, a freezing mixture had fallen the night before. I scraped my windows and set out carefully on the roads. They were a little tricky but I knew I had to make it in to work. The office manager was on vacation the first part of this week, the week before Christmas, and I would have a lot of her work to do in addition to my own.

I noticed when I got closer to work there was a traffic signal out, then another one. I pulled into the driveway and to the back of the building and my regular spot. No one had shoveled

or salted the sidewalk, which was odd, but I shrugged it off as we had a newer coworker doing that and perhaps he thought he should wait until asked by one of the bosses to do it. I walked in the door and noticed no lights were on. The door had been unlocked, so someone must already be there.

I called out “hello.” One of the bosses, Bob, responded that he was down the hall. There was Bob, standing with Danny, the new estimator. Bob said that the power was out from the ice storm and he had been texting everyone.

I checked my phone and yep, there it was, sent after I had already started out from home. I asked Bob what we should do. When the power went out at the old place, we sometimes went out for breakfast then came back and it was usually back on.

Danny said that the phone didn’t work and Bob said that it could be a couple of days without power. Lots of people were out in the area, and since we’re not around many other businesses, our section priority was low. Bob said that he was sending everyone home and would call when the power was back on.

I was simultaneously very happy to have some time off, because I’d not even started my Christmas shopping, and distressed, because when the power did come back I would have even more work to do. With nothing to be done about it, I said my goodbyes and went out the door and back into my car. I went right to the mall, which had power. It was a weird feeling to have my day suddenly so different than I had expected it to unfold.

The power ended up being out all week, finally coming back on that Friday evening, the day before Christmas Eve. Plus they even paid us for the week, so we all ended up with a nice bit of time off for the holidays.

APPENDIX E. STUDY 2 MEASUREMENTS

E.1 Manipulation check items

Please answer the following questions about the person whose memory you just read. (1 - Strongly agree, 2 - Somewhat agree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 - Somewhat disagree, 5 - Strongly disagree)

1. The shared memory is an important memory for this person.
2. The shared memory represents the "real me" for this person.
3. This person thinks about the shared memory regularly.
4. The shared memory describes an important theme from this person's life.
5. The shared memory is an emotional memory about this person's life.
6. To what extent does the shared memory reflect who this person is? (1 – Not at all, 2 – A little, 3 – A moderate amount, 4 – A lot, 5 – A great deal)

E.2 Likability

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding the imagined person whose memory you just read. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree)

1. This person is friendly.
2. This person is likeable.
3. This person is warm.
4. This person is approachable.
5. I would ask this person for advice.
6. I would like this person as a coworker.
7. I would like to be friends with this person.
8. This person is knowledgeable.

E.3 Affective trust (adapted; McAllister, 1995)

The following questions are about the person whose memory you just read. Please imagine this person is a coworker who has shared this memory with you. Based on this memory, please indicate the extent to which you agree to the following statements regarding this imagined person. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree)

1. I believe we would have a sharing relationship. We would both freely share our ideas, feelings, and hopes.
2. I believe I would be able to talk freely to this individual about difficulties I am

- having at work and know that (s)he will want to listen.
3. I believe I would feel a sense of loss if one of us was transferred and we could no longer work together.
 4. I believe that if I shared my problems with this person, (s)he would respond constructively and caringly.
 5. I believe I would make considerable emotional investments in our working relationship.

E.4 Empathy

Please indicate the extent to which the following adjectives describe how you feel about the imagined person whose memory you just read. (1 - Not at all, 2 – Slightly, 3 – Moderately, 4 – Very, 5 – Extremely)

1. Sympathetic
2. Warm
3. Compassionate
4. Soft-hearted
5. Tender

E.5 Meaningfulness (adapted; Bunderson & Thompson, 2009, May et al., 2004)

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding the imagined person whose memory you just read. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree)

1. This person's job activities are personally meaningful to him/her.
2. The work this person does on their job is worthwhile.
3. This person's job activities are significant to him/her.
4. The work this person does on their job is meaningful to him/her.
5. I feel that the work this person does on their job is valuable.
6. The work that this person does is important.
7. This person has a meaningful job.
8. The work that this person does makes the world a better place.
9. What this person does at work makes a difference in the world.
10. The work that this person does is meaningful.

E.6 Insight

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding the imagined person whose memory you just read. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 -

Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree)

1. This person is an insightful person.
2. This person knows "life lessons" that can apply to life broadly.
3. This person can articulate the way he/she thinks about the world.
4. This person has wisdom that can apply to many contexts.
5. The knowledge this person has is not relevant to my life.
6. There is little I can learn from this person about the world generally.

E.7 Cognitive trust

The following questions are about the person whose memory you just read. Please imagine this person is a coworker who has shared this memory with you. Based on this memory, please indicate the extent to which you agree to the following statements regarding this imagined person. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree)

1. I believe this person approaches his/her job with professionalism and dedication.
2. Given this person's track record, I see no reason to doubt his/her competence and preparation for the job.
3. I believe I can rely on this person not to make my job more difficult by careless work.
4. I believe that most people, even those who aren't close friends of this individual, trust and respect him/her as a coworker.
5. I believe that other work associates who must interact with this individual consider him/her to be trustworthy.
6. I believe that if people knew more about this individual and his/her background, they would be more concerned and monitor his/her performance more closely.

E.8 Memory Experiences Questionnaire (adapted; Sutin & Robins, 2007)

The following questions are about the person whose memory you just read. Please think about how this person considers the memory they just shared. Please indicate the extent to which you agree to the following statements regarding this imagined person. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree)

1. Vividness
 1. This person's memory for this event is clear.
 2. This person's memory for this event is very vivid.
 3. This person's memory for this event is very detailed.
 4. This person's memory for this event is dim.
 5. This person's memory for this event is very vague.

6. This person's memory for this event is sketchy.
2. Coherence
 1. The order of events in the memory is clear.
 2. When this person recalls this memory, the sequence of events seems realistic.
 3. This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events.
 4. This person recognizes the setting in which my memory takes place.
 5. The order of events in the memory is confusing.
 6. This memory comes back to this person in bits and pieces, not as a logical, coherent story.
 7. This memory is a blending of many similar, related events rather than a specific memory about a particular event.
 8. This person has a difficult time remembering the event in a coherent manner.
3. Accessibility
 1. This memory just sprang to this person's mind when thinking about their past.
 2. This memory was easy for this person to recall.
 3. It was difficult for this person to think of this memory.
 4. This person had to think for a while before they could recall this event.
 5. This person really had to search their "memory bank" for this experience.
4. Sensory detail
 1. As this person remembers the event, they can hear it in their mind.
 2. As this person remembers the event, they can feel now the emotions that they felt then.
 3. This person can bodily "feel" themselves in this memory.
 4. When this person recalls this event, they think the same things they thought when the event originally happened.
 5. When this person recalls this memory, they do not feel the same feelings they felt when the event originally happened.
 6. When this person recalls this event, it does not really feel like they are reliving the experience.
 7. This person's memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information (sounds, smells, tastes, etc.).
 8. As this person remembers the event, they have a difficult time recalling the particular physical reactions and sensations they had during the experience.
5. Emotional intensity
 1. As this person is remembering the experience, their feelings are very intense.
 2. This person's emotions are very intense concerning this event.
 3. The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions for this person.
 4. This person does not remember having particularly strong emotions at the time of this event.
 5. This person does not have strong emotions about this memory.

6. This memory does not evoke strong emotions in this person.
6. Visual
 1. This person sees the experience in the memory through their own eyes.
 2. In their memory, this person sees this experience through their own eyes.
 3. When this person visualizes this memory, they clearly see this event from their own perspective.
 4. This person views this memory as if they were an observer to the experience.
 5. In their memory, this person sees this experience through the eyes of others.
 6. As this person remembers this event, they feel like an observer watching themselves.
7. Time perspective
 1. This person's memory for the year when the event took place is clear.
 2. This person's memory for the day when the event took place is clear.
 3. This person's memory for the hour when the event took place is clear.
 4. This person's memory for the year when the event took place is vague.
 5. This person's memory for the day when the event took place is vague.
 6. This person's memory for the hour when the event took place is vague.
8. Sharing
 1. This person often shares this memory with friends or family.
 2. Since it happened, this person has talked about this event many times.
 3. This person frequently thinks about or talks about this event with others.
 4. This person rarely tell others about this memory.
 5. This person does not feel the need to share this memory with others.
 6. This person does not think about this memory often.
9. Distancing
 1. The person sharing the memory doesn't have much in common with the person in the memory.
 2. The person sharing the memory feels like the person in this memory is a different person than who they are today.
 3. When this person recalls this memory, they think, "that's not me anymore."
 4. This person's behavior in this memory is consistent with their personality.
 5. This person feels like they are the same person in the memory as they are today.
 6. This memory is consistent with who this person thinks they are today.
10. Valence
 1. The overall tone of the memory is positive.
 2. The experience described in this memory is positive.
 3. This person's feelings at the time were positive.
 4. The overall tone of the memory is negative.
 5. The experience described in this memory is negative.
 6. This person's feelings at the time were negative.

E.9 Centrality of Events Scale (adapted; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a)

The following questions are about the person whose memory you just read. Please think about how this person considers the memory they just shared. Please indicate the extent to which you agree to the following statements regarding this imagined person. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree)

1. This event has become a reference point for the way this person understands new experiences.
2. This person automatically sees connections and similarities between this event and experiences in their present life.
3. This person feels that this event has become part of their identity.
4. This event can be seen as a symbol or mark of important themes in this person's life.
5. This event is making this person's life different from the life of most other people.
6. This event has become a reference point for the way this person understands themselves and the world.
7. I believe that people who haven't experienced this type of event think differently than this person does.
8. This event tells a lot about who this person is.
9. This person often sees connections and similarities between this event and their current relationships with other people.
10. This person feels that this event has become a central part of their life story.
11. This person believes that people who haven't experienced this type of event, have a different way of looking upon themselves than they have.
12. This event has colored the way this person thinks and feels about other experiences.
13. This event has become a reference point for the way this person looks upon their future.
14. If this person were to weave a carpet of their life, this event would be in the middle with threads going out to many other experiences.
15. This person's life story can be divided into two main chapters: one is before and one is after this event happened.
16. This event permanently changed this person's life.
17. This person often thinks about the effects this event will have on their future.
18. This event was a turning point in this person's life.
19. If this event had not happened to this person, they would be a different person today.
20. When this person reflects upon their future, they often think back to this event.

E.10 Likelihood of sharing a memory

Please answer the following questions about the person whose memory you just read. (1 – Extremely unlikely, 2 – Somewhat unlikely, 3 – Neither likely nor unlikely, 4 – Somewhat likely, 5 – Extremely likely)

1. How likely are you to share something personal with this person?
2. How likely are you to share an emotional story about yourself with this person?
3. How likely are you to share an important memory about yourself with this person?

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