

"IMPERIALISM REVISED: MILITARY, SOCIETY, AND U.S. OCCUPATION IN THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1880-1924"

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DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the historical implications of World-War-One-Era armed occupations through a study of the U.S.-created constabulary in the Dominican Republic during the military occupation of 1916-1924, and a contextualization of those years in the wider context of Dominican history. Through this historically under-studied case, I demonstrate the negotiations and compromise that, over the course of a long occupation, both revised the approaches of U.S. occupying forces and changed occupied society--fundamentally reshaping Dominican social class and regional power relationships through the military, unifying a heavily regional society, and polarizing society between military and civilian. The occupation took place during a time of rapid modernization in the Dominican Republic and drastically changing U.S. foreign policy methods, opening the way for its events and character to play a central role in the development of both. This study combines an analysis of U.S. and Dominican government and popular sources, including international communications, military records and newspapers from both countries, and private letters, to demonstrate the complex dialogue through which the new Dominican military and political system came into being. This dissertation takes back to its origin the question of what happens in U.S. military occupations meant to export democracy, examining the interplay and give and take between the occupied and occupiers, and the ways in which the end results were an evolution of something new, built of compromise. The society and military that emerged on the other side of the occupation was the result of a creative and ever-evolving dialogue between opposing forces, an evolution that led to a product distant from the plans of occupiers, but also distant from the plans of resisters, one that fundamentally reshaped Dominican power relationships and societal structure by the occupation's end.

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A note about sources: Recent organization and extensive digitalization of the Dominican Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) under Director Roberto Cassá has greatly facilitated research there and led to better preservation and clearer classification of documents. My research began before these changes, however, and took place over the years of transition in the archives. For that reason, I have marked the original citations from the AGN as "AGN1," and the citations from the new system as "AGN."

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines inter-Caribbean relations and Latin American state-building in the early twentieth century through a case study of the international and domestic negotiations that shaped Dominican society and politics before and during U.S. occupation (1916-1924). I examine Dominican political culture, military institutions, and U.S.-Dominican relations from 1880-1924, and the U.S. creation of a new Dominican military under Marine forces of occupation from 1916. My research demonstrates that early U.S. attempts to build Dollar Diplomacy and to export democracy inadvertently sparked changes in society that led to an especially powerful and long-lived military dictatorship in the post-occupation Dominican Republic. In creating this new military, U.S. occupation planners carried out an "experiment" expected to control and reshape Dominican society and provide a model for U.S. military interventions elsewhere. The majority of Dominicans fought to reject the experiment. The end result was a dialogue between the theoretical expectations of an occupying force and the creative negotiation of an occupied people who largely rejected U.S. impositions. This set of international relations was central to the diplomatic and military histories of both countries. On the U.S. side, it was one of the core interventions characterizing and defining U.S. diplomacy of the period, a key experiment in the policy of exporting democracy through military intervention. On the Dominican side, the major focus of this study, it completely shifted the balance of power among classes and--through infrastructural developments and military imposition and resistance--united previously regional power bases. Dominican society was drastically changed because of negotiations between U.S. impositions and Dominican reactions against them. The country's diverse regions were unified physically through improved roads and communications, and

ideologically through the growing unification of anti-occupation sentiment and action.

Analyzing these changes, my dissertation shows how negotiation to end the occupation allowed the hated, U.S.-supported military to become first a tenable national force and then the backbone of the potent Trujillo dictatorship.

The history of the Dominican Republic has been influenced heavily by the symbiotic connection between its geographical location and its military needs and development, a fact that extends well beyond its relationship to the United States. The Dominican military, in the period from the 1880s to the 1920s, drastically changed from an often loose coalition of regional military forces to a modern, centralized, national armed force. This was a time of extreme change and upheaval in all aspects of Dominican society as planters and a growing middle class progressively entered the international economy, and the support of a centralizing government came to depend ever more on revenue from international trade. Dominican national leaders during the late 1800s and early 1900s, most elevated through their military backgrounds in the wars for independence (1821, 1842-1844, 1865-1868), worked in a highly regionalized country to bring about some level of centralization that could increase revenue and strengthen the central state. Understandably, they used the military to do so. But the military was largely regional too, and local governments and merchants jealous of their autonomy struggled to retain the flexibility of local traditions. The period under study was consumed by a multi-faceted struggle of regionalism versus centralization, an issue that many Dominican and U.S. investors and diplomats came to see as a question of "backwardness" vs. "modernity." For others, among them the Dominican northern intellectual elite and tobacco merchants, regionalism represented tradition and autonomy while centralization came increasingly to represent foreign imposition--and sometimes even theft of sovereignty. In the Dominican experience during these decades,

centralization tended to benefit the sugar industry, which was progressively foreign in ownership. This trend was reinforced under the rules of Dominican presidents Heureaux (1882-1899) and Cáceres (1905-1911), and then under the U.S. military occupation (1916-1924).

In the pre-occupation Dominican military, the controversy of regionalism versus centralization manifested itself in the struggles between caudillo power and a splintered, non-professional armed force, and in the ideal of Dominican versus foreign control. The latter concern became more prominent in the early twentieth century as the U.S. government became more involved in Dominican politics and economy. This dissertation focuses on the military as a central arena of power conflicts and a primary tool whereby Dominicans redefined their cultural and social national identity, in ways that reflected emerging relationships among competing groups. This process occurred through imperialism and active resistance, constructive adaptation, and negotiation. Concentrating on how political, social and cultural characteristics of the military affected social structure and nation formation from the dictatorship of Ulises Heureaux (1882-1899) to the beginning of the Trujillo era, my analysis aims to demonstrate the complex interplay of imperial ambition and “indigenous” response in colonial settings, and how this interplay helped form twentieth-century Dominican national identity.

U.S. diplomats and occupation forces pinpointed the Dominican military as the main source of Dominican political problems, and thus economic problems, and sought to remake the military in order to restructure and revise Dominican society. In 1916, U.S. Marines occupied Dominican cities and declared a military government. The first measures of this unilaterally imposed government included the gradual but complete disbanding of all existing Dominican armed and police forces, the disarmament of the entire Dominican population, and strict censorship of the Dominican press. Through eight years of occupation (1916-1924), during

which the U.S. government left the occupation administration largely under the control of the Department of the Navy and U.S. Marines stationed throughout the country, occupying forces placed greatest emphasis on improving the country's infrastructure, centralizing governmental power, and creating a new Dominican army modeled on the U.S. Marine Corps. This military, U.S. forces hoped, would eventually work apolitically to bring U.S.-defined stability to the country. The results of this prolonged intervention, though not those predicted either by U.S. forces or by those resisting them, brought major and lasting change to the Dominican military and way of life.

The occupation and the new Dominican military changed social relations, re-ordered social classes, and increased social mobility. This was especially true for those Dominicans who lived in rural areas far away from major urban centers. Many rural Dominicans had remained removed from larger national developments because they could more easily avoid obligatory military service; recruiters could not reach those populations that were not connected to urban centers by infrastructure, and the remoteness of many populations meant exclusion from the training and mobility that military service might provide. Regional fragmentation and a lack of central infrastructure also contributed to difficulties in centralizing trade that might have funded a larger central government. Despite military exclusion and regional fragmentation, Dominicans across the country sought news of national happenings and jealously guarded national independence, fearful of repetitions of the many incursions on sovereignty that the country had suffered since independence largely because they led to incursions on local autonomy. Dominican writers, even in the most remote regions, had a strong tendency toward anti-imperialism, but also toward guarding regional and local autonomy.¹

¹ See, for example: Alberto Baeza Flores, *Don Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, un siglo de conducta y de valor*, Revista de la Habana, Reimpreso del No. 50, Oct. 1946; Juan Daniel Balcácer, *Lilís, cartas y comunicaciones*,

Internal and external developments meant that the decades from 1880 to the 1920s would bring sweeping change to this way of life, gradually centralizing the country and its government and military. It would take forceful foreign intervention, however, to push through much of the change, and even then the strength of Dominicans' culture and determination led to a rapid evolution that deeply incorporated Dominican regional and military structures into the changed society that emerged to dominate in the later twentieth century. By 1900, U.S. investors and gradually the U.S. government joined in the struggle to centralize and standardize the Dominican economy. Their eventual decision to use the Dominican government and then the Dominican military, I argue, first perpetuated regionalism and civil war and then culminated in the U.S. military occupation and, finally, in the military dictatorship under Rafael Trujillo that dominated twentieth-century Dominican history for more than three decades. This was true both because of the national struggle between regionalism and centralization during this period and because both U.S. and Dominican actors saw the military as the key to development. Through the course of the U.S. military presence, however, a twofold revision of the planned occupation constabulary took place. The two major revisions of the constabulary were products of the collision and mixing of occupation plans and Dominican realities, from tradition to deliberate initiatives, but also formed a portion of the broader contemporary struggle between centralization and regionalism as it played out in the military.

The first revision occurred in phases through the bulk of the occupation period as occupation plans were laid out, carried out, and revised by occupation realities. In the first phase, the occupation constabulary was created in 1917 and the majority of Dominicans refused to join or support it. In response to this unexpected turn of events and the lack of consistent

(Santo Domingo: Editora Cosmos, 1977); Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, *Papeles de Pedro F. Bono, para la historia de las ideas políticas en Santo Domingo*, (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe), 1964.

support from the U.S. State Department, occupation officers continually changed their plans to try to accommodate the problem, eventually by neglecting the constabulary and ruling the country through the force of U.S. Marines. In overlapping phases after the end of World War One, the plans for the constabulary were repeatedly changed and often locally developed, until a rising set of resistance movements in 1920 brought a drastic new revision of constabulary initiatives. This included the abandoning of the early occupation plan to train and eventually promote the lowest classes to officer positions. It instead quickly elevated the slightly more cooperative middle classes directly to officer positions as the United States sought to withdraw its forces from deep involvement in the country.

The second revision, overlapping slightly with the first, began in earnest in the years 1920 to 1924, when many Dominicans began to see that they had a clear stake in the occupation process and end result. In the earlier years of occupation, the majority of the population had settled for resistance, often passive resistance, that sought to make the occupation government untenable so that U.S. forces would leave. From 1920, many individuals and groups began to insert themselves into the political and military process of the later occupation. By this time, the development of power dynamics with impending had changed the playing field, with many Dominicans commissioned in the officer corps during the changes of this period. Others began to consolidate a resistance movement to try to bring about an alternative end to the occupation that allowed U.S. forces no say in the post-occupation military or political arenas. As different forces struggled to control the terms of the withdrawal, the military government and new Dominican officers in the constabulary joined with a growing number of merchants and politicians to refocus occupation reporting and documentation. The purpose was to encourage wider support for the constabulary and the post-occupation government. Methods for this

refocusing included publications that discredited those still resisting cooperative withdrawal, and a campaign to improve civil-military relations. This campaign brought about a revision of occupation military history that was a clear result, in the end, of both U.S. and Dominican imperatives. While the first major revision of the occupation was more operational and cultural, consisting in physical reorganization and redefinition of the military, the latter revision was largely politico-historical. It included a re-writing of occupation and constabulary history that took place through the 1920s and was intentionally carried into the post-occupation military.

An understanding of the complex motivations and revisions of U.S.-Dominican relations during this period offers a unique window into the development of U.S.-Latin American relations during the period of U.S. expansion and Latin American state formation. This study takes into account the broader world context of foreign relations through this period, U.S. imperatives impelled by World War One and developing U.S. policies of “informal empire,” and how those contexts affected actions and decisions on the ground in the Dominican Republic as the two countries' politics and economies became more intertwined. I join with the expanding group of scholars who seek to apply a new model to the study of U.S.-Latin American relations, one that combines multiple aspects of “the deployment and contestation of power,” as Gilbert Joseph phrased it in the theoretical introduction to the 1998 anthology *Close Encounters of Empire*.² While avoiding a post-modern approach that excludes a close examination of the military and institutional development of the period, a trap into which some cultural history falls, I agree with this group of scholars' approach to combining historical fields of diplomacy, military and foreign relations, and questioning the usefulness of fixed terms such as nation and modernity. The

² Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. Legrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 5.

military in the 1916 occupation of the Dominican Republic provides a useful case study by which to challenge these terms and categories.

The developments during the occupation were complicated by multiple forces and definitions, both within a diverse society and from without. The occupation was a direct U.S. response to long-term civil war in the Dominican Republic that, due to a combination of European interests and growing U.S. investments in the country, seemed to threaten growing U.S. hegemony. The civil war itself was an expression in part of reaction against the foreign presence, magnified by Dominican sectional tension that was in this period intensified by an entrenched class hierarchy and a failing economy. These problems plagued the newly developing country and had become more pronounced and contested since the 1890s, the very period when U.S. investment and U.S. naval expansion grew exponentially throughout the Caribbean region. The U.S. occupation intended to create the institutional means by which regional differences would be managed, and thereby ameliorate the long-standing regional tensions by building new Dominican governmental and military structures from the ground up. The occupation began during World War One, and—by the time of official U.S. entry into the European war in April of 1917—was informed by an inconsistent commitment of U.S. resources, manpower, and clear direction from the U.S. State Department, on one side, and by Dominican rejection of foreign models on the other. By the time the occupation ended in 1924, the dialogue that formed from these conflicting goals had in measurable but incomplete ways stimulated the process by which contending factions in the Dominican Republic began to form a more cohesive definition of national identity.

Many historical studies of U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean during this period treat the U.S. expansionist impulse as the primary focus in their examinations of the historical process,

often with an emphasis or reliance on U.S. sources. Among these works are the groundbreaking studies of Peter Smith, Greg Grandin, and Mary Renda. Their studies have contributed widely to an understanding of U.S. relations with Latin American countries in the twentieth century, revealing the general development of U.S.-Latin American relations as experimental and often flexible. Peter Smith's *Talons of the Eagle* demonstrates that U.S. diplomacy and intervention in Latin American countries has maintained flexibility based on changing U.S. economic and security needs, which have then constrained Latin American response and action--a valuable work in explaining the changing face of U.S. power in the Americas.³ In *Empire's Workshop*, Grandin uses a variety of examples of U.S. twentieth-century interventions throughout Latin America to argue that over time the United States developed policy in Latin American countries that allowed it to perfect empire elsewhere in the world, suggesting a stronger coherence in U.S. policy than that put forth by Smith.⁴ Works such as Mary Renda's *Taking Haiti* bring a fresh interpretive approach to U.S. imperialism in the early twentieth century, demonstrating how complex cultural understandings affected imperial relations in U.S. occupation throughout the Caribbean.⁵ These works, however, tend to neglect the active participation of Latin American actors and motivations in the broader development of these international relations, and thus neglect deeper connections and underpinnings of Latin American contributions to U.S.-Latin American relations.

A few scholars have begun to take a more synthetic approach to the historical study of U.S. Latin-American relations in this period, combining both U.S. and Latin American sources.

³ Peter Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁴ Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

⁵ Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

Historians such as Gilbert Joseph and Michel Gobat emphasize the "colonized" in imperial encounters and work to bring together a balance between U.S. and Latin American sources. Joseph's *Revolution from Without* combines U.S. and Latin American sources to demonstrate the complexities of relationships and state development in U.S.-Mexican relations. Joseph uses a wide synthesis of sources to demonstrate that local, national, and international forces shaped the course of revolution and subsequent development in Mexico.⁶ Gobat's *Confronting the American Dream* examines U.S. intervention and occupation in Nicaragua in terms of Nicaraguan response, demonstrating that Nicaraguan elites selectively accepted and even embraced U.S. cultural, political, and economic structures even while using those structures to reject U.S. imperialism.⁷

This dissertation follows the approach of scholars such as Gilbert Joseph and Michel Gobat in re-examining traditional approaches to U.S.-Latin American relations, combining sources, and examining the dialogue of international motivations as they shaped twentieth-century Latin American development. Following this model, my research demonstrates new avenues and dimensions that can only be revealed by a synthetic examination of U.S.-Latin American relations. While a synthesis of U.S. and Dominican sources for this period demonstrates that U.S. structures gradually came to re-shape the Dominican government and military, as they did in Nicaragua, the process in the Dominican Republic was unique because of the extensive rejection of U.S. modes among Dominicans. The majority of Dominicans did not only reject imperialism, but attempted to reject the changes brought with it. The course of occupation led to gradual adaptation in which--much like Gobat describes for Nicaragua--

⁶ Gilbert M. Joseph, *Revolution From Without: Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States, 1880-1924*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

⁷ Michel Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

Dominicans used U.S. structures to work to overthrow U.S. imperialism. The adaptation in the Dominican Republic, however, was less intentional, and was also unique in that it centered around the military rather than the elites, who were gradually pushed from power in the process. The importance of combining U.S. and Dominican sources for a study of this occupation would be difficult to over-emphasize. The modern history of the Dominican Republic, like that of any Caribbean nation, has been influenced heavily by its location so near the United States. In his 1994 study of U.S. relations with Caribbean nations, sociologist Anthony P. Maingot wrote that "if one were to choose a single word to encapsulate Caribbean history, that word would have to be 'geopolitics.'"⁸ In 1917, as his country's government was being restructured by a U.S. military occupation, Dominican historian Tulio M. Cestero made a similar observation about the "problem" of Caribbean nations' relationship with the United States. West Indies countries, he argued, were in this relationship ruled by geographical position and production.⁹ To the central questions of geographical location and U.S. interest in Caribbean production and goods, this dissertation adds the ever-influential question of the military.

In adopting a synthetic examination of sources from both countries and from military and non-military sources, I provide a case study that clearly demonstrates the problem of less-synthetic works. In contrast to the works of Smith, Grandin, and Renda, a synthetic study of Dominican and U.S. sources problematizes the approach--taken by Smith and Grandin--that U.S. actions are decided by U.S. needs, and provide constraints to Latin American action. While this is certainly true in part, the active negotiation and re-negotiation between Latin American actors and U.S. actors has provided as much of a fuel for change, and sometimes more, than purely

⁸ Anthony P. Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean: Challenges of an Asymmetrical Relationship*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 1.

⁹ Tulio M. Cestero, *Estados Unidos y Las Antillas*, (Madrid: Compañía Ibero-Americana de Publicaciones, 1931), 35.

U.S.-based economic or security needs. The picture is much more complicated, as this dissertation demonstrates: In early U.S.-Dominican relations, the actions and active resistance of Dominicans decisively changed U.S. security needs in ways that a U.S.-centered study cannot extend. Grandin's work, while valuable in demonstrating the over-arching goals of U.S. policy-makers in Latin America, fails to account for the nuances of how those goals were re-shaped by Latin American imperatives.¹⁰

The Dominican case, widely publicized in its time and instrumental in direct changes to U.S. policy from 1904 to the 1920s, offers a window into the types interaction that informed international negotiation in the Caribbean region during these years of rapid U.S. expansion. Largely because of military necessity, the U.S. occupation forces placed great emphasis on improving the country's communication and transportation infrastructure and creating a new Dominican army modeled on the United States Marine Corps. The military government's focus on a new armed force was based largely on the concern about how escalating sectional divisions were perceived as symptoms of Dominican traditions of caudillismo and praetorianism. While this perception was at least partially accurate, it failed to take into account the centrality of regional economic and ideological differences--the Dominican side of the story--the existence of which increasingly complicated occupation structures and methods that were based on military change. Two key problems beset the occupation plans because of this misunderstanding: The first was an inability, for the first six years, to integrate economic change and development plans with changes to the military; the second, in the context of U.S. government interest in the European war, was that the new military—despite its centrality to occupation plans—was usually

¹⁰ A subtlety to which, despite the acclaim of *Empire's Workshop*, Grandin's earlier works are more attuned. See: Greg Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: The Latin American Cold War and its Consequence*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

understaffed, under-budgeted, and run by low-ranking and inexperienced Naval and Marine officers. The significance and centrality of military culture and the wide acceptance of armed conflict in the previous historical trajectory of the Dominican Republic, and then its continuation through the U.S. occupation, meant that the re-shaping of the military would be key to the occupiers' plans for a complete rebuilding of the country. It also meant, however, that Dominican historical experience would gradually allow the new military to become a vehicle for more cohesive resistance—both because Dominican citizens resented disarmament and because the fundamentals of new structures and techniques were still military, and thus could be widely accepted as Dominican rather than foreign in their basic nature, as long as armed resistance was under the control of armed Dominican citizens.

The military government so prioritized military centralization that centralization of government eventually took a back seat to centralized military control. The emphasis on maintaining militarily defined social order after the occupation's end contoured the withdrawal plan and post-occupation U.S. relations with the Dominican Republic. The story of the constabulary within the U.S. occupation is therefore a vital link both to Dominican history and to U.S.-Caribbean relations, and provides insight into the early development of U.S. attempts to export democratic models to foreign countries. Recent scholars studying democratization as a foreign policy have used detailed research to understand the effects of attempts to export democratic government. From a political science perspective, the study has often centered in recent years on which aspects of foreign intervention can most aid democratization in countries that have struggled with either continuing civil war and or repeated autocratic regimes. Scholars

such as Peter Burnell, Thomas Carothers, and Sarah Henderson, have argued that direct military intervention is not supportive of democracy, and often leads to autocratic regimes.¹¹

As these scholars set their arguments and research against the arguments of both previously accepted political theory concerning intervention and against more recent theories, such as that of James Meernik and even the more moderate Mark Peceny, their central concern is to denote how different types of more intrusive and often violent intervention can be counterproductive, while arguing also that interventions can provide powerful aid to democratization by less-intrusive means. Meernik follows many long-accepted and recently questioned ideas, stating that military intervention is, overall, beneficial to targeted countries, demonstrating the results of increased and longer lasting democratization in countries that have experienced foreign military intervention. The crux of his argument is that democratic transitions are most successful when established out of war situations.¹² Peceny complicates his theory in useful ways, agreeing with Meernik's basic premise but arguing for a much more nuanced interpretation. Peceny insists that the positive results stem not from the military intervention itself, but from the many pro-liberalization policies that are used in conjunction with and supported by military force.¹³ This dissertation provides a specific historical contextualization for this evolving discussion, demonstrating how the complexities of interactions and unexpected consequences led to constant negotiation and redefinition of goals from both countries. In the end, as an early attempt to export democracy through military force, the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic was a clear failure in many senses, leaving the

¹¹ Peter Burnell and Vicky Randall, eds., *Politics in the Developing World*, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Sarah L. Henderson, "USAID Support for Civil Society," in: David Lehrer and Anna Korhonen, eds., *Western Aid in Post-Communism: Effects and Side Effects*, (New York: Palgrave, 2009); Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

¹² James Meernik, "United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy," *Journal of Peace Research* 33:4 (Nov. 1996), 391-402.

¹³ Mark Peceny, "Forcing Them to Be Free," *Political Research Quarterly* 52:3 (Sept., 1999), 549-582.

country with a more powerful centralized military and surveillance system that precluded the possibilities of democratic development that occasionally surfaced in the attempts of Dominican politicians during U.S. interventions in the period. The occupation had the effect of forcing rapid centralization of infrastructure that united regions, developing a form of national unity that was long silenced by a new culture of military-civilian separation that came into existence only with the occupation.

Numerous historical studies from both the United States and the Dominican Republic have, especially in recent decades, examined some aspects of the major changes to Dominican society in this vital period, seeking to complicate the earlier dependency approach that dominated Dominican historical study. Most notable among these are those that emphasize and analyze the extensive changes to the Dominican economy around the turn of the century. Dominican scholars Pablo A. Maríñez and Wilfredo Lozano have published a number of works examining the changes to Dominican modes of production and the Dominican export economy, focusing especially on the turn of the twentieth century and on the Trujillo years (1930-1961).¹⁴ Lozano also provides a valuable study of the export economy and the role of U.S. interests during the occupation years (1916-1924).¹⁵ Both emphasize the interactions between the country's agricultural classes and elites, and the interaction of both with U.S. investors and government representatives. Maríñez, especially, argues that active Dominican resistance before, during, and after the occupation largely shaped local policy despite the national predominance of sugar. Recently, historian Michiel Baud has provided in-depth studies of the

¹⁴ Pablo A Maríñez, *Agroindustria, estado y clases sociales en la era de Trujillo (1935-1960)*, (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1993); Pablo A Maríñez, *Resistencia campesina, imperialismo y reforma agraria en República Dominicana (1899-1978)*, (Santo Domingo: Ediciones CEPAE, 1984); Wilfredo Lozano, *Proletarización y campesinado en el capitalismo agroexportador*, (Santo Domingo: Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo INTEC, 1985). See also: Julie Cheryl Franks, "Transforming Property: Landholding and Political Rights in the Dominican Sugar Region, 1880-1930," PhD dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1997.

¹⁵ Wilfredo Lozano, *La Dominación imperialista en la República Dominicana, 1900-1930*, (Santo Domingo: Editora de la Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, 1976).

changes to both Dominican sugar and tobacco, with the goal of analyzing the transition toward capitalist production and relations in the country.¹⁶ Baud, too, demonstrates the problem of overarching theory in attempting to explain Dominican development, showing that while central state policies encouraged the growth of sugar (and thus U.S. investment), the realities of other regions of the Dominican Republic meant that central state policy was repeatedly re-made through active resistance in areas outside of the capital-city region. Through the development of the military, which came to form the core of attempts to centralize the national government, this dissertation demonstrates that the interplay of Dominican actors and regional characteristics with occupation forces reshaped the course of the occupation and, through it, Dominican society.

Many historians have worked to explain the changes to the twentieth-century Dominican Republic through biographies of Trujillo and studies of how the Trujillo regime maintained power. The son of a middle-class family trained and promoted under the occupation military, Trujillo rose rapidly first to the new military's commandant and then to military dictatorship. Important biographical studies of the dictator that appeared after his assassination in 1961 traced the individual development of Trujillo and his use of terror in the late 1920s and early 1930s to demonstrate that his regime was militarily forced on the Dominican population.¹⁷ Many complications, including the heavy scholarly emphasis on the Trujillo Era, have led to an overall lack of research and publications about the U.S. occupation period. Most recently, Richard Turits and Lauren Derby have contributed to the historical understanding of Trujillo's long dictatorship by examining other aspects of his regime. Turits argues that, rather than ruling by

¹⁶ Michiel Baud, "The Origins of Capitalist Agriculture in the Dominican Republic," *Latin American Research Review* 22:2 (1987), 135-153; Michiel Baud, *Historia de un sueño: los ferrocarriles públicos en la República Dominicana, 1880-1930*, (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1993); Michiel Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco in the Dominican Republic, 1870-1930*, (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1995). See also: Pedro Luis San Miguel, *Los Campesinos del Cibao: economía de mercado y transformación agraria en la República Dominicana, 1880-1960*, (San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1997).

¹⁷ See, for example: Robert D. Crassweller, *Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966).

sheer force, Trujillo maintained power by building an alliance with the peasantry through which he was able to maintain power, an interpretation that is useful and path-breaking, but applies variably to different regions. Lauren Derby's study demonstrates the complicated cultural aspects through which Trujillo worked to legitimate his rule, through which he promised modernity and infused Dominican culture with an image that tied him to a promising future for Dominicans.¹⁸ While I agree with aspects of both interpretations, I argue that neither provide an explanation of the role of the occupation in reshaping Dominican institutions, a foreground which is vital to both of these authors' interpretations. The infrastructure for Trujillo's relationship with the peasantry and cultural propaganda were built earlier, and centered around the military complex and politico-historical revisions begun through negotiation between U.S. occupation forces and Dominican resistance during the occupation.

Despite the extent of historical and social science literature attempting to explain such vital historical occurrences as the Trujillo dictatorship and the role of foreign military interventions, the precise role of U.S. intervention in the development of the Dominican military and society remains unclear. Two distinct works by Dominican historians Bernardo Vega and Valentina Peguero have recently located the importance of military development in the rise of Trujillo in ways that challenge previous interpretations and demonstrate more than ever the need for a closer examination of that military's origins and development in the pre-Trujillo decades. In 1992, Bernardo Vega's path-breaking *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas norteamericanas* brought forth an abundance of new evidence in the historiographical quest to understand Trujillo's long-lasting presence at the forefront of Dominican life. His work demonstrates conclusively that the withdrawal of U.S. military forces in the years 1922-1924 was incomplete, that Trujillo's close

¹⁸ Richard Lee Turits, *Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican History*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Lauren Derby, "The Magic of Modernity: Dictatorship and Civic Culture in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1962," PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998.

relationships with U.S. Marine officers not only propelled him to the top ranks of the Dominican military, but contributed forcefully to his ability to remain in power for so long. U.S. officers who had overseen the constabulary during the occupation and often visited the Dominican Republic as distinguished guests also intervened on his behalf with the U.S. State Department and successive U.S. presidents.¹⁹ Vega's study demonstrates that, in many ways, the U.S.-created constabulary therefore remained a foreign force even after the occupation ended. This makes all the more urgent the question of how that military was formed, who took part, and why it was able to become such a powerful force in such a resistant society. While Vega's work demonstrates the new military's strong break from the past, historian Valentina Peguero offered an interpretation in 2005 that instead stresses the continuity of military prominence in Dominican society. Peguero provides an overview of the ways in which early Dominican society was heavily militarized, alongside a closer examination of the militarization in society under Trujillo's regime, to demonstrate the similarities and argue that a long pattern of militarized culture paved the way for Trujillo's military dictatorship.²⁰

Both of these works focus on the military and provide crucial reappraisals of the previous scholarship. They also both demonstrate the overall lack of scholarship explaining the role of the U.S. occupation in the formation of this centralized military. Peguero, for example, concentrates on the early military and compares it to Trujillo's military. Between the two, she provides a brief chapter that gives an overview of major military developments during the occupation, using secondary literature to argue that the occupation enforced militarization in Dominican culture. This dissertation intends to show that it did much more than reinforce a tradition of military

¹⁹ Bernardo Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas norteamericanas*, (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1992).

²⁰ Valentina Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture in the Dominican Republic, from the Captains General to General Trujillo*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004).

predominance, that it instead re-shaped that tradition and much of Dominican society. Vega's work, the first work outside of military publications to incorporate U.S. military sources, paints a picture much different from that in Peguero's work. Through a close study of Trujillo's relationships with military officers beginning in the early 1920s and emphasizing the post-occupation years, Vega demonstrates the distinct break from the past in the post-occupation military; the new military was propped up by U.S. officers, and for decades was heavily influenced by the wishes of those officers and their diplomatic support of Trujillo. Studies of early Dominican history demonstrate that Dominican military leaders before the occupation, as well as the constituents they governed, stressed regional and national sovereignty. The question remains, therefore, what forces came into play to allow such a proudly regional country to change drastically enough to permit the rise of Trujillo. This dissertation examines that question, arguing that the delicate balance of Dominican resistance and foreign imposition, coincident with a crucial moment of national development, opened the way for change that could only occur once both Dominicans and U.S. officials reached a point of compromise and negotiation.

In the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo dictatorship itself silenced many who might have published examinations of those years, while in the United States the changes in foreign policy and direction in the 1920s and 1930s encouraged a dearth of literature. Upon the death of Trujillo in 1961 and into the 1970s, Dominican publishers reprinted many occupation-era resistance writings, opening a wide variety of available primary sources, but historians were generally focused on examining the post-occupation years.²¹ Among U.S. sources, with the exception of economist Melvin Knight's critical 1928 account of U.S. economic policies in the

²¹ For re-printings of anti-occupation literature written during occupation years and preserved throughout the 1920s and the Trujillo dictatorship, see especially the works of Max Henríquez Ureña, Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, Cuban Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, and Fabio Fiallo.

Dominican Republic, the accounts of U.S. diplomats reigned.²² The histories published by U.S. diplomats Sumner Welles and Dana G. Munro, and those officially published by the U.S. military, relied almost exclusively on U.S. sources and offered a generally apologetic view of the occupation with which Dominican scholars did not agree.²³ These were the reference sources for the majority of works referencing the occupation until Bruce Calder's 1984 *The Impact of Intervention*.²⁴ Calder's valuable work is the first and only U.S. monograph directly examining the occupation, incorporating both Dominican and U.S. archival sources to examine the occupation's political economy and the guerrilla resistance of the eastern provinces. Calder argues that the U.S. occupation ignored Dominican realities, but that it sought to make changes without fundamentally reshaping the Dominican government. This dissertation demonstrates that, while the U.S. State Department sought a more middle-of-the-road approach, U.S. military actors who were in charge of most of the occupation were in fact determined to change the most fundamental structures of Dominican society, government, and culture.²⁵

Since the nineteenth century, Dominican national identity has centered in large part around local militaries and their interactions with each other and with non-military actors. Dominican history during this period can therefore only be understood with an exploration of the redefinitions of regional divisions of power and competition among groups and ideologies that tended to be played out in contests for control of the military. This dissertation traces how the military affected Dominican power relationships in pre-occupation years, and then closely examines how the U.S. military occupation of 1916-1924 changed these power relationships and

²² Melvin M. Knight, *The Americans in Santo Domingo*, (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928).

²³ See, for example: José Ortega Frier, *Memorandum relativo a la intervención del Señor Sumner Welles en la política dominicana*, (Santo Domingo: Ediciones de Taller, 1975) and Ramón A. Ferreras, *Enfoques de la intervención militar norteamericana a la R.D. (1916-1924)*, (Santo Domingo: Editorial del Nordeste, 1984).

²⁴ Bruce J. Calder, *The Impact of Interventions: The Dominican Republic During the U.S. Occupation of 1916-1924*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984).

²⁵ Calder's study did not incorporate the extensive collection of documents at the Marine Corps archives, for example, in which many of the discussions that advocate fundamental change are stored.

military institutions in Dominican society through imposed U.S. military structures and a militarily controlled government. I also trace Dominican reception of these imposed structures, which took place through creative patterns of selective resistance and adaptation. I argue that the enduring results of the occupation played into a continuing reorientation of Dominican society, changed the class and regional make-up of the military, and intervened in the development of local cultures. The occupation military forced the centralization of government that Dominicans had resisted, but the strong emphasis on the military allowed the Dominican systems of regionalism and military culture to persist within the new centralized state. The ongoing reactions of Dominicans forced significant revisions of the occupiers' agenda, which had been based on the expectation of Dominican acquiescence to foreign rule; in response to varied and diverse manifestations of anti-imperial sentiment from significant portions of all classes and regions, the military government attempted to impose a number of different models, finally reaching the conclusion in the early 1920s that increased knowledge of Dominican society and the Spanish language were crucial for leaders—thus gradually creating a new series of models that were increasingly Dominican in character. For this reason, and against the expectations of the U.S. military government, major changes in the military were not exclusively a product of U.S. priorities and programs, but a vital product of Dominican and Latin American military tradition and the reactions of Dominicans to the foreign military presence.

Neither the occupation nor U.S.-Dominican relations in pre-occupation years make coherent sense without a study of the military. This is true because the development of the Dominican military became the central point of concern and focus both for U.S. policy makers and Dominicans during this period, and debates about control of the military occurred on many levels. The struggle between resistance to centralization, on one side, and foreign military

control, on the other, played out through the military in distinct phases and revolved around the tensions between Dominican regionalism and U.S. expectations of centralization. Foreign involvement, which began gradually with growing U.S. investment in the late nineteenth century and with U.S. national security concerns in the early twentieth, eventually became centered on the question of military control. It came to include the occupation constabulary and Marine involvement in the post-occupation Dominican military. Historical works correctly pinpoint U.S. expansionism and Dominican civil war as key factors in the onset of occupation, but have yet to adequately explain the centrality of the military. In answer to how the U.S.-created constabulary became such a powerful force after the occupation, the historiography demonstrates that U.S. disarmament of the population and the new efficiency of a centralized and nationally controlled military gave unprecedented power to those in the military.²⁶ A closer study of Dominican reactions to a U.S.-imposed military, however, shows that disarmament and military might alone were unable to bring military control and centralization, as evidenced in the resistance movements of 1920-1921.

The forces of negotiation that allowed the new military not only to be functional but even to change Dominican society remain unexplained. Despite the common historical trend of considering the development of the armed forces and the occupation as separate from each other or from general Dominican history, these developments were always intertwined and cannot be understood without considering their mutual effects on each other. Historical accounts such as the official military history of the Secretaría de las Fuerzas Armadas Dominicanas, however, have minimized the importance of the occupation on Dominican national development. This official history skips over the occupation years completely in its timeline overview of Dominican

²⁶ See, for example: Luis F. Mejía, *De Lili's a Trujillo*, (Santo Domingo: Editora de Santo Domingo, 1976); Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*; Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*; Frank Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic: A National History*, (New York: Hispaniola Books, 1995).

military history, picking the history back up in 1928 as though occupation events have no place in developing a historical understanding of the Dominican armed forces.²⁷ Yet the history of the military during these transformational years provides a window through which to see how the struggle between continuity and change played out, and how it led to a creative dialogue that incorporated structures both U.S. and Dominican by the 1920s.

Through a close examination of the development of multiple Dominican military forces, both institutional and unofficial, this research also contributes to the unfolding debate in broader military history--one that is vital for understanding international military interventions--concerning the development of changing modes of warfare. In the study of the development of "unconventional" or "asymmetrical" warfare, examinations of early U.S. military interventions demonstrate an earlier development of new techniques for combating conventional militaries or insurgencies than many theorists admit. Brian McAllister Linn, for example, applies a regional approach to the insurgency and counterinsurgency in the occupation of the Philippines at the turn of the twentieth century, demonstrating the continuous revision of both broader strategy and operational approaches during such unprecedented actions.²⁸ While Linn's approach shows the ways that on-the-ground exigencies and unexpected resistance affected the Army's approach, Alfred W. McCoy demonstrates the long-term effects of military structures and approaches from U.S. intervention, arguing that structures built during the occupation led to a military police state.²⁹ Despite the importance and influence of local initiatives by the occupied populations, however, neither study focuses on how such initiatives reshaped occupation plans. The study of

²⁷ Dominican Republic, Secretaría de Estado de las Fuerzas Armadas, *Curso de Comando y Estado Mayor, Monográfico Para Optar Por El Título Diplomado Comando y Estado Mayor, "El Ejército Nacional Dominicano: Orígen, Evolución y Determinantes de Sus Armamentos y Equipos,"* (San Isidro: Santo Domingo Oriental, 2003).

²⁸ Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

²⁹ Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

this early military occupation and the founding of the new Dominican military provides a glimpse of the *occupied* population during an intermediary period in which warfare and military rules were in transition as occupied populations fought larger and more well-armed opponents.³⁰ As John Lynn argues, the differences between the theory of combat and the ways that people culturally conceive combat diverge, a process that shapes the way warfare affects society.³¹ An examination of both the actions and the perceptions of the occupied population is crucial for understanding the end negotiations and thus the end result of occupation.

As this dissertation demonstrates, the centrality of perceptions meant a persistent revision of approaches and re-working of institutions that made some occupation goals functional--and allowed combined occupation officials and resistance fighters to reject others. Decades before Mao's concerted efforts to organize and define a new unconventional warfare, early interventions played out in struggles between the conventional and unconventional modes of western war. Intervening U.S. forces fought to overcome opposition through the use of superior technology and numbers, only to find that prolonged intervention led to the growth of new and unexpected alliances among broadly disparate sectors of the occupied population, who waged an increasingly unified war through national and international propaganda, guerrilla warfare, and passive and semi-passive forms of resistance. The development stymied occupation military planners at the time, leading to a struggle for military control that was built largely through compromise and adaptation. Occupation forces later recognized this change and the Dominican intervention's place in it; the Marine Corps, in 1940, looked to the experiences of the World War

³⁰ For an examination of historiographical definitions of these changing modes of warfare over time, see: Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2006), chapter 1-5.

³¹ John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America*, (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2003); John A. Lynn, "Discourse, Reality, and the Culture of Combat," *The International History Review*, 27:3 (Sept. 2005), 475-480.

One occupations to define its approach to evolving warfare in unconventional situations.³²

Trujillo's government, supported by the new post-occupation military, also defined its military based largely on Dominican experiences with guerrilla opposition groups fought by the constabulary during the occupation. The opposing militaries' roles and development during such interventions provide insight into military responses to changing warfare over time. The scope of dissent to foreign military rule in the early twentieth-century Dominican Republic makes it an especially clear example through which to study the interactions of these military developments.

This dissertation thus provides a case study of how U.S.-Caribbean relations were shaped by evolving understandings of military and defense, before, during, and after the occupation.³³

In addition to questions of defense and the shaping of military policy, the documents of the period under study provide a link to cultural clashes in the military ventures of the period.

Conflicting understandings of society led to friction between occupying forces and Dominicans, but also, with time, led to compromises and adaptations that defined later U.S.-Caribbean relations and often challenged ideas prominent in the United States. This dissertation, though primarily a Dominican history study, thus contributes to recent historiography that examines the cultural implications of clashes during the turn of the century interventions, portraying both U.S. and the Dominican reactions.³⁴ U.S. officials clashed with Dominicans not only in their definitions of race, but in their definitions of culture and civilization. The latter, they held as they worked to consolidate power in and reorganize Dominican society, should be centralized rather than regional, and should include a strong and apolitical centralized military. Their

³² United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1940).

³³ For insightful studies of the role of the U.S. Navy in this development, see: Donald A. Yerxa, *Admirals and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 1898-1945*, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991); David Healy, *Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

³⁴ Renda's, *Taking Haiti*, for example, examines the cultural implications of the U.S. occupation of Haiti to the Marines who were stationed there, though her focus is on the effects on U.S. troops and culture.

statements and communications also demonstrate a broad lack of understanding of the Dominican culture of the time. As Robert Holden discussed for Central America, U.S. officials failed to understand the fundamental differences between their own country and those of the Caribbean region. Holden discusses the difficulties met by U.S. officials in Latin America who could not understand why Latin American states did not have the kind of monopoly on violence that U.S. governing forces did. Their perceptions of Latin America through the period, and those of the U.S. public, were based on misunderstandings of Latin American societies. Holden argues that repeated reorganizations of government led to an "improvisational" nature of the state for Central American countries, in which it was "the primordial requirement of every new government to attract and hold the loyalty of the fighting forces to which it owed its accession to constitutional office, and the concomitant need to buy off or otherwise co-opt anyone capable of quickly mobilizing an opposing force of fighting men."³⁵ The model holds true for many countries throughout the Caribbean region, and is clearly applicable to the Dominican Republic both in terms of the nature of the Dominican state and U.S. reactions to it. U.S. official reports and decisions from the period under study demonstrate that one of the major reasons for clashes between U.S. officials and Dominican political actors centered around just such a lack of understanding.

While the Dominican state of the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was centrally weak and therefore relatively fluid, functioning through improvisation and regional cooperation or compromise, U.S. planners became increasingly convinced over time that an externally imposed centralized government and military would solve the problems of economic and political instability in the country. These assumptions, and Dominican adherence to the idea

³⁵ Robert Holden, *Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821-1960*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 25-26.

of a more fluid state apparatus, informed the conduct of U.S.-Dominican relations before and during the occupation, until both countries' need for a compromise solution allowed the pattern to change in the 1920s. U.S. interventions in the country from the late 1800s therefore followed a path of growing interference that gradually led to the goal of complete reformation of the Dominican government and military. With the advent of U.S. military occupation, and the rotation of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officers through the highest posts of Dominican government in the years 1916-1924, foreign officers repeatedly planned to re-make the country's system of government. They attempted this through reforms aiming to make Dominican governmental and military systems imitate those of the United States. Not only were Dominican local systems incompatible with such change, and U.S. resources too inconsistent, but Dominicans from all sectors of society continuously resisted the change, as they had done under Dominican government attempts to centralize. The result, as groups united in compromise to end the occupation in the 1920s, was a system that incorporated multiple elements from both societies. The military was gradually strengthened, centralized, and professionalized, but Dominican structures within the centralized military largely remained in place.

The occupation did bring notable change to the country too, however. Outside forces were able to bring rapid change and centralization whose attempt would have been political suicide for any Dominican politician. One of the ways by which the foreign imposition brought drastic change was through the very unifying of resistance in 1920 that forced U.S. officials to change their goals and methods. While U.S. officials originally attempted to bring change through a variety of means that included takeover of offices and the restructuring of Dominican offices and society, the Dominican unity formed in resistance was to bring some of the most notable change to occur during the occupation. In the end, when occupation methods were

unsuccessful, U.S. officials settled for a combination of compromise and military control, first through heavy Marine forces stationed throughout the country, and then through the buildup of the new Dominican armed force they had created. This new armed force, called the "constabulary" or "guardia" throughout the occupation, was in the end to be the force that maintained the most drastic change to the country in the form of infrastructural centralization. While the constabulary was at first treated both by Dominicans and by the U.S. military as a joke, enlisting the least educated and poorest classes of Dominicans and disallowing Dominican officership, the U.S. need to withdraw from the country later brought a re-focus on the constabulary that improved military centralization and infrastructure and elevated the Dominican middle classes for the first time to the highest officer positions in the Dominican military. This change, accelerating as U.S. forces worked toward withdrawal and a growing number of Dominicans settled for compromise to see the occupation end, was reinforced by continued U.S. military involvement in the years after the occupation's end in 1924, as Vega's history demonstrates. This dissertation demonstrates that the end solution for the United States was military, and that the prestige of the military in Dominican culture eventually allowed for a military solution on the Dominican side as well.

The development of this occupation, which over time became more and more about a set of compromise agreements and systems, was crucial to the development of the militaries of both the Dominican Republic and the United States. U.S. officers' ideas of foreign occupation were re-shaped, and enlisted men were exposed to drastically distinct ways of life and military service. Among Dominicans, the occupation did not only reinforce the emphasis on military power, as Peguero argues, but also reshaped society and reinforced an already strong culture of resistance to foreign rule. In the end, the conduct of eight years of contentious occupation created such an

anti-imperial atmosphere that the U.S.-military-trained Rafael Trujillo was able to use anti-imperialism, by promising a military that would be able to maintain sovereignty, to increase acceptance of centralization. In other words, the fear of and distaste for foreign rule was so strong by occupation's end that Trujillo was able to reach back to and claim continuity with Dominican military culture from the late nineteenth century, contrasting his rule with that of the occupation so effectively that, despite continued U.S. military involvement and backing, his regime's promise of continued independence allowed the tempered change toward centralization to continue successfully for decades.

A close study of the U.S.-created constabulary in the years before 1922 is difficult for two primary reasons that help to explain the lack of in-depth research to date: The first is that many of the records are missing from the Dominican archives, some lost over time, but many probably intentionally removed during the Trujillo regime. For example, most of the records covering the constabulary's development in the Department of the South, and especially in the units in which later military dictator Trujillo began his military career, are missing. Much of the information about the overall numbers for such statistics as recruits and desertions in the constabulary has therefore to be pieced together from reports for the Department of the North and overall constabulary development. The second difficulty with the research is that the haphazard and often un-monitored development of the constabulary for its first four years of existence meant that no standardized records were kept; this is especially true for outlying regions during the intermediate years of occupation, when the type of regional solution described in Chapter Four was most prominent.

Locating the history of those who fought in armed resistance to the occupation was and is especially tricky due to the nature of the sources and the nature of the armed resistance.

Resistance was scattered and generally disorganized, and many criminals and opportunists who were not revolutionaries were hunted by the Military Government under the collective label of "bandits," so that constabulary records seldom distinguish between those fighting the occupation and those otherwise taking advantage of the political and social chaos that reigned through so much of the occupation's tenure. Many of these were fugitives long before the intervention began, but their names were often mixed in the official occupation sources. Many armed resistance leaders were also illiterate and lacked supplies or the ability to keep records of their members. The records are further complicated by an intentional revision of the history discussed in the conclusion. Dominican governments had a long tradition of de-emphasizing the political nature of any armed resistance by calling revolutionaries "gavilleros" or bandits. Occupying forces who worked with Army manuals for intervention, which did much the same, quickly adopted this mode and often reinforced by middle- and upper-class Dominicans who sought to demonstrate their ability to come to a solution through diplomacy and without violence.³⁶ Generally, the occupation forces seem to have listed armed resistance leaders as one of two categories--"fugitive" or "bandit"--often using the two interchangeably without reference to the actions for which they were being pursued.³⁷ Furthermore, the spelling of the names of many constabulary men during the occupation are incorrect and confused due to the illiteracy of the recruits and the lack of Spanish among Marine-constabulary recruiters, a problem that continued through the early years of the constabulary until Marines began to promote Dominicans to lower officer ranks in 1919 and 1920.

³⁶ For a discussion of Army Doctrine for the period, see: Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2004). For this particular practice of trying to define unconventional warfare as banditry, see especially page 14.

³⁷ Roughly translated, the term "gavillero" indicates a nest of thieves.

Because the story of the constabulary during the occupation has not been told, one of the goals of this dissertation is to provide that story, as much as the sources will allow. In addition to demonstrating the fundamental changes that took root in the Dominican military and state through the military during occupation years, I work to trace the way that the changes affected Dominicans from all sectors of the population. The constabulary, whose history began as an offshoot of U.S. interference and attempts to control and remake the Dominican government, brought under-represented segments of the population gradually into a military tradition that had customarily been a step toward limited social mobility. For those who joined in the early years, enlistment was often a product of financial desperation or even a way to avoid local legal persecution for acts committed before the occupation. Recruits did not gain literacy, and were often ostracized by other Dominicans in their communities who sought to proscribe the constabulary and reject the occupation, but they did gain financial support, housing, some physical mobility, and the hope of future social mobility. Over time, the struggle to develop the constabulary was greatly affected by U.S. motivations and fluctuating commitment of resources, but also by continuous and varying Dominican resistances. In the end, only a heavy commitment of resources and strong compromise from both Dominican and U.S. groups allowed the constabulary to be even a tenable force in society. The occupation commitment of resources to make it so in the final years of occupation gave it a place of utmost priority, and finally brought about the military centralization so long planned.

Chapters One and Two provide a background to the militarism and regionalism of the country, and to the growth of U.S. interference over time in Dominican politics, arguing that gradual and steady increases of U.S. influence led to a deterioration of the military as well as a growth of anti-Americanism in the country over the decades of 1890-1916. Chapter Three

demonstrates the early failures of U.S. creation of a constabulary. The constabulary was a failure primarily because of the clash of U.S. expectations versus Dominican realities, in which U.S. officers expected easy centralization and Dominicans fought to retain a regionally autonomous system of rule, and because of the international changes and atmosphere in the early years of intervention. Mistakes made during the foundational year of the constabulary, in which Marines and U.S. Navy administrators struggled to control the situation in the country without having a firm basis for understanding it, were so deep-seated that they were detrimental to later attempts to improve or build up the constabulary.

Chapters Four and Five discuss the intermediate years of occupation and the ways that the new constabulary inserted itself into local politics and power structures. Chapter Four argues that the mistakes of the early occupation led to the gradual Dominicanization of the constabulary, in which through compromise constabulary leaders accepted the traditions of regional power relations, and in which Dominicans brought many of their own traditions to bear in the struggle to make the constabulary function. Chapter Five demonstrates that, despite regionalisms in both culture and the military, widely similar and often identical complaints stretched from province to province, almost all centering directly or indirectly around the constabulary through the intermediate years of occupation. Despite the fact that regional structures and censorship kept complaints regionalized, common grievances from region to region demonstrated the deeper problems with the occupation constabulary and would provide a strong fuel for resistance when it could be united.

Chapter Six argues that 1920 was a major turning point for the occupation and the constabulary, as local and international events coincided with military centralization to bring together a unified resistance. Resistance concerned Marine constabulary planners and caused

them to redouble their efforts to improve and strengthen the constabulary, but their efforts--focused on centralizing the country militarily, provided the inspiration and infrastructure that aided the unification of resistance. Chapters Seven and Eight demonstrate how this hated constabulary became a tenable national armed force after such resistance. Chapter Seven, covering the final years of occupation, demonstrates how political compromise and the gradual withdrawal of Marines led to a breakdown in unified resistance that--alongside serious efforts to improve the reputation of the constabulary and gradually place it under Dominican leadership--allowed the constabulary to consolidate and focus on increasing its military strength. As the chapter also demonstrates, political compromise and the nationalists' struggle against compromise agreements gradually opened a door for the constabulary to step in as a legitimate Dominican force, even while it was still backed by a U.S. military presence. Chapter Eight concludes with a brief discussion of how the post-occupation constabulary became a major force for societal control under U.S.-trained officer Rafael Trujillo, who was able to use the atmosphere surrounding the occupation's end to rise to leadership of the constabulary, overthrow the government, and begin a thirty-one-year dictatorship propped up by the U.S.-created military. I argue that all of the tools for Trujillo's rise to power were in place by 1924, products of a unique combination of Dominican tradition and occupation-inspired compromises and negotiations.

Chapter ONE

Seeking Modernity: Between Regional Military Tradition and the Search for a New Republic

The first Spanish colony in the Americas, the land on Hispaniola that would become the Dominican Republic was early neglected as a colony. A difficult terrain divided by mountains to which slaves frequently escaped, the colony was neither as easily ruled nor as lucrative as that of Cuba. As sugar cultivation was introduced in both island colonies, and production and slave control proved to be easier in Cuba, Spain gradually allowed Hispaniola to fall into deep neglect. When Spain tried to regain political control over the colony's population in the late sixteenth century by re-concentrating the entire population to the south, they further devastated the population.¹ Over the centuries, due to Spanish neglect, many Spanish elites in the colony moved to Cuba, leaving a small number of families with little Spanish regulation on the eastern two thirds of Hispaniola. The Dominican Republic gained its independence from Spain in 1821 on the heels of other Latin American independence movements. No sooner had the elites remaining in the former colony extended their offer to become part of Gran Colombia, and thereby gain its protection, was their new country overrun by Haitian forces under President Jean-Pierre Boyer. Boyer sought to change land tenure, and officially end slavery (which had long been in decline as an institution), and increase the power and potential of Haiti as a country.

Haiti ruled the Dominican Republic from 1822 to 1844, just after it gained independence from Spain. In the early 1840s, especially after devastation from an 1842 earthquake, Dominicans fought a new independence war to free themselves from Haitian rule--a war against Boyer in which they allied with Haitian anti-government forces before breaking free in 1844 and

¹ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 45-50.

declaring Dominican independence.² Because the country's development from that time was formed against the backdrop of fear of another Haitian invasion, and because so many were elevated in early Dominican society through military experience and the status of heroes of independence, military experience was highly emphasized as vital to good government. The regional character of the Dominican Republic and the glorification of and need for the military created pockets of local military-run autonomy with which central governments had to contend. Regional separation and regional military forces perpetuated a system in which local caudillo leaders furthered traditions of largely military-based regional and local economies, often at odds with each other and with non-military entrepreneurs in the struggle to control the work force and define the country's future. Various definitions of modernization would combine with struggles for regional autonomy to contribute to incessant friction between different groups in society.

The long history of neglect of centralized governmental infrastructure through the colonial period and the nineteenth-century in the Dominican Republic contributed to a militant regionalism that left early twentieth-century Dominicans struggling to define a form that "modernization" could reasonably take. By the late nineteenth century, some began to work toward consolidation of power either to protect Dominican autonomy against foreign powers or to expand the capacity of the economy. Frequent revolutions and political upheaval in the previous decades made it clear to many that change was needed were the Dominican Republic to be successful in the world market or to overcome the violence of its past.³ The powerful and militarily backed autonomy of provinces and regions led state builders to seek a solution that accommodated caudillistic regional tradition with the growth of a modern state. Neither the state

² Juan Bosch, *Trujillo: Causas de una tiranía sin ejemplo*, (Caracas, 1961), 96.

³ Michiel Baud provides an extensive study of the late nineteenth-century attempts to link tobacco to the world market while maintaining regional autonomy in the Cibao in *Peasants and Tobacco in the Dominican Republic*, chapters 4-7.

nor the military were centralized by 1900, even after dictator Ulises Heureaux's 1891 re-organization of the army and repeated attempts to centralize and improve the national military. Instead, regional power structures allowed many peasants outside the region of the capital city to avoid national and impersonal military service by pledging themselves to the service of local elites and caudillos who protected them. The final decades of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth century were therefore a moment of crisis in the country as many different groups struggled to define modernity for the country. Because the regionally divided military units of the country seemed to perpetuate civil war and what many saw as "backward" traditions, a growing camp of Dominicans pushed for change in government that became increasingly centralized in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Dominican Regionalism and the Early Military

Dominican geography so divided the regions of the country that even during the colonial era the Spanish attempted to control it by keeping all of its population concentrated in one central location. The dominant geographical characteristic contributing to regional separation was the Cordillera Central, a large mountain range that runs from the western Dominican Republic down to the southeast, dissecting the country. The centrality of this mountain chain, the highest in the Caribbean, led to a growing north-south division of the eastern side of Hispaniola from the time of Spanish colonial possession and well into the twentieth century. Due to colonial neglect, land tenure through most of the territory remained legally undefined, and largely unmonitored, and the population spread out before and after the sixteenth-century to pursue cattle ranching and small agriculture. The result was that from the sixteenth century on the territory's regions increasingly became autonomous units ruled by local elites or left to the care of ranchers and

subsistence agriculturalists. Over time, as many ranchers turned to growing sugar in the south and tobacco in the north, regional elites and regional cultures defined the makeup of law and order. The north-south division contributed to the growth of two distinct cultures and hierarchies. The concentration of official institutions in an area around the capital city led to further regional divisions on top of that of north and south, as the areas bordering Haiti developed distinctly. As the capital city lay about two hundred miles from the Haitian border at its closest point, and Dominicans feared another Haitian incursion on their jealously guarded sovereignty, central governments needed strong military forces on the border both north and south of the Cordillera Central. As they lacked the state apparatus and revenue to fund and monitor such forces, they depended on local elites to be able to field forces there. This in turn encouraged a strengthening of the regional caudillo system, with central governments paying local military leaders to recruit local militia or guards.⁴ Well into the twentieth century, the divisions that grew from this system of regional support meant a lack of infrastructural development connecting the provinces. One U.S. observer remarked as late as 1919 that "the interior of the country is practically unknown," that there were "practically no roads, and the northern and southern parts of the Island are like two different countries."⁵

Due to regional patterns of rule and a lack of infrastructure, the only way that national leaders could maintain power was through the placement of popular military-political leaders as vice presidents with their offices in the Cibao Valley. Leaders from the traditionally liberal Cibao, however, ruled differently from those in the traditionally conservative South, augmenting the widening north-south division of the country. Cibaños often saw their generals and elites as

⁴ Communications, 1891, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 005040, AGN; Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 44; Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*, 50.

⁵ Samuel Guy Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti: A Cruise with the Marines*, (New York: Committee on Co-operation in Latin America, 1919), 8, 14.

more enlightened leaders, preserving a way of life superior to that maintained by military repression in the south, and many nineteenth-century presidents only maintained a national base of support by allowing vice presidents to rule the Cibao differently and separately.⁶ In conjunction with the lack of roads and the difficulties of traveling in the 1800s, this led to a political system based largely on compromise between distinct regions. Within the North-South divisions were born other regional divisions created by the distinct needs of disparate and largely unconnected provinces. As Bruce Calder points out, “the geography, the life-style, the customs, and the speech of the east, the southwest, and the north each exhibited uniqueness, and even within these regions there were strong contrasts.”⁷

The country's first national leaders, north and south, were clear examples of the period's Latin American caudillos, military leaders and men on horseback who rose from regional to national prominence through charisma and military prowess. They retained political power through the building of strong support networks through patronage, and bribing and supporting local military leaders to guarantee the success of far-flung provinces along the border and in the north.⁸ Because of the extensively regional character of the Dominican Republic, caudillismo persisted there when its prominence was fading throughout much of Latin America. Regional approaches to governing meant a central government inability to monopolize power through the nineteenth century, so that the government and party structure's survival “depended on gaining the consent or temporary submission of popular regional leaders, the caudillos, whose authority

⁶ Pedro Troncoso Sánchez, *Ramón Cáceres*, (Santo Domingo: Editorial Stella, 1964), 31.

⁷ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, xxvii-xxviii.

⁸ Caudillismo was a common phenomenon throughout newly independent nations of Latin America in the decades after they broke from Spain. The term caudillo refers to military-political leaders who could attribute much of their political base of support to their individual character, charisma, and military status. Through most of Latin America, caudillismo reached its height in the mid to late 1800s, when rapid change gradually made the mode of rule obsolete in most places. For further reading, see: John Lynch, *Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800-1850*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); John Lynch, *Latin America Between Colony and Nation: Selected Essays*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

ultimately rested on their military skills.”⁹ National presidents, usually military generals, ruled the south by the placement and support of regionally prominent generals while they maintained a careful balance in the Cibao by allowing its citizens to elect prominent Cibaeños to the vice presidency. As a result, despite the existence of a national military that retained the right to conscript men throughout the provinces, the majority of recruits for the south came from the south, and the majority of those defending the Cibao came from the valley.¹⁰ This pattern did not end until well into the U.S. occupation, despite government attempts to centralize. The army was split into two major battalions that were physically separated between north and south. The origins of national army recruits in the south in 1904 came not only from the south, but primarily from near the capital city. From Santo Domingo Province and the areas just to the north, west, and east came a total of 158 recruits. From other regions there were a total of 44 recruits from the eastern provinces, one from the west, and one left blank in the record. Recruits from the north, recorded separately and employed in guarding the north, included 84 men, most from Puerto Plata. In addition to the geographical regionalism, division in the Dominican Republic in the nineteenth century was fed by partisanship; the country shared the Liberal-Conservative party divisions common through nineteenth-century Latin America. Over the decades following independence, the Conservative parties were made up primarily of the southern caudillos and commercial class and the bureaucracy of the capital, whereas the Liberal parties were made up primarily of northern politicians and caudillos and the small but growing middle class.¹¹

Dominican society was also heavily defined by class distinctions and class relations. In all regions, urban society was divided into what is often called a caste system, separating the population between the elites, or *gente de primera*, and the *gente de segunda*. The elites were

⁹ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, xxxi.

¹⁰ Nóminas, 1904, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 005040, AGN.

¹¹ Bosch, *Trujillo*, 98-99.

defined by their descent from the early elite Spanish families, while the latter were those from urban families that had gained some education and prominence in society, but whose lineage did not allow them entry into the ranks of the *gente de primera*. Outside of the cities, with the exception of the penetration of some elite landowners and some *gente de segunda* who had gained rural prominence as merchants, the peasants formed the majority.¹² From before Dominican independence, the large and vital peasantry was essential to the nation's development. As historian Richard Turits explains:

the peasantry forged an essentially agro-pastoral and autarkic economy across this relatively large Caribbean colony. And it secured and valorized land access and subsistence production within an ethos of freedom, self-determination, and opposition to slavery and, subsequently, to dependence on the uncertainties of wage labor and commercial production. Also, the peasantry's relative autonomy from Spanish and urban control and its own minimal racial segmentation impeded, it seems, the establishment of metropolitan racial groups, identities, and, to some extent, hierarchy and furthered the possibilities for a common, proto-national sense of local or creole culture in the Dominican countryside.¹³

Both Turits and Baud describe the peasants' way of living as one formed in resistance to urban domination.¹⁴ This pattern encouraged the development of local and regional caudillos who could protect the population from urban forces of regulation and military recruitment.

The extent of peasant autonomy was also tempered by region, however, depending on the character of local rule. The peasant autonomy described by both Turits and Baud applies most accurately to the northern regions of the country, and is not representative everywhere. The history of larger landholdings in the south and east led to a larger conservative elite class, while

¹² Harmannus Hoetink, *The Dominican People, 1850-1900: Notes for a Historical Sociology*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1982), 165-171; Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 5-21, 109; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, xxvi. Juan Bosch also discusses the social consequences of this class/caste system throughout *Trujillo: causas de una tiranía sin ejemplo*.

¹³ Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*, 49-50. For a discussions of race in politics in the Dominican Republic, see: Ernesto Sagás, *Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic*, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000) . For contemporary takes on Dominican race from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see: Silvio Torres-Saillant, "The Tribulations of Blackness: Stages in Dominican Racial Identity," *Latin American Perspectives* 25:3 (May, 1998), 127-129.

¹⁴ Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*, 50; Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 8,41-42.

the historical lack of regulation in the north allowed for a proliferation of subsistence landholdings. Along the Haitian border in the northwest and southwest, too, power dynamics were different. These regions grew in relative isolation from the capital, their economies connected more closely to foreign trade with Haiti or through their own ports than to Santo Domingo or the Cibao's primary cities of Santiago and Puerto Plata. They developed distinct cultures as well as economies, often centered around fluid border populations that defied central government interests from either country. With a general lack of infrastructure connecting these regions to the major cities, and a sometimes prosperous border trade, these regions began to fall under the leadership of caudillos who built growing landholdings and oversaw local government. This was especially true in the southwest, which was most far removed from urban centers and was increasingly ruled by large landowning caudillo families.¹⁵

In all regions, the differences between urban and rural society were notable, and those elite families who owned rural land were close to cities, where they had access to formal education. In the countryside, especially in the north, peasants worked on shared lands called *terrenos comuneros* and shared state lands for their agricultural needs--a tradition that encouraged peasant autonomy. Even as they entered the world market through the growing of tobacco, they maintained their subsistence plots and their autonomy in the countryside into the twentieth century.¹⁶ In the south and east, as sugar began to dominate, communal landholdings

¹⁵ The system and patterns of landholding and power in the southwest are described throughout the first chapters of Jan Lundius and Mats Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion: A Socioeconomic Study of Dios Olivario and the Palma Sola Movement in the Dominican Republic*, (New York: Routledge, 2000). Some description of the power dynamics of the northwest can be found in the introductory chapter of Haroldo Dilla Alfonso and Sobeida de Jesús Cedano, eds., *Frontera en transición: diagnóstico multidisciplinario de la frontera dominico/haitiana*, (Santo Domingo: Yan Impresos, 2007).

¹⁶ As Baud describes it, the wide autonomy of Cibao peasants allowed the integration, rather than destruction, of peasant production in the north. Peasantries of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were formed *within*, but not *by*, the modern capitalist system. *Peasants and Tobacco*, 31-36. For examples of how these patterns encouraged and aided autonomy, see pages 63-64 and 117-119. The availability of open land, with lack of regulation on land ownership in the 1800s, also contributed to peasant autonomy throughout the country, because

came into conflict with expanding sugar plantations and Dominican peasants became agricultural laborers competing for work; the seasonal nature of sugar production meant high unemployment.¹⁷ Unemployment in the sugar regions always spiked when the sugar harvest was over. Regionalism cut across class lines, however, often being the most divisive factor in Dominican life. For regional leaders, the division often centered around the rivalry between the Cibao and the south. With the growth of sugar in the south and the connections of tobacco to the world market in the north, the rivalry between north and south only grew in the late nineteenth century.¹⁸

Among the elites, most of whom lived in the cities, the growing connections of Dominican production to the world market in the late 1800s presented a new set of complicated questions that also tended to be defined by region. By the 1890s and early 1900s, many Dominican groups and individuals were interested in pushing the country forward into what they saw as the modern era. Definitions of modernity, too, were regional. The decades of capitalist expansion in the Americas around the turn of the century increased the fluidity of Latin American elite groups in other countries. In the Dominican Republic, it allowed major changes in society and a strong preference among many for a new and more "modern" way of life that, in the south, emphasized the growth of sugar to strengthen the export economy and increase revenue to the state.¹⁹ As the Dominican government lacked the revenue to fund or protect large

when peasant land was encroached upon, peasants simply moved their *conucos* further into the mountains or unclaimed land.

¹⁷ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, xxvi-xxviii.

¹⁸ Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 147-156; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, xxvii; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 248-263.

¹⁹ The literature about this type of transformation and the politics surrounding it throughout the Caribbean at the turn of the century is extensive. For U.S. involvement in Caribbean sugar in the period, see: Baud, "The Origins of Capitalist Agriculture," 125-153; Jacqueline Boin, *El Proceso de desarrollo del capitalismo en la República Dominicana, 1844-1930*, 2 vols., (Santo Domingo: Gramil, 1981); César Ayala, *American Sugar Kingdom: The Plantation Economy of the Spanish Caribbean, 1898-1934*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). For close examination of the resultant economic, legal, and social changes resulting from such attempts within the

sugar enterprises, this effectively meant that a growing presence of foreigners accompanied the growth of sugar. Sugar thereby fueled change in the south, but also fueled the continued general impoverishment of the population.²⁰ By the late 1800s, the majority of commerce in the country was controlled on some level by foreigners, a condition that furthered debates about the meaning of Dominican modernization.²¹ The situation in the late nineteenth century came to resemble what Fernando Ortiz described for Cuba, in which sugar represented standardization, vertical labor relations, large business, mechanization and the foreign. Tobacco, mainly cultivated in the Cibao, boasted native origins in its culture and production and, at least according to many, protected a more Dominican way of life.²² By the late 1800s, though, even the tobacco sector of the Dominican economy was heavily dependent on European and U.S. markets for both exports and imports.²³ The customs houses at the country's borders and ports early became central points of contention, in fact, as most revenues of the state came from import and export duties.

In the north, where peasants and elites contended with a growing intermediary merchant class to define the character of social relations and change, resentment of foreign control in the

Dominican Republic, see also: Julie Franks, "Transforming Property: Landholding and Political Rights in the Dominican Sugar Region, 1880-1930," PhD Dissertation, State University of New York, 1997; April Janice Mayes, "Sugar's Metropolis: The Politics and Culture of Progress in San Pedro de Macorís, Dominican Republic, 1870-1930," PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2003; Julie Franks, "The *Gavilleros* of the East: Social Banditry as Political Practice in the Dominican Sugar Region," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 8:2 (Oct. 2006), 158-181.

²⁰ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, xxv. In addition to the wide extent of foreign ownership, the lack of property tax and other elements of the system meant that the majority of money gained in new enterprises could easily flow to foreign creditors rather than to the Dominican state.

²¹ Bosch, *Trujillo*, 100. The attraction of sugar for immigrant groups and foreign merchants and creditors also complicated the racial makeup and definitions of the elite and merchant classes, and most immigrant groups, not fitting into any defined Dominican social class, remained outsiders despite their predominance in Dominican industry. They included Sephardic Jews, Spaniards, Italians, Germans, English, North Americans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans, among other groups, and many from Haiti and the other islands of the West Indies arrived during the *zafra* to help with the harvest. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, xxvi-xxvii; José del Castillo, *La inmigración de braceros azucareros en la República Dominicana, 1900-1930*, (Santo Domingo: Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, VOL. CCLXII, No. 7); *Primer censo nacional de República Dominicana*, 2d ed., (Santo Domingo: Editora de la Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, 1975).

²² Fernando Ortiz, *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar (advertencia de sus contrastes agrarios, económicos, históricos y sociales, su etnografía y su transculturación)*, (La Habana: J. Montero, 1940).

²³ Nathan Appleton, "Santo Domingo City." *Journal of the American Geographical Society of New York*, Vol. 23 (1891), 558.

export economy was especially strong, and the aversion toward internal regulation was equally strong.²⁴ The rising merchant class in the region, which first cooperated with government attempts to bring technological advancement, found itself losing its position of authority to foreign buyers and the southern bureaucracy, and attempted to resist the changes as the nineteenth century wore on.²⁵ As elsewhere in Latin America, the elite class was fluid as a group during this period, and elite definitions of the path to modernization were "widely divergent," regional groups struggling to control the state and native landowners competing with foreign landowners to control labor while traditional elites resisted change.²⁶ State efforts to control peasantry often were inconsistent, and "regional elite groups lived close to the peasantry and often functioned as buffers against an encroaching state."²⁷ In the Dominican Republic, this was especially true in the north, where elites were conservative small landholders and merchants were often foreign mediators or Dominican *gente de segunda*.

As the struggle to define modernization grew, Dominican society was imbued with militarism and violence that hindered the centralization of a state military or government. The constant threat and fear of renewed Haitian intervention required all men of fighting age to take up arms in defense against the Haitian military (and, of course, to protect the central and regional governments from internal overthrow).²⁸ Theoretically, fighting age was generally defined as between fifteen and eighteen years of age to forty or fifty years. Among those many who avoided official military service, younger men were often drawn into unofficial or local military

²⁴ Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 133-134, 143-144. Baud provides a detailed description and analysis of the northern economy and its changes through this period, focused especially on the late 1800s and the post-occupation 1920s.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Chapters 8 and 9.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 44.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 47.

²⁸ Bosch, *Trujillo*, 98-99; Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 16-21. For an overview of the early Dominican armed forces, see Ernesto Vega y Pagán, *Historia de las fuerzas armadas*, (Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1955).

duty, working with local patrons to defend crops from revolutionary groups or foreign invaders. Despite the lack of efficient centralized recruitment, therefore, most Dominican men had military experience at some point in their lives.²⁹ Further, those too old to serve in the military were obligated, up to the age of 60, to serve in the Civil Guard, as were foreigners who had lived in the country for over three months.³⁰ The Dominican military of the mid- to late-1800s was still a clearly direct descendent of the army of liberation. From 1844, despite wide, popular glorification of military service, many in the ranks of the Liberation Army were mutinous and desertion rates were high despite penalties as severe as death for shirking the obligation of military service. Systems of patronage and *compadrazgo* meant protections from military conscription for many. The widest population with no such protection was the poorest classes of peasants, who therefore served in large numbers in the lowest ranks of the early military. Those who could not gain the patronage of elites so as to avoid conscription often moved farther away from the roads that the military traveled, creating new agricultural plots further up in the mountains, so that they would not be impressed into service.³¹ This process was common in the north, south, and east, and disrupted trade and the growth of an export economy because peasant movement away from roads and urban centers encouraged the centrality of subsistence agriculture. Peasants living closer to population centers were therefore more likely either to be conscripted into the military or to develop closer patron-client relationships with local elites. Those who developed such relationships, however, were not necessarily free from military service, as they were obligated to aid those regional elites and might be called up for local

²⁹ Miguel Angel Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas: Historia y Perspectivas*, (Santo Domingo: Amigo del Hogar, 2004), 28; Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 18.

³⁰ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 18-19.

³¹ Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 63-64; Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 21.

military defense (or revolution) at any time.³² As Robert Holden describes, the "enormous potential for violence embedded in patron-client politics is so great that it overshadows ideology or class interests, or regional, familial, or ethnic identity, as independent sources of public violence."³³ In the Dominican case, the dominant role of patron-client politics exacerbated inter-regional violence and was one of the main contributors to continued regionalism.

Recruitment into military service was conducted through forays organized under local governments to help maintain regional order. Those who did not have patrons were impressed as "volunteers."³⁴ They were "uprooted, armed with antiquated weapons but with no discipline or cause to guide their newly acquired power, the recruits often deserted to become *gavilleros* (bandits), guns for hire, leaders or followers of rebels who promised material gain"—and those who did not desert were forced into battle and lacked medical examinations or adequate clothing and supplies.³⁵ The subject of whether such recruits had a "cause" to guide them is worth drawing out. Goldwert's impression that the Dominican "peasants" were uninterested in a larger national cause, an impression that comes from the reports of U.S. occupying forces in 1916-1924, contains some accuracy. While some historical moments such as independence drew wide voluntary recruitment, warfare or armed struggles between regions were so common in the late nineteenth century that peasants tended to keep themselves removed from the political arena and work to maintain relative autonomy. While many volunteered to fight for an end to Haitian rule, one of the strongest motivations to do so was that the Haitian state attempted to interfere with land tenure and to regulate the peasants. Once the independence war was won, peasants tended to be interested in returning to their agricultural plots. The extensive warfare and civil strife of

³² Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 114.

³³ Holden, *Armies Without Nations*, 10.

³⁴ Mejía, *De Lilís a Trujillo*, 146.

³⁵ Marvin Goldwert, *The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua: Progeny and Legacy of United States Intervention*, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), 3.

the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were incredibly destructive to peasant agriculture due to the high number of deaths among grown men.³⁶

Despite the hardships for peasant families, the original call for military service after the 1844 independence drafted over eight thousand men in the defense against potential Haitian invasion, so that the number of men with military service and military titles was extremely high throughout the country. Serving in the military was seen as a great source of pride, and central governments gave military ranks and titles as awards for service in lieu of wealth they did not have to offer.³⁷ Military service was made obligatory in July of 1845, but many military leaders were able to build strong units through systems similar to those of patronage common in the countryside, and fielded large numbers of loyal forces.³⁸ The number of men serving in the military began to decline in the 1850s, only to increase again when Dominican president Pedro Santana tried to deal with his government's severe shortage of funds by annexing the country to Spain's renewed colonial leadership in 1861. A combination of wide popular disapproval of annexation and Spain's refusal to appoint prominent Dominican officers in the Spanish Army led

³⁶ Into the twentieth century, and even among peasants, Dominican society was bound by strict gender roles, with women occupying a private place inside the domestic realm or in agricultural chores near the home. While most women were therefore not openly involved in politics or public questions, there were very powerful exceptions in Dominican society, especially centering around education. Despite an overall lack of women in business or industry, and the continuing ideal of women as remaining in or near the home, one of the country's most renowned poets was a woman (Salomé Ureña), and many women were heavily involved in campaigns to improve the country's education-- notable among these women was Ercilia Pepín, an intellectual and activist in Santiago who gained educator titles no Dominican woman previously had, and an increasing number of women became very politically active during the time of the U.S. occupation. For women's role in Dominican history, see Valentina Peguero, "Participación de la mujer en la historia dominicana," *Eme-Eme*, (Jan-Feb., 1982), 21-49.

³⁷ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 18-21. There were exceptions to the obligation to military service; married men with children, sole children of poor widows, those supporting elderly parents, and "important businessmen" were excepted from service. As Peguero points out, this led also to an increase in marriages and childbirth.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

to an extensive war for the restoration of sovereignty that lasted until 1865 and brought a new generation into extensive war experience.³⁹

Peguero provides a useful vignette of the officer corps of the late-nineteenth-century military. Social class distinctions were evident. The officer corps and government consisted almost exclusively of members of the upper class, while general troop enlistments were made almost exclusively from among the illiterate peasants, who often fought without uniforms, and even barefoot and with inadequate arms. Most president-generals in the nineteenth century came from large landowning families and were well-educated and often well-traveled men. Social mobility through the military, however, was not unheard of. From 1879 on, several important presidents rose from much lower ranks in society and became important political leaders. Presidents Guillermo (March-July, 1878), Luperón (1879-1880), and Heureaux (who ruled from 1882 to 1899) all reached power through social mobility within the ranks, and all acquired considerable wealth.⁴⁰ It bears mentioning that, as later dictator Rafael Trujillo would learn in the late 1920s, social mobility through the military was limited. While it was possible to become more important in society and politics through the military, and even to rise to such distinction as to be able to take the presidential office, this mobility was partial; it did not mean entry into the category of *gente de primera*. Even the few who rose to higher political office and gained great prestige in the military were excluded from the clubs and general social life of the elites.⁴¹

Such mobility was made possible, as Peguero notes, by the ubiquity of the military in Dominican society. Many aspects of Dominican culture contained military elements or foci from the country's founding. In addition to obligatory military service and large numbers of recruits,

³⁹ The contemporary and modern literature about the Restoration War is extensive. For a short overview, see Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 204-218. Moya Pons provides a thorough bibliographical list on pages 473-476.

⁴⁰ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 25-26.

⁴¹ This phenomenon is discussed further in Chapter Six.

regional leaders were usually military commanders. The country was divided into twelve provinces under the control of provincial governors who answered to the president in the south or the vice president in the north. Because the office of governor was a military as well as government post, both civilian and military local authorities reported to the governors. One of the effects of this system, especially in conjunction with the country's regionalism, was to make the political system of the country more of a loose confederation of provinces in some ways than a united nation. Travel from the Cibao to the capital by horse back as late as the early twentieth century took three days during the rainy season, making communication between the two difficult and maintaining the segregation of regions; as one U.S. diplomat observed, "national feeling . . . was subordinated to local prejudice."⁴² The lack of sufficient transportation contributed to economic as well as cultural isolation, so that regions were sometimes more closely tied to foreign countries through trade than they were to other Dominican regions.⁴³ Because of the lack of roads between the provinces' capital cities through most of the nineteenth century, provincial isolation and the lack of a strong central state institution lent the office of provincial governor great local power.⁴⁴ Further aspects of societal organization encouraged this emphasis on military strength, as Peguero describes in her work. In 1854, for example, all members of the adult male population were ordered to report to local military stations for weekly training so as to be prepared to replace those who finished their military terms of service. Throughout the provinces, military force was widely accepted as a part of government.⁴⁵ Despite Peguero's characterization of this force, however, the reality was much less clear or centralized

⁴² Sumner Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1922*, 664-665.

⁴³ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, xxv; Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 91-93, 129-134.

⁴⁴ United States, "Senate Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic," *Report No. 794*, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 1922, 97; Colonel Santos A. Núñez Francisco and Colonel José Alt. González Lora, *El Ejército Nacional Dominicano: origen, evolución, y determinantes de sus armamentos y equipos*, (Dominican Republic: Sec. de Estado de las Fuerzas Armadas), 30; Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 28.

⁴⁵ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 19.

than it was in theory. In many regions, especially those most removed from urban centers, military service was seen as a part of local government, and even as a way to ensure local autonomy. The result was a less, rather than more, centralized military, as local caudillo patrons often called upon their clients to resist impositions from the central government's military forces.⁴⁶

In addition to regional militaries with forced recruitment and obligatory service, the Dominican independence movement formed a naval force to turn the campaign against Haiti from a defensive to an offensive war and to increase the efficiency of the military in national defense. The navy had ten ships by 1845, though it lacked qualified sailors.⁴⁷ Within a short time, however, as peace with Haiti became more assured, the central government used the small navy more to transport troops against uprisings in its own territory than for any other purpose. This was its primary use from the 1870s to 1915, when the navy provided a vital link between the north and south, transporting troops and transmitting information faster than any could by foot when trails through or around the Cordillera Central were impassable.⁴⁸ The navy's movement of troops was one function of attempts to centralize the military and cope with regionalism. When northerners rose against presidents in the south, and staged revolutions from the north, the president's ability to get his own troops to the north quickly was vital in his maintenance of power. The entire system, however, was fragile. Any mixed loyalties could lead troops to join in the revolution, and the need to keep troops in the capital for defense meant that

⁴⁶ Documentation of these patterns for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is widespread. See individual military orders throughout: "Correspondencia," 1891-1914, Guerra y Marina, Dep. 08, I.T. 004610, AGN. See also the descriptions of local military politics in: Troncoso Sánchez, *Ramón Cáceres*, Introduction and chapter One; Rufino Martínez, *Hombres Dominicanos: Deschamps, Heureaux y Luperón*, (Santo Domingo: Sociedad de Bibliófilos, 1985).

⁴⁷ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 19-20.

⁴⁸ Orders and Communications, "Correspondencia," 1891-1914, Guerra y Marina, Dep. 08, I.T. 004610, AGN.

most presidents could not overcome military revolutions from the north during the nineteenth century.

The inherent structural weaknesses of the regional system and regionalized military led many over the course of the late nineteenth century to attempt reform that would attract better officers and help centralize the military. In 1860, for example, President Pedro Santana founded a national military academy; the annexation to Spain, however, and the Spanish disinterest in Dominican officers, ended the academy's short run.⁴⁹ By the 1870s, the power of regional militaries and the fragility of the central Dominican state society was clear. From 1876 to 1878, the Dominican Republic had eleven different governments in the space of two years—during which Conservative president Buenaventura Báez ruled for the fifth time from 27 December, 1876 to 2 March, 1878.⁵⁰ Báez, in this last of his five terms in the presidential office, established a dictatorship and worked to reform the military so that it was more directly answerable to him. He worked to establish a permanent national force that would be maintained separately from the provincial forces, staffed at 1,200 men under four-year terms of enlistment, and carefully appointed high-ranking and loyal military men to civil positions throughout the country in an attempt to control regional and provincial forces. This approach marked an official recognition, however, of the distinction between national and provincial armed forces, reinforcing the regional approach to government.⁵¹ Báez's manipulation of the military and of provincial loyalties could not maintain him in power, as he had lost too much popular support first by accepting the Spanish annexation, and then by continuously courting U.S. annexation of the

⁴⁹ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 20.

⁵⁰ Tulio H. Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles, 1844-1965*, (Santo Domingo: Editora Universitaria, 2005), 61.

⁵¹ Núñez Francisco and González Lora, *El Ejército Nacional*, 30; Angel Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 28. Báez was president from 1849-1853, 1856-1858, 1865-1866 (directly after the Restoration War), 1868-1874, 1876-1878.

country.⁵² Opposition groups united loosely to overthrow Baecismo and restore the country to a more liberal constitution.⁵³

General Gregorio Luperón of Restoration War fame took power in 1879 through a provisional government. The various branches of the military, at the time that Luperón came to the presidency, were most often used to fight opposition to the regime in power and maintain order through caudillo-based rule of isolated regions.⁵⁴ Pinpointing the previous conservative constitution and the lack of military organization as the main sources of tyranny and civil disorder in the previous decades, Luperón envisioned modernization as centralization and liberal politics, and worked to usher in a more liberal era by creating a new constitution and reforming the military. His provisional government and the subsequent liberal presidency of Father Fernando Arturo de Meriño at first seemed set to bring powerful change to the country. As provisional president, Luperón oversaw the creation of the new constitution in 1880, initiating major liberal reforms that centralized government agencies and, especially, education. His government began new construction throughout the provinces, improved existing military buildings, and paid public employees and soldiers for salaries long in arrears.⁵⁵ Luperón strongly emphasized military reform, hoping to build a small and well-trained centralized national military; building on previous military traditions, he attempted to mandate three-year military service, obligatory for all men between the ages of eighteen and fifty. He also ordered the establishment of permanent schools and academies in military garrisons, making education mandatory for all enlistees and officers in an effort to make all military men literate.⁵⁶

⁵² Bosch, *Trujillo*, 103; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 232-239.

⁵³ Bosch, *Trujillo*, 104.

⁵⁴ Angel Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 29

⁵⁵ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 246-247.

⁵⁶ Núñez Francisco and González Lora, *El Ejército Nacional Dominicano*, 68-69; Angel Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 28; Peguero, 2004, 21.

In short, Luperón authored the beginnings of Dominican military professionalization of a sort that was occurring throughout Latin America in that period. He himself explained his desire to create and re-organize a permanent armed force based on the need for social order and security for governments and economic and public interests, arguing that the country's current state could not guarantee individual liberties or the evolution of government. Stronger centralized armed forces under the flag and regulating the functions of state, Luperón held, would work together with the citizenry and government for the common good rather than continuing to be a threat.⁵⁷ The new constitutional government took office in September of 1880 under Father Fernando Arturo de Meriño.⁵⁸ The Dominican Church traditionally was associated with the Dominican military,⁵⁹ and Restoration War heroes worked closely with Meriño in attempting to reform the country. Meriño continued the reforms begun by Luperón and attempted to stave off rebellion by the opposition by decreeing the penalty of death for anyone who took up arms against the government.⁶⁰ Over the course of 1880-1881 Luperón continued to work on the professionalization of the armed forces, bringing in improved arms, and, on 15 Feb. 1881, creating a new set of rules for the Policía Municipal de la Capital, fitting them neatly into the newly centralized military chain of command--an illusion of municipal power that sought to give way to greater military centralization. The 1881 laws reorganizing the military also regulated the conduct of the military in an attempt to improve civil-military relations, disallowing them to frequent taverns while in uniform, for example.⁶¹ In June of 1881, Congress established a Cuerpo de Policía y Seguridad Pública under the national military chain of command, originally set at 113 men. In the powerful position of Minister of War under Meriño's government, named

⁵⁷ Angel Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 29.

⁵⁸ Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 68-69.

⁵⁹ Peguero addresses this briefly in *The Militarization of Culture* on pages 12-14 and 99-100.

⁶⁰ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 249.

⁶¹ Angel Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 29.

with reassurances of confidence by the widely trusted Luperón under whom he had fought in the Restoration War, was Ulises Heureaux.⁶²

The reforms were not, of course, without opposition by conservative generals and regional caudillos whose power was threatened, and the military strength of opposition caudillos and generals severely threatened the liberal and military reforms that Luperón was installing. Undeterred by the penalty of death, many took up arms against the central government in late 1881 and early 1882. The situation during Meriño's presidency was so precarious that the government could not keep up. Military units were in a general state of abandonment, and men deserted widely.⁶³ From the field of battle in 1882, Heureaux wrote desperate communications asking for reinforcements; upon one garrison dispatch of rebel troops from Santiago he complained that all of his men had deserted, leaving him with only twenty-two soldiers and four rifles.⁶⁴ Heureaux responded to the difficult situation by having all captured rebels shot. Meriño, too, came to fear that the new constitution was too liberal, and through 1882 he and Heureaux worked together to centralize government control by authoritarian means. Despite frequent difficulties with a lack of supplies and inability to move troops quickly, the repressive violence of the temporary authoritarian government combined with reforms of armed forces from Santo Domingo to halt the uprisings from the Cibao.⁶⁵

As civil fighting and Meriño's term in office came to an end, Heureaux was elected into the office of the presidency. He took office in September of 1882 with the strong backing of General Luperón. Luperón trusted his former subordinate and recommended him largely based on his military service, but Heureaux was maneuvering for power. Heureaux, popularly known

⁶² Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 68-69; Bosch, *Trujillo*, 105.

⁶³ Angel Cordero, (2004), 30.

⁶⁴ Núñez Francisco and González Lora, *El Ejército Nacional*, 31.

⁶⁵ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 249-250.

as "Lilís," courted powerful men from the ruling party and the opposition party alike and elevated himself to an ever more powerful position in politics and the military, becoming a growing adversary of Liberal reform. When his two-year presidential term ended, he created a puppet government under Francisco Gregorio Billini through fraudulent elections in 1884.⁶⁶ When his chosen puppet president proved unsatisfactory after a short time in office, Lilís pressured him to resign. He was succeeded by his vice president, Alejandro Woss y Gil in May of 1885.⁶⁷ From that time until his assassination in 1899, Heureaux widely controlled Dominican politics. As in his capacity of Minister of War during 1882, he maintained power by means of many forms of manipulation and strong-man rule despite the country's regional fragmentation. Having no effective centralized government, Heureaux bribed local leaders. If that failed, he put down local or regional dissent through means of military force.

Dictatorship, Centralization, and Foreign Encroachment Under Heureaux, 1886-1899

Heureaux's rule, which lasted nearly two decades, provides a clear demonstration of the ways in which attempts to modernize and centralize the economy and state clashed with regional and caudillo rule. Heureaux continued Luperón's attempted improvement of the military while also encouraging the continuation of caudillo rule through the provinces, reforming the national military while falling back to the old traditions of paying off regional bosses to keep the peace. Heureaux was aware of the power of both caudillismo and the military, and had full confidence in military rule. While he founded the Segunda Academia Militar in May of 1885, it was an officers' school through which a five-year education could bring its members to the rank of

⁶⁶ Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 67-72; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 250-253. Luperón was also somewhat discredited by many at the time due to the fraudulent elections of 1884 and his earlier backing of Heureaux.

⁶⁷ Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 71-72.

second lieutenant.⁶⁸ While Heureaux himself was one of a few rare examples of men who rose up through the ranks despite having a lower social-class background, he did not attempt any change to the system in which the elites officered the military. His government did not take up Luperón's programs to teach literacy to enlistees; some have suggested that as the dictator consolidated his control over the country he purposely used the recruitment of illiterate and landless peasants to more easily guarantee the loyalty of his forces.⁶⁹ Merchants and elites, of course, were also better able to resist conscription or to gather forces to oppose the government.

Active and indirect support for Heureaux's government came in large part from a flourishing of civil society during the 1880s, brought about with the liberal reforms begun under Luperón and augmented by the lack of civil strife under the heavy-handed rule of the decade. Heureaux at first allowed these developments as part of his program to unite the widely dispersed loyalties throughout the provinces. This was the period of Puerto Rican educator and author Eugenio de Hostos's broad educational campaigns through the country, and the spread of Dominican literature and poetry, of the opening of newspapers across the country. Many of the period's publications were written by officers and heroes of the Restoration War.⁷⁰ Dominican poetry and theatre also thrived through the 1880s. Despite the mounting authoritarian rule under Heureaux, the years 1879-1886 allowed an extent of liberal rule that encouraged growth, and Heureaux's interest in increasing military efficiency and revenue from exports aided in the building of roads and the country's first small railroads. His government's interest in improving the economy led government offices to focus on an increased centralization of the state, the

⁶⁸ Núñez Francisco and González Lora, *El Ejército Nacional*, 32.

⁶⁹ See, for example: Bosch, *Trujillo*, 105, 121-122.

⁷⁰ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 25-26.

founding of the first National Bank, and the beginnings of telegraph lines connecting the Dominican Republic to other countries.⁷¹

From 1887, Heureaux's dictatorship was increasingly defined by manipulation and coercion, and he adopted a new constitution at the time of the 1888 presidential election that would extend the president's term of office from two to four years.⁷² He now ruled, however, with a military that had some of the characteristics of a professionalized army. After his extensive work toward military improvement in the previous years, he could now boast a semi-regular force, or set of forces, with adequate numbers, modern equipment, and some instruction and--an important change from earlier militaries--one that was regularly paid. Even then, however, its units answered to regional commanders despite the facade of centralization. Heureaux and his Minister of War, General Miguel Andres Pichardo, brought European instructors and technicians to the military academy.⁷³ In July of 1887, Heureaux extended his military rule to the careful protection of agriculture and the national economy through the creation of a specialized corps called the Policia Gubernativa or Guardia Civil.⁷⁴ A U.S. traveler in 1891 described these Dominican police as "very neat looking" and overseeing a population so "peaceful and good natured" that the police had little work in keeping order.⁷⁵ Heureaux played on the population's fear of Haitian invasion to maintain such order and to justify ever-increasing expenditures and focus on the military, a tactic that helped him to maintain power in later years.⁷⁶ For the elections of 1888, Heureaux used his improved military forces to carry out a campaign of repression and persecution. Most voters abstained from voting, and the election

⁷¹ Bosch, *Trujillo*, 105.

⁷² Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 266-268.

⁷³ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 22.

⁷⁴ Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 30; Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 22.

⁷⁵ Appleton, "Santo Domingo City," 555-556.

⁷⁶ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 475-476.

campaign had allowed him to identify his opponents, who his military harshly persecuted after the election.⁷⁷ To those members of opposition groups who would cooperate went high government posts and financial favors such as tax exemptions.⁷⁸

By the time that Heureaux began to consolidate power in the mid-1880s, the Dominican Republic had clearly arrived at a moment of change, but definitions of modernization varied widely. Heureaux's interest in increased revenue and the growth of an export economy conflicted with many interests throughout the country. Among Dominicans, distrust of too much foreign economic power was widespread, while German buyers and U.S. or Caribbean investors demanded more control of their investments in the country. While the country's growing class of entrepreneurs and merchants welcomed some form of modernization, and cooperated with the first attempts to bring technology and investment, they were disillusioned to find that these encroachments came with planned state regulation of their enterprises.⁷⁹ Efforts at modernization also stressed the building of infrastructure that the increasingly corrupt government could not afford to build, and the creation of a strong export economy that met a great deal of resistance from the traditionally autonomous regions and peasantry. Either of these changes would have required political centralization of a sort that conflicted with continued strong military regionalism. Heureaux's response, ultimately, was to prop up the sugar economy, thus facilitating foreign investment and loans, while military strongmen maintained order through the provinces as in the past. The result of Heureaux's growing support for sugar was not a broad centralization of the country, either economically or otherwise. His continued manipulation and support of caudillo politics, and his continued inability to mediate between southern interests and those of the various regions, actually fueled regionalism.

⁷⁷ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 268.

⁷⁸ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 22.

⁷⁹ Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 141-144.

Heureaux also worked from as early as 1883 to play foreign powers against each other in an attempt to the benefit of the Dominican economy and to his own political advantage, especially against his mentor Luperón, whom he saw as a potentially dangerous political rival. To U.S. diplomats, he claimed that he supported the leasing of the widely desired Samaná Bay to a U.S. company while Luperón supported leasing it to a French Company. Through his first years in office, Heureaux set the strong precedent of favoring the United States to improve his revenue, and negotiated a reciprocity trade agreement with the United States.⁸⁰ To gain favor with foreign governments and investors, he attempted to use the same system he used at home: he offered incentives and financial favors to those businesses and industries that seemed most potentially beneficial. For example, as the sugar industry seemed the most lucrative, he exempted sugar machinery from import duties.⁸¹ He also offered concessions to U.S. citizens for the building of railroads, the establishment of a national bank, and construction of public utilities, bringing an increase over time in U.S. investors. The actions and attitudes of these investors, however, did little to increase Dominican support for U.S. investment through most of the country. Most serious investors took their money to other countries and territories, such as Cuba, that they considered more stable. Among those who did come to the Dominican Republic, American Consul Astwood called them “adventurers who are dissipated, dishonest, and immoral, who come to have a good time generally, spending freely in the gambling dens and drinking saloons the hard earned cash of some capitalist, and who return to the United States bankrupt with some exaggerated statement detrimental to the interest of both countries to cover up their own debauchery.”⁸² In an attempt to gain control over the Cibao, whose staple product was tobacco, Heureaux also encouraged a reorientation of the tobacco trade from German to U.S.

⁸⁰ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 463-464.

⁸¹ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 468.

⁸² Quoted in: Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 466.

buyers.⁸³ The population there, heavily dependent on German buyers, resisted changes, resisted control, and objected to rumors about the leasing of Samaná Bay to a foreign navy.⁸⁴ Many had objected, in fact, even to the proliferation of German buyers in the region, and they saw U.S. buyers as more potentially threatening to regional sovereignty.⁸⁵ Only through careful, regional military control did Heureaux allay fears well enough to maintain a tenuous balance through the same system used in the past, with strong vice presidents ruling the Cibao.

Heureaux's long dominance through regional military forces was an expensive system, however, that could only be maintained by such overtures to foreign investors and even extensive borrowing from Dominican private banks. Many U.S. observers felt that the conspicuous spending of Heureaux's regime indicated a move toward "modernity," a "progressive spirit of material go ahead." Encouragement of foreign investment during the last decades of the nineteenth century did, in fact, contribute to the extensive building of infrastructure, from the beginnings of a telegraphic cable laid out by a French company to the inception of internal railroads to bring goods to the coast.⁸⁶ The price of this development, however, was more than the struggling central government could pay, and was financed by repeated loans and by allowing foreign merchants to conduct illegal activity in the Republic.⁸⁷ The price for the Dominican people was not only the deep financial debt into which these loans and activities plunged the central government, but also the tightening of military control to enforce the government's power. In short, Heureaux's method of rule depended on growing military expenditures and the wide use of expensive bribes to maintain order.⁸⁸ The dictator's

⁸³ Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 74.

⁸⁴ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 482; Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 20.

⁸⁵ Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 133-134.

⁸⁶ Appleton, "Santo Domingo City," 564.

⁸⁷ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 271.

⁸⁸ Dana Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 82.

personal lifestyle was likewise expensive, and also drew from the public treasury and international loans.

As the first decade of his rule wore on, Heureaux found it more and more difficult to balance his interests and spending against Dominican popular opinion. His solution to the problem of growing unrest was to work harder--also through loans--to augment the central government's military might. The Westendorp Loan of 1888, for example, was negotiated by one of Heureaux's most trusted generals, Generoso de Marchena, to buy new arms and uniforms for the army and to build new warships to more quickly transport national army troops around the country to put down uprisings. At the same time, it increased dissatisfaction by allowing foreign intervention into the collection of Dominican customs revenues as a guarantee against the loan.⁸⁹ It also set a precedent for a series of similar loans, in 1890 and 1892, that Heureaux allowed to be bought by a U.S. company when the original loaning company began to fall into bankruptcy. This was the founding, in 1893, of the highly controversial U.S. San Domingo Improvement Company (SDIC), whose investors included a number of high U.S. government officials who extended continued loans to Heureaux's government in the 1890s.⁹⁰ Alongside continuous internal borrowing, Heureaux's dependence on loans to prop up his military might throughout the regions of the country led to a floating debt that threatened the stability of the country's economy and government. Falling into the same trap of many heads of state before him, Heureaux re-initiated the divisive idea of negotiations for the temporary leasing of Samaná Bay to the U.S. in exchange for a large loan.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 266-267; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 469-471; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 82.

⁹⁰ Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 75; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 270-274.

⁹¹ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 468.

Heureaux's early successes in government were largely attributable to his calls for an end to civil strife through a combined rule of the parties that had struggled for supremacy in previous decades. In reality, his system shut out the major opposing party by placement of supportive generals in major positions of power, but in the beginning he was able to build a reputation as both a respected general and a key player in the end to civil strife.⁹² By the 1890s, reactions against his repeated persecutions and repressions of opposition, and his manipulation of the political system to retain power, combined with concern about his overtures toward U.S. investors to bring about a growth of movements against his regime. Heureaux responded, in 1891, by using money from loans to again attempt to overhaul the military and improve recruitment. Realizing the centrality of his provincial governors in recruitment, and perhaps by now more assured of their loyalty, he increased the military power and prestige of provincial governors, who were responsible for recruitment of local commandants and the creation of local military stations that included doctors. Demonstrating the need for regional compromise and strong official support for the class nature of conscription, the law made enlistment exceptions for those with large amounts of land under cultivation or those who practiced scientific professions.⁹³

Crises of Finance and Modernization, 1899-1905

While the military might of Heureaux's government grew, the government declined economically into a continuously deeper state of crisis through the 1890s. His attempts to modernize and centralize the country were frustrated by his emphasis on the provincial and regional based military growth needed to maintain control. Modernization was also frustrated, of

⁹² Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 265-266.

⁹³ "Ley de Organización del Ejército," 1891, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 005040, AGN.

course, by a lack of agreement about how change would look and how it would be funded, a struggle between ideas that were often regionally defined. As Baud describes, "the insolvent government needed to stimulate productivity to acquire the financial means to promote" growth of investment and therefore increased revenue from more exports. Politicians reduced taxes to increase foreign investment for development, but this cut the revenue gained from private enterprise, leading to fluctuating commitment to state intervention in the economy.⁹⁴ The search for funding and the need to attract foreign investment, of course, also met with resistances to the growth of foreign economic power on Dominican soil. While in the north many resisted too much power by any particular group of foreign buyers by working to diversify their markets and resisting centrally imposed laws, the growth of sugar continued uncontrolled in the south during the last decades of the nineteenth century. State laws such as tax exemptions, created to benefit sugar in the south existed throughout the provinces, where they made less sense and often harmed local economies.⁹⁵ By the late 1890s, toward the end of Heureaux's rule, many of these laws were defined by U.S. investors, whose vision of modernization differed widely from that of most Dominicans. Attempts to unite or combine the definitions of Dominicans and U.S. investors were practically nonexistent, but Heureaux's government was a slave to its expanding debt. Many Dominicans argued for an alternative form of modernization that allowed regions to autonomously enter the world market economy while retaining the ability to create local laws to protect their provinces from subservience to it. Heureaux, however, continued to allow the SDIC to continuously issue new bonds without recalling or redeeming old ones.⁹⁶

The deepening extent of U.S. investment, featuring some prominent members of U.S. government, bound Heureaux's government to close negotiation with U.S. officials. The U.S.

⁹⁴ Baud, *Peasants and Tobacco*, 148-149.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 275. In popular lore, these became known as "papelitas de Lilís."

government pushed for a reciprocity trade agreement, for example, that was only halted by European investors' reactions against it.⁹⁷ The 1895 English seizure and naval occupation of Nicaragua's Pacific seaport at Corinto also increased U.S. public concern about European interference in the region.⁹⁸ By 1898, foreign and domestic creditors were demanding repayment on loans for which the government did not have funds, and many government employees were also demanding payment for salaries months in arrears.⁹⁹ In desperation for funds, Heureaux again approached the United States about Samaná, and by mid-1899 even proposed a protectorate to the American minister.¹⁰⁰ When Cibaeño revolutionaries Ramón Cáceres and Jacobito de Lara assassinated Ulises Heureaux in Moca on 26 July of 1899, the country's economic entanglement was so deep that a firm solution was not to be found; the situation formed under Heureaux led to a series of negotiations and efforts that tied the United States and the Dominican Republic ever closer to each other economically, and would come to form the justification for repeated U.S. military interventions.

Upon Heureaux's death, his elderly vice president General Wenceslao Figuereo took over the government and immediately attempted reprisals against those responsible for the assassination while negotiations with the U.S. government begun the year before continued.¹⁰¹ Both because of popular dissatisfaction with Heureaux's government and because of the traditional system of regional support and alliances, but also fearing the military, Dominicans were unwilling either to directly support or to turn in the conspirators. The result, in the midst of continuing economic crisis, was a brief period of struggle in government between military caudillos and short-lived governments during which the centralizing military built under Luperón

⁹⁷ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 269.

⁹⁸ Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, 33.

⁹⁹ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 276.

¹⁰⁰ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 529-534.

¹⁰¹ Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 80; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 534.

and Heureaux rapidly declined.¹⁰² Central government leaders of the period depended, as had Heureaux, on the bribery or blackmail of adversaries who often held more prestige and commanded more military might than those in power in the capital. As historian Miguel Angel Cordero points out, both before and after Heureaux's administration, provincial governors and politicians could only maintain power by naming military men to protect them, which led to frequent local overthrows in the provinces and an increased fragmentation in society, a process that was accelerated after the dictator's death.¹⁰³

After the initial months of confusion following the assassination, those most closely responsible for Heureaux's death initiated a rebellion under popular general Horacio Vásquez. The rebellion gained quick popular support throughout the Cibao, forcing the resignation of General Figuereo within months and installing a provisional government under Vásquez. Under broad support, the country elected popular merchant Juan Isidro Jiménez as president with Vásquez as vice president, and the new government took office on 15 November of 1899. In line with tradition, the president was stationed in Santo Domingo, where he governed the south of the country, and the vice president held headquarters in Santiago and governed the north. In effect, as Tulio Arvelo describes it, this solution effectively created two different governments with two differing agendas.¹⁰⁴ From the beginning, this and subsequent governments struggled with the debts brought about in the past decades and with the continuing presence of generals who had supported Heureaux and sought to find their way back into government office.¹⁰⁵ Jiménez and Vásquez worked to bring order and control to the military, but their attempts were largely

¹⁰² Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 31.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

¹⁰⁴ Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 84.

¹⁰⁵ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 279-282.

unsuccessful.¹⁰⁶ Uprisings, general lack of unity and the country's financial situation complicated attempts at military reform.

Only with Heureaux's death was the full extent of financial crisis realized, and when European powers threatened to take control of Dominican customs houses to force payment of debts, the Jiménez government found itself attempting negotiations with the SDIC.¹⁰⁷ The Dominican Republic over which Jiménez and Vásquez came to preside in 1899 was much changed from the one that existed before Heureaux, both because of changes in the world and because of changes initiated by the dictator at home. U.S. expansionism and an increasingly global market for goods, as well as industrialization that meant new ways of producing and manufacturing, had changed the face of the Caribbean on many levels. But Heureaux had played a direct role in on-the-ground change too. U.S. interests had been allowed increasing dominance, and support for the sugar industry had transformed the south and east from a primarily wood-exporting and cattle-raising economy to one dominated by sugar production for export to the United States. The Cibao had expanded its production of cacao and coffee, and the cities of San Pedro de Macorís and Sánchez had rapidly transformed from small fishing villages to important export centers and commercial cities.¹⁰⁸ The treasury was in complete financial ruin, and foreign creditors were still clamoring for payment of debts.

While the Jiménez government struggled to solve the financial problems, negotiating with the SDIC and the U.S. government, it also sought to maintain order through the time-honored tradition of building up the military. Growing regional opposition to the government, especially the leadership of Jiménez in the south, led to press censorship and repression by military

¹⁰⁶ Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 32-33.

¹⁰⁷ The relationship between the Dominican government and the SDIC is examined more closely in chapter Two.

¹⁰⁸ See Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 279-280.

forces.¹⁰⁹ The government still lacked funding for infrastructure. As under Heureaux, the majority of the national budget was the national military budget was slated to pay military personnel. The military budget in 1902 accounted for 71.7 % of the government's expenditures, and in 1904 it accounted for 72.6%.¹¹⁰ The increasingly unstable Jiménez-Vásquez government was fighting outbreaks of open hostilities, especially from the outlying provinces, throughout the country in 1902, in which provincial governors gathered forces and took up arms against the government. These uprisings were exacerbated by the continuation of tensions between north and south, and the inability of Jiménez and Vásquez to agree on the proper form of government for the republic. The tension finally brought the uneasy regional alliance to a breaking point when, in March and April of 1902, an uprising in the southwestern provinces of Azua and Barahona caused Jiménez to send an armed force of around 2,400 men to the area to end the rebellion.¹¹¹ Vásquez asked for permission to send out an armed force to put down rebellions along the border, but Jiménez did not trust him, and denied the permission. In April of 1902, feeling threatened, Vásquez armed troops and rose against the Jiménez government, marching on the capital in early May and forcing the president into exile.¹¹² The result was a further division of the country's many military officers; camps supporting either Jiménez or Vásquez were added to the discontents who still sought a return to those who had served in Heureaux's government. The resulting civil war consisted of factions that, again, were largely regionally based, with Jiménez finding greatest support in port cities and the capital city of Santo Domingo and Vásquez holding the greatest support base mainly in the interior and southwestern provinces.

¹⁰⁹ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 565-567.

¹¹⁰ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, xxxi.

¹¹¹ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 576.

¹¹² Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 283-284.

Regional loyalties were based on much more complicated realities than simply those that emphasized individual leaders. Again, many aspects of the civil war reiterate the questions and concerns over rapid modernization that had plagued modernizers and those seeking change for years. Vásquez, aware of the concerns among many Dominicans about rapid change, called on nostalgia in his proclamation of rebellion against the Jiménez government, emphasizing the "July Revolution" of 1899 against Heureaux in which he claimed that Dominicans had joined across region and class to form a common government. Drawing on common concerns that fretted about lack of unity in the face of foreign encroachment, he argued that Dominicans had in 1899 proven their ability to bring about a revolutionary unity. Vásquez declared that

In that solemn moment, perhaps the most striking in the history of our Nation, all Dominicans, thirsting for liberty, cherished the greatest hope and believed that the moment had arrived when they might see the realization of their aspiration for national prosperity, confident that with the arrival of a new era, the august majesty of law, the sacred principles of right, the efficacy of justice, and honesty in administration, would become an impulse toward salvation. . . . In that moment of supreme elation, the Dominican people, who for so long had suffered every class of outrage, put aside old passions, political antipathies, personal prejudice and sordid rancor, to commence with joy and to undertake with an enthusiasm which can never be forgotten the task of redemption proclaimed throughout all portions of the Republic.¹¹³

After months of fighting, Jiménez's forces lost, and Vásquez presided over a new provisional government. His government was quickly recognized by the United States, whose officials were eager to work with a stable government in bringing about negotiations to end the confusion surrounding the SDIC and foreign investments in the country.¹¹⁴ Despite his strong unitary rhetoric, like Heureaux, Vásquez immediately fell to persecution of those who had resisted his government's rise to power.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Quoted in: Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 579-580.

¹¹⁴ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 586.

¹¹⁵ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 284.

Despite rapid U.S. recognition, therefore, the Vásquez government was quickly faced by new regional rebellions by generals supporting Jiménez, especially in the Northwest. When his armed forces attacked the forces of rebellion there and arrested dissident General Andres Navarro, they still struggled with an eight-month guerrilla war led partially by General Desiderio Arias, which was complicated by an outbreak of malaria, and a new set of uprisings in the central provinces of Moca and La Vega.¹¹⁶ A growing number of uprisings and a continued inability to solve the country's financial problems threatened the Vásquez government from all sides until it was overthrown by Heureaux's supporters in March of 1903, in part because overcrowding in Santo Domingo prisons and Vásquez's pre-occupation with traveling throughout the country to stop revolutions in other provinces allowed Heureaux's followers easy access to many potential supporters. Some of the rebellion's leaders, in fact, proclaimed their revolution from inside the prison building in the Fortaleza Ozama in Santo Domingo.¹¹⁷ In the end, to bring about stability, the United States aided the insurrection, helping to place Heureaux supporter General Woss y Gil in power.¹¹⁸

Woss y Gil's government faced the same problems as previous governments, however. Foreign governments clamored for payments on long-standing Dominican debts, the treasury lacked money, and the new president had no way to pay his troops, or even to buy them rations. In late 1903, he was quickly overthrown by Jimenista General Carlos Morales Languasco. Morales's control too, however, was precarious, his government also beset by repeated regional uprisings that frustrated any attempts to improve the financial situation or even maintain order.

¹¹⁶ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 285; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 588-589.

¹¹⁷ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 285; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 593-594.

¹¹⁸ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 285.

Only through increased U.S. intervention did Morales maintain power for a short while.¹¹⁹ The budget continued to collapse, however, and the military deteriorated dramatically through 1904 despite U.S. support. Diverse communications detail the extreme vulnerability of remote areas to revolutionary activity, and the inability to right the problem due to lack of funds for men or for general military resources. Local political leaders loyal to the government through all of the country's provinces implored it for aid for general defense.¹²⁰ Patients of the military hospital in Santo Domingo petitioned repeatedly for attention or treatment, which were lacking, and the medical director wrote a series of unanswered letters to the Minister of War and Navy that his employees lacked salaries, food, and the medical instruments necessary to care for patients. Urgent surgeries were on hold because of the lack of medicine. The hospital was charged with holding prisoners, and had sixty-one, but did not have the funds to hold them.¹²¹ Many among the merchant and upper classes and some in the military seem to have been willing by mid-1904 to at least give this government an opportunity to improve the country's conditions. Petitions and letters to the government increased through 1904 as Dominicans in various sectors and regions requested funding and specific improvements from the government, apparently based on the assumption that the financial agent's control would increase government funding.¹²² Much of the correspondence of the second half of 1904, when finances were becoming more regular, demonstrate that despite the apparent hope for improvements, the incredibly small amount of revenue that reached the Dominican government was simply not enough to support even the

¹¹⁹ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 611-612; Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 287-289; J. Fred Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 17:4 (November, 1937), 440. This revolutionary period, heavily dependent on and shaped by U.S. action, is discussed more in depth in Chapter Two, which addresses the effects of U.S. intervention in the period.

¹²⁰ Correspondence of Jefes Comunes, August-October 1904, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 005040, AGN.

¹²¹ Petitions and letters to the governmental ministers from patients and the Medical Director of the Hospital Militar, dated 30 July 1904-13 December, 1904, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 005040, AGN.

¹²² Comunicaciones Diversas, 1904, "Correspondencia y Decretos," 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289, AGN. Examples include the requests of many provincial governors and community leaders for improvements and electricity in government buildings.

capital city's military. The head of the military hospital in Santo Domingo, for example, wrote about the need to remove prisoners from the hospital and increase its budget so that it could treat patients. His repeated efforts to improve the resources for care of military patients were echoed by a petition signed by the hospital's patients informing the government that they lacked attention or treatment.¹²³ Despite his entreaties and those of his patients, his letters become more and more desperate throughout the year; by late September, urgently needed surgeries were unperformed due to lack of surgical supplies.¹²⁴ The pattern of budget crises, military deterioration, U.S. intervention, and short-lived governments was the rule of Dominican politics until Vice-President Ramón Cáceres ascended to the presidency when unpopular President Morales fled into exile in December of 1905.

Conclusion: Ramón Cáceres, the Military, and Centralization as Modernity

Within the period of nearly incessant civil war and revolutions that characterized Dominican politics from 1899 to 1916, the years 1906-1911 stood out as an exception, a brief return to civil order and military and state development and coherence. The exception, however, was not especially different from the historical precedents. The presidency of Ramón Cáceres during these years brought stability and development through the traditional means of careful balance of regional interests and strong military control in the provinces. The major difference, under Cáceres, was that like Heureaux, he distinctly and unapologetically took the side of centralization of the state and armed forces in the modernization debate. While his presidency retained many state military methods of control from the past, such as the maintenance of power

¹²³ Petition signed by 43 patients of the Military Hospital of Santo Domingo, dated 30 July, 1904, Comunicaciones Diversas, 1904, "Correspondencia y Decretos," 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289, AGN.

¹²⁴ Letters from the Director of the Military Hospital of Santo Domingo, dated July to December 1904, Comunicaciones Diversas, 1904, "Correspondencia y Decretos," 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289, AGN.

in the provinces through strong local military governors, and the allowance for private guards on plantation lands, he worked to centralize the national military in ways that no previous statesmen had done with the possible exception of General Luperón. This centralized effort and development, alongside a charismatic character and reputation as a militarily distinguished member of the Cibaño *gente de primera*, allowed him to take clear advantage of the population's readiness for political stability.

The presidency of Ramón Cáceres is well covered in the historical literature from the Dominican Republic.¹²⁵ The methods and effects of his presidency were and remain controversial because of his strong use of the military and military centralization of the state.¹²⁶ He was able, however, to bring a balance between the arguments for regional autonomy and centralization in the years 1906 to 1911, when he was assassinated. When Cáceres came to the presidency, the Dominican Republic and the United States were already closely tied through financial agreements that kept U.S. naval forces close and closely supervising the Dominican political situation.¹²⁷ He did not have to explain to his constituents why or how he had allowed U.S. penetration, because it was already a strong force in society by the time he ascended to the office of president. Instead, he balanced the ever-present U.S. interests with other aspects of Dominican development. This was probably made easier, too, by his prominence and popularity in the Cibao, where his family was a respected element of Cibaño society, the son of a hacendado merchant and previous vice president. The neglect the Cibao suffered under

¹²⁵ For a balanced and in-depth study of Cáceres and his family and military background, as well as his presidency, see: Troncoso Sánchez, *Ramón Cáceres*.

¹²⁶ Troncoso Sánchez offers an analysis that emphasizes the traditional and positive of Cáceres's rise to political prominence, but not apologetically; his work ties Cáceres specifically to the regional traditions that formed him and his presidency. Other authors take mixed approaches to his reforms. Moya Pons, for example, emphasizes the use of strong military repression under Cáceres, the extent of resentment against his rule from many economic and military sectors, and the importance of U.S. support of his leadership. Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 296-303.

¹²⁷ The financial agreements of 1903-1905 are further discussed in Chapter Two.

Heureaux's dictatorship was not likely to repeat itself under Cáceres. With careful attention to the needs of both southern sugar and northern tobacco, Cáceres maintained a steady balance through most of his presidency.

Cáceres also took unprecedented steps toward centralization, breaking with much of what was traditional in Dominican politics in his effort to bring stability and national unity. He maintained order, however, through the military, using censorship and strong force when necessary as per tradition. Cáceres's military was different mainly because he accepted the need for eventual centralization, but he also strengthened the tendency toward regional military solutions, encouraging the development of local military leadership--especially on plantation land--so as to allow himself time to consolidate more general military reforms.¹²⁸ Immediately upon his ascendance to the presidency in late 1905, and his election in 1906, Cáceres worked against what he saw as the most divisive factors of Dominican politics and society. His program of centralization aimed at the realms of politics, the military, and the economy. Politically, he worked to do away with the office of the vice presidency, that historical answer to geographical division that he felt had long encouraged the dual character of the republic, the political division that had led to repeated revolutions. Despite his popular mandate, this call to reform provided justification for other military men who wanted to rebel against his government, most prominent among them General Desiderio Arias and other proponents of the opposing popular party in the Northwest.¹²⁹ To respond to such threats, Cáceres responded with military force, driving the attackers into prolonged guerrilla warfare and eventually concentrating the population of the

¹²⁸ Letters between secretaries of government, 1908, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 005040, AGN.

¹²⁹ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 296-297; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 666-667.

Northwest.¹³⁰ He declared martial law there in 1906 and his repression proved generally effective. In 1908 he was able to unite a sufficient number of Dominicans behind the revision of the constitution that did away with the vice presidential office.¹³¹

Such military actions against his government, which had long caused difficulty for Dominican central governments, indicated the strong need to do what Luperón had advocated: truly centralize the military. As Cáceres's presidency coincided with a growing explosion of foreign investment and development in agriculture, one of the keys to his extended centralization reforms was improved revenue that allowed military building. His initiatives were also aided by the military support of his presidential mandate, which came both from his family background and his emphasis on using resources to improve and expand the military.¹³² Believing that stability and socio-political and economic improvement would only come to the country through a strong, institutionalized national military, Cáceres set to work immediately to institute many military reforms and to build on those begun when he was vice president in 1904-1905. He used the Dominican navy to consolidate the fight against forces that had been in rebellion against the central government since then.¹³³ He supported the civilian function of a strong military force emphasized by a June 1905 law, created the position of Inspector General of the army in 1906, and created the Guardia Republicana as the central national armed force, combining the earlier Guardia Rural and Policía Gubernativa in June of 1907.¹³⁴ He continued to support the free

¹³⁰ This often-devastating approach was similar to that the Spanish colonial administration took toward the northwest border population when it could no longer police it, and would be repeated under the U.S. occupation government in the eastern provinces during prolonged guerrilla warfare there.

¹³¹ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 297; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 666-667.

¹³² Troncoso Sánchez, *Ramón Cáceres*, chapters 1 and 2.

¹³³ This was especially true for the northwest, as it was throughout his presidency. His directives ordering the movement of troops to the northwest to combat the "revolutionary nucleus" there emphasize the need to use rapid military operations to put down such revolutions as a means of "pacification of the country." Quotations from letter of 18 August, 1904, Comunicaciones Diversas, 1904, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 005040, AGN.

¹³⁴ Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 33; Dominican Republic, Secretaría de Estado de las Fuerzas Armadas, *Curso de Comando y Estado Mayor*, 33.

growth of the sugar industry too, pushing for modernization through economic improvement. He followed Heureaux's practice of not taxing sugar, and passed regulation to begin partitioning traditional communal lands, but raised taxes in other sectors.¹³⁵ He also formalized the practice of allowing agricultural land owners to hire and maintain their own armed guards through the Guardia Campestre, though he attempted to centralize the practice by placing authority for it under the new Guardia Republicana.¹³⁶

Once he had eliminated the obstacle of a geographically remote vice presidency in 1908, Cáceres was able to take actions toward transforming some of the traditions that had kept the country's provinces militarily autonomous and splintered. His effort was aided by the fact that rebellions, like most loyalties, tended to remain local.¹³⁷ His government removed many military provincial governors who had held wide power in the administration of their provinces, and replaced them with civil governors; with this change, he mandated, military affairs would be the exclusive realm of the military in the form of the Guardia Republicana.¹³⁸ To guarantee the smoothest transition possible and keep the new army under direct control of the presidency, he augmented historical precedent by setting aside a portion of the national budget for what was effectively bribery. Generals who had previously commanded much control in society were to receive a national pension in return for political neutrality and transferred to other areas those who could not be retired from the military.¹³⁹ The goal was to completely eliminate the old caudillo rivalries and rebuild the military anew, expanding and empowering it under central control of one president. The result was not always as clean, however, as he had envisioned it. In his military reorganization, for example, Cáceres promoted the young Cibaño general,

¹³⁵ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 301.

¹³⁶ Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 33.

¹³⁷ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 667.

¹³⁸ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 298.

¹³⁹ Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 33-34; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 298.

Alfredo María Victoria, to the position of chief of the army in Santo Domingo, passing over others who by tradition and rank expected to be promoted to the position. Governor of Santo Domingo province and son of the Minister of Foreign Relations, Luis Tejera and his supporters saw this as a snub. Despite echoes of past rivalries and difficulties with centralizing that complicated his presidency, Cáceres was able to maintain control and continue reforms for a long period for a combination of reasons that included improved economy and the military that it allowed him to build. As late as the first months of 1911, Cáceres was actively carrying out fundamental reforms to the system of Dominican government from the ongoing effort to break up communal lands to laws that mandated improved arms use and hygiene among the country's police forces.¹⁴⁰

Nevertheless, the depth and wide breadth of reforms and the growth of the economy under his presidency were unable to turn around many of the problems of the Dominican state and military that had caused political and military instability in decades past. In the end, much of what Cáceres accomplished was to pass into the same sort of confusion that had swallowed previous reform efforts. In November of 1911, Ramón Cáceres was assassinated by a group of Dominican opposition members led by none other than General Luis Tejera, whom Cáceres had passed over when promoting General Alfredo María Victoria. The actions of Tejera, and those such as Arias in the northwest who represented the continuation of military and party rivalries through the diverse provinces, also demonstrated the continuation of many deeply divisive issues that had complicated nation building in decades previous. The uprisings and the assassination of Cáceres, which plunged the country into the most devastating period of civil war yet, also represented resentment tied to varying regions and economic sectors, especially as they fought against centralization that favored U.S. interests and sugar. Further, they demonstrated the

¹⁴⁰ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 300-301.

essential lack of change among those in the military. Like military reforms before his time, those initiated by Cáceres did not bring about broad or lasting change to the regional or elitist structures in the military despite centralization. Santo Domingo and the south, especially as the center of a new sugar economy, still sustained privileges in comparison to other regions of the country, and over time a growing number of groups and individuals came to see his reforms and cooperation with U.S. interests as antithetical to their interests.¹⁴¹ Although his reforms worked to re-distribute wealth and people throughout the country, and to centralize a presidentially mandated civilian rule in the provinces, his presidency did nothing to change or reform the system by which the *gente de primera* held the highest positions in the government and military and used locally recruited military forces to challenge centralized power in their realms.¹⁴²

With civil war that exploded upon the assassination of Cáceres, many of his reforms were rapidly undone. The same tensions that brought about his assassination brought a pattern of civil struggle that continued for years. Old generals, both those who had fought against his presidency and those who had stayed more removed from politics, were called upon or volunteered their service to return local military order in the various provinces, and gradually replaced the civil governors. Again, regional militarism and the distinct interests of the provinces, influenced by U.S. interests and the need for government revenue to pay past debts and reform institutions and infrastructure, perpetuated *caudillismo*. It was a system that combined with conflicting ideas as to how to "modernize" the country, creating political, economic and military power vacuums into which foreign powers--especially the United States--increasingly stepped. Cáceres, until his death, finally appeared to have managed a balance of U.S. encroachment with military control and centralization while supporting a sufficient amount

¹⁴¹ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 297, 301-303; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 675.

¹⁴² Bosch, *Trujillo*, 40.

of regionalism. It was a tenuous balance, however, and fell apart at his assassination.

Controversies about how to modernize and whether to centralize, and long-standing political and military rivalries, stemmed largely from the regional character of the country and complicated efforts at change in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Repeatedly, the Dominican response was to force change, or enforce the status quo, through military force. This approach, and the specific methods associated with it, created a rotating system of government into which the expanding U.S. investors and forces could more easily insert themselves.

Chapter TWO

Sovereignty in the Caribbean at the Height of U.S. expansionism: Intervention and Military Deterioration

Accompanying and ever entwined with the Dominican question of modernizing and centralizing was the continuous question of U.S. influence and, increasingly, interference. U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic was always multi-faceted and, until 1916, ambiguous. For Dominican policy makers, it represented two sides of a new coin of modernity, both closely related to the international economy: foreign investment, which many sought, and foreign interference in government, which was anathema to most Dominicans. Unlike in Haiti, no Dominican laws specifically forbade foreign ownership and encroachment. The rules of conduct for foreign business and investment were generally less well defined, despite the strong pride in Dominican sovereignty that had been reinforced in repeated nineteenth-century wars to gain and maintain independence. Caribbean nations' development was destined to play a role in U.S. development, and grew in the shadow of an economically expansionist United States. Until the 1890s investment interest was intermittent, but lack of regulation from either country during this expansive period led to a growth of private investment in Dominican industry and infrastructure that, by 1900, seemed to demand the involvement of U.S. naval and government officials. While regional military and intellectual leaders in the Dominican Republic struggled with defining modernity around the turn of the century, therefore, they were faced with the continual issue of foreign encroachment. Successive political leaders attempted to manipulate the market, investment forces, and U.S. government and naval interests to gain or maintain power or to weaken political opponents. Their efforts were frustrated, however, by exploding anti-U.S. sentiment, continued traditions of military regionalism, and the distinct priorities of U.S. actors.

Dominicans' entry into the international market and attempts to build a modern national government formed an internal crisis that coincided with a growing U.S. naval and economic presence in the Caribbean. This meant a buildup of tension between conflicting interests and definitions beginning in the 1860s and bringing relations between the two countries by the early 1900s to crisis.

Attempts to define a U.S.-Dominican diplomatic relationship began in the late 1860s, when the governments of the two countries began making overtures toward each other regarding possible annexation of the Dominican Republic to the United States. State Department officials and travelers to the Caribbean remarked about the rich value of the island's resources, and the two countries signed a commercial treaty in 1867, and many U.S. investors and government officials became interested in annexation. None championed the idea at the time more strongly than President Ulysses S. Grant. Grant's 1870 message to Congress urging annexation provides insight into the concerns and interests that would define prolonged U.S. interest in the country. He argued that the acquisition of Santo Domingo was desirable both for its geographical position commanding the entrance to the Caribbean Sea and because of its rich soil, "most capacious harbors, most salubrious climate and the most valuable products of the forests, mines, and soil of all the West Indies islands." He held that its possession would be of immense value to U.S. trade, and would help equalize U.S. imports and exports, as well as giving the U.S. an advantage in the case of a foreign war.¹

Dominican reactions to this idea of annexation were mixed, but having just rid themselves of the control of yet another foreign government after the annexation to Spain and the

¹ Quoted in: Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 17. See also: Charles Callan Tansill, *The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873: A Chapter in Caribbean Diplomacy*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1938); Emilio Rodriguez Demorizi, *Papeles de Pedro F. Bono. Para la historia de las ideas políticas en Santo Domingo*, (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1964).

Restoration War (1863-1865), the majority were strongly opposed. Dominican president Báez, in fact, carried out most of his negotiations secretly so as to avoid political fallout. One of his primary goals in seeking annexation to the United States, or even selling the Samaná Peninsula, was to increase his government's revenue and power, a political decision that led to strong opposition and his eventual overthrow.² In the end, the proposed annexation failed when the U.S. Congress closely rejected it. The annexation vote was doomed by a combination of Dominican public opposition, U.S. fear of embroilment in foreign affairs, and U.S. concerns about Dominican racial composition. The congressional commission of inquiry into the country found that Dominicans were widely against the idea of annexation. In December of 1870, U.S. Senator Charles Sumner argued that “the island of San Domingo, situated in tropical waters and occupied by another race, never can become a permanent possession of the United States. You may seize it by force of arms or by diplomacy. . . but the enforced jurisdiction cannot endure. Already by a higher status that island is set apart to the colored race. It is theirs by right of possession, by their sweat mingling with the soil.”³ While politics Dominican popular resistance and conditions in the United States temporarily made plans of closer ties unattainable, the idea continued to attract some planners over subsequent decades.⁴

² Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 226-232.

³ Quoted in: Merline Pitre, “Frederick Douglass and the Annexation of Santo Domingo,” *The Journal of Negro History*, 62:4 (Oct. 1977), 391-392. The commission, which did not visit the south or west of the country, mostly interviewed President Báez and politicians aligned with him--understandable, as those opposing him were under threat of death at the time. Frederick Douglass, contemporary U.S. diplomat to the Dominican Republic and Haiti, strongly supported the idea of annexation. The commission visited the country from mid January to late March of 1871. Pitre, “Frederick Douglass,” 392-400. See also: José G. García, *Brief Rebuttal of the Report of the Santo Domingo Commission*, (New York: M.M. Zazamendi, 1871), 23.

⁴ Much of the historiography about late nineteenth-century U.S. imperialism and expansion has maintained that racism and an early form of white supremacy drove imperial expansion. This particular event, and the discussions surrounding it, support Eric T. Love's argument that racism had the opposite effect, that U.S. planners were often hesitant because they preferred to keep the question of race from the center of any developments--an argument that is well in keeping with earlier U.S. historical concerns about marginalizing the race question. See Eric T. Love, *Race Over Empire: Race and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-1900*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), especially pages 27-72.

The pattern set during these negotiations and the resultant Dominican political crisis continued on and off through the last decades of the nineteenth century. It was a pattern of cautious U.S. interest in Dominican economic development and the acquisition or control of strategic bases, and of Dominican politicians' strategic courting of or rejecting of that interest. Dominican politicians continued to fear foreign military incursion from Haiti or Europe, and therefore many in the government occasionally considered the advantages that U.S. aid would afford them against current and future foreign aggression. As important was the constant need for revenue, aggravated by the political system in which heads of state paid local leaders to maintain order. U.S. loans and investment might help modernize Dominican industries, improve revenue, and allow governments to maintain power. Dominican intellectuals and the growing merchant class, however, rejected what they saw as too much foreign involvement, and politicians sought a balance between foreign investment and constituents' fears of foreign encroachment. These conflicting concerns were to form the backdrop of much of the turmoil surrounding Dominican reaction to U.S. influence over the course of the next few decades, up to the U.S. military occupation of the country in 1916. In both countries, those interested in Dominican development--which included a growing number of private U.S. investors--settled for a less defined international relationship.

U.S. imperatives, on one side, were increasingly built around a late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century interest in finding expanding markets for the exploding industrial production of U.S. cities, as well as the need to expand naval protection as U.S. interests in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean grew.⁵ During the same years, as Dominican businesses and

⁵ For detailed discussions of this naval expansion, see: Yerxa, *Admirals and Empire* and Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*. Yerxa provides an account of naval strategy and policy from 1898 to the end of the Second World War, focusing on how U.S. Navy planners sought to expand naval power and control in the region through the period as U.S. interests

governments struggled between centralization and regionalism, many Dominican actors saw U.S. interest in their country's development as a key to modernization. Because the country lacked a reliable source of revenue, its governments funded almost exclusively by customs revenues, international business held powerful sway. U.S. businesses were willing to invest in expanding sugar, which brought increased revenue, and government after government in the Dominican Republic struggled to encourage such investments while balancing the spread of foreign influence with popular resistance to it. Resistance, often framed as the fight for national sovereignty and regional autonomy, was propped up by strong patron-client relations that guaranteed the continuation of regional cultures and industry. Through the analysis of a combination of primary documents and secondary literature, I argue that Dominican politicians and regional leaders took advantage of U.S. involvement, either using it to gain and maintain power or denouncing other politicians for working with U.S. forces. The result was that U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic during the late 1800s and early 1900s contributed significantly to political and military deterioration over time, creating a power vacuum into which U.S. forces gradually stepped despite a long-term growth of Dominican anti-imperialism.

U.S. Encroachment and Dominican Politics, 1870-1905

As Bruce Calder and Dana Munro pointed out, much of the character of early U.S. State Department approaches to diplomacy with the Dominican Republic can be ascertained by the fact that the U.S. did not establish a permanent diplomatic mission to the Dominican Republic until 1889; instead, the U.S. Minister to Haiti, who spent most of his time in Port-au-Prince,

expanded. Healy's work is a close examination of U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean during these years, and demonstrates the diverse interests and actors who came together to shape U.S. Caribbean policy.

served as minister for both countries.⁶ The State Department therefore had little up-to-date knowledge of events within the Dominican Republic, and the situation was complicated by historic tensions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Not until the increased U.S. investment in the country during the 1880s was the Dominican government, under dictator Ulises Heureaux (1881-1899), able to push effectively for a U.S. minister. Frederick Douglass was appointed in 1889, arriving in early 1890.⁷ Before then, U.S. interest had waxed and waned, from the annexation question of the 1860s to navy planners' vacillating claims as to whether the Dominican bay of Samaná was or was not the best location for a coaling station for the U.S. navy. By the time of Douglass's appointment, U.S. private and corporate investment were widening the diplomatic channel between the two countries. Investments augmented the interest begun during the question of annexation, when Frederick Douglass and others went on an 1871 commission of inquiry to the country; one of the commission's major goals was to discover the country's agricultural and resource potential.⁸

Already at the time of the commission of inquiry, U.S. interest had a military component, and was led by Grant's personal secretary General Orville Babcock. In fact, the period brought major changes in both U.S. and Dominican militaries, and therefore serves as a good point of departure for the examination of both in the early 20th century. In both countries, military matters were central to change in the period. As early as the late 1800s, U.S. planners and analysts focused on the military aspects of Dominican-U.S. relations. They argued that the United States held a natural role as protector of Caribbean nations, that only the U.S. Civil War

⁶ Calder, *Impact of Intervention*, 1; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 84.

⁷ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 269.

⁸ For a closer examination of Douglass's role, and his desire to expand American institutions abroad, see: Pitre, "Frederick Douglass," 390-400.

had stopped it from helping Dominicans regain their independence from Spain in the 1860s.⁹ This was, of course, distinctly 1890s thinking. Ideas of the U.S. government's role in the Caribbean had changed drastically in these decades, and a wider movement and capability to define and make use of the Monroe Doctrine began to form in the last decade of the nineteenth century.¹⁰ While Andrew Johnson's Secretary of State William H. Seward (1861-1869) worked to revive the antebellum interest in pursuing West Indian naval stations, his pursuit had a military focus, and failed politically.¹¹ By the 1890s, however, new perspectives on the role of the U.S. military and economy in the hemisphere were reshaping political thought. Further, many private citizens took actions that were disconcerting for Dominicans. As early as 1860 some U.S. citizens aroused concern among Dominicans when they landed on a southwestern Dominican island and planted a flag, claiming the territory and its guano deposits for the United States.¹²

While the question of annexation fell out of favor in the United States with the failure of the vote in the Senate, political and economic representatives in both countries repeatedly returned to the notion. Five-time Dominican president Buenaventura Báez, for example, struggling with revenue and defense, first asked for a protectorate or annexation from Spain after the U.S. vote failed, and then again solicited U.S. aid against Haiti in 1877.¹³ Báez's solicitations were, of course, only the beginning of a long trend in such political approaches toward the United States. The Dominican elite and intellectual response to this was to disparage the

⁹ Appleton, "Santo Domingo City," 560.

¹⁰ For historical essays examining recent developments in the historiography of the Reconstruction-Era United States, see Thomas J. Brown, ed., *Reconstructions: New Perspectives on the Post-bellum United States*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). See especially Mark Smith's essay, which examines the global implications of U.S. Reconstruction.

¹¹ Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, 30.

¹² Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 201-202.

¹³ Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 438.

politicians seeking such foreign aid.¹⁴ The U.S. government response remained ambiguous, while the U.S. navy became increasingly interested in the country. The dictatorship of Ulises Heureaux (1882-1899) brought sufficient political stability and U.S.-friendly economic development to deepen and complicate the relationship between the two countries. Heureaux's government brought some change and more open economic opportunity for foreign investors even as the United States embarked on a period of economic and naval expansionism. The rapid economic growth and industrialization in the decades after the U.S. Civil War created a government and business sector that looked increasingly outward for markets in which to sell its goods, even while geographical and industrial expansion meant a growing need for cheap raw materials to fuel growth and industry.¹⁵

U.S. investment in the Dominican Republic was also complicated by global trends toward capitalization and empire as European powers, too, expanded further in their search for raw materials and markets. This led to competition and friction between some European powers and certain sectors of U.S. government. The latter, especially the State Department, framed their argument for U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere in terms of "informal empire," and set their own expansion against that of Europeans, who they argued had more territorial aims.¹⁶

¹⁴ Many of these arguments and speeches resurfaced or were reprinted in 1913, when U.S. intervention increased, and are reprinted in late 1913 issues of the newspaper *El Radical*, and again in 1915 with the founding of *La Bandera Libre*, whose prime focus was to inform the Dominican public about the actions of the U.S. Minister and any complicity shown by the Dominican central government. They criticize central government decisions to make successive agreements with the United States that harmed national sovereignty over the years.

¹⁵ Historical and social science studies of this phenomenon around the turn of the century are abundant. Among those works examining the Dominican Republic within this larger trend, see especially: G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, *The Dominican Republic and the United States: from imperialism to transnationalism*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), Chapter One and Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*.

¹⁶ President McKinley summarized these arguments well in his speech of 16 February 1899 when he argued that the Philippines, as a U.S.-occupied country, would only benefit from U.S. intervention there, that they would come out of U.S. guidance with a friendlier government while "no imperial designs lurk in the American mind." William McKinley, "American Ideals Not Imperialistic," in Paul Monroe and Irving E. Miller, eds., *The American Spirit: A Basis for World Democracy*, "World Book Company," Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y.: World Book Company, 1918. pages 85-86. Hans Schmidt also discusses U.S. ideas of "informal empire" in the context of the island of Hispaniola, *The United States Occupation of Haiti*, (Rutgers University Press, 1971), 9-10.

Seeking to justify their expansion, U.S. philosophers, politicians, and teachers propagated the ideal that their motivations for intervention were different, a product of the desire to improve the world through a spread of U.S.-style democracy and economic methods. Even as U.S. administrations moved ever more toward the use of the military to intervene in Latin American politics, especially as World War One unfolded, many within the United States would hold that U.S. aims and approaches were drastically different from those of "Old-World nations."¹⁷ U.S. observers from the late 1800s to the onset of U.S. occupation called for evangelical and economic missions from the United States to promote stability and modernity.¹⁸

With the late-nineteenth-century reform spirit that sought to spread democracy and U.S. financial institutions came a strong historical moment of military reform, often of an expansionist nature.¹⁹ The influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory of U.S. naval predominance in the Caribbean region became increasingly popular.²⁰ The U.S. acquisition of rights to the Panama Canal in 1902 was both a product of this set of expansionist impulses and a major contributor to them. Mahan's theories and the Panama Canal led to increased discussion of naval expansion as both coastal defense and defense of the Caribbean region as a U.S. territorial water. These developments, in the late 1890s and early 1900s, also brought about growing tension between the power of the U.S. Department of the Navy and Department of State--a problem which was to complicate U.S. relations with Caribbean-region nations because of the conflicting goals of the two departments. When the State Department hoped to oust dictator José Santos Zelaya in Nicaragua, for example, the Navy Department members who met

¹⁷ Monroe and Miller, eds., *The American Spirit*. The quotation is from the editors' introduction in 1918, page iv.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* See also a 1915 report of the Reverend Philo W. Drury, quoted in: Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 51-52.

¹⁹ After the Prussian military victory of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, the U.S. Marine Corps even briefly adopted the Prussian-style spiked helmet. Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti*, 4.

²⁰ Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, 28-30; Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1890).

with Zelaya complained that they were not well informed of State Department policy. The State Department, in turn, argued that navy officials were there to uphold policy, not to make it.²¹ The expansion and shifting of U.S. naval power that occurred with the Spanish-American-Cuban-Philippine War (1898-1902) also complicated tensions between departments and throughout the region, increasing the naval desire for advance bases and coaling stations.

For Dominican governments, this U.S. naval expansion in Dominican waters was both potential boon and potential danger. Heureaux sought to balance these two possibilities, courting U.S. and European powers in attempts to consolidate his own power and fund his military dictatorship. By the 1890s, when opposition to his regime was strong but his military was stronger, he found himself subjugated by the need for funds, and drove the Dominican government into a growing debt from which it could not surface. This began in earnest when, in 1893 he allowed U.S. investors to buy out Dutch loans his government had contracted in previous years. The U.S. investors, forming the San Domingo Improvement Company (SDIC), included some U.S. government officials.²² Many apparently envisioning a growth of U.S. control over the country, or even eventual U.S. annexation of the country, the leading investors of the SDIC extended repeated loans to Heureaux's government in the 1890s. When payments on these loans became more difficult to make, and his military more difficult to maintain as opposition grew, Heureaux unsuccessfully offered the lease of Samaná Bay to the U.S. navy.²³ The U.S. State Department was hesitant to further involve U.S. forces in the tangled politics of the Dominican Republic, but investments and loans continued as the SDIC funded the early building of railroads and infrastructure as well as extending loans to Heureaux's government. U.S. investors continued to expand through Dominican sugar regions. In 1897, Heureaux made

²¹ Yerxa, *Admirals and Empire*, 34.

²² Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 75; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 270-274.

²³ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 468.

another agreement with the SDIC, allowing it to issue new bonds in order to consolidate the foreign debt, but did not recall or redeem the old bonds. Heureaux blamed the SDIC as the crisis worsened in the following year and Dominican creditors demanded payment.²⁴ Because of the financial entanglements and the downward spiral of Heureaux's ability to cope economically, the U.S. government was to become more willing to interfere in Dominican politics in an attempt to solve the problem.²⁵ As Heureaux was traveling through the country in search of merchants willing to lend his government more money in 1899, he was assassinated in Moca.²⁶

Heureaux's assassination, inspired largely by the extreme financial crisis especially in the Cibao by the late 1890s, did not bring an answer to the financial hole he had created. The only organizations profiting from Dominican revenues upon Heureaux's death were the SDIC and sugar companies, most of which were under foreign ownership and enjoyed exemptions from taxes or state regulation. Revolutionary forces struggled immediately upon taking power with the need to rebuild a military whose members had deserted en masse due to the dictator's inability to pay them. But the new government was not in a financial position to immediately reform it.²⁷ The most pressing matter facing the new government and those that followed it was the question of how most immediately to deal with the national debt. Anti-U.S. sentiment was strong among multiple sectors of the population by 1900, much of it surrounding the extensive economic power of the controversial SDIC. Many Dominicans felt that the company was the main source of their economic troubles.²⁸ New government heads also saw the dangers of continued control by this powerful U.S. company, to which they learned all of Dominican

²⁴ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 275-276.

²⁵ When Juan Isidro Jimenes staged a revolution in 1898 he did so from the United States, and some have claimed that the U.S. government was complicit or aided the revolution. See, for example: Juan Bosch, *Trujillo*, 116.

²⁶ United States Department of State, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1899), 242-255, hereafter abbreviated as FRUS (year); Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 558; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 277-278.

²⁷ Communications, "Correspondencia y Decretos," 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289, AGN.

²⁸ Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, 112.

customs revenues were mortgaged since the mid 1890s.²⁹ Because of the indebtedness of the government, their attempts to buy out the company were unsuccessful.

In 1900, European bondholders pressed their governments to send warships to demand payment from the Dominican government. Under pressure from U.S. Minister Powell, and with U.S. warships arriving near the coasts of the Dominican Republic, President Juan I. Jimenes negotiated a new contract with the company.³⁰ The contract was controversial in the Dominican Congress and among the population, and with the remaining European creditors who held Dominican bonds, but the SDIC carried out its terms anyway. The new contract, to appease the SDIC and permit the payment of European creditors, allowed the company to use customs revenues to pay the European bondholders. The new arrangement only increased popular anti-U.S. sentiment and distrust of the SDIC.³¹ On 10 January of 1901, the Dominican government and courts worked together to declare the National Bank as bankrupt, seeking to bar the SDIC from collecting revenues needed by the national treasury. The company appealed to the U.S. government. Jimenes sent his Minister for Foreign Affairs to Washington, and despite the political power of some of the SDIC's representatives in Washington, the U.S. State Department at first refused to intervene officially in the dispute. Its members were hesitant here, as elsewhere, to overtly challenge European powers when it came to collection of debts. In this early stage of defining its expanding role in the Caribbean, the U.S. government settled for arbitration, seeking to negotiate a way for the Dominican government to buy out the SDIC's

²⁹ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 274.

³⁰ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 558-563; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 80-95. When the Jimenes government took power, the foreign debt of the country was \$34 million, and incoming customs revenues to support the government totaled just over \$2 million per year. Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 281-282.

³¹ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 559-563; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 80-95; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 282. European bondholders and investors demanding payment in 1900 were from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and England.

interests.³² Negotiations between the company and the Dominican government failed, however, and Jimenes even sought money from European creditors to buy out the company.³³

During arbitration, the Dominican government became split by regional and caudillo rivalries that returned the country to civil war and a rapid turnover of governments. Presidential rulers in the south governed differently from vice-presidential rulers in the north, and the rivalries between the two led political leaders to ally against each other. Old generals who had supported Heureaux allied with President Jimenes, but the large military force fielded by his enemies in the north was more powerful.³⁴ Jiménez's opponents were able to field such a force against him largely because of his agreement with the SDIC and because he allied with Heureaux's generals, both of which made him widely unpopular in the Cibao.³⁵ When Jiménez's vice president Vásquez ousted him from the north, however, he too proved willing to work with U.S. ministers to try to consolidate his government's power.³⁶ His and successive Dominican governments began to work more and more closely with U.S. ministers, but the opposition denounced such cooperation. The final protocol of arbitration between the SDIC and the Dominican government on 31 January of 1903, especially, brought a storm of public protest in the Dominican Republic because it settled upon a board of arbitration that included one Dominican representative, one U.S. representative, and--failing agreement--another who would be appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court.³⁷

³² Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 428-429; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 563-564, 586; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 282.

³³ Bosch, *Trujillo*, 116.

³⁴ Those generals who had been loyal to Heureaux were enemies of Vásquez, who had been the orchestrator of the dictator's assassination.

³⁵ Orders and memoranda, 1902, File 1, Box 1, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

³⁶ United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1903), 390-405; United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1904), 261-264; Bosch, *Trujillo*, 116.

³⁷ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 285; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 85.

Such controversial decisions demonstrating apparent cooperation with U.S. interests provided repeated fuel for groups in opposition to standing governments in the years 1900 to 1905, and then complicated government attempts to consolidate power. Insurrections were also aided by the continued crisis of Dominican government finances. Prisons in Santo Domingo, for example, were over-crowded with political prisoners who could be drawn in to support opposition groups, and no national military could field sufficient forces during this period to guard the capital as well as the other provinces. When the bulk of the military left the city to fight insurrection, the opposition could take advantage of the unprotected capital city and declare government overthrow. In 1903, shortly after coming to power, Vásquez was overthrown by such a revolution led by one of Heureaux's generals.³⁸ When Vásquez used the traditional system of enlisting the aid of provincial governor generals to gather troops and march on Santo Domingo April, foreign consuls in the city called upon their governments for help. The crisis brought a combination of German, British, Italian, and Dutch ships to the harbor, and the U.S. navy quickly landed troops from the *U.S.S. Atlanta*, ostensibly to protect U.S. sugar interests.³⁹ U.S. properties were not endangered, however, and U.S. Minister Powell's communications demonstrate that the decision was based on working to gain broad support from the Dominican government. Powell wrote that without interference Vásquez would probably take the city, and that U.S. aid from the *Atlanta* was making the population friendly to the United States.⁴⁰ The presence of U.S. troops provided aid to the insurrection as long as Vásquez was not willing to attack and risk endangering the foreign troops. Vásquez withdrew to Santiago and resigned the presidency.⁴¹ The rapid changes of governments over the next few years, however, continued to

³⁸ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 285-286; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 594.

³⁹ These properties were not endangered at the time that U.S. troops landed.

⁴⁰ United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1903), 391.

⁴¹ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 285; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 595-598.

contribute to growing confusion as to the official Dominican position in regards to relations with the United States, the SDIC, and U.S. investors.

For the United States, the years 1902-1904 were a defining moment in international relations, which was to have a strong impact on the course of Dominican politics and history. The U.S. navy, and the desire to uphold the Monroe Doctrine and support U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean, necessitated the reshaping of U.S. approaches to Caribbean diplomacy. The Venezuelan Crisis of 1902 was therefore a major historical turning point in U.S. relations with European powers and Latin American nations. U.S. military and economic expansion throughout the Caribbean, including maneuvering to gain control of a future Panama Canal site, shifted the focus of U.S. security considerations. These U.S. interests coincided with an increase in European demands for overdue debts from a number of Caribbean countries. When Germany and England sent warships to intimidate Venezuela's president to pay his government's debts, U.S. President Roosevelt at first attempted an approach of watchful waiting. He could not possibly insist that European powers stay out of the Americas when debts remained unpaid. Germany and England, careful not to strain relations with the United States, notified Roosevelt's government of their plan to force collection of debts, and promised that they had no plans to seize territory. Roosevelt and Secretary of State John Hay agreed to support the European right to use force as a last resort, but their concern about German motives was clear when they mobilized the U.S. navy in the Caribbean. When the German and English blockade of Venezuela led to an exchange of fire between Venezuelan shore batteries and European ships, the U.S. public reacted against the show of European power so close to its borders. The U.S. exerted diplomatic pressure in an attempt to help arbitrate the crisis, the blockade was lifted in February of 1903, and the crisis was submitted to the Hague Court. The court ruled in favor of

the European powers.⁴² This precedent might encourage European use of force in the Americas, however, and Roosevelt and Hay were among many who saw the need for a more permanent solution to the issue of uncollected debts to European powers among Latin American countries.

Combined with the crisis in Venezuela and its eventual result, the deteriorating political situation in the Dominican Republic led Roosevelt and Hay to work toward a solution throughout 1903 and 1904. U.S. sugar planters who had built extensive wealth during Heureaux's dictatorship, and who were essentially autonomous units on Dominican soil due to all the exceptions he had provided their industry, contributed to the discussion, demonstrating concern about what they now saw as chronic instability in the Dominican system. Many wrote to the U.S. government to encourage varying levels of intervention that they thought might bring about sufficient political stability to protect their interests. In December of 1903, for example, the owner of one of the country's largest sugar plantations urged U.S. Minister William Powell to send "at least three men-of-war" to the Dominican coast with the announcement to the contending factions in the civil war that "upon the first promiscuous use of firearms order will be maintained by foreign force." In subsequent communications he tried to encourage such a U.S. show of force by playing on U.S.-German tensions, informing Powell that certain Dominican authorities were pro-German, cruel, dictatorial, and unfriendly to U.S. nationals.⁴³ Others who feared that the civil war would affect their investments wrote directly to the Secretary of State or President Roosevelt, accusing the U.S. government of abandoning its citizens and their interests.⁴⁴ As the numbers of such complaints and concerns increased, Roosevelt and Hay decided upon the need to take a more coherent and collective stance regarding the Dominican Republic and other

⁴² Miriam Hood, *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1895-1905: Great Power Pressure in Venezuela*, (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983). See also: Charles Carreras, *United States Economic Penetration of Venezuela and its Effects on Diplomacy, 1895-1906*, (New York: Garland Press, 1987).

⁴³ Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 422.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 420-422.

Caribbean-region countries. Arguing that U.S. political and military interventions in Cuba since 1898 had set that country on a path toward U.S.-style government, many angled for increased U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.⁴⁵

Dominican concerns about modernity, change, and sovereignty clashed with U.S. ideals and expectations, a clash that was exacerbated by U.S. understandings of Caribbean cultures and government. As Anthony Maingot points out, U.S. opinion:

tended to be premised on a misreading of Caribbean society and, thus, of how it related to the U.S. It confused the Caribbean peoples' historical capacity and propensity to be morally indignant at injustice with a propensity for revolution. Applauding and celebrating every revolution and pseudo-revolution which came along, these [U.S.] authors overlooked the fact that the central thrust of Caribbean life has been the pursuit of progressive ends through moderate or conservative means.⁴⁶

While the struggling governments of the Dominican Republic worked to overcome the financial hole into which the country had been dug during the Heureaux dictatorship, and to create a new central government that would align the country with modernizing trends in the international economy, many U.S. nationals saw it as a backward territory in need of tutelage and ripe for economic investment. As they did elsewhere during this era of U.S. economic expansion, various investors argued that U.S. economic influence would uplift the Dominican Republic and its people.⁴⁷ The result, through these years, was increasing U.S. intervention in Dominican politics, and a growth in Dominican reaction against that intervention. For example, the more

⁴⁵ United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1903), 390-405.

⁴⁶ Anthony P. Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean: Challenges of an Asymmetrical Relationship*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), viii-ix.

⁴⁷ See Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). Rosenberg details the ways in which loans to foreign nations during this period were initially intended to extend financial leadership and U.S.-defined civilization, and U.S. economic advisors counseled investors to reassure them about the safety of investments in foreign countries, the complications of which neither investors nor economic advisors began to understand until the 1920s. See also: William McKinley, "American Ideals Not Imperialistic" [From a speech given in Boston, 16 Feb. 1899] and Elihu Root, "Our Pan-American Policy," 89-90 in: Paul Monroe and Irving E. Miller, eds., *The American Spirit: A Basis for World Democracy*, (Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Company, 1918), 85-86 and 89-90.

frequent appearances of U.S. ships off the Dominican coast in these years reinforced rumors that the U.S. had territorial aspirations in the Dominican Republic, augmenting widespread rejection of Dominican governments' agreements with U.S. forces.⁴⁸

Dominican governments had no choice but to closely deal with the United States, and struggled to temper this reality with widespread reaction against it. When the Belgian government turned to the United States for help in collecting debts, and the provisional Dominican president in mid-1903 found himself under extreme pressure, he first returned to the discussion of leasing Samaná and possibly Manzanillo Bays to the United States but then declared the ports free--probably to calm fears of loss of sovereignty throughout the Dominican public.⁴⁹ When he also tried to refuse to appoint a Dominican arbiter in discussions about the SDIC's claims, arguing that the Dominican Congress had not ratified the January protocol, the U.S. Minister forced the issue by briefly breaking relations with the Dominican government.⁵⁰ Despite his agreement to restore relations, this provisional president could not maintain power with no money in the treasury to pay or provide rations for his troops as many opposition groups vied for control over the government.⁵¹ In late 1903, General Carlos Morales Languasco launched another successful revolution from the north, imprisoning the vice president and quickly taking power.⁵²

Again, the results of the revolution were largely decided by U.S. action. When the constitutional president did not have sufficient funds to fight the rebellion, U.S. Minister Powell informed the U.S. government that the bankruptcy of the country and its current political

⁴⁸ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 573. See also: Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, Chapter 14.

⁴⁹ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 286; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 86; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 604.

⁵⁰ Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 86-87.

⁵¹ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 604; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 86.

⁵² Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 286; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 605.

condition were a threat to the United States, especially due to a growth in European demands for payment.⁵³ As European naval forces landed and revolution continued to split the government throughout the provinces over the subsequent months, the U.S. Minister kept the State Department closely informed. The power of generals to recruit forces through the provinces proved to be stronger than any forces a constitutional government could muster, but these forces, too, quickly deserted when governor generals could not pay them.⁵⁴ Morales, who controlled the small Dominican navy, continued to maintain a thin veneer of power from Puerto Plata into 1904. When a strong revolutionary movement threatened his power, however, gathering large forces from throughout the country, the U.S. intervened to support Morales in an attempt to help reestablish political stability.⁵⁵ Morales unabashedly asked the U.S. Minister and U.S. forces for help, trying to stave off both revolution and the demands of European creditors. Following quick recognition by U.S. Minister Powell, the Roosevelt administration recognized Morales's government on 20 January 1904 and expanded its naval presence to help intimidate rebel forces. While the U.S. president and State Department were hesitant to intervene, Powell's quick recognition of his government and Morales's open cooperation with U.S. interests forced the issue.⁵⁶

Further, U.S. navy forces in the area involved themselves in the struggle. Commander Dillingham of the U.S.S. *Detroit*, for example, reported on 17 January 1904 to the Secretary of the Navy that he had landed Marine forces in order to prevent fighting on the streets of Puerto Plata, helping to defeat the revolution there.⁵⁷ After direct verbal intervention by Commander

⁵³ Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 433-434.

⁵⁴ Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 433-434; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 606-608.

⁵⁵ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 287-288.

⁵⁶ United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1904), 261-262. See also: Munro, *Dollar Diplomacy*, 88-89; Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, 115.

⁵⁷ Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 444.

Dillingham and Admiral Sigsbee, commander of the new Caribbean Squadron, resistant generals allowed the U.S. navy forces to install a customs collector in the port of Monte Cristi, which the navy argued would remove a potential source of funds for revolution.⁵⁸ In February, a U.S. cruiser bombarded rebel forces besieging Santo Domingo from the Ozama River who they said had shot on a U.S. launch and killed an engineer.⁵⁹ American war vessels landed marines throughout the area of the capital, occupying the neighborhood of Villa Duarte and causing a renewed outburst against Morales's government.⁶⁰ On 11 February previous Dominican minister Federico Henríquez y Carvajal sent a letter of grievance to the U.S. State Department about this action, and included the complaint that U.S. war vessels had prevented the privately owned Clyde Liner steamship *New York* from landing munitions at Monte Cristi, and had forced them to land instead in Puerto Plata to support Morales.⁶¹ Commander Dillingham bragged about his role in the conflict and its controversial resolution, stating that the U.S.S. *Detroit* was a factor in all events, and argued that he was "entirely responsible for the placing of Morales in power," which he believed was in everyone's interests.⁶²

In exchange for all of this U.S. support, while only controlling a few small parts of the country, Morales opened discussions about leasing Dominican bays for the U.S. navy, agreed to the U.S. desire to build lighthouses along the Dominican coast to facilitate the navigation of ships toward the Panama Canal, and made it clear that he wanted to place control of Dominican

⁵⁸ Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 1964, 101-102. In March of 1904, too, U.S. Navy Captain James M. Miller invited an opposition general aboard his ship to warn him that the revolution had to end, as the United States could not allow any other foreign power into the Dominican Republic. Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 432.

⁵⁹ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 292.

⁶⁰ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 612-613.

⁶¹ Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 444.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 444.

customs under the control and management of U.S. government agents.⁶³ Popular general Desiderio Arias was among many military leaders who increased his resistance to Morales when the latter began to work so closely with the United States. He called upon his constituents to expel the foreigners from the country, "without paying any attention to the Consuls or to the Americans."⁶⁴ U.S. interest in the Dominican Republic had increased through this warfare. In addition to defensive interests, U.S. capitalists and investors already by 1904 held a large amount of interest in the country, a combination of factors that pulled the U.S. State Department increasingly into the quagmire of Dominican politics and finances.⁶⁵ In June of 1904, in addition to these multiple calls for more tangible control of Dominican affairs, the arbitration board called for by the Protocol of 1903 began arrangements for the U.S. financial agent to collect customs revenues for repayment of debt.⁶⁶

U.S involvement was a constant thorn in the side of any government that came to power in the Dominican Republic, not only because of the prominence of anti-American sentiment throughout the country, but also, as an extension of that sentiment, because of the way that opposition groups could so easily seize and capitalize upon any apparent readiness of the government in power to surrender part of national sovereignty. Morales's government, coming to power largely through U.S. support and in a time when U.S. interest in so many forms had increased, was no exception to this rule. Even with U.S. support, his government was enforced by compromise—Monte Cristi remained the last stronghold of the most powerful opposition

⁶³ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 287-288; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 611-612; Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 440; J. Fred Rippy, *The Caribbean Danger Zone*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), 163.

⁶⁴ Correspondence dated 18 January, 1904, quoted in: Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 610.

⁶⁵ For the role of the U.S. public's interests and the U.S. press, see: Dana Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 75-92; Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 429-433.

⁶⁶ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 288.

group against his government, and its leaders were appeased by the placement of Desiderio Arias as governor of the province, where he carried out a largely separate rule.⁶⁷

U.S. Financial Control and Military Change: The Customs Receivership

A number of works have discussed the financial aspects of the U.S. customs receivership in the Dominican Republic, which was one of the key factors leading to U.S. military occupation of the country in 1916.⁶⁸ After a brief overview of the events leading up to the receivership, and the terms of the agreement between the two countries, this examination combines the understandings formed in that literature with a discussion of the role of the U.S. navy and the changes to the Dominican military that came with the receivership. The prominent role of U.S. government actors and the U.S. navy in the shaping of negotiations and politics first had what appeared to be a consolidating effect on the Dominican government following the establishment of the customs receivership. That appearance of consolidation proved to be illusory, however, due to the changing U.S. policies of the period and some aspects of the receivership that have not been examined in the historiography. The experiment with the receivership was supposed to bring stability to Dominican politics and economy, protect U.S. investors in the country, and improve U.S.-Dominican relations so that the two countries could continue to work closely together. Instead, largely because different individuals defined the U.S. role in the Dominican Republic differently, it led to further deterioration of Dominican sovereignty and government. With the assassination of the president in 1911, this deterioration would reach the proportions of

⁶⁷ Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 215.

⁶⁸ Primary among these are: Rippy, "Initiation of the Customs receivership"; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*; Knight, *The Americans in Santo Domingo*. The specifics of the economic aspects of the early Customs receivership can also be found in the "Report of the Dominican Customs receivership," (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919).

a civil war bloodier than any the country had before experienced, and U.S. intervention surrounding the receivership was instrumental in prolonging that war.

The extent of U.S. intervention in supporting Morales's government led to some definite changes in the political situation of the country through 1904. Most immediate was the initial support of U.S. forces for the new regime, which caused the opposition to become violently anti-American and even to approach Haitian and European governments in attempting to bring about the overthrow of Morales. In addition to the recognition of Morales's government, the opposition was angered when some officers of the U.S. navy attempted to direct the developments through their own influence, tending to favor increased U.S. control. Rear-Admiral W.C. Wise wrote to the Secretary of the Navy on 30 March, 1904 that the United States would eventually "have to assume a grave responsibility on the island in order to work out the solution of a stable government." On 26 June, Rear-Admiral C.D. Sigsbee called for drastic action, mentioning three points for naval bases and recommending intervention, especially due to his perception of the races of Hispanic America as primitive and unable to self-govern.⁶⁹ These goals among officers of the U.S. navy did not change over the course of the following decade, and were directly influential in the eventual U.S. occupation of the country.

By mid-year, Morales was able, through negotiation and diplomacy among Dominican provinces and with the U.S. Minister, to begin to strengthen his government's power. As the United States became more directly involved in Dominican government, he negotiated with U.S. representatives in an attempt to solve the financial crisis that had plagued the country since the dictatorship of Heureaux. In June of 1904, based on the protocol signed in 1903, the arbitration board designed the year before temporarily put a U.S. financial agent in place to collect Dominican customs revenue and repay foreign debts and counsel Morales's government on

⁶⁹ Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 426-427.

financial matters. Dominican reaction was widely against this action, especially because the financial agent chosen was an official of the SDIC, but the growing presence of U.S. warships kept the opposition groups from openly rebelling in early 1904. In the meantime, Morales diligently fostered his relationship with U.S. representatives.⁷⁰ He took advantage of both the controlled revenue, which gave his government some money, and the enforced peace, building up his military and improving military buildings and communications through 1904.⁷¹

The troops that he formed to begin to garrison key areas of the country, especially along the coasts, often lacked resources, but were a notable improvement over the military of the previous years. Important generals who supported his government, even tentatively, aided in this consolidation of military power, informing the government in the capital of which regions were least protected or most susceptible to potential revolution. General Ramón Cáceres, his government's vice president (Special Delegate to the Cibao Valley), wrote in May about the need to increase troops in the northwest, where Governor General Desiderio Arias and other openly hostile individuals held a strong potential revolutionary base.⁷² In April, President Morales responded to these concerns by blockading the port of Monte Cristi.⁷³ Uprisings therefore remained minor and localized through the rest of the year, unable to unite. Despite this, uprisings continued, and demands for troops were continuous in some areas throughout the year. Opposition groups capitalized on any apparent readiness to surrender part of national sovereignty under Morales's government, a common problem by now for any Dominican government that

⁷⁰ United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1904), 261-293; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 288-289. The official was John T. Abbot.

⁷¹ Correspondence of *Jefes Comunes* and provincial ministers, 1904, "Correspondencia y Decretos," 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289, AGN.

⁷² Comunicaciones Diversas, 1904, "Correspondencia y Decretos," 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289, AGN.

⁷³ Presidential Decree dated 23 April, 1904, "Decretos," "Correspondencia y Decretos," 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289, AGN.

might otherwise more readily cooperate with the United States.⁷⁴ Uprisings, contained though they were, continued to disrupt trade and drain resources.⁷⁵

In the period during which this financial agent was in place, it became progressively clearer to both Dominican and U.S. government representatives that a long-term solution was needed to fix the Dominican debt and financial crisis. To investigate conditions and report on the situation, President Roosevelt sent a commission to the Dominican Republic under Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis, who had experience in the diplomacy surrounding Panama, and Admiral George Dewey. During the investigation, Commander Dillingham of the U.S.S. *Detroit*, still heavily in favor of full U.S. military control of the island, wrote to Loomis in August of 1904 about what he saw as hopeless conditions in Santo Domingo, claiming that insurgency had become an institution, and that if the United States did not take over, another foreign power would.⁷⁶ Loomis returned arguing for more direct intervention. During his investigation he had spoken to a limited audience, consisting of supporters of Morales's government and a small portion of the upper-class, all in the north—he stated that:

The conservative, property-owning, and industrious people of the country, irrespective of nationality. . . talk seriously and with evident favor of annexation to the United States. General Morales and the politicians of his following suggest, with much force, that peace of a permanent nature would be secured if the administration of the customs-houses of the country were undertaken by the Government of the United States....”

He held that the agricultural classes would “probably” favor it, and that the only groups that would not were “the rather small contingent of military-political freebooters who have nothing to lose and much to gain by maintaining a state of anarchy in the country.”⁷⁷ Loomis also wrote in

⁷⁴ Dana Munro also details U.S. officials' discussions of cooperation from Morales. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 1964, 89.

⁷⁵ La Correspondencia de los Jefes Comunales, 1904, “Correspondencia y Decretos,” 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289, AGN.

⁷⁶ Rippy, “The Initiation of the Customs receivership,” 426-427.

⁷⁷ Quoted in: Rippy, “The Initiation of the Customs receivership,” 442.

a private memo to the president that "The frequent and sometimes bloody civil wars in the Dominican Republic. . . are shameless sordid struggles for the privileges of controlling customhouses and disposing their revenues. The country is largely in the grasp of desperately selfish irresponsible brigands."⁷⁸ Roosevelt hesitated, however, postponing final negotiations until after November's presidential election, though he ordered U.S. war vessels to remain in the area to guard against insurrections.⁷⁹

Because of U.S. navy interests, its vessels did more than guard. With many of its commanding officers in the area believing that the country needed firm, foreign control, and reporting this to the Secretary of the Navy, they intervened directly whenever they perceived a threat to Morales's power. When in December discussions again ensued for creating a financial agreement between the two countries, the Dominican press carried out a vigorous campaign against Morales as negotiations for financial control began again late in 1904.⁸⁰ Commander Dillingham was sent as representative to the Dominican Republic as part of the group that arranged the agreements, much to the dismay of many Dominicans who had experiences with him during the war of the previous year. Ministers in Morales's Cabinet insisted upon the addition of a clause to the agreement in which the U.S. government agreed to respect the "complete territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic."⁸¹ The negotiations continued into 1905, but Morales's open support for the agreement under negotiation led to floods of denunciations; despite U.S. assurances that they harbored no wish to gain Dominican territory, the events of the Panama Revolution and even of the U.S. seizure of territories in the war of 1898 were fresh in many minds. The Haitian president, too, was concerned about the amount of

⁷⁸ Quoted in: David Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, 117.

⁷⁹ Rippy, *The Caribbean Danger Zone*, 163.

⁸⁰ Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 420.

⁸¹ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 624-625.

power such an agreement might give U.S. representatives on the island, and in March his delegate in Santo Domingo threatened to support Morales's opposition if he went ahead with the plan.⁸²

Dominicans had other practical reasons to be concerned about U.S. motives. A growing number of U.S. investors or their investigating lawyers went to the Dominican Republic in late 1904 and especially early 1905 to study the island's resources. Travelers had long written about the country's promise for tourism, development, and "improvement," and argued that the country only required U.S. intervention or stable government to become modern and productive.⁸³ The trend increased as the safety of U.S. investment seemed more secure. One such representative, lawyer Henry J. Hancock, belittled the majority opposition to the government, calling the country's insurrections "more theatrical than real" and arguing that revolution in Santo Domingo did not stem from differences in political principles, but simply plots to seize customs houses for self-enrichment.⁸⁴ He stated that political disorder had prevented U.S. capital development in agriculture and mining that would improve the country. He worked with Admiral Sigsbee and Commissioner Dillingham, interviewing some of Puerto Plata's elites who supported Morales, and informed U.S. readers that the majority of Dominicans were in favor of an agreement such as the receivership.⁸⁵ The navy officers with whom Hancock was directly dealing during his visit were even more suspect among Dominicans. Despite Hancock's rosy picture of Dominican approval for the plan, Admiral Sigsbee in late January of 1905 requested seven more warships for Dominican waters, and the Navy Department reported to the U.S. Secretary of State strong

⁸² Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, 115-116. The latter led some U.S. representatives to be concerned about the potential for joint Dominican-Haitian action against U.S. goals and interests on the island.

⁸³ Appleton, "Santo Domingo City," 533-565; Henry J. Hancock, "The Situation in Santo Domingo," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 26 (July, 1905), 47-52; Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, 62-63.

⁸⁴ Hancock, "The Situation in Santo Domingo," 50-51.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 50.

opposition to the occupation of the customs houses by an agent of the SDIC.⁸⁶ Negotiations, meanwhile, were kept largely secret, and Dominican popular protest centered around fears not only of U.S. control of customs houses, but the possibility that Morales and U.S. representatives were discussing the leasing of Samaná Bay.⁸⁷

In February of 1905, the agreement reached by Morales's and Roosevelt's representatives was therefore a compromise between the many contending groups, and also largely a product of force and intimidation. The agreement was signed on 7 February, and stipulated that the Dominican government would agree to give U.S. financial agents complete control of incoming revenue by ceding control of the customs houses, creating a customs receivership. The agents of the receivership would use five percent of incoming revenue to fund their operation, give forty-five percent to the Dominican government to fund all government operations, and use the remaining fifty percent to consolidate and pay off the extensive Dominican debt.⁸⁸ Roosevelt addressed the U.S. Senate on 16 February of 1905 in an attempt to gain approval for the plan, explaining the continuing financial crisis of the Dominican Republic and the danger of its debt to European powers. Roosevelt argued that profiting from the Monroe Doctrine also brought a responsibility when other powers lent money to countries in the Western Hemisphere, pointing out that foreign creditors must have the right to demand loan repayment of debtor nations--and that the Hague Convention gave them that right. If the United States did not want European powers to step in and seize territory or customs houses, then it was obligated to do whatever it must to guarantee those payments. Summarizing the complaints of U.S. investors and the implications for relations with European powers, Roosevelt emphasized the obligation of the

⁸⁶ Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs receivership," 447.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 420; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, 100-101.

⁸⁸ "History of the Customs receivership," 1962, Preliminary Inventories Number 148, Records of the Customs receivership, page 2, NARA.

United States to intervene in the issue, and cited the example of the Platt Amendment in Cuba as proof that the U.S. had no permanent territorial interests and that U.S. intervention had a positive influence on the creation of stable Caribbean states.⁸⁹ His argument coincided with that of Secretary of State Elihu Root, who followed the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan and opinion of many when he argued that “the inevitable effect of our building the Canal must be to require us to police the surrounding premises. In the nature of things, trade and control, and the obligation to keep order which go with them, must come our way.”⁹⁰

When neither the Dominican Congress nor the U.S. Senate immediately passed the resolution, Roosevelt instituted a temporary *modus vivendi* agreement that would put the receivership into place for the next two years. President Morales forced the protocol in the Dominican Republic through a decree on 1 April of 1905, and the receivership became operative.⁹¹ As a trial period, its first two years made it seem promising, the experiences with which led to initiatives to champion for similar receiverships in other countries. The Dominican Republic's finances improved, foreign creditors began to receive payment, and the new government consolidated power more solidly over time. Even when Morales was overthrown in favor of his vice president, Ramón Cáceres, the transition of power was relatively painless in comparison to the wars of previous years: In December of 1905, as Cáceres and the Horacistas supporting him gradually unified their effort to throw him out, Morales attempted to maintain his office by calling on forces of U.S. marines to intimidate rebels in Santo Domingo. This

⁸⁹ “President Roosevelt on Santo Domingo,” *Boston Daily Globe*, 17 Feb. 1905, 11.

⁹⁰ Quoted in: Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti*, 43. See also: Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean*, 29. Assistant Secretary of State Loomis argued in 1905, adding to his earlier encouragement of direct U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, that “no picture for our future is complete which does not contemplate and comprehend the United States as the dominant power in the Caribbean Sea.” Quoted in Louis A. Pérez Jr., “Intervention, Hegemony and Dependency: The United States in the circum-Caribbean, 1898-1980,” *The Pacific Historical Review*, 51:2 (May, 1982), 168.

⁹¹ “History of the Customs receivership,” 1962, Preliminary Inventories Number 148, Records of the Customs receivership, page 1, NARA. See also: Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 291-295.

intimidation was ineffective in restoring his power, however, and he was forced to hand over the Army to Horacista general Luis Tejera, and to hand over other important government positions.⁹² When Morales fled the capital to gather troops and fled upon finding no support, U.S. Minister Powell offered him safe passage out of the country, and Cáceres formally took power on 29 December of 1905.⁹³ With the receivership now in place and legally binding, it is likely that U.S. representatives were less concerned than before with keeping Morales in power around the nearly absolute lack of support he enjoyed throughout the country.

As described in chapter One, Cáceres was able to form a strong government and, with the financial help of the receivership, finally to put the most immediate aspects of the Dominican debt crisis behind him and create reforms toward the future. His government, which maintained power until late 1911, built a strong national military based in the capital and encouraged the development of strong regional militaries. He encouraged industries that brought higher revenue, most central of which was the sugar industry of the south, but also attempted to balance this with the needs of the North. He did this in part by allowing foreign investors into other areas of the country, and in part through the beginning of an extensive reform that would build the country's infrastructure, from telegraphs to roads. He also had a wider popular mandate because he had been openly against the customs receivership when it was signed under Morales. As president, he now enjoyed the popular approval of having rejected it even while his government benefited from the increased revenue and end to European demands for debt repayment.⁹⁴

Cáceres cautioned the U.S. government through its minister about the need to develop

⁹² Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 292-293.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Letters of President Ramón Cáceres, Dominican Minister Emilio Joubert, and representatives of the U.S. State Department. United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1907), 306-307, 310, 312-317; United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1908), 256-272. Cooperation between the two governments increased over the years, including a lengthy extradition treaty in 1909-1910. United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1910), 424-429.

agriculture wisely, and spoke before the Dominican National Assembly where he promised to protect the country and its constitution. He promised to keep railroads under the control of the presidency even if they were built by foreign private investment "in order not to put into the hands of foreigners with these mighty civilizing agents the power of regulating the progress of the Republic."⁹⁵

During his relatively long tenure in power, however, the politics of U.S.-Dominican relations were evolving below the surface in ways that would severely complicate later relations between the two countries. The balance of power, while it appeared to fall centrally on Cáceres, was leaning more toward the U.S. forces in the country, who had ultimate control of finances, increased their military presence in Dominican waters over the years, supported Cáceres's government against insurrection, and gradually inserted programs that supported their goals into the internal politics and workings of the country. The customs receivership itself created a number of institutions that, while they were officially part of the receivership, had direct effects on the politics and military development of the Dominican Republic. One of these centered around the amount of protection to the sitting Dominican government that was afforded due to the U.S. presence. First, warships from the U.S. navy's Caribbean Squadron often patrolled and protected the waters around the port cities, and guards protected the customs houses, which through seizure had traditionally provided the largest source of funding for revolution or government overthrow. The U.S. navy maintained an average of eleven warships in Dominican waters during the early period of the receivership, and some of these were financially maintained solely by the U.S. navy.⁹⁶ Second, in addition to this U.S. military presence and the protection it afforded, U.S. Customs even provided the Dominican government with a "revenue cutter

⁹⁵ Quoted in: United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1908), 257-258.

⁹⁶ United States Senate, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, *Report No. 794*, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 1922, 91.

service." This provided four steel cutters that the receivership maintained and made freely available to the government to transport officials, mail, and troops as it saw necessary.⁹⁷ In the context of a regionally divided country that required transports to move troops around from city to city to combat revolution, this provided a strong backing for the government's military power, especially when compared to the small Dominican navy of two (sometimes three) ships that had transported Dominican troops in the past.

Another advent of the receivership that was to have a powerful effect on later Dominican-U.S. relations was the creation of the Customs Frontier Guard which evolved through the years of the receivership. The Frontier Guard had two major effects in the years leading up to the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic. First, it provided even further military protection to the Cáceres administration, as the Haitian border ranked with the customs houses and ports as one of the major traditional routes to revolution. It also provided U.S. military and government forces with an unprecedented (and, officially, largely undefined) power in some of the interior military workings of the country. In so doing, it formed the precedent for U.S. plans and desires to control the Dominican military, which were to come to the forefront in 1914.⁹⁸ The Frontier Customs Guard, or Frontier Guard, stemmed from the mid-1905 establishment of border customs receivership houses along the Dominican-Haitian border in the towns of Comendador, Tierra Nueva, and Dajabón--the locations of most overland trade. They were organized by the receivership "as a customs adjunct to prevent smuggling along the Haitian frontier and to assist in the collection" of land-port customs duties. From the start, customs agents at these posts were mounted and armed, and paid from the five percent of Dominican customs revenue that funded

⁹⁷ "History of the Customs Receivership," 1962, Preliminary Inventories Number 148, Records of the Customs Receivership, page 5, NARA.

⁹⁸ In the context of wider U.S.-Caribbean relations, and Dominican-Haitian relations, it created growing tension with Haiti by allowing U.S. forces to command Dominicans in policing a border that remained legally undefined.

the receivership, and September of 1905 saw the official creation of the Frontier Guard.⁹⁹ Upon its establishment, the border customs administrator was authorized to hire one-hundred-twenty Dominicans, sixty of them mounted, to act as frontier police under the command of U.S. customs officers.¹⁰⁰ In its primary role of policing trade along the border to combat smuggling, the Frontier Guard met a great deal of resistance from both Dominicans and Haitians along the border, and its agents often fell under fire from local forces from both countries.¹⁰¹ When Cáceres was elected to a full six-year term in July of 1908 the Guard was turned over to the Dominican government, though it still worked closely with the receivership and would be returned to U.S. customs control in 1913 when, during civil war, its posts were abandoned.¹⁰²

The Dominican-American Convention was officially signed on 8 February 1907, after being passed by the U.S. Senate and a Dominican Congress under pressure by the executive, making the Dominican Republic a virtual U.S. protectorate.¹⁰³ For the first years of the receivership, and especially after the election of 1908, the country seemed to enjoy relative quiet and reform. As 1911 dawned, the Dominican Republic seemed on the surface both politically stable and progressive. Cáceres welcomed change and investment, and set up an ambitious

⁹⁹ "History of the Customs Receivership," 1962, Preliminary Inventories Number 148, Records of the Customs Receivership, page 6, NARA. The only other mention of the Frontier Guard in the historiography is in the work of Whitney Perkins, who mentions it briefly as a border customs patrol set up in 1912 from a recommendation prepared for Taft by Huntington Wilson. Whitney Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 47.

¹⁰⁰ Anna Saba, "H.F. Worley--a true Renaissance Man," *U.S. Customs Today*, (September, 2000), accessed at: http://www.cbp.gov/custoday/sep2000/worley_3.htm, 1 October, 2008. The authorization for such a guard was part of the *modus vivendi* agreement. It is unclear who paid the Dominican recruits, but most likely they were paid through the Dominican military and that many were recruited from some of those Dominican men who had military experience along the border in earlier years.

¹⁰¹ Saba, "H.F. Worley"; "History of the Customs receivership," 1962, Preliminary Inventories Number 148, Records of the Customs Receivership, page 6, NARA.

¹⁰² "History of the Customs receivership," 1962, Preliminary Inventories Number 148, Records of the Customs Receivership, page 6, NARA; United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1913), 417.

¹⁰³ Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Dominican Republic, "Memoria que al Ciudadano Presidente de la República, General Ramón Cáceres, presenta al Ciudadano Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores," *Memorias correspondientes a los ejercicios de...*, Departamento de Relaciones Exteriores (Santo Domingo: Impr. de J.R. VDA García, 1910); Jacob H. Hollander, "The Convention of 1907 Between the United States and the Dominican Republic," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April, 1907), 292-293; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 648-649.

restructuring of the military and programs to improve infrastructure throughout the country. He also worked closely with the United States, however, including in controversial agreements such as the prohibition of the sale of arms into the Dominican Republic--part of his plan to reform the country through a program of disarmament.¹⁰⁴ This sort of cooperation with U.S. goals, when combined with the presence of U.S. marines in Santo Domingo or U.S. customs agents commanding Dominicans along the border, inflamed anti-U.S. sentiment and led to growing opposition to his presidency and growing U.S. influence over the years.¹⁰⁵ In the end, the Dominican-American Convention did a much better job of covering up problems in the Dominican Republic than it did of solving them. It did little to repair the social and regional divisions that had widened through the course of civil wars, despite extensive planning for infrastructural reform, and the extensive military consolidation and growth therefore fell apart rapidly upon the assassination of Cáceres in November of 1911.

Sovereignty Stalled: Civil War and Marine Invasion

On 19 November 1911, a revolutionary group led by General Luis Tejera fatally wounded President Cáceres during an attempted kidnapping, plunging the Dominican Republic into civil war. The assassination ended the extensive reforms and reorganization carried out and begun under the Cáceres presidency, and elevated the power of Chief of the Army General Alfredo Victoria, who carried out an immediate wave of repression throughout the country.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Government communications with the U.S. Minister dated January to October of 1911, "Correspondencia y Contrato," 1911-1913, RE Deposito 07, I.T. 007792, AGN.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 653-654.

¹⁰⁶ The *New York Times* reported, during this period of harsh repression, that the assassination of Cáceres appeared to be retribution for his killing of Heureaux in 1899, and that "nothing has developed to indicate an uprising. The country is completely quiet." 21 November, 1911.

The year 1911 saw not only the assassination of a change-oriented Dominican president and the return of factional war, but also an increasingly interventionist and determined U.S. government. Cáceres had generally excelled at balancing nationalist sentiments at home--sometimes with strong, military repression--with U.S. demands for stability and protection around sugar lands. His long presidential tenure allowed him to build up and restructure the military, more along the lines of what previous Dominican planners had attempted than along those that the U.S. recommended, but well enough that he was able to offer enough protection for the development of sugar, which he always promoted. This friendly atmosphere meant that U.S. investments and entrepreneurs continued to flow to the island in the years leading up to his 1911 assassination.¹⁰⁷ Then-U.S.-President Howard Taft, an advocate of "Dollar Diplomacy," approved of the measures taken by the Cáceres administration. The assassination, and the descent of the Dominican government into a war of factions led by opposing generals, led U.S. investors to again call to their government for pre-emptive interventions in case the civil war were to affect their production or shipments.¹⁰⁸

By 1912, U.S. involvement in Dominican politics became so omnipresent and influential that it perpetuated intense civil war. Regional military and political bosses manipulated popular anti-American sentiment and U.S. support in the years 1912 to 1915 in such a way, in fact, that continued U.S. intervention virtually guaranteed continued civil struggle. Any political leader who accepted and used U.S. help, or cooperated with the United States, was branded by many as a traitor, but without U.S. support, no regime could last long.¹⁰⁹ While regional government

¹⁰⁷ Letter of Minister Russell quoted in: Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 51-52.

¹⁰⁸ Letters between U.S. president Taft and Dominican president Nouel printed in: United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1913), 417-418.

¹⁰⁹ Communications between the U.S. Minister and the U.S. State Department in: United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1913), 418-421; publications in *El Radical*, Nov-Dec. 1913, calling for the censure of the government for creating "humiliating" pacts that allowed continued U.S. interventions.

continued to be the rule throughout the provinces, the struggle for control over a changing central government bathed the Dominican Republic in years of conflict that devastated the infrastructure and military built up under Cáceres. Dominican politics of the time was a complex game. Anti-American sentiment had grown exponentially in the previous two decades, especially in provinces such as those of the Northwest, or in the northern Cibao Valley, where tobacco planters often saw themselves as at odds with the growing sugar industry of the South. Such regional struggles represented much more, however, than a contest between U.S. and European interests or between sugar plantations and small farming. Increased U.S. intervention was especially volatile because it coincided with a moment of powerful and fundamental change in the entire Dominican social and economic system, one that had been under way for decades by 1911 in the centralization of sugar and the progressive insertion of the Dominican economy into international trade and its gradual reorientation toward U.S. markets. These trends encouraged the growth of large sugar plantations and damaged other small industries, thereby fueling the conflicts that followed the death of Cáceres. Some have argued that those elements of capitalization and modernization that the country had maintained outside of U.S. control were destroyed in the civil war, opening a hole for U.S. businesses to further their control.¹¹⁰ While the economic effects and their role in the civil war and occupation continue to be debated, this model of deterioration describes what happened with the Dominican military during the years of civil war.

Victoria and Tejera had already been strong rivals when Cáceres chose Victoria over Tejera as head of the Army. Upon the assassination, Victoria ordered the capture and execution of those responsible for the assassination--Tejera and his followers--and opposed the candidacies of the two popular prospective presidential candidates. Victoria, firmly controlling the Guardia

¹¹⁰ See, especially: Bosch, *Trujillo*, 117.

Republicana forces in Santo Domingo, pressured Congress instead to elect his uncle Don Eladio Victoria as first provisional and then constitutional president.¹¹¹ President Victoria, a puppet president to his nephew General Alfredo Victoria, carried out waves of repression and quickly sought to reform and organize the army. He created a military commission to draw up plans for army reorganization, adopting a coat of arms for the country in February of 1912 and issuing a law to reorganize the army in July.¹¹² One of the major goals of this reorganization was the training of recruits under a new corps of instructors. Another was clearly to distribute and improve communications with those most loyal to him.¹¹³ Some in the officer corps had good reason to be loyal to him. They had worked under him for years while he was Secretary of War under Cáceres, and many were paid well. Military men were paid, during this presidency, in three-month periods, with sergeants making between \$84-\$185 per pay period. Low-ranking officers made around \$120-\$240 for the same period, but a number of those most loyal or with the longest service records made twice as much.¹¹⁴

Victoria at first enjoyed the support of the U.S. representatives in the country, who hoped to see his government maintain relative calm. Navy officers communicated with him throughout the year about the movement and placement of U.S. warships, and the U.S. Secretary of State helped through the Dominican Minister Plenipotentiary to Washington, Francisco J. Peynado, giving him the maps of Santo Domingo prepared by the U.S. War Department in 1904 and 1907.¹¹⁵ They also handed the Frontier Guard over to the Dominican Army when potential

¹¹¹ General Alfredo Victoria was too young to be president constitutionally. Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 306.

¹¹² Nuñez Francisco and González Lora, *El Ejército Nacional Dominicano*, 35; Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 34.

¹¹³ "Correspondencia," 1914, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 004610, AGN. Alfredo Victoria carefully nurtured relationships throughout the provinces with generals who supported his uncle's presidency and changes in the armed forces.

¹¹⁴ "Relación de los documentos que sirvieron de base para la emisión del pagaré," December, 1912. Box 179, Folder #1-3, 1912-1933. Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 008769, AGN.

¹¹⁵ "Correspondencia," 1914, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 004610, AGN.

threats of Dominican conflict with Haiti loomed in 1912.¹¹⁶ The Dominican Legation in Port-au-Prince sent Peynado official communication, in July, outlining the way that U.S.-led negotiations about the Haitian-Dominican border were causing tensions in Haiti; his observations were that the Haitian government might have been interested in starting a war with the Dominican Republic by convincing the Haitian population that Dominicans were preparing for a frontier war. The letter was explicit about the danger of such a confrontation with civil war breaking out throughout the Dominican Republic; the Dominican Minister stated that the Haitian government clearly wanted to take as much Dominican territory as possible, and would aid rebels to see it happen. One indicator, he pointed out, was the increase in disappearances of Dominicans along the border.¹¹⁷

Indeed, Haiti was not the only problem facing Victoria's government, and Victoria had good reason to fear that Dominican rebels might try the traditional route of allying with the Haitian government to supply a revolution from over the border. Shortly after Victoria took office and began to carry out a campaign of repression, popular Jimenista General Desiderio Arias organized a new rebellion in the hopes of imposing a politically friendly president.¹¹⁸ Armed rebellion also erupted throughout the provinces in support of the two popular candidates, Horacio Vásquez and Juan Isidro Jimenes. Reforms grinded to a halt, and by mid-year the country's institutions were in disarray, and the Dominican military--even the Guardia Republicana--was fractured by camps opposing or supporting Victoria. Victoria's July *Ley*

¹¹⁶ "History of the Customs Receivership," 1962, Preliminary Inventories Number 148, Records of the Customs Receivership, page 6, NARA.

¹¹⁷ Letter dated 27 July, 1912, "Correspondencia y Contrato," 1911-1913, RE Deposito 07, I.T. 007792, AGN. Extensive communications between the U.S. Minister and the Dominican government in 1911 and 1912 also demonstrate the rising tension between the two countries, including reports of the Haitian government in 1912 supplying rebels under Arias with arms for overthrow of the Dominican government. United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1912), 339-390.

¹¹⁸ Cordero, *Las Fuerzas Armadas*, 34; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 681-682; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 303.

Orgánica for the Army was presumably a response to this explosion of uprisings and the strains it placed on the military system. The year in which he was in power, 1912, later became known as *El Año Rojo*, the red year of the civil war, when Horacista generals and followers allied with Jimenista general Desiderio Arias in an attempt to overthrow Victoria.¹¹⁹ In August, acting Chief of the U.S. War Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs and Colonel in the U.S. Army wrote to Minister Francisco Peynado to offer the service of Major George B. Bowers in a proposed plan to reorganize and train the police force of Santo Domingo. Bowers had ten years of experience doing the same in the Philippines, and believed that his services would help the Dominican government to bring order and stability.¹²⁰

The large set of difficulties facing the Dominican government were augmented by the death of Haitian President Jean-Jacque Leconte in August of 1912. President Victoria quickly set to work sending communications of sympathy to the Haitian government as soon as he heard about the explosion of the president's palace.¹²¹ In the United States, the *Washington Post* reported that 400 were dead or injured in the blast, and that the two countries had been dangerously close to border war as "Santo Domingo seethes with revolt." The U.S. ordered a navy gunboat to the scene, where the population of Haiti was "in a state of panic." While the Haitian Consul reported that the explosion was an accident, U.S. officials reported that it was a plot by Haitians and perhaps also Dominicans, simultaneous as it was with reports of "revolutionary outbreaks" along the border directed against the Dominican government of Victoria.¹²² The *Washington Herald* reported that, due to the current state of war between the two countries, U.S. government representatives feared that the situation would only get worse,

¹¹⁹ Jaime de Jesús Domínguez, *Historia Dominicana*, (Santo Domingo: abc editorial, 2005), 181.

¹²⁰ "Correspondencia y Contrato," 1911-1913, RE Deposito 07, I.T. 007792, AGN.

¹²¹ Letters between the Dominican Legation in Port-au-Prince and President Victoria dated August 1912, "Correspondencia y Contrato," 1911-1913, RE Deposito 07, I.T. 007792, AGN.

¹²² "Ruler of Haiti Killed by Blast," *Washington Post*, 9 August 1912, pages 1-2.

and that this along with revolution in the Dominican Republic that had caused attacks on the customs land-port of Dajabón they might be "compelled to land an armed force in that vicinity in order to protect Dominican customs-houses."¹²³ U.S. Minister in the Dominican Republic William Russell traveled to the border to try to work out the arrangement of a boundary settlement and try to calm tensions there.¹²⁴ The situation within the Dominican Republic, however, was only worsening, the Dominican government claiming (probably accurately) that Haitian forces had done much to aid the Dominican revolutionary forces.¹²⁵ The treasury was bankrupt due to the costs of fighting so many revolutionary forces, and salaries of public employees were no longer being paid.¹²⁶

Finally, in September of 1912, U.S. President William Taft began to consider direct military intervention. When U.S. investors in the sugar areas wrote to his government asking for intervention before the civil war reached their lands and affected their business, he sent a "pacification commission" with 750 marines to Santo Domingo in September of 1912 to try to end the civil war and fix a provisional border with Haiti.¹²⁷ The commission carried out these orders with the proviso that failure might mean direct military intervention, and cut customs funds to the government, making certain demands before they were reinstated. Primary among these was the resignation of President Victoria and the appointment of a mutually agreeable interim president until it accepted the U.S. solution to the border dispute, which delineated a provisional U.S.-defined border.¹²⁸ The U.S. commission and Dominicans quickly agreed on popular Archbishop Adolfo Nouel as interim president, and he took office on 30 November of

¹²³ "President Killed and 400 Injured in Haitian Plot," *Washington Herald*, 9 August 1912, page 1.

¹²⁴ "Correspondencia," 1912-1921, RE Deposito 07, I.T. 007952, AGN.

¹²⁵ "President Killed and 400 Injured in Haitian Plot," *Washington Herald*, 9 August 1912, page 1.

¹²⁶ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 306-308.

¹²⁷ Domínguez, *Historia Dominicana*, 182.

¹²⁸ José Miguel Soto Jiménez, *Las fuerzas militares en la República Dominicana: Desde la Primera República hasta los comienzos de la Cuarta República. Ensayo sobre su evolución institucional* (Santo Domingo: Ediciones Grupo 5, 1996), 126-132; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 5; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 307.

1912, from which he was to organize elections for the next year. Nouel immediately found himself incapable of running the government, trying to please all of the opposing forces and in the end pleasing none. From the beginning of his government, General Desiderio Arias--whose faction then controlled a good portion of the country in the Northwest and the North--declared rebellion against the government and made an evolving series of impossible demands upon Nouel to try to place his constituents in the most powerful positions of government.¹²⁹

When Nouel resigned in early 1913, U.S. representatives tried to convince him to stay in office, offering him a loan to consolidate his government's power. The U.S. Navy's later official version of his resignation held that he resigned because he "realized" the hopelessness of Dominican government "due to the inability of the professional politicians to accept anything except personal success in the shape of appointments and patronage."¹³⁰ When Nouel resigned, the Dominican Senate found itself unable to agree on a new provisional president, as its members supported three opposing factions (the Jimenistas, the Horacistas, and a new group following Federico Velásquez). They settled instead on Senator José Bordas Valdez, who took office in April of 1913 with the task of setting up elections. Bordas quickly demonstrated his desire to maintain himself in power, however, and began to put into place a system by which he could gain support in the country's diverse regions through regional military governors. He appointed Arias Special Delegate to the government in the Cibao, giving him control of the North and its railroads, and appointed General Luis Felipe Vidal as Special Delegate in the Southwest. When the Horacistas rose up in revolt against his provisional government, U.S. representatives stepped in. They informed the Horacistas that a government brought to power through revolution would receive no recognition from the U.S. government, and therefore no customs revenue, and

¹²⁹ United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1913), 419-422; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 308.

¹³⁰ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 92.

promised free elections.¹³¹ Bordas, enjoying the military support of Arias and the diplomatic and economic backing of the United States, carried out clearly fraudulent elections; popular rejection of this fraud on all sides stalled the election, which was delayed.¹³²

U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's election in 1912, and his presidency beginning in 1913, only increased U.S. interventionism. Wilson believed firmly in the maintenance and expansion of U.S. influence overseas, and the ability of U.S. forces to help bring U.S.-style democracy to other countries. He therefore gave wide powers of intervention and involvement to the naval authorities in the Caribbean. Wilson also named the controversial and widely disliked James Sullivan as U.S. foreign minister to the Dominican Republic in 1913. Wilson's increasing concerns about war developing in Europe, and about German expansion into the Americas, caused his decisions regarding the Dominican Republic to be made with an eye to U.S. military security and economic interests; to this end, his representative Sullivan was given extremely wide powers within the Dominican Republic. Sullivan proved to be corrupt and opportunistic, and to have little respect for Dominicans, a situation that augmented the rising tensions between Dominicans and U.S. investors. Further, Dominican politics were by now complicated by the extent of U.S. interventions, as all factions and groups within the country made decisions based on expectations of U.S. involvement. David Healy describes a similar pattern with U.S. intervention in Cuban politics; in 1906, when Liberals struggled against Estrada Palma's administration there, both sides of the conflict knew that any action would cause some form of intervention. Politics became a guessing game, Liberals causing uprisings to bring intervention because they thought it would bring U.S. forces guaranteeing free elections, and

¹³¹ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 309-311; Domínguez, *Historia Dominicana*, 183.

¹³² Because of the financial crisis brought about by the civil war during 1912, and the bankruptcy of the treasury, the U.S. State Department advanced customs money to Bordas and provided him with the loan that they had promised to Nouel earlier. Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 310-311.

Estrada Palma causing chaos because he thought U.S. forces would help maintain him in power as the constitutionally elected governmental head.¹³³ As in Cuba, Dominican political decisions had become part of a guessing game, with the potential U.S. response always at issue.

The guessing game about U.S. possible actions was complicated, too, by the rapid evolution of U.S. motivations during these years. This was especially true for the motives of the U.S. navy. With expansion of U.S. interests abroad, the navy developed a system of advance bases to protect interests in foreign locations through use of trained marines. The USMC Advance Base School was established in Philadelphia in July of 1912, and in 1914 Admiral Colby N. Chester declared that policy requirements compelled the United States to supervise circum-Caribbean nations.¹³⁴ Later in the same year, Marine Corps Commandant George Barnett, who had been the brigade commander of five foreign expeditions that included Cuba, issued a memorandum regarding the growing need for advance bases both permanent and temporary, for defense of widespread U.S. interests.¹³⁵ Barnett later admitted that one of the most pressing reasons for the development of advance bases was that they afforded the marines a way to give their officers "tropical" experience.¹³⁶ As war in Europe unfolded, and the U.S. Navy played a growing role in operations in the Atlantic, officers became more and more interested in developing advance bases and finding foreign training locations for officers and men.¹³⁷ President Taft, meanwhile, had used limited military force to achieve national goals, and

¹³³ Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, 128-130. See also: Allan Millett, *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909*, (Columbus, 1968).

¹³⁴ Pérez, "Intervention," 167.

¹³⁵ Memorandum dated 8 December, 1914, "Barnett, George, GEN USMC (DEC)," Biographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

¹³⁶ Letter from Barnett to Joseph Pendleton, dated 30 April 1917, "Pendleton Papers," Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

¹³⁷ Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Tunbladh, *Hold High the Torch: A History of the 4th Marines*, (Washington D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 1960), 10.

the Marine Corps conducted more and more foreign landings through the course of his presidency, often as demonstrations of force.¹³⁸

While the navy and marines were expanding advance bases and foreign experience, U.S. support was vital to maintaining Bordas in power in the Dominican Republic for a brief period as provisional president. The U.S. State Department's financial aid to Bordas and its refusal to recognize any revolution allowed Bordas to remain in power until his term as provisional president was set to expire in July of 1914, by which time new elections were to have decided the next president. In exchange for the money it advanced his government, however, the Receivership insisted that Bordas agree to the appointment of a U.S. "financial expert" to supervise government spending.¹³⁹ The Dominican Congress refused to accept this expert.¹⁴⁰

In addition to the imposed financial expert, the State Department demanded the placement of a U.S. official in the position of Director of Public Works, paid by the Dominican government but not liable to dismissal by it.¹⁴¹ Finally, Wilson's administration demanded in the infamous "Nota Número 14" that the Dominican government give U.S. forces complete control of the Dominican military. In official letters, inter-governmental communications, and the press, Dominicans argued that U.S. intervention would lead to a U.S. take-over of their country, that--despite claims to the contrary from Presidents Roosevelt to Wilson--the real aim behind U.S. interference was to gain territory for naval bases and to augment the territorial size of a growing empire. By 1915, they pointed to instances of racism in the United States, and violence in U.S. interventions in Mexico, Cuba, and Haiti, to argue that increased U.S. control would lead to the

¹³⁸ Condit and Tunbladh, *Hold High the Torch*, 1.

¹³⁹ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 310-311.

¹⁴⁰ United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1914), 221-228; Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 310-311; Marvin A. Soloman, "Law, Order, and Justice in the Dominican Republic During the United States Military Government—1916 to 1924," Master's thesis, Southern Illinois University, 1969, fn 52, 15.

¹⁴¹ Secretary of State Bryan to Walter Vick, Receiver General of Customs, quoted in the *New York Times*, 15 January 1915, page 6; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 6.

collapse of Dominican sovereignty and subjugate the Dominican population under the hands of racist oppressors. Those such as Archbishop Nouel who tried to mediate U.S. demands with popular pressure against them were ousted from government or resigned in frustration. U.S. representatives added pressure to the demand that Dominicans accept a U.S.-controlled military-- a demand that Dominicans in both government and press vehemently refused, as a sovereign nation, to accept.

The constant tension between U.S. and widely divergent Dominican goals during these months brought the country deeper into severe crisis; the receivership demanded reforms of Bordas, and threatened to cut off customs funds if he did not accept the reforms.¹⁴² The internal conflict in the country became so extensive that those regional leaders Bordas had placed in power increasingly revolted against his government. U.S. Navy forces moved to the locations of rebellions to "protect the lives and property of Americans, and others as circumstances may require," and to inform rebelling governors that their actions would not be tolerated by U.S. forces.¹⁴³ The state of the country in June was such that elections still could not be held. When Bordas's term expired in June of 1914, therefore, the country was left without a president, but fighting continued. After the expiration of his term, on 24 June, Bordas even sent the Dominican navy to bomb the city of Azua in response to the rebellion of General Vidal in Azua province in the Southwest.¹⁴⁴

Intense fighting throughout the country in July convinced the U.S. State Department that U.S. forces should intervene again, forcing the contenders to agree on a truce with new mediation commission from Washington and a truce proposal drawn up by President Woodrow

¹⁴² Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 6.

¹⁴³ United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1913), 425.

¹⁴⁴ Undated correspondence, 1914, "Correspondencia," 1912-1921, Relaciones Exteriores Dep. 07, I.T. 007952, AGN. The bombing occurred on 24 June, after Bordas's official term as president had expired.

Wilson; the commission came with the threat of intervention by U.S. Marines from Guantánamo “to protect U.S. interests” if the truce was not accepted.¹⁴⁵ The new U.S. Minister James Sullivan and U.S. navy commanders worked in the country to call for an armistice and then organize elections for a new provisional president, who was in power until December of 1914.¹⁴⁶ But controversy rose widely, too, around Minister Sullivan, who worked most closely with institutions representing U.S. financial interests in the country and increased anti-U.S. sentiment.¹⁴⁷ Dominican newspapers through the second half of 1914 and into responded widely to both bullying and corruption by many U.S. representatives, calling on patriots to fight against the incursion of colonialism that U.S. demands indicated. One author published an open letter to Sullivan explaining that the population of the cities was in an uproar because the peaceful and orderly elections Sullivan had arranged may well have been peaceful, but were not legal.¹⁴⁸ In late 1914, reporters for *El Radical* published growing numbers of accounts of demands made by U.S. representatives to cede control of Dominican institutions, from finances to communications. Professor Moises García Mella of the National University in Santo Domingo later pointed out, too, that Sullivan's interventions in the revolutionary activity of 1914 were against a number of Dominican laws, and were only accepted by force and at the threat of invasion; Báez was only president as an imposition by U.S. representatives.¹⁴⁹

When elections were finally held in October of 1914, Jimenes won, and took office in December. His election did not unite the country. It could not, in part because of rivalries formed by regionalism and in part because of consistent and unpopular attempts at imposition by

¹⁴⁵ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 311.

¹⁴⁶ Rippey, *The Caribbean Danger Zone*, 195-196; Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 312.

¹⁴⁷ David Healy also outlines Sullivan's ties to the national bank, and the resulting conflict. *Drive to Hegemony*, 244-245.

¹⁴⁸ Emilio Morel, "Al Honorable Sullivan," *El Radical*, 27 Dec. 1913, pg. 2-3.

¹⁴⁹ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1055.

U.S. representatives. His Congress was divided, and consisted of many supporters of Arias, which led Jimenes to appoint Arias Secretary of War.¹⁵⁰ While the U.S. Minister immediately began making demands on Jimenes, Arias worked over time to consolidate his power throughout the provinces, writing letters to his many constituents in preparation for any potential eventual conflict. Arias's wording is sometimes vague, but over time becomes more direct, as he writes to citizens and military officials throughout the provinces about the need to improve government and economy and consolidate and build patriotism against foreign and internal threats to order.¹⁵¹ U.S. demands on Jimenes began with the State Department's insistence that he formally approve the demands of Nota Número 14 that the Dominican Congress had rejected earlier in 1914. Jimenes again submitted the issues to the Congress, where they were again rejected. The State Department then imposed a comptroller by force, issuing him control of the signing of all checks to the Dominican government and for the payment of public expenditures, and made further demands for control of the armed forces.¹⁵² The tone of news headlines became bolder and more concerned, and the country's leading newspapers printed such front-page headlines as "U.S. Threatens on All Sides."¹⁵³ Newspapers were resurrected or brought into print specifically to address the issue of U.S. intervention and to allow the public to follow its developments. Most prominent among these were *La Bandera Libre* and *El Radical*, which published updates and protest articles throughout 1915-1916, especially drawing attention to the corruption of U.S. foreign minister Russell and closely watching any suggestions of Dominican government compliance with U.S. demands.

¹⁵⁰ Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 312-313.

¹⁵¹ Communications of Secretary of War Desiderio Arias, "Correspondencia" 1915, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 004539, AGN.

¹⁵² Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 313.

¹⁵³ Adriano Miguel Tejada, *100 Años de Historia*, (Santo Domingo: Corripio, 1999), 33-37. Dominican Press Secretary Tejada's work is a compilation of newspaper articles from two of the most widely read Dominican newspapers in the twentieth century; some of these early editions, photocopied in his work, are now lost to the Dominican archives due to aging.

Through 1915, the U.S. State Department increased its demands, insisting on increased power for the financial advisor and eventually even demanding that Jimenes agree to a U.S. disbanding of all Dominican armed forces and creation of a U.S.-controlled constabulary in the country. Jimenes, of course, could not accede to these demands; even the imposition of the comptroller had led many to begin movements in 1915 toward impeaching him, and Arias and his followers to begin making secretive plans to begin a rebellion against the government.¹⁵⁴ In the East, local generals of importance also rose up against the government.¹⁵⁵ As rebellion and open conflict increased, Arias revolted against the government, with the support of many of the army's forces in the capital. U.S. Marines offered assistance to Jimenes, who stated that he would accept arms and munitions but could not accept the landing of marines or any other force that would fire on Santo Domingo.¹⁵⁶ When officers insisted on landing marines anyway, Jimenes resigned the presidency and marines invaded and occupied the country, first from the capital, and soon after from the northern port cities.

U.S. Minister Russell, recognizing the secretaries of state as an extension of the Jimenes government, declared the country without a government. A commission of Dominican political representatives from the Cibao came to the Marine-occupied capital to request the chance to elect a president. After their meeting with U.S. representatives under U.S. Navy Admiral William B. Caperton, it was agreed that the legislative bodies--who had not resigned--could elect a provisional president. They quickly elected Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, who would head

¹⁵⁴ Communications of Secretary of War Desiderio Arias, "Correspondencia" 1915, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 004539, AGN; Memo to President Jimenes from A. González, Captain, Jefe de Zona, dated 12 May 1915, Box 179, 1912-1933, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 008769, AGN.

¹⁵⁵ Gregorio Urbano Gilbert, *Mi Lucha Contra el Invasor Yanqui de 1916*, (Santo Domingo: Editora de la UASD, 1975), 34-35. These generals would continue to carry out guerrilla war against the government during the U.S. invasion and into the years of occupation, first against Jimenes, and then against the U.S. military government. Among them were Vicentico Evangelista, Salustiano Goicoechea.

¹⁵⁶ Otto Schoenrich, "The Present American Intervention in Santo Domingo and Haiti," *The Journal of International Relations*, 11:1 (Jul., 1920), 46.

the provisional government for six months.¹⁵⁷ Minister Russell and Admiral Caperton, however, had insisted on the right to approve the elected candidate before extending recognition. Soon after Henríquez y Carvajal's election, when the new president would not accept the demands set forth in Nota Número 14, U.S. representatives refused to extend recognition to his government and began withholding customs revenue.¹⁵⁸ Unable to pay the army without treasury funds, the president discharged unit after unit, and unpaid provisional governors began to take possession of the belongings of local *comandancias* so as to liquidate them to cover their own pay; some also paid their men, while others disbanded their militaries during the months that marines moved inland from north and south.¹⁵⁹ The invasion, and armed resistances it met in Puerto Plata and through the interior, solidified the interest of U.S. Navy officials in long-term occupation of the country. In marine reports, Dominicans were "enemies."¹⁶⁰ Any illusion that marines might, as promised, move in as friendly occupying forces were quickly erased as local populations clashed with marines in a number of violent battles throughout the country.¹⁶¹ On 26 November, U.S. president Wilson reluctantly accepted the calls of his military for a formalized military intervention to bring an end to the situation.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1057.

¹⁵⁸ Domínguez, *Historia Dominicana*, 199.

¹⁵⁹ Resolution dated 12 September, 1916, "Resoluciones, 1916," Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 004606, AGN.

¹⁶⁰ Communications and reports, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," File 1916, "Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

¹⁶¹ Reports of 24-27 October, 1916 regarding clash in Villa Duarte, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," File 1916, Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Printout of Marine radio message from La Vega, 30 November 1916 from Arthur Marix, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," File 1916, Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico. Report of Operations, 1 December 1916, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," File 1916, Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1974), 24.

¹⁶² United States Department of State, *FRUS*, (1916), 240-242. Wilson's letter is copied on page 242.

Conclusion

U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic followed a distinct trajectory in which U.S. government and navy planners increasingly argued that more U.S. control would be beneficial to all involved parties. The United States, heavily involved and concerned with the rise of European war, gradually turned control of the Caribbean situation over to the Secretary of the navy, whose officers had the goals of the navy in mind. Many U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic in the years leading up to November of 1916, therefore, were more informed by U.S. military than U.S. government or economic interests. The Dominican Republic, meanwhile, already struggled in these decades to find its place in the world economy while successive governments worked to define the country's future. For government after government, the two apparent forces that might have the power to save political leaders and their plans for modernity seemed to be foreign investment and a strong military; in the end, both turned out to be the downfall of Dominican sovereignty, largely due to the confluence of the Dominican path with that of the U.S. navy. Dominican regionalism, persistent despite Cáceres's reforms, quickly resurfaced with his assassination and subsequent heavy U.S. intervention.

Any hope of containing regional dissent and salvaging Cáceres's political and centralizing gains, many of which focused heavily around the military, were lost to the combination of U.S. interference and growing anti-U.S. sentiment in the country. Disgusted with a years-long inability to "fix" the Dominican situation, and desirous of guaranteeing firm control and advantage in the Caribbean during World War One, the U.S. navy became more and more interested in simply controlling the situation--through military force, if need be. U.S. military leaders and planners, inspired in large part by racism and a belief in the superiority of American institutions, but also by an organized military ethos, believed that if only given the power to do

so they could step in and right all of the country's problems. By 1915, when the takeover of Haiti and other countries seemed more productive and efficient for U.S. causes than diplomacy had been, they simply intended to do the same with the Dominican Republic. By that time, the only options open to Dominican government officials--who were unable to balance Dominican popular opinion with U.S. demands and thus helpless to maintain themselves in office--were to sign over sovereignty or watch it vanish anyway. Precedent told them that the U.S. government would wait until it had some agreement, but no Dominican government would or could agree to U.S. control of a Dominican military. Precedent also told them that international law was on their side as long as they did not sign an agreement. While Dominican statesmen struggled to salvage their state and resist U.S. advances, however, the U.S. forces became ever more determined, an explosive combination of motivations that guaranteed a continuing degradation of an already fragmented political and military system.

The deterioration of the Dominican military and the increase in the U.S. military presence and interventions in the country, from the assassination of Cáceres to the formal U.S. military occupation that began in late November of 1916, was critical in the development of both countries as well as their relations with each other. For the Dominican Republic, it was not only a time of destructive civil war, but was also the culmination of a time of rapid change and movement in the country. From the growth and expansion of sugar plantations to the increase of foreign capital investment in the previous decade, and from the changes initiated by President Cáceres, the country was both stepping and being pushed into a new era. What it would look like upon stepping out the other side was a mystery. Various groups and individuals vied to become part of the decision-making process that would shape the country, some fighting for a return to a Dominican society that was passing, and others hoping to use the atmosphere of

change and development to "modernize" the country based on their varying definitions of modernization.

The U.S. presence, in the frequent involvement of U.S. navy and marine personnel and in the person of Minister Sullivan, both perpetuated and worsened the Dominican civil war and military deterioration from 1911 to 1916. The types of actions taken and demands made by multiple U.S. forces guaranteed continuing and worsening conflict between the different camps in the war, and gave repeated justifications for war to Dominican generals either anti-imperialist or opportunistic enough to use them. During this time, those Dominicans such as Archbishop Nouel who worked to balance U.S. demands with Dominican needs were unable to allay Dominican fears of a foreign takeover while still meeting unrealistic U.S. requests. Presidents Taft and then Wilson tended to receive partial reports of the events in the Dominican Republic, and at first generally worked to stave off a full military intervention. U.S. investors, however, often argued that U.S. military control would be preferred to Dominican sovereignty, and U.S. Naval planners had their eyes on control of Dominican territory, a goal that would only be realized if conditions in the country deteriorated to a point justifying a military occupation. Naval control of the island, they argued, would provide an important base for U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean, strategic coaling stations, and tropical experience for their men. Furthermore, Secretary of Navy Josephus Daniels was eager to carry out an experiment in governing foreign countries, to demonstrate that with a sufficient amount of autonomy the navy could establish "quiet, stabilizing conditions" in areas of interest to the United States.¹⁶³

Intervention increased anti-U.S. and anti-imperialist sentiment among many sectors of the Dominican population. It then increased reactionary elements, and led to a politics that pitted

¹⁶³ C.C. Baughman, "United States Occupation of the Dominican Republic," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 51:12 (December, 1925), 2306.

those who would obtain power by gaining U.S. support (at the expense of popular Dominican support) against those who would obtain power by emphasizing nationalism and playing on anti-U.S. sentiments. The chapter follows this power-play as it unfolded in a Dominican political arena dominated by a periodically deteriorating military. The assassination of Cáceres, itself, provides a window into both the state of the Dominican military and the partisan and regional conflicts that affected the country. Even before the assassination, and especially after it, the increases in U.S. intervention were highly influential in Dominican politics. The widespread anti-U.S. sentiment and anti-imperialism described in chapter One played a decisive role in the politics during this time. It could not have been otherwise. On the Dominican side, as elsewhere in the Caribbean, the expectation of U.S. intervention by all actors affected decision-making and outcomes, whether generals and politicians intentionally worked to bring about such intervention or whether they made decisions specifically attempting to avoid it.¹⁶⁴ This trend only grew as U.S. intervention became more common and comprehensive. During this period, as Louis Pérez Jr. describes it, the U.S. outlook changed, so that "what was at one time the defense of the region as a means of hegemony became hegemony as a means of defending the region."¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ This was a common problem in the politics of Caribbean countries during this period of growing U.S. interventionism; no political or social plans could be made without reference to how U.S. government, military, or investors might react. For examples, see Yerxa, *Admirals and Empire*, 32; Lester Langley, *The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century*, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1982), 90-91.

¹⁶⁵ Pérez Jr., "Intervention," 169.

Chapter THREE

Threads of Power, Fraying Ends: The Occupation Constabulary, 1916-1918

The U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic officially began on 29 November 1916, when U.S. Navy Captain Harry S. Knapp read out his proclamation. He stated that the occupying forces would take control of the Dominican government and create a new Dominican military to ensure domestic tranquility. The proclamation spelled out the terms of an unprecedented full military occupation of a foreign country that was not at war with the United States, and whose government had signed no treaties or agreements allowing the occupation. Unlike in the Philippines, where a treaty from a formerly controlling colonial power ceded the U.S. right to rule, or countries such as Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua, which were occupied after U.S. forces pressured treaty agreements, this occupation had no international legal basis and retained no native puppet government. It was, instead, a full military occupation of Dominican government and armed forces imposed unilaterally by the United States and not recognized throughout the international community.¹ Having also taken place during a time of expansive growth in U.S. naval power, the Dominican occupation provides key insight into the development of U.S. policies of expansion and foreign occupation--the then-new Wilsonian idea of exporting democracy to foreign countries to promote "peace and stability" throughout regions bordering the United States. In 1916, exportation of democracy was not much more than an idea, especially among the branches of the U.S. military: the Navy and Marine forces in charge

¹ In December of 1916, despite U.S. denouncement of the constitutionally elected government of *Henríquez y Carvajal*, Colombia, Denmark, and Switzerland recognized the Dominican government; in January, their recognition was followed by that of the governments of Argentina, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay. See Marvin A. Soloman, "Law, Order, and Justice in the Dominican Republic During the United States Military Government—1916 to 1924," Master's thesis, Southern Illinois University, 1969, 57. Also in January of 1917, German Chancellor von Bethmann Holweg was still addressing diplomatic letters to the constitutional government, rather than that put in place by the U.S. Navy. *Gaceta Oficial*, No. 2767, 6 January 1917. As late as March of 1917, one of the leading newspapers in Buenos Aires, *La Razón*, published a protest of the U.S. government's actions in Santo Domingo. See also: Soloman, "Law, Order, and Justice," 57.

of the 1916 intervention had only U.S. Army field notes and the U.S. Army "manual of interior guard duty" from which to draw,² and most lacked relevant training and experience. The occupation that began in 1916 was to be an "experiment" in the exporting of U.S.-style democracy by use of military force.

In this period of U.S. naval and economic expansion, military and government planners were exploring methods to ensure markets, political stability, and friendly relations with neighboring countries. The preferred method in 1916 was to gain as much control of relevant foreign countries as possible through diplomatic representatives placed in positions of authority in those countries. Those diplomats were to encourage restructuring of the countries' governments and militaries to more closely resemble those of the United States. When diplomatic channels failed to achieve the desired result, military force would take their place.³ The latter method centered on the creation of new, professional, and apolitical native militaries patterned after the U.S. Marine Corps. As proposed vehicles of democracy, these native militaries were to be purely volunteer forces. Planners called them constabularies, stressing their roles as peacekeeping forces in regions the U.S. government and military saw as plagued by

²Memo from Major General Commandant Barnett to commanding officer of the 2nd Provisional Brigade Joseph H. Pendleton, 2 December 1916, File 3615, Box 1, Biographical File: Thomas E. Watson, USMC Archives and Special collections, Quantico. See also: Bernardo Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas norteamericanas*, (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1992); Vega points out that plans for the creation of the constabulary in the Dominican Republic referenced Army experiences as precedents--the Guardia Filipina, the Guardia Rural Cubana, and the Policía Insular Puertorriqueña.

³ In the last few decades, this topic has been treated considerably in many anthologies of historical, political science, and anthropological works. In history, Peter Smith's 1996 *Talons of the Eagle* provides a succinct introduction to these policies in the twentieth century primarily from the U.S. perspective, while David Healy's 1988 *Drive to Hegemony* analyzes the Caribbean aspect of U.S. expansion. Greg Grandin's 2006 history, *Empire's Workshop*, explores the ways in which Latin American countries were used as a laboratory for U.S. expansionist policies, and how those early policies affected the development of later U.S. policies toward Latin America, while Gilbert Joseph and others have put forth analyses and interpretations of the cultural aspects of this trend. In political science, many scholars have published aspects of debate about both the successes and failures of attempts to export democracy and about the primary goals of U.S. intervention; for representations of the most widely published debates, see Walter LaFeber, Abraham Lowenthal, and Lester Langley. Anthropologists such as Arlene Torres and Norman Whitten have recently published works exploring the development of identity politics stemming from these international and transnational encounters.

chronic disorder and political instability. As in the contemporary occupations of Nicaragua (1912-1933) and Haiti (1915-1934), one of the primary goals of the occupation in the Dominican Republic was the replacement of all armed forces with such a peace-keeping constabulary. Because the United States had by 1916 overextended its resources, because the occupation coincided with World War One, and because of unexpected levels of Dominican resistance, the new Dominican constabulary was not created right away as had been planned. When it was, contemporarily with U.S. entry into the war in Europe in April 1917, the military government lacked manpower and resources for training, arms, and even basic provisions.

Dominican memoirs and writings from the time also allow the analysis of what this early occupation meant to the inhabitants of the occupied country, how they cooperated, resisted, and renegotiated identities to cope with the overwhelming foreign presence on sovereign national territory. Dominican resistance to the occupation was widespread, and grew extensively during occupation years. Not limited by class, gender, or region, it found adherents throughout all segments of the Dominican population, and grew rapidly in the first two years. The new constabulary was an axis around which many of the early failures of the occupation centered. This was true in large part because occupation forces heavily prioritized the constabulary and planned to use it as a measurement of occupation success. They argued that the cooperation of a force of armed Dominicans would increase support for their goals. The new, U.S.-officered Dominican constabulary was also central to occupation failures because it became one of the occupation impositions against which Dominicans reacted most strongly. So negative was the Dominican experience with the constabulary during the early years of the occupation that it quickly became one of the strongest points of Dominican resistance. In many ways, the successes and failures of the eight-year occupation of the Dominican Republic were decided in

the first two years. The 1916-1918 period was a tense historical moment, one during which occupying forces would only gain cooperation from Dominicans by seeking to disprove Dominican conceptions of U.S. forces as violent, racist occupiers seeking territory and monetary gain. The confusion and disorder of the first two years were unable to prove any such thing, and in fact seemed to prove to many Dominicans that their preconceptions had been correct.

The creation of the constabulary was first delayed for over four months. When it was finally created, enlistment was low and desertion rates were high, problems that continued to plague planners; most Dominicans were unwilling to enlist in the foreign-officered military despite the promise of stable pay, forcing recruiting marines to continually lower recruitment standards. Occupation forces' lack of consistent resources and manpower also meant that promised training programs were not initiated, a situation that combined with general resistance to make the constabulary a mercenary force of Dominicans who were often illiterate, lower-class, unhealthy, or previous criminals, whose power was backed by the force of the marines. The high level of tension at the beginning of this “experiment” magnified the intensity of dissatisfaction among both Dominicans and occupiers, both of whom came to see the failures of the new military as central. To Dominicans, it was a sign that promises of reform had been lies and, for many, proof that the United States meant to colonize the country for its own benefit. To those who made up the occupying forces, the failures in the military were a powerful source of frustration in an already frustrating situation. This set of circumstances produced growing tension between Dominicans and occupiers that changed occupation priorities, increased resistance, and seemed to guarantee the failure of occupation efforts to build a new, respectable Dominican military. The historical record of the early part of this occupation provides a glimpse of the experiences of Dominicans who encountered the constabulary, an encounter that occurred

at many levels of Dominican society. Extensive military records, as well as the writings of many Dominicans who wrote in protest of the occupation, left behind detailed traces of those encounters to alert the world to what was being done in the Caribbean. The hopes and frustrations of government and military planners, both U.S. and Dominican, permeate the records from those early years, and the experiences of individual marines and individual Dominicans in their encounters open wide a window onto a relevant historical situation that has been lost in what Michael Taussig calls the “politics of epistemic murk.”⁴

This chapter traces the early development of the constabulary, a period of military evolution that provides a central insight into the process and growth of an imperial project yet in its infancy. Its story is one of dialogue between the theoretical expectations of an occupying force and the creative negotiation of an occupied people who largely rejected U.S. impositions. Outlining the goals set by occupying forces in creating the constabulary, I examine the theoretical underpinnings of its organization, and how individual Dominicans and U.S. forces shaped its character in its first two years. This chapter situates the early occupation within the contemporary growth of military theory of exporting democracy, examining U.S. attempts to create a native, volunteer constabulary as the central goal in the promotion of U.S.-defined stability. The application of this developing theory, as the situation unfolded, forms the major content of this chapter. Even in the highly structured confines of the military arena, occupation did not equal control. Dominican response and management of occupation structures and relations on the one hand, and lack of clear definition or consistent support in the military government on the other, forced the planned constabulary to be much more versatile and adaptable than its proponents had expected, resulting, by late 1918, in its revision. The result of

⁴ Michael Taussig, *Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing*, (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1987), xiii.

the revision, and the changed constabulary that was formed at the end of 1918, only somewhat resembled the force planned by occupiers in 1916. It also significantly resembled military forces planned and created by Dominicans in years before the occupation, and incorporated Dominican military laws and traditions from as far back as the late nineteenth century. In other words, despite the original expectation of occupation planners that they could create and impose a native constabulary whose ideals and structure were an implantation from the United States, the exigencies of the situation and the reality of context meant that constabulary had to become a blend of Dominican and U.S. military traditions and goals. In an analysis of how and why priorities were later so drastically revised, I follow the constabulary's actual development over time, and its interplay with the civilian portion of the Dominican population from its foundation to the fundamental restructuring in December, 1918, at the end of two years of occupation. The first years of occupation set precedents of violence, resistance, and tension that the later years could not overcome, even when tactics and governing approaches were radically revised. Anti-U.S. sentiment grew, and tensions between Dominicans and occupiers became so strong that many could not be overcome without an end to the occupation.

In Theory

The beginnings of the occupation and the early failures of occupation goals, and the ways in which Dominicans negotiated the experience, provide a concrete historical example demonstrating the problems and difficulties of the U.S. intention to militarily export democracy in those early years. A question that remains prominent in the literature today is whether military interventions and occupations can successfully bring U.S.-style democratic government

to foreign countries, countries that have histories and cultures different from those under which U.S. democracy developed. Specific historical examples provide a vehicle by which scholars can examine the causes and results of successes and failures in such attempts. The first two years of the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic demonstrate the gap between reality and contemporary U.S. theories of nation-building and the exportation of democracy. This occupation began when those theories were still in early development, when economic and naval expansion were unprecedented in growth and the Navy was under pressure to develop quickly due to the unfolding of World War One in Europe and the Atlantic. By the time of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1916, the Caribbean had become a central focus of U.S. foreign policy and concern: not only did naval and government planners stress the need for forward bases and fueling stations for their forces, but they feared that regional political instability and German expansion would combine to allow Germany a naval foothold into lands situated in U.S. coastal waters and much too near the Panama Canal for comfort.

This set of concerns escalated after 1914 when war became a reality in Europe. The European war augmented U.S. interest in naval expansion that had begun in the 1890s, and sped the growth of that expansion throughout the Caribbean. The period also saw significant change in the roles of the U.S. service branches. By 1914, the role of the U.S. Marine Corps had undergone drastic change in its relations both to the Navy and to the State Department. Developments in technology and changes in U.S. foreign policy in the preceding decades had gradually erased the earlier amphibious assault role of marines in sea battles. By 1914, the marines' primary role was that of colonial infantry, focusing on the seizing and control of forward bases and on expeditionary duty in foreign countries.⁵ This role was new. In this early

⁵ See: Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, (New York: MacMillan, 1980), Introduction and 115-174.

stage of democratization through use of an occupying military, parameters for such duties remained undefined. The shift in roles meant that military actions carried out by the U.S. Army in the earliest stages of this "experiment," such as in the Philippines, would now be realized through the navy and marines. Furthermore, the coincidence of the interventions in this period with World War One meant that the U.S. State Department accorded them a secondary priority as World War One escalated. With an expanding Navy and increasing concerns about national security in the Caribbean, this shift of emphasis to navy and marine occupying forces made sense to policy makers. It led to a confusing struggle for power between departments, however. From the military government's beginning, it was under the charge of three different U.S. governmental departments: the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, and the State Department. This was a major source of confusion and lack of coherence in the administration of the occupation, leading to an intermittent power struggle between the latter two departments that led to the delay of many occupation promises, and was one of the major reasons for the postponement of the new constabulary's creation.⁶

At the time of occupation in 1916, the Marine Corps also lacked a definition or training for this type of operation. Not until decades *after* the occupation of the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) did the Marine Corps develop a unified set of guidelines and definitions for such operations. Finally published in full form in 1940, the *Small Wars Manual* for the first time offered a comprehensive definition of what the Marine Corps termed "Small Wars," and provided instruction in a number of aspects learned from the earlier occupation "experiments."⁷

⁶ For more details about this power struggle, see: Carl Kelsey, "The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 100:189 (1922), 110-202.

⁷ United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, 1. Note, this definition retroactively justified military interventions of the type carried out in the Dominican Republic, with no provocation by the occupied nation. "Small wars," guerrilla warfare, and unconventional warfare became a focus of historical debate and interest only later in the twentieth century, especially in the 1950s.

The term “Small Wars” was, even in 1940, defined as largely indefinable:

The term “Small War” is often a vague name for any one of a great variety of military operations. As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.

The lessons illustrated in the manual are indicative of the results of those early experiments; as they were gleaned from experience in locations such as the Dominican Republic, their emphases provide a broad outline of the most prominent problems the marine units faced in the occupation under analysis. After laying out a definition of “Small Wars,” the manual emphasizes the following aspects of training needed for expeditionary forces: 1) Strategy for such unconventional “wars” and interventions. 2) Sections about psychology and military-civil relationships, or what would later be termed “Civic Action.” 3) Relations with the State Department in such circumstances, the lack of definition for which caused extensive problems during the early years of the Dominican occupation. 4) Organization and logistics, including an overview of the chain of command in such situations--another major point of contention in the Dominican occupation in the years 1916-1918. This occupation was indeed an “experiment,” as professed by many in the navy at the time.⁸

U.S. planners did not intend the occupation to be limited to military experiment, however. The ambition of the new foreign policy as it applied to this specific case can be seen in the words of Military Governor Knapp, who stated in a letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1917 that one of his officers was “carrying on a great experiment in the Dominican

⁸ See, for example, the military analytical work of Marine Lt. Col. Charles J. Miller, who emphasized the experimental aspect of the creation of a constabulary in the Dominican occupation, as “such a force, organized, trained and controlled, had never existed.” “Diplomatic Spurs: Our Experiences in Santo Domingo.” *The Marine Corps Gazette*, 19:2 (May, 1935), 19. See chapter two for a more extensive discussion of U.S. motivations.

Government.”⁹ This was a field test of the plan, consolidated under U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, to guarantee stability in the Caribbean by exporting (read: imposing) U.S. forms of government on the countries that made up the region. Political science studies in recent years offer a frame for debate about the realism and possibility of exporting democracy. The debate centers primarily on whether U.S.-style democracy can be exported to or imposed upon other countries, and--if so--which methods are successful and which are not. Mark Peceny statistically analyzes a large set of U.S. military interventions occurring in the years 1898-1982 to convincingly argue that military interventions have not had a positive impact on democracy. Conversely, Peceny argues that active support for democratic elections often has a strong, positive impact on democratization.¹⁰

Peceny’s conclusions mesh well with an analysis of military intervention and desires to promote democratic government in the Dominican Republic in the early years of the occupation. It was exactly the use of military force, which often discouraged active democratic participation, that would become a problem in later attempts to turn the occupation and Dominican society toward democratic government. Military force, in this historical case, led to disillusionment with the U.S. system, and ultimately led to a three-decade military dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. Because of the challenges of the occupation, the perceived need to increase military control and censor the Dominican press in the first two years re-wrote occupation priorities in ways that discouraged participation and encouraged government by force. This, in turn, led to a result opposite the plans of the occupiers: shortly after withdrawal of occupation forces in 1924, the Dominican military would be the strongest force in Dominican politics.

⁹ Letter dated 5 November, 1917, Biographical Files, “Lane, Rufus H. MGEN USMC,” USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

¹⁰ Peceny, “Forcing them to be Free,” 549-582.

Warp and Weave: Foundations of the new constabulary

To many Dominicans and U.S. planners, the new Dominican constabulary already existed three years before its 1917 inception. Both the constabulary and Dominican protest against it were conceived in theory in 1914. It existed then only as a concept, but as a heavily charged concept, it was a powerful agent in the Dominican history of the years 1914-1917. As discussed in Chapter Two, it began, on the U.S. side, with the unfolding of the experiment to promote U.S.-friendly stability in the region, and on the Dominican side with an increasingly bloody civil war. Through years of growing U.S. involvement in Dominican financial and political affairs leading up to the official occupation, the concept of the constabulary and the resistance to it formed from the time of the publication of Wilson's "Nota Número 14," or the Wilson Plan, in July of 1914. This plan included continued and expanded U.S. control over Dominican administration, but also demanded the disbanding of all Dominican armed forces, to be replaced by a constabulary controlled by an appointee of the U.S. president. When the Dominican government refused, the plan was repeatedly presented, eventually backed by the threat of full occupation.¹¹ Dominican resistance to the idea, and fears about U.S. imperial goals, only increased under such threats to national sovereignty. The U.S. invasion and occupation in 1916 did not improve the Dominican popular impression of U.S. intentions. Occupation forces, entering the country with the belief that only a few "handfuls" of rebels opposed the occupation, encountered a population that heavily protested it. Commanding marine officer Brigadier General J.H. Pendleton wrote in a letter to Marine Corps Major General Commandant as late as 18 December 1916 that ninety-five percent of Dominicans "have wanted just what they are now getting but have been afraid to say

¹¹ Correspondence from General Desiderio Arias to General Enibert Saint Vil Noel and Dr. Rosalvo Bobó of Haiti, August 1915, Guerra y Marina, Deposit 08, I.T. 004539, AGN. See also: Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 311-315; Rippy, *The Caribbean Danger Zone*, 197; Calder, *Impact of Intervention*, 7.

so, fearing the small percentage of politicians and professional disturbers.”¹²

Dominicans throughout the country, however, felt much differently. Historian Bruce Calder sums up, for example, the public “day of mourning” that accompanied the U.S. invasion in the capital city, and the abundance of popular and scholarly publications in protest of the occupation.¹³ The general Dominican lack of cooperation with the occupying government continued. Dominican Cabinet members refused to accept a military governor and continued to uphold constitutionally-elected president Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, and were pushed out of power by the occupying forces. In fewer than two months from Knapp’s proclamation on November 29, occupation forces had disbanded the Dominican Congress by fiat, replaced the Dominican president with a military governor who was a U.S. Navy officer, began to heavily censor the Dominican press, and fought armed resistance with the force of superior weaponry.¹⁴ The difficulties facing both occupying forces and Dominican officials and citizens were extensive, to say the least. The occupiers knew virtually nothing about the Dominican land, people, or society. Despite Knapp’s assurance that Dominican civil courts would remain in place as long as they did not conflict with occupation objectives,¹⁵ few among the occupation forces knew Spanish, and none understood the Dominican justice system (which was based largely on French codes of law). They were critical of, and interfered summarily with, the Dominican court system.¹⁶ This tendency and their encounters with a resisting population led them to increasing use of military provost courts staffed by marine officers and run under navy courts-martial rules.

¹² Letter to USMC Major General Commandant George Barnett. USMC Special Records Division, Quantico, Pendleton Papers.

¹³ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 13. See also: Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 42-43.

¹⁴ Testimonies and communications in: United States, “Senate Inquiry,” 1136-1156; Joaquín Balaguer, *Memorias de un cortesano de la “Era de Trujillo,”* 9th ed. (Santo Domingo: Editor Corripio, 1989), 19.

¹⁵ Captain Harry S. Knapp, “Proclamation of the Military Occupation of Santo Domingo by the United States,” *American Journal of International Law*, 11:2 (April 1917), 95.

¹⁶ Rufus H. Lane, “Civil Government in Santo Domingo in the Early Days of the Military Occupation,” *The Marine Corps Gazette*, 7:2 (June, 1922), 142.

These courts held wide and vaguely defined powers of arrest and detention of suspects, and also enacted "surveillance and espionage" against Dominicans. These marine-run military courts were also the only legal body through which complaints against American military personnel, members of the constabulary, and local officials could be examined.¹⁷ The seeming arbitrariness of the courts' functions, and the mistakes of provost court judges who were usually marine captains or lieutenants and lacked training for the post, led to Dominican charges of illegal conduct.¹⁸

As U.S. navy and marine forces gradually established the occupation government and spread throughout the country, they encountered widespread resistance and lack of cooperation from Dominicans of all classes and segments of society.¹⁹ They found themselves unprepared to deal with the intense anti-U.S. and anti-imperialist sentiment that had by then become a powerful feature of Dominican society. The moment of the proclamation of 29 November 1916 was a telling one: Those Dominicans who had offered some cooperation in the hopes that the military intervention would be temporary were dumbfounded, many withdrawing from cooperation. Those who had attempted to stave off a complete occupation by remaining in government positions for nearly seven months with no pay stayed in office even after the proclamation; they continued working to create a constitutionally viable and sovereign Dominican government, as though in denial of what was going on outside their cabinet offices.²⁰ Dominican diplomats and officials protested widely in Washington and abroad: on 4 December 1916, Dominican Minister

¹⁷ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924*, (Washington D.C.: Marine Corps, 1974), 55. For an examination of the controversy surrounding the Dominican court system and Dominican law, and the use of provost courts, see: Brian Moran, "Prison Reform in the United States Navy and the Dominican Republic: The Military Occupation and Prisons, 1900-1930," PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago, 2000. See also: Otto Schoenrich, *Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), 120.

¹⁸ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 57.

¹⁹ See, for example: Balaguer, *Memorias*, 19.

²⁰ *La Gaceta Oficial*, May-December of 1916; Reports by deposed Dominican President Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal in: United States, "Senate Inquiry," 52-53.

in Washington Armando Pérez Perdomo presented his official protest about the occupation's illegality to the State Department;²¹ on 16 January 1917, Dominican Chargé de Affaires in Cuba Manuel M. Morillo was removed from his post for calling a meeting and publishing a protest against the occupation.²² Then and throughout the occupation, President Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal published and organized extensive resistance abroad. Dominican artists, authors, and newspapers decried the occupation as illegal, some blaming Dominicans for being so disorderly and others blaming the United States for being imperialist, but in wide agreement that Knapp's announcement was a moment of extreme national crisis. Renowned teacher, educational reformer and feminist Ercilia Pepín, for example, went on a speaking tour beginning in January, vehemently denouncing the occupation. In cities throughout the country, as widespread as Santo Domingo, La Vega, and Puerto Plata, audiences received her speech with tumultuous applause. Pepín continued to speak out against the occupation through the rest of its tenure.²³

Dominicans abroad, from those in official positions to those living abroad in Cuba or the United States, wrote tracts decrying the occupation.²⁴ Dominicans throughout the provinces, especially outside of the cities, sabotaged transportation and marine communication networks.²⁵ Despite months of a "pacification campaign" carried out by marines since May of 1916, others revolted militarily in protest to the proclamation.²⁶ Armed resistance in the form of guerrilla

²¹ Joseph Robert Juárez, "United States Withdrawal from Santo Domingo," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 42:2 (May, 1962), 164. Juárez states that "numerous protests by prominent Dominicans followed, but the world was occupied with World War I." In January 1917, Executive Order 20 recalled the Minister's Post.

²² Executive Order 21, Dominican Republic, "Colección de leyes, decretos, y resoluciones emanados de los poderes legislativo y ejecutivo de la República Dominicana tomo 21 (1916-1918), (Santo Domingo: Imprenta del Listín Diario, 1929), section entitled "Colección de órdenes ejecutivas y reglamentos administrativos," 29-30.

²³ Alejandro Paulino Ramos, *Vida y obra de Ercilia Pepín*, (Santo Domingo: Editora Universitaria, 1987), 56, 83. Other Dominican authors and public figures who published immediate written protests include such prominent names as Americo Lugo, Fabio Fiallo, José Narciso Solá, and Federico Henríquez y Carvajal.

²⁴ See, for example, the extensive anti-occupation writings of Cuban Emilio Roig de Leuchsenrig.

²⁵ "Report of Operations" from 2nd Lieutenant Charles A.E. King to "District Commander," 3 December 1916, "Geographical Files," 1916, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

²⁶ Various reports and communications, Files 1916, 1919, 1921, "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

warfare and intermittent sniper fire in the interior was so persistent and strong that the U.S. flag was not raised over the *fortaleza* in Santiago until nearly six months after the arrival of the U.S. invasion force.²⁷ This resistance arose throughout the Republic in the first days and months of the occupation, though most strongly in the interior and the northern city of Puerto Plata. While Dominican civil governors were to be kept in place under the authority of the military government, Governor Lico Pérez of Pacificador Province led an armed revolt upon hearing of Knapp's proclamation, making himself an "outlaw" by the definition of the occupying government.²⁸ In the ensuing conflict, seven marines were wounded and eleven Dominicans killed and six wounded.²⁹ Marine reports in January of 1917 also warn that Emiliano Camarena, the head of the Monte Plata church, should be considered an agitator.³⁰ Even the popular archbishop of Santo Domingo, who had in years previous attempted to mediate between the Dominican population and U.S. officials, soon traveled internationally to protest the occupation.

It was against this background that the occupying forces attempted to set the Wilson Plan's priorities in motion. Primary among these were the disbanding of all Dominican forces, the disarmament of the population, and the creation of a new constabulary to help maintain social order. The creation of the constabulary, occupation officials believed, could not begin until better-trained Marines had been able to disarm the majority of the population and bring about what they defined as social order. It was therefore postponed for the first months of occupation while the occupying forces attempted to consolidate power, both over the government and over

²⁷ Charles H. Noxon, "Santo Domingo, Ward of the Marines," 3.

²⁸ Military Government Executive Order 3; communications, File "Secretaría de Estado de Justicia e Instrucción Pública 1916," Box 64, "Gobierno Militar Americano," (1916-1920), AGN; C.A.E. King, "Report of Operations," 3 December, 1916, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, 1916, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

²⁹ Unsigned and undated report, "Synopsis, Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, 1916, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

³⁰ "Report of Operations" from Captain R.E. Adams to "Commanding Officer, SD," 5 January 1917, file "1917," "Geographical Files," "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

the rest of the population through force.³¹ Many other factors contributed to the difficulties that occupiers faced in gaining Dominican loyalty, and that Dominicans faced in coping with and responding to the occupation. Prominent among these was the prevalence of racism among U.S. officers. Many of the officers staffing the military government in the first months, even those such as Knapp who attempted to include Dominicans in an advisory capacity, approached the issue with an air of superiority.³² In official communications, they commented that Dominicans were childish and naïve, overly violent and emotional, racially inferior, and unable to govern their country without U.S. tutelage--all approaches that were common to the U.S. thinking of the time, and thus to the entire experiment in exporting democracy in those early decades of the twentieth century. The combination of this approach with Dominican resistances led to a repressive occupation force, one that seemed to prove to Dominicans that their suspicions had been correct.

The difficulties and tension of the early months of the occupation were in large part responsible for the population's continued unwillingness to accept the new U.S.-created Dominican constabulary. The postponement of the new constabulary meant a period of pure U.S. military rule through most of the country that lasted until April of 1917. With the long postponement of the constabulary and the disarmament of the population, marines were responsible for even basic policing action throughout the country. This increased tension between occupying forces and Dominican citizens, and also fueled Dominican suspicions that

³¹ See Charles J. Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs: Our Experiences in Santo Domingo," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, 19:3 (August, 1935), 35-55.

³² One traveler and friend of military government administrators even suggested that Dominicans needed fifty years of U.S. tutelage, with an education beginning with the question: "What are the chief faults of Dominicans (of Latin-Americans in general) which it is necessary to correct before they can take their proper place in the modern world?" Harry A. Franck, *Roaming Through the West Indies*, (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1920), 245.

the occupation was a pure military takeover of their country.³³ The buildup of tension during this period led many Dominicans to see the constabulary as a Dominican arm of the oppressive, foreign forces, even months before the constabulary became a physical reality. Among occupiers, the difficulties and resistances facing the military government and marines during this time reinforced their opinion that the only way to bring “order” to the country would be through a wide restructuring of Dominican power structures. U.S. officials staffing the occupation government sought, by early 1917, to restructure Dominican society and government, beginning with a "reorganization" and "stabilization" of the activities of governmental departments and a "general improvement of the country," all by U.S. definition of course. These changes included dismissing respected Dominican elites from cabinet and government positions.³⁴ The controversial changes were to be enforced by Marines and members of the new Dominican constabulary.

One major change envisioned by the occupation government was an ambitious restructuring of social power that would move the old Dominican military elites out of power and gradually replace them by the integration of new Dominicans. Occupiers argued that Dominicans without previous strong loyalties to the government could be more easily trained in marine methods, allowing them to build a new Dominican government that would be more cooperative toward the United States.³⁵ The most likely place to begin restructuring was with the military, one of the sectors of Dominican society that had traditionally held much of the power and influenced decisions in government, and one that occupiers expected to more easily control through structured training. Occupation forces, lacking knowledge about Dominican history and

³³ See Dr. Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, *El Antiimperialismo de don Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal*, (Havana: la Sociedad Cubana de Estudios Históricos e Internacionales, 1959); Teófilo Castro García, *Intervención Yanqui 1916-1924* (Santo Domingo: Editora Taller, 1978).

³⁴ Baughman, "United States Occupation," 2308-2309.

³⁵ Correspondence, "Gobierno Militar, clasificado por años, año 1917," "Gobierno Militar," AGN.

society, worked from conclusions formed through their recent experience with the country. They looked to influential Dominicans such as Minister of War during the civil war, General Desiderio Arias, and made sweeping generalizations about the type of power that was most successful in Dominican society: U.S. planners conceived of Dominican society as one in which simple Dominicans who were incapable of self-government could only be controlled by military force, in which generals who lacked professional military training and sought self-gratification battled, with no overlying structure, for control of a malleable and easily exploitable Dominican population.³⁶ Marine Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Davis, for example, stated that "the Dominican is himself indoctrinated with one thing--respect for FORCE," and that the Dominican "does not want to be patted on the back and told he is an equal. He has had a master his entire life; he recognizes the necessity of a master, and he wants a master."³⁷ As discussed in Chapter Two, occupiers' conception of the old Dominican military was also an extreme oversimplification. Military forces had traditionally held a great deal of influence in Dominican politics, but in complex ways that the occupying forces did not understand. National militaries had tended to be largely ineffectual outside of the area of Santo Domingo; elsewhere, throughout much of the country, civilian government was run by caudillo-style generals and politicians who accepted pay in return for maintaining social order in their provinces. Other armed forces, such as property guards and border guards, answered directly either to landowners or local authorities. It was a complicated and adaptable system, and one that had long served the necessary government functions of an intensely regional country.

With over-simplified assumptions and the argument that Dominican officers and officer-politicians had sought and maintained power with an eye to personal gratification, occupying

³⁶ See Noxon, "Santo Domingo," 3; Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 187; Correspondence, "Gobierno Militar, Clasificado por años, Año 1917," "Gobierno Militar," AGN.

³⁷ Henry C. Davis, "Indoctrination of Latin-American Service," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, 5:2 (June, 1920), 155.

forces saw them as one of the major sources of civil disorder in the Dominican Republic.³⁸

Marine Major Charles F. Williams stated that Dominican officers lack responsibility toward the government, have a "very cloudy idea of discipline and sanity," and have to be supervised by Marine officers "to guard against pillage and possibly murder."³⁹ Occupying forces also held that officers of the previous military owed too much allegiance to individual leaders from the time of the civil war, for which reason one of their first priorities in creating a new military was to weed out old military families and replace them with new recruits.⁴⁰ These new recruits would come from the lower classes and from regions previously un-integrated into the military, those less likely to be loyal to previous elites and military leaders. The integration of remote regions was gradual and slow due to lack of infrastructure and sufficient manpower, however, and the incorporation of lower classes was also problematic. Occupiers' arguments for the need to incorporate the uneducated, lower classes were a clear indicator of their lack of faith in the previous Dominican education or political systems, and that they intended to try to remake aspects of Dominican society by beginning with a clean slate. They did not, however, account for how the lack of education and experience would affect the actions of these recruits, believing as they did that a training program could be set in place, and they did not account for popular reaction to such recruitment. Though occupying forces publicly argued that this incorporation of the lower classes was meant to promote democracy, Dominicans could look to the history of dictator Heureaux and recognize the pattern as one of control. Heureaux had recruited illiterate

³⁸ See, for example, Lane, "Civil Government," 132.

³⁹ Quoted in Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 4; Fuller and Cosmas state that "most of the Dominican officers had risen from the ranks or received their commissions from friendly politicians; veterans of various constabulary organizations, they had learned bush fighting from hard experience but otherwise lacked adequate training." *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47.

⁴⁰ Memo from the Major General Commandant to Chief of Naval Operations, 17 March, 1917, "Guardia Nacional Dominicana," "Santo Domingo," "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

and landless Dominicans, using them to defend the power of wealthy planters.⁴¹ As the years 1917 and 1918 unfolded, educated Dominicans and those who remembered Heureaux's dictatorship could easily make this connection. Largely unaware of that history, occupying forces sought to use this method both for control and to recreate the military force of the Dominican Republic, to buy its loyalty through steady pay. They argued that the Marine-equivalent pay of seventeen U.S. dollars per month would seem a "princely sum to peasants accustomed to working 12 hours a day on a sugar plantation" for twenty-five cents or less per day.⁴² They underestimated the difficulties facing them in such an enterprise.

Although a few of the U.S. navy and marine officers in the Dominican Republic in the early months of the occupation had some minor experience with foreign interventions--in the Philippines, Mexico, or Haiti--most did not, and marine officers governing local populations had neither experience nor training for governing.⁴³ In addition to lacking training and clear goals, they lacked funding, especially for military needs that had not been figured into the occupation's original objectives such as prison administration and guarding. Commander Arthur Marix sent an urgent request for funding to the Military Government in December of 1916. District Commander at an interior post at La Vega, he informed the government that after years of civil war the local prison in the Fortaleza was "worthless as it is absolutely insecure and insanitary [*sic.*] to the extreme, the rooms small and frequently packed from pit to dome with prisoners." He requested \$1,750 for repairs, but was told that there were no public funds for such an improvement. Nearly three months after his request, he was finally sent less than one third of the

⁴¹ Bosch, *Trujillo*, 121-122.

⁴² Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47.

⁴³ Condit and Tunblad, *Hold High the Torch*, 76. See also: Charles J. Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs: Our Experiences in Santo Domingo." *The Marine Corps Gazette*, 19:1 (February, 1935), 43-50; Franck, *Roaming Through the West Indies*, 245.

requested funds.⁴⁴ Such denials for funds or troop increases were common despite the extensive damage and lack of repair to police and military facilities from over five years of civil war. Initial occupation plans included neither budget nor manpower for such needs as local policing and prison-guarding. With the population legally disarmed and all autonomous Dominican forces disbanded, however, such duties had to fall to the marines throughout the country. Without funds or manpower, their ability to carry out these duties was limited, especially in regions of heavier Dominican resistance. The result was that many facilities continued in a poor state, damaging the reputation and efficiency of the occupying forces as well as the authority and capability of the new constabulary when it was created.⁴⁵ This was especially true of prisons and medical facilities. Prisons tended to be poorly ventilated and crowded, damaged, and to lack drainage, and medical facilities lacked supplies until late 1918 and early 1919.⁴⁶

Despite the goal of general disarmament and the disbanding of all Dominican armed forces, the difficulties facing the military government caused them to at first maintain a small remainder of the Guardia Republicana (G.R.) under the command of marines. By the time of Knapp's proclamation, the old G.R. was already a small force. It had been gradually reduced in the years of the civil war and officer pay had decreased over the years. Finally, when 1916 brought severe budget constraints and then the U.S. intervention withholding of all government funds, desertions from the G.R. skyrocketed.⁴⁷ In the last months before Knapp's proclamation, President Henríquez y Carvajal was frantically ordering reports of how many G.R. members and arms remained in the provinces around Santo Domingo, by then the only remaining site of

⁴⁴ Gobierno Militar Americano, Box 119, File "Gobierno Militar Americano Clasificado por Años, 1917," AGN1.

⁴⁵ Lane, "Civil Government," 138.

⁴⁶ Moran describes the conditions of prisons and facilities, and the delays in repair. Moran, "Prison Reform," especially pages 177-182.

⁴⁷ Muster and Pay rolls, Box 179, Files #1-3, years 1912-1916, "Ejército Nacional," 08, I.T. 008769, AGN.

official government military forces.⁴⁸ Upon Knapp's proclamation, the decimated forces fell under the control and direction of the marines. Marines gradually began disbanding the organization, maintaining the most cooperative officers for assistance in civil and armed resistance situations, translations, minor intelligence gathering, and communications with Dominican civil administration. By March of 1917, shortly before the constabulary was formed, the entire force of the G.R. stood at only 178 members.⁴⁹ Many U.S. officers serving in the occupation estimated that the old G.R. had been more a threat than a support to the stability of government. The Marine Corps history of the occupation argues that the G.R. men "had been ragged and untrained, their officers ignorant and corrupt."⁵⁰ Yet in the early months of the occupation, the remaining G.R. members were recorded to have served occupation forces well, aiding in the gathering of intelligence, fighting against resistance, and the disarming of the Dominican population. The marine inspector who oversaw them in those months, Thomas E. Watson, reported a lack of discipline or drill, but that the men were clean and able, and did not complain despite lack of basic provisions such as clothing.⁵¹

At the beginning of April 1917, four months after Knapp's proclamation, occupation forces were still fighting armed resistance and working to set up viable military headquarters from which the Marines could operate in more remote regions of the country. Logistical and administrative problems meant that the constabulary had yet to be formed. The military government still lacked translators, manpower, and cooperation from much of the local Dominican population and civil government. Lieutenant Pimental of the G.R. reported in

⁴⁸ Memos from President Henríquez y Carvajal to the Minister of War, May to July 1916, Government correspondence 1916, Box 22, "Gobierno Militar," AGN1.

⁴⁹ Pay roll, March, 1916, Box 179, File #3, "Ejército Nacional," 08, I.T. 008769. G.R. Pay roll, Box 179, File #3, March 1916, AGN1.

⁵⁰ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 46. See also: Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 56.

⁵¹ Thomas E. Watson, "Report of inspection at Azua and Barahona" to "Chief of Staff," 22 February 1917, Biographical File, Thomas E. Watson. File 3615, Box 1, Archives and Special Collections, USMC, Quantico.

February, for example, that when the G.R. members came to town one *Jefe Comunal* told all of the Dominicans who had arms to hide in the bushes until the soldiers left.⁵² Some local authorities refused to carry out orders of arrest, or hesitated due to conflicting orders between the marine and Dominican authorities.⁵³ Facing such challenges, occupation forces felt that some of the remaining G.R. officers were still vital to the realization of occupation goals, and temporarily retained them in service; the official disbanding of the G.R. would wait until later that year. Even four and five months after the new constabulary was formed in April 1917, a number of G.R. members were still working alongside marines, and distinguishing themselves in fighting armed Dominican resistance.⁵⁴ In the very month that would see the final creation of the constabulary, for example, and in what occupying officers would classify as the “most important of major contacts with bandit forces” for the year, a mixed force of marines and G.R. fought a day-long battle against armed resisters.⁵⁵

In addition to using the G.R. officers to supplement their own military forces, occupiers employed them in intelligence gathering and the recruitment of members of the new constabulary. G.R. officers knew the country and worked as interpreters scribbling pencil translations at the bottoms of communications within the military. They knew the backgrounds of men who might be interested in enlisting in the new constabulary, and of men who were fugitives from the previous government. The continued use of Dominican officers from the

⁵² Thomas E. Watson, "Report of inspection at Azua and Barahona" to "Chief of Staff," 22 February 1917, Biographical File, Thomas E. Watson. File 3615, Box 1, Archives and Special Collections, USMC, Quantico. See also report of lack of cooperation in the east, "Reports requested by Senate Committee Re-Santo Domingo," from District Commander Henry C. Davis, Southern District, to Commanding General, 30 December, 1921. "Dominican Republic," "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

⁵³ Communications, May 1917, "Correspondencia, informes y nóminas," 1917, Guerra y Marina, Dep. 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

⁵⁴ See, for example, "Orden de Campaña No. 3" August, 1917, Box 22, "Año 1924, "Gobierno Militar," AGN1.

⁵⁵ In this battle at Las Canitas, the Dominican forces under resistance leader "Díos" Olivorio sustained "more than 40 casualties," but Olivorio escaped. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., *Soldiers of the Sea*, (Anapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1962), 247. To delegitimize the armed resisters, occupying forces consistently referred to them as "bandits" and argued that they had no organization worth noting.

previous military gave the impression that some of the officer corps might be Dominican.⁵⁶

Gaining the cooperation of these officers by promising them transfer to the future Dominican constabulary, the military government would use them for recruitment and then weed them out of the military once the new force was viable. The occupying forces' employment of G.R. members from the pre-occupation military was, for their purposes, double-edged: On the one hand, it meant that at least some Dominicans briefly remained in the lower-level administration of the occupation; they worked with marines for months and, with the promise that they would be able to remain in the military, were one of the few sources of Dominican cooperation. On the other hand, the ability of these officers to impress Dominicans or improve the reputation of a U.S.-created constabulary was hampered by their willingness to serve with occupation forces in the disarmament and repression of the Dominican population, and because respect for them among Dominicans was already mixed; many remembered the G.R. as an object of repression in the recent past.⁵⁷

Since the Military Government had decided to exclude previous military officers and replace them with a set of new and previously untrained and inexperienced recruits, the question remained of how to push these officers out of the military once the new constabulary was formed. Methods varied, and the process--meant to avoid engendering hostility from these powerful figures in Dominican society--was gradual. The primary method was to retain a small force under the name of the old military while beginning recruitment for the new constabulary in April, 1917; the promise of eventual transfer to the new constabulary was enough to maintain the cooperation of those who wished to continue their military careers. Only when the said transfer came were the officers informed that they would only be able to join the new constabulary at the

⁵⁶ Letters from Col. Buenaventura Cabral to George C. Thorpe, dated May and June of 1917, File: "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

⁵⁷ Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas civiles*, 217.

lowest rank--a pay decrease that most could not afford, and a prestige decrease that most were not willing to accept. There is a note of incredulity in some of the letters of resignation from those men who had been offered the chance to transfer into the new constabulary as privates. One officer in the G.R. wrote to Marine Corps Colonel McKelvey that, although he was a "faithful friend of the military government," he was also the father of a family, and could not afford to enlist in the constabulary as a private.⁵⁸ Others left only curt resignations through the months of May and June as the disbanding of the G.R. was gradually finalized.⁵⁹

One of the more distinguished men in the pre-occupation military, Colonel Buenaventura Cabral, was in a command position as a G.R. officer working with the constabulary until late 1917 and commanding forces fighting resistance alongside the marines.⁶⁰ In late 1917, he was made governor of Azua.⁶¹ Grandson of former Dominican president Buenaventura Báez, Cabral was a long-time member of the Dominican military, a captain at a young age at the beginning of the Heureaux dictatorship (1889-1899) and a commanding officer through the years of the G.R.⁶² Just as occupation forces convinced Cabral to peacefully resign from the military by giving him a governorship, they worked to diplomatically discourage the enlistment of old G.R. members. Many were eventually discharged for "health reasons" or placed in minor political positions. Many, interested in continuing their military careers, protested. Selecting a literate representative among them, a group of such men wrote up and signed a petition protesting their discharge from the military in May of 1917:

⁵⁸ Telegraph letter dated 30 May, 1917 from José Luis Perozo, "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, "Oficios diversos recibidos," Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

⁵⁹ "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, "Oficios diversos recibidos," Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005042, AGN.

⁶⁰ "Orden de Campaña No. 3," August 1917, Box 22, File "Año 1924," "Gobierno Militar," AGN.

⁶¹ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 57. Colonel Buenaventura Cabral would, significantly, be brought back into the military through the constabulary in October of 1922 with General Order No. 35 (1922), upon the beginnings of U.S. withdrawal. Box 5, File "53," "Ejército Nacional," AGN.

⁶² Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 20.

Señor, the undersigned members and agents of the Guardia Republicana. . . Respectfully write to you with the objective of bringing to your attention the fact that we have been disarmed and retired by the new Jefe Comunal, in the moment that he took office, without knowing the reason. . . We have been faithfully compliant in service every time the case has required it of us. Believing that the said power does not have the authority to impoverish us without cause...

With these words, and signed “your subalterns,” they addressed their petition to the military government.⁶³ They addressed the petition directly to G.R. Captain Manuel Batlle, still in a position of some authority in the military government’s intelligence structure, who forwarded it on to the Secretary of War and Marine.

Many of the discharged also sent petitions over the next four months, some writing more than once, that they had not been paid for their last weeks of service to the military government.⁶⁴ Communications within the military government demonstrated the reasoning behind the discharges. One, for example, communicated concern about G.R. officer Captain Manuel Batlle, who had cooperated with occupiers, had been moved from El Seybo Province to the more central location of Santo Domingo, and seemed prepared to move to the new constabulary: “Captain Batlle is one of the Guardia Republicana and is not desired in the new organization.”⁶⁵ The military government held firm to its goal of completely remaking the military from the ground up, and of transplanting a structure based on the Marine Corps, one that would not incorporate elements of Dominican military tradition, and one that would not be compromised by previous Dominican loyalties. The military government also maintained the claim that its purpose there was due to Wilsonian Progressivism and the need to create

⁶³ “Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas,” 1917, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* See also: Thomas E. Watson, “Report of inspection at Azua and Barahona,” to “Chief of Staff,” 22 February 1917, File 3615, Box 1, Biographical File of Thomas E. Watson, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

⁶⁵ Memo, June 8, 1917, Box 22, File: “Año 1924,” “Gobierno Militar,” AGN1.

democracy, and the old military was associated with undemocratic militarism.⁶⁶

Some officers from the old military who served with the marines in early 1917 saw the remaking of the military as an opening, a possibility to see conditions in the military improved, and an enterprise in which they might take part. They wrote letters with suggestions, based on their extensive experience in the Dominican military, to help the military government in its goals to make the new constabulary less corrupt and more efficient. Colonel Cabral wrote to marine Colonel George Thorpe in May suggesting a list of G.R. members who would make good additions to the constabulary.⁶⁷ G.R. Lieutenant Pedro Richardo, who served with the marines in Azua, wrote a three-page plan for the new organization. He states that he had proudly served with the marines to maintain order, that as a Dominican officer he shared the stated interests of occupation forces. Richardo criticized some aspects of the G.R., that it was sometimes infamous among the population for arbitrariness and "innumerable abuses." For the new constabulary to avoid such issues, he argued, it must emphasize the health and training of its members. Training should focus on teaching recruits the Dominican Police Law, reading, writing, arithmetic, hygiene, and "civic and moral instruction." Setting himself and the class of Dominican officers apart among the population as "belonging to honored family," Richardo uses the first person plural in his discussion of building a new military.⁶⁸ His investment in the reform, like that of other officers, was clear. His letter, like others, was politely answered with an emphasis on appreciation for his cooperation, and its suggestions filed and ignored.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 186-187.

⁶⁷ 1 May 1917, "Oficios de la Jefatura de Zona de la Guardia Republicana de Santo Domingo," "Correspondencia, informes y nóminas," 1917, Guerra y Marina, Dep. 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

⁶⁸ Letter from Jefe de Zona in San Francisco de Macorís, 1 May 1917, "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, "Oficios de Jefaturas de Zonas de la Guardia Nacional," Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN. See also communication to General Pendleton from the Lieutenant Jefe de Zona in Samaná, dated 3 May 1917, which demonstrates enthusiastic support for the new constabulary.

⁶⁹ Various correspondence, "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, "Oficios de Jefaturas de Zonas de la Guardia Nacional," May, 1917, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

Some officers of the G.R. thus made up one of the few groups willing to support the military government. Yet, by the end of 1917, they were effectively pushed out of military decision making and most positions of importance, and completely removed from the military. Attempts to balance military control with some pretense of democratic government became increasingly problematic in early 1917, however. With no Dominicans in high office in the government or in officer ranks in the new constabulary, maintaining a pretense of democracy or even strong Dominican involvement was impossible. As occupation forces attempted to understand and reorder the Dominican governmental system while also fighting resistance and working to build infrastructure, the confusion and intermittent reports of corruption in the remaining forces of the old G.R. seemed just another problem. The irony, then, was that while intellectuals, politicians, the upper class, large segments of the lower classes, and much of the middle class (excluding foreign landowners) were resisting the occupation, military government forces alienated the one educated group from which they had consistently received support.

World War One and the Guardia Nacional Dominicana

U.S. entry into World War One on 2 April 1917 had immediate and major effects on Dominican military development. It effectively ended the power struggle between the Navy Department and the State Department, the latter of which, preoccupied with the European war, ceded authority over the situation to the former. This meant that many of the administrative difficulties surrounding the occupation administration and the creation of the constabulary could be set aside. Officers in the Department of the Navy quickly began to consolidate their administrative control and emphasize their own priorities, and to clarify and attempt to realize occupation goals. U.S. entry into World War One also forcefully rearranged priorities, meaning

that the constabulary's creation could no longer be delayed. The constabulary was to serve as one answer to the many challenges of administration that were brought about by the war. Most immediate among those challenges was decreased attention to the occupation from the United States. The State Department was preoccupied with an issue that policymakers prioritized as more important and urgent than its continuing occupations of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti. One of the central motivations for those occupations had, after all, been concerns about European--and especially German--influence and expansion in the Caribbean. This meant the almost immediate withdrawal of more experienced U.S. officers and a decrease of U.S. troops and funds in the Dominican Republic. The few officers who did have some previous experience with foreign occupations were removed, and the marine provisional regiment stationed throughout the Dominican Republic found itself increasingly understaffed.⁷⁰ Marine strength, numbering well over 2,000 personnel at the time of Knapp's proclamation on 29 November 1916, dropped to 1,683 within a month of the U.S. declaration of war.⁷¹ Dominicans and U.S. investors alike protested the removal of experienced troops, knowing that the occupation already stood on precarious ground, and that such a withdrawal of experienced forces would further hinder the military government's ability to cope with its many duties.⁷²

The decrease in marine strength took place concurrently with rising Dominican resistance--resistance that increased in part due to a declaration of war that put the occupied Dominican Republic in an ambiguous foreign relations position. In an attempt to appease Dominican popular opinion, the military governor claimed that the military government was

⁷⁰ Heintz Jr., *Soldiers of the Sea*, 221; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 29.

⁷¹ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 29, 89.

⁷² Files 1917 and 1918, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

neutral in World War One while occupying marine forces were not.⁷³ Dominicans were not appeased; newspaper front-page headings lamented that “La República Dominicana ha entrado sin querer en la Primera Guerra Mundial.”⁷⁴ The attempt also caused further confusion over who should be taking orders from whom. Further, the war affected actions on the ground: marines persecuted Germans throughout the republic, interning them and divesting them of their land.⁷⁵ Rufus Lane described the extensive presence and influence of Germans, and stated that the ignorance among the Dominican population made them highly susceptible to widespread propaganda that he felt Germans must be spreading to encourage Dominicans to resist the occupation.⁷⁶ Communications about this concern demonstrate the ways that World War One affected decisions made in the Dominican Republic, the increase in repression and censorship, and occupiers' low opinions of Dominican capabilities. Throughout 1917 and 1918, they spelled out the impossibility of inferior Dominicans carrying out such a successful resistance against "superior" U.S. forces, and claimed that Germans must be organizing and supplying the resistance. George Thorpe wrote, for example, that

The general opinion here is that whoever is running this revolution is a wise man: he certainly is getting a lot out of the niggers. Somehow or other he has indoctrinated the gabilleros [guerrillas] and really made them revolutionaries, and he has gotten spirit into them. It shows the handwork of the German as certain as can be. There is no doubt in my mind that a German is commanding the enemy's campaign. They are really working tactics on us showing the cardinal activity on or at widely separated places on succeeding days, to keep us jumping from the north to the south and from the east to the west, and vice versa.⁷⁷

⁷³ Rufus H. Lane, "Memorandum for Admiral Knapp," 1 October 1918, File "Gobierno Militar Americano Clasificado por Años, Año 1918," Box 59/119, "Gobierno Militar Americano," AGN1; Rufus H. Lane, "Civil Government in Santo Domingo," 130; *Gaceta Oficial*, 14 April 1917.

⁷⁴ "The Dominican Republic has unwillingly entered World War One" in: Tejado, *100 Años*, 41-42.

⁷⁵ *Gaceta Oficial*, No. 2794, 14 April 1917; Lane, "Civil Government in Santo Domingo," 130; Memo from Thorpe to Brigade Commander, 12 May 1918. "Pendleton Papers," Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

⁷⁶ Lane, "Civil Government in Santo Domingo," 130.

⁷⁷ "Pendleton Papers," Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico. See also: Rufus H. Lane, "Civil Government in Santo Domingo," 130; letter from Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels dated November, 1918, that "bandits" are receiving arms shipments from the Germans, quoted in Soloman, "Law, Order, and Justice," 74;

They even explained Haitian cooperation with Dominican resistance by placing the blame on elusive German organizers; Pendleton wrote that “their German assistants and backers have not been asleep and are using every effort to reinforce and keep alive this lively insurrection by scraping together criminals from all parts and utilizing Haitians laid off from sugar centrals during the inactive sugar season.”⁷⁸

Despite the clear consolidation in armed resistance described by Thorpe, other resistance efforts suffered from the shift of world attention to the European war. International resistance gained little interest during those years, and the military government used that lack of attention and the claims of German subversion to pass strong censorship laws.⁷⁹ Pendleton justified the use of force and arbitrary arrest against the population, arguing that the “bandit situation” was not representative of public sentiment, but “simply vagabonds bought up by German interests.”⁸⁰ Military decisions made during 1917 and 1918 were, therefore, much more influenced by World War One interests and concerns than by concerns about improvement of the Dominican Republic. Even military infrastructural and legal improvements demonstrated this set of priorities. Knapp had to maintain an artillery company for defense against raiders in the port cities, Pendleton explained to marine Commandant George Barnett in a letter on 9 April, 1917: “even a submarine could shell this city,” he noted.⁸¹ Executive orders through 1917 emphasized war concerns too. Executive Order 102 of 8 December 1917, for example, attempted to set laws

unsigned letter from Pendleton to George Barnett, 9 April 1917 and memo from Thorpe to Brigade Commander, 12 May 1918, “Pendleton Papers,” Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

⁷⁸ Letter from Battalion Commander to Regimental Commander, 9 August 1918, “Pendleton Papers,” Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

⁷⁹ Dominican President Henríquez y Carvajal, who had begun to spearhead a resistance abroad, argued that resistance would be ineffective while the world was preoccupied with World War One. Marine Charles Noxon, too, said that during this time “the [U.S.] papers told little of what was going on because events of this island republic were overshadowed by the European war.” Noxon, “Santo Domingo,” 11.

⁸⁰ Letter from Battalion Commander to Regimental Commander, 9 August 1918, “Pendleton Papers,” Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

⁸¹ “Pendleton Papers,” Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

to control the passing of information. Anyone not in the service of the military government or U.S. government, or "of a nation holding friendly relations with" the United States, was forbidden "to send, take out of, bring into, or attempt to send, take out of, or bring into" the Dominican Republic any "tangible form of communication" except through government-controlled mail service. Doing so was prosecutable by military courts with up to \$5,000 fine and/or years in prison.

Those U.S. officers left in the Dominican Republic to deal with the situation meant to answer it by hurrying the constabulary's creation to make up for the lack of troops. The move was also meant to calm increasing tensions, and to improve relations between Dominican civilians and the armed forces of occupation.⁸² This need became all the more urgent with occupation forces undermanned and understaffed. They hoped that the Dominicans constabulary might fill the gap in manpower, give them first-hand knowledge of the land (especially in remote regions), allay Dominican fears of U.S. imperialistic goals, and put up the appearance of a united front in which Dominicans were working with marines.⁸³ On 7 April 1917, only five days after the U.S. declaration of war, military government Executive Order 47 finally ordered the recruitment of a "native constabulary" with a budget of \$500,000 for the remainder of the calendar year.⁸⁴ Planners emphasized that it must be a purely volunteer force, manned by Dominicans but run by officers from the United States; the commanding officer to decide the rules and organization of the constabulary must be a U.S. citizen. As with forces being created in Nicaragua and Haiti, occupiers named it with emphasis on its capacity as a national, civil guard. The new "Guardia Nacional Dominicana" would replace all previous Dominican armed

⁸² GND Orders, 1918, File 2, Box 1, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

⁸³ "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Files 1917 and 1918, "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

⁸⁴ All Executive Orders can be found throughout the AGN files, and also organized by date and number in: Dominican Republic, *Colección de Leyes, Decretos y Resoluciones*.

forces, including the Dominican Army, Navy, and police forces, already disbanded, and the Guardia Republicana and Frontier Guard.⁸⁵

From the beginning, however, the exact nature of this experimental force was in dispute. Governor Knapp argued that “Dominicans are capable of producing a body of excellent trained police, and in my opinion police are what are needed in this country, not an army,” presumably because he thought that an organized police force scattered throughout the country would be less susceptible to dictatorial control.⁸⁶ In the face of such a threat, Knapp argued that small Caribbean countries were better off without militaries, that their proximity to the United States meant they did not need forces to protect national sovereignty. Pendleton, however, felt that the Dominican Republic needed an army, and chafed at the idea that U.S. forces should constantly be responsible for the sovereignty of nearby nations.⁸⁷ The question remained contentious throughout the occupation, and after initial discussions was never precisely answered. Rufus Lane, one of the most prominent functionaries of the military government, described the result: military by organization, it was a body whose police duties were secondary and subordinate; it was “never large enough to discharge the military functions incumbent on the national army and was too military to devote itself, except spasmodically, to its police duties.”⁸⁸ Pendleton, too, called it a “hybrid and emasculated body,” lamenting this problem extensively in his personal and professional communications and stating that the delays and failures of organization and clarity in the new constabulary were a direct product of Knapp’s refusal to allow the creation of a

⁸⁵ Originally called the Guardia Nacional Dominicana, the organization’s name was later changed to “Policia Nacional Dominicana,” in order to emphasize its role as a police body and downplay the need for a regular military in a Caribbean country. Despite the name change, it continued to function in the capacity of a full armed force, and the occupation allowed the creation in later years of local police forces. The most common names used by the occupation forces in communications were “constabulary,” “Guardia,” and “policía.” I use the term “constabulary” throughout this work, in order to avoid confusion.

⁸⁶ Quoted in: Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 35.

⁸⁷ “Pendleton Papers,” Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico. Various correspondence. See also: Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 55.

⁸⁸ Lane, “Civil Government in Santo,” 136.

national army.⁸⁹

This problem severely damaged the efficiency and reputation of the constabulary during 1917 and 1918, especially when joined with the undefined and widely diverse functions that would fall under the constabulary's duties. From the beginning, the exact authority and duties of the constabulary were unclear. With the policy of disarmament and the disbanding of armed forces in the first months of occupation, marines were by April of 1917 patrolling the country, fighting armed resistance, working to disarm the population, policing cities, guarding prisons and effecting arrests, all while still trying to establish headquarters and military substations.⁹⁰ The new constabulary would join in all of these duties, and were also required for such unplanned needs as the escorting of local government functionaries. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Miller described some of the confusion reigning in regard to the constabulary's powers of arrest: "The [constabulary] was not authorized to arrest persons for violations of municipal ordinances. This was rather vividly illustrated by [constabulary] orders which directed that the organization would restrict its operations within municipal limits to assisting local authorities when the latter were unable to cope with a given situation, and to guard against any interference in strictly municipal or communal affairs," though they were required to execute warrants. Miller also pointed out the damage to the constabulary's reputation caused by the use of its members to make arrests regarding censorship laws and for verbal insults against members of the occupation.⁹¹

Unclear mandates regarding the administration of civil law, combined with the

⁸⁹ Various correspondence, "Pendleton Papers," Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico. Pendleton wrote to Marine Corps Commandant George Barnett on 9 April, 1917 that Knapp could not make up his mind, and that by delaying the formation of the Guardia, Knapp was also increasing the duration that the Marine Corps would need to remain in the country. Barnett wrote back on 30 April that he would try to push a rapid decision, and try "to have the Guardia a military affair."

⁹⁰ George C. Thorpe, "American Achievements in Santo Domingo, Haiti, and the Virgin Islands," in George H. Blakeslee, *Mexico and the Caribbean*, (New York: G.E. Stechert and Company, 1920), 234.

⁹¹ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (May, 1935), 55.

difficulties of travel and communication, confusion of differing orders emanating from the military governor and the marine commander, and widespread lack of cooperation from the local population to complicate the broad job of "restoring order."⁹² In the end, the constabulary was a somewhat anomalous force. Despite the final decision that the constabulary would be a police force, in deference to the desire of Governor Knapp, those carrying out the organizing of the force were Marines under the command of Joseph Pendleton. The constabulary was thus patterned after the Marine Corps, its structure mirroring that of the marine brigade stationed throughout the country, one company planned to be stationed in each province.⁹³ Planned training and discipline also mirrored those of the Marine Corps.⁹⁴ Even the new constabulary uniforms, where they were actually supplied, consisted of a marine-style uniform with khaki shorts, further reinforcing the image of the constabulary as an arm of the foreign force.⁹⁵ Each company was headquartered in the available military structures, meaning that the constabulary's companies were stationed in the Dominican fortalezas that had long served as military headquarters and prisons in previous Dominican militaries. Not until five weeks after the executive order that authorized the constabulary was even the most basic part of the command structure laid out. A decree of 14 May 1917 finally set out the authority of a constabulary commander and his subordinates throughout the provinces, including a command structure for "requisitions, pay lists, and local expenses."⁹⁶ Knapp fixed the original strength of the constabulary at eighty-eight commissioned officers and 1,200 enlisted men, placing it under

⁹² Henry C. Davis, "Reports requested by Senate Committee re-Santo Domingo," 30 December, 1921, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," "Geographical Files," 1921, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

⁹³ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 46.

⁹⁴ Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea*, 185.

⁹⁵ The marine-designed uniform was assigned officially with G.N.D. General Order Number 1, dated 5 September 1917, and General Order Number 4, dated 13 November 1917.

⁹⁶ Goldwert, *The Constabulary*, 9.

the command of a marine officer within the Second Brigade.⁹⁷

The greatest problems plaguing the new military, after the official command structure was laid out, continued to be the lack of definition about its duties and the need for extensive manpower for policing and fighting resistance combined with the relatively small size of the constabulary. These problems led to regional variations as figured out by marines commanding local contingents of the new constabulary, a process that meant gradual development over time, rules made up based on local necessities, and an organization that lacked central unity. Further, from the beginning, more was expected and needed of the units than they could possibly achieve. The primary results of this were: 1. Marines often had to carry out the duties ascribed to the constabulary. 2. The duties of constabulary members varied widely from site to site, depending on the most pressing needs of any given location. 3. Constabulary duties were flexible as needs changed, which often meant that their authority was unclear and their training and experience was incomplete. 4. Especially with the manpower shortage in the occupying forces that accompanied the withdrawal of many U.S. troops to Europe, systematic training of the constabulary recruits was simply impossible.

During World War One, the lack of budgetary and supply resources meant that recruits lacked arms, clothing, and sometimes basic provisions. Especially in the more outlying regions, both Marine occupiers and constabulary recruits tended, in 1917 and 1918, to "appropriate" mounts, food, and other supplies from a local population already suffering through a difficult economic time,⁹⁸ an action that could only increase tensions between the civilian population and

⁹⁷ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 46; Nuñez Francisco and González Lora, *El Ejército Nacional Dominicano*, 58.

⁹⁸ Memo "Seizure of horses," from Thorpe to "Brigade Commander," 11 May 1918, Box 2 "Pendleton Papers," USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico; Reports from a detachment of the 1st Co. under D.B. Roben, in which forces had commandeered horses for a patrol, "Dom. Rep., Santo Domingo," File 1917, Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 32; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 4; Franck, *Roaming*, 224-225.

the Marines and Dominicans of the constabulary. Further, many of the U.S. officers who were drawn away from the occupation were replaced by new marine recruits who had joined the military in the hope of fighting in the European war--men who resented being sent to the Caribbean, and who would resent being kept in service in a foreign country after the armistice was signed in Europe.⁹⁹ More experienced men were sent to Europe, and World War One draftees were rushed into occupied territories, lacking sufficient training: "One detachment of these men in bandit territory, on their first night in the camp, mistook the flare of lighted cigarettes for enemy rifle flashes. They blazed away with their own weapons, and only their poor marksmanship prevented them from mowing down the battalion commander's escort."¹⁰⁰ Edward A. Craig, a temporary captain of one company in early 1919, said that not only were his men poorly trained, they were "practically mutinous" to the point that he felt the need to sleep with a weapon.¹⁰¹ The unhappy and poorly trained marine recruits and the prevalence of racism among U.S. occupying forces only served to further break down Dominican-marine relations, and Dominican relations with their countrymen who worked for marine officers. The influx of poorly trained marines, which extended over the period 1917-1919, made more difficult the justification of having only marine officers, and further decreased the possibility of training in units outside the major cities.

The combination of conflicts led to marine and constabulary violence against the populace. George C. Thorpe, as Chief of Staff, wrote to Pendleton on 30 May, 1918 that a

⁹⁹ Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 11-14; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 31; United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1151-1155. Even commanding General Joseph H. Pendleton wrote that "It is hard lines to be in this service nearly thirty-nine years and then when the first real war of one's service comes, to be shelved down here," as a neutral, and that he wanted to be "IN THINGS." Unsigned letter from Pendleton to George Barnett, 9 April 1917, "Pendleton Papers," Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico; see also Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 29; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1919*, 2638.

¹⁰⁰ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 31.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

marine named Hatton had been left in charge in El Seibo Province, Thorpe reported that upon the escape of a guerrilla leader, Hatton summarily executed eleven Dominicans in the prison and then “for some time conducted a campaign of severity in Seibo province, burning houses, treating the inhabitants arbitrarily, taking horses, etc. In short, the inhabitants suddenly felt a great change in the conduct of the 11th Co., and a number of unsteady ones” joined the armed resistance campaign.¹⁰² He further reported that Hatton was not alone among marine officers leading the constabulary, that before that marine Thad Taylor “misconceived his function,” arresting indiscriminately and leaving people in jail where they “rotted. . . pending investigation or search for evidence”; “In Macoris people were deadly fearful of being arrested because of the uncertainty of getting a hearing.”¹⁰³ He also reported corruption among marine officers and U.S. civilians: Taylor’s American friends used his name to gain unwarranted privileges, “as did one American woman on several occasions in her dealings at the Market in Macoris where if she did not obtain unwarranted concessions as to the place she should take in the line of food applicants or the quantity of food she was to receive would threaten to report to Captain Taylor and have the official arrested who tried to enforce his proper orders”; marine captain McLean told him that it was common for any enlisted man to arrest civilians, and their hearing might be delayed indefinitely; Captain Morse arbitrarily arrested but commanded no respect, even allowed a native to disarm him. This concern further affected treatment of Dominicans outside of the constabulary: Thorpe reported that several times in Seibo Province was that some police officials, commissaries, etc., were armed with pistols while others were not allowed to carry even a machete. . . The excuse for not allowing these police officials arms is that they might allow

¹⁰² “Confidential report upon conditions in Seibo and Macoris provinces,” 30 May 1918, Box 2, “Pendleton Papers,” USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

bandits to disarm them.”¹⁰⁴ Violence and arbitrary treatment from the constabulary, of course, further distanced marine and Dominican constabulary members from the possibility of popular approval.

Furthermore, issues that had long plagued the Dominican military continued to be problematic for the constabulary. These problems, unforeseen by inexperienced occupying forces who did not know the terrain or geographical particularities of the country, centered around lack of communications and travel infrastructure in a mountainous country whose heavy seasons of rainfall washed out trails. The commander of the Southern District described the problem of communication in these years, and its implications:

The only communications between troops and various headquarters from 24 January 1917 to 6 July 1918 was by messenger mounted on horses or on foot. No means of checking up either positions, efficiency or conduct of patrols and patrol leaders existed. Patrols were sent out at various times and were frequently not heard of for three weeks. . . . No telephone, telegraph, radio or other field communications existed for civil or military usage prior to July 1918. . . . In Seibo, (nearly as large as Porto Rico) not one kilometer of road on which an automobile could travel existed prior to July 1918.¹⁰⁵

Another long-term problem, and one that had been a major issue for the previous Dominican military, was the inability to adequately supply its force. Revenue from the state was simply not enough to provide modern arms and the other requirements of an efficient military. This continued to be the case during the occupation, and the occupation government was also diverting funds in its attempts to improve sanitation and health and to build a workable transportation and communication infrastructure throughout the country. During the early occupation years, when the military government had less support from a U.S. State Department preoccupied with World War One, arms confiscated from the local population often proved the

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ "Reports requested by Senate Committee Re-Santo Domingo," from District Commander Henry C. Davis, Southern District, to Commanding General, 30 December, 1921. "Dominican Republic," "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

only arms they could afford for distribution to the new constabulary's forces.¹⁰⁶ Many in the constabulary thus ended up charged with going into battle against well-armed resistance forces carrying only rusted machetes and other crude weapons--conditions that led to higher desertion rates, especially in areas of higher violence.¹⁰⁷ The guerrilla movements actively recruited men from the constabulary, and because desertion made them outlaws, many other deserters moved directly to the ranks of the resistance--a problem that continued for years.¹⁰⁸

Many other instances of confusion resulted from the widespread lack of definition that plagued the constabulary and its planners. Some stemmed from occupation goals. For example, the disbanding of Dominican armed forces caused problems and confusion: Dominicans resented the rapid and sudden changeover of all armed authority to foreign representatives.¹⁰⁹ Civil unrest continued throughout 1917-1918, especially in areas into which the occupation forces were late in expanding, which had a long tradition of guarding large landholdings--especially sugar estates--by privately hired armed guards. Occupying forces found it necessary to make numerous exceptions to protect (usually foreign) landowners' assets, allowing dispensations for arms for local forces and guards. With the many different allowances, most unclearly defined by law during 1917 and much of 1918, numerous controversies arose about under whose authority such armed Dominicans should fall.

¹⁰⁶ Letter from H.S. Knapp to Pendleton, July 1917, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," file 1916, "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

¹⁰⁷ A.M. Norris, "Weekly Report," 27 February, 1921, Box 3, File "1921, 18," "Ejército Nacional," AGN1.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ One major source of such controversy was in a site that seldom required the use of arms: Executive Order 19 did away with Comandancias de Puertos, leaving the powers of arrest in ports to customs collectors there; this led to a controversy in November of 1917, when one such customs collector arrested a Dominican man, demonstrating a power that many felt he should not have. Box #64 (1916-1920), File: "Secretaría de Estado de Justicia e Instrucción Pública 1917." Various Correspondence, "Gobierno Militar Americano," AGN1; for Dominican reaction, see Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, *El Antiimperialismo*, 59.

The Fabric of Failure: Recruitment and Retention, 1917-1918

When enlistment to the constabulary opened in April of 1917, marine officers were optimistic. Their use of officers from the previous Dominican military, the promise of a democratic future, and the pay rate they established--equal to that of marine recruits--seemed to spell out the conditions for an enthusiastic rush of willing recruits despite the widespread lack of approval for the occupation as a whole. The constabulary's planners, who were mostly headquartered in Santo Domingo, continued to hold, after all, the belief that most Dominicans wanted the reform and were simply afraid to speak up. The use of Dominican officers did provide some inroads: Despite the desire to find all new recruits, some of the first to enlist came from the recommendations of officers such as Batlle and Cabral, who actively worked to recruit a reliable force. This was especially important in regions to which the marines had not yet spread, such as in the east, where local G.R. officers were the major recruiters for the new constabulary in its first months. At the moment that enlistment opened, reactions to the constabulary in some areas were still mixed, and the fact that so much recruitment was done by G.R. officers who were known and often respected must have greatly affected the ability to gain recruits. One can readily imagine the reaction of these recruits--enlisted for three years of service--when the G.R. officers were suddenly replaced by foreign military officers. Many of those recruited by G.R. officers in the early months were among the early deserters from the constabulary, and a number of them--thus outlaws--joined the armed resistance.¹¹⁰

In the first months of 1917, G.R. officers were still autonomously effecting arrests and then reporting them to the marines or military government; they were also still the major go-between for civil authorities, especially in areas that the marines had not yet occupied, but also in

¹¹⁰ Evidence of this trend is found throughout the files of "Gobierno Militar" and "Ejército Nacional" for the years 1917-1922 in the AGN. See especially correspondence, GND and PND special orders, prison records, GND and PND patrol reports (further examined in Chapter Four), and PND Intelligence Reports from the years 1920-1922.

areas in which marines were stationed.¹¹¹ While this in-between state lasted, it solved some problems for marine recruiters even while it was being phased out without a solution to replace it. It also caused problems: The organization and paperwork for this improvised solution was problematic. For example, many of the G.R. members were illiterate, some unable to sign for checks, and the haphazard ways in which occupation forces employed their services left reigning confusion about who had been issued checks or cash.¹¹² Much of the administration of the constabulary in its early months went through G.R. officers, with no clear line drawn as to how this should be organized, causing a great deal of confusion in the records, especially concerning pay and equipment; many letters complained that no salaries had been paid to certain groups.¹¹³ Using the G.R. was also more or less successful depending on region, in large part due to corruption in the G.R. and to the difficulties in the command structure caused by communication and travel difficulties. Batlle, in the capital, received letters complaining about how G.R. officers working with marines in the early months did not appear for work, or did not cooperate with (now officially disarmed) local authorities.¹¹⁴ The command structure was unclear, with multiple letters from civil administrators and governors asking whether the G.R. officers were under their orders or not, as they continuously failed to report to those civil authorities. These letters also reported, especially in areas in which the marines had not yet extended their authority such as el Seibo, that G.R. members were committing crimes against the citizens.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, various correspondence, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

¹¹² May 1917 communications, "Oficios de la Jefatura de Zona de la Guardia Republicana de Santo Domingo," "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ "Oficios de Gobernadores de las Provincias," May, 1917, "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

¹¹⁵ Letter from the Department of "Hacienda and Comercio" to General Pendleton from the Chief of the municipal police in el Seybo, "Oficios de Secretarías de Estado," May 1917, "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN. The Chief reported that when the process of the changeover of armed forces was still ongoing, reported that Guardia Basilio López insulted him, wounded a woman, and was about to wound another woman when the Civil Governor of the province had him arrested.

Notably, the tone of complaints, petitions and letters in the months of April-June remains hopeful that the military situation might improve or at least that they might gain some individual benefits. The military band in Santo Domingo, for example, produced and signed a carefully written petition, which they addressed to the military government through G.R. Captain Manuel Batlle. In it, they solicited the military government for an increase in salary, lamenting the impossibility of continuing to sustain themselves and their families on their very small salaries. Most, they reported, were fathers, and they justified the military government's attention to them because they were "respectable men," a clear appeal to the interests of a growing middle class.¹¹⁶ The military government received many such petitions during early and mid-1917, demonstrating the hope that many still held out that the occupation might bring about changes and improvements. Requests ranged from petitions for pensions, better medical care for the military, and some even requesting jobs with the military government. Most appealed to the human element, carefully explaining the need for a better salary to support families, and emphasizing the extreme financial difficulties shadowing the capital city of Santo Domingo at that time. The occupation military, usually through G.R. officers, received many such petitions, especially from members of the budding middle class in Santo Domingo City.¹¹⁷ The proliferation of such petitions in those months add a very human element to the historical record; they also provide some insight into why some cooperated with the occupation at first, at least in minimal ways.¹¹⁸ Finally, they create a backdrop against which to envision the process of

¹¹⁶ "Oficios de la Banda de Musica Militar," May 1917, "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

¹¹⁷ One example is the letter of mechanic A. de Peña in Santo Domingo dated 28 May 1917, addressed to the administration of the military government, again emphasizing that he is the father of a family, "Oficios diversos recibidos," "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN. In his case, the petition was well received, and as he had done some important work for the Military Government, his pay was increased for government jobs.

¹¹⁸ While many were denied, or no records of reply exist, a number of these who had worked for the military government were given requested aid or pay increases for government jobs.

increasing disillusionment among middle-class, urban Dominicans as problems as racism, abuse, and sometimes chaotic conditions unfolded in early occupation years. As the G.R. officers were replaced by marine occupiers and Dominican constabulary men, and conditions worsened rather than improving, the majority of such letters stopped.

Even with the help of Dominican officers, early enlistment in the constabulary was sparse, especially in certain regions. In El Seibo province, where the civil war continued in 1917, reports from the first opening of recruitment to the constabulary noted that only eight men had come to enlist, and they were all previous G.R. members. It was no wonder, however, that more men were not coming out to enlist; in addition to the mixed reactions to joining the foreign military, the letter reported that although these men were enlisted and serving in the new constabulary--and in the area suffering the most violence in the country at that time--the men had no clothes to wear, had not received their last months' payment, and could not get meals on credit. This letter, from G.R. 2nd Lieutenant Julio Cortes, was the second letter reporting these conditions, which had still not been addressed.¹¹⁹ In addition to these conditions, another letter from Julio Cortes complained, later in the month, that one of his men had been arrested by civil authorities and sentenced to a year in prison for what he dubbed an "insignificant crime," further demonstrating the confusion of authority in such removed regions.¹²⁰

To increase enlistment, authorities in the military government sent a notice through the local newspapers announcing the opening of recruitment and the "great care" that would be taken to recruit the best of men. The notice mentioned that there would be "excellent opportunities for promotion," a promise that quickly proved to not be true. The continuing problems of the new

¹¹⁹ Letter dated 11 May, 1917, "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, "Oficios de Jefaturas de Zonas de la Guardia Nacional," May, 1917, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN. Similar reports came from other areas. See, for example, Report of Jefe de Zona in San Pedro de Macorís, 10 May 1917.

¹²⁰ Letter dated 28 May, 1917, "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, "Oficios de Jefaturas de Zonas de la Guardia Nacional," May, 1917, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

constabulary was hinted in the notice's announcement that, despite the opening of recruitment, the exact organization of the new constabulary had still not yet been determined. Recruitment opened anyway, and would take place only in locations that held a U.S. medical official. In the beginning, this meant that the majority of recruitment was concentrated around the major cities of Santo Domingo and Santiago as recruitment for Dominican national militaries traditionally had been.¹²¹ The notice also laid out enlistment standards: men interested in enlisting were to be Dominican citizens between the ages of 20-35 years, fully literate in Spanish, and of “good morality”--excluding any with records of arrest for serious “non-political” crimes.¹²²

As marines spread to more remote provinces and established recruitment centers through 1917, and found few Dominicans willing to enlist, recruitment standards were often relaxed in practice. One of the first major recruitment efforts, in May of 1917, turned out 54 men, only 35 of whom were accepted; the rest were rejected for various health reasons and “deficient mentality.”¹²³ The majority of those willing to defy the wishes of their communities and join the armed force were those who were desperate for jobs, or interested in using the military position to improve their own standings at the cost of social acceptance. The result, with the lowering of recruitment standards, was that the majority of constabulary members were illiterate, had criminal records, and came from “the laboring, or “peon” classes.”¹²⁴ Marine Lieutenant Fellowes estimated that “our first enlisted men were the most ignorant and crude specimens possible, as

¹²¹ Memo from the Major General Commandant to Chief of Naval Operations, 17 March, 1917, “Guardia Nacional Dominicana,” “Santo Domingo,” “Geographical Files,” USMC Historical Division, Quantico. A 1917 medical study (undated) stated that the Dominican population at that time had an estimated one medical doctor per 29,891 people. It suggested a medical department within the constabulary. Assistant Surgeon P.E. Garrison, U.S.N., “Public Health/Sanitation Report,” File “Gobierno Militar 1917,” Box 106 (1916-1924), “Gobierno Militar,” AGN.

¹²² Letter to the editor of the newspaper *Ecos del Valle*, early May 1917, “Oficios expedidos por la Secretaría,” “Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas,” 1917, Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

¹²³ Memo on May enlistment from the office of the Provost Marshal, 31 May, 1917, “Gobierno Militar,” Box 22, AGN1.

¹²⁴ Edward A. Fellowes, “Training Native Troops in Santo Domingo,” *The Marine Corps Gazette*, 8:4 (December, 1923), 229.

far as intelligence was concerned," the "scum of the Island," that the constabulary was in the beginning a "harbor of last resort for natives who were too lazy to earn their living in any other way."¹²⁵ His estimation demonstrates the racism that affected marine attitudes toward recruits; he argued that "as a general rule, the degree of intelligence increased with the decrease of the ebony tinge. The blacker recruits were generally simple-minded giants who did what they were told," while "those who were of a clearer complexion usually were more intelligent, and could be trusted with responsible jobs." Fellowes emphasized the preference in the officer corps for those of Puerto Rican descent, rather than Dominican, or those who "had a larger proportion of Spanish than of negro blood in their veins."¹²⁶ A later military governor, Samuel S. Robison, in 1921 was still passing on unofficial instructions to recruiting officers to try to "lighten" the body a bit.¹²⁷

This attitude comes as no surprise. After all, the only guide occupying forces had to the Dominican Republic was rife with the racism and environmental determinism in the period's thinking, informing them that "the inhabitants as a whole are quiet, lazy and shiftless. Life in the tropics is easy, necessities are few, the climate is enervating and the lower classes manage to exist with very little effort and that effort is made only when necessary." The guide further stated that the racial "blood mixture is responsible for the complex and unreliable nature of the Dominican."¹²⁸ Marines arriving in the Dominican Republic thus came armed with the idea that

¹²⁵ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 230-231.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 231.

¹²⁷ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 59.

¹²⁸ Monograph, "Guide to the Dominican Republic," Section 200, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico, 201-100. One marine's description of the Dominican people, after having lived there for 14 months, demonstrates the interest in the race question. Charles H. Noxon recorded with meticulous detail, for a popular audience, his conclusions about the racial make-up of the Dominican people and the percentage to which they seemed to contain "negroid blood;" he emphasizes that the upper classes are more Spanish, the lower classes darker. Noxon, "Santo Domingo: Ward of the Marines" *New York Times*, 30 November 1919, 3.

the population was racially unreliable.¹²⁹ If the problem was inherent in the "race" of the populace, it was harder to take resistance seriously, harder to imagine promoting Dominicans to officer positions. Policies encouraging "whitening" existed throughout the occupation's administration, not just in the military. For example, immigrant workers who were considered to be "of the Caucasian race" were given precedence over any workers whom occupying forces classified as "non-white"; any categorized by occupation forces as other than "Caucasian" were required to get a work permit within four months or leave the country.¹³⁰ Ironically this might have worked in their favor with Dominican elites, if other conditions had been improved, as one of the common publicized Dominican complaints against the constabulary was that it tended to be composed of the darker elements of the population.¹³¹ For the occupiers, however, other concerns about race came into play. Extensive communications with the officer corps of the constabulary and the administration of the military government comment on the dangers of blacks in the United States hearing of negro men being promoted to officer positions in the Dominican Republic while it was under U.S. control.¹³²

Many of the Dominicans who did at first join, especially as the Dominican officers of the G.R. were phased out, faced so much persecution in society that they deserted.¹³³ In his memoir of the early days of occupation, resistance fighter Gregorio Urbano Gilbert emphasizes the pressure that young men felt not only to avoid siding with the occupation forces, but even to join

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* See also: Franck, *Roaming Through the West Indies*, 239.

¹³⁰ Executive Order 372, 16 December of 1919.

¹³¹ Rufus Lane discussed Dominican fears of the darker Haitian population infiltrating the Dominican Republic, arguing that Dominicans were lighter than Haitians and seemed to be "from a better African stock." Lane, "Civil Government in Santo Domingo," 139-140. For an extensive study of Dominican elite discussions of race in the 19th and 20th centuries, see Sagás, *Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic*.

¹³² Memoranda between General LeJeune, Captain Cole, and Captain Boswick, File 1921, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," "Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico. Boswick emphasizes, too, the need to be "careful not to enter into the race question in any matter" in public discussion.

¹³³ Evidence for this is found throughout the files of both "Gobierno Militar" and "Ejército Nacional" for the years 1917-1922. See especially correspondence, GND and PND special orders, prison records, GND and PND patrol reports, and PND Intelligence reports from the years 1920-1922.

the resistance. The population around them angry at the illegal and violent occupation of the country, many encouraged young men to fight and resist; sixteen-year-old Gilbert felt that young Dominican women would not respect him if he did not rise up against the occupation, and also cites a sense of nationalism that required action of him.¹³⁴ With the difficulty of recruitment and retention, lack of marine manpower, and problems of discipline, in addition to the lack of education among recruits and the inability of most Marine commanding officers to speak Spanish, the most common use for constabulary recruits in 1917 and 1918 was as a pure supplement the sheer manpower force of marine regiments. Despite the plan to spread the constabulary through the provinces, they were at first placed instead wherever marines needed more manpower. In December of 1917, more than half a year after recruitment began and the constabulary was issuing general orders, only 28 constabulary enlisted men were stationed in the Department of the South, versus 784 in the Department of the North.¹³⁵

The lack of interpreters continued to be a problem, too, both in recruitment and in the relationship of marine officers with Dominicans in and outside of the constabulary; the problem increased with the phasing out of G.R. officers. Needing interpreters for the constabulary posts in Barahona and Azua in June of 1917, the regimental commander there hired a man who was willing to come from Santo Domingo city to do the work; he came with this dubious recommendation from a superior officer: “this man is not considered a competent interpreter. . . But would be acceptable if no one else can be found.”¹³⁶ Many of the surviving documents in the archives include both the originals, in whichever language they were written, and the translations, and clearly demonstrate the poor quality of translation. Even when letters were

¹³⁴ Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 1-30. After fighting in the early armed resistance, Gilbert survived, becoming a Dominican hero and a resistance fighter, and eventually went to fight the resistance against U.S. forces in Nicaragua.

¹³⁵ Goldwert, *The Constabulary*, 9.

¹³⁶ G.N.D. Memos, May, 1917, “Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas,” 1917, “Oficios diversos recibidos,” Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

written in impeccable Spanish, the English translation is difficult to read through grammar and spelling errors. In light of problems such as officers' inability to speak Spanish, a promotion of Dominicans into the officer corps might have seemed appropriate and desirable. In fact, one of the more powerful reasons that Dominicans tended toward increasing resentment of the Guardia was U.S. officers' absolute refusal to have Dominican officers in the constabulary--Colonel Thorpe described how one marine officer of Mexican parentage, who spoke Spanish fluently and "did not look at all like an American" was popular with Dominicans "*because* he was not a real American."¹³⁷

Marine refusal to promote Dominicans, and Dominican resentment of the fact, caused consistent problems within the organization and the Dominican population.¹³⁸ Captain A.M. Norris, for example, reported that resentment about this issue was so high that many constabulary members deserted, and others rebelled in minor ways within the organization.¹³⁹ Valentina Peguero states that the refusal to promote Dominicans with the displacement of Marines to World War One "meant contempt and disrespect for la Guardia [the constabulary], and Dominican soldiers were infuriated and humiliated."¹⁴⁰ With the shortage of enlistment, this

¹³⁷ Thorpe, "Dominican Service," 321.

¹³⁸ Franck, *Roaming*, 235. Franck was an independent travel writer and friend to long-time administrators of the Military Government. Overall, much of his work becomes an apology for the occupation, but he spoke fluent Spanish and interviewed Dominicans across all classes and sectors of society through a number of provinces in early 1920. Encountering many contradictions between the stories and proofs offered by these Dominicans and what he was told by Marines and military government officials, Franck included both stories and interviews, in the end satisfying himself as to the overall justification of occupiers based almost completely on the racial ideas of his day. His interviews, often rather candid and recorded despite criticism of many U.S. troops and administrators, offer valuable insight into the testimonies and actions of many Dominicans whose voices were otherwise not recorded, and offer rare glimpses into the roles and backgrounds of the constabulary in late 1919 and early 1920.

¹³⁹ A.M. Norris, "Weekly Report," 27 February, 1921, Box 3, File "1921, 18," "Ejército Nacional," AGN1. Norris, unfortunately, did not specify types of minor resistance within the organization.

¹⁴⁰ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 37; Memo from the Major General Commandant to Chief of Naval Operations, 17 March, 1917, "Guardia Nacional Dominicana," "Santo Domingo," "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico. U.S. dignitaries argued that Dominicans refused the position--an argument refuted throughout the archival record. Sumner Welles, for example, stated that it was easy to get privates from the beginning, a statement that was in itself based on misinformation, and that it was "impossible, from the outset, to persuade Dominicans of the necessary education and standing in the community to serve as officers in this force." Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 810.

also led to problems with the constabulary's size that were chronic through 1918. Military Governor Knapp pondered the issue in a letter he penned to Pendleton in July of 1917:

As no Dominican commissions have yet been issued to Guardia [constabulary] officers, and as the details of organization are in our hands here, I see no reason why a first-lieutenancy in the Guardia should not be filled by a selected [Marine] non-com. . . I hope the day will come when the Dominicans can fill these places, but it isn't here now, apparently; and I see no reason to keep up the experiment that retards development. A year or so of training and indoctrination may bring the [Dominican] second lieutenants to a point where they may merit promotion, and I hope it will.¹⁴¹

He suggested filling constabulary first lieutenant vacancies with marine non-coms to avoid the promotion of Dominicans into the constabulary's officer corps. This line of reasoning became less and less tenable, however, when Knapp's proposed training never happened. Instead, military exigency led occupation forces to a need for expediency, and this meant the continued ruling by force with the constabulary men as untrained, hired arms.

So strong was the desire to keep Dominicans out of officer positions that a company commander fighting resistance in the east had only two lieutenants for 150 enlisted men, and when he had to relieve one of the Marine lieutenants from field duty for misconduct, he pressed a Navy medical officer into temporary troop command rather than to temporarily promote one of his more experienced Dominican men.¹⁴² As late as 1920, all but thirty-three of the sixty-nine officers were still Marine officers and NCOs, "who accepted GND [constabulary] commissions in return for extra pay authorized by an act of the United States Congress. . . Under the Executive Order of 1917, captaincies in the GND were open to veterans of the old [U.S.] forces and U.S. citizens, as well as Marines."¹⁴³ Among the thirty-three who were not marines, the majority were North Americans with previous experience in the U.S.-run Dominican Frontier Guard or

¹⁴¹ "Pendleton Papers," Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

¹⁴² Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 29-31. All but one of the North American officers in the constabulary by the end of 1918 who were captains in the GND were only sergeants and corporals in the USMC, increasing Dominican resentment. Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 2.

¹⁴³ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47.

other police agencies. Even as late as June of 1920, over three years after the founding of the constabulary, there were still no Dominicans above the rank of second lieutenant; it would be another year before any Dominicans were promoted above the rank of first lieutenant.¹⁴⁴ In his brief summary of the constabulary, Calder connects this issue to general recruitment as well: “The military government compounded the problem by making a feeble to nonexistent recruitment effort and by reserving all ranks above lieutenant for North Americans, thus assuring officer cadets that there was little chance for promotion.”¹⁴⁵ He points out that those who were willing to join the constabulary, forced to be commanded by marine sergeants, corporals, and even privates who were first lieutenants in the constabulary, tended to come from the “lower middle social stratum, men whose inferior social positions and general lack of opportunity caused them to accept this chance to gain status and a decent income.”¹⁴⁶

In addition to problems of enlistment and race relations, retention was a serious issue throughout the occupation. Despite the early optimism of occupation forces, the constabulary never attained the numerical strength to act on its own before 1922--the year in which gradual withdrawal began.¹⁴⁷ As the constabulary’s reputation continued to deteriorate, and as conditions within that military stayed the same or worsened through 1917 and 1918,¹⁴⁸ desertion rates were high. Those who remained in the constabulary did so for a variety of reasons: Some had better experiences, depending on the command of regional marine officers and the availability of supplies. Desertion rates were much lower, for example, in Santo Domingo and Santiago, the country’s two largest cities, where weather and supplies caused fewer difficulties

¹⁴⁴ “General Order No. 27, Series 1919,” dated June 14, 1919, “Ejército Nacional, Box 1, File “1919, 2,” AGN1; Box 1, File: “1920, 6,” “General Order No. 14 (Series 1920), “Ejército Nacional,” AGN1; File: “1921,” “Muster Rolls,” “Ejército Nacional,” Box 2, AGN1

¹⁴⁵ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 56.

¹⁴⁶ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 56; Goldwert, *The Constabulary*, 10.

¹⁴⁷ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 48.

¹⁴⁸ Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 4.

for enlisted men. Many remained in the constabulary because they were not willing to become outlaws by deserting, especially in such urban areas over which marines had better consolidated control, and the records show many who deserted, realized the consequences of it, and returned.

One such enlisted man informed the court “I did it because I didn’t know any better.”

Authorities were well-disposed to believe any act that implicated Dominican ignorance; this man, Epifanio Sánchez, received two months confinement and a loss of pay of \$15, and was maintained in the constabulary.¹⁴⁹ As so much of the recruiting in the first year was from elements of the population that had traditionally held little or no power, many would stay even through difficult conditions to retain that power, possibly with hopes of future advancement. Early recruitment ended up emphasizing, after all, the lower and landless classes in ways that most previous national militaries had not done, and continued to promise eventual promotion. As marine outposts and doctors for medical examinations spread into the more remote provinces, occupying forces were especially distinct from previous national militaries in their ability to recruit men who came from more remote regions of the country, incorporating families and communities that had previously tended to be excluded from any except local guards.¹⁵⁰

Desertion and retention in the constabulary were not, of course, the only problems to come of lowered recruitment standards. Both the inexperienced backgrounds of the majority of the enlisted men and, most likely, the incredible pressure under which they were working in this hated force, led to violence against the populations they were policing.¹⁵¹ The military government, upon publishing Executive Order 54 in late 1917, laid out extensive regulations

¹⁴⁹ Records of proceedings of Courts Martial. “Ordenanzas y Correspondencia,” 1917-1920. Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁵⁰ Registers of Personnel, “Correspondencia y Decretos,” 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289 AGN; Muster rolls, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007896, AGN.

¹⁵¹ The tendency in the constabulary of violence toward the civilian population is recorded, for example, in the contemporary account of Marine Colonel George C. Thorpe, “American Achievements in Santo Domingo,” 234.

about the discipline and treatment of crimes by constabulary members. Its writers began the order with the statement: "It is not the intention of the Military Government to relieve the personnel of the Guardia from the obligation of obeying Dominican laws." Because the population had grown accustomed to seeing the marines as forces "outside" the law, it was natural that members of their extension arm might enjoy the same immunities. Actual events confirmed these suspicions for many, when constabulary members often were not prosecuted for crimes that incited loud resistance by local populations. In one infamous incident in October-November of 1917, dubbed the "Higüey Incident," Dominicans protested the treatment of civilians by constabulary members guarding prison workers. The instances around which protests formed included torture of prisoners and suspects and disrespect in the handling of dead bodies being carried to the local graveyard.¹⁵² Commanding officer Thad Taylor explained why the constabulary men were not prosecuted: "To try these guardias would create a diminution of courage, and ill-will and a distressing moral effect on the personnel of the Guardia Nacional, which would require considerable time and effort to overcome."¹⁵³ Prosecutions and punishment were minimized or avoided where possible in order to uphold the already tenuous grasp on morale among enlisted men.

The effect of such policies was to further distance constabulary members from the rest of the Dominican population and reinforce their image as oppressors backed by marines. Despite regular reports to the Department of the Navy claiming that the constabulary was improving and efficient, and that armed resistance had ended, the constabulary was in fact no closer to being organized or efficient in 1918 than it had been in 1917, and armed resistance was again on the rise: reports demonstrated that in January 1918 the fight against armed resistance was still being

¹⁵² Military Government correspondence, October to November of 1919, File 1, Box 22, "Gobierno Militar," AGN1.

¹⁵³ Thad Taylor, "Guardia Nacional Dominicana observations on prisons," 26 October, 1917, File 1, Box 22, "Gobierno Militar," AGN1.

waged unsuccessfully, and that "to cope with it the brigade was still mainly on its own, since the Guardia [constabulary] was as yet only half organized."¹⁵⁴ The extent and continuation of armed resistance, combined with insufficient marine manpower and insufficient funding, continued to make further organization impossible. Most available arms and men were required to fight resistance, especially in the east. Through 1918, the constabulary was primarily dedicated to pursuing some six-hundred guerrillas in the Eastern District and other provinces.¹⁵⁵ Further, even by mid-1918 marines said that much of the 1918 increase in armed reaction, or "disturbance," was in reaction to "troops, particularly the Guardia [constabulary], taking their horses, and also sometimes dealing arbitrarily with the populace."¹⁵⁶

Conclusion

By the end of 1918, Dominicans had formed an opinion of the constabulary that was certainly not favorable or respectful, usually approximating that written in 1946 by Emilio Morel: The constabulary was "the ridiculous armed institution that the occupying power had formed of the subjects that it had at its reach: Haitians, *barloventinos* [mixed-race island workers], Puerto Ricans, blacks, and native mulattos," that it was a "promiscuous heaping of adventurers drawn from the most obscure zones of the population."¹⁵⁷ Dominicans saw it as a force of armed ruffians from the worst classes and segments of the Dominican population turned traitor, or men who were already outsiders: marines, U.S. citizens, and seasonal workers from other countries. It was in many cases all of these things, as well as a force that often resorted to

¹⁵⁴ Heintz, Jr., *Soldiers of the Sea*, 248.

¹⁵⁵ Communications, 1917-1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," Ejército Nacional, Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; communications, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Files 1917 and 1918, "Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico. See also: F.S. Ducoudray, Jr., "Una Epopeya Ignorada: Fueron Bandidos los guerrilleros antiyanquis de 1916?" *Ahora!* No. 557, (15 July 1974), 37-39; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 3.

¹⁵⁶ George C. Thorpe, quoted in: Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 4.

¹⁵⁷ Quoted in: Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 4.

stealing from, abusing, and even torturing the locals, a force already disliked for upholding, by force, foreign military officers who were imposing an unwanted occupation on the populace. The only real reforms that marines had enacted in the country by the end of 1918, reforms that had pulled funds away from the constabulary, had been through the resurrection of public works planned and begun under Ramón Cáceres but interrupted by civil war.¹⁵⁸ Neither promised reforms toward achieving U.S.-style democracy nor even a restoration of civil order had come to fruition, and the touted constabulary was increasingly the enemy of the Dominican populace and of order itself.

By the end of 1918, therefore, occupation forces reassessed the constabulary and its role in the occupation. They did so due to the wide failures of the constabulary and its poor reputation among Dominicans, but also because of a number of internal and external changes affecting the administration of the military government. The first was the ending of World War One. The signing of the 11 November 1918 armistice allowed many departments to rearrange priorities, and the State Department again became directly involved in occupations throughout the Caribbean region. The end of World War One also saw the replacement of Military Governor Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp with Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden, a man who was to take a drastically different approach to the administration of the occupation. The end of World War One also meant an increase in the wide Dominican and Latin American protest against the illegal occupation, and an increase in those who were willing to listen. Further, the armed resistance within the country had steadily increased, enjoying a resurgence after every triumphant marine claim that it had finally been ended.¹⁵⁹ Fuller and Cosmas point out that

¹⁵⁸ See, for example, Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 322.

¹⁵⁹ Report, 24 September, 1917, File "1917," "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1916*, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1917, 765-66; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1917*, (Washington:

constabulary troops continued to lack training because, due to steady armed resistance, they had to enter combat as soon as they were enlisted; Marines, too, were too low in numbers to take time from "their many other duties."¹⁶⁰ This was, of course, a major concern to those trying to administer the military government and the marine forces and constabulary, and made difficult any claim of progress.

Such indicators as the continuance of major guerrilla warfare therefore combined with global change to force a reappraisal of the entire approach toward the Dominican military. With all of these changes came, too, a reorientation of both resources and public interest from the United States. The result was that, after exactly two years of occupation, the constabulary was to undergo a major overhaul. Occupation forces would finally address, in concrete ways, the many problems that had plagued the constabulary since its foundation. A change in public reception of the constabulary, and in the constabulary itself, was desperately needed by the end of 1918 if the new force was to hold any authority at all with the population. Resentment of and disgust with the constabulary had grown so much by late 1918 that the force could hardly carry out any duties anymore without concern about widespread resistance.¹⁶¹ Late 1918 saw a scramble among occupying forces to undo the damage that had been done in 1917-1918, to re-make the constabulary. The changes they made, however, reflected Dominican suggestions from previous years and aspects of the pre-occupation Dominican military. They also reached back to the rules they had made for the organization in its original planning, restating them. For example, the constabulary commandant in October 1918, Charles F. Williams, stated in General Order No. 32

Government Printing Office), 1918, 838, 840; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1919*, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1920, 2375; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1920*, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1921, 46-50; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1921*, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1921, 52. Letters between military government and ingenio lawyer Francis Vedder, October-November 1918, File 2, Box 1, "Ejército Nacional," AGN1.

¹⁶⁰ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47.

¹⁶¹ Dominican testimony and statement of Horace Knowles, who served as lawyer for the Dominican case. United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1121.

(1918) that "only those applicants who are considered exceptionally desirable," that "new" enlistment requirements include literacy in Spanish and that recruits be Dominican citizens.¹⁶²

They emphasized that "there has, in the past and since the organization of the [constabulary], been reported to these Headquarters several cases of disorder, including drunkenness and street fighting in which members of the [constabulary] have been the chief leaders and participants." The new constabulary must be a selected body of men and not a body of men who "at the least provocation, disturb the peace and cause unnecessary disturbance in the community." Therefore all organization commanders were ordered, in October of 1918, to assemble their commands and explain this to the men, explain that the constabulary was now at authorized strength--partially because of the arrival of World War One draftees--and intending to "weed out members who are always causing trouble for themselves and for the Guardia as a whole." All "undesirables" were to be discharged and replaced by men who "can fulfill their duties." Finally, the new general order spelled out that "at least twice a week the police law of the DR will be read and explained to all organizations"--a technique that came almost word for word from the original suggestions of those Guardia Republicana officers who had submitted suggestions in April and May of 1917.¹⁶³

¹⁶² GND General Order No. 32, 17 October, 1918, File 2, Box 1, "Ejército Nacional," AGN1.

¹⁶³ GND General Order 33, 26 October 1918, Folder #2, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, EN Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Letter from Jefe de Zona Pedro Richardo in San Francisco de Macorís, 1 May 1917, "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas," 1917, "Oficios de Jefaturas de Zonas de la Guardia Nacional," Guerra y Marina 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

Chapter FOUR

The Osmosis of Tradition: Regional Negotiation

While many earlier complaints against the constabulary and the conduct of occupation were universal across regions, the inefficiency of transportation and communication, combined with censorship and local military control by marines, made resistance and response regional in nature from 1917 to 1920. Regional resistances waxed and waned depending on changes in the economy and local events. The regionalism of both the country and the constabulary meant that resistances *could* continue to be local and distinct, that constabulary forces *could*, and did, continue to keep opposition localized. Yet incessant problems with the occupation and constabulary, including a chronic lack of money and necessary resources, had plagued occupation planners and Dominican towns for the first years of the occupation. By late 1918, occupation government and general civil stability were tenuous at best. The need for solutions was apparent to both Dominicans and occupation forces by late 1918. Many national-level reforms, targeting problems identified from previous years, fell flat because the military government and constabulary leaders did not address fundamental problems and did not sufficiently address new, distinct problems arising in 1919 and 1920. Much of the planned reform of the constabulary, in the form of orders from the military government and constabulary central command, was ineffectual in military units throughout the country. In 1918, occupation planners worked to gain Dominican cooperation with occupation initiatives, so as to allow occupation administrators to carry out infrastructural reform planned first under the Cáceres administration (1905-1911) and then under the initial occupation government in 1916.

I argue that the period from 1918 to 1920 brought major change to the occupation

military approach. Dominicans and occupation forces during this period realized the need to try to be more flexible through local and regional negotiation, allowed the comingling of Dominican regional traditions and U.S. occupation plans. By late 1918, the official occupation was two years old, and marines had been a strong presence throughout the country for nearly three years. A process had begun by which Dominican society was adapting to the new realities and the occupation methods were adapting to Dominican society. While many Dominicans continued to demonstrate strong resistance to the occupation and the principle of foreign intervention on which it was founded, the invasive nature of the foreign presence could no longer be ignored or seen as transitory. New forms of cooperation and negotiation, which varied from population to population, began to develop and take definite shape during these intermediate years. Because the form of foreign intervention was military, power negotiations during this period tended to develop through and around military units, both marine and constabulary, in negotiation and conversation with civil society and government.

Marine officers leading the constabulary began to adapt their units to meet the exigencies of the situation. Because the broader institutional changes in the constabulary in this period seldom addressed the current problems, the military conduct of the occupation only functioned successfully through experimentation with local and individual negotiations. Occupation officers created such regional compromise by stepping back from original plans that had assumed a unified country. Through individual leaders, new compromises *embraced* the regionalism of the country as an answer to continuing problems of communication, transportation, funding, and regional resistance in late 1918 to mid-1920.¹ Marine officers and

¹ Frank Moya Pons gives a thorough description of the development and extent of regionalism in the country from independence to the time of occupation. He describes how the War of Restoration against Spain (1863-1865) was successful only because "local and regional leaders had been able to form a temporary alliance against the Spaniards," one which broke down as soon as Spain withdrew from the country. "Dominican politics had always

eventually Dominican officers attempting to lead constabulary forces in distinct regions far removed from the capital city, lacking sufficient manpower, resources, or civil support, developed local and regional responses. Dominican officials and populations also responded differently in distinct regions as the occupation wore on, and began to develop diverse modes of cooperation or resistance and, in the end, negotiation with the constabulary run by foreign forces that were beginning to seem a more permanent feature of society than most had expected in 1916. The gradual development of local and regional solutions in these years was carried out through an evolving dialogue between constabulary-marine forces and Dominican civilians, negotiations and relationships that made each local or regional response and solution both strongly Dominican and strongly influenced by U.S. forces and plans. Although the process created a precarious balance between the civilian and military, the occupation government and Dominican civil society, marine and constabulary units employed local solutions until consolidation occurred later in the occupation. In the wider context of the U.S. occupation, this was a significant step in the process of the new military's adaptation, one that allowed increasing Dominican character into the constabulary even while the majority of Dominicans continued to reject the constabulary as a foreign imposition. It also set regional tones for civil-military relations that were based as much on Dominican regional traditions as they were on marine-patterned power structures.

been based on personalism and *caudillismo*," Moya Pons explains, "because the population was primarily rural and illiterate, and their loyalty was only possible through a system of personal connections." Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 220.

Regional Variation and Negotiation; *lo dominicano*.

Until late 1919 and early 1920, constabulary units were mostly in communication with headquarters through the use of mounted units who brought orders and took reports. When they were cut off from central command supplies and orders, such as in the extremely rainy seasons of late 1919 or after the hurricane of 1920, or because of surges in guerrilla activity, their commanders had no choice but to improvise solutions to regional problems. These marine constabulary commanders, more familiar with their respective regions and men than a central command that failed to understand the regionalism, sometimes made on-the-spot decisions based on local realities even when they were not out of communication. This was especially true because many of the orders of the central military government did not take into account the intense regional differences throughout the country. Before the late 1919 minimal improvements in roads and railroads, even when conditions were good, general orders from the military government often took days or even weeks to reach marine outposts throughout the country, and the many marine groups actually administering the occupation outside of the capital often had to act without orders from above, outside of regional command, when situations warranted quick action. By the time general orders or responses arrived, these isolated units had developed their own strategies.

Due to the autonomy of constabulary units in provinces outside of those housing the major cities of Santo Domingo and Santiago, marines took many initiatives on their own by use of constabulary units. In addition to charting and keeping patrols, many worked to improve local civil-military relations, often gaining cooperation by setting themselves *apart* from the central organization of the widely hated military government. By 1918 and 1919, the experiences of marines who stayed in the Dominican Republic for longer periods had clearly demonstrated that

regions varied greatly in culture due to long traditions of regionalism and isolation, and many innovative initiatives were formed on this basis. Some marine constabulary leaders had been able to build local acquaintances to aid them in the gathering of information. In the years leading up to the final reforms that came with withdrawal initiatives in 1921-1924, often the only possible solution to the many discrepancies in military government theory versus practice was for constabulary leaders to create separate systems that varied by location. To combat frustrations and often violent clashes, and to increase morale, the military government and constabulary commandants generally encouraged individual and regional initiatives by 1919.²

Until central training and unit rotations began in late 1921, most constabulary members in any given unit with exception of the eastern provinces served in or near the locations at which they enlisted, working with populations in their areas of origin. Despite the fact that constabulary units throughout the provinces did have a semblance of central organization, and were modeled after marine-style military structure as though the constabulary were a mini-Marine Corps brigade, geography meant that more isolated units had to develop differently despite the shared character of being commanded by marines. As described in Chapters One and Two, previous Dominican national militaries had been strongly regional; the country's heavy geographical fragmentation, and the lack of transportation and communications infrastructure, continued to oppose military government attempts to unify the military until very late in the occupation.³ As with Heureaux's military in the 1890s, and that created under Cáceres in the following decade, the isolation and autonomy of Dominican provinces necessitated regional

² General Order number 22.

³ John Luke Gallup, Alejandro Gaviria and Eduardo Lora adapt the political science theory of fragmentation to demonstrate the social, cultural, and political effects of the wide diversity of geographical areas in most Latin American populations. They demonstrate that Latin American countries are the most geographically fragmented in the world, and that among Latin American countries the Dominican Republic ranks high, the seventh most fragmented country in Latin America. John Luke Gallup, Alejandro Gaviria, Eduardo Lora, *Is Geography Destiny? Lessons from Latin America*, (Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2003), 11-14.

solutions. By late 1918, constabulary units had largely settled into regional patterns in which company commanders, all marines in this period, had broad power for on-the-spot decision making and recruited mainly from the landless, illiterate classes in the countryside who guarded the areas around which they had enlisted. The pattern and power relations at work in the system were highly reminiscent of the Dominican tradition of maintaining control through outlying provinces by giving authorities to caudillo generals who ruled by force and decree and recruited from the rural, illiterate populations in their regions.⁴

The country's top one-hundred or so elite families had traditionally controlled politics and the military, and Dominicans of other social classes negotiated empowerment through the establishment of patron-client relationships with elite families and military leaders. In the intermediate years of the occupation, the local negotiations of all classes with occupation forces opened to the *gente de segunda* the choice of allying with either the elite families, who widely opposed the occupation, or with the foreign power. In the first years of the occupation, most had sought to maintain neutrality or negotiate between the two, but during this intermediate period, the occupation seemed to settle into a certain permanency. By late 1918, when it was clear to Dominicans that the course of the occupation was to play a role in deciding what the post-occupation Dominican Republic would look like, some began to ally strongly with one side or the other. In a clientelist society, in which the rising *gente de segunda* would normally turn to the prominent elites for patronage and power, it was not surprising that some allied themselves with the military government forces through this period. Both Ducoudray and Calder list some of those who came to collaborate with the military government, which increasingly seemed a

⁴ "Correspondencia y Decretos," 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289, AGN. Military units in the decades leading up to the occupation, as described in Chapter One, had much the same composition. As a representative pre-civil war example, the national army unit guarding Puerto Plata in the years 1903-1904 consisted of 84 men, 64 recruits from Puerto Plata Común, and only twenty from other areas, most of which were near Puerto Plata.

source of protection and insurance or, as Calder points out, a patron, source of jobs, and even a potential customer or an ally in settling grudges against other Dominicans.⁵

Despite the similarities to the pre-occupation system, the military could boast one major difference during the middle years of the occupation: the leading "caudillo" figures heading local and regional military units during this time were foreigners, most of whom spoke little to no Spanish. This meant that the enlisted men who had traditionally been powerless in such structures were empowered as go-betweens and negotiators, as they were the only ones able to communicate effectively with local populations. Both the language barrier and the anti-U.S. sentiment through most of the country meant that marine constabulary commanders were distanced from populations, leaving constabulary men with some power to take initiatives in local communications. The results varied by region. Some enlisted men and Dominican non-commissioned officers in 1919 and 1920, used this empowerment to better their own social positions or enrich themselves, while others used it to lessen the impact and intrusiveness of the foreign imperative. Some used the position of relative power to aid guerrilla and anti-occupation forces. As with the roles of the constabulary, Dominicans' use of this power to insert themselves in negotiations also became largely regional in character by 1920.

From the beginning of the occupation, the military government commanders divided the country into the Department of the North and the Department of the South, separating the military administration much as previous Dominican governments had done, bowing to the natural geographical division caused by the Cordillera Central that dissects the country. In 1918, a further military division was created with the formation of the Department of the East to designate the area of the eastern provinces as militarily exceptional, due to the extent of guerrilla warfare there. The constabulary was built with regional headquarters for each Department.

⁵ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 28; Ducoudray Jr., "Una epopeya ignorada," 37-40.

Within these largely superficial designations, however, were sub-regions that were not officially recognized by the organization of the constabulary, but which had rather different cultural and economic concerns, different reactions to occupation initiatives, and constabulary companies with different approaches. They were not militarily unified until the changes of late 1920 and 1921. I have divided the regions by groups of provinces based on widely shared social, geographical, and agricultural characteristics.⁶

Table 4.1 Dominican Populations by Region in 1920.⁷

Region and Provinces	Total Population	% urban population
Capital region; Santo Domingo	146,652	4.3%
Southwest; Barahona and Azua	149,326	1.05%
Northwest; Monte Cristi	67,073	0.6%
Interior; Santiago and La Vega	229,285	1.7%
North coast; Puerto Plata, Espaillat, Pacificador	188,085	0.8%
Samaná peninsula; Samaná	16,915	0.7%
Eastern region; El Seibo, San Pedro de Macorís	97,329	1.55%

Strong regional variation had long been a character of the Dominican political, economic, and cultural landscape, reinforced through successive governments and militaries before the occupation.⁸ In the first years of occupation the military government was unsuccessful in creating a new, unified and monolithic central government backed by a powerful national military; they met the same difficulties with communications, transportation, regional allegiances, and regional cultures with which previous governments had struggled. When the apparent military solution was to place individual commanders in the various regions and give

⁶ This division is based in part on the information given by the National Census of 1920, which demonstrates strongly variant regional characteristics, and also on the regional social differences evident in the Dominican sources cited over the following pages.

⁷ Dominican Republic, *Primer Censo Nacional*, 1920, 124-126; Lozano, *La dominación imperialista*, 277.

⁸ Schoenrich describes how Dominicans also identified themselves culturally by region through use of differences in pronunciation of Spanish, a point that seems to have been held up as a source of regional pride; in Azua, for example, he says that many Dominicans held their province's Spanish to be the best in the country, a claim that was disputed by other regions. *Santo Domingo*, 172-173.

them wide autonomy, the pattern was reinforced--a step intended as a temporary measure to allow the occupation to gain the control it had failed to achieve in the early occupation.⁹ Marine constabulary commanders developed different regional methods to improve civil-military relations and to attempt to improve the efficiency or reputations of their constabulary units in their given regions, methods that varied greatly by region in both approach and result. Much of the rule in intermediate years was like that in Haiti, consisting of "military control of the occupied towns and cities [that] varied in style and emphasis according to the personalities of local commanders."¹⁰ One type of major initiative undertaken by constabulary commanders, for example, was using constabulary units to provide civil infrastructural improvements or general aid to areas under their command, so as to show general improvement of living standard through the constabulary while simultaneously facilitating military control. Dominicans in some regions such as the east and the northwest frequently resented such initiatives as unwarranted imperial impositions.¹¹ Dominican intellectuals and community leaders in the interior and north, for example, began a campaign against marine health initiatives introduced to combat disease.¹² Many resisted attempts by the marine-officered constabulary to reform sanitation and public

⁹ General Order number 22, "Ejército Nacional," Box 1, AGN1; Fuller describes many aspects of the regional variations among Marine commanders, including the broad autonomy they had and the lack of effective central command through these years. Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*. See especially 28-29, 32-33, 47-48, 54-61.

¹⁰ Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti*, 70.

¹¹ Despite censorship within the Dominican Republic during these years, the contemporary literature concerning the rejection of occupation interference in civil law and development is extensive. See especially: Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, *Nacionalismo*, (Santo Domingo: Biblioteca Nacional, 1986); Julio Jaime Julia, *Antología de Américo Lugo*, 3 vols. (Santo Domingo: Taller, 1976); Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 803-849; Testimonies of Dominican lawyers and ex-government functionaries, United States, "Senate Inquiry," 946-970; Max Henríquez Ureña, *El imperialismo yanqui: los yanquis en Santo Domingo*, (Madrid: M. Aguilar, 1929), 85-133. Chapter Six discusses this opposition further in terms of its influence on the development of the constabulary in the later years of occupation.

¹² I.S.K. Reeves, "Statement Regarding smallpox in Dominican Republic, and Expenditures for Vaccine," "Gobierno Militar años 1916-1922," Box 43, AGN.

health, and even used such efforts as rallying cries against foreign attempts to restructure Dominican society.¹³

In addition to the varying reactions of regional populations, other, more military issues contributed to the distinct regional characteristics of the constabulary. Armed resistance was more of a problem in the Southwest and the East through 1919, and the need for constabulary prison guards was much more demanding in the Departments of the North and the South. In the Department of the East, constabulary and marine planners did not trust native Dominicans to guard civil prisons, and prisoners were often moved from those areas to be housed near the much more well-guarded capital and away from resistance leaders.¹⁴ Because resistance leaders were housed in prisons around the capital city, most marine prison guards were employed there, while most of the constabulary guards guarded prisons in the Northern District.¹⁵

Santo Domingo

The province housing the capital city of the Dominican Republic was, of course, exceptional in that it housed the majority of military government administrators and marine forces in the country during the entirety of the occupation, contained the most advanced and well-kept roads, was widely connected by telephone and telegraph, and was the primary site of most large, national initiatives taken such as the development of the national penitentiary. It was, therefore, a region that was closely monitored by marines. Because of the heavy marine

¹³ Communications and public statements, "Gobierno Militar Americano," Box 43, AGN1; such attempts included local laws about disposal of waste that were to be enforced by constabulary units--a power that went well beyond the stated occupation goals in Knapp's proclamation of 1916, which had promised to leave local, civil government to local Dominican officials. Some of these resistance initiatives were formed by local governments, and others by intellectuals or the general population. These initiatives are discussed further in Chapter Five.

¹⁴ General Order Number 24 of 3 July, 1918 guaranteed the availability of constabulary units for prisoner transfer as necessary.

¹⁵ "Percentage of Men Employed as Guards in Civil Prisons," File, "Secretaría de Estado de Justicia e Instrucción Pública 1920," Box 64 (1916-1920), Gobierno Militar Americano, AGN1.

presence, the constabulary was thin and less influential in Santo Domingo; constabulary units in the province were often relegated in this region to garrisoning the capital city or patrolling the province's border with the Department of the East.¹⁶ In addition to being one of the first and most thoroughly occupied locations in the Dominican Republic, it was also an area easily monitored by a military presence because it had been the traditional seat of the national militaries of the past, and the province that had supplied the majority of recruits to the national militaries.¹⁷ Within the capital city, marine and constabulary units met much less direct opposition to military rule.¹⁸ In more urban areas such as Santo Domingo, more plentiful and immediate resources and funds also meant more emphasis on public instruction and civil improvements. But constabulary and marine units, in the absence of municipal police during the early years of the occupation, also had to carry out policing functions, and those constabulary units that were stationed in the crowded city spent much of their time attempting to reinforce military government initiatives to improve sanitation.¹⁹

The East: El Seibo and Macorís

In large part because of history and social science interest in the modernization of agriculture juxtaposed with the rise of guerrilla insurgency there, many studies have examined

¹⁶ "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. Many of the military records for this province from the years 1916 to 1922 do not appear in the archives in Santo Domingo; it was the company through which Trujillo came into the constabulary, and nearly all military records pertaining to his areas of service before he reached the rank of Captain are similarly lacking in the archives.

¹⁷ See, for example, "Nóminas," Box 1, folder 1, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 008836, AGN; "Nómina, Battallón Ozama 1904," "Correspondencia y Decretos," 1902-1905, Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 007289, AGN.

¹⁸ Most such manifestations of resistance within Santo Domingo are discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Five, and were especially minimal during the intermediate years under discussion, as the combination of military surveillance and middle-class entrepreneurialism in the capital settled much of the region's population into more stable patterns during 1918-1920.

¹⁹ Communications, Santo Domingo, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

the eastern provinces of El Seibo and San Pedro de Macorís.²⁰ This region, before the occupation and even before the civil war of 1911-1916, was the site of intense friction between those who wanted to retain communal landholdings and caudillo rule and those who hoped to invest or enrich themselves in large-scale sugar plantation wealth. U.S. interest in the growing Dominican sugar trade was augmented by the growing U.S. ownership of such plantations. During the occupation, marines cooperated widely with the owners of sugar *centrales*, both Dominican and American. Many sugar planters, both foreign and Dominican, had invested their fortunes in the rise of sugar during the previous decades since its growth under dictator Heureaux, and were therefore already pitted against the regional caudillos who openly rebelled against the central government in 1915.²¹ Sugar plantation owners felt that the autonomy of the region depended on capitalism and a form of modernization that moved the region away from traditional power relationships and the type of communal property holding that was still widespread outside of the plantations. This made the east distinct from the rest of the country, a region that even Dominicans saw as a separate political and developmental sphere.²²

The description of the area by marine forces and those heading the constabulary demonstrate both their lack of understanding about the state of the region, and the fact that their intelligence there came almost exclusively from the wealthy planters. Thorpe, for example, described the area as being from the beginning of the occupation full of thousands of "murderers

²⁰ No study focuses on the constabulary's role there; the historiography has focused on the Marine-Dominican guerrilla warfare and the role of the growing sugar industry in the region. The most detailed studies of the guerrilla warfare are Félix Servio Ducoudray, *Los "Gavilleros" del este: una epopeya calumniada*, (Santo Domingo: Editora de la Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, 1976) and Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros." See also: Felix Servio Ducoudray, "Una epopeya ignorada: ¿Fueron bandidos los guerrilleros antiyanquis de 1916?" *Ahora!* No. 557, 15 July 1974, 37-43. The phenomenon of rapid change and modernization of sugar plantations and their effects on a caudillo society are more well-researched. Wilfredo Lozano, Luis Mejía, and Tulio H. Arvelo have contributed vital historical examinations of economy and social realities surrounding the period before and during U.S. occupation, including the types and extent of oppression by U.S. occupation forces.

²¹ Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 653.

²² See, for example, Ducoudray, "Una epopeya ignorada " 37-43.

and fugitives." His descriptions demonstrate his lack of understanding about the civil war preceding the occupation. For marines officering the constabulary, these "bandits" "made a fine nucleus for insurrections; with slight aid from corrupt politicians or other interests opposed to the military occupation, they could easily form a raiding party that terrorized the inhabitants of a section. They knew the innumerable mountain and forest trails and so could cover themselves from pursuit."²³ As a purely military problem, in the eyes of marines, this situation of guerrilla warfare was one that should be handled through pure force.²⁴ From the beginning, however, they found that the creation and maintenance of constabulary units in the region was either impossible or difficult. As described in Chapter Three, Dominicans in the region were less likely to join the constabulary in the beginning, leaving most of the guarding of vital sugar properties to marines and individually hired *guardacampestres*. With the gradual disarmament of the population, marines sought to use constabulary units to guard plantations. They quickly found that the majority of the population cooperated with the guerrillas, and saw even Dominican sugar plantation owners as traitors to the country if they cooperated with foreign armed forces.²⁵ Many of the U.S. planters, too, resented the intrusion of marines and constabulary into their affairs because they had so long functioned with near autonomy from Dominican governments before the occupation.²⁶ Such constabulary members as did join to work in the East were targeted for abuse by the general population and assassination by both guerrilla leaders.²⁷

Many of those who did join the constabulary there in 1918 and 1919 seem to have done so to get personal revenge on other Dominicans and even foreigners who they felt had wronged

²³ George C. Thorpe, "Dominican Service," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, 4:4 (December, 1919), 319-320.

²⁴ *Ibid.*; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 33-45.

²⁵ Ducoudray, "Una epopeya ignorada " 37-38; Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 52-67, 85-90.

²⁶ Knight, *The Americans in Santo Domingo*, 102.

²⁷ Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 60-67.

them, which in itself made the interaction between constabulary and civilians brutal.²⁸ Some Dominicans secretly agreed to act as guides to the constabulary in isolated regions with terrain and politics unfamiliar to constabulary units and marines. As soon as they were seen working with constabulary units, however, they became targets. Guerrillas advertised their involvement with the constabulary, publicizing constabulary actions that led to the deaths of women and children during constabulary arrests, and working to assassinate such guides.²⁹ Many of the guides, too, quit working for the constabulary once they realized the brutalities that were being carried out by the organization.³⁰

Reports also show that deaths of and violence against constabulary enlisted men in these provinces were more common, and that those who did enlist in the constabulary in this region were more likely to desert.³¹ Whereas constabulary members in other areas might desert and join resistance, or simply not re-enlist, tensions were so high in the east that there is at least one recorded incident of a constabulary members in uniform firing on a marine in San Pedro de Macorís.³² This level of tension is not surprising. In addition to the guerrilla warfare and the already tense character of the rapidly evolving provinces of the east, constabulary units lacked training or sufficient incentive, and, as they were locally recruited in the years leading up to 1920, faced strong pressure from families and acquaintances. Their main duties, after all, were carrying out arrests and raids on local populations; arrests tended to become violent, and a

²⁸ Ducoudray, "Una epopeya ignorada " 37-38; Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 652; United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1117-1119.

²⁹ RW Conkley, "Field Operation re bandits," undated, USMC, Historical Division, "Geographical Files," "Santo Domingo," file 1919; O.T. Pfeiffer, commanding officer Guayabo Dulce, "Report of killing of one, Bolito," 20 May 1920, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," 1920, Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

³⁰ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1141-1147.

³¹ Commandant reports, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Intelligence reports and "Reports from Seibo," Box 3, Files 11-19, Year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908; "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," File 1920, "Geographical Files," USMC, Historical Division, Quantico.

³² United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1158-1159.

number of constabulary members were killed in shootouts with local guerrilla forces while attempting to search homes.³³ Further, constabulary units here were especially undersupplied for the work they were attempting to carry out. Until well into 1919, none of the companies operating in the field here had field radios.³⁴ Patrols were ineffectively planned and coordinated, and often regional commanders, both marine and constabulary, had little knowledge of where their patrols were. Fuller and Cosmas point out that "sometimes patrols from two or three commands might be operating in the same area, totally unaware of each other's presence."³⁵

Internal conflicts in the region increased in the first years of the occupation both because many U.S. planters resented marine and constabulary interference and because arming Dominicans--even constabulary members, might mean arming some who would serve as double agents for the resistance. At first the military government tried to solve this problem by allowing plantation owners to hire and arm their own forces from among local populations. Many such men were subsequently found to be, or accused of, working with resistance leaders, especially by helping guerrilla fighters get supplies and arms or by giving them information about marine and constabulary whereabouts. These difficulties were answered by a combination of force and torture and by the hiring of foreigners to guard plantation lands as *guardacampestres*, whose pay and orders came from plantation owners.³⁶ La Romana, for example, in 1919 employed two hundred Puerto Rican "ex-policemen" as factory and plantation guards in addition to being guarded at all times by a force of marines.³⁷ The struggle between Dominicans in the region led

³³ "Reports from Seibo," Box 3, Files 11-19, Year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

³⁴ Fuller, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 41-43.

³⁵ Fuller, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 43.

³⁶ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 51; Jan Knippers Black, "Development and Dependency in the Dominican Republic," *Third World Quarterly* 8:1 (Jan. 1986), 236-257; Franck, *Roaming*, 226-227, 255. Most such workers and guards came from Puerto Rico, Haiti, and the islands of the West Indies. Dominican Republic, *Primer censo nacional*, 146.

³⁷ Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 9.

to an intensity of conflict that pitted more and more Dominicans against each other as time passed. Local doctors or store owners with supplies or medicines that could be used by the other side was suspect, and some were tortured or killed based only on this possibility.³⁸ Both Dominican and U.S. plantation owners found themselves in the middle of a power struggle between guerrilla forces and marine-constabulary forces; many, unwilling to trust either the constabulary or local civil authorities--who might be working with guerrillas--sent their complaints directly to the military government offices in the capital.³⁹

From 19 August of 1918, as measure against guerrilla warfare, then-constabulary commandant George C. Thorpe issued the order for the constabulary and marines to begin a concentration of inhabitants; this often brutal campaign included the burning of homes and crops of non-combatants as insurance against the resupply of guerrilla fighters.⁴⁰ The camps used in this campaign in San Pedro de Macorís and El Seibo moved populations of entire towns at the threat of force and violence; Dominicans are reported to have starved in these camps for lack of food, while towns ceased to exist in some areas.⁴¹ Local populations began to flee their homes because of the destruction of land and crops and the twin dangers presented by marine-constabulary forces and guerrilla forces. Soldiers from both sides were known to accuse neutral residents of being secretly allied with the other side, and to torture or kill the residents based on

³⁸ See, for example: United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1112.

³⁹ Ducoudray, "Una epopeya ignorada " 37-38; Franks, 205-214.

⁴⁰ Julia, *Antología de Americo Lugo*, vol. I, 105.

⁴¹ "America's Ireland," 232; F.S. Ducoudray, Jr., *Los "gavilleros" del este*, 25-33. This action by Thorpe was one of the concrete results of Military Government efforts through 1918 to bring more officers and administrators who were experienced with other foreign interventions; army manuals from interventions in Cuba and the Philippines outlined this tactic as an effective way of controlling populations during guerrilla warfare. See Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*. The camps, known by Dominicans as *reconcentraciones*, were identical in design and devastation to the infamous camps of Spanish Captain-General Waleriano Weyler during the Cuban war for independence. Dominicans noted the hypocrisy of U.S. criticisms of Weyler and then use of the same system in the Dominican Republic.

these accusations.⁴² Those who fled, however, were seen as suspects by marine constabulary officers. Families who fled the area to hide in the bush and hills were chased down by constabulary forces. Patrol reports include numerous stories of women and children in 1919 and 1920 who, after fleeing from the marines and constabulary, were shot and killed in hidden camps that were found to harbor no arms or guerrillas.⁴³ The military government did not officially halt the concentration system until 1921, when the U.S. Senate Inquiry brought the U.S. public's attention to the atrocities being committed in the Dominican Republic under this campaign. Even when it was halted, many of the practices carried out under it were revived through 1921 and 1922 as the guerrilla campaign and the marine-constabulary campaign against it "took on a new intensity and cohesion."⁴⁴ To aid in the concentration of civilians, constabulary officers and their units employed the help of the Marine First Air Squadron based between Santo Domingo and the eastern provinces. At the direction of the constabulary, marines in airplanes dropped fire bombs on hamlets and villages and shot at fleeing Dominicans in the countryside.⁴⁵ The Air Squadron first directed attacks against human targets in the east in July, 1919, and in 1920 was moved to another improvised air field near Santo Domingo and re-equipped with more versatile and maneuverable planes to facilitate its missions in guerrilla combat.⁴⁶ In addition to carrying out mapping services, being used in attacks, and even carrying mail, the planes were used to drop messages from the air to remote patrols and thereby keep marine and constabulary patrols in communication with headquarters, or to carry troops over mountainous areas in orientation

⁴² United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1118-1119; Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 102-189.

⁴³ Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1920-1921, and Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1921-1922, Headquarters, Departamento del Norte, "Guardia Nacional" file, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁴⁴ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 43.

⁴⁵ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 50; Alfred A. Cunningham, "Weekly News Letter," First Air Squadron, USMC, 12 February, 1921; Fuller and Cosmas, 58.

⁴⁶ Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea*, 250. The First Air Squadron in the Dominican Republic had an average strength of nine officers and 130 enlisted men, and usually kept six aircraft in operation. Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 40-41.

flights that would help them later patrol the areas by foot.⁴⁷

Finally, in 1920, constabulary commanders decided that they would have to bring in constabulary units recruited from distant locations, who would not have personal ties to the problems of the east; a rotation system that they would use throughout the country beginning the next year to attempt to increase control. Trujillo serves as a good example of such recruits in the East. From west of the capital, where he had previously served as a *guardacampestre*, he was brought to the east in 1920 and succeeded there despite repeated disciplinary actions against him. He did so by being efficient, often through brutality, and by cultivating friendships with marine officers.⁴⁸ As Trujillo's involvement and action in these years demonstrate, a successful career in the constabulary in the eastern region, unlike elsewhere, would generally be formed through efficient brutality. These constabulary members' cultivation of such friendships with marine occupiers would not have endeared any Dominican to the general population any more than did the brutality. For the purposes of marine attempts to end armed resistance and speed up the construction of infrastructure against the backdrop of continuous resistance, however, such members were seen as necessary.

The Southwest: Barahona and Azua

The large southwestern region, comprising the provinces of Barahona and Azua, was as remote and isolated during the occupation as it long had been. Based largely on small plantation agriculture producing sugar and coffee, the region had seen little change since the nineteenth

⁴⁷ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 41.

⁴⁸ Vega also documents the brutality with which Trujillo carried out his early duties. Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 3-10. Much of the record of this brutality and disciplinary actions taken against Trujillo under the authority of the constabulary, some appearing in Vega's work, is found in Biographical File: Thomas E. Watson, USMC Archives and Special collections, Quantico. The records do not exist today in the AGN. See also Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 328.

century, and was not an area of major and rapid foreign investment. The only exception was its far eastern reaches, which abutted the capital city and had seen some development in sugar plantations. Azua and Barahona, long separate in administration from the central government, and seldom heavily involved in factional conflicts pitting Santo Domingo against Santiago, were traditionally run by wealthy planter families headed by generals in the old military. One of the most prominent planters in the region at the time of occupation, Wenceslao Ramírez, remained one of the region's more powerful influences, and serves as a useful example of how power relationships were negotiated during the occupation years.⁴⁹ Like in the East, though to a much lesser extent, the Southwest had become a political battleground between those who supported traditional landholding patterns and those--like Ramírez, who allied with Heureaux and plantation owners and encouraged the western-style "progress" of the region. Because the Southwest did not suffer the results of rapid change that overtook the East, some local leaders such as Ramírez were able to balance many occupation priorities with local approval by maintaining the local populations' priorities and interests during the years leading up to 1920. Importantly, the occupation penetrated selectively through this region; it was not high priority for the building of infrastructure, either for economic advancement or military control. As before the occupation, the region remained mostly neglected by the central government, making the regional power negotiations for men like Ramírez much less complicated than they were in the East, where such a planter would be condemned by *guerrilleros* for aiding occupation forces.

Life-long resident Victor Garrido, who was the Inspector of Public Instruction in Azua from July 1918, and later served as Trujillo's Secretary of State of Education, described the area

⁴⁹ Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 39-41. Ramírez had become a general in the army in 1884, "Superior Chief of the Borders" under Heureaux in 1895.

during the occupation as being in a state of economic, social and cultural crisis.⁵⁰ The Americans, he states, did not tie people to the tails of horses or burn them with hot irons as they did in the East,⁵¹ nor did they name anyone governor based on the promise that said governor would assassinate enemies of the military government. Yet Garrido lamented what he saw as the decline of this region through the occupation. Men of high social position and respect such as José Alfonso Lagranje and Abigaíl Díaz were reduced to "sweeping the streets," or to carrying back cans of water on their heads from the river for constabulary and U.S. troops because they had been accused of concealing or owning firearms, whether proven or not.⁵² Respected General Juan Bautista Ramírez of the old military, Garrido's brother-in-law, even committed suicide in Bánica rather than endure the humiliation of such treatment.⁵³ Garrido also reports that when Dr. Armando Aybar of Azua refused to carry heavy items for constabulary troops, the commanders forced him to carry a sack of one hundred books from one site to another with a bayonet at his back.⁵⁴ What Garrido describes and laments is not only the brutalities of the occupation and constabulary, but the overturn of society and social classes in the region. While some prominent leaders in society were able to maintain their status even when they lost their military titles during the occupation, the majority were unwilling to compromise their arms, their honor, or their standards, and were thus treated poorly by occupation troops and the constabulary. Others rose to higher social prominence by cooperating with occupation and constabulary forces; Miguel Angel Roca, for example, cooperated and did well for himself as Governor of the

⁵⁰ Victor Garrido, *En la ruta de mi vida, 1886-1966*, (Santo Domingo: Impresora "Arte y Cine," 1970), 113.

⁵¹ These events are documented widely, and were some of the more prominent complaints brought forward in testimonies at the Senate inquiry. See United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1126-1130. See Chapter Five for a further discussion of such events in relation to the constabulary in the East.

⁵² Garrido, *En la ruta de mi vida*, 106-108. Garrido reports that many such accusations were not even investigated before the accused were punished and stripped of their social positions, a claim that would balance with reports throughout the rest of the country.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 108.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

province of Azua.⁵⁵ The regionally widely loved popular intellectual and professional General Carmito Ramírez, however, was imprisoned in Azua for nine months on unproven accusations that he had received arms shipments from Germany, before he was released by the testimony of his father-in-law Wenceslao Ramírez.⁵⁶

In addition to the broader changes reaching the region through occupation and a push toward modernization in agriculture, some constabulary initiatives did directly affect the region. They were all highly controversial. The highest priority for the constabulary in the region, and one that was not new, was the desire to bring more efficient control and policing of the long border that the southwestern provinces shared with Haiti. While the Border Patrol established in pre-occupation years had long worked to build such a policing authority, the creation of constabulary units in the provinces of Azua and Barahona, with high priority on "dominicanizing" the border, changed the power dynamics of the enterprise.⁵⁷ Instead of a mostly removed, rural force maintained in border outposts away from the cities, the border would be policed by constabulary units whose headquarters were in the towns and who encouraged certain types of development along the border.

As armed resistance in the interior of Haiti grew from 1915 to 1918, the desire of U.S. officials to better police the border grew exponentially. The urgency of this prioritization of the border was doubled not only by the increase in resistance over the border, but by the continued growth and prosperity of the peasant religious movement under "Dios" Olivario that had long prospered in the region. The movement, begun in the years of turmoil and change before the

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 108. Miguel Angel Roca later served as president of Trujillo's Cámara de Diputados, until the latter imprisoned him.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 109-110; Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 95-97. By the final years of the occupation, José del Carmen "Carmito" Ramírez would come to work with occupation officials and the constabulary, negotiating, like his father-in-law, between their desires and local priorities. He became the most powerful man of the Ramírez family between the occupation and the Trujillo era. Lundius and Lundahl, 134-137.

⁵⁷ Garrido, *En la ruta de mi vida*, 118-121.

occupation, drew followers from provinces around the country, and emphasized tradition and the power of communal landholdings and communal prosperity. In short, it was a largely anti-capitalist movement that sought to undo rapid change in the area.⁵⁸ With wide rural support and an extensive network throughout the sparsely-populated southwest and the mountains that bordered the north of the region, the movement was seen as a high-priority problem by occupation and constabulary officials. Characterizing Olivorio and his followers as "common bandits" trying to take advantage of the rural populations--despite the lack of violence of those in the movement--the constabulary hunted Olivorio's followers with the same zeal that they did the followers of guerrilla leaders such as Vicentico and Chachá in the East.⁵⁹ The similarities between those movements in the East and Olivorismo in the Southwest were, with the exception of some of their root causes, actually different in most ways. The movement enjoyed strong support from the oligarchy, including the powerful Ramírez family, from its inception around 1912. This support that continued illicitly throughout the occupation to the death of Olivorio.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, much of the time and manpower of the constabulary was spent on trying to root out those regionally supported followers of Olivorismo, with whom constabulary members often

⁵⁸ Lundius and Lundahl provide an incredibly valuable two-decade study of the movement in the region, combining historical, sociological, and economic research and analysis in a 774-page publication that spans the years from the beginning of the movement in the southwestern region through the campaign against the movement in the last years of Trujillo's regime. Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*. For the communal and anti-capitalist aspects of the movement, see especially 72-78.

⁵⁹ Byrd, "Field Operations re bandits," 3 March 1919, File 1919, "Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Weekly memo from Harry E. Hurst, 4th Co. Dajabón, to Colonel Commander, PND, reports dated 16 July, 1921, 23 July, 1921, Box 3, Files 11-19, years 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 35-37; Olivorio's highest-ranking follower was killed by constabulary forces in May of 1922, with the consolidation of a more unified and nationally powerful constabulary, and Olivorio himself was killed a week later. Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 70, 112-121.

⁶⁰ Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 57-80. Guardia Republicana generals and local elite families in the Southwest struggled between each other for the support of the Olivoristas during the civil war of 1911-1916; Olivorio pledged his support to the elite families. Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 57-58. Though the decision may well have been closely related to Olivorio's personal relationship with the Ramírez family, who had served as his patrons before he began the Olivorista movement, the resulting relationship continued to serve him well through occupation years when the old national military was disbanded and the oligarchy maintained a great deal of its power.

exchanged fire, and on patrols for whom more than half of constabulary units at any time were operating in the years 1919 to 1922 through these provinces.⁶¹

Because of the focus of constabulary units on pursuing Olivoristas and patrolling the border, the majority of enlisted men had little contact with the region's urban populations. Constabulary men were therefore often generally isolated, housed in barracks outposts created in previous years for various border guards, and interfering less overall in civil government than they were in any other region in the country. The higher ranking members of these units, marines during these years, spent much more time at the urban headquarters. Until after 1921, these commanders were known among the population for their abuse of power and willingness to commit illegal acts that would not be prosecuted or even investigated by a central command.⁶² Furthermore, they were at the head of the few initiatives that affected the rural *and* urban populations in the region, among which the most controversial was an initiative to improve irrigation throughout the region.⁶³ This particular action was especially controversial both because it involved strong interference in local, civil laws, and also because it favored the U.S.-owned Barahona Company.⁶⁴ The constabulary through the Southwest thus consisted mainly of an interfering and locally disliked Marine officer corps in the cities and a constabulary enlisted corps whose majority was preoccupied with patrols focusing on Olivorismo, isolated mountain populations that were difficult to monitor, and the policing of the long Haitian border, for which

⁶¹ Informes, File 1, 1917-1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; operational reports, Files 1919 and 1920, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 105-116.

⁶² Garrido, *En la ruta de mi vida*, 122; Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 97-102

⁶³ 1919 proposals from local officers to distribute water to arid regions, "Gobierno Militar," File 69, AGN1; see also: communications, Box 26 (folder 1919), "Secretaría de Interior y Policía," Dep. 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*; Garrido, *En la ruta*, 111-113; See also: Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 104-105. The second most controversial civil reform that these authorities attempted was in school reform, and is discussed further in Chapter Five.

the Southwest inherited much of the structure of the pre-occupation U.S. Customs Border Patrol.⁶⁵

The Northwest: Monte Christi

The Northwest, centered on the Province of Monte Christi and the mountains to its south, had long presented problems to the creation of a unified, central government or military. The region, home of pro-German and anti-U.S. caudillo and former Minister of War Desiderio Arias, boasted the tradition of hosting and supplying both anti-U.S. and anti-government movements. Containing a growing port and the most-used border crossing with Haiti, it was a province that had long functioned as largely separate from central governments and even those northern governments based in the city of Santiago.⁶⁶ Mostly self-sufficient due to unregulated border trade with Haiti, and the enterprising and cattle ranching of a mixed Haitian-Dominican population that stretched back in development for more than a century, the dry northwest was growing economically in the years leading up to the occupation. Growth also came from rapidly increasing international trade through Monte Cristi's port, most of which was oriented toward Germany.⁶⁷ This trade had changed the landscape of the province's smaller towns, leading to a growing entrepreneurial population that benefitted from trade with Germany and fiercely

⁶⁵ The Border Patrol is discussed at length in Chapter Two.

⁶⁶ While Arias himself was seen by occupation authorities as not much of a threat after 1917, his anti-occupation and pro-German stance was representative of the many members of the previous military who made their homes in the province, many of whom were close friends of Arias. Intelligence reports, Box 3, Files 11-19, Year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. Arias's previous career is also discussed at length in Chapter Two, but he was seen by many during this period as a hero and a representative of the fight for Dominican sovereignty. See: Nancie L. Gonzalez, "Desiderio Arias: Caudillo, Bandit, and Culture Hero," *Journal of American Folklore*, 85:335 (Jan-Mar 1972), 42-50.

⁶⁷ 4th Company weekly reports, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007809, AGN; Port records, Monte Christi, "Correspondencia," 1912-1921, Relaciones Exteriores Dep. 07, I.T. 007952, AGN.

maintained its independence and autonomy.⁶⁸ At the time of the pre-occupation civil war, Monte Cristi was still recovering from President Ramón Cáceres's concerted effort to violently force the region's caudillos to conform with centralization of the country, an effort that had forcefully depopulated many of the Northwest's rural areas and left much of the countryside devastated.⁶⁹ When marines invaded the country in mid-1916, the population of the Northwest was one of the areas that offered the most armed resistance to the marine presence, including the two major battles at Las Trencheras and Guayacanes.⁷⁰

The military government's major concerns in Monte Cristi from 1916 to 1920 were the presence of so many anti-government and anti-U.S. people of influence and monitoring the two major ports of entry into the country. As the military government found marine and constabulary forces often spread too thin to efficiently police both the border and the port, the occupation administration gradually re-routed port traffic toward Puerto Plata and Santo Domingo.⁷¹ The changes in the early years of occupation thus brought economic decline for many of the families that had newly risen to the middle classes in the region.⁷² Like the Southwest, the Northwest region also presented the constabulary with the problem of policing the border. Unlike the Southwest, however, the border region here was less remote. Populations had long settled along

⁶⁸ Balaguer, a young son of a tobacco entrepreneur from the region during this time and later a high functionary in Trujillo's government, president of the Dominican Republic, and important literary figure, gives an account of the economic growth and the subsequent effects of U.S. intervention and re-orientation of trade, the latter of which would cause the gradual decline of the port and therefore the city of Monte Cristi. Balaguer, *Memorias*, 18-19.

⁶⁹ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 296-298.

⁷⁰ García Godoy, *El Derrumbe*, 173-174; "Battle of Guayacanes (July 3, 1916) and occupation of Santiago," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 16-18.

⁷¹ 4th Company weekly reports, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007809, AGN; Balaguer, *Memorias*, 424. One reason for this re-directing of port traffic from the early years of the occupation, in addition to the shortage of manpower and resources in the more remote area, is the traditional prevalence of Italian and German merchant trade there, whereas most other foreign trade took place at the ports of Puerto Plata, Santo Domingo, and even Azua. Some of the re-directing was purposeful, but much of it gradually declined as overall Dominican imports and exports were re-oriented toward the United States during World War One. The port of Monte Cristi today is used only by local ships and fisheries.

⁷² Balaguer, *Memorias*, 18-19.

both sides of the border at the towns of Dajabón and Restauración, and the more heavily populated area was easier to police than the overgrown and more mountainous southwestern border. The open border here meant that Monte Cristi was distinct not only as a traditional hotbed of resistance movements and pro-German merchants, but also a province that contained a variety of admixtures of cultures and languages. Vodún, seen by occupation forces and many Dominicans from other regions as backward and repulsive, thrived in the northwest border region.⁷³

Constabulary commanders worked to police the border to stop Haitian revolutionaries from crossing into the country, and enlisted men spent much of their time guarding and deporting Haitian prisoners. The border was seen as an especially central problem in Monte Cristi because of the traditional character of the Northwest as a center of resistance, and the proximity of its towns to the parts of the Haitian interior that harbored the most Cacos in their rebellion against U.S. occupation forces in Haiti. Constabulary emphasis on the policing of the border increased during uprisings of Caco revolution or violence on the Haitian side.⁷⁴ As early as 5 July 1918, military government General Order No. 25 emphasized the importance of ensuring that all constabulary enlisted men stationed on the border scrupulously respect the Haitian boundary line, an order that was both needed and difficult to enforce because of the long local traditions of an open, cross-border culture. The frequent military government closings of the border meant that roads were cordoned off by constabulary units. The recurrent isolation of the Northwest due

⁷³ Martha Ellen Davis, *La otra ciencia: El vodú dominicano como religión y medicina populares*, (Santo Domingo: Editora Universitaria, 1987); Sibylle Fischer, *Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 173. For a socio-historical account of the border in this region, see Dilla Alfonso and Cedano, eds., *Frontera en transición*, 29-59. Where Vodún and off-shoot religions and ceremonies developed in the Southwest, especially in remote rural areas and along the border, they were also seen by elite and urban classes as dangerous and backward. With border crossing much more difficult and less common, and fewer mixed populations along the border, the prevalence of pure Vodún was lower there, however. See Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 25-30.

⁷⁴ Weekly memos to Colonel Commander of the PND from the 4th Co., Box 3, Files 11-19, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

to rains and lack of roads, combined with the closings of the border that was the livelihood of Monte Cristi Province, affected the population harshly. Border closings, which included forbidding constabulary or Marine officers to cross, left the people in the northwestern towns wanting for food. The problem of hunger in the region from border closings was exacerbated when the Masacre river along the border overflowed, which it often did, pushing *caimanes* up to kill hogs and cattle on both sides of the border.⁷⁵ It is therefore not surprising that constabulary units along the border met high armed resistance in the areas surrounding the city of Monte Cristi and clashed often with the local populations in Dominican towns.⁷⁶ Isolated as the constabulary commanders here often were from central command, reports were irregular until 1920, and accountability for such actions low.

The violence and accusations of banditry that plagued the East and even the Southwest, however, did not make their way to Monte Cristi, where the balance was much more tenuous between marines and constabulary or those likely to resist or aid resistance. The region lacked foreigners who might collaborate, and it lacked powerful merchants who supported U.S. aims. This reality, and the dangers that the border and Cacos rebellions presented to the military government in Monte Cristi Province, were clear by the time the constabulary was settled there in 1917 to 1918. Unable to answer dissatisfaction and threats of subversion through brute force or heavy surveillance and censorship, due to the lack of resources or collaborators in the region, the constabulary took a much more careful approach. Marine constabulary commanders seem to have been much less likely to instigate trouble or steal from the local populations than they were

⁷⁵ Weekly memos to Colonel Commander of the PND from the 4th Co., Box 3, Files 11-19, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. See especially weekly memo dated 9 October, 1921.

⁷⁶ 4th Company weekly reports, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007809, AGN. Franck also gives an account of the tension between Marines and the local population. Marine commanders in the city of Monte Cristi held loud parties on their watches late into the night, shooting up the famous Monte Cristi clock tower and showing utter disregard toward the opinions of the town's population. Franck states that the Dominican attitude toward Americans was understandably "surly," and that "the attitude of silent protest was everywhere in the air." Franck, *Roaming*, 195-197. Quotations on page 197.

elsewhere. Gregorio Urbano Gilbert, who hid in the province from August of 1917 until his arrest in February of 1918, describes an encounter in which a U.S. officer asked to borrow a horse he was keeping, and Gilbert declined to help. When questioned as to why he said no, Gilbert claims that he admitted his refusal to "associate with any Yankee." According to Gilbert's account, the soldier then left without objecting.⁷⁷ The refusal to help alone would have been enough to have earned Gilbert the status of collaborator with "bandits" in both the East and the Southwest. Instead of the approach in those regions, the 4th Company in Monte Cristi Province relied heavily on surveillance, including keeping some enlisted men in plain clothes to help search for resistance or illegal activity.⁷⁸ They were used in this capacity, for example, to track ex-civil official Josefa Almonte of Monte Cristi, who had been removed from his post by the military government, had fled to Haiti, and returned to Monte Cristi.⁷⁹

Low-ranking Dominican constabulary officers, too, seem to have worked outside of their commanders' orders to allow them to work more closely with the local population. When merchants refused to supply constabulary members or threatened to report their locations to resistance leaders, as they did elsewhere, some Dominican constabulary enlisted men made deals such as allowing illegal activities among merchants in exchange for supplies or anonymity.⁸⁰ The most common such activity was gambling. Since gambling in many forms was customary throughout the country, and traditionally supported many community services through a lottery, the military government laws outlawing it were both widely hated and very difficult to enforce. Constabulary officers reported that, in their capacity as the force policing this law, enlisted men

⁷⁷ Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 135-136.

⁷⁸ 4th Company weekly reports, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007809, AGN.

⁷⁹ Weekly memo to Colonel Commander of the PND, 4 May 1921, Box 3, Files 11-19, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁸⁰ Harry E. Hurst, Report, 21 August, 1920, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, File 1, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

frequently ignored gambling and other minor infractions of military government law in exchange for both information and the ability to conduct business.⁸¹ Another major point of contention, and one that demonstrates a divergence between military government laws and the actions of Dominican constabulary officers and enlisted men, was the issue of vodún in the area. Military government efforts to ban any practice of vodún or any related ceremony met, in the Northwest as in the Southwest, with the realities of a culture that was heavily saturated by such traditions. Dominican constabulary members, who were from the area, seem to have taken a much more realistic approach to the banning of vodún. Furthermore, the desire of local populations to maintain their culture would have provided an opening for constabulary members and other Dominicans either to gain some pull with the population or to take advantage for their own benefit. The result was a back-and-forth set of power relationships. Civil government officials in Restauración, for example, gained revenue by charging groups to let them hold vodún ceremonial dances. When a 4th Company first sergeant at the local outpost reported them to Company headquarters in Monte Cristi for holding the forbidden dances, the local government stated that Dominican officer Lieutenant Reyes had allowed the behavior. Constabulary investigators, faced with conflicting such reports throughout the area, tended to blame the civil government and only superficially investigate accusations of this behavior by the constabulary.⁸² Because civil officials offered strong resistance and lack of cooperation with military government and constabulary officials throughout the country, this one-sidedness was easy to explain or excuse. In defending cooperative constabulary men at the expense of minor laws,

⁸¹ Harry E. Hurst, Report, 21 August, 1920, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, File 1, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁸² Weekly memos to Colonel Commander of the PND, Box 3, Files 11-19, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. As with other cases, there was no substantial investigation into the actions of Lt. Reyes. The Marine Company commander was satisfied to complain about that civil government, stating that "it would seem that they are all against the Military Government and would not stop at anything to cause the withdrawal of forces." Memo dated 2 October 1921.

commanders of the Monte Cristi constabulary such as Harry Hurst were able to maintain a balance that kept constabulary units functional in the region. It also meant, of course, a relative empowerment of constabulary men to take initiatives in civil-military relations.

The Alliance of the North and the Interior

The interior, comprising the fertile Cibao Valley and the second major city of the Dominican Republic, Santiago, often allied itself closely with the northern coastal region centered around the major port city of Puerto Plata. Traditionally the home of the country's liberal intellectuals, this region supported a growing middle class and booming tobacco economy at the time of occupation. When the mountainous division of the country in decades before the occupation had forced the division of administration between north and south, Santiago and the interior were the seat of the country's vice presidents. Vice presidents ruled, in the years before Cáceres, as regional presidents, and often called up their own armies--to fight revolutionary movements in the Northwest, for example. Dominican politics in the decades leading up to the occupation had been held together by a precarious balance of the South versus the North or, more accurately, military might in Santo Domingo versus the intellectual center that was Santiago. The system worked, almost as a federation of two states might work, but it broke down when one of the two interfered with the other. Liberal President Ulises Francisco Espaillat (1876), whose government was based out of Santiago, was forced to resign due to rebellion against his government from the military in the south. Espaillat himself had come to power through a revolution originating in the North and Interior. When President Buenaventura Báez fled the country in 1878, the country was temporarily split by two governments, a military junta

in Santo Domingo and a separate provisional government based in Santiago.⁸³ When dictator Heureaux (1889-1898) used his military to attempt to enforce changes in policies to favor the growth of foreign investment in the North and Interior, a combination of groups resented his interference in the region and assassinated him in the wealthy interior city of Moca.⁸⁴ One of the two chief assassins in this Moca plot, Ramón Cáceres, would himself become president on a platform of reform in 1905. He was assassinated by the Santo Domingo military in 1911, the event that directly preceded the civil war that was used to justify U.S. intervention.⁸⁵

The interior around Santiago, and Puerto Plata with it, therefore had a long tradition of opposing military-run governments out of Santo Domingo. Its intellectuals and political leaders made no exception for the U.S. military government, and held the authority of the military government officials in open disregard.⁸⁶ These regions put forth determined and violent resistance to both initial and ongoing marine occupation. As discussed in Chapter Two, the marine landing in Puerto Plata in 1916 met a powerful, armed resistance from local military forces. Five years later, the population of Puerto Plata was still seen by constabulary leaders as a hotbed of anti-U.S. sentiment, and one that was especially unfriendly toward the constabulary that upheld military government law.⁸⁷ In the interior cities of Santiago and San Francisco de Macorís, too, many inhabitants carried out intermittent guerrilla attacks against marines in the early occupation.⁸⁸ Scattered armed resistance throughout the Interior lasted until 1918, and

⁸³ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 235-239.

⁸⁴ Chapters One and Two discuss this conflict, and its effect on the nation's military forces, in greater detail.

⁸⁵ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 302-303.

⁸⁶ Julia, *Antología*, vol. I, 63-74; Balaguer, *Memorias*, 19, 33-35; Henríquez Ureña, *El Imperialismo Yanqui*, 61-241; Weekly Intelligence Reports, Box 3, 1921, Ejército Nacional, AGN1; Franck, *Roaming*, 212, 242-243. Moca was central in later unification of resistance during the occupation, as well, becoming one of the main centers for public protest rallies, defiant anti-occupation publications, and even the funding of armed insurrection. See Chapter Six.

⁸⁷ "Weekly Intelligence Report," 5 March, 1921, 8th Co., Folder "1921, 18," Box 3, 1921, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

⁸⁸ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 25-26; Charles H. Noxon, "Santo Domingo, Ward of the Marines," 3.

began again in 1920, targeting both Marines and constabulary.⁸⁹ As armed resistance in Puerto Plata and the Interior was met with force and arms, most resistance settled into a regionally traditional pattern of resistance through publications, speeches, and meetings of organizations. During the intermediate years (1918-1920), intellectual and community leaders in the interior and northern provinces supported the majority of the most notable non-violent resistance efforts against occupation.

Most of this resistance came in the form of publications that defied increasing censorship in their attempts to enlighten the population about constabulary and occupation activities in other areas of the country. Newspaper after newspaper was suspended because of writings that military government officials saw as "incendiary," a category that was left open to definition by any military court that decided to prosecute an editor. *La Bandera* in San Francisco de Macorís printed patriotic poems and editorials from such Dominican intellectuals as Fabio Fiallo, Americo Lugo, and Max Henríquez Ureña. When patriotic articles were printed in the capital, those in the interior reprinted them.⁹⁰ Despite the growth of censorship through occupation years, such publications only increased as the occupation wore on and the constabulary grew. *El Anuncio*, also based out of San Francisco de Macorís, repeatedly published reports and rumors specifically about the constabulary. One in March of 1921, for example, published a condemning report about the constabulary, including an account of a constabulary member having assassinated a Dominican citizen.⁹¹

⁸⁹ "Informes," April, 1920, 6th Company, File #1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁹⁰ Weekly Intelligence Reports of the 6th Company, GND, File #4, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. While many of the originals no longer exist, these files contain long quotations from many of the regional newspapers.

⁹¹ Quoted in "Weekly Report of Intelligence of the 6th Company week ending 20 March 1921," Folder: "1921, 18," Box 3, 1921, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

Intellectual and political pressure against aiding the military government and constabulary in the region was strong.⁹² By 1920, it included the formation of secret patriotic, anti-U.S. societies throughout the region, reported in Santiago, La Vega, Salcedo, San Francisco de Macorís, Pimentel, Villa Rivas, and Matanzas, patterned and named after the secret society "El Trinitario" that had been formed in the interior town of La Vega in 1844 in the fight for independence from Haiti.⁹³ Constabulary reports throughout the region from 1918 through 1920 demonstrate a strong preoccupation with the influence that these groups and local publications had on the loyalties of constabulary members, especially in the province of Moca.⁹⁴ Although publications criticized the constabulary, other patterns of resistance in the interior were especially aimed at marines. The predominant tendency was to demonstrate anti-U.S. and anti-occupation sentiment through sabotage of marine equipment or attacks on marines--for example by throwing stones and fleeing--and then to spread rumors about what would happen to the constabulary members when marines were no longer there to protect them.⁹⁵ Also by 1920, despite a lack of unity or cooperation with guerrillas in the East, a new armed resistance movement was on the rise through the region. Second lieutenant César Lora, who excelled in the occupation military but was killed in 1924, gathered many reports of arms collections being hidden in the remote countryside, many of them rumored to have been brought in by shipments

⁹² Henríquez Ureña, *El Imperialismo Yanqui*, 169-263; "Informes," April, 1920, 6th Company, File #1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; 10th Company "Patrol Reports," File #4, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Franck, *Roaming*, 212, 242-243.

⁹³ "Informes," April, 1920, 6th Company, File #1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁹⁴ 10th Company "Patrol Reports," 1920, File #4, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁹⁵ Weekly Intelligence Reports of the 6th Company, GND, File #4, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. Sabotage included the burning of marine facilities or destruction of vehicles, and one included the killing of a marine horse. As the interior was to be the center of the increasingly unified national resistance in the later years of occupation, these types of attacks against both marine and constabulary units are discussed at length in Chapter Six.

along the north coast and then transported to the interior. and also included the escape of "old chiefs of bandit groups" gathering supplies in the area ⁹⁶

Unlike in the East, constabulary officials working to build the intelligence networks and find collaborators did not have the availability of large foreign populations. In fact, many provinces in the interior had almost no foreigners [See Table 4.2]. This meant a lower likelihood of disinterested individuals who might be loyal to and support the constabulary in its efforts to find intelligence about resisters. Also unlike the east, despite the fact that the Cibao Valley was an important region for agriculture, most planters and land-owners were Dominican; this and the lack of guerrilla warfare meant that the constabulary did not have to focus its efforts on protecting plantations--reports of robberies from plantations were minimal, and actual attacks on agricultural land nonexistent here. Until 1921, this also meant that most peasants in areas remote from urban centers were largely unaffected by the population throughout the Interior region.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ César Lora, "Informes," April, 1920, 6th Company, File #1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁹⁷ Julia, *Antología*, vol. I, 112-158; "Informes," 1920, 6th Company, File #1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

Table 4.2 Percentage of foreigners residing in the Dominican Republic, by province.⁹⁸

Province	Percentage foreign residents
<u><i>Provinces of the Interior and North:</i></u>	
Pacificador:	1.06%
La Vega:	1.06%
Españat:	.87%
Santiago:	1.53%
Puerto Plata:	5.16%
<u><i>The East:</i></u>	
San Pedro de Macorís:	35.64%
Seibo:	9.08%
<u><i>Other:</i></u>	
Santo Domingo:	3.58%
Azua:	5.11%
Barahona:	12.7%
Samaná:	4.32%
Monte Cristi:	20.17%

The mechanisms developed by constabulary officers to cope with resistance quickly came to match the traditional pattern in the region: The military force in power avoided interference with rural peasants, based operations more heavily from urban areas, and preoccupied itself with balancing the use of military force with the ever-present criticism stemming from the intellectual and liberal tendencies of the area; it was at all times, even despite heavy censorship, accountable through a strong tradition of press and education and information networks. The primary concerns of constabulary officers, both marine and Dominican, were to counteract the influence on constabulary members and to attempt to improve civil-military

⁹⁸ From numbers given in: Dominican Republic, *Primer Censo Nacional*, 145-146. A note regarding the border provinces of Azua, Barahona and Monte Cristi: Of the foreign population in Azua Province, 92.42% were Haitian. Of the foreign population in Barahona Province, 82.71% were Haitian. Of the foreign population in Monte Cristi, 97.48% were Haitian. The numbers in the border provinces thus appear inflated in a discussion about foreigners; many of the Haitians in these border regions had long lived in the Dominican Republic or in towns along the border, and were considered much less foreign to local populations than they were to the military government authorities conducting the census.

relations so as to show the constabulary in a good light, especially in the region's urban areas.⁹⁹

Constabulary officers worked through the region to aid civil governors, sending multiple units to help fight fire in Santiago's business district, for example.¹⁰⁰ Constabulary units in rural towns in the region, especially those in the north that were most isolated from the transportation networks to the capital city, spent many of their hours aiding the Public Works Office in public health and sanitation.¹⁰¹ These roles of the constabulary units through interior and northern provinces, at least until late 1920, seem to have somewhat eased direct attacks on the constabulary members, despite continued propaganda by intellectuals and elites against enlisting, and reinforced the heavier emphasis on attacking Marines rather than Dominicans in the constabulary.

Samaná

The northeastern peninsula of Samaná was an area mostly dedicated to the production of coffee, sparsely populated with no major cities. Long used as the location of a heavily garrisoned penal settlement to which political prisoners were exiled, it contained two heavily garrisoned penal forts and an assorted population of emigrants from throughout the Dominican Republic and from the Canary Islands, as well as French refugees from Haiti, and its provincial government carried out independent trade with the Turks Islands.¹⁰² It contained a portion of one of the few remaining usable railroads in the country, which made its southwestern city of Sánchez an occasional jumping-off point or site of sabotage for the guerrilla movements to the south, but was otherwise an area in which occupation forces generally spent few resources and

⁹⁹ Weekly Intelligence Reports of the 6th Company, GND, various, 1920, File #4, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Marine Corps, *A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps*, 122, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

¹⁰¹ 8th Company reports, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁰² R.H. Schomburgk, "The Peninsula and Bay of Samaná, in the Dominican Republic," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, vol. 23 (1853), 264-283.

little manpower before 1920.¹⁰³ Until after mid-1920, Samaná was neither a site of significant resistance nor an area of major concern to the constabulary. Civil officials were not cooperative with the occupation, but before 1920 there are no reports of subversion against the constabulary as there are elsewhere.¹⁰⁴ Rather, it remained largely isolated and apart through the early years of the occupation. Three major causes led to this difference: The first, as Gregorio Urbano Gilbert describes, is that Samaná was a province that was traditionally unconcerned about happenings elsewhere due to its natural abundance.¹⁰⁵ Its interior population could easily support itself if cut off by rains or revolution. In addition to this traditional autonomy, the location of Samaná is situated on the north side of the Samaná Bay, which meant that it also spent occupation years under the shadow of U.S. naval forces. Another reason for an overall lack of resistance seems to have been the desperate need for medical care in the province. Early in the occupation, there was what Franck called "support," and what was at least heavy compromise, among those of Samaná in order to gain navy medical care due to a near-absolute scarcity of doctors there.¹⁰⁶ The strong presence in Samaná of U.S. Navy forces mitigated this problem, as the navy provided the medical units for the constabulary and health improvement throughout the country.

Samaná also contained a community of English-speaking blacks from the 1800s colonization programs out of the United States, who emigrated to the peninsula during the Haitian domination in the 1820s. They retained the English language, which was some help in

¹⁰³ Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 84-87.

¹⁰⁴ 13th Co. reports, Box 3, Folders 11-19, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁰⁵ Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 84. It was, interestingly, with the collapse of the economy beginning in late 1920 that Samaná became a serious concern and a point of resistance.

¹⁰⁶ Franck, *Roaming*, 216-217.

bridging the language gap for those units who worked in the region.¹⁰⁷ This particular portion of the population seems to have been much more friendly toward occupation forces and the constabulary, and this might also help to explain the general lack of problems in the constabulary there as compared to other regions.¹⁰⁸ U.S. reporter Harry A. Franck, who traveled through the area in early 1920, interviewed the Reverend James of the African Methodist Episcopal Church there; James was a supporter of the U.S. intervention, and opined that "aside from the politicians," all of the influential people of the region seemed to be in agreement.¹⁰⁹ James's large community, however, seems to have been a non-integrated community in Samaná, and there is no evidence that the reverend's opinions include anyone outside of his community and church. This particular community might well have been "influential" and supportive, as it seems to have enjoyed some favoritism from U.S. forces.¹¹⁰ Many of the Dominican constabulary members in Samaná's 13th Company spoke the "Samaná English" of this population rather than Spanish, and were used across the bay into the East as guides.¹¹¹ Across the bay from the eastern provinces in armed resistance, small parts of Samaná sometimes became involved in the larger guerrilla warfare of the East, but the peasantry and politicians there

¹⁰⁷ Schoenrich, *Santo Domingo*, 170-171, 173. The original community that moved to Samaná consisted of sixty families, and still formed by 1918 was Schoenrich called a "distinct class," in a commune officially called "Sección de los Americanos."

¹⁰⁸ No record exists giving the number of inhabitants who were part of this English-speaking community during the occupation, as they were Dominican citizens and recorded as such in the census. We know that in 1851 they made up about 17-18% of the small population of the province. Schomburgk, "The Peninsula and Bay of Samaná," 281. We also might get an idea from the population self-identifying as Protestant on the 1920 census. Where the percentage of population recorded as Catholic in other provinces of the Dominican Republic (with the exception of the heavily foreign San Pedro de Macorís in the East) was between 97.7-99.9%, the population of Samaná is listed as 87.4% Catholic and 12.6% Protestant. Dominican Republic, *Primer Censo Nacional*, 139. Most provincial populations are listed as over 99.5% Catholic; the lower numbers of 97.7 and 98% reflect the populations of Seibo with its foreign population on sugar plantations and the large port city of Puerto Plata, respectively. Judge Schoenrich, who visited this community before the occupation, explained that they had remained "aloof," farming in their commune and seldom mixing with the local population or speaking Spanish, an exclusiveness that he said had "more than once been criticized by Dominicans." Schoenrich, *Santo Domingo*, 171.

¹⁰⁹ Franck, *Roaming*, 220.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 218-219. See also Chapter Two. U.S. Customs officers creating the Border Patrol in the early 1910s attempted to recruit them as fighters on the border due to their knowledge of the English language.

¹¹¹ Franck, *Roaming*, 224.

generally maintained outward neutrality before 1920, and the constabulary enjoyed enough local support to function with no major problems. For this reason, its units seem to have most closely resembled the forces planned by those constabulary commanders authoring the national-level constabulary reform of these years.

Conclusion

The constabulary reform intended with General Order 39 of 21 November, 1918, which stated that "More attention will be paid to General Orders issued from these Headquarters,"¹¹² was largely ineffectual due to regional differences and scarcity of resources and manpower. While many changes took place in the constabulary during these years, including major changes such as the entry of some Dominicans into officer ranks, the regional character of the country was too powerful to disregard. Constabulary officers throughout the provinces, away from the central command, understood this reality and adjusted their priorities and orders to make their forces as tenable and effective as possible given the difficulties confronting them. Among Dominicans across different regions and social groups who were not in the constabulary, the period of late 1918 to mid 1920 brought an increasing realization that the intervention was going to consist in a major re-making of at least certain aspects of Dominican society, including the need for national unification and a centralized approach to resistance. Dominicans worked to balance their own and their communities' interests with the realities of the occupation, while constabulary officers--some of them Dominican--worked to bring regional solutions to distinct regional difficulties.

¹¹² Folder 2, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

In some areas, these contentions were not as strong: Much of the southwest and the interior were sparsely populated and not affected as much by the growth of constabulary or the intrusiveness of marine occupation. The east, on the other hand, became one of the key areas of contention in the occupation--a reality that was not solely a product of the intervention, but one that had been continuous for decades when marine forces arrived there in late 1916 and early 1917. In local and regional negotiations throughout the country, those invested in regional Dominican society or economy worked through the intermediate years of occupation to insert themselves into new and changing power structures, working to consolidate power across regions. The occupation imposition of change in power relations and administrative posts, however, was often a thin veneer. From under it, Dominican traditions and culture seeped upward. The results, as had historically been the case during times of change in the Dominican Republic, varied drastically in these years depending on local lore and culture and the character of regional economies.

Chapter FIVE

Foundational Elements of Resistance: The Constabulary Across Regions, 1918-1920

The conclusion of World War One and the European preoccupation with recovery in the post-war world coincided with a new non-interventionist movement in the United States and brought major changes in U.S. foreign policy interests. The reappraisal of foreign interventions and military occupations in late 1918 also demonstrated the absolute failure of U.S. plans to export democracy and create democratic governments through use of its military between 1915 and 1918. The U.S. State Department began to redirect its attention to its occupation governments throughout the Caribbean, and requested reports and explanations about their progress.¹ A growing interest in military non-intervention among the U.S. public in the wake of the war also increased the need for naval planners to find a way to justify the occupations.² Administrators of the military government in the Dominican Republic and of the U.S.-created Dominican constabulary were largely unable to report any forward progress, either in the building of infrastructure or the promotion of "peace and stability" that was the primary stated goal of the occupations. In the last months of 1918, two years after the occupation had begun, the country was in a state of disarray and was rife with violence. Navy reports from the administrators, responding to questions about what the occupation had done, stressed accomplishments in planning and the need for funds to carry out changes. The major successes they touted in those reports, the building of a native constabulary and the ending of armed resistance, were known among occupation forces to be mostly fiction at that point. Armed resistance continued, and the constabulary had, in reality, been one of the most public failures

¹ *Annual Reports of the Navy Department*, 1918-1921.

² See: Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse: its twentieth-century reaction*, (New York: Collier-MacMillan, 1966).

within the Dominican Republic in the early years of occupation. In late 1918 that planned beacon of order, stability, and Dominican support that had been such a high-priority aspect of the imperial experiment was, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, disorganized, widely hated by the Dominican population, comprised of lower-class and uneducated Dominicans, rife with desertions and perpetually short on recruits, and had become an inefficient and completely untrained supplement to marine forces fighting resistance throughout the country.

Because of external developments and clear failures of the occupation on the ground by 1918, both the Navy Department and the State Department carried out major changes in the administration and functioning of the occupation and the Dominican constabulary in the period from late 1918 through 1920. The review of occupation strategy, engaged after two years of occupation, resulted in a major shuffling of administration. The Navy Department pulled from the occupation many navy officers who had carried out the functions of the military government during World War One, placing many of them, such as Military Governor Harry Knapp, in diplomatic positions in Europe. Also, with the arrival to the Dominican Republic of large numbers of World War One draftees no longer needed in Europe came new marine officers. In October of 1918, the Navy recalled Joseph H. Pendleton to the United States, placing the Marine Second Brigade in Santo Domingo under a succession of commanders who held different visions for the Brigade and the Dominican constabulary. As the commandants of the constabulary were marine officers reporting to the commanders of the Second Brigade, this shifting command had as direct an impact on the constabulary as did the rapid overturn of constabulary commanders during this period. While many of the new appointments consisted of officers who had extensive experience in overseas operations, and some who spoke Spanish, the shifting command also

meant the rapid influx of administrators and commanders who were ignorant about Dominican history and culture and the previous conduct of the occupation.³

In late 1918 and early 1919, newly arriving U.S. officers encountered a country whose infrastructure had been devastated through a decade of civil war and foreign occupation, whose population was largely hostile or uncooperative, and whose provinces continued to be isolated and disconnected from the central government. Years of pre-intervention civil war, and lack of repair or maintenance since, had damaged roads and railroads, telephone and telegraph wires, and government buildings such as prisons and government offices. Marines in charge of running and improving the constabulary were faced with attempting to bring and maintain relative stability to provinces despite lack of resources or cooperation from the local populations, and their only tools for doing so were command of constabulary forces and small and fluctuating funds given their units by the military government from national revenues. While marines coming into the country were therefore moving into a difficult situation, Dominicans had been living it for years. The daily lives of all Dominicans, especially in provinces further from the country's two major cities, had been changed first by civil war and then by an extensive military occupation that had brought little positive change and seemed to wear on indefinitely. Even for those least affected by the changes in administration--such as small landholders in the countryside who continued to grow crops and bring them to local markets--the rise and fall of armed resistance movements meant constant fear that either guerrilla fighters or marines and constabulary would appropriate their goods to supply troops.

³ Most of these navy and marine officers had no experience in the Caribbean, and no special training provided them a needed background for carrying out these duties or working with the Dominican people. This shift from those who had learned Dominican culture to those who were ignorant of it also pervaded the administration throughout the civil government levels. Moya Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 327.

The previous chapter demonstrated how the constabulary interacted with the distinct and factionalized resistances of various regions, abandoning the original hopes for a quickly centralized military and embracing a regional, and thus more Dominican, approach. This chapter shifts focus to the more universalizing aspects of occupation during the same years. While most occupation difficulties were settled in the early years by regional and local negotiation or force and resistance, the one objection to occupation that would prove to be common across regions was the constabulary. In the years 1916 to 1920, occupation forces, primarily marine constabulary commanders, faced difficulties for which they had not been prepared, and in response they used the constabulary as the go-between for U.S. forces and the Dominican population. With the exception of some individual relationships and negotiations, however, the constabulary--despite institutional changes--continued to be rejected by the majority of the country's population, and even by those who otherwise worked on some levels of cooperation with U.S. forces. As the understaffed, under-trained, and unstable constabulary was used throughout the country in the execution of multiple duties as both military and police, controversy was constant as to its proper sphere of authority. It was to become, in the subsequent growth of resistance movements, one of the central points of both rallying cries against the occupation and fears about the direction of the country's development. This was true because of reports of brutality and corruption from the constabulary; many who worked in individual negotiations with constabulary members and even marine constabulary officers saw the brutality and the corruption first-hand, and despite negotiations, were not likely to see it as the legitimate source of authority after the occupation ended. Occupation planners also failed widely in gaining cooperation for their initiatives or for the constabulary because they did not play to the needs of the traditionally powerful *gente de primera*, who continuously stood against

the constabulary from its founding until the beginning steps of withdrawal in 1922. Even the most wealthy among Dominicans were likely to see their fortunes at risk from the incoming flood of U.S. investments and occupation patterns that gave such preference to the power of a military that was not obligated to cooperate with the upper classes. The period of 1918 to 1920 was an important transitional period in the occupation military both because of the adoption of regional approaches and because broader institutional change and infrastructural improvements begun in this period by the military government transformed the course of military operations throughout the country and gradually shaped the national-level institution of the constabulary.

Institutional Change at a National Level, 1918-1920.

The military government, under successive leaders, initiated broad changes from late 1918 through 1920, and attempted a reform of the Dominican constabulary that was meant to improve civil-military relations throughout the country. In October of 1918, Marine Second Brigade Commander Joseph Pendleton was replaced by Brigadier General Ben H. Fuller in charge of Marine operations in the Dominican Republic. Fuller, who would later become Commandant of the Marine Corps (1930-1934), was experienced in foreign interventions, his career paralleling the growth of U.S. interventionism and the new role of the Marine Corps as a tool for foreign interventions. At the time of his arrival in the Dominican Republic, Fuller had served in the Philippine intervention, the Boxer uprising in China, and in Hawaii, and had commanded units in the Panama Canal Zone and Cuba (1910-1911).⁴ When Fuller arrived to take command of the marine Brigade, and to serve as interim military governor from November

⁴ "Benjamin Hebard Fuller MGen Commandant (Ret)," Biographical Files, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 29.

of 1918 to February of 1919,⁵ he came to a country that in many ways looked much like it had when the official occupation began in November of 1916: civil administration was in disarray, and it remained unclear which cases would go before local Dominican courts or military provost courts run by the marines. The Dominican population was decidedly hostile toward the marine presence and the constabulary, and local, armed uprisings continued to be of primary importance for marine planning throughout the country. The majority of roads, railroads, public buildings, and communications infrastructure that had suffered damage through five years of civil war had remained unrepaired or had only been partially repaired, many to be damaged again in guerrilla warfare since the occupation began, and most areas of the country still lacked sewage or electricity.

Some real changes had taken place too, however. Most changes by late 1918 were directly related to the attempt to build an efficient, centralized, national government in a country that had always been highly regional in its makeup. Military government administrators in 1918 began an overhaul of the national system of education and increased national government funds by initiating multiple national taxes--many planned under the Cáceres administration--meant to eradicate local taxes and centralize the functioning of the country.⁶ They had also increased the Dominican Republic's net domestic product by reorienting Dominican import-export trade away from war-torn Europe and toward the United States, and had negotiated a \$1.5 million U.S. loan to the Dominican Republic in 1918 that increased available funds for infrastructural building in 1919.⁷ U.S. navy and marine officers staffed a new and revised national government that had

⁵ He was made interim Military Governor with Executive Order 226 on 15 November, 1918.

⁶ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 97; for a summary of 1918 tax reforms, see Lane, "Civil Government," 133-134.

⁷ For an in-depth discussion of economic changes, and the growth of Dominican economic dependence on the United States from 1900 to 1930, see Lozano, *La Dominación Imperialista*. For the growth of economic dependency and its effects on latifundismo during this period, see also Emilio Betances, "Agrarian Transformation

been re-formed to increase efficiency, its departments consolidated and better supplied than those of previous governments. The operations of marine and navy personnel in the Dominican Republic's government meant that much of the cost of government was paid by the U.S. military, making the strain of financial resources for central government independent of Dominican revenue and thereby lighter during these years. In their capacity as Dominican government officials, these officers' salaries were paid by Dominican revenue, but many supplies used were U.S.-government-issue to supply troops abroad. Even those administrative supplies paid for by Dominican revenue, such as typewriters and paper, were easily acquirable from the U.S. military. Furthermore, much of the policing of the country was carried out by marines under the pay of the U.S. government, leaving funds open for municipal development. Finally, occupation administrators had by this time pushed Dominicans out of all higher levels of both government and military, allowing U.S. military administrators wide leeway and autonomy in decision-making. Multiple resistances, though persistent, were mostly limited to the local level by the combination of a strong system of censorship and the widespread disarming and marine policing of the population.

The changes in administration and command in October and November of 1918 also led to a reevaluation of the constabulary. Fuller, and Major Charles F. Williams, who was appointed commandant of the constabulary in November, immediately reviewed the past and current problems with the organization. The constabulary still lacked a general scheme for training, and was poorly organized and did not necessarily conform to Dominican law, despite the fact that it was meant to eventually take over marine duties.⁸ Fuller's first priority was to improve the constabulary's reputation, a goal that he hoped would also increase its efficiency. Immediately,

and Class Formation in the Dominican Republic, 1844-1930," *Latin American Perspectives*, 10:2/3 (Spring-Summer 1983), 60-75.

⁸ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (May, 1935), 19.

Fuller called for the discharge of "undesirables," defined as those of poor health or criminal backgrounds and those who were illiterate or had undergone courts-martial in the early years of the constabulary. Constabulary members with any of these undesirable traits, he argued, would lessen both the efficiency and reputation of the constabulary, and removing those enlisted men who had any of these traits would facilitate recruitment and decrease the amount of civilian complaints against the constabulary.⁹ Also, to address the frequency of desertions, he added to the medical examination an explanation to each recruit about the nature and duration of service before men committed to enlisting.¹⁰ While no full or consistent records survive concerning total numbers of desertions, the company records, communications, and prison lists demonstrate that desertions were extremely common in most regions. In surviving records, almost every company reported at least one deserter for every six month period, and most in high-tension areas reported at least five.¹¹ With companies totaling an average of thirty to eighty enlisted men during these years, the numbers are high, with desertion rates ranging by region so that some regions' companies had a desertion rate of 3% and others a rate as high as 15%-20%. Deserters in these early and intermediate years of the occupation tended to be lower-class enlisted men, and desertions were understandably highest in the east, where guerrilla warfare was most prominent.¹²

From November, 1918 the new commandant of the organization, Colonel Charles F. Williams--who was only a major in the Marine Corps--worked to increase efforts to organize

⁹ General Order No. 32, 17 October 1918, Folder #2, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Communications and prison lists, Folders 1 and 2, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Weekly Intelligence Reports, Box 3, Files 11-19, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908; Company intelligence summaries, File #8, "Correspondencia," 1922, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹² Company intelligence summaries, File #8, "Correspondencia," 1922, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

constabulary companies and improve accountability.¹³ Williams had the advantage of being the only constabulary commandant, in the years 1917 to 1921, to remain in that position for more than seven months, and he ran the constabulary for two years, until September of 1920.¹⁴ This lent the constabulary a much-needed consistency, one that lasted long enough to allow Williams to see through some of the changes and orders he began. One of his first goals, in line with Fuller's plans, was to improve record-keeping and accountability. For example, Williams issued and enforced an order requiring each company to furnish a complete roster, including each person's name and rank, on the last day of each month.¹⁵ While this had been standard procedure in the pre-occupation Dominican military, for which records are extensive, no standard or thorough records of the constabulary had been regularly kept to this time in many constabulary locations, and Williams worked to improve the efficiency of record keeping. The shortage of manpower at many posts, and the lack of emphasis on the constabulary during the first years, had meant that such record-keeping had not been enforced. Williams also issued general orders of organization that were long overdue, such as the creation of savings account funds for constabulary posts to allow for troop rations funds, and standardization of forms sent to provost marshals for provost court cases regarding constabulary members.¹⁶ Another immediate goal was to discharge "undesirables" and open a new recruitment campaign. The new recruitment campaign stressed that only U.S. and Dominican citizens and military personnel could be enlisted in the constabulary, a stipulation that had been implemented with the creation of the

¹³ Williams received a Marine commendation for his service in the constabulary.

¹⁴ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47.

¹⁵ General Order 9 (Series 1919). 13 March, 1919. Department memos, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁶ Fluctuations in company populations and central government inconsistency in providing support to outlying areas during major storms or guerrilla uprisings made it impossible to predict or standardize the exact funding needed for each company from month to month, necessitating flexibility in budgeting. General Order No. 34 (Series 1919), 30 July 1919 and General Order No. 39 (Series 1919), 5 September 1919, Folder 2, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional, Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

constabulary in April of 1917, but that had not been followed.¹⁷ Because the reputation of the constabulary was so negative, and its units so inefficient, Fuller also facilitated the dismissal of constabulary members for reasons such as chronic indebtedness and “conduct unbecoming.”¹⁸ He was optimistic that improved organization and efficiency would make Dominicans feel more inclined to enlist.

On 28 January, 1919, constabulary commandant Williams laid out new authorized enlistment strengths for the constabulary. He decreased the total authorized strength for enlisted constabulary from 1,200 to 826 members.¹⁹ It renewed the budget for enlisted pay at fifteen dollars per month. Most of the changes made turned out to be superficial, however, as discharges were not balanced by incoming recruits.²⁰ The result was that, despite the discharge of many members of questionable action or foreign citizenship, the constabulary continued to suffer a lack of recruits. Unfortunately, complete and consistent records of the total strength of the constabulary do not exist for the years 1917 to 1919; many reports discuss the general problems of recruitment, but companies were not held accountable for full rosters of their men, and the turnover of enlisted men from desertions and discharges, especially near the areas of highest armed resistance, meant that numbers fluctuated greatly. A few reports were made over the years that worked to collect this information. These reports show that the overall enlisted

¹⁷ As discussed in Chapter Three, many early recruits in the constabulary were U.S. civilians or sojourners from other islands in the Caribbean, especially Puerto Rico.

¹⁸ General Orders, October 1918, Folder #2, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁹ Despite the long-extant target of 1,200 enlisted and 88 officers, actual enlisted strength had never exceeded seven-hundred. General Order No. 5 (Series 1919), dated 28 January 1919. All general orders through this period are found in Folder 2 of "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. Authorized strengths for constabulary companies at this time, as listed in General Order 5, were: 1st, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th—total 76 each (56 enlisted), 2nd company total 42 (28 enlisted), 4th company: 95 total (70 enlisted), 5th company: total 98 (72 enlisted), 6th company 110 total (84 enlisted), 9th company total 92 (68 enlisted). The larger authorized strength for the 4th, 5th, and 9th Companies included extra men for Frontier Service, as these companies were stationed west, toward the border of Haiti.

²⁰ Memos from Charles F. Williams, Nov., 1918 to Feb., 1919, Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

strength of the organization was 575 in July of 1917, 691 in October of 1917, 600 in December of 1917, and that through 1918 enlisted strength remained in the 600s.²¹ Because of continued recruitment difficulties and the need for manpower, the constabulary also continued to recruit those who were illiterate and lower class, and many of poor health and criminal backgrounds.²² Though discharges were easier to carry out, recruitment for Dominican citizens actually became more open at this time with Williams's attempts to increase the enlisted strength of the constabulary, with constabulary officers in local outposts recruiting illiterate men and criminals in direct contravention of Fuller's orders.²³ Furthermore, the frequency and ease of discharging members led to constabulary units that were often understaffed in areas that were already short on manpower and police. The cyclical purge of the military in search of "better" recruits through 1919 thus shorthanded units throughout the country even as other aspects of the occupation, such as road-building and communications networks, were gradually advanced.²⁴

One of the most effective methods that Williams introduced to increase enlistment was to make it possible, by late 1918, for Dominicans to be promoted to second lieutenant, the lowest rank in the officer corps. The possibility of an officer rank for Dominican recruits, long promised but never a reality, did increase interest in joining, as demonstrated by the application of some Dominicans to the constabulary in December of 1918 to January of 1919. Records indicate that a strong recommendation from a member of the U.S. forces or administration was a ticket into the constabulary; those who applied with such a letter were admitted. Those applying

²¹ Communications within "Gobierno Militar Americano," (1916-1920), AGN1; Marvin Goldwert, *The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, 1962*, 12; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1917*, 840.

²² Records as late as 1921 demonstrate the frequency of company commanders discovering that their enlistees and troops were illiterate, had health problems at the time of enlistment, or were passed into the organization illegally or despite criminal backgrounds. Rosters and payroll correspondence, "Correspondencia, 1921," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007896, AGN.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Neither numbers nor overall efficiency of enlisted recruits significantly changed until 1921, with renewed reforms in both the occupation and the constabulary's central command. See chapter Six.

who were able to demonstrate social connections to U.S. citizens or military officers were even able to enlist despite criminal or debt-related problems in their records.²⁵ The new recruitment campaign beginning in late 1918 thus re-emphasized the originally planned requirements that would make the body more respectable. Continued problems in meeting desired enlistment strength led to the recruitment of a new force of Dominicans, one that emphasized health and dependability, but often recruited members of questionable reputation: the constabulary still recruited primarily from the lower and middle echelons of Dominican society. Dominican society was structured, at the time of intervention, in large part by a hereditary caste system that separated the *gente de primera* from those considered *gente de segunda* and lower-class peasants.²⁶ The former had tended to be the military officers and the top one-hundred or so land-owning families among Dominicans, those families that controlled the most wealth in the country not controlled by foreigners. The *gente de segunda* consisted of lower-ranked military men or municipal guards, or *nouveau riche* and the rising merchant class.²⁷ Despite growth in the wealth among the *gente de segunda* during the decades preceding the intervention, they continued to be excluded by upper-class Dominicans from the most elite social clubs and events. The new and more organized recruitment campaign initiated under Fuller and Williams, recognizing these distinctions among Dominicans and now increasingly attentive to the need to

²⁵ Though the majority of these applications are lost, they are discussed in communications within the officer corps of the constabulary, usually in relation to analyses of the backgrounds of the recruits; most of these communications detail attempts to find character witnesses among planters and Marines or U.S. citizens who had been in the country for more than a year. "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 2-5. Ironically, one of the major Marine criticisms of previous Dominican militaries was the prevalence of this practice of gaining appointment to the officer corps through political connections. See, for example, Fuller, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47.

²⁶ I refer to this as a caste system because it was highly exclusive based on the families into which people were born; as Trujillo would later discover (see Chapter Six), even the highest political and military prominence did not keep one from being excluded from the events and clubs of the *gente de primera*. This system also presented patterns that U.S. forces at first thought they recognized as racial segregation, because the *gente de primera* were mostly descendants of the old European land-owning families while the *gente de segunda* included families that had mixed with previous slave families over time, and thus were more racially diverse. See: Sagás, *Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic*.

²⁷ Bosch, *Trujillo*, 122.

improve the constabulary's reputation, sought to discharge many of those from the peasant classes and bring into the constabulary those of the higher classes.²⁸

Due to a combination of continued elite rejection of the constabulary and marine unwillingness to recruit those from the pre-occupation officer corps, constabulary officers were unable to recruit Dominicans from the *gente de primera*, but did, in late 1918, obtain some applications for officer-hopefuls from among the *gente de segunda*. This was a major shift from recruitment patterns of 1917 to late 1918, but one that left the constabulary under the command of foreigners and a class to which the traditional *gente de primera* considered themselves superior. Some of the officer recruits were men who had been in the enlisted ranks in the pre-occupation Guardia Republicana.²⁹ Further, to meet recruitment levels, constabulary officers continued to enlist low-ranked recruits from the lowest classes of the population--those who were in the most financial need. Most infamous among those enlisted into the constabulary from the *gente de segunda* in this period was Rafael Trujillo, whose application included a letter of support from the owner of a sugar plantation, and whose uncle was a close friend of Marine Major J.J. McLean. Along with other enlisting *gente de segunda*, Trujillo gained quick admission at the rank of second lieutenant.³⁰ Trujillo would use his career in the constabulary, and the Dominican military that stemmed from it, to rise and become the most notorious dictator of Dominican history (1930-1961). Thus while the elite families of the country continued to boycott the constabulary, the changes did allow some opening for recruitment among a few from

²⁸ In communications, a growing number of marine officers in the years 1918 to 1920 were using terms such as "the good class" of Dominicans, instead of the previous racially based discussions, demonstrating a growing if incomplete understanding of these distinctions in Dominican social class. The tendency among Marine commanders to emphasize race alone, especially in the earlier years of the constabulary, most likely played a large role in upper-class rejection of the U.S.-created military.

²⁹ Most notably, José Arias and Luis Alfonseca.

³⁰ Others of similar station who enlisted with him and quickly gained promotion, and remained successful in the constabulary throughout and following the occupation, were Cesar Lora and José Alfonseca. See: Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 3-6, 7-17; Francisco Franco Pichardo, *Historia del Pueblo Dominicano, Tomo II*, (Santo Domingo: Taller, 1997), 436; Bosch, *Trujillo*, 122.

the middle classes, some of whom became strong supporters of the constabulary. By February of 1919, Trujillo numbered among sixteen Dominicans in the officer rank of second lieutenant in the constabulary, all of whom seemed to have gained entrance as officers through political connections and the recommendations of marine officers who knew them.³¹

In addition to bringing low-ranking Dominican officers into the constabulary, the reshuffling in the occupation ranks brought change through the administration of the military government. U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden became Military Governor in February of 1919, and instituted major changes throughout his tenure in the position, many of which directly related to the constabulary. Williams and Fuller's efforts to restructure the constabulary were therefore aided by changes and reforms initiated throughout the military government, from Snowden to the new cabinet he appointed to replace those who had served under Knapp.³² Snowden, who had gained his rank commanding naval forces in the Atlantic Fleet during World War One, had originally rejected his superiors' request to serve as military governor in the Dominican Republic, and only agreed after receiving a verbal reprimand from Admiral Benson, First Chief of Naval Operations.³³ When Snowden arrived, resentful of the position, he approached the problems of continued resistance and the occupation's failures with frustration and the assumption that the problem was one of racial and cultural inferiority among Dominicans. He determined, based on these assumptions, to censor the population and to use harsh military rule to bring order to the country.³⁴ He also changed many of the policies commonplace in the early years of military government, such as Knapp's attempts to give

³¹ "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 221; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 3-4.

³² *Gaceta Oficial*, February-March, 1919; Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 7.

³³ Quoted in: Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 7.

³⁴ Multiple memos and communications, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

preference to Dominican laborers and to employ some Dominicans as advisors to the government.³⁵

Early 1919 claims that armed resistance had ended or was less of a problem quickly proved to be premature, and guerrilla warfare continued throughout the country. By February of 1919 it was clear that the armed resistance in the east was growing rather than diminishing.³⁶ As the armed resistance grew, government officials as high ranking as military governor Snowden, and those Dominicans cooperating with occupation forces, received death threats.³⁷ In response to the guerrilla threat, the Marine Corps brought the 15th Regiment, including 1,041 enlisted men and 50 Marine officers, to re-enforce the marine brigade and constabulary units fighting in the eastern provinces of El Seibo and Macorís [see table 5.1].³⁸ To this time the country was divided into two military districts, the Northern District and the Southern District. This change added an Eastern District whose major concern was to deal with armed resistance. It also meant an increase in Marine forces so high that constabulary officials found it difficult to convince Dominicans that their work toward Dominicanizing the constabulary force were sincere. With the arrival of the 15th Regiment came the introduction of the First Marine Air Squadron, positioned in San Pedro de Macorís to aid occupation forces with mapping and surveillance, and later in the fighting of guerrilla warfare.³⁹

³⁵ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 51.

³⁶ For a detailed discussion of the origin and conduct of guerrilla warfare in the eastern provinces, see Bruce Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros versus the United States Marines: Guerrilla Insurgency during the Dominican Intervention, 1916-1924," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 58:4 (1978), 649-675. For first-hand accounts, see: Gilbert, *Mi lucha contra el invasor yanqui* and Félix Servio Ducoudray, "Los "Gavilleros" del Este: una epopeya calumniada," Santo Domingo: Editora Cultural Dominicana, 1976.

³⁷ Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 30-31. Snowden requested an increase of nearly 1,000 Marines.

³⁸ July 1919 "Report of activities of the Second Brigade, U.S. Marines, for the year ending June 30, 1920, File 1920, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 28; Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 30.

³⁹ The 1st Marine Air Squadron, commanded by Marine Captain and pilot Walter E. McCaughtry, consisted of 6 JN-6 (Jenny) biplanes, and began its operations from a Marine-cleared airstrip near Consuelo, twelve miles from San Pedro de Macorís in the east. Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 33.

Table 5.1. Total Marine enlisted strengths in the Dominican Republic 1916-1919.⁴⁰

May, 1916	632
November, 1916	2,219
January, 1917	1,804
May, 1917	1,683
June, 1918	1,635
October, 1918	1,964
February, 1919	3,007
December, 1919	1,970

Snowden immediately implemented other changes that had direct effects on the constabulary. For example, he initiated the long-planned establishment of a national penitentiary with a budget of \$100,000.⁴¹ In the area of the capital city, where the national penitentiary was to be build, the constabulary supplied men for the building and guarding of this and other reform initiatives, such as schools. With Executive Order 274 in April of 1919, Snowden also introduced the long-planned Medical Department of the constabulary.⁴² In May of 1919, therefore, Williams oversaw this addition to the constabulary, which included budget adjustments to allow each company commander to appoint two enlisted constabulary members for service with its company's Medical Corps, each to be trained on-site with U.S. Navy medical officers.⁴³ Once each province's constabulary headquarters was able to carry out enlistments, the Medical Corps development within constabulary companies allowed for wider geographical recruitment. Finally, by April and May of 1919, this wider geographical reach allowed an increase in maximum strength and began to increase overall enlistment. In August of 1919, the

⁴⁰ "Strength of organizations in Santo Domingo," "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, files 1916-1919, Quantico; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 89.

⁴¹ Executive Order No. 257, 15 February 1919.

⁴² "Gobierno Militar Americano," File #106 (1916-1924), (Folder, "Gobierno Military Americano, Año 1919"), AGN1.

⁴³ General Order 17 (Series 1919), dated 8 May 1919, and General Order 18 (Series 1919), dated 15 May 1919.

constabulary was able to report the overall strength of the constabulary at a height of 1,186 men and officers.⁴⁴

The changes to this point also demonstrated the high importance placed on military control. In addition to the 3,000 marines serving in the country, whose force was paid for the U.S. Marine Corps, the constabulary this year consumed 26.3% of the nation's growing budget.⁴⁵ This government emphasis on building a large military force gave Williams another advantage over previous constabulary commandants. Throughout 1919, and especially in early 1920, the Military Government's budget would grow due to increasing revenue and the benefits accrued from infrastructural development and a tremendous post-World War One boom in the sugar economy [See Tables 5.1 and 5.2]. The budget allowed for developments such as the Medical Corps's establishment, but also allowed for the beginnings of repairs and improvements in constabulary structures and prisons that had long been neglected, and basic training supplies that had previously been lacking. Because Williams had the marine manpower to emphasize infrastructural reform and minor basic training in some constabulary headquarters, he was able to oversee many of the changes that previous constabulary commandants had attempted in vain, or for which they had requested manpower or an increased budget.

Table 5.2 Expense of National Constabulary by Calendar Year.⁴⁶

1917	\$500,000
1918	\$622,688
1919	\$747,780
1920	\$702,030

⁴⁴ Goldwert, *The Constabulary*, 12.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* The budget for the constabulary at the time of this 8 August, 1919 report was \$789,780, up from the original \$500,000 budgeted per year in Executive Order 47 of 7 April, 1917. This reporting is for the fiscal year beginning in mid-1918 and ending in mid-1919. After this year, the budget for the constabulary was again decreased to until Executive Order 774 in 1922 increased it to \$666,664 annually. See Table 2 for actual expenses by calendar year.

⁴⁶ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1106.

Table 5.3 Value of Sugar Exports of the Dominican Republic, 1905-1920.⁴⁷

1905	\$3,292,470
1906	\$2,392,406
1907	\$2,009,679
1908	\$3,092,429
1909	\$3,304,931
1910	\$5,590,536
1911	\$4,159,733
1912	\$5,841,733
1913	\$3,650,556
1914	\$4,943,452
1915	\$7,671,383
1916	\$12,028,297
1917	\$13,386,463
1918	\$11,991,399
1919	\$20,697,761
1920	\$45,305,620
1921	\$14,338,354
1922	\$9,192,172
1923	\$18,722,912
1924	\$21,682,556
1925	\$15,447,036
1926	\$14,699,613
1927	\$16,668,385
1928	\$16,911,925
1929	\$12,258,831
1930	\$9,910,289 ⁴⁸

Table 5.4 Dominican National Commercial Balance, 1914-1920.⁴⁹

1914	\$3,859,780
1915	\$6,090,547
1916	\$10,780,443
1917	\$5,044,516
1918	\$2,636,192
1919	\$17,582,765
1920	\$12,205,365

⁴⁷ Value in U.S. dollars. Lozano, *La dominación imperialista*, 278.

⁴⁸ In addition to the global economic crisis in 1929-1930, the Dominican Republic was hit by a particularly devastating hurricane in September of 1930, which caused severe damage to much of the sugar-planting land in the east and center of the country.

⁴⁹ Value in U.S. dollars. Lozano, *La dominación imperialista*, 277. The lower commercial balance for 1920, seemingly surprising with exportations of more than double the value for 1919, is due to very high importations of sugar industry machinery from the United States to support a rapidly expanding sugar economy. See Lozano, *La dominación imperialista*, 163.

Military Governor Snowden was, by military standards, highly efficient in organizing the occupation. He was not, however, diplomatic in his efforts. On 8 June, 1919, two and a half years after the occupation began, Snowden gave a public speech that proved to be a major turning point in the way both occupation and resistance were conducted. The Navy Department authorized Snowden only to state that "up to the present time nothing has occurred to alter in the slightest the present situation."⁵⁰ Snowden embellished on this, announcing to the Dominican public that the occupation would continue indefinitely due to Dominicans' apparent inability to govern their own country; he expected the U.S. would be occupying the country for at least another ten to twenty years.⁵¹ Snowden's speech in the middle of these new recruitment efforts lent more credence to the widespread claim that those enlisting were betraying the sovereignty of their country by aiding occupation forces. The event loudly spelled out the strong disillusionment among both occupation forces and Dominicans, and highlighted the failure of recent changes meant to improve relations by improving the marine-officered Dominican constabulary.

The controversies surrounding Snowden's speech and the spike in marine arrivals led constabulary commandant Williams to some new concern about the possibility of gaining Dominican support for the constabulary through the provinces. At the same time, the increased marine forces in the Eastern district allowed Williams to balance out the numbers in constabulary companies from province to province. He worked to spread constabulary forces more evenly throughout the country's regions, institutionalizing the changes in September of 1919 with

⁵⁰ Whitney Perkins, *Constraint of Empire: The United States and Caribbean Interventions*, (Westport: Greenwood Press), 1981, 119.

⁵¹ Quoted in: Tejado, *100 años*, 45.

constabulary General Order 39 (Series 1919).⁵² Williams made this change with the hopes that it would make Dominicans see the constabulary as more representative of national policing forces, leaving fewer areas policed only by marines and thus improving the reputation of the constabulary and the general occupation. This change worked better in theory than in practice, of course, as the military government ordered officers to pull many constabulary members from policing power to be used as hands in infrastructural building during 1919, and marines outnumbered constabulary by about three to one during that year.⁵³ To increase enlistment enthusiasm, and in the hope of boosting re-enlistment for the many who would be eligible for it in the next year, Williams also issued an order in November of 1919 giving departmental directors the authorization to provide licenses for leave after certain terms of service (depending upon rank).⁵⁴

As 1920 began, reactions to the constabulary were mixed. Some real changes in the institutional structure of the organization had transformed some of the most problematic aspects of the constabulary: it now had Dominican officers, even if they were at the lowest officer rank, and recruited from a broader geographical population than it had been able to do previously. Higher levels of accountability, through the creation of an Inspector General's office and structured reporting, lessened blatant incidents of corruption among both marine and Dominican constabulary members. The constabulary was spread more evenly through its outposts in each province, and was finally operating at near-full capacity. Constabulary companies were still, however, led by inexperienced marine officers, and still lacked any consistent training. In part

⁵² Dated 5 September, 1919. Folder 2, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional, Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁵³ Constabulary units were used especially in such infrastructural projects as road building, mapping, and the building and repair of prisons and military bases; this was true even when a lack of manpower might cause severe difficulties for individual constabulary units, because the Brigade Commander of the occupation Marines had so much power over the constabulary, whose leaders were his command subordinates.

⁵⁴ General Order No. 46 (Series 1919), 10 November 1919.

because of these problems, and the wider rejection of occupation conduct, it also still lacked the support of the elite families and still struggled against the rejection of most middle-class families.⁵⁵ On 5 June of 1920, interim commandant George C. Reid complained that Dominican constabulary officers were a failure because they were not "from among the higher types of Dominicans," and therefore lacked stability, character, and natural aptitude.⁵⁶ Williams agreed that the Dominican officers were inefficient, though he opined that it was due to lack of training.⁵⁷ Despite many attempts to improve the constabulary, and even to bring in native officers, constabulary leaders still faced major challenges. As late as 1920, U.S. Minister William Russell was demanding major change to the constabulary, stating that the military government was spending large sums of money for the constabulary's maintenance without proving its efficiency, and that complaints against constabulary methods were still "numerous."⁵⁸

When Williams was ordered back to the United States in September of 1920, the constabulary was briefly taken over by George C. Reid, and soon after by J.C. Breckenridge, reinitiating the rapid turnover of constabulary Colonel Commandants.⁵⁹ Not surprisingly, the Dominican opinion of the constabulary seemed to change little or not at all in 1918 and 1919. Marine officers continued to refuse Dominican members any promotions above the rank of second lieutenant. Still, constabulary Colonel Commandant J.C. Breckenridge argued that the result of the changes were good; before late 1920, he stated, the members of the constabulary had themselves had to be "watched," so that the fewer and more selectively recruited numbers of Dominican recruits was preferable to the previous riffraff. Upon briefly taking command of the

⁵⁵ See interviews and news reports quoted in: Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 100-102, 109-112, 116-121; Franck, *Roaming*, 197.

⁵⁶ Quoted in Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 57 and fn 71. The constabulary rosters through this time show only the original sixteen Dominican officers brought in from late 1918 to early 1919.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Quoted in: Soloman, "Law, Order, and Justice," 81.

⁵⁹ Orders and General Orders, Folder 2, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional, Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

force in late 1920, he explained away continued complaints, stating that the constabulary was simply "passing through a stage of reconstruction which requires patience and several months of time."⁶⁰ His added clause that "there is no doubt as to the outcome" might have struck Dominicans as an empty promise by this time, had they heard it, after years of repeated promises of a reformed constabulary and friendlier military-civil relations. New orders in 1920 emphasizing the requirement that even U.S. constabulary officers must have a working knowledge of Spanish and be examined successfully on basic knowledge of Dominican history seemed to come as too little and too late, three years after the constabulary's founding.⁶¹

The constabulary experience.

Overall, the changes in the constabulary as it was experienced were modest and varied by region, despite the extent of efforts and institutional changes made by Fuller and Williams. This was true for four primary reasons: 1) The period under which Fuller and Williams initiated changes began with a constabulary that had a very dark reputation throughout the country. Restructuring did not bring widespread or even marginal support for the constabulary among the majority of the population, largely because of the disparity between central command and regional commands. 2) Despite many suggestions issued in general orders through 1919 for constabulary training in outposts and headquarters, training continued to be un-systematized and largely nonexistent; some company commanders had sufficient regional resources to allow for training while others did not. The especially high number of marines in the country in early to mid 1919 was used primarily in the guerrilla warfare in the east, and to garrison marine headquarters in the face of continued resistance. Their presence was large but temporary,

⁶⁰ "Memorandum for the Military Governor," from GND Colonel Commandant J.C. Breckenridge, dated 15 Dec. 1920, Legajo 59, "Gobierno Militar," AGN1.

⁶¹ "General Order 30 (1920)" and "General Order 2 (Series 1920)," in Legajo 1, "Ejército Nacional," AGN1.

causing a reaction among a populace that rejected an increase in Marine strength, while not allowing constabulary commanders to use marines for training. 3) Despite the high budget for the constabulary, equipment and provisions continued to be short throughout 1919 due to inefficiency and the incredible need for funds for buildings and repair, all of which had been neglected for nearly a decade. Outlying regions farther from the major cities especially suffered from lack of supplies, as the military government emphasized military superiority especially in regions near the major cities: the high increase in the military government's budget in 1919 was directed mainly toward the improvement of the sugar industry and the building of infrastructure to show concrete improvements in reports to the U.S. Navy and State Departments.⁶² 4) The changes in needed military infrastructure such as roads and telecommunications were extremely gradual until 1920, which combined with a year of intense rains in 1919 to make constabulary patrolling and reporting difficult, especially in more remote areas. The country remained highly regional, and populations from one area to the next were distinct and accustomed to a high degree of regional autonomy.

One of the key reasons that so many Dominicans rejected the constabulary was the very nature of the military government: From late 1916 to 1918, despite Knapp's attitude toward Dominicans as inferior, many Dominicans wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt during his time as military governor because he did include Dominican advisors in the government. Yet the disorder caused by lack of budgeting or support from the U.S. State Department worked against him and against occupation goals, and Dominicans became increasingly disillusioned with the motives of the occupying force from the first months of the occupation.⁶³ Despite Knapp's use

⁶² See Lozano, *La dominación imperialista*, 162-167; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1919*, 140-141.

⁶³ Statements in United States, "Senate Inquiry," 945-973, 1054-1084; this growing, early disillusionment is also discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

of Dominicans as advisors, eye-witness accounts of American advisors and travelers through the region constantly pointed out the lack of Dominicans in any positions in the official government.⁶⁴ 1918 and 1919 brought adjustments that allowed the beginnings of infrastructural reform and improvement in government oversight of health, sanitation, and education, but also complicated the Dominican reception of the military government through the appointment of Thomas Snowden as military governor. Snowden was even less inclined either to trust Dominicans in their own self-governance or to include them as advisors in any fashion. Thus even the appeasement of having Dominicans involved in minor aspects of the governance of the country was removed upon Snowden's entry into the office of military governor, which coincided with the first real efforts at improving the constabulary in 1918.

Marine constabulary officers were well aware of the problem of the constabulary's reputation, but unable to fix it. From late 1918 until 1922, marines serving as constabulary officers continuously urged the development of a recruitment process and campaign that could help to remove the dark reputation of the organization and bring "better" recruits to enlistment.⁶⁵ Yet the main roles of the constabulary in many provinces during 1918 and 1919 continued to be in the fight against continual resurgences of armed resistance, patrolling around cities and throughout the countryside, prison guarding or escorting of officials, and basic policing duties.

As Marine Colonel George C. Thorpe described it in late 1919, the constabulary

is expected to function under the War Department as well as under the Department of Justice. It not only combines the functions of army and police but has some of those of the sheriff. It is organized and trained and administered upon military principles. As a small army it fights battles against insurgents; as a police force it hunts down criminals,

⁶⁴ See, for example, the accounts of Samuel Guy Inman and reporter Harry A. Franck who traveled through occupied regions of the Caribbean in the early years of the occupation; this refusal to allow Dominican citizens into governmental posts is also well-documented by U.S. diplomat Sumner Welles. Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*; Franck, *Roaming*, 196-228; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 797-814. See also: United States, "Senate Inquiry," 934-936, 943-961.

⁶⁵ Communications, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional, Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

especially in the rural districts; it operates in the rôle of sheriff in serving summons and other judicial writs and in furnishing guards at court sessions. It also has some connection with the Sanitary Department in enforcing sanitary regulations, and represents the central government, more or less, in connection with quarantine and immigration.⁶⁶

For urban areas, the military government throughout 1919 began to allow the re-establishment of municipal police so that constabulary units could be freed up for the military duties that their military organization reflected. The creation of municipal police, who officially answered to civil government, created its own problems for the constabulary and occupation forces. Until late 1921, the exact lines were unclear in many cities between which duties belonged to the constabulary and which fell under the obligations of municipal police forces. The latter also worked to distance themselves from the constabulary, and generally did not cooperate with constabulary or occupation forces. The chiefs of the municipal forces encouraged this behavior, also distancing themselves from occupation authorities, leading to constabulary and Marine demands for local, civil governments to request resignations from stubborn police chiefs. Charles A. McLaughlin, marine commander of the constabulary in charge of the 10th Company stationed in the interior town of Moca, for example, reported disorder in the audience at a public show on 12 September, 1920. The marine commanding officer requested that Chief Valario in charge of the municipal police there, do something, and Valario stood by and did nothing. The following Monday, the *ayuntamiento* requested Valario's resignation.⁶⁷ Such incidences, in which municipal police not commanded by marine officers were supported by large portions of the local populations in their rejection of marine authority, led to increasing instances of civil-military clashes rather than lessening the problems.⁶⁸ Even with the addition of some municipal

⁶⁶ Thorpe, "Dominican Service," 316-317.

⁶⁷ 10th Company Report, 19 September, 1920, File #1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁶⁸ Various Reports, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. In one case in Azua in the southwestern region, police were so disruptive and uncooperative with the

police forces, furthermore, the small constabulary was spread too thin. Constabulary men employed as guards in civil prisons, for example, included more than eleven percent of the constabulary membership in 1919 and 1920.⁶⁹

In an effort to improve the constabulary's interaction with the public, especially to deal with the isolation and lack of accountability in some constabulary command outposts, Commandant Williams emphasized the awarding of commendations to those constabulary members who distinguished themselves in service, and especially to those who worked well with the public.⁷⁰ By mid 1919, after Snowden's speech and attempts by Fuller and Williams to reform the constabulary, the tensions between the military and the civilian population are clear in Williams's need to issue a General Order on 23 July, 1919 reiterating the authorized roles of the constabulary, and its obligations in dealing with the public. All constabulary members were required and empowered to execute lawful warrants, and were authorized to make arrests upon reasonable suspicion without warrants. He stressed, however, that they "must act in good faith and have reasonable grounds for suspicion of the guilt of the person arrested." Furthermore, the order stated that arrests without warrants should only be made when immediate action was required to avoid disturbance of the peace, that arrests should be made "as quietly as possible" and using only "such force as may be reasonably necessary to accomplish the object," and even that "persons arrested will not be humiliated."⁷¹

The reasons bringing about the need for such an order are clear. Instances of friction remained high, and from the beginning of the occupation, instances of military brutality occurred

constabulary that they were disbanded. See: Reports from San Juan, August 1920, Box 3, Files 11-19, Year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908.

⁶⁹ "Percentage of Men Employed as Guards in Civil Prisons," File, "Secretaría de Estado de Justicia e Instrucción Pública 1920," Box 64 (1916-1920), Gobierno Militar Americano, AGN.

⁷⁰ General Order No. 22, July 1919, Box 1, "Ejército Nacional," AGN.

⁷¹ General Order No. 33 (Series 1919), 23 July 1919, Folder 2, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional, Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

especially in isolated locations. One of the more infamous examples of excessive use of force came as early as October of 1916, while the occupation was just beginning, in the widely documented and publicized "Villa Duarte" incident. In Villa Duarte, a neighborhood in Santo Domingo, marines went in to arrest a fugitive; they saw the area as a "harbor for insurrectos and criminals, whose insolence to and defiance of the American authorities had aroused considerable feeling" among marines.⁷² The event, like many others, led to a shooting exchange that killed non-combatant Dominican civilians, including a woman. A number of marines in officer positions in the constabulary were arrested and tried for brutalities against the population, mostly in the east. Constabulary Captains who were lower-ranking marines, such as Harry Seipel, Gustave Schmidt, and James Merkel regularly robbed locals of horses, food, and other supplies in addition to the seizure of arms.⁷³ Schmidt, in his capacity as a Captain in a constabulary company was eventually arrested for the regular torture of local inhabitants. Merkel, too, committed blatant torture, and encouraged his Dominican constabulary recruits to do the same. He was arrested for beating and disfiguring a prisoner and having four others shot. During the investigation, while Merkel was confined awaiting trial, he committed suicide.⁷⁴

Constabulary involvement with such men, especially when they were marine officers, and with the constant raids against the eastern population, caused growing numbers of violent incidents between local populations and constabulary members as the occupation wore on.⁷⁵ Marine and Dominican constabulary officers were also notorious for corruption, and even in the 1920s commanding officers' memos to headquarters still repeatedly emphasized the problem of

⁷² Lane, "Civil Government," 128-129.

⁷³ All three of these Marines were captains in the constabulary, but of lower rank in the Marine Corps, and all three of them were stationed in the eastern provinces when these brutalities were committed.

⁷⁴ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 33. See also: Calder, 130-131; Solomon, 87-88. Mary Renda also writes about the psychological difficulties for Marine forces in the occupation of Haiti, where conditions were similar, in: *Taking Haiti*, Part One.

⁷⁵ Reports of the Office of the Inspector, especially August, 1920, File #1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

reports of constabulary abuse of the peasantry and the frequency with which they stole from the native populations, especially in areas further removed from the capital city.⁷⁶ Dominicans issued complaints to their local governments, rather than to the commanders of the constabulary, that constabulary members were corrupt and sometimes murderous but did not receive sentences equal to their crimes. The result was that solutions were local more often than standardized across provinces, and judgments often tended to try to right the balance of power. For example, constabulary commanders called for an investigation of sentences carried out by the local courts, where they reported that a man from Barahona received only six months for wounding a man five times with a knife, while a constabulary member was given a year for shooting a man while on duty. The Secretary of the Judge of the First Instance there stated openly in court that the constabulary members were "vagabonds only good to assassinate [*sic*] people."⁷⁷ In some areas, constabulary members complained that local residents would not extend credit to them, and General Order 22 of 14 August 1920 ordered constabulary medical officers to establish friendly relations with local dentists so that the constabulary men could be assured dental care.⁷⁸

Despite the initiation of many institutional reforms in 1918 and 1919, the exigencies of guerrilla warfare meant that training was often neglected, especially in areas of high resistance in which both constabulary members and marines were fighting resistance. The result was a wide regional variation in the constabulary's successes. Calder points out that of the constabulary's marine field officers in mid-1919, not one had previously served as an officer, nor was there "one who had experience in that peculiar line of police work necessary for the success of the

⁷⁶ "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Various correspondence, 1920, Box 64 (1916-1920) "Gobierno Militar Americano," AGN1; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 48.

⁷⁷ Reports from San Juan, 12 August 1920 report, Box 3, Files 11-19, Year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁷⁸ "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia," 1917-1920, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

Guardia."⁷⁹ This meant that constabulary companies in the field lacked trainers. Sixteen of the thirty-four marine non-coms serving with the Guardia had quit by mid-1919, and despite the need for training, the State Department refused to authorize more officers than were absolutely necessary for the basic staffing of the Guardia, so most marine duties were in the field with their Marine or constabulary companies.⁸⁰ The large spike in marine numbers in early 1919, which predated improvements in housing, communication, and infrastructure also added to difficulties, straining the already insufficient support for troops of both the Marine Corps and the constabulary. While some marine and constabulary units in the country's major cities were housed in the *fortalezas*, those in rural areas spent most of their time in field tents, and many constabulary members were housed in field tents on the grounds of the *fortalezas* even in the cities because sufficient barracks had yet to be built before 1920. Morale among troops was thus often low, putting a strain on commanders who were in the process of attempting to better civil-military relations.⁸¹

Fuller, concerned with morale among marine enlisted men, developed a system to cope with this problem while providing basic training to unprepared new recruits. He opened a training center for marines in Santo Domingo City, assigning each marine company to a rotation of six weeks of standard marine training and special schooling in "occupation duties." This improved the morale of marine officers from interior stations, who saw these periods as times to "see a little night life and do some dancing at the club."⁸² One might imagine the reaction of Dominicans already skeptical about the sincerity of efforts to improve the constabulary, which

⁷⁹ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 57.

⁸⁰ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47.

⁸¹ Inman recounted the extensive stories of Marines about the what they saw as the "rotteness" of the country in 1919. Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 11. See also Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 31-32.

⁸² Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 32.

still lacked training centers or any form of rotation. The preference to training enlisted marines before constabulary officers in those years was representative of the larger problem of Dominican recruits and officers not being taken seriously or prepared for the eventual takeover of the armed forces that was supposed to have been the purpose in creating the constabulary. In 1919, U.S. Minister to the Dominican Republic William Russell suggested a complete reorganization of the constabulary, preferably under “white officers and not native Dominicans.”⁸³ This of course had been the reality since the constabulary's founding, but the continued determination of policy-makers to keep it that way led to a reaction among them against the opening of lower ranking officer positions for Dominicans.

Not until late 1921, with discussions about preparing for eventual U.S. withdrawal, would any systematic training of the constabulary or its Dominican officers begin. Constabulary recruits in most locations therefore were armed only with improvised training, often in the field and through a language barrier by marines who had “no special instruction in constabulary work.”⁸⁴ They came to the constabulary with knowledge of the local populations and landscape, and most had experience with the old firearms that the marines gained from disarmament and often used to supply the constabulary's enlisted members.⁸⁵ Some marines, mostly in the center of the country and the capital city where armed insurrection was less common, enforced on-site teaching of basic drilling techniques, which were administered in English with physical demonstrations to circumvent the problem of the language barrier.⁸⁶ Constabulary company reliance on recruit knowledge of the territory, people, and language was set side-by-side with a

⁸³ Bruce J. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 58.

⁸⁴ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47.

⁸⁵ “Ordenanzas y Correspondencia,” Ejército Nacional, Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Fuller, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47-48.

⁸⁶ Communications, 1919, “Ordenanzas y Correspondencia,” Ejército Nacional, Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

foreign-language drill in an attempt to make constabulary units effective for local needs but also disciplined and respectable.

The result, in the middle years of the occupation, was a synthesis of Marine Corps organization and Dominican local traditions, the latter of which persisted as Spanish-speaking constabulary members inserted themselves into power relationships and negotiation with local populations in ways that English-speaking marine constabulary leaders could not do. The tendency toward on-site training as possible at the discretion of various marine commanders was also the reinforcement of the same regional patterns that had plagued national militaries of the previous decades: the new military in areas such as the southeast and southwest were underdeveloped in training and discipline, and often cut off from supplies and medical care, due to local insurrections and guerrilla warfare. Units in the area surrounding the capital city, where the largest numbers of marines were stationed, were well-supplied and better trained. Constabulary companies in the interior, especially in the Cibao Valley, were housed in remote outposts through the provinces there, and were focused mainly on rural patrolling. As both armed resistance and the need to police urban populations were less notable there, company commanders were able to emphasize the drill and basic training. In the northwest and along the Haitian border, the military continued to be focused on the policing of trade goods and border crossings, and spent much more time on long patrols and paperwork relating to the border. Despite the insertion of marine organization for the units, and the English drill, the exigencies of regional needs trumped a real re-making of the military, and the constabulary units settled into regional training and policing patterns that more resembled previous Dominican militaries than the national, unified constabulary of theory.

Through 1919, the increase in the constabulary's budget gave commandant Williams the opportunity to begin some major apportioning of financial resources toward the construction, repair, and maintenance of buildings for constabulary barracks and outposts, as well as general supplies. Since the units had not been supplied to this point, however, constabulary units in most regions lacked even basic military equipment such as firearms when the higher 1919 budget came into play. Marines commanding the constabulary units, of course, had firearms provided by the Marine Corps. Because the number of pistols available was only enough to arm officers and trumpeters, constabulary enlisted members were without.⁸⁷ While those constabulary members serving in more remote outposts were supposed to be equipped with rifles as of 12 December 1919, their lack of training in the cleaning and handling of the Krag-Jorgensen rifles meant that the weapons rapidly deteriorated.⁸⁸ Though it was closely monitored that constabulary enlisted men were only to have access to arms while on duty or in the barracks, and never while off-duty, from 1917 through 1920 most were only carrying machetes and other such weapons that been captured in the disarmament campaign.⁸⁹ Even as late as 1921, the entire constabulary organization had only three automatic rifles and no machine guns, and a lack of field equipment and vehicles or mounts.⁹⁰

Despite the continued problem of lack of equipment and supplies, constabulary commandants were careful to keep the pay for enlisted men at a steady \$15 per month. This salary, twice that earned by most Dominican laborers and the same amount paid to enlisted marines in the period, was meant to guarantee enlistment and to guarantee loyalty among those

⁸⁷ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47-48.

⁸⁸ General Order 48 (Series 1919), 12 December 1919, Box 1, "Ejército Nacional," AGN1; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47-48.

⁸⁹ A.M. Norris, "Weekly Report," 27 February, 1921, Box 3, File "1921, 18," "Ejército Nacional," AGN1.

⁹⁰ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47-48.

enlisted.⁹¹ Enlisted pay was also increased to \$17 per month when Marine Corps enlisted pay was increased in 1919. This pay level may well have seemed very high to laborers, but was too low to recruit many from among other classes. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, it often proved to be insufficient to offset the dangers and pressures of being in the constabulary. Weather conditions in some years of the occupation, coupled with poor roads and the need to patrol in areas that had no roads, meant that some marine and constabulary battalions would become completely cut off from both central orders and supply, leading to the need to support their livelihoods from local populations. Merchants extending credit to constabulary members ran the risk of being called traitors, or of being persecuted by the armed resistance for aiding the enemy.⁹² This often meant increases in constabulary theft from local populations, and made conditions in the units difficult in all but the best of times.⁹³

Complaints against the constabulary

One of the primary reasons that multiple resistance movements did not unite before 1920 was the lack of movement across regions among intellectuals and politicians. From 1916, censorship was one of the primary forms of control that the military government used to keep resistances from uniting, and it was also one of the strongest points of contention. As nationalist resistance leader Henríquez y Carvajal would emphasize in 1920, the military government had long used World War One to justify strict censorship; the constabulary, from its inception, enforced censorship to facilitate the job of “subduing” the population for civil and military

⁹¹ General Order 14, 6 March, 1918, Box 1, Folder 2, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

⁹² United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1108-1147; Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 53-60.

⁹³ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 32; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 4; Franck, *Roaming Through the West Indies*, 224-225.

reform.⁹⁴ Successive administrators adjusted levels of censorship to allow control while attempting not to incite rebellion, and the level of censorship also varied by region depending on local traditions and expectations. As military governor in 1918-1919, however, Thomas Snowden instituted extreme censorship laws to shackle resistance.⁹⁵ In 1919, though World War One was over, his military government forbade Dominicans from using the title "General," and prohibited the use of the terms "national," "rebellion," "freedom of thought," and "freedom of speech."⁹⁶

Through the years of occupation, Dominicans in all regions were brought under court-martial by marine provost marshals for publication of articles or statements that might do harm to the military control of the country. The military government and constabulary, seeing the danger of possible unity across regions or from outside of the country's borders, was especially sensitive to any sign of unification in resistance after World War One. In 16 December of 1919, for example, editor of Puerto Plata's *Ecos del Norte* Rafael Morel was brought in for reprinting a statement criticizing the military government that had been written by the Ladies Commission Pro-Santo Domingo in New York City.⁹⁷ The marines and constabulary dealt most severely with publications that had strong potential to unite regions, but arrests and harsh fines would actually work to galvanize the resistance.⁹⁸ Groups like the Ladies Commission Pro-Santo Domingo sprung up more and more after World War One, and *de jure* Dominican president Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal's movement from Cuba grew exponentially after the war ended. Henríquez y Carvajal spoke at the Paris Peace Conference, could not get an audience with President Wilson,

⁹⁴ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 39-41.

⁹⁵ Correspondence between Snowden and the director of the newspaper "El Tiempo," "Gobierno Militar Americano Clasificado por años, Año 1919," Box 119, Gobierno Militar Americano, AGN1; Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 13; Schoenrich, "The Present American Intervention in Santo Domingo and Haiti," 210.

⁹⁶ From Judge Otto Schoenrich's report, quoted in: Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 119.

⁹⁷ Soloman, "Law, Order, and Justice in the Dominican Republic," 101-103.

⁹⁸ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 196.

and returned to the United States to pursue it.⁹⁹ When Wilson still did not grant him an audience, the Dominican president brought complaints to the State Department.¹⁰⁰ He suggested that the military governor call together a commission of Dominicans to make suggestions about how the occupation should be conducted. When State Department officials suggested that he take these ideas to Military Governor Snowden, he responded that under Snowden the "thought and will of the people" were suppressed or forced into "underground channels of divulgation" due to censorship.¹⁰¹

Notably, Snowden himself opined that Henríquez y Carvajal's idea of a Dominican commission "would result in anarchy and early ruin" of occupation goals.¹⁰² With pressure from both the State Department and Dominican politicians and intellectuals, Snowden's administration did finally attempt to smooth public opinion in November, 1919 by appointing four prominent Dominicans to a *junta consultiva* that was charged with proposing reforms with the ostensible end of facilitating U.S. withdrawal.¹⁰³ No actual plan for withdrawal existed, but rising resistance to continued occupation necessitated creating an appearance of eventual withdrawal. Snowden admitted the powerlessness of this commission in official and private correspondence, however, saying that he hoped that the nominal inclusion in government of prominent Dominicans would appease popular opinion.¹⁰⁴ The commission consisted of Archbishop Nouel, previous Dominican Treasury Minister and political party leader Federico Velasquez, and prominent Santo Domingo lawyers Francisco Peynado and Jacinto R. de Castro, who quickly realized the impotence of the position: When they recommended a suspension of censorship as

⁹⁹ Juárez, "United States Withdrawal from Santo Domingo," 165.

¹⁰⁰ Kincheloe Robbins, "What Santo Domingo Wants," *The Nation* 110:2853 (March 6, 1920), 312.

¹⁰¹ Quotes in: Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 119. See also: Fabio Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista Dominicana en Washington, 1920-1921*, (Ciudad Trujillo: Imp. La Opinion, C. por A., 1939), 31.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ See Moya-Pons, 330; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 191-192.

¹⁰⁴ Calder, *Impact of Intervention*, 191-192. See also: Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 1981, 120; Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, 31-46.

one of the first key steps toward democratic government, Snowden responded by increasing censorship. The commission members resigned in protest on 9 January of 1920.¹⁰⁵ From there, resistance would turn into a growing nationalist movement that worked outside the bounds of military government laws and drew attention to the wide scope of problems such as censorship.

In addition to censorship, the nationalist resistance worked to draw attention to another major complaint that existed across regions, and one instituted by the military government specifically in order to centralize national government: military government interference in local and civil government, as enforced by the constabulary. As described in Chapter Three, Knapp's original proclamation of Military Government reassured Dominicans that civil government would remain in the hands of the Dominican courts as long as it did not conflict with the goals of the occupation. The latter clause, of course, left each case open to individual interpretation, and almost any case could be said to affect occupation goals. Bruce Calder argues that authors of occupation reform sought "to eliminate inefficiencies and inequities, but they had no thought of radically changing the Dominican economy or society."¹⁰⁶ This was true in some aspects: For example, reformers reinitiated many changes begun under previous Dominican governments. Yet records demonstrate that many in the highest military government and constabulary posts had in mind exactly the goal of radically changing Dominican society, and that was one of the more powerful catalysts for growing resistance against the occupation and the constabulary that enforced its changes. Racist and paternalist ideologies led many to come to the occupation with

¹⁰⁵ Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, 31-33; Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 1981, 120. Resistance against censorship is well-covered in the literature. In addition to Fiallo's work, See Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 193-199, Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 329-332.

¹⁰⁶ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 89. Calder's study does not make use of the Marine Corps archives, which contains many of the reports calling for radical and fundamental change of society. One of *de jure* President Henríquez y Carvajal's major points of protest, in his calls for a return of Dominican sovereignty, was that he, as legal president of the Dominican Republic, did not authorize the ongoing re-writing of the Dominican constitution that was being carried out under the U.S. military government. E. Henríquez García, ed., *Cartas del Presidente Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, Comisión del Exterior, 1919-20-21*, (Santo Domingo de Guzman: Imprenta Sánchez, 1970), 20.

the understanding that their role was that of modernizer and tutor, and occupation records are rife with Marine discussions of the need to radically change varying aspects of Dominican society and government.¹⁰⁷ Many U.S. officials sought to rebuild the entire structure of Dominican government, enforcing the changes and surveillance of their results by use of the constabulary.

The constabulary, seen by most Dominicans as part of the occupation forces rather than as a Dominican military, carried out and enforced controversial civil reforms that fell outside the publicly stated goals of the occupation. For example, many local positions such as ayuntamientos and municipal mayors were traditionally elected, but were appointed under the military government.¹⁰⁸ The constabulary was given wide powers to arrest in cases that might be construed as relevant to military government objectives. This became especially contentious due to the legal inconsistencies in the occupation's civil administration. Rufus Lane, appointed Minister of Justice and Public Instruction, advocated major changes that would gradually phase out much of the power of regional civil government, centralizing the national government and military so as to empower central control in relation to traditional regionally based power structures.¹⁰⁹ Prior to the occupation, Dominican civil governors in the provinces had traditionally been military generals and had held wide power, including the constitutional right to call up men in arms to defend local government.¹¹⁰ Although marine Brigade Commander

¹⁰⁷ Derby documents Military Governor Snowden's many calls to revise the law system of the Dominican Republic and replace it with U.S. laws, and the perceived need to rebuild Dominican society so that it could "progress." Derby, "the Magic of Modernity," 41, 46-47. For a detailed account of many fundamental changes to Dominican social institutions and the Dominican constitutions, see: Lane, "Civil Government."

¹⁰⁸ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 97.

¹⁰⁹ Lane, "Civil Government," 128, 135-136, 141-142.

¹¹⁰ Testimony of Dominican lawyer Pedro A. Pérez in: United States, "Senate Inquiry," 964.

George C. Thorpe defended the occupation, stating that "the native courts never lost any of their authority," the record contradicts him.¹¹¹

The problem was that the military government was charged first with bringing order, and it sought to do so by centralizing government and military power. From as early as 1918, military government administrators had worked to revise the Dominican civil governmental system and consolidate multiple regions to centralize and facilitate military and administrative power.¹¹² Joseph Pendleton, as marine brigade commander in the country through 1918, began the process of consolidating and centralizing government starting with the reduction of Dominican provinces. He hoped to reduce the country's number of provinces from twelve to four or five, stating that "governors are a joke anyhow, and not really worth their keep."¹¹³ Lane called Dominican municipal governments by nature "highly inefficient and wasteful," and stated that they "seemed to be incapable of carrying responsibility in reformatory measures." The military government therefore gradually took over the roles of those municipal governments, backing their authority through a combination of marine and constabulary policing, "with the prospect that at no distant date even the nominal independence [of regions] will disappear."¹¹⁴ Pendleton, too, advocated the gradual elimination of local governments, and considered consolidation of *comunes* and districts throughout the country to be the most effective way of carrying out this change.¹¹⁵ The decreasing importance of civil governors, however, can be

¹¹¹ Thorpe, "Dominican Service," 316. Dominicans were regularly brought before U.S. Navy courts martial on a wide variety of charges that should legally have been tried under native courts. Extensive examples are documented in: Soloman, "Law, Order, and Justice."

¹¹² For example, Executive Order 126, dated 1 February 1918, converted the Común of Sabana de Palenque into a Municipal District of the Común of San Cristóbal; Executive Order 136 of 14 March, 1918, converted the Común of Ramón Santana into a Municipal District of the Común of Seibo.

¹¹³ Letter from Pendleton to W.N. McKelvey, 15 April, 1918, Box 2, "Pendleton Papers," USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

¹¹⁴ Lane, "Civil Government," 135-136.

¹¹⁵ Letter from Pendleton to W.N. McKelvey, 15 April, 1918, Box 2, "Pendleton Papers," USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico. The work of revising Dominican civil systems, while increasingly controversial, was

explained by the character of the occupation; as Thorpe later explained it, the nature of the occupation government was military, and thus lent itself more to centralization that left civil governors "little authority and few functions."¹¹⁶ The apparent ineffectiveness of civil governors stemmed from the very centralization and militarization that the occupying government was carrying out, and from civil resistance against that centralized control. Yet many in the military government worked to consolidate military control by such reforms despite the fact that they fell outside of the parameters of what the occupation had promised to do. Military government interference in civil government increased popular dissatisfaction with those willing to be members of the constabulary that enforced such changes.

The Dominican population reacted to oppression and change carried out by the constabulary, and these reactions were often misunderstood or ignored by occupation planners and high-ranking U.S. officers of the constabulary. One of the most controversial reforms, and one in which the constabulary was most visible, was that of disarming the population. The centrality of disarmament in clashes between the civilian population and the constabulary provides a useful case study of how occupation initiatives and failures in building military-civil relations affected the development and reception of the constabulary, and of the interplay of widening resistance with the attempted consolidation of constabulary control.¹¹⁷ Individuals working for the military government, most prominent among them previous U.S. Minister to the

a continuing goal of military government administrators, and became even more central with the need to abandon regionalism in 1920 and 1921. Military Governor Thomas Snowden's report to the Department of the Navy in October of 1920, for example, called for extensive revision to Dominican court systems and legal codes as necessary for stability and centralized order. *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1920*, 334-336. A *común* was one of the smallest units of Dominican municipal government.

¹¹⁶ Thorpe, "Dominican Service," 316.

¹¹⁷ Throughout the course of occupation, the disarmament campaign was one of the highly touted examples of success, probably in large part because it was so easily quantifiable. Marines collected an estimated total of 53,000 firearms (most of them of "obsolete type"), 200,000 rounds of ammunition, and "about" 14,000 edged weapons. Fuller, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 57. Despite the proclaimed success of the campaign, the resurgence of armed groups of Dominicans never ceased to be a problem for the military government until a withdrawal plan was firmly in place in mid-1922.

Dominican Republic Sumner Welles, attempted to explain away the foreign imposition of disarmament by pointing out a proposal under the 1902 provisional government of Vásquez to begin a program of disarmament by prohibiting the import of firearms and ammunition with the eventual goal of disarming individuals.¹¹⁸ Welles's argument and that of the Military Government was that disarmament was not just a foreign imposition, but a sound and also Dominican policy.¹¹⁹ The Vásquez and Cáceres governments had not been successful in carrying out disarmament either, however, because of the ubiquity of arms in Dominican culture and because even under those governments the plan was heavily influenced by U.S. pressure.¹²⁰

Disarmament also had cultural and psychological ramifications that occupiers did not understand. As Dominican historian and contemporary occupation resister Luís Mejía points out, Dominican fathers had by tradition long given revolvers to their sons as a sign of manhood, and the surrendering of such a weapon might be seen as tantamount to renouncing one's manhood.¹²¹ The museum in the Fortaleza in Santiago today contains a display of weapons with a placard describing the importance of this tradition in Dominican history from the time of independence and before. The placard states that, traditionally, "the surrender of one's own sword has always been a demonstration of surrender or of submission, and its breaking, a

¹¹⁸ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 585.

¹¹⁹ In the *Gaceta Oficial*, the Military Government reprinted the portion of the 1911 *Ley de Policía* which stated that "Only the government may possess arms and munitions of war." *Gaceta Oficial*, No. 2801, 9 May 1917.

¹²⁰ In dealings with the Dominican Republic, with which the United States had developed closer relations since the 1890s, U.S. governments had emphasized arms control due to increasing U.S. investments in the country; a U.S. presidential proclamation of 1905 prohibited the export of arms and munitions of war from any U.S. or Puerto Rican port to the Dominican Republic. Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 54.

¹²¹ Mejía, *De Lili's a Trujillo*, 144-145. See also: Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 38. Charles Noxon, who witnessed the early part of the occupation as a Marine, described the importance of weapons, whether firearms or knives, for fiestas, parades, and entertainment. Noxon, "Santo Domingo," 3. Judge Otto Schoenrich, who spent a great deal of time in the Dominican Republic as an advisor under multiple financial interventions, also recorded the prominence of firearms as both indicators of manhood and social status and stated that provincial governors sometimes "forbade the carrying of arms, but the prohibition was rarely enforced with reference to their friends and adherents." Schoenrich, *Santo Domingo*, 179. In an interview, sanjuanero Arquímedes Valdez stated that "You carried a revolver in order to gain respect, so my father really needed all his arms." Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 93.

ceremony of degradation." The occupation disarmament campaign was in many other ways different from campaigns initiated by previous Dominican governments. It was an initiative begun and enforced by foreign military forces, and its objectives and targets were much wider than those of previous reforms.

The conduct of the disarmament campaign, listed among the immediate objectives of occupying forces, tended to highlight its character as a foreign initiative. Marines in 1916 and 1917 had begun carrying out disarmament as they fought their way into the country. This, and the fact that a marine commanding officer held sole authority to revoke or sign arms permits, highlighted its foreignness.¹²² Provincial governors resented that arms were to be turned over to U.S. provost marshals and then to marine District Commanders, instead of passing through the channels of provincial Dominican civil government.¹²³ It was not an order issued by a Dominican government, but an imposition by hostile and invading armed forces, an insult aggravated by the ease with which U.S. civilians in the country could obtain guns and permits. Disarmament was used by marines and later by constabulary units to justify forcible entry into Dominican homes when "an appreciable percentage" of Dominicans refused to voluntarily surrender arms.¹²⁴ One Marine called disarmament "the most drastic and effective step in the restoration of domestic tranquility," stating that "these forcible measures while not tending to promote good feeling were unavoidable and wholly justifiable in the effort for an early return of peace and order" and that "this measure divested the inhabitants of the only physical means of protracting armed resistance, and conclusively convinced them of the futility of further

¹²² Soloman, "Law, Order, and Justice," 59. The Marine commander given this authority in early occupation was Hiram Bearss.

¹²³ Franks, "Transforming Property," 206.

¹²⁴ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 25.

opposition in the face of the new order of things.”¹²⁵ As the 1920 resistance emphasized, however, the extensive disarmament campaign did not restore peace and order throughout the country, nor did it “conclusively convince” Dominicans of the futility of resistance. Instead, it only demonstrated the intrusiveness of the occupation and led to abuses and infractions on civil rights. So great was the opposition to marine methods in the early disarmament campaign that marines sought to collect arms through the population's voluntary surrender to civil officials, and even offered money in exchange for arms.¹²⁶ Civil officials did not effectively campaign for the surrender of arms, however, and some of them even encouraged populations to keep their weapons.¹²⁷ From June of 1917, marine Brigade Commander Pendleton ordered that only constabulary and marines would be authorized to represent the military government in collecting arms.¹²⁸

The 1920 resistance movements noted two other key differences between the military government disarmament and that of previous Dominican governments. They were the inclusion of machetes and knives in disarmament, and the extent of the campaign across geography and class groups. The machete and the knife were, in addition to being traditional symbols of manhood and independence, a major part of everyday peasant life. They were a traditional tool of agricultural and home use among lower- and middle-class men.¹²⁹ Reaction to the disarmament campaign also varied widely by region: in the fiercely independent eastern provinces, for example, marines had more difficulty securing the cooperation of civil officials and the general population. There, guerrilla fighters such as the infamous Vicentico, who had

¹²⁵ Miller, “Diplomatic Spurs,” 24.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 52. The money to pay for these arms was provided from Dominican revenue.

¹²⁷ Thomas E. Watson, “Report of inspection at Azua and Barahona” to “Chief of Staff,” 22 February 1917, Biographical File, Thomas E. Watson. File 3615, Box 1, Archives and Special Collections, USMC, Quantico; reports, File 1917, Geographical Files, “Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo,” USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

¹²⁸ Miller, “Diplomatic Spurs,” 25.

¹²⁹ Mejía, *De Lillís a Trujillo*, 144-145; Appleton, “Santo Domingo City,” 556.

built support and operations bases during the previous civil war, demanded local surrender of arms to their own guerrilla campaigns before marines and constabulary could get them. When one landowner refused to hand over his arms to Vicentico's band, and the arms were then gathered by marine and constabulary forces, the guerrillas executed the landowner as a traitor to his country.¹³⁰ The disarmament campaign was also different from the city to the traditionally isolated countryside. Rural traditions centered in large part around local autonomy with a lack of government interference--a cultural development that would aid resistance in bringing rural populations to its side as centralized government and military control became increasingly intrusive in 1920. Finally, as Franks points out, the occupation disarmament campaign was distinct in that it included those upper-class Dominicans and civil government officials immune to pre-occupation disarmament. Particularly galling was that lower-class Dominicans acting in the constabulary under marine Command sometimes confiscated arms from local officials themselves.¹³¹ As the efficiency of military enforcement increased with expansion of transportation networks in 1920, the intrusion into local and rural life created a population ripe for the unification of resistance and united rejection of the constabulary.¹³²

¹³⁰ Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 53-55.

¹³¹ Furthermore, those private citizens who were given licenses to carry arms complained that they were repeatedly challenged by police under Marine supervision, and made to prove their right to carry arms. Franks, "Transforming Property," 206.

¹³² As early as 1917, especially in the east where constabulary forces were concentrated under Marines to fight armed resistance, the constabulary played a key role in this highly controversial campaign. Even as the widely disliked military body formed, its untrained members were thrown into use in the disarmament campaign, empowered to force their way with marines into Dominican homes to demand arms from their traditional superiors. They often backed this power by the use of excessive force. As the constabulary was employed more and more in these efforts, clashes between civilians and the military became widespread, engendering growing hostility by 1919 and 1920 against Dominicans who were willing to serve in the constabulary. The constabulary's role in supporting disarmament and giving Dominican arms to the U.S. forces, who many believed had imperial aims on the island, made the constabulary increasingly seem a foreign force--especially as so many of its early members were U.S., Puerto Rican, or other foreign citizens. The long-held belief that the U.S. government and navy simply wanted permanent control of Samaná Bay, for example, resurfaced and affected the occupation until the final withdrawal of U.S. forces. See Chapter Two.

Disarmament in some areas caused unintended consequences, long unknown nationally due to censorship and the isolation of regions, that complicated life for Dominicans. Farmers long protested disarmament on the grounds that it damaged their crops, for example. One letter, addressed to the military government from Governor Octavio Beras of El Seibo Province, is indicative of one of the many unexpected problems brought about by disarmament in the Dominican countryside. In addition to the inability of farmers to protect themselves from crime in areas lacking police forces, disarmament affected other aspects of Dominican society:

Sir: Many farmers frequently approach this dispatch stating that, as a consequence of the rifles and shotguns having been collected, their plantations are imperiled by birds such as the guinea that destroys the corn plantations and the *carpintero* who is a terrible enemy of the cacao plantations. Especially because the latter prodigiously multiplies itself and destroys such a large and valuable percentage of the harvests, I request that the Government permit this *Gobernación* to authorize some farmers of good conduct and reputation to have a rifle or shot gun to defend their plantations.¹³³

Beras, a long-time collaborator with the military government, suggested the creation of a registry allowing certain farmers to keep firearms.¹³⁴ His suggestion was gradually carried out, with those who were permitted arms or armed guards given permits upon his suggestion. This would, of course, mean that political and personal enemies of Beras would not be permitted arms, leaving their farms unprotected while those most friendly to Beras and the military government would be given preference in the permission to carry arms, and thus to defend their crops.

In addition to those complaints emphasized by 1920 public resistance movements, the population became more inclined to openly resist due to many controversial reforms that advanced with the centralization of power and growing efficiency of the constabulary.

¹³³ Letter addressed to the Secretary of Interior and Police from Octavio Beras, 10 May, 1917, "Correspondencia, informes, y nóminas, 1917," Guerra y Marina, Dep. 08, IT 005043, AGN.

¹³⁴ The military government had removed Governor Ortiz and appointed Beras in his place because Beras was willing to cooperate with the constabulary and military government officials. Beras was, through early years, one of the most noted collaborators in the eastern provinces. He often provided reports about the direction and location of guerrillas to the constabulary or the Marines. F.S. Ducoudray, Jr., "Los "gavilleros" del este," 36; Oficios expedidos por la Secretaría, "Correspondencia e Informes 1917," Guerra y Marina Dep. 08, I.T. 005043, AGN.

Dominican constabulary and marines carried out some especially controversial reforms aiming to "improve" and "modernize" Dominican society. As an example, attempts to initiate sanitary reform, enforced by the constabulary, met with little success and much resistance. Suggested reforms were mild, and included the maintenance of clean streets. Marines saw this type of reform as simple and non-controversial, the type of work they relegated to the constabulary. In attempting to enforce the sanitation laws, however, constabulary members met with a reticent population.¹³⁵ The practice of disposing of trash on the curbside was the norm, and Dominicans must have seen little incentive to cooperate with occupation forces' initiatives, initiatives imposed by a force of foreign officers flaunting their "superior" culture and enforced by an untrained, mercenary force of lower-class Dominicans. The tensions surrounding such issues as sanitation control in the early occupation years were palpable in some places, and led to local resistance and arrests that damaged later attempts to enforce such reforms.¹³⁶ Sanitary reform was, however, among the least intrusive of many reforms directly affecting cultural practice. Other attempted reforms carried out by constabulary and marines addressed many aspects of Dominican society, pushing controversial changes and trying to enforce them through censorship, the gradual centralization of power, and by giving the constabulary wide powers of arrest. Many coming directly from the arguments of contemporary reformers in the United States, they emphasized a "moral" reform program that neither marines nor, especially, Dominicans serving in the constabulary could clearly explain or justify. Many were, in a sense, arbitrary, products of the development of different cultures, but seen by marine reformers as

¹³⁵ This reform and reaction provide an example of the ways that sanitation reform has been used as one of the chief methods of modernizing Latin American countries, facilitating state expansion, and centralizing power. It is also traditionally met with wide resistance, and, as Diego Armus points out, required strong and sometimes militarized state intervention. *Disease in Modern Latin America: From Malaria to AIDS*, (Durham: Duke University Press), 7-8.

¹³⁶ "Forwarding Correspondence between Chief Sanitary officer and City Council of Santo Domingo," "Second Provisional Brigade, U.S. Marines, Santo Domingo City, D.R. April 27, 1917," Folder "1917," Box 26, "Gobierno Militar Americano," AGN1. See also: Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 43.

absolute necessities for modernization and "progress."¹³⁷ Examples include the persecution and criminalization of such common and integral customs as cockfighting and gambling.¹³⁸ Thorpe wrote that "the Dominican is fond of cock-fighting. That is disgusting entertainment for Americans. Our first inclination is promptly to illegalize cock-fighting. We favor prize-fighting. No doubt we are right and that cock-fighting should not be. The way to accomplish that is by the process of substitution instead of elimination."¹³⁹ Gambling, too, was a central part of Dominican culture seen as a "vice" by those arriving from the United States.¹⁴⁰ In Dominican culture, gambling was an essential component of Dominican civil society, used in lieu of centralized government taxes to fund education, charities, and social support programs to support community needs while also supporting local autonomy. In addition to reforms seeking to erase traditions of gaming and replace local support systems with centralized governmental power, reformers attempted to eradicate prostitution, "obscene writings," and what the Chief of Naval Operations called "numerous other laws of a corrective liberalizing and constructive nature."¹⁴¹

While military government leaders flaunted their belief in the superiority of U.S. customs

¹³⁷ Initiatives for this sort of "moral reform" came, too, from the many other citizens of the United States who flooded increasingly into the Dominican Republic during the years of occupation. This group included not only Navy and Marine officers and enlisted men, but their families who often joined them there, U.S. investors and speculators, and other travelers such as missionaries. One missionary, who wrote frankly and openly about the faults of the Military Government in 1919, stated for example that religious zeal, unlike the stability garnered by religious institutions in the United States, was "exotic and misguided" in the Dominican Republic. Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 15.

¹³⁸ General Order 26. When advised during an explosion of work on infrastructural developments in April of 1919 that Dominican men working on an important road project needed entertainment and would have higher morale if allowed to set up cockfighting pits, Snowden wrote that "the project is not recommended. Better that the road remain unbuilt than that the Military Government lend its authority to the extension of cockfighting." Letters between Officer Administering the Affairs of Department of Justice and Public Instruction Rufus Lane and Military Governor Thomas Snowden, 9-10 April 1919, Folder 1919, "Secretaría de Interior y Policía," File 26, Box 69 (1921), "Gobierno Militar Americano," AGN1.

¹³⁹ Thorpe, "Dominican Service," 324.

¹⁴⁰ Inman, *Through Santo Domingo and Haiti*, 37.

¹⁴¹ Report of Chief of Naval Operations, "Inquiry into Occupation and Administration," 942; Extensive communications, Folder "Año 1920," Box 26 (1917), Gobierno Militar Americano, AGN1. Long contentious, the issue of prostitution was finally solved in part by the publication of Executive Order 96 on 22 November 1922, in which Brigade commander Pendleton, in his capacity as Interim Military Governor, set up a compromise Zone of Tolerance of prostitution in Santo Domingo in and around which the sale of liquor was prohibited.

and morality, Dominicans called occupation programs hypocritical and stressed the occupation's destructiveness to regional autonomy and Dominican society.¹⁴² Lawyer Pedro A. Pérez, for example, stated that: "We were more happy in our previous condition than in the present status. The Dominican Republic is administratively lost. We do not know where the money of the nation goes nor from where it comes. The Province of El Seibo, to which I belong, is completely ruined."¹⁴³ Horace Knowles, in his capacity representing the Dominican people to the U.S. Senate in 1921, pointed out the hypocrisy of U.S. accusations that Dominicans were disorderly:

Never in the history of the country has there been a disturbance comparable to the one that occurred recently at Tulsa, a short time ago at Springfield and Boston, and that occur with increasing frequency in Chicago, New York, and all the larger American cities. In that country lynchings, burnings at the stake, and tar and feathering, now pastimes in some parts of the United States, are unknown and never practiced. Life and property are more secure in any part of that country than they are to-day or to-night in Central Park or on Broadway in New York, and the total lawlessness for a year throughout the Republic is less than that which is recorded in any one of the five largest cities of the United States in 24 hours.¹⁴⁴

Many occurrences during the occupation must have reinforced the widely held Dominican rejection of U.S. claims of cultural or moral superiority. After the enactment of U.S. Prohibition in January of 1920, for example, Santo Domingo would become a center for the smuggling of rum into the United States by some among the navy personnel traveling to and from the island country.¹⁴⁵ Instances such as when marines stormed into a Seibo social club and drank the

¹⁴² Testimonies, United States, "Senate Inquiry," 946-956, 958-973, 1054-1084. Calder also cites a report from the Military Governor dated 9 September, 1920 that estimates that "the majority" of U.S. naval enlisted personnel in Santo Domingo had not completed grade school and only "a few" had begun high school. Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 663, fn 39.

¹⁴³ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 967.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 50.

¹⁴⁵ Making the issue public, *The Chicago Defender* reported that "there has been more or less indiscriminate smuggling of intoxicating liquors into the United States on board vessels of the United States Navy," and that on 7 July Rear Admiral Hugh S. Rodman of the 5th Naval District issued orders for an extensive investigation into what had by 1922 become a common practice of smuggling rum from Santo Domingo into the Norfolk port on the naval transport *Sirus*. "Santo Domingo Main Point in Rum Smuggling," *The Chicago Defender (National Edition)*, 8 July 1922, 2.

champagne were so common, as Bruce Calder puts it, that many "probably went unrecorded."¹⁴⁶

One of the complaints that most widely reached across regions was the extent of brutality, abuse and corruption in the constabulary. Reports and investigations of torture and brutality were especially common in the East. The most brutal nearly always involved Marines who were serving in leadership capacities within the constabulary, who enjoyed wide independence and few repercussions for actions that Dominican witnesses feared reporting.¹⁴⁷ Not until 17 February of 1919 did Military Governor Snowden issue the order for the constabulary not to use certain torture devices in interrogations.¹⁴⁸ Though officials denied the use of torture in interrogations after this, evidence of its continued and widespread use is abundant in constabulary communications and court-martial records.¹⁴⁹ James J. McLean, once an officer of the Frontier Guard and an acting commandant of the constabulary, was removed from his position as assistant constabulary commandant in late 1921 after loudly and publicly denouncing the use of torture by constabulary and occupation forces.¹⁵⁰ What military government authorities neglected in their reporting, when forced to deal with the issue of such atrocities, was that they were not isolated incidents, and that the majority of those marines who carried out torture and other brutal acts of force were heading constabulary companies. Some in these companies, especially in the East but also throughout the country, intimidated and tortured Dominicans for information about guerrillas or hidden arms, with the use of red-hot machetes

¹⁴⁶ Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 662. Such incidents were not only common in El Seibo, but through isolated provinces throughout the country. See: Franck, *Roaming*, 195-197.

¹⁴⁷ Marine Corps investigations of torture, including testimonies of Dominicans Luis Bautista, Dr. A. Coradin, Jesús Vázquez and Emilio Suárez, File 1922, "Dom. Rep., Santo Domingo," USMC Geographical Files, Quantico.

¹⁴⁸ Executive Order 258.

¹⁴⁹ "Reports from Seibo," Box 3, Files 11-19, Year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Moran, "Prison Reform in the United States Navy," 185-213.

¹⁵⁰ United States, "Senate Inquiry," fn 119; "Charges torture in Santo Domingo," *New York Times*, 29 December, 1921.

and other instruments of torture.¹⁵¹ Constabulary officers executed some natives without trial, robbed and burned homes; many of those tortured as prisoners in Haiti and the Dominican Republic were later found not guilty and freed.¹⁵² San Pedro de Macorís commercial agent Francisco Augusta Cordero, for example, was arrested on 20 August, 1918, but not charged for a month. He was finally accused of being a traitor to the Dominican Republic and accused of conspiracy, a charge based on the testimony of one individual. He was sentenced to twenty-five years of hard labor, and made to sweep streets and work as a laborer at the San Pedro de Macorís military camp, before being set free eight months later with a statement that he was not guilty of the acts for which he had been imprisoned.¹⁵³

These abuses were much more damaging in the long term because of their involvement of Dominicans through the constabulary. Nationalist leaders trying to unify resistance across regions seized on the glaring examples of abuses of the population by Marines and Dominican constabulary officers and enlisted men. Abuses included torture, corruption, and bullying, and although they were more common in areas that reported high instances of armed resistance--especially the eastern provinces--various constabulary members committed brutal and coercive acts against those uninvolved in armed resistance, too. Brutality and corruption led to strong resentment against the occupation and the constabulary as an institution.¹⁵⁴ Further, as the

¹⁵¹ Judson King, "U.S. Marines Revive Slavery in Haiti," *The Chicago Defender National Edition*, 10 June 1922, pg. A3, 20; Tulio Cestero letter and telegraph in response, 18 May 1920 from Flagship San Domingo, File 1920, "Dom. Rep., Santo Domingo," USMC Geographical Files, Quantico; photographs published in *Letras*, 7 November 1920; Soloman, "Law, Order and Justice," 89.

¹⁵² King, "U.S. Marines Revive Slavery," A3, 20; United States, "Senate Inquiry," see especially 1117-1123 for the testimonies of multiple Dominican witnesses about the extent and types of such actions by marine officers. Testimonies outline many of the reasons for attack, which usually involved accusations that citizens were aiding guerrilla fighters.

¹⁵³ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1111-1112.

¹⁵⁴ Dominican testimony and statement of Horace Knowles, who served as lawyer for the Dominican case. United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1121. Some of the statements of Dominicans in these testimonies emphasize the corruption and brutality of marines while downplaying the role of constabulary Dominicans. This seems to have been part of a larger publicity strategy that sought to focus on convincing U.S. Senators and the U.S. public to call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces; testimonies repeatedly highlight the desire to demonstrate not only the Dominican

resistance publicized, the majority of Dominicans were by 1919 and 1920 afraid to report even the most atrocious of acts committed by marines and the constabulary.¹⁵⁵ When they did report illegal actions, military forces retaliated against them, whether by threatening, jailing, fining, attacking, or even killing them.¹⁵⁶ Patterns of constabulary abuse were aggravated by the lack of unified leadership or checks on local power, and by specific reform issues. Liquor, for example, became a strong point of contention. From mid-1918, Executive Order 180 established the penalty of being tried in provost courts to any who sold liquor to a constabulary member in uniform. This led to growing tensions between the constabulary and local populations, as did the prohibition of selling liquor to marines, because storekeepers were bullied into selling to the armed forces. Those who did not were harassed and attacked, and if they tried to report marine and constabulary actions they were visited with retribution by those armed forces, and their shops were burned or their supplies destroyed.¹⁵⁷

right to self-rule, but also the capability to it. In an interesting twist, marines used the opposite tactic in some reports, emphasizing that Dominicans had committed torture while not mentioning that those Dominicans were in the constabulary working under Marine officers. This occurred, for example, in the case of constabulary torture of Cayo Báez. Communications, November 1920, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

¹⁵⁵ Testimonies, United States, "Senate Inquiry," 946-956, 958-973, 1054-1084. The record demonstrates that Dominicans who cooperated with occupation forces and the constabulary, or worked on the most important sugar *centrales*, had some, if minor, recourse to address problems such as extortion from constabulary officers. See: Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 13-14.

¹⁵⁶ See, for example: United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1108, 1130-1149; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 13-14. The majority of such reports, unsurprisingly, come from the areas with the most armed resistance and generalized violence such as the eastern provinces and the southwestern provinces; by 1920-1922, more of them came from the interior, where armed resistance in the Cibao Valley was growing. See: Company Patrol Reports, Box 3, Files 11-19, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Henríquez y Carvajal, *Nacionalismo*, 161-166; Intelligence Reports, including copies of Cibaeño newspapers *El Progreso*, *El Cibao*, *El Diario*, and *La Información*, File 8, "Correspondencia," 1922, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹⁵⁷ See, for example, the case of Luis Bautista at Guayabo Dulce in El Seibo. Bautista, a shop owner, states that he refused to sell liquor to marines, who took the liquor and burned down his store. United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1130-1136. The marine report from 1921, subsequent to the event, stated that Bautista had sold liquor to military forces in uniform, and that some Marines were in fact guilty in the arson. Bautista was brought to trial and some involved Marines were also court-martialed. The board of investigation, composed entirely of Marines, discounted Bautista's arguments, stated that he was proven to have sold liquor, and argued that his guilt in this action meant that "no regard should be paid to his complaints." "Facts," "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico. The report is undated, but was prepared in response to Senate Inquiry testimonies. Whether or not Bautista did sell liquor to the constabulary marines in question, the pressure upon such Dominicans

The resistance not only criticized constabulary actions, but also publicized widespread rejections of the constabulary itself as unnecessary and inefficient, and possibly a cover for the occupation administration's misuse of government funds. In the U.S. Senate investigation of 1921, former military government bookkeeper Rafael Isaac Pau stated that "the necessity for this body of national police remains yet to be justified, inasmuch as the service asked from it has at all times been very limited, due chiefly [*sic*] to the lack of confidence on the part of its American directors to put arms in the hands of the Dominicans enlisted in the corps. But if the service given by the national police guards has been scant, in return, the cost of maintenance has, since their establishment, been a heavy nominal charge on the treasury." Pau called the force a "company of practically decorative police."¹⁵⁸ While the lack of Dominican officers in the constabulary had been responsible for popular rejection in earlier years, the constabulary did contain Dominicans of officer rank by the time of Pau's statement. At least one foreigner residing in the Dominican Republic provided a different take for this time period: Dominicans in the constabulary, officers included, were hated because they were working for the Americans.¹⁵⁹ Thorpe reported, too, that Dominicans did not respect the new officers because they were from outside the traditional military elite, and that for this reason they could not control their enlisted men, who abused civilian populations.¹⁶⁰

One of the forms of resistance that constabulary leaders had most sought to keep isolated and hushed was guerrilla warfare, and in the first years of the occupation they were highly successful in discrediting armed resistance from one region to another. The most damaging and

must have been incredibly strong, and the fact that his testimony was discounted and that the board consisted only of marines indicates the one-sidedness of such investigations and the continued pressure on store owners.

¹⁵⁸ Statement of Rafael Isaac Pau, United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1104-1106. Pau stated that "the aggregate amount of nearly \$3,000,000 to entertain the livelihood of an almost purely ornamental police service would seem altogether disproportioned, if one did not stop to consider that the existence of the national Dominican police has at least been useful as a handy pretext for large disbursements that have been little, if at all, controlled."

¹⁵⁹ Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 12.

¹⁶⁰ Quoted in: Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 13.

long-lasting armed resistance, and the most studied, was that in the eastern provinces of El Seibo and San Pedro de Macorís.¹⁶¹ Armed uprisings throughout the country, however, affected the development of the constabulary and the wider occupation from the landing of marines in 1916 until the final plan for withdrawal in 1922, increasing in the years 1920-1921.¹⁶² Occupier and constabulary accounts downplayed the significance and patriotic aspects of armed resistance in all regions, characterizing all uprisings as isolated and largely ineffectual.¹⁶³ So thoroughly did reports emphasize the fiction that all armed resistance was isolated in the east, that many marines who reported about the occupation assumed that Olivorio's movement took place in the East rather than the southwest.¹⁶⁴ The U.S. Navy worked to discredit guerrilla fighters, describing all armed resistance as "brigandage," claiming in the early years that most guerrilla warfare was simply the effects of "vagabonds or highway robbers in the eastern section of the country"

¹⁶¹ Much more has been written about the conduct of the occupation and armed resistance in the eastern provinces of El Seibo and San Pedro de Macorís, in part because of interest in the intensity of the guerrilla conflict there. Due to the lack of a larger study of the constabulary, these studies have said little about the interaction of the constabulary with the anti-occupation guerrillas, despite extensive records in the Dominican National Archive and Marine Corps archives. The most detailed studies of the guerrilla warfare itself are Ducoudray, *Los "Gavilleros" del este* and Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 649-675. See also: Felix Servio Ducoudray, "Una epopeya ignorada: ¿Fueron bandidos los guerrilleros antiyanquis de 1916?" *Ahora!* No. 557, 15 July 1974, 37-43. The phenomenon of rapid change and modernization of sugar plantations and their effects on a caudillo society are more well-researched. Wilfredo Lozano, Luis Mejía, and Tulio H. Arvelo have contributed vital historical examinations of economy and social realities surrounding the period before and during U.S. occupation, including the extent of oppression by U.S. occupation forces. See also: Julie Cheryl Franks, "Transforming Property: Landholding and Political Rights in the Dominican Sugar Region, 1880-1930," PhD dissertation, State University of New York, 1997. For a summary of the Marine explanation of armed resistance, see Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 35-37.

¹⁶² Lundius and Lundahl provide a detailed and lengthy account of the instances of armed uprising in the West, under messianic leader "Dios" Olivorio from pre-occupation years to 1922, when he was killed by the constabulary. *Peasants and Religion*, 1-170. Calder mentions the extent of armed resistance in the west in a footnote in his article. "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 657, fn 15. Outside of Olivorio's movement and the eastern provinces, intermittent instances of armed resistance cropped up through all regions with the possible exception of Samaná throughout the occupation.

¹⁶³ As evident in Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, the official Marine presentation of such resistance even fifty years after U.S. withdrawal still portrays all instances as "banditry." The July-September 1921 Quarterly Report of the Military Governor referred to anything relating to armed resistance as "petty thievery and bandit activities," stating that some of those fighting armed resistance were "masquerading as patriots fighting for Dominican sovereignty [sic.]" File 1921, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

¹⁶⁴ Reports, Files 1919-1922, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

caused by criminals released from jails during the pre-occupation civil war.¹⁶⁵ This argument, made to discredit armed insurgencies, was continued by the Dominican military following the occupation. As they worked to consolidate power, marines de-emphasized armed resistance by reporting year after year that armed resistance had ended, giving the impression that each incidence was new and unrelated to the last.¹⁶⁶

Many upper- and middle-class Dominicans and intellectual and political resistance leaders, sought to publicly distance themselves from any violent resistance so as to support their argument that Dominican sovereignty would bring social and political order. They sought to demonstrate that Dominicans were not prone to violence or incapable of self-government, and therefore publicly discredited guerrilla warfare.¹⁶⁷ The characterization of armed resistance as isolated in the East, also reported in the widely referenced works of U.S. diplomats who wrote about the occupation, was thus carried down in the historiography and continues in the most recent literature.¹⁶⁸ Even in early years, however, guerrilla fighters in the East were not

¹⁶⁵ United States Senate, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, *Report No. 794*, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 1922, 96. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Miller, who was Chief of Staff of the Marine Second Brigade in the country from 1921-1924, tried to characterize guerrilla fighters by separating them into five categories: professional highwaymen (or "gavilleros"), discontented politicians, unemployed laborers driven by poverty, peasants recruited under duress, and "ordinary professional criminals--murderers, kidnappers, and the like." Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 35.

¹⁶⁶ Logan Feland, "Report of activities of the Second Brigade, U.S. Marines, for the year ending June 30, 1920," 19 October, 1920, USMC, Historical Division, "Geographical Files," "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," File, 1920; Report, 24 September, 1917, File "1917," "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1916*, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1917, 765-66; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1917*, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1918, 838, 840; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1919*, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1920, 2375; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1920*, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1921, 46-50; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1921*, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1921, 52.

¹⁶⁷ Ducoudray, "Una epopeya ignorada," 37-43; Mejía, *De Lilís a Trujillo*, 129-130. This general approach toward diplomacy by disassociation with violent movements is also evident throughout the testimonies given in the U.S. Senate Inquiry.

¹⁶⁸ The portrayals by U.S. diplomats were highly influential, the only U.S. publications until Bruce Calder's work in 1978 and 1984. See especially: Knight, *The Americans in Santo Domingo*; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*. The works of Félix Servio Ducoudray and Félix Servio Ducoudray Jr., and Bruce Calder's 1978 article, examine the phenomenon of armed resistance in the east, and in portions of Calder's 1984 book about the occupation he occasionally emphasizes passive and intellectual resistance as proof that many Dominicans did not accept the

completely isolated. Many Dominicans who wanted to take up arms in resistance to the occupation came to the East to fight under guerrilla leaders.¹⁶⁹ They were aided by local populations and many in civil government throughout the occupation.¹⁷⁰ Despite their draw for those wishing to actively resist the occupation, and the on-and-off support of civil officials, armed resistance movements did not unite with each other or with other forms of resistance until 1920 due to lack of funding and the same communication and travel difficulties encountered by the military government, but they were never as isolated or destructive as occupation forces made them out to be. To those living in the East, it was generally clear that the marines and constabulary were causing at least as much of the trouble as the guerrilla fighters, and using many of the same tactics. One of the marines' strongest criticisms of the guerrilla fighters, for example, was that they stole and requisitioned local arms and provisions for their own use. But marines did the same, and used arms taken from the local population to arm the local

foreign control of their country, though he too focuses on guerrilla warfare in the eastern provinces. For the most detailed descriptions of this guerrilla warfare, see: Ducoudray, "Una epopeya ignorada" 37-43; Ducoudray, *Los "Gavilleros" del este*, "; Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 649-675; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, chapters 5-7. Even these works, however, fall into some of the same historiographical patterns of examining the guerrilla warfare in the East alone. Many Dominican publications have carried out the invaluable work of reprinting extensive political resistance works written during the occupation, which are discussed throughout this chapter. Many Dominican historians, such as Frank Moya-Pons and Roberto Cassá have addressed the occupation in the context of broad histories of the Dominican Republic, and Wilfredo Lozano, Luis Mejía, and Tulio H. Arvelo have contributed vital historical examinations of economy and social realities surrounding the period before and during U.S. occupation, including the types and extent of oppression by U.S. occupation forces. See: Lozano, *La dominación*; Mejía, *De Lilís a Trujillo*, and Arvelo, *Nuestras luchas Civiles*. For a general overview of the occupation, see Castro García, *Intervención Yanqui*.

¹⁶⁹ Gilbert, who was himself from Puerto Plata, was surprised to run into his friend Rafael Aguilar in the hills of the East. Aguilar was from Puerto Plata, and came east to join the armed resistance when General Apolinar Rey dissolved his troops in Santiago. *Mi lucha*, 53. Aguilar was one of many Dominicans from around the country who traveled to join armed resistance in the east; many also went to the west, where Olivario's group accepted the growing number of fugitives from the military government. In August of 1918, Russell claimed that the "bandits" in El Seibo were receiving aid from "the political malcontents to the north"; later in the year (November, 1918), Josephus Daniels tried to explain the influx of arms to these guerrillas by claiming in a letter that they must be receiving aid from the Germans in the form of arms shipments. Quoted in: Soloman, "Law, Order, and Justice in the Dominican Republic During the United States Military Government—1916 to 1924," fn 25, 73 and 74.

¹⁷⁰ See Gilbert, especially 47-53, 70-77, in which he describes his travels across the country as a fugitive, descriptions that demonstrate the cross-country networks of those aiding guerrillas and fugitives; Thomas E. Watson, "Report of inspection at Azua and Barahona" to "Chief of Staff," 22 February 1917, Biographical File, Thomas E. Watson. File 3615, Box 1, Archives and Special Collections, USMC, Quantico; reports, File 1917, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

constabulary.¹⁷¹ In addition to discrediting guerrillas for their violence, occupation and constabulary forces characterized them as illiterate, uneducated peasants and criminals. While many among the guerrillas, especially in the early years, were carryovers from the pre-occupation civil war, or fugitives, a growing number had no criminal record, were literate, and joined the armed resistance specifically in rejection of the occupation; by 1920 and 1921, the latter group had become much more representative of armed resisters.¹⁷²

Armed uprising in the East and throughout the country was largely responsible for the lack of Marine manpower to train new recruits to the constabulary, as marines were funneled to the eastern provinces in large numbers in attempts to end resistance there, and the urgency led to the trend of repeatedly sending new untrained and under-equipped constabulary recruits immediately into battle. Constabulary leaders and occupation officials worked through propaganda not only to isolate and denigrate armed resistances, but also to set up the constabulary as the ideal against guerrilla insurgency. They went to great lengths to attribute blame for the poor conditions of the East to the guerrillas, while guerrillas denounced the marine and constabulary presence as being responsible for poor conditions and violence.¹⁷³ If armed

¹⁷¹ Letter from H.S. Knapp to Pendleton, July 1917, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," file 1916, "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico. Dominicans who attempted to avoid conflict by not joining either side must have seen the two as quite similar. Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 53; "Confidential report upon conditions in Seibo and Macoris provinces," 30 May 1918, Box 2, "Pendleton Papers," USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico; Memo "Seizure of horses," from Thorpe to "Brigade Commander," 11 May 1918, Box 2 "Pendleton Papers," USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 32; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 4.

¹⁷² Weekly memos to the Colonel Commander, File 3, Folders 11-19, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. Report from B.F. Weakland, 3rd Company, dated 22 October, 1921; Gilbert, 51-72. Crassweller also gives a profile of those resisting in arms in the east, explaining that they ranged from "patriot" to "bandolero." Robert D. Crassweller, *Trujillo: La trágica aventura del poder personal*, (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1967), 57. As Calder points out, many pre-occupation guerrilla leaders who were operating in the beginning of the occupation were killed and captured in the first year of fighting. "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 656, fn 14. As resistance increased, more and more respectable members of Dominican society filled the holes they left.

¹⁷³ Despite the fact that many Dominicans distanced themselves from the armed resistance throughout the occupation, they also did not accept claims that the constabulary was patriotic as holding any remote truth. While the propaganda campaign was not successful in uplifting the public image of the constabulary during 1917-1922, later dictator Rafael Trujillo, who came to power through the marine-created constabulary, would pick up and

resistance directly affected the constabulary's development, the constabulary just as directly affected armed resistance. Constabulary abuse augmented the growth of guerrilla warfare; Calder states that "overshadowing all other factors was that of personal hatred and fear of the Marines" and the marine-created constabulary, who frightened, abused, oppressed, injured, and killed "hundreds of Dominicans, combatants and noncombatants alike, who lived and worked in the area of hostilities."¹⁷⁴ The eastern provinces were so devastated, and their populations so in danger of being suspected of cooperation with one side or the other, that most Dominicans in the region had no choice but to join the armed resistance or flee by 1920-1922.

Those who hoped to unite a resistance movement were stymied by the military government's increased focus on military consolidation through constabulary arrests of any they saw as "inciting rebellion." Another difficulty stemmed from those who cooperated with occupation goals for various reasons, or who were hesitant to openly cooperate with either side. Throughout the course of the occupation, military government officials and constabulary leaders sought collaborators from outside the constabulary, a need that became more urgent by 1920 as popular opinion of the constabulary failed to improve. As discussed in Chapter Three, they received the most initial cooperation from some generals of the old Dominican military. This social group was split in the first year of occupation by those who rejected the occupation and those who cooperated in hopes of seeing real change or gaining command positions in the new force. When the character of the occupation and the new military closed these hopes, many old military leaders from both groups joined or led armed resistance. Some were generals of regional militaries, such as Vicente Evangelista ("Vicentico") and Salustiano Goicoechea ("Chachá") in the eastern provinces. Other members of the old military such as Fidel Ferrer first

embellish on the idea to lend his own regime further legitimacy. See Crassweller, *Trujillo*, 61-62. Trujillo's adoption of this propaganda campaign is discussed further in Chapter 6.

¹⁷⁴ Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 662. See also: Crassweller, *Trujillo*, 61.

aided marines in hunting guerrilla fighters in the East, later to join the guerrilla movements themselves.¹⁷⁵ Still others, most prominent among them Buenaventura Cabral and former Minister of War Desiderio Arias, settled into the patterns of the occupation, the former in the position of a civil governor to which occupation officials appointed him to appease him for his loss of military position, and the latter to tobacco farming under heavy surveillance in the Cibao.¹⁷⁶

Occupation forces saw the lack of support for the constabulary and occupation from other groups as astonishing in its extent throughout the occupation, and sought to rectify the problem by offering salaries, official positions, or protection to those who would cooperate.¹⁷⁷ Most cooperation still only existed at a superficial level. One common pattern among Dominicans in the countryside was to report general guerrilla activity, and then to warn guerrilla leaders of the locations of marine and constabulary forces.¹⁷⁸ This allowed peasants an extent of protection from the dangers associated with aiding either side, but also made the unification of resistance difficult. Armed resisters and constabulary deserters alike were often harbored or supplied by the same Dominican civilians who outwardly seemed friendly to the marines.¹⁷⁹ Many middle-class, urban Dominicans were counted as friendly and supportive by occupation forces in the city, but withheld information from the constabulary and occupation forces, and were often feeding information to resistance forces. Gregorio Urbano Gilbert, for example, provides

¹⁷⁵ For Ferrer's involvement with hunting guerrillas in the East in the early occupation, see: Letter from George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton, 25 July, 1918, "Pendleton Papers," box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

¹⁷⁶ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 57; Franck, *Roaming*, 242; Mejía, *De Lilís a Trujillo*, 129.

¹⁷⁷ Miller, in "Diplomatic Spurs," 37, discusses the astonishment of U.S. government officials at the continued lack of cooperation throughout the country.

¹⁷⁸ See, for example: Reports from a detachment of the 1st Co. under D.B. Roben, "Dom. Rep., Santo Domingo," File 1917, Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico. Many were more openly hostile to the constabulary; Roben reports, for example, that in one area in the east civilians were "unfriendly and almost uncivilized, and unwilling to give least information about anything," and concealed arms in the bushes.

¹⁷⁹ "Reports from Seibo," Box 3, Files 11-19, Year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," File, 1920, "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

personal accounts of merchants who supplied arms and information to resistance groups, and then warned them to leave the cities because they had to report their locations to the constabulary the next day to avoid being accused of aiding "bandits."¹⁸⁰ Those among the general population who did cooperate with occupation forces were widely labeled treasonous.¹⁸¹ Many, if caught collaborating, were disciplined by the armed forces of resistance, often by execution.¹⁸² The sensitivity of the names of those who collaborated was therefore so strong that military government communications seldom mention them by name unless they are deceased.

Constabulary leaders gained most of their cooperation from those who outwardly or conditionally cooperated, checked by what President Henríquez y Carvajal referred to as an "unmerciful system of espionage" that functioned through both the marine Brigade Intelligence Office and, later, the constabulary Intelligence Office.¹⁸³ Marines with few allies and no background knowledge of the territory usually had to rely on unofficial, local informants. For reasons that varied from political disputes to actual cooperation with military government objectives, or fear--often induced by torture, the marines and constabulary were often able to gather some intelligence by questioning locals. From 1918, occupiers realized the need for improved intelligence, and began to put together the beginnings of what would become a centrally organized Brigade Intelligence Office that in 1919-1920 was passed to constabulary leadership. All of its officers and informants, and the constabulary commandant, reported back to the current marine brigade commander, the military governor, and the Marine Corps General Commandant. The Intelligence Office was run through, and staffed by, a combination of

¹⁸⁰ See, for example, the memoir of Urbano Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 67. Constabulary reports from El Seibo and San Pedro de Macorís outline the discoveries of similar relationships throughout the years 1918-1921. Reports from a detachment of the 1st Co. under D.B. Roben, "Dom. Rep., Santo Domingo," File 1917, Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

¹⁸¹ See, for example, Ducoudray, *Los "Gavilleros" del este*, 76.

¹⁸² Urbano Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 82-84.

¹⁸³ Quoted in: Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 119. See also: Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, 31.

marines, constabulary, and the Bureau of Naval Operations and Intelligence. By 1920, the majority of intelligence patrols were headed by Dominican constabulary second lieutenants and patrol leaders, and its Chief Intelligence Officer in 1920, marine F.A. Ramsey, also served as a lieutenant colonel in the constabulary. Extensive, if often unreliable, intelligence networks helped to keep regional movements from unifying, and carefully monitored those trying to unite.

While those leading intelligence initiatives were willing to be "unmerciful" to gain information and keep opposition down, the intelligence office only gradually became efficient. Before 1921, its reliability was hit-and-miss. Marine Lt. Col. Charles J. Miller stated that "there were numerous channels of information, the sources of which were not always dependable." He lists as dependable sources the provost department, the constabulary, civil officials, and "friendly inhabitants."¹⁸⁴ Neither the provost department nor the constabulary had the manpower or knowledge in the first years to be of much help, and civil officials who were unfriendly to occupying forces were only gradually removed from their posts. Further, some surreptitiously supported resistance for years while remaining in their posts.¹⁸⁵ As Miller admits, "friendly inhabitants" were few and far between.¹⁸⁶ The primary sources for collaboration in early attempts at intelligence networking came most often from three groups: minor criminals;¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 38.

¹⁸⁵ When civil officials were not cooperative, or their level of loyalty seemed questionable, occupation officials dismissed them and replaced them with those openly friendly to the Military Government. Executive Order 24 in January of 1917, for example, dismissed Seibo's provincial governor Juan Esteban Ortiz with Octavio Beras, a man who would be highly controversial for his cooperation with the occupation forces.

¹⁸⁶ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 37.

¹⁸⁷ Some were released because they promised to cooperate with occupation officials, others were "forced" to work as guides and many were promised freedom if they proved their loyalty through work with the constabulary and Marines. See: Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 109. Many coerced or forced into guiding constabulary units against armed resistance, however, sabotaged the search efforts. When many fugitives were captured, they were then used to find others. Example of "Felix Castillo, alias "Dolce," who surrendered himself in La Vega to the 3rd Company in October 1921 and then worked with the constabulary to help find others. Weekly memo to Colonel Commander, 3rd Company, "Guardia Nacional" Box 3, File 18, 1921, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. Victoriano Almanzar had by 16 July 1921 been an informant for the constabulary in Monte Cristi for three years and helped turn over many "criminals" to the constabulary; referred to as Hurst's "man in the bushes," and Hurst wanted to arm him so that he could capture someone they had been after, or even to enlist him in

foreigners;¹⁸⁸ and some plantation owners.¹⁸⁹ The first group included minor criminals who had been in collaboration with the military government from early in the occupation, when occupation officials released some prisoners for use in gathering intelligence.¹⁹⁰ Foreign collaborators came from a wide variety of locations and were useful to the constabulary because of their lack of involvement in local politics. They included adventurers and speculators from other Caribbean countries and islands, such as Puerto Rico.¹⁹¹ They also included many from the population of U.S. business investors that had been growing since the 1890s and grew exponentially during the occupation, when they were often given favored status in negotiations and many U.S. opportunists sought their fortunes in the Dominican Republic.¹⁹² Some new U.S. investors, in fact, were marines.¹⁹³ One of the major points of resistance in 1920-1921 centered around the rapid growth of U.S. investments, and the Dominican press and intellectuals aimed

the 4th company without anyone knowing (Abraham Anpaller, one of Olivario's men who they had been hunting "for some time" in the hills south of Sabaneta). Weekly memo to Colonel Commander, 4th Company, "Guardia Nacional" Box 3 File 15, 1921, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. Gregorio Urbano Gilbert, too, was eventually captured by one such fugitive-turned-collaborator. Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 137-143.

¹⁸⁸ Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 111; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 5-20.

¹⁸⁹ See Ducoudray Jr., "Una epopeya ignorada," 37-40; Ducoudray, *Los "Gavilleros" del este*, 63-64. Bruce Calder gives a brief profile of those who came to work for the occupation government, especially the increasing number among the middle classes who came to see the military government as "a source of jobs, as a potential customer, as a possible sponsor for their favorite projects, or even as an ally in settling grudges against other Dominicans." Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 28-31. Quotation on page 28.

¹⁹⁰ Letter to Pendleton from [illegible], 6 March, 1917, "Pendleton Papers," Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico. Others were released from prison throughout the occupation in exchange for other forms of cooperation, such as showing constabulary to weapons. Report of constabulary Inspector Sheard, 1 June, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁹¹ Charles J. Miller described them as "sojourners" in "Diplomatic Spurs," 37.

¹⁹² Memoirs of Theodore S. Orme, File #2354, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico. Orme was the son of a "Spanish War Veteran" and U.S. Customs official who ran the Customs House for the Puerto Plata Receivership. Orme's brother served as an interpreter for both Marines and Dominicans. Orme lived in the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1944, a child at the time of the occupation's proclamation, and his memoirs outline the extensive increase in U.S. investors and in anti-U.S. sentiments and the frequency of shouts such as "maldito yanqui." See also: Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*, 71-77.

¹⁹³ In a letter to his commanding officer, Pendleton, as early in the occupation as 18 March of 1917, Arthur T. Marix outlined the potential personal profit to be gained by Marines in investing in Dominican land, and laid out the plan of Marine officers buying adjoining tracks of Dominican land for investment. Marix argued in this letter that the Navy and Marine personnel should be able to benefit from the influx of Americans representing moneyed interests and speculating since the beginning of the intervention. Box 2, "Pendleton Papers," USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

one arm of their campaign toward making U.S. businesses accountable.¹⁹⁴ Senator William H. King reported in 1922 that the chief visible results of the occupations on Hispaniola were the populations' hatred for the U.S. government "and the enhanced opportunities of American capitalists to loot the resources of the island [sic]--of which they are promptly availing themselves under the protection of American guns and diplomacy."¹⁹⁵ It is no wonder that these collaborators were not successful in winning the loyalty of the Dominican population.

While even inconsistent cooperation did discourage a unified, national resistance, many Dominicans and foreigners working for the Intelligence Office were of such questionable background that marines and constabulary were often not sure for whom they were really working at any given time.¹⁹⁶ The difficulty of finding Dominicans who would cooperate meant that the Intelligence Office often gathered information and compared notes so as to find inconsistencies, such as might come from those offering only superficial cooperation. This technique, however, required centralization and organization that were highly inefficient before 1920 reforms. As part of the wider marine experiment in carrying out civil government initiatives during military interventions, the evolution of the Intelligence Office was carefully documented. Miller later emphasized the importance of the lessons it taught for phases of future

¹⁹⁴ "Una demanda," *Ecos del Valle*, 1 September, 1921, page 1 and "Por el Este," *Ecos del Valle*, 22 September, 1921, page 2; Dominicans also widely complained that loans from the United States were supporting the largely U.S.-controlled sugar industry rather than supporting Dominicans. Patrol reports. Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1920-1921, and Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1921-1922, Headquarters, Departamento del Norte, "Guardia Nacional" file, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908; 4th Co. Weekly Report, 18 December 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁹⁵ Judson King, "U.S. Marines Revive Slavery in Haiti," *The Chicago Defender National Edition*, 10 June 1922, A3.

¹⁹⁶ Dominican Antonio Draiby, for example, was armed in his intelligence position working for Major F.A. Ramsey and the constabulary. He was known to be working solely for money and to be willing to work for both sides; George Thorpe reported the problem to Pendleton in a letter dated 16 May, 1918, saying that "there are too many of that type identified with the government already. . . Draiby's dashing around the hills of Seibo with a gun and a card of the Intelligence Office is not going to help things and whatever intelligence he sends in will be absolutely unreliable." Letter from George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton, 16 May 1918, "Pendleton Papers," box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.

military occupations.¹⁹⁷ Archival records, primarily in communications and often through veiled references, make clear the existence of intelligence activities through the early years, but not until the advent of improved communications and transportation in 1920 do standardized references to intelligence operations appear. In late 1920, an increasing number of Dominicans in the constabulary were in charge of intelligence initiatives and intelligence reports, and Dominicans were often sent out on undercover work or even recruited into the constabulary secretly so as to have the ability to spy on local populations.¹⁹⁸ Further, marines insisted on a large and growing budget for the intelligence office, so that by 1921 and 1922 it was budgeted about twenty-five thousand dollars, though most men working for it earned less than constabulary enlisted men.¹⁹⁹

Although Miller describes early intelligence activities as pertaining solely to civil relations, and not to tactical considerations for combat preparation, intelligence reports demonstrate the emphasis on tactical considerations concerning the centralization of military power and the isolation of resistances.²⁰⁰ Though reports stressed morale among Dominicans in the cities and countryside, and closely followed economic and political situations, many of them are concerned with the locations of opposition groups and possible combat conditions.²⁰¹ Miller describes the activities of constabulary intelligence officers, who were authorized and paid to

¹⁹⁷ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 36.

¹⁹⁸ "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Weekly memo to Colonel Commander, 4th Company, "Guardia Nacional" Box 3 File 15, 1921, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Weekly memo to Colonel Commander PND, 3rd Company, 22 August, 1921, Box 3, File 12, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Report from PM Rixey, 23 June 1921, Folder 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN; Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 137-143; Report dated 5 November 1920, "Informes," File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. Dominican corporal F. Alba of the constabulary was one of those listed as undertaking such undercover missions.

¹⁹⁹ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 167 and note 43 on page 292.

²⁰⁰ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 37; Weekly Intelligence Reports, Box 3, File 18, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

²⁰¹ Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1920-1921, and Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1921-1922, Headquarters, Departamento del Norte, "Guardia Nacional" file, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Company intelligence summaries 1921-1922, "Correspondencia," File 8, 1922, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

"interrogate inhabitants, and to search out and translate newspapers, periodicals, documents, and secret and confidential reports printed or written in Spanish. The forces in the field secured information by sending out patrols or through the establishment of detached posts in the outlying districts."²⁰² Central organization of the intelligence office was paralleled by organization of the constabulary. Both worked on regional levels before 1920, and lacked the resources or organization required to work across regional lines. When in 1920 constabulary officers began to centralize the intelligence office, they also faced growing tension between the Dominican population and the constabulary, making intelligence in many areas more difficult to gather. The increasingly public character of resistance in 1920 also meant fewer Dominicans willing to work for the constabulary's intelligence office. One of the common results was the continuation of the more brutal methods of gathering intelligence about local populations.²⁰³

Conclusion

Dominican regions had long been uninterested in uniting, and the occupation forces and constabulary by 1918 worked to reinforce this trend so as to bring about reforms and stability on at least local levels. Complicated loyalties and Dominicans' attempts to locate themselves in the new order that was developing around them during the occupation made central unity even more difficult. The U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic reached its fourth year in 1920. To this point, the occupation had consisted of improvised actions, local solutions, and a mixture of compromise and forcible control or resistance. These had played out primarily between an occupying force that hoped to centralize political and military power and an occupied population that sought to retain traditions of regional autonomy and reject foreign interference. 1920 would

²⁰² Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 37.

²⁰³ See, for example, Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 13.

bring change as multiple internal and international developments facilitated the development of a unified resistance movement. The fundamental problems with the constabulary provided a more and more glaring complaint across region and class upon which Dominicans were able to agree, fueling the potential for unity. Those who would struggle to consolidate resistance in 1920 and 1921 used growing communications and transportation infrastructure to draw national attention to the universality of complaints against the constabulary and the broader occupation, arguing against regionalism by demonstrating the commonality of Dominican needs. The concurrence of so many regional complaints against the constabulary would provide fertile ground for those finally seeking to unite resistances across the country from mid-1920 as the constabulary centralized military power and increased efficiency. Most complaints universal across regions, after all, directly involved constabulary methods and the reforms that the constabulary enforced.

Chapter SIX

Opposing Networks for Change: Consolidating Reform and Resistance, 1920-1922

International and economic changes in 1920 challenged the fragile regional system that had fallen into place. The struggle between pro- and anti-occupation forces took on new meaning and character as in late 1920, under strong political pressure, Woodrow Wilson called for plans for early withdrawal. As an end to the occupation became imminent, the system of regional compromise did not dovetail with the need for coordinated withdrawal. Growing camps of Dominicans openly called for unconditional and immediate restoration of sovereignty, and U.S. forces and the Dominican constabulary struggled now with a new urgency to centralize military power and try to control the population. Marine officers centralizing the constabulary worked, however, around a collapsing economy, increasingly public resistance movements, and the urgency of preparing for early withdrawal. In this context, they overhauled military infrastructure, working to centralize it in the ways they had planned at the occupation's beginning, and gradually abandoning much of the failed experiment in attempting to reform the Dominican population. One of the primary tools of centralization was rapid building of communications and transportation infrastructure, which gained primary importance in 1920 and 1921 and were expected to handicap resistance through efficient military control. The resistance, faced with the threat of a progressively centralized military force, did something drastic: It, too, centralized. Its members used the growing infrastructure to consolidate their own campaign in response and contradiction to the centralized power of the military. Over the course of 1920-1921, the constabulary became a more integrated force, and the resistance actively used constabulary improvements to build a national and unified campaign against the constabulary

and the occupying forces--sometimes even to call for the maintenance of Dominican tradition and regional autonomy. As the constabulary tried to tighten its grip, the unification of nationalist resistance grew. As resistance grew, constabulary officers worked harder to tighten their grip.

International changes of 1920-1921 were central to this process. In these years, an international campaign composed of politicians and intellectuals fought to bring attention to the Dominican occupation; Dominican intellectual leaders involved in this campaign, having been conscious of the fact that World War One was top priority for the international community, now redoubled diplomatic and public relations efforts to bring attention to the illegal occupation. Countries were beginning to recover from the war's devastation, and many Latin American governments drifted away from the strong wartime alliance they had solidified with the United States, emphasizing anti-imperialism and calling for self-determination in Latin America. Those countries whose governments had not allied closely with the United States during World War One likewise became more bold in their rejections of U.S. military supremacy in the hemisphere--especially World War One military interventions in countries like Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 1920 was also a presidential election year in the United States. Politicians made full use of the contradictions between the occupation and Woodrow Wilson's calls for democracy and sovereignty around the world, and the Dominican-led international campaign gladly inserted itself into U.S. politics. Within the Dominican Republic, too, resistance leaders invested themselves deeply in the politics of the U.S. election, arguing that a Republican-party win against Wilson's Democratic Party would spell change in foreign policy. If they could insert their voices into the politics of the presidential election, many believed, they might be able to influence the direction this change would take.

Economic change was of equal importance to the process of consolidation and centralization of both the constabulary and the resistance. The post-World War One economic downturn hit the Dominican Republic belatedly at the end of 1920. Before this, the country had benefitted from the devastation of European beet sugar, and the continued prospering and growth of the economy had supported the functions of the occupation government. In October of 1920, however, concurrent with the U.S. presidential election, the Dominican economy began to collapse. Over the course of the next year, the steadily declining economy aided the international campaign against occupation and allowed the nationalizing resistance campaign to bring a wider involvement of rural Dominicans into their movement. Rapid economic decline seemed to demonstrate an absolute failure of the only bragging points that the occupation forces had been able to hold up to show their success: the improved Dominican economy and the growing, centralized education system, which the military governor literally closed down in early 1921 for lack of funds. The occupation forces had also invested a great deal in their claim to have brought political stability and an end to armed conflict, a fictional claim that they maintained through censorship, selective reporting, and the regional isolationism that kept incidents from reaching national attention. In the changing international atmosphere of 1920-1921, spurred by economic devastation within the country, the resistance used the radically improving communications and transportation infrastructure to highlight the falsities of such claims and to make their resistance--solid proof against those claims--more and more public.

As national and international resistance grew in scope and publicity, Dominicans and many in the United States called out U.S. forces for inefficiency and the brutality and illegality of the occupation. By 1920, though, U.S. forces and the U.S. government were heavily invested in the country, and heavily invested in seeing no withdrawal without a successful culmination of

their stated programs and plans. Dominicans in the constabulary, all from the middle and lower classes, were also invested in the constabulary's centralization and improvement and hoped to retain their newfound positions (and potential power) once the occupation ended. Calls for withdrawal, and unifying resistance, stymied the military's efforts, and they tried to combat internal and international resistances with a growing reconstruction and strengthening of the constabulary. Economic difficulties left constabulary planners and administrators short of funds to carry out their broad reform as they struggled against resistance to centralized military control. New loans from the United States allowed the military to build on infrastructural improvements, but also increased Dominican resistance.

Thus by late 1920, the haphazard, improvised structures in the constabulary were collapsing. Local and regional power relations were being subsumed in an increasingly national discourse. Over the course of 1920-1921, both the military government and the majority of the Dominican population gradually abandoned the regional approach to occupation. World attention to the brutalities and illegality of the occupation made U.S. government planners urge the military government and those leading the constabulary to improve the situation of the country, build up the constabulary, create a good record of U.S. involvement, and begin to prepare to withdraw from the messy situation. While the constabulary in the preceding period had evolved largely in continuity with Dominican tradition, it changed drastically in 1920-1921, and many aspects of Dominican society changed with it. For power relationships in Dominican society, this was a major period of rupture. The national aspects of both reform and resistance changed the relationships between regions. It was also to be a major point of rupture in the power relationships between Dominican families and social classes. The rise of the *gente de segunda* into the military officer ranks especially marked a strong departure from tradition. Most

Dominicans would not have believed this to be a major rupture at the time, however; the new social order within the constabulary seemed only tenable while Marines were present to physically back it up. As the resistance campaign mounted and united during 1920 and 1921, even many of those who had joined the constabulary with the hopes of potential social advancement, began to doubt that it would survive on its own after withdrawal, and looked for other avenues to power. Some even left the constabulary and joined the resistance. The result was a growing polarization in Dominican society, especially by late 1921: On one side were those who remained in the constabulary or supported U.S. forces' efforts--almost all from the poorer classes or *gente de segunda*. On the other side were the elite classes, intellectuals, politicians, and those who followed their campaign against the occupation and constabulary--including, by 1921, most of the rural peasantry. The result through 1921 and 1922 was a society that was increasingly unified across regions, but also increasingly polarized between military and civilians.

Challenges to the Regional Approach; Change and Consolidation in 1920

Events of 1920 were a major turning point in the occupation and Dominican history. They forced a consolidation and centralization of constabulary administration, and brought about increased unification of nationalist resistance movements. The two changes were intimately connected, their developments intertwined at all stages, each feeding off the other. The whole regional system that military occupation administrators and constabulary leaders had embraced was only functional as a temporary fix based on traditions of regional autonomy, occupation censorship, and the lack of infrastructure connecting provinces. It was crippled by the changes of 1920, a year during which many coinciding events helped provide avenues for the uniting of

previously shared, but isolated, complaints against the occupation and constabulary. One of the most significant was the advent of new roads and telephone lines through 1919 and 1920, which brought openings to regionally unify distinct resistances even while international and national attention to the occupation created a safer, more open space to resist. While regional resistance movements unified through 1920, the constabulary changed drastically, too. Internal and external challenges to regional solutions brought about a major shift toward centralization in the new military and the wider Dominican population, which would last well beyond the occupation.

From 1919, Dominicans seeking to build a nationalist resistance movement actively advertised their cause to the international community. After the Treaty of Versailles, with Wilson's calls for a League of Nations and national sovereignty for countries throughout the world, they had little difficulty drawing attention to the apparent hypocrisy of continued U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic.¹ Henríquez y Carvajal, when deposed from his provisional presidency in 1916, had expressed the difficulty of diplomatically fighting the occupation when the world's countries were occupied with the war. Due to world governments being distracted with the war, which also gave U.S. administrators an excuse for heavy censorship, he postponed most diplomatic initiatives.² Diplomatic efforts to end the occupation therefore increased exponentially after 1918, especially as Europe began to recover from war. The war's end brought an opening in inter-Latin American relations too, an increasing number of Latin American countries speaking out against the occupation. Dominicans formed a commission in December of 1918 to advertise the crimes of the occupation internationally.³ While the

¹ For reaction among U.S. publications to the apparent hypocrisy of fighting against imperialism in Europe while carrying it out in the Americas, see Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," especially 153-154.

² See: Jaime de Jesús Domínguez, *Historia Dominicana* (Santo Domingo: abc editorial, 2005), 204.

³ It was aided in its cause by U.S. lawyer Horace G. Knowles, who brought the Dominicans' case repeatedly before U.S. officials and was instrumental in bringing about the 1921 U.S. Senate Inquiry into the occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. When Henríquez y Carvajal spoke at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, he emphasized

Dominican commission to Versailles brought more international and especially Latin American attention to the occupation and its illegality, it also increased tension in the Dominican Republic between resisters and military government officials. Just after the commission's presentation to the Peace Conference, the military government drastically cut the numbers of Dominicans in the constabulary and nearly doubled the presence of Marines in the country, partially in response to a spike in armed resistance [See Table 5.1].

When the broadening international movement against the occupation reached a height in mid-1920, Dominican intellectuals, elites, and politicians highlighted the occupation's illegality and brutality in appeals to the international community. In the interior of the country, they waged a war against those who collaborated, chief among them those who joined--and especially those who officered--constabulary units. Those among previous collaborators who defected were welcomed into the resistance, and those who did not were continuously courted or threatened and harassed. Many among the middle class and *gente de segunda* had worked back and forth between occupiers and resistance depending on opportunity, and many--such as future dictator Rafael Trujillo--saw potential future power in the U.S.-backed constabulary and remained in its ranks. From 1920, as the resistance grew and began to take on more recognizable nationalist tones, larger numbers of this class moved toward the side of resistance, and many Dominicans who had been less involved, such as many peasants in far-removed areas, also came to join the resistance because of the nationalist campaign and economic distress. Constabulary

the "degenerate militarism" of the military government's system and called for a program of "total reform aimed to free the soul of the people from all the oppressive, constrictive and restrictive bonds in which it has lived." Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 119.

reports show, as early as January, 1920, that they recognized the appearance of secret political meetings and the beginnings of movement of illicit groups across provincial lines.⁴

Resistance varied widely, from the intellectual protest of ex-politicians, lawyers, and journalists who petitioned the government and circulated protests despite censorship laws, to artists depicting the destruction of sovereignty—often through plays and poems. It also included Dominicans and their allies outside of the country, especially in New York and Cuba.⁵ The anti-occupation campaign exposed torture and brutality that had been carefully hidden in the record and used international attention and improved communications and roads within the Dominican Republic to expose the constabulary's history in contradiction of the Navy reports yearly claiming the constabulary's efficiency and popularity.⁶ When U.S. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby embarked on a post-war goodwill tour through Latin America, a commission of Dominicans used the opportunity to draw Latin Americans' attention to the hypocrisies of his speeches, following him from country to country and presenting their case in the wake of his diplomacy.⁷ Others traveled throughout Europe and the United States to plead their case. By 1920, wide international support for the Dominican cause was evident. Many European and Latin American countries recognized Henríquez y Carvajal's government as early as 1917, after the U.S. occupation began, and many more joined in this official recognition and in protest in 1919 and 1920.⁸ The damage of the Dominican occupation to U.S. relationships with other

⁴ See, for example, Weekly Report, McLaughlin, 10th Co. (Moca), 2 January, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. This report discusses secret political meetings of Samaná functionary M.M. Sanabia in Moca, for example.

⁵ Some of the most notable included the movement led by popular Dominican Archbishop Nouel, who circulated a protest letter and exposition of constabulary torture, and of course that led by *de jure* president Henríquez y Carvajal, who publicly decried the occupation throughout its eight-year span.

⁶ *Annual Reports of the Navy Department* 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920.

⁷ Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, 37-38. The Commission followed Colby through Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru.

⁸ Colombia, Denmark, and Switzerland recognized the government in 1916; Argentina, Costa Rica, Paraguay and Uruguay recognized it in January of 1917; In August of 1920 the Congress of Colombia passed congratulatory

Latin American governments was clear by 1920; Colby wrote in November that "the increasing agitation among Dominicans during the last two years for the right to self-government, and the anxiety expressed by the governments of other American republics as to our intentions in Santo Domingo, have caused the Department of State to give very thoughtful consideration to the question of whether the United States might now well take the first steps in returning to the Dominicans the Government of their Republic." He called for an announcement of rapid withdrawal, which he argued would be highly beneficial to U.S. relations throughout Latin America and "do much to dispel the misunderstandings and suspicions which have been largely occasioned by the unexpectedly protracted period of our occupation in the Dominican Republic."⁹

The protest resonated loudly within the United States, and was taken up and championed by growing anti-imperialist groups there. Through 1920, publications against the occupation became a matter of interest to many sectors of the U.S. public, and groups such as the NAACP joined with prominent U.S. Senators to call out the U.S. government on its actions.¹⁰ The

resolutions on the anniversary of Dominican independence from Spain, and in October passed a resolution expressing its sympathy for the Dominican Republic and voicing a desire that the occupation would end soon. Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 23-25; Soloman, "Law, Order, and Justice," 57. Brazilian president Pessoa promised at the Paris Peace Conference to support the Dominican case, and his ambassador in Washington formally expressed to Secretary of State Colby his hope that the Dominican Occupation would be terminated soon. Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, 21-22; Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 23-25. Policarpo Bonilla of Honduras successfully proposed to the League of Nations on 22 April, 1919 that reference to the Monroe Doctrine in Article XXI of the Covenant of the League of Nations be defined as "signifying that all the American republics have a right to their independent existence, without any other nation having the right to acquire, by conquest, any portion whatsoever of their territory, or the right to intervene in their Government or interior administration, nor in any way to injure their autonomy or national dignity"; in a speech before the Cuban International Law Society in January, 1919, eminent Cuban jurist Emilio Roig de Leuchsenrig "criticized the American intervention [in the Dominican Republic], and his speech was printed and widely read" throughout Latin America, whose publicists protested to Woodrow Wilson and urged withdrawal of U.S. occupation, Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 23-25. For a print of the entire speech, see: Dr. Emilio Roig de Leuchsenrig, *La ocupación de la República Dominicana por los Estados Unidos y el derecho de las pequeñas nacionalidades de América*, (Habana: Imprenta "El Siglo XX," 1919).

⁹ From 2 November 1920 Foreign Relations Papers, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, quoted in Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 164.

¹⁰ Leaders of the U.S. NAACP worked with the Union Patriotique d'Haiti in founding the "Haiti-Santo Domingo Independence Society. Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 170. This movement eventually included men of powerful positions in U.S. society, including James Weldon Johnson, Senator William Borah, Ernest Gruening,

Chicago Defender published damning articles about the occupation and the lack of voice Dominicans had in civil government under the marines and constabulary.¹¹ An anonymous author published an article calling Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels “Czar of Haiti and Lord Protector of Santo Domingo, by virtue of his office as Secretary of the Navy.” The author pointed out that the U.S. Congress and people were unaware of the absolute power the navy and marines held over the Dominican Republic, because “Mr. Daniels’s duties are purely extra-constitutional, and the censorship on Caribbean affairs has been so severe that that last American newspaper man to visit Haiti was compelled to assume the disguise of a sergeant in the U.S. Marine Corps....”¹² U.S. speakers repeated allegations of cruelty and torture carried out by occupation officials and the constabulary, and protests within the United States reiterated the arguments of Dominican officials, reporting, for example, about the military government's authority being unchecked by public opinion either U.S. or Dominican.¹³ On 22 May, 1920, the *Boston Globe* published a story based on accusations of a former functionary of the military government who spoke of torture and the shooting of prisoners as “escapees,” the intense unpopularity of the occupation troops, and parallels between the abuses in the Dominican Republic and abuses in the military occupation of the Philippines.¹⁴ Increased scrutiny from the

Horace G. Knowles, and Senator William King, “The Nation” editor Oswald Garrison Villard, among others. In 1921, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes repeated the concerns about the damage the occupation was causing to U.S. relations with other Latin American countries. Juárez, “United States Withdrawal,” 168-170. See also: Grieb, “Warren G. Harding and the Dominican Republic,” 428.

¹¹ *The Chicago Defender*, Sept. 20, 1919, pg. 1. The article also called attention to what it saw as the growth of color prejudice under the occupation and the subsequent retardation of progress toward democratic government in both the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

¹² Anonymous. “America’s Ireland: Haiti-Santo Domingo.” *The Nation*, 110:2851 (February 21, 1920), 231.

¹³ *Boston Daily Globe*, May 21, 1920. Pg. 14. See also: “America’s Ireland: Haiti-Santo Domingo,” 231; Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, 35-36.

¹⁴ *Boston Daily Globe*, May 22, 1920, pg. 4.

United States forced change in the constabulary by enhancing official supervision, under which constabulary leaders worked to centralize and increase constabulary accountability.¹⁵

As global attention was drawn to the hypocrisy of long-term U.S. military interventions, the opposition U.S. Republican Party under presidential nominee Warren Harding made good use of the glaring contradiction between theory and policy. By December, 1920, Wilson's beleaguered Democratic party sought the most rapid withdrawal possible.¹⁶ The U.S. presidential campaign did not escape the notice of Dominican intellectuals and politicians. Those many groups that had long been fighting local battles to discredit the U.S. occupation forces capitalized on the 1920 U.S. election, publishing support for Harding and criticisms of Wilson's administration. Wilson's call for approval of U.S. entry into the League of Nations, juxtaposed with the politics of the U.S. presidential election campaign, drew the occupation to the public eye. Democratic Party vice-presidential candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt gave a speech in Montana on 18 August of 1920 ridiculing the Republican Party for its contention that Great Britain would have more votes than the United States on the League Assembly; he was reported to state that the United States would have the advantage because "the eleven small republics of the Caribbean area viewed the United States as a benevolent guardian and that at Geneva their representatives would align themselves with their big neighbor." He also claimed that he himself had written Haiti's new constitution.¹⁷ Roosevelt's speech drew protests from *The Nation* and the NAACP, the latter suggesting that the Republican Party could capitalize on

¹⁵The Department of the Navy, for example, repeatedly began to request official reports about instances of torture and constabulary corruption such as those exposed by Nouel's campaign.

¹⁶Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 160.

¹⁷Joseph Robert Juárez, "United States Withdrawal from Santo Domingo," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 42:2 (May, 1962), 157. Roosevelt later denied the latter claim, saying that he had only meant to demonstrate that Caribbean nations would align themselves with the United States on the League Assembly.

the hypocrisy in their election campaign.¹⁸ They did. On 28 August, Republican presidential candidate Senator Warren G. Harding said: “If I should be elected President. . . I will not empower an Assistant Secretary of the Navy to draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies and jam it down their throats at the points of bayonets borne by United States marines, nor will I misuse the power of the Executive to cover with a veil of secrecy repeated acts of unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of the little republics of the Western Hemisphere, such as in the last few years have not only made enemies of those who should be our friends but have rightly discredited our country as a trusted neighbor.”¹⁹

U.S. voters and Dominican resistance leaders alike seem to have taken this strong language to mean that Harding's election would mean immediate withdrawal from the Dominican Republic.²⁰ Dominican nationalists backed Harding's campaign, and rumors spread of a possible withdrawal upon his inauguration. The language of the campaign in the United States, and U.S. public attention to the occupation, empowered the nationalist resistance from the outside and stirred up hope and attention in many parts of the Dominican Republic, facilitating a growing unity in resistance while causing the State Department to pressure occupation administrators to relax censorship. Occupation forces and marine constabulary leaders were well aware of how these changes affected the issue of public relations in both the Dominican

¹⁸ *The Nation*, Aug. 28, 1920, page 231; Juárez, “United States Withdrawal,” 157.

¹⁹ Quoted in: Juárez, “United States Withdrawal,” 158; See also: Kenneth J. Grieb, “Warren G. Harding and the Dominican Republic U.S. Withdrawal, 1921-1923,” *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, 11:3 (July, 1969), 426. Grieb discusses Harding's pinpointing of the hypocrisy of the intervention in the Dominican Republic, and the damage that it did to the international reputation of the United States.

²⁰ The international resistance picked up pace, too, as the U.S. presidential campaign picked up pace. An October, 1920 reunion in New York of the Dominican Nationalist Commission worked to build on growing public interest in the United States, beginning a renewed propaganda campaign that included the establishment of an office for publications and gathering of funds to send some members as envoys to Latin American countries in an effort to build unity against the occupation. Fabio Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, 35-6. For more information on nationalist resistance, see Henríquez Ureña, Max, *Los yanquis en Santo Domingo*, (Madrid: M. Aguilar, 1929), a primary account written five years after the U.S. withdrawal. Max Henríquez Ureña, a national Dominican hero, was a Dominican historian and ex-Dominican politician who toured Latin America with the *de jure* Dominican president in protest of the U.S. occupation. For evidence of intense nationalistic motivation in regional resistance movements from 1916-1920, see: Ramos, *Vida y obra*, especially pages 23-24.

Republic and the United States. The U.S. Navy attempted to quell concerns by reporting that in late 1920 conditions in the Dominican Republic were "becoming stabilized," and that they hoped naval administration would need not last much longer before Dominicans could take over government "with such protection from the United States as may insure it against any threatening intervention of foreign nations or internal disorder."²¹ Lane prepared a speech for all marine recruits entering the Dominican Republic in the last years of the occupation, in which he discussed Dominican and U.S. anti-occupation elements. He pointed out that each assault on Dominicans by marines "is published in the Dominican press and the Dominican people are astounded that American Marines should so abuse their people. Prominent Dominicans forward the story to their friends in the United States and it is taken up by the American press, maybe in Congress, and the blame is laid upon the whole Marine Corps."²² It was not only an issue for the marines, however, but a clear problem for the consolidation of a Dominican constabulary that was already widely disliked by the population.

Marine commandants were concerned with the image of the constabulary among Dominicans, with its reputation for corruption, arbitrary methods, and robbing and abusing the peasantry; they were concerned that people associated the constabulary with previous Dominican militaries that had tended toward corruption and abuse, damaging its public image and reducing its "effectiveness in maintaining order."²³ Yet Dominicans across the country refused to accept the constabulary as a legitimate power because of its foreign leadership, its record of corruption, and its membership from among the lower classes. One guerrilla in late 1920 sent word that he

²¹ U.S. Navy Department, *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for Fiscal Year 1920*, 193. See also: "Daniels Defends Marines in Haiti," *New York Times*, Sept. 19, 1920. Pg. 18. Daniels states that marines have brought "order," but also stresses infrastructural improvements such as the restoration of roads.

²² Rufus Lane in: Robert C. Kilmartin, "Indoctrination in Santo Domingo," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, VII:3, 379.

²³ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47-48.

would surrender, but not to anyone in the constabulary.²⁴ As the international and national resistance campaigns mounted through 1920, reforms in the constabulary late in the year emphasized the urgent need to give the constabulary some respectability. As they had done unsuccessfully in previous years, constabulary leaders attempted to enlist more respectable recruits by again discharging men "who were not good enough" and emphasizing that enlistment must bring men of more respectable backgrounds.²⁵ The first general order of 1921 stated that recruiters might waive much in the way of "military smartness" in order to gain recruits who were more reliable and of "honorable character." This order reiterated the importance of instilling in men that they were supported by the Dominican government for the purpose of enforcing law and order, that they were useless unless they themselves obeyed and set an example, and stated that "they must inspire the population with confidence and respect, and never with fear or dislike."²⁶ An October order focused on improving respectability by ordering the placement of large mirrors at all constabulary posts, emphasizing the need to improve "personal neatness and military precision," and insisting that all constabulary officers have a working knowledge of Spanish. Recognizing the level of difficulties in command and "control" that had arisen from the language barrier, it stated that any constabulary officer "who cannot do without the services of an interpreter is not fifty per cent efficient," and any constabulary officers remaining who could not conduct ordinary conversations in Spanish were to correct the problem immediately. This order also tried to reverse the trend toward dealing militarily with civil

²⁴ Constabulary second lieutenant Thomas H. Lawyer, 6th Company, San Francisco de Macorís, 12 October, 1920, reported that "Perone the lone Bandit" sent word that he would surrender to the Second Comisario, but not to anyone in the constabulary. "Informes," File #1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

²⁵ The order does not define what is meant by a respectable background, but communications about new recruits focus on trying to bring in fewer men with criminal backgrounds. 1921 constabulary communications, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

²⁶ General Order No. 1, 12 January, 1921, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

offenders, reminding regional headquarters of the constabulary's duties toward civil authorities; it called for reform in constabulary relations with civil officials by reminding constabulary members that "when fault is found with civil official in the way he performs his duties," it was not the constabulary members' job to correct it.²⁷ A general order the following month reminded constabulary members that when they were administering prisons and jails "they will cooperate in every proper way with the official of the Civil Government having duty with prisons and jails, and will assist them in every way possible," and that the constabulary would help civil officials in their duties, but without interfering.²⁸

Another response to constabulary-civil tensions was to publicly encourage civil officials to give suggestions.²⁹ This was difficult to carry out in practice, however, when marine commanders did not respect the opinions of civil officials and the latter often worked to undermine the authority of constabulary units.³⁰ For example, in the province of Monte Cristi, 4th Company commander Harry Hurst reported in December, 1920 that the members of the local ayuntamiento in Dajabón were "doing all they can to cause trouble" in regard to the constabulary detention camp along the Haitian border, complaining that it was not clean enough and that it did not have sufficient constabulary guards. Rather than adapt based on local officials' advice, Hurst

²⁷ General Order No. 30, 22 October, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

²⁸ General Order No. 34, 6 November, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

²⁹ General Order No. 35, 11 November, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. The order stipulated that "the senior Guardia officer in the capital of each province should confer with Civil Governor of the province, keeping him informed of all matters pertaining to the policy of the Guardia, and solicit the cooperation and help of the Governors, including inviting their criticism and suggestions."

³⁰ After nationalist festivities in mid 1920, military government officials increasingly felt that they could not trust civil governors or their employees, and worked harder to take power away from them to improve stability through military force. McLaughlin reported in June, 1920 that government-employed people were the "chief agitators" in Samaná. 13th Company report, 26 June, 1920, "Informes," File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; the same Samaná officials were reported to deal very unjustly with English-speaking people there, especially after the upswing of rumors of U.S. withdrawal. 13th Co. Weekly Report, 12 September, 1920, File "1920, 8," Box 1, Ejército Nacional, AGN1. For earlier examples of passive resistance by civil officials, see Chapters Three and Four.

held an interview with the president of the ayuntamiento to "give him to understand" that the constabulary inspector and the chief of the constabulary-directed Public Works Department thought it to be in good order.³¹ Instead of incorporating the advice of civil officials, constabulary leadership often reinforced the trend toward stacking local governments with more cooperative Dominicans. Headquarters encouraged constabulary and marines to suggest removal and replacement of "native" officials when they deemed it necessary.³²

While the international campaign brought a frontal assault on occupation forces, internal developments increased difficulties in centralizing and consolidating control even while the international atmosphere made centralization more urgent by highlighting the need for withdrawal plans. The powerful, global economic downturn that finally caught up with the Dominican Republic toward the end of 1920 proved to be another catalyst that forced both sides, military and resistance, to step up their efforts at centralization and improved efficiency. It increased open resistance from civil officials.³³ It brought many Dominicans, such as peasants from the remote interior, more directly into the debate, and brought a shift of many previous collaborators toward the resistance. The economic crisis in late 1920 devastated all regions of the country, halting reforms and infrastructural building and leading Dominicans to blame the military government for the ruin of the Dominican economy. Most of the occupation's infrastructural improvements were built during the 1919-1920 economic boom that caused the Dominican Republic to prosper when many countries were already suffering from the post-

³¹ 4th Company report, 11 December, 1920, "Informes," File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

³² General Order No. 30, 22 October, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

³³ On 14 May, 1921, company commander C.R. Darrah reported that in Puerto Plata, the civil governor "when asked to do a little work for the Guardia [constabulary] the other day got real mad about it. He is a very great enemy of the Marines and the Guardia. And now that his pay is being cut he seems to be more so. 8th Company Weekly Intelligence Report, Box 3, File "1921 18," 1921, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

World War One recession.³⁴ Occupation forces held these improvements up as proof that the occupation was a positive force in Dominican society. When resistance leaders inside the country criticized the constabulary, the military government emphasized the extent of these improvements and claimed that a completion of infrastructural growth would bring greater efficiency in the constabulary. The economic boom was short-lived, however, as European beet sugar quickly revived and was preferred to the cane sugar of the Caribbean.³⁵ By late 1920 a severe economic downturn halted infrastructural growth and led to starvation and growing dissatisfaction in all regions.

With the financial crisis beginning in October, 1920, the military government cut the 1921 budget from around \$11 million to \$6 million and practiced austerity measures that, to Dominicans, seemed to represent an absolute failure of the occupation's fiscal measures.³⁶ New budget cuts were especially a problem for the constabulary, which was already practicing financial austerity measures since mid-1920 due to inefficiency.³⁷ 1921 began with a frustrating contradiction, marine constabulary leaders announcing plans to withdraw as soon as the constabulary was ready to maintain order, but then drastically cutting the constabulary force. In

³⁴ The boom was possible and largely successful due to the reorientation of trade toward the United States and a new stress on the production of sugar and the high U.S. consumption as war-ravaged Europe was unable to produce on pre-war scales.

³⁵ From its post-war height to the 1920-1921 period, one hundred pounds of Dominican sugar dropped in value from \$30 to less than \$1, and other export items dropped similarly. Bosch, *Trujillo*, 127. The drop in sugar prices from 1920 also encouraged the already growing preference of Haitian laborers on sugar *centrales* because their labor was cheaper. Castillo, *La inmigración de braceros azucareros*, 57. Military government reports in the early years of occupation emphasized that much of the disorder and looting that occurred on some sugar estates were the product of unemployment during the always problematic *zafra*, and Domínguez emphasizes, too, the strikes caused by the extraordinarily high cost of living for ordinary Dominicans during the first four years of the occupation. H.S. Knapp, report, 26 October, 1918, File 1918, Geographical Files "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division," Quantico; Domínguez, *Historia Dominicana*, 199. The problem worsened considerably through 1921: employees received less than half of what they had in previous years at the same time that personnel on sugar estates was "reduced by half." Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 161.

³⁶ Domínguez, *Historia Dominicana*, 207. For Dominican reaction, see: Company patrol reports, Box 3, Files 11-19, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

³⁷ General Order 18 of 16 July, 1920, for example, urged the reduction of expenditures for transportation and general expenses due to depleted funds. "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

February, the commandant reduced the active enlisted force from an authorized strength of 1,200 to only 346 men for lack of funds. Austerity budgeting also meant worsening the constant problem of inadequate provisions and equipment.³⁸ This was accompanied by a brief spike in the Marine presence in that month, which caused many to question U.S. intentions.³⁹ This only highlighted the image of the constabulary as an arm of mercenaries working for marines. Marine constabulary leaders viewed the economically motivated reduction as a chance to push all but the most devoted/loyal/cooperative members and officers out of the constabulary.⁴⁰ Rumors circulated throughout the country about what this extreme constabulary reduction might mean. Many held it to mean that the U.S. planned a full takeover of the country or that withdrawal was again to be pushed into the distant future.⁴¹ One rumor even circulated in Monte Cristi Province that all constabulary were to be discharged within three months and the property of each constabulary post sold at auction because the U.S. government had stolen funds from the country and were leaving so little that they had to "give up" the constabulary and Dominican schools.⁴²

By April and May of 1921 the financial crisis was affecting the entire population. In May of 1921, in Santo Domingo City alone, constabulary commandant F.A. Ramsey worried

³⁸ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47.

³⁹ 8th Company commander A.D. Ryan reported that "the people in Puerto Plata that want to see the troops leave were very much disappointed when the Henderson unloaded six trucks for Marines." 8th Company Weekly Intelligence Report, February 1921, Box 3, Folder 18, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁴⁰ General Order No. 1, 12 January, 1921, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁴¹ Weekly Intelligence Reports, February, 1921, Box 3, File 18, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁴² Harry E. Hurst, 4th Company Weekly Intelligence Report, Weekly Intelligence Reports, February, 1921, Box 3, File 18, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. In Barahona Province, another rumor spread that all of the sugar mills and other U.S.-run enterprises there were going to close down because the owners were afraid to invest anything until they were sure the Marines were going to remain. This rumor led to panic and put the province in "an unsettled state" due to the potential for job loss if such a thing were to occur. Harry E. Hurst, 4th Co. Weekly Intelligence Report, 6 November, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

that 175 merchants had gone into bankruptcy since October of the previous year.⁴³ One prominent San Francisco de Macorís merchant, Frances Guzman, father-in law of local resistance leader Luis Mejia, attempted suicide by cutting his own throat, reportedly due to his financial problems.⁴⁴ April and May also saw an increase in robberies throughout the country as the economy continued to decline.⁴⁵ By increasing crime, economic devastation weakened the constabulary and its tenuous hold. The same devastation galvanized the resistance.⁴⁶ Nationalist leaders pointed out that U.S. forces had intervened on the basis that they could improve the country's financial situation, but that by 1921 the Dominican economy was much worse than it had been before U.S. intervention in 1916; that occupation officials had claimed they would uplift the country by building roads, improving mail service and phone lines, and port improvements, but with the economic crisis all such reforms were halted; that occupation officials had promised to bring order through an efficient military, but the constabulary was neither efficient nor bringing order. The economic crisis thus augmented problems for constabulary centralization while providing impetus for the unification of resistance. Continuing economic problems through mid-1921 drove some among the rising merchant class to seek enlistment in the constabulary to pay off debts.⁴⁷ Many more, however, joined armed groups throughout the provinces, emboldening armed uprisings not only the East and the Southwest, but

⁴³ "Information" from constabulary Colonel Commandant F.A. Ramsey to "Commanding General U.S.M.C.," 29 May, 1921, Folder "1921, 9," Box 2, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

⁴⁴ Weekly Intelligence Report, 6th Co. 27 Feb., 1921, "Box 3, Folder 19, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁴⁵ Reports, Folder "1921, 8," Ejército Nacional, Box 3, AGN1.

⁴⁶ Constabulary intelligence reports for May of 1921 emphasize the wide suffering of Dominicans through the cities and rural areas. Harry Hurst reported for Monte Cristi province, for example, that "it is a fact that the people of the poor class are in a bad way, no one has any work and those who have are afraid that they too are soon to be with-out work." He reported that the towns and the countryside were "full" of men who had lost their work over the past three months, that "most everyone" blamed the United States for the hard times. Hurst was of the opinion that the general lack of arms from disarmament was the "only thing that keeps people from getting together and causing trouble in all parts." Harry E. Hurst, Weekly Intelligence Report 4th Company, 16 May, 1921, "Guardia Nacional" Box 3, File 15, year 1921, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁴⁷ Weekly Intelligence Report, 8th Company (Puerto Plata), 14 May 1921, Folder "1921, 18," Box 3, 1921, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

throughout the country.⁴⁸ Reports from the Cibao indicated that merchants blamed the military government for hard times and the shortage of money, and that many said that they "may as well get revolvers and go join the bandits in the hills and try to drive the intruders out."⁴⁹

The economic crisis also brought to the fore another controversial issue essential to the centralization of the constabulary: The military government had requested loans from the United States through 1920 to aid in consolidation and help build infrastructure to improve military efficiency. As the debt was charged to the Dominican government, which would owe it even after withdrawal, many protested.⁵⁰ The economic crisis increased the constabulary's need for both money to centralize and for military efficiency to combat growing resistance, but requests for new loans in December of 1920 did their own part to increase resistance.⁵¹ In Samaná, which to that point had demonstrated only minor resistance, political leaders began a petition to Washington, protesting that they believed another U.S. loan would give the U.S. military a further hold on the country and delay the independence that Wilson was promising. Dominican lawyer Pelegrín Castillo began making trips from San Francisco de Macorís to hold conferences with these political leaders in Samaná, and rumors spread that people were threatened with removal from their posts if they did not sign the petition.⁵² Military Governor Snowden reported to the Secretary of State, however, that nothing but the proposed loan of \$10 million dollars

⁴⁸ "Reports from San Pedro de Macorís," 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Box 3, Files 11-19, 1921, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Report from PM Rixey, 23 June, 1921, Folder 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

⁴⁹ Weekly Intelligence Report, A.M. Norris, Jr., 6th Co. (San Francisco de Macorís), 20 November, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁵⁰ As President Henríquez y Carvajal put it, the officials running the government and taking out the loans were being paid by an increasingly indebted Dominican Republic, but were not held to responsibility for their acts before the authorities of the Dominican Republic, "and inasmuch as they were not subject either to the laws of the United States, they were to enjoy an unprecedented immunity and exercise an unlimited and irresponsible power over the Dominican people." United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1103.

⁵¹ See Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 161; United States, "Senate Inquiry," 51.

⁵² Reports list the local Samaná leaders as Father Zúñiga, Ayuntamiento president T. Messina, Judge of Instructions Santamaría, and "some ex-politicians." Weekly Intelligence Report, Capt. Arnold, 13th Co. (Samaná), 10 December, 1920, File 4, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

would allow resumption of public works, and that failure to approve the loan would "result in an economic disaster."⁵³ The loan had been planned from earlier in the year, and much of the money spent in advance, but the State Department withdrew it once plans for early withdrawal began. In early 1921 they extended a \$1.2 million short-term loan to stave off the financial disaster Snowden predicted, and in June they authorized another loan of \$2.5 million.⁵⁴ Protests against both loans were widespread and public, a cause behind which large and diverse numbers of Dominicans could unite: Many reported that the U.S. was the cause of the economic hard times, and that they would rather starve than accept another U.S. loan.⁵⁵ A group of about 250 protestors joined to hold a protest in Santo Domingo's Parque Independencia.⁵⁶ The nationalists pointed to the increase in foreign indebtedness through five years of occupation, with no Dominicans in representation, and pointed out that it was a violation of the 1907 treaty.⁵⁷ Most of the money was spent on roads and, with the prospect of withdrawal more real than ever, the

⁵³ Quarterly Report of the Military Governor from January 21, 1921, for period October to December, 1920. Quoted in: Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 161. Military Governor Robison reported later in the year that the depressing economic conditions in mid-1921 were so bad, and only worsening, that they had reached "the point of an almost entire collapse in business, and that the Military Government now finds itself in the position of requiring immediate relief in the nature of long-term financing." Robison, Memorandum for Senate Committee in: United States, "Senate Inquiry," 935. See also: Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 78-80.

⁵⁴ P.M. Rixey Jr., "Informational Report" to Commanding General USMC, 9 June 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 78-80. Dominicans complained that this second loan was taken out to finish public works, but that it was instead used to pay outstanding debt of the military government. United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1103-1106. As Henríquez y Carvajal pointed out, while schools remained closed and public employees' salaries more than halved, the military government sought a new loan of \$10 million at 8% interest, whereas the country was paying only 5% of the previous debt as of June, 1921. Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 161. Many rumors also continuously circulated to the effect that the U.S. was working out a deal to get Samaná Bay permanently. Intelligence Reports, Box 3, 1921, File "1921 18," Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

⁵⁵ Weekly Memo to constabulary Colonel Commander from 4th Co., 4 May, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. The central provinces also reported "considerable unrest" due to loans and requests for further loans. A.M. Norris Jr. reported that with rumors of another loan of \$10 million several "agitators" "got busy," and one could see small groups having discussions in parks, clubs, and cafes discussing the matter. 6th Co. Intelligence Report, 10 April, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁵⁶ P.M. Rixey Jr., "Informational Report" to Commanding General USMC, 9 June 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN

⁵⁷ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 51; "Fuente de Imprestitos," *La Información*, 16 March, 1922, an article which argues that the U.S. propensity toward loaning money to Latin American governments was a technique for guaranteeing their economic dependency on the United States; "Protesta Dominicana," *El Diario*, 20 March, 1922.

strengthening of the constabulary. As Calder points out, such loans were an embarrassment and highlighted the double standard at work: "They called into question the ability of the United States to manage Dominican affairs," and "Washington would have soundly condemned any Dominican administration which had found itself in a similar predicament."⁵⁸

1920-1921: Dominicanizing the Constabulary, Nationalizing the Resistance

Well before the economic crisis hit the Dominican Republic in October of 1920, the provinces were already being united by a combination of two powerful currents: military centralization and nationalization of resistance. Regional confluences of local resistance movements by early 1920 kept the constabulary battle alert, while public attention to its activities and conduct necessitated a stricter system of control and accountability. Centralization, constabulary officials decided, would be the key to improving unit accountability to a central command structure and thereby combating the negative image and inefficiency of the earlier constabulary. With the realization that regional solutions would no longer work due to growing resistance and international attention, constabulary officers and the military government focused reform on consolidation and standardization, to create a national system that would allow the constabulary to take firm control over the country by the late 1920s. The centralization was gradual, however, and constabulary planners continued to battle long-standing regional patterns of power relations. They did so in the context of many other difficulties. When Charles Williams left command in September of 1920, the constabulary returned to the rapid turnover of commandants that had plagued it before his arrival. Growing armed resistances continued to present a serious problem to constabulary development, and the general lack of cooperation

⁵⁸ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 80. See also: "Report of Naval Operations" in: United States, "Senate Inquiry," 939.

throughout the country made difficult even such basic requirements as the building and maintenance of infrastructural improvements that would aid the military. Furthermore, as the constabulary worked to consolidate power, the resistance movements increasingly unified to counteract its growing presence and consolidation. Using the same networks and infrastructural improvement that aided the reform and empowerment of the constabulary, those leading various resistance movements began to consolidate, too. They traveled from region to region gathering funds and advertising their cause.

The nationalist resistance, which originally included many distinct groups and individuals with the shared goal of pushing U.S. forces from the country, comprised an unusual mix of Dominicans. Ex-politicians, intellectuals, lawyers, merchants, clergy, youths, feminists, and upper-class families formed anti-imperialist groups throughout the country, and by 1920 some contingents began to work to unite the many disparate elements into larger, regional units. Secret gatherings of previous politicians and civil officials began in late December, 1919 and January, 1920, and became widespread enough to seriously alarm the constabulary command when resistance leaders heightened the campaign in March and April. The sudden growth of the nationalist campaign coincided with three relevant occurrences: the growth and publicity of the international campaign, the increase in military government orders that centralized aspects of civil government, and the rapidly growing communication and transportation networks.⁵⁹ Many specifically worked to create propaganda against the constabulary and military government, and

⁵⁹ Examples of nationalist resistance use of new road and communication infrastructure to build networks and unify local movements proliferated. Company reports throughout the provinces reported the increased movements between regions of intellectuals and politicians throughout the year. See, for example: 13th Co. Report, 24 April, 1920, 4th Co. Report, 5 June, 1920, Constabulary Inspector William Sheard's report, 2 August, 1920, 13th Co. Report, 28 August, 1920, and 10th Co. Report, 11 December, 1920, "Informes," File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Major P.D. Cornell's report, 13 December, 1920, "Informes," File 4, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

their efforts increased with the U.S. presidential elections in the fall.⁶⁰ Dominican interest groups, politicians, intellectuals, and clergy actively addressed letters and petitions to U.S. senators and interest groups in protest of the occupation, and a group under such prominent, nationalist Dominican authors as Emiliano Tejera and Américo Lugo founded the Unión Nacional Dominicana (UND) in March to centralize and publicize protest.⁶¹

The UND, aided by the growth of other local Dominican organizations for independence, targeted the constabulary in its propaganda: it reinforced the condemnation as national traitor of any Dominican who accepted any charge or employment that cooperated with or supported the military government or otherwise slowed the return of absolute sovereignty.⁶² Many civil officials, determined to retain local and regional autonomy, resigned or threatened to resign as the military government published executive orders that centralized local governmental administration.⁶³ Other prominent Dominican intellectuals founded the Junta Patriótica Nacionalista in San Francisco de Macorís, addressing handbills to "Dominicans who want to see national sovereignty restored and the enormous injustice committed upon la patria repaired." The handbills, which were reported to cause "considerable excitement among Dominicans" in the center of the country, called for collective actions such as the closing of all businesses for an afternoon. They also reported that the U.S. Senate had ordered an investigation of Nouel's accusations of torture and the dis-occupation of all of the country except for Samaná, a rumor

⁶⁰ Patrol Reports, October, 1920, Box 1, File "1920 7," Ejército Nacional, AGN; Weekly Intelligence Reports, August to December, 1920, File 4, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁶¹ Domínguez, *Historia Dominicana*, 206. As Peguero points out, the rise of this movement took the character of uniting civil resistances, with Dominicans organizing meetings, rallies, and protests that "brought together Dominicans from different social strata to organize juntas nacionalistas across the country and to support the leaders of the movement." *The Militarization of Culture*, 32.

⁶² Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, 90-93.

⁶³ Report, Sheard, 10 May 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. See, for example, Executive Order 463.

that caused many in the cities and towns to parade in the streets and rejoice.⁶⁴ The constabulary did not endear itself to the population by being the force that broke up such celebrations.⁶⁵

Other Juntas Nacionalistas were founded in the country's cities through the year. Efforts to build the resistance and gather funds for the fight for independence were highly successful in the cities, especially with the June 12-19 "Patriotic Week," but also continued on largely regional terms.⁶⁶ Leaders of the resistance used the new infrastructure in the country through June to work to rectify these divisions, traveling frequently from province to province in the interior.⁶⁷ The countryside was another matter. While constabulary reports in early 1920 discuss a growing strength in "unfriendliness toward occupation forces," and "contemptuous remarks by natives frequently heard in streets and public places," they reported that many peasants in the countryside told Dominican constabulary officers that they were afraid, and that if occupation forces were withdrawn they would abandon their farms as they were afraid of renewed revolutions.⁶⁸ Despite divisions, the national campaigns emboldened other forms of resistance. Civil disobedience against the constabulary increased, and guerrilla campaigns picked up pace through 1920.⁶⁹ After June, nationalist leaders enlarged their campaign across regions, involving

⁶⁴ Report, McLaughlin, 13th Co. (Samaná), 30 April, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. The report includes the copied text of one handbill, signed by Manuel M. Castillo and Carlos F. de Moya.

⁶⁵ Constabulary break-ups of such celebrations and dances continued through 1920 and 1921. See, for example: 4th Co. Report, 26 April, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; 6th Co. Weekly Intelligence Report, 16 January, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁶⁶ In Samaná, for example, the Patriotic Week seems to have received most of its support from foreign merchants, Dominican inhabitants in general reported to have contributed little. Report, McLaughlin, 13th Co. (Samaná), 26 June 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁶⁷ Report of Inspector Sheard, 7 June, 1920, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁶⁸ Report, McLaughlin, 13th Co. (Samaná), 30 April, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. For more information about the work of the Juntas Nacionalistas and the nationalist campaign, see: Ramos, *Vida y obra*, 23-24; Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 120; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 183-212.

⁶⁹ General Order No. 13, 21 June, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; 6th Company report, Thomas H. Lawyer, 12 October, 1920, "Informes," File 1, "Ordenanzas y

a growing number of other regional and local resistance leaders; many were reported to leave secret meetings and travel long distances along the newly built roads, and were visited by Dominicans who had recently traveled to New York and Cuba.⁷⁰ Inspector Sheard was so impressed with the organization of the Patriotic Week and the ensuing campaign, in fact, that he thought it had been a "grand success in demonstrating their ability to govern themselves."⁷¹

When nationalist resistance unified enough to alarm the constabulary, its officers emphasized military standardization. In early 1920, the constabulary was still a weak organization.⁷² With an eye toward unification of the constabulary and standardized communication across companies, officers made a number of changes from mid-1920. The first, and one of the most effective, was centralized reporting to combat the strength of resistance. Before his departure, commandant Charles Williams ordered that by July all companies were to bring their lists of known fugitives up to date and share the information with the constabulary commandant's office. He also instituted the practice by which each company sent in a weekly

Correspondencia 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 156; Peguero, *Militarization in the Dominican Republic*, 31-32. During the Patriotic Week, the Junta Patriótica de Damas, a women's organization created in protest of the occupation in March and led by such notable women as prominent Dominican educator and feminist speaker Ercilia Pepín, made and distributed flags as a symbol to the cause and to raise the morale of protestors, who were to raise them when Marines walked through the streets.

⁷⁰ Report, Haslup, 3rd Co. (La Vega), 3 July, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Report of constabulary Inspector Sheard, 9 August, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; 10th Company report, unsigned, (Moca), 14 September, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Report of constabulary Inspector Sheard, 14 September, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁷¹ Report of Inspector Sheard, 4 July, 1920, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁷² Despite three years of "development," the constabulary in 1920 had only deteriorated rifles, only three automatic rifles, and sufficient pistols only to arm the officers, first sergeants, and trumpeters. It had "no machine guns, tentage, or signal equipment, and the men's field equipment was old and badly worn." Most travel was done on foot; the constabulary had only eighteen motor vehicles--mostly concentrated in city use--22 horses, and 81 mules. Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47-48. Late 1920 reports from the constabulary to the military governor still emphasized the difficulty of obtaining sufficient equipment and uniforms. See: "Memorandum for the Military Governor," from GND Colonel Commandant J.C. Breckenridge, dated 15 Dec. 1920, Legajo 59, "Gobierno Militar," AGN1.

memorandum describing the general state of the province.⁷³ In addition to better and more regular reporting to central headquarters, Williams emphasized infrastructure. The constabulary and military government also began to combine efforts to improve constabulary efficiency. For example, they put enlisted men to work with military government forces on mapping the country and building roads and communication networks through mid-1920, and ordered units to use these reforms to their advantage: Reports of operations against guerrillas were to use maps or, for those locations not yet mapped, to use local place names and distance and direction from more noted locations.⁷⁴

By October, all constabulary companies were enlisted to aid in making regional maps, and headquarters emphasized the need to get constabulary members to cooperate with field engineers on other infrastructural improvements.⁷⁵ The occupation government and constabulary leaders held up communication and transportation improvements as proof that they were there to help the Dominican people and improve the country, but constabulary and resistance alike knew that the emphasis on such infrastructure by 1920 had much more to do with the need to unite remote regions of the country and give "military control of the whole Republic to the government and its military police force."⁷⁶ In late 1920, the military government reported success in the extensive building of roads and railways that it hoped would aid in consolidation of power and pacification of the population.⁷⁷ While the clearing of roads was helpful, the

⁷³ General Order No. 15, 8 July, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁷⁴ General Order No. 21, 3 August, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. One of the top expenses for the constabulary in 1921 was for mapping, while the other primary expenses were for the building of a national penitentiary, a constabulary hospital in Santo Domingo, and constabulary barracks in Santiago, Barahona, San Francisco de Macorís and San Pedro de Macorís. "Report of Chief of Naval Operations" in: United States, "Senate Inquiry," 939.

⁷⁵ General Order No. 30, 22 October, 1920, and General Order No. 31, 29 October, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁷⁶ Kilmartin, "Indoctrination in Santo Domingo," 382.

⁷⁷ Report of Chief of Naval Operations, United States, "Senate Inquiry," 938-939.

constabulary was still not equipped to deal with the storms and heavy rains. The especially long, heavy rains of December washed out the dirt roads and trails, threatened livestock, damaged crops, and furthered economic decline.⁷⁸ The constabulary was not equipped to travel across washed out roads, and its leaders had no choice but to sit back and wait for the weather to improve so that they could begin working on them again as soon as possible.⁷⁹ The resistance, on the other hand, was able to use washed out trails. Gilbert describes the cultural practice of extending aid to travelers during poor conditions, and the way that this practice aided guerrilla fighters--a service that was not open to constabulary units.⁸⁰

Constabulary officers also worked to improve standardization in training and other aspects of the constabulary through 1920. Reforms aimed, for example, to gain reenlistments as men's terms began to expire. Early 1920 marked the constabulary's third year in existence, and thus the ends of terms of enlistment for some of the original members who still remained. Reports estimated that the constabulary "successfully overcame the difficulties incident to discharging, enlisting and reenlisting." Reenlistment of those whose original three-year enlistments had expired was approximately 65%.⁸¹ Reenlistment was indeed good during the financial success and general calm of early 1920, though the report does not mention an overall number of those reaching the end of their term of enlistment. Due to the discharges and desertions of earlier years, the majority of the force's enlisted men were not up for re-enlistment

⁷⁸ "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. Reports from all provinces reported the devastation of heavy rains through the month of December, though it was especially a problem in the interior--where political and intellectual nationalist resistance was strongest.

⁷⁹ See, for example, 4th Company report, Harry E. Hurst, 30 December, 1920, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," File 1, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. Even as late as August of 1921, despite rapid progress on some road building, mail was repeatedly delayed by poor roads, the deaths of pack animals along the way, and lack of bridges. See 3rd Company Weekly Memo to Colonel Commander, 22 August, 1921, Box 3, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁸⁰ Gilbert, *Mi lucha*, 27-32, 69-119.

⁸¹ Logan Feland, "Report of activities of the Second Brigade, U.S. Marines, for the year ending June 30, 1920," 19 October, 1920, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," File, 1920, "Geographical Files," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

at the time of this report, as they were not from the original recruitment campaigns of three years previous. When these men did come up for reenlistment, the next year, the majority opted to be discharged.⁸² Williams gained approval the military governor's approval early in 1920 for an optimistic increase in the authorized strength of the constabulary to 1,225 enlisted men and 82 officers.⁸³ In a (largely failed) attempt to initiate at least basic standard training in outposts and company headquarters, Williams mandated the introduction of specific athletic games to improve strict discipline in all company posts while avoiding the monotony of long military exercises, reforms that subsequent commandants continued.⁸⁴ They emphasized improvement of basic drill actions such as saluting and coming to attention, and ordered company commanders to send their weekly memoranda to other company commanders who might have interest in the information--and important step toward centralized efficiency.⁸⁵ They also consolidated the constabulary by lessening the number of companies from fourteen to twelve, so that each province had only one company.⁸⁶ With this change, to improve *esprit de corps* and be sure that all constabulary members had a vested interest in the good of the populations, they proposed a more careful program of keeping enlistees in their home provinces and of calling the companies by their province name rather than by number.⁸⁷ J.C. Breckenridge, as commandant of the

⁸² Weekly Intelligence Report, 26 February, 1921, Box 3, Folder 18, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁸³ Logan Feland, "Report of activities of the Second Brigade, U.S. Marines, for the year ending June 30, 1920," 19 October, 1920, USMC, Historical Division, "Geographical Files," "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," File, 1920.

⁸⁴ General Order No. 19, 30 July, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. The games described in the order included leap frog, passing the ball, Mrs. Murphy died, jumping the bag, passing the bag sideways, snap the whip, stingaree, three deep, jumping the stick, bull in the ring, and, ironically perhaps, cockfighting.

⁸⁵ Reforms carried out under Commandant Logan Feland. General Order No. 30, 22 October, 1920, and General Order No. 31, 29 October, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁸⁶ Previously, the major cities of Santiago and Santo Domingo had housed two companies each. Reforms by F.A. Ramsey. General Order No. 35, 11 November, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* This aspect of the order is notable in its recognition of the rivalries between provinces, and thus growing recognition of the country's regionalism, to which previous commandants had not paid sufficient attention.

constabulary from December of 1920 to April of 1921, stipulated that each company headquarters should keep half of its men in the field in selected permanent camps or outposts to patrol and "preserve law and order," while those in headquarters would receive "military and civil training." Every constabulary outpost was for the first time marked with a uniform sign indicating what it was, and each was to have a clock, a calendar, and a set of the Official Gazette; they were even to fly the Dominican flag, so that surrounding residents and civil officials might come to look on the outposts as centers of information.⁸⁸ Breckenridge also stipulated that each company headquarters would always have at least one marine line officer so as to improve training.⁸⁹ These latter reforms came at the same time, however, as the economic decline, and successive declinations of the authorized enlisted strength of the constabulary began in November of 1920.⁹⁰ Further, economic difficulties meant that the constabulary administration was no longer able to supply morale boosters such as baseball goods to companies, and had to continually decrease budgets, limiting rations to prisoners, for example, to bare sustenance.⁹¹

New centralization and efficiency in the constabulary was strongly tested beginning in December, 1920 by resistance, heavy rains, and a small pox epidemic that wreaked havoc on the un-vaccinated population. In the midst of a severe financial crisis, and as nationalists increased their campaigns against the occupation and its collaborators, the constabulary found it difficult to convince people to agree to vaccinations. The damage wrought by the disease was wide and

⁸⁸ "Memorandum for the Military Governor," from constabulary Colonel Commandant J.C. Breckenridge, dated 15 Dec. 1920, File 59, "Gobierno Militar," AGN1.

⁸⁹ General Order No. 35, 11 November, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁹⁰ General Order No. 37, 15 November, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁹¹ PND Circular #14, 7 July, 1921, "Correspondencia 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN; General Order No. 53 (1921), 11 December, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Box 3, File 15, "Ordenes Generales, años 1921," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. The continual lack of funds decreased morale and satisfaction through prisons, making guarding more difficult by rousing the anger of prisoners, and also affected the morale and supplies of the men in the constabulary through 1921, returning the constabulary to use of forage, most basic supplies and equipment, and the cheapest forms of transportation possible.

immediate, spreading quickly through occupied territory and back and forth over the Haitian border. The military government used constabulary units to initiate a mandatory vaccination campaign and the quarantining of populations. Dominicans widely rejected compulsory vaccination, seeing it as a threat and an unwanted imposition from the foreign central government. The nationalist campaign distrusted military government motives, and seized on the protest as another way of harming the occupation's centralizing process. Word spread quickly, especially in the interior where the nationalist campaign was strongest, that there were "very dangerous germs" in the vaccinations and that they were killing large numbers of Dominicans who agreed to get them.⁹² Within a month, constabulary officials trying to administer the vaccine reported that a "vicious propaganda campaign against vaccination was started in January and carried on by all the periodicals of the country and many prominent people, including doctors."⁹³

In December, 1920, under pressure on all sides, Wilson officially announced the need for a withdrawal plan. Constabulary leaders stepped up the work of consolidating control across provincial lines so as to prepare the constabulary to take over with eventual withdrawal. As the constabulary centralized to prepare for withdrawal, however, so did the nationalists. The resistance was stronger, as the constabulary and military government suffered severe budget cuts even while the resistance gathered funds and gained increasing numbers because of the poor

⁹² William B. Mitchell, Weekly Intelligence Report, 30 January, 1921, 6th Company, "Guardia Nacional," Box 3, File 16, year 1921, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Weekly Intelligence Report, Charles McLaughlin, 29 January, 1921, Folder "1921 18," Box 3, Ejército Nacional, AGN; February reports, Folder "1921 18," Box 3, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

⁹³ Correspondence regarding small pox vaccinations, 14 December 1921, Box 110 (1919-1921), Gobierno Militar Americano, AGN; U.S. Navy Commander I.S.K. Reeves, "Statement Regarding smallpox in Dominican Republic, and Expenditures for Vaccine," 14 December, 1921, Folder "1921 18," Box 3, Ejército Nacional, AGN1. Not until September of 1921, as the small pox epidemic had continued to worsen throughout the year, did newspapers agree to print encouragement to get vaccinations; by then it had spread to all provinces, and the border with Haiti was closed to all crossings. Harry E. Hurst, Weekly memo for the Colonel Commandant, 4th Company, 24 September, 1921, Folder "1921, 12," Box 3 Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

conditions of the country.⁹⁴ From December to January, Dominican journalists and intellectuals founded groups such as Congreso de la Prensa to fight censorship, and growing numbers of Dominican newspapers joined the resistance, publishing the Congreso's decrees, editorials, and reports, first against censorship laws, and then as their pressure and that of the international community forced a relaxing of censorship. Published reports became more hostile toward the constabulary as time passed.⁹⁵ One December 1920 edition of *Ecos del Valle* published a long story about the actions of the UND and the Congreso de la Prensa, reiterating their insistence that no Dominican cooperate in any way with the occupation. Both the UND and the newspaper reminded the population that the Dominican Constitution forbade any Dominican citizen from accepting employment by any foreign government on Dominican national territory without the authorization of the appropriate congressional official, and that therefore any Dominicans accepting any position under the military government were to be considered traitors. It recommended that the Dominican people ostracize any Dominican national who cooperated in any manner to retard the immediate and complete return of sovereignty.⁹⁶

Despite the remarkable amount of centralization in both the constabulary and the resistance movements by the end of 1920, however, both still struggled against persistent regionalism and divisions. Many Dominicans rejected efforts toward centralization, whether they were urged by the constabulary and occupation forces or by leaders of the nationalist

⁹⁴ Meetings of the Juntas Nacionalistas throughout the interior increased in December as constabulary intelligence was overextended trying to follow their movements. 10th Company Report of Tri-weekly patrols, Charles A. McLaughlin, 31 Dec. 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁹⁵ Some of the newspapers most hostile to the constabulary were *El Anuncio*, *La Bandera* and *Ecos del Valle*. Constabulary officers reported with great interest and concern all of the publications of the newspapers, which they could not easily censor due to international attention: Joseph M. Feeley, "Memo for the Director, Department of the North," 24 December, 1920. Box 1, Folder "1920, 4," Ejército Nacional, AGN. For a brief description of the campaign against censorship in 1920 and 1921, see: Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 185-199.

⁹⁶ *Ecos del Valle*, 18 December, 1920, 1; Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista Dominicana*, 32-33, 90-93. The reference to the Dominican Constitution refers to Paragraph 4, Article 10.

resistance. Regional differences, tradition, and the slow progress of infrastructural growth still confounded broader attempts to consolidate the country. One of the most prominent regional questions for the constabulary was, of course, the border, where concern about loyalties of Dominican constabulary officers and local officials was especially acute. Commandant Ramsey reported that the constabulary there kept a roster of "those Dominican officers and enlisted men who are preeminently qualified for service on the border and should not be transferred."⁹⁷ The East continued to be a major exception as well. Whereas elsewhere constabulary officers became increasingly accountable for their actions, and were discharged or asked to resign if they proved inefficient or committed too many infractions against local populations, the constabulary continued to be more brutal in the eastern provinces.⁹⁸ Those groups hoping to unite resistance also struggled with regionalism. Samaná, with its large English-speaking and foreign populations, was slow to support resistance.⁹⁹ Furthermore, both constabulary and resistance vied to gain the support of rural Dominicans who were far removed from either politics or most of the effects of occupation. Many farmers in remote areas benefited from infrastructural building--especially roads, repair of railroads, and improvement of ports--and had suffered under the pre-intervention civil war. While they did not directly cooperate with the occupation forces, they were also uninterested in joining a nationalist resistance that might bring about disruption. Some such farmers even reported to Dominican constabulary officers in early 1921 that they were "anxious to have [U.S.] troops remain."¹⁰⁰ The many among the rural population who did resist, especially in areas where guerrilla warfare led to destruction of property and persecution

⁹⁷ General Order No. 35, 11 November, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

⁹⁸ See, for example: Translation of letter from Eliseo Acevedo at Yamasa," Second Lt. G.L. Rice, and Third Endorsement from Colonel Commandant GND, 19 February, 1921, Bundle #69, File "1921, Secretaría de Interior y Policía," "Gobierno Militar Americano," AGN; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 10-13.

⁹⁹ Report, McLaughlin, 13th Co. (Samaná), 19 June, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁰⁰ Report of Patrols, 4 January, 1921, Folder "1921, 19," Box 3, 1921, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

of neutrals by both sides, were more likely to join armed resistance. The nationalist groups continued to distance themselves publicly from guerrilla resistance, constructing a careful publicity strategy that sought to prove to U.S. senators and the U.S. public that Dominicans were capable of non-violent self government.

For constabulary leaders, one of the primary answers to resistance and all of the continued problems through 1921 was to emphasize enlistment, retention, and gaining more cooperative recruits. They focused on recruiting rural elements, even to the exclusion of those from the city.¹⁰¹ Not only had rural populations been generally less interested in directly resisting occupation rule, but they also contained many of the poorest and those who were excluded from even the most remote possibility of achieving high status in Dominican society, and thus were seen as more likely to join the constabulary. By tradition, even those of the rising merchant class were always *gente de segunda* or *campesino*, and could not become part of the elite. Trujillo, for one, seems to have weighed this in his own decision when he joined the constabulary in 1919.¹⁰² As officers rebuilt the constabulary after the drastic cuts of early 1921, they placed more attention on supplies, and worked to try to bring some among the elite class around to supporting the constabulary.¹⁰³ After the failures of the reenlistment period early in the year, they were concerned with retention, heavily emphasizing company spirit, reducing

¹⁰¹ General Order No. 1, 12 January, 1921, Box 3, File 15, "Ordenes Generales," year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁰² Crassweller, *Trujillo*, 27. Trujillo's father was a popular merchant in San Cristóbal, and a staunch supporter of and military colonel for previous dictator Lilfs, but even this middle-class and military background gave him no access to elite society in the Dominican society of the time. He would always be *gente de segunda*.

¹⁰³ General Order No. 1, 12 January, 1921, Box 3, File 15, "Ordenes Generales," year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; General Order No. 21 (1921), 14 May, Box 3, File 15, "Ordenes Generales," year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Letter from Chief of Naval Operations to the Secretary of the Navy, 19 November, 1921, "Material Accomplishments in Dominican Republic under Military Government," File 1921, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

terms of enlistment from three to two years, and allowing men to live in their company quarters while they were on extended furlough during the cutbacks at the beginning of the year.¹⁰⁴

The resistance, struggling against the constabulary, had the advantage in early 1921 due to economic difficulties, weather and roads, and international opposition--one of Harding's first actions upon becoming U.S. president was to order a Senate investigation into the occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The Senate investigation began in February of 1921 and received extensive press coverage in both the United States and the Dominican Republic.¹⁰⁵ At the same time, the nationalists actively recruited people across regions to their cause, and the newspapers continued to support them. Throughout 1921, *Ecos del Valle* reported extensively on investigations and repeatedly published damning articles about the occupation.¹⁰⁶ In February, it closely covered the U.S. Senate Inquiry and the Third Congress of the Pan-American Workers Confederation--where Samuel Gompers championed the Dominican cause. As international attention continued to increase through 1921, and even limited censorship was more difficult for the constabulary to enforce, *Ecos del Valle* published increasingly harsh language against the occupation, calling the U.S. forces "brutal invaders" and outlining the course of actions taken by Dominican nationalists.¹⁰⁷ Resistance leaders also used the continued military government requests for loans to help galvanize resistance, and Dominicans throughout the country showed

¹⁰⁴ General Order No. 1, 12 January, 1921, and General Order 11 (1921), 5 March, Box 3, File 15, "Ordenes Generales," year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. In the economic atmosphere, a place to stay was a strong draw.

¹⁰⁵ Dominicans closely followed the entire Senate Inquiry, newspapers printing news about it through 1921 and into 1922, when it concluded. "Carta de Mr. Knowles al Departamento de Estado de los EEUU," *La Información*, 16 March, 1922; 3rd Co. Weekly Memorandum, 18 February, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹⁰⁶ See especially, 19 February 1921 edition.

¹⁰⁷ 10 November, 1921. These actions included the founding of the Dominican Nationalist Commission.

great interest in loan negotiations.¹⁰⁸ By mid-1921, they united all patriotic with the Junta Nacionalista, which had headquarters in each province.¹⁰⁹

Finally, while the loans were still being negotiated in May, the financial crisis in the government became so bad--and the need to continue improving the constabulary so high a priority--that the military government closed the schools rather than losing money for the constabulary or transportation infrastructure. Resistance exploded, and just in time to begin preparations for the June 1921 Patriotic Week. The usually careful Santo Domingo newspaper *El Listín Diario* reported that "there is at least something that still floats victoriously over the shipwreck that is the American employee, the beloved son of the good father, who can not lose his fat salary," stating that Public Works projects had been abandoned but that U.S. employees were all sent to the constabulary "so that they may receive a good salary to help them along and enable them to reach home safely and contented."¹¹⁰ The Dominican Republic prided itself well before the occupation on its superior education system, reformed in previous decades by Eugenio María de Hostos and always supported locally by lottery. With the lottery and other such forms of local funding outlawed and the constabulary patrolling against them, Dominican civil officials had no alternative funding to continue the schools. The constabulary increased intelligence with attention to reactions against the school closings, and opined that the general lack of arms was the only thing causing people from uniting in resistance.¹¹¹ Many argued that the closing of schools was not about finances at all, but about social control, censorship, or even punishment of

¹⁰⁸ William B. Mitchell, 6 Co. (San Francisco de Macorís), Weekly Intelligence Report, 18 April, 1921, Box 3, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. 3rd Co. Weekly Intelligence Report, 16 April, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁰⁹ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 946.

¹¹⁰ Quoted, in translation, in: F.A. Ramsey, "Informational report" to Commanding General USMC, 25 May, 1921, file 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN. From this point, and until final withdrawal plans, the *Listín Diario* and other conservative newspapers joined the resistance.

¹¹¹ See, for example, 4th Company Intelligence Memorandum, 16 May, 1921, "Guardia Nacional" Box 3, File 15, year 1921, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

Dominicans for the ongoing boycott of property taxes.¹¹² President Henríquez y Carvajal believed that the school closing was for economic reasons, but protested it strongly, and U.S. businessman in Santo Domingo H.P. Krippene reported that "schools will be closed indefinitely because of lack of funds--and this despite our boast that the landmarks we leave are pre-eminently schools and education."¹¹³ More Dominicans began to come forth against the occupation, speaking publicly, joining the nationalist societies, or writing books.¹¹⁴

While this criticism of the military government opened across a national arena, and helped to unify resistance, the constabulary struggled to maintain any semblance of control in many areas, especially in the cities. Snowden reported that as military governor he had "faithfully" tried to uphold the U.S. Navy Department's policy of building a military police force officered by Dominicans that could serve as a Dominican military upon the withdrawal of Marines. Many changes, he reported, had to that point been required in working to "obtain good and competent men for these positions." As of April, he reported that there were still U.S. civilians as permanent officers in the constabulary, though, that when it had been impossible to find natives to fill these positions, he had requested marine officers or medical navy officers to temporarily fill the positions.¹¹⁵ The explosion of resistances in May seem to have heightened the priority of recruiting Dominicans as officers to appease the population, and constabulary

¹¹² Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, 30; Garrido, *En la ruta*, 118; Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 161. For a summary of the boycott on property taxes, see: Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 106-107.

¹¹³ Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 161. Rufus Lane, as Secretary of Justice and Public Instruction, had loudly and frequently made this claim.

¹¹⁴ Some such books were published in Havana, but others seem to have only been circulated through the population; some are mentioned in constabulary reports, especially where they accuse constabulary and Marines of torture, and then are lost in history. See, for example, "Information" from P.M. Rixey, Jr. to Commanding General, USMC, 29 June, 1921, File "1921 9," Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

¹¹⁵ "Appointments of officers to the Guardia Nacional Dominicana," to the Chief of Naval Operations, 19 April, 1921, File 1921, Geographical Files "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

leaders throughout May focused on recruiting non-criminal Dominicans as officers.¹¹⁶ They focused too, on centralizing efforts to deal with resistance, sending Dominican officers to lead patrols and report any unusual activities back to their district commanders and the commanding officer of U.S. Marines at the nearest station.¹¹⁷ The constabulary continued to struggle, however, because trails were still washed out as late as April, those in the interior "almost impassable due to heavy rains and mud" and nothing was being done to improve the problem.¹¹⁸ Further, constabulary correspondence turned increasingly to the problem of propaganda by middle- and upper-class Dominicans against enlistment in the constabulary. The military government once tried to increase censorship in response, but this was short-lived when it only increased resistance and further harmed enlistment.¹¹⁹

In June of 1921, the Navy Department and State Department instituted major changes. They replaced military governor Snowden with Samuel Robison, who they believed would be more cooperative with the State Department, and appointed Presley M. Rixey Jr. commandant of the constabulary with the mandate to improve it in preparation for withdrawal.¹²⁰ For the resistance, this change did not have the effect of calming complaints or slowing unification. In a speech on 14 June, 1921, Robison proclaimed a withdrawal plan, the "Harding Plan," that brought what Henríquez y Carvajal called unanimous protest among the Dominican

¹¹⁶ General Order No. 19 (1921), 10 May, 1921, Box 3, File 15, "Ordenes Generales," year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹¹⁷ General Order No. 16 (1921), 2 May, 1921, Box 3, File 15, "Ordenes Generales," year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹¹⁸ 6th Company Weekly Intelligence Report, William B. Mitchell, 18 April, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹¹⁹ Legajo 2, "Ejército Nacional," AGN, especially correspondence dated: 26 June 1921, 6 July 1921, 13 August 1921, 25 August 1921.

¹²⁰ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 840. Rixey had served on the Brigade Staff in the Dominican Republic before taking this position.

population.¹²¹ Unilaterally created by U.S. officials, the plan demanded that an incoming Dominican government accept another loan of \$2,500,000 for the completion of public improvements begun under occupation, agree to ratify all actions of the military government, "agree to a further guaranty to protect the payment of the public debt in case the customs revenues are not sufficient" and to leave the constabulary under the command and organization of U.S. officers, who would form a military mission and receive compensation from the Dominican government. The military officials to lead this mission would be appointed by the new Dominican president, but "on designation or recommendation of the President of the United States."¹²² Robison, as military governor, was to convoke regional assemblies for the selection of electoral college delegates to vote for a congress, while he appointed a commission of Dominicans to negotiate a withdrawal agreement and worked with the electoral college to select a provisional president. U.S. military forces would remain to train the constabulary, with U.S. officers remaining in the constabulary's highest command ranks until training was complete.¹²³ The *Ecos del Valle* published an article of protest signed by a number of prominent Dominicans against the continuance of so much control in U.S. hands, stating that by the withdrawal plan Dominicans would be "abject and enslaved under the omnipotent power of the North American nation." The paper also reported the preparation of a "monstrous nationalist manifestation" of protest in the capital city.¹²⁴

¹²¹ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 57-58. In August, Henríquez y Carvajal expressed his concern to Senator Knowles that the withdrawal plan had to be modified before the Dominican people could accept it, stressing especially the need to guarantee that those promoted to officer positions in organization of the constabulary would have nothing to do with politics, and that politics would be not the least bit dependent on the U.S. military. Further, he argued that a withdrawal plan could not be accepted which left a military mission under U.S. officers in place. *Cartas del Presidente Henríquez y Carvajal*, 37-39.

¹²² *Ibid.*; Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 141; Grieb, "Warren G. Harding and the Dominican Republic," 428-429.

¹²³ Grieb, "Warren G. Harding and the Dominican Republic," 429.

¹²⁴ "Contra la Proclama del Jefe de la Ocupación," *Los Ecos del Valle*, 16 June, 1921, page 1.

New Alliances and Polarization

When the military government attempted to carry out elections under the proposed plan, nationalist groups and Dominican elites worked together to carry out an anti-election campaign. New Juntas Patrióticas were formed and others revived or strengthened. Dominicans in prominent civil government positions in Santo Domingo created the Anti-election League of Santo Domingo Province, circulating a petition drawn up by the Electoral Board of Abstention. The petition called for Dominicans not to take part in the elections, stating that:

the Antielection League of the Santo Domingo Province is composed of Dominican citizens who are determined not to submit to the criminal brute force being employed here by the United States of America . . . [who] commit murder, burn, and concentrate the poor peasants of entire regions, depriving them of their lands and water for the benefit of despicable Yankee corporations; they weigh the people down with burdensome taxes, squander and rob the public funds to the extent of bringing the country to bankruptcy, suppress public instruction throughout the land, and, lastly, commit all kinds of unjust abuses before the eyes of the world, which witnesses such acts in consternation; Whereas the United States of America is haunted by the incessant and increasing clamor of protest from Spain, Latin-America, and England, and, goaded by its insane desire to possess the treasures of the Dominican soil, as well as Dominican funds and police, on the 14th of June last it issued a proclamation in which it hypocritically expressed a desire to withdraw from Santo Domingo, and ordered the Dominican people to hold an election to the end that sovereignty might be placed in the hands of the United States..."¹²⁵

The military government dismissed all Dominican employees in their service who signed the petition from their positions, pushing them even more toward the growing opposition.¹²⁶ The armed resistance was on the same page: In the eastern provinces, guerrillas threatened the lives of anyone who went to polls in the planned elections.¹²⁷

Newspapers called for unification across regions, emphasizing the need for a truly national movement to rid the Dominican Republic of occupiers. They called out the occupation

¹²⁵ United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1121-1122.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1098-1100

¹²⁷ Report, P.M. Rixey, Jr., 29 June, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

administration for the suffering of the many unemployed throughout the country and encouraged Dominicans to unite, decrying any hints of partisanship.¹²⁸ One pointed out that some, guided either "by error or bad faith," continued the "criminal tendency" of taking actions that supported "the forces that oppress us." The author emphasized the need for Dominicans to take action against traitorous Dominicans, stating, "we have a popular expression that we can with an overwhelming certainty apply in this case, and that is "dirty rags are washed at home.""¹²⁹ One journalist wrote a tract that was published throughout many papers of the country stating that:

In these most psychological moments that threaten the Dominican people after winning a difficult civic battle against the hardened colossus of the United States, through passive resistance by not ceding any of their attributes as an absolutely free and sovereign nation, and absolutely independent, the most delicate and transcendental hour has come to pursue with self-sacrificing patriotism the torturous path laid out since foreign forces have been in our territory.¹³⁰

Such calls were picked up by more newspapers throughout 1921 and into 1922.¹³¹ An article in *El Cibao* recommended that Dominicans be on the alert, that after resistance leaders had threatened the "mercenaries and traitors" with vengeance at the hour of justice, "the liberty of a people ought not to be obtained through concessions nor by treaties of subordination."¹³²

In the East, prominent Dominicans even formed a group calling for national unification with the express purpose of recovering local autonomy, which they believed would return as soon as the U.S. forces had left the country.¹³³ The rise of such movements as this and the

¹²⁸ Editor Francisco X. Billini of the Baní newspaper *Ecos del Valle*, on 18 December, 1920, printed an editorial reminding readers that "the land of Quisqueya does not beget traitors," that Dominicans should serve the country, not the interests of the occupation. See also: Intelligence Report, 13 February, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹²⁹ See, for example, "Labor desquiciadora," *Ecos del Valle*, 18 August, 1921, page 2.

¹³⁰ "La Epopeya Inmortal," *Ecos del Valle*, 27 August, 1921, page 1.

¹³¹ Some of the newspapers who printed these calls most often were *La Bandera* through 1921, *La Información* (a traditionally anti-government newspaper), mid 1921-March 1922, *El Diario* and *El Cibao*, in early 1922, and *Ecos del Valle* from December, 1920 through mid 1922; more conservative papers such as the *Listín Diario* in Santo Domingo also printed calls for unity through 1921. Calls for unity often also included a warning against joining the constabulary.

¹³² M. Curiel R., "Alerta," *El Cibao*, 28 January, 1922.

¹³³ Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 17.

Antielection League in Santo Domingo are demonstrative of a growing right-wing anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism that in mid-1921 allied itself with diverse sectors of Dominican society to push their call for an absolute and immediate withdrawal. They worked, often through the press, in collaboration with intellectuals and politicians from the interior to demand withdrawal of U.S. troops on Dominican terms.¹³⁴ Nationalists, in turn, were able to use the continued economic problems and Robison's speech to widely recruit rural populations into the resistance. Now backed by Dominican elites and using new roads and improvements to send representatives to the countryside, they worked to convince peasants not to vote in any elections that were not called by a Dominican government. The movement of nationalist leaders through the countryside grew parallel to the consolidation of the constabulary, increasing as the constabulary became more efficient and working to counteract the potential power of the constabulary among peasants.¹³⁵ They were generally well received everywhere they went by mid- to late-1921.¹³⁶ In turn, constabulary and intelligence reports became increasingly focused on the movement of politicians and nationalists through the provinces, and the noted that areas through which prominent nationalists passed were directly thereafter connected with new and different types of resistance.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Reports emphasize concern about the wide circulation of the "violently anti-American" book written by Professor Henríquez Ureña in June of 1921. Intelligence Report from P.M. Rixey, 8 June, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN. Max Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos y La Republica Dominicana: La verdad de los hechos comprobada por datos y documentos oficiales*, (Habana: Teniente Rey, 1919).

¹³⁵ Company Weekly reports and memos to Colonel Commander through 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Report from San Francisco de Macorís and Moca, 30 September, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN, about many meeting to send representatives to meetings in Santiago to consolidate resistance.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*; Garrido, *En la ruta*, 122-123; "Convención Nacional," *Ecos del Valle*, 29 September, 1921, page 2.

¹³⁷ Company Weekly reports and memos to Colonel Commander through 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

These representatives spread extensive rumors that the U.S. forces would be withdrawing very soon, so as to convince them that elections could wait.¹³⁸ While in January of 1921 Dominicans in the countryside were reported to have largely given up hope of U.S. withdrawal happening any time in the next four years, by the middle of the year the nationalist campaign had convinced many that withdrawal could occur at any time.¹³⁹ At first, the constabulary reported that rural people reported great interest in elections and voting even while all other segments of the population outside the constabulary were increasingly hostile.¹⁴⁰ As the nationalist recruitment campaign picked up through the countryside, however, peasants throughout regions became less cooperative with the constabulary and occupation forces, and began to demonstrate against the occupation and join in calls for withdrawal, reiterating the statements made by nationalist speakers.¹⁴¹ Constabulary second lieutenant Bruno Zapata reported in August that groups representing the nationalist resistance left Dajabón "almost daily to the countryside to introduce in the souls of the *campesinos* the idea that should not agree to any elections unless they were called by a Dominican government."¹⁴² Politicians and other resistance leaders also used the Anti-election League's propaganda in their speeches to demonstrate the weakening of

¹³⁸ Weekly constabulary reports from all companies, July and August, Box 3, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Weekly Intelligence Reports, August to December, 1920, File 4, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; 6th Co. Weekly Intelligence Report, 18 April, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; "Reports from SEIBO," 13 August, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN; Letter from Chief of Staff C.J. Miller, 30 November, 1921, Box 26, File 1922, "Gobierno Militar Americano," AGN1.

¹³⁹ 10th Co. Report, 10 January, 1921, Box 3, Year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; May and June intelligence reports, Company intelligence summaries 1921-1922, "Correspondencia," File 8, 1922, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, reports from San Pedro de Macorís for July, 1921, Box 3, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Intelligence Report from P.M. Rixey, 9 June, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

¹⁴¹ Agents' Reports, February 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹⁴² 4th Co. Report, 6 August, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

the military government.¹⁴³ By mid-year, constabulary reports in all provinces complained that even the peasants were now blaming the United States for all economic problems, and claiming that all Public Works projects would be halted; the reports demonstrated special concern that these rumors passed back and forth between people in both city and countryside, and concluded that "the people as a whole, are against the military government."¹⁴⁴ Other Dominicans, such as those who worked in the occupation-run Public Works Department, also joined in protest and began to work with nationalist leaders in spreading propaganda against the occupation.¹⁴⁵

Around all of these protests, in light of expectations to begin the proposed withdrawal, the constabulary underwent major changes toward centralization and continued hope of de-politicization. The State Department charged Robison with improving U.S.-Dominican and military-civil relations and thereby gaining cooperation for withdrawal plans that would be agreeable both to the United States and Dominican nationalists. One of Rixey's first actions under command of Military Governor Robison was to change the constabulary's official name from Guardia Nacional Dominicana to Policía Nacional Dominicana. The change was intended to emphasize the organization's police functions. Rixey hoped that, despite the clearly military function of the force, this change would emphasize de-politicization and improve the constabulary's reputation by distinguishing it from politically involved pre-occupation militaries

¹⁴³ Report from San Pedro de Macorís, July, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁴⁴ 4th Co. Weekly Memo to Colonel Commander, 16 May, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. While in late 1920 constabulary leaders were placing all blame for disaffection of peasants on the press, by mid-1921 they clearly recognized the implications of the nationalist campaign's frequent and extensive movement through the countryside. 6th Co. Intelligence Report, December 1920, Box 1, File "1920 8," Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

¹⁴⁵ 3rd Co. Weekly Memo to Colonel Commander, 25 July, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. See also: Ortega Frier, *Memorandum relativo a la intervención*, 8.

such as the Guardia Republicana.¹⁴⁶ Dominicans, however, widely lambasted the revisions and drew attention to the continued low social status of the officers and recruits, calling it by names such as Pobres Negritos Dominicanos and Pobres Negros Descalzos.¹⁴⁷ Other reforms at the time did not do more to improve the constabulary's reputation, and resistance leaders spread rumors that popular nationalist Dominicans would soon take command of the constabulary and stop the abuses. Rixey reported, in a summary of such reports, that many were looking forward to natives "holding important posts" in the constabulary, continuing their objections of the command of the Dominican military by U.S. officers.¹⁴⁸ A group calling itself the Association of Young People of Macorís held a parade that culminated in a speech in which Licenciado Jafet de Hernández stated that the constabulary was "no more than a menace to the inhabitants of the country as long as it is officered by Americans."¹⁴⁹

The constabulary reforms of the second half of 1921 did, however, rapidly improve its centralized command and general military efficiency, and its leaders often settled into acceptance of simply having more efficient military control over the country. The large new loan of June paid for the re-opening of the schools, but otherwise went to a renewal of road building and constabulary improvement. The constabulary improved mail service, bridges, and roads rapidly

¹⁴⁶ General Order No. 27 (1921), 8 June, 1921 and General Order No. 30 (1921), 13 June, 1921, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Lane, "Civil Government," 136; Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 48-52; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 48.

¹⁴⁷ Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 16; Interview with Mimicito Ramírez, cited in: Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 97. Emphasizing the disdain among many in the upper class for the lower classes, who tended to be darker, and who many saw as inferior. For an explanation of the Dominican racial system, see: Ernesto Sagás, *Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic*, (University of Florida Press, 2000). Military Governor Robison stated that he was also given "unofficial instructions to 'lighten' the Guardia a little," Calder says "presumably to accommodate Dominican color prejudice against the organization." Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 59.

¹⁴⁸ Memo from Colonel Commandant P.M. Rixey Jr., 9 June, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

¹⁴⁹ "Information" from Colonel Commandant P.M. Rixey Jr., to Commanding General USMC, 6 July, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN. The protest and speech were dated 26 June, 1921.

through July and August.¹⁵⁰ Rixey quickly developed detailed plans for the force, increasing mobility. He gave the two larger units sufficient truck transportation to be able to move quickly from their bases to areas in which they were needed, and proposed the creation of a network of strategically placed combat outposts to provide early warning of armed resistance.¹⁵¹ Reforms in the constabulary tried to encourage friendlier military-civilian relations, including an extensive indoctrination program for Marines and constabulary members in the best ways to deal on friendly terms with the civilian population. Commandant Rixey also ordered newspapers to publish a notice about the constabulary that responded to the criticisms of the resistance. The notice reminded the population that the constabulary was organized with the objective of taking over for the forces of occupation, that it was a force necessary to maintain peace and that the sooner it could take control the sooner the occupation could end and leave the Dominican Republic in peace.¹⁵² These efforts were much less successful, however, than those centralizing military power, largely because of the effectiveness and extent of the nationalist campaign.¹⁵³ Despite the fact that constabulary enlisted pay was increased to seventeen dollars a month (parallel with a Marine enlistee pay increase of the same amount), a higher pay supported by loans from the United States, numbers continued to be much lower than authorized strength. In late 1921, the actual strength of the organization--including its many marine officers and navy medical officers, remained between 569 and 577, less than half of the authorized number.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ Weekly Memos to Colonel Commander, July, 1921, Box 3, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁵¹ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 48-49.

¹⁵² See: "Sobre Policía Nacional," *Ecos del Valle*, 1 September, 1921, page 1.

¹⁵³ See Fellowes, "Training of Native Troops"; Fuller, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 49.

¹⁵⁴ General Order 47 (1921), 30 September, Box 3, File 15, "Ordenes Generales," 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN; Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Secretary of the Navy, 19 November, 1921, "Material Accomplishments in the Dominican Republic under Military Government, File 1921, Geographical Files, "Dom Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

Rixey also tried to carry out reforms that would bring rural guards (*guardacampestres*) and municipal police into cooperation with the constabulary forces, but met continued resistance on both fronts. *Guardacampestres*, who were to be accountable to the constabulary for their appointments as of November 1920, continuously refused to cooperate.¹⁵⁵ In August of 1921, when the resistance was building and uniting through the country, the constabulary began collecting many *guardacampestres'* arms, submitting many to courts martial for refusal to comply with constabulary orders.¹⁵⁶ Civil governor of Santo Domingo Province Juan Francisco Sánchez, however, ordered that owners and administrators of property had the right to appoint rural guards to defend their crops, and that the constabulary was not to intervene in such appointments, thus openly working against the military government and constabulary to maintain Dominican traditions of local autonomy.¹⁵⁷ The military government was caught between this insistence of Dominican leaders on local decision-making and the growing concern of constabulary leaders, who worried about the damage that such continued appointments would cause to military consolidation in the constabulary.¹⁵⁸ Municipal police authorized by the military government in some cities also refused to cooperate with military government orders, such as by protecting prostitutes from arrest throughout the country.¹⁵⁹ In response, constabulary commanders arrested prostitutes instead, and had men working in civilian clothing at night to

¹⁵⁵ General Order No. 36, 13 November, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁵⁶ "Information from Constabulary Colonel Commandant P.M. Rixey Jr. to Commanding General USMC," 8 August, 1921, Folder "1921 9," Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁵⁷ Copied in: "Memorandum," 25 August, 1921, Box 119, "Gobierno Militar Americano 1917-1924 , varios sin clasificación," "Gobierno Militar Americano," AGN1.

¹⁵⁸ The struggle continued until withdrawal plans were in place and the constabulary commandant wrote to Military Governor Robison in August of 1922 to change Executive Order 527, making *guardacampestres* more controlled by the constabulary. Box 106 (1916-1924), "Gobierno Militar Americano," AGN1.

¹⁵⁹ Intelligence report from constabulary commandant P.M. Rixey, 8 June, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

arrest men for petty robbery, etc.¹⁶⁰ Over time, such actions increased the urban power of the constabulary while complicating planned reforms to keep the force from intervening in civil affairs. In San Juan, the constabulary even disarmed municipal police due to suspicions that they collaborated with Haitians in an attack on constabulary barracks.¹⁶¹ Military consolidation continued to be paralleled by growing unification of resistance. Planters in the East responded from late 1920 with a traditional regional response: When the constabulary could not stop attacks on agricultural lands, large landowners there ceased reporting guerrilla activity to constabulary authorities and worked out a traditional agreement for "protection," provisioning guerrilla units twice a month.¹⁶² Nationalists, in response to the amount of funding being funneled toward the constabulary, simply renewed and magnified their protests against U.S. loans and any who enlisted in the constabulary.

By mid-1921, the polarization between a widely comprehensive resistance, on one side, and the military government and constabulary, on the other, was conclusive. The economic problems through the year augmented the polarization when some joined the constabulary and many more joined the stronger and more united movement to end the occupation immediately and unconditionally. Those joining the constabulary were in the clear minority, and those collaborating with the occupation forces were increasingly ostracized by broader society, forced to depend on the protection of marines and constabulary forces. The resistance, by the middle of 1921, comprised elements from all sectors of Dominican society demonstrating a remarkable unity against the constabulary and occupation. They broadened their campaign by the month, continuing the international work of publicizing their cause while gathering support through the

¹⁶⁰ 3rd Co. Weekly Memo to Colonel Commander PND, 22 August, 1921, Box 3, File 12, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁶¹ Weekly Memo to Colonel Commander, PND, 4th Co., 2 August, 1921, Box 3, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁶² Crassweller, *Trujillo*, 61.

country, often very creatively. For example, they adopted the use of baseball. Occupation forces had worked in previous years to build solidarity through the popular spread of baseball, funding and encouraging inter-regional games, but in July, 1921 had to cut funding for baseball due to the poor economy.¹⁶³ One constabulary officer in the north warned the commandant in August of 1921 that the Junta Nacionalista was holding baseball games to raise funds in protest of the occupation and to increase popular support for their cause.¹⁶⁴

In addition to those like Rafael Isaac Pau who signed the anti-election petition and were removed from their posts, and thus pushed toward the resistance, many notable previous collaborators moved into the resistance as it united from late 1920 through 1921. Notably, some of the most widely reported protestors who were in previous collaboration with the military government included former constabulary second lieutenants and patrol leaders. The most notable of these was former second lieutenant Alejandro Kunhardt, who had been entrusted as a patrol leader in Puerto Plata Province through 1920, and who joined his brother César and father Eugenio in leading parades and speeches against the occupation toward the end of 1920.¹⁶⁵ Kunhardt became one of the most visible leaders of the growing labor movement in 1921, and was instrumental in bringing the labor movement to national attention and unifying it with various nationalist resistance groups. The Kunhardts led parades and gave speeches against the occupation, criticizing the constabulary and gaining a great deal of followers as they moved through the interior. Such followers included civil officials.¹⁶⁶ They called for the end of U.S.

¹⁶³ "Circular #5," 7 July, 1921, "Ejército Nacional," File 2, AGN1.

¹⁶⁴ "Memo for the Commandant," 21 August, 1921, File 3, 1921, AGN1.

¹⁶⁵ 8th Company Patrol Reports, November 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁶⁶ 6th Co. second lieutenant William B. Mitchell reported from San Francisco de Macorís, for example, that when Alejandro Kunhardt gave a speech and then left to speak in La Vega at the end of March, "Chief Sanitary Officer Sr. García Jimenez seemed most interested in him and left the city with him. 6th Co. Weekly Intelligence Reports, 28 March, 1921 and 31 March, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

dominance, which they argued was responsible for the wide unemployment and the deplorable state of labor in the country.¹⁶⁷ Alejandro Kunhardt often spoke more about the occupation and constabulary than he did about labor. He tied the two together by arguing that the occupation was responsible for deplorable economic conditions, stating that "no power or government in the world had the power to force themselves and developed the unwarranted conditions" such as those present in the Dominican Republic.¹⁶⁸ Constabulary intelligence reports demonstrate both disdain for his message and astonishment at the extent of support Kunhardt enjoyed, one Marine officer stating that "not even the better class of Dominicans here realized that this man is not sincere in what he is advocating."¹⁶⁹ Emboldened by support, the Kunhardts attempted to assassinate the Civil Governor of Puerto Plata Province for his cooperation with the military government.¹⁷⁰ They planned attacks on constabulary barracks, and fired on constabulary members.¹⁷¹ After these actions, Alejandro Kunhardt's following only grew, more people in the north and interior publicly supporting him and parading with Dominican flags after his speeches.¹⁷² Another previous second lieutenant who had served in the constabulary was none other than Francisco X. Billini, the rabidly anti-occupation and anti-constabulary director of the newspaper *Ecos del Valle*.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁷ 6th Company Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1921, Box 3, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁶⁸ 6th Co. Weekly Intelligence Report, 28 March, 1921 Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. Kunhardt was always more a nationalist than a labor leader. He left the Labor Congress in February of 1922 when the Federation of Labor of Santiago resolved to change its flag from the Dominican national flag to a red flag with two black hands clasped in the center. Reported in: *El Diario*, 15 February, 1922.

¹⁶⁹ 6th Co. Weekly Intelligence Report, 31 March, 1921 Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁷⁰ 8th Co. Weekly Intelligence Report, 26 March, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁷¹ 8th Co. Weekly Intelligence Reports, 26 March and 23 April, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁷² "Information" from P.M. Rixey Jr. to Commanding General USMC, 29 June, 1921, File "1921 9," Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

¹⁷³ Anti-U.S. newspaper *El Cibao* was also edited by an ex-constabulary member.

Despite claims to the contrary in the contemporary and current literature, the extent and unification of resistance by 1920 and 1921 also created new and unexpected alliances between different resistance groups. While the historiography discusses the general growth of the nationalist campaign as it exploded outward from the Cibao, for example, it continues to hold that armed resistance was separate and isolated. Franks argues that "as their conflict with the Marines wore on, gavilleros [guerrillas] lost their capacity to articulate a compelling political position. While some continued to announce themselves as "The Revolution," many others hid their identity and took the name of certain Marine officers, or represented themselves as members of the Policia Nacional [constabulary]." ¹⁷⁴ Constabulary reports made the same claim. Yet the argument could just as well be made that they found it *easier* to articulate a compelling political vision in 1921. While earlier armed resistance leaders like Vicentico had tended toward brutality and robbery, the guerrilla leaders of 1921 articulated their political position clearly through abduction of mail, returning mail carriers unharmed to cities with written versions of their political program--a call for absolute sovereignty. ¹⁷⁵ Some even established schools in their districts of operation, and forced storekeepers to sell at low prices during the economic crisis. ¹⁷⁶

In addition to the fact that armed and nationalist resistances inadvertently worked together to end the occupation and harass the constabulary, numerous patrol reports show that despite a lack of public unity, the two often directly united after 1920. Though they publicly continued to distance themselves from armed resistance, many nationalist leaders and civil officials were aiding guerrillas by 1921 by withholding information on their whereabouts or

¹⁷⁴ Franks, "Transforming Property," 210.

¹⁷⁵ Ducoudray, *Los Gavilleros del Este*, 57-60.

¹⁷⁶ Ducoudray Jr., "Una Epopeya Ignorada," 40; Reports from Seibo, P.M. Rixey, 13 August, 1921, Correspondencia 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

actively by supplying them or helping them obtain or hide arms.¹⁷⁷ Many farmers in the interior provided arms and supplies or helped guerrilla leaders hide.¹⁷⁸ Constabulary forces reported that this aid came only from poor and desperate farmers, but some of them, such as Tilo and Luis Germán, were wealthy and had a great deal to lose.¹⁷⁹ Though the military governor reported that the increase in "bandit activity" was tied to the eastern provinces, greater numbers were actively joining in armed resistance not only in the war-torn eastern provinces, but throughout all provinces with the possible exception of Samaná by 1921.¹⁸⁰ Many had no previous criminal records. Growing numbers of middle class merchants and farmers in various regions were reported to be giving direct aid to the armed resistance and were kept under close surveillance by the constabulary, and civil officials were more and more often submitted to justice for aiding armed resistance.¹⁸¹ Even the exclusive social clubs of the elite were implicated in aiding armed resistance.¹⁸² This type of support may go a long way in explaining the "increasing boldness" of armed resistance movements through 1921 that so baffled the constabulary.¹⁸³

Intelligence reports by Dominican constabulary officers recorded increasing numbers of new alliances and coalitions against occupation among different resisting populations and groups

¹⁷⁷ Patrol reports. Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1920-1921, and Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1921-1922, Headquarters, Departamento del Norte, "Guardia Nacional" file, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908.

¹⁷⁸ 4th Co. Report, 11 September, 1920, File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁷⁹ 3rd Weekly Memo to Colonel Commander, 24 September, 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. This report contradicts the constabulary's official line about such supporters, acknowledging that the brothers were "rich farmers."

¹⁸⁰ Quarterly Report of the Military Governor of Santo Domingo from the months of July, August and September of 1921, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," 1921, USMC Historical Division, Quantico; constabulary weekly reports, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁸¹ Informational reports from P.M. Rixey to Commanding General USMC, 21 May 1921, 14 June, 1921, and 23 June, 1921, Folder 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN; 3rd Company Weekly Memo to Colonel Commander, 24 September, 1921, Box 3, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁸² Report, 30 September, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

¹⁸³ Informes, File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Quarterly Report of the Military Governor of Santo Domingo from the months of July, August and September of 1921, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," 1921, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

through 1920 and 1921. For example, as early as May of 1920 Dajabón merchants used the illicit cross-border trade to smuggle in gunpowder for a prominent resistance leader in Santiago.¹⁸⁴ Parties of Haitian and Dominican anti-occupation groups also met frequently along the border from June of 1920, and in Monte Cristi repeated arsons against storekeepers were said to have been set because the owners would not contribute funds to the Junta Nacionalista campaign.¹⁸⁵ Demonstrating a growing acceptance of armed struggle against the occupation, many who had not been involved in guerrilla warfare began plans for armed revolution from 1920 to early 1922, stockpiling arms and making plans.¹⁸⁶ The entire constabulary in the Northern Department was reorganized and dispatched to new posts in September of 1920 due to increasingly strong reports and evidence of a large, united armed resistance movement that was gathering arms and planning to march inland from the north coast to overcome the constabulary and overthrow the military government.¹⁸⁷ There also existed a growing number of men who regularly crossed the border as go-betweens for Haitian and Dominican revolutionaries and also met with "prominent Dominican officials: in Santo Domingo. When the constabulary caught up with one such man, who was Cuban and was thereafter deported to Cuba, they found "revolutionary papers implicating some high Dominican officials, the Clergy and some Haitian officials."¹⁸⁸ Evidence throughout constabulary reports also points to the likelihood of increased

¹⁸⁴ 4th Company Report, 1 May, 1920, "Informes," File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁸⁵ 4th Company Report, 25 June, 1920, "Informes," File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁸⁶ Memo from constabulary Major Joseph M. Feeley to Director, Dept. of the North, 1 January, 1921, Box 1, File "1920, 4," Ejército Nacional, AGN. Plans for a revolution began in the interior and northern provinces, but were also reported in both the Dept. of the South, emanating from San Pedro de Macorís, by early 1922. 3rd Co. Report, based on word from the Civil Governor of La Vega, 19 January, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹⁸⁷ Department Special Order No. 196 (1920), 11 September, 1920, Department of the North, "Special Orders," File 5, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁸⁸ Report from F.A. Ramsey, 31 May, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN. The clergy is implicated in aiding resistance elsewhere, too, and local priests gave speeches in

sabotage by elements of the growing nationalist resistance, such as the beginning of a rumor near the Haitian border that stated that the marines were going to turn over part of Haiti to the Dominican Republic; constabulary officers along the border believed that the rumor was intentionally started to frighten Haitians and stop all work and planting along the border.¹⁸⁹ Other reports of apparent sabotage against the constabulary, are common in reports through 1921, especially after the events of June. For example, when the constabulary band gave a concert at Parque Independencia, the lights suddenly went out and the concert had to be stopped, but the municipal band's concert at Parque Colón the same night had no trouble at all.¹⁹⁰

Due to polarization and the strength and unity of resistance, 1921 was a dangerous and uncomfortable year to be working for the military government, and especially to be officering a constabulary unit. The resistance actively recruited among the constabulary even as its leaders worked to consolidate, centralize, and empower it. Many within the constabulary responded to the tension by remaining in the constabulary but also working for the resistance, whether by helping resisters gain supplies or by feeding information about the constabulary to guerrillas.¹⁹¹ While some middle class men joined the constabulary during mid-1921 out of apparent financial need, the difficulties, dangers, and discrimination that constabulary members and officers faced caused some to rethink their positions, and many others left it or sought to.¹⁹² Among those considering leaving the constabulary in 1921 was Rafael Trujillo, who expressed in private

resistance in mid-1921. See especially: Report from San Pedro de Macorís, July 1921, Box 3, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁸⁹ 4th Company Report, 11 September, 1920, "Informes," File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁹⁰ Report from P.M. Rixey, 5 June, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

¹⁹¹ Inspector Sheard, "Confidential, Intelligence Information," 14 September, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN.

¹⁹² Petitions to enlist in Puerto Plata in April of 1921 included five Dominicans, all of middle-class backgrounds and in professions that had suffered greatly during the financial crisis. Summary of letters, File 7, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

correspondence that he felt the constabulary was going nowhere and was under a constant state of siege, and that he might try to get a different job with the Marines rather than remain an officer in the constabulary.¹⁹³ Many who rendered service to the constabulary or the occupation government during 1920 and 1921 were attacked, and some killed.¹⁹⁴ General harassment of those wearing the constabulary uniform was common throughout the provinces. In Puerto Plata in June of 1921, one constabulary member was at his station when two Dominicans walked up to him and asked why he continued to wear the uniform; they offered him some money to buy civilian clothes and go with them.¹⁹⁵ Even as early as December of 1920, on his way home after a leave of absence, constabulary second lieutenant César Lora was accosted by a group of men shouting "here comes an American!" He ignored the group until they shouted "throw out the Americans," and began to throw stones at him, at which point he fired on them and they fled.¹⁹⁶ Rumors in the cities greatly exaggerated the pay that constabulary members were receiving under occupation forces, and some merchants refused to cash constabulary checks.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Quoted in: Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 15-16. In March, 1921, Trujillo wrote "I am tired of the Guardia and its great inconveniences. . . My wish is to keep an eye out for something else that can allow me to quit. . . Do you think it would be possible to get a job in the Marine Intelligence?"

¹⁹⁴ See, for example, "Report of killing of one, Bolito," in which O.T. Pfeiffer reported an attack by three armed Dominicans on the home of Patricio Sánchez in Guayabo Dulce. Sánchez had "rendered valuable service as a guide to the Marines formerly stationed there. File, 1920, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Report of Inspector Sheard, 9 August, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; local officials in the interior were afraid even to speak with the constabulary leaders and U.S. forces in January of 1921, as if they were seen doing so they were called traitors by the local population. 3rd Company Patrol Report, 8 January, 1921, Box 3, year 1921, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. Sergeant Luis Peralta of the 10th Company in Moca was stabbed to death when he attempted to make an arrest on a routine patrol between Moca and Salcedo on 24 September, 1921. Report from acting commandant C.C. Riner, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

¹⁹⁵ Report from P.M. Rixey, 29 June, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

¹⁹⁶ 6th Company Report, A.M. Norris Jr., 26 Dec. 1920, "Informes," File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. See also: Report from P.M. Rixey, 2 June, 1921 File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN, in which Rixey reports an attack on constabulary officers at one of their residences outside Santo Domingo City.

¹⁹⁷ Report from P.M. Rixey, 2 June, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN. Surprisingly, this exaggeration of constabulary pay worked against the constabulary. It increased anger by many suffering poor economic conditions and cuts in salaries, but did not lead to any increased enlistments.

Many constabulary members and officers in mid-1921 came to their superior officers in the constabulary with fears that, upon withdrawal, they would be thrown out of the military for having worked under U.S. officers.¹⁹⁸ Others were increasingly concerned that if a Dominican were made commandant of the constabulary that those who had served the longest under American officers would be discriminated against, and rumors spread widely that those Dominicans would be lucky if they only lost their jobs, and that many were likely to be killed.¹⁹⁹ Rixey reported that "the term 'chulas' has been applied freely to those who have been in the service of Americans, particularly the Guardia Nacional."²⁰⁰ One Marine constabulary officer, Harry Hurst, received three death threats between June and July of 1921.²⁰¹ Constabulary leadership responded to many such threats and fears by putting arms in the hands of Americans and others they believed they could trust.²⁰²

Conclusion

The speed with which the resistance movements united baffled military government officials and constabulary officers--even the Dominican officers--who had never seen all regions of their country united behind any one cause. It pulled even a tenuous and partial control of the country out of the grasp of the constabulary at the same time that the force gained more funding

¹⁹⁸ "Information" from PND Colonel Commandant P.M. Rixey Jr. to Commanding General USMC, 23 June, 1921, Box 2, Folder "1921, 9," Ejército Nacional, AGN; 4th Company Weekly Intelligence Report, 26 February, 1921, Box 3, Folder 18, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

¹⁹⁹ "Information" from PND Colonel Commandant P.M. Rixey Jr. to Commanding General USMC, 9 June, 1921, Box 2, Folder "1921, 9," Ejército Nacional, AGN.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰¹ 4th Company report, 23 July, 1921, Box 3, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. Hurst was the commanding officer of the Monte Cristi constabulary company.

²⁰² "Information" from PND Colonel Commandant P.M. Rixey Jr. to Commanding General USMC, 29 June, 1921, Box 2, Folder "1921, 9," Ejército Nacional, AGN; Intelligence Report for week ending 23 April, 1921, 8th Co., Box 3, 1921, File "1921 18," Ejército Nacional, AGN.

and supplies, and was therefore able to recruit an increasing number of financially struggling citizens. The result was, in 1920-1922, a drastic polarization of society between the military and the majority of Dominican society. Combined with economic problems and negative international attention, etc., this had the effect of forcing U.S. authorities to compromise and initiate steps toward rapid withdrawal. It also forced them to shore up the widely disliked and disrespected constabulary. As military men, those administering the occupation put their faith in a military solution for safeguarding rapid withdrawal and saving their own reputations and that of their government. A de-politicized and highly mobile Dominican military that had the training to halt insurgency must be the answer for maintaining calm upon the removal of U.S. forces that had policed the island since 1916.

The nationalist insistence on unconditional withdrawal juxtaposed with the Marine and constabulary insistence on further military training brought about a compromise solution, one that would allow the United States to save face while ultimately driving the country toward a long military dictatorship. The question that historians must ask, and the same question that both Dominican and marine constabulary officers were asking by late 1921 and early 1922, was how such an intensely hated and disrespected military could come to control such a resistant--and now widely unifying--population. Unification of the population across regions and classes in support of U.S. withdrawal meant that the constabulary continued to be attacked as an element of the U.S. presence. By late 1921 and early 1922, despite nearly two years of constabulary efforts to improve the military's reputation, the attacks were increasing rather than decreasing, and more and more of the population was taking part in the anti-constabulary aspect of the growing military-civilian polarization. Official disarmament and the building of infrastructure were by this time clearly an insufficient solution, however, and had even done their part in aiding the

unification of resistance. Occupation officials recognized this issue by 1922, and sought to augment forceful military control with some more complete solution.

Chapter SEVEN

Products of Compromise: Legitimizing State and Military, 1922-1924

In late 1921, the alliance of groups demanding unconditional withdrawal of U.S. troops and an immediate return of Dominican sovereignty was strong, and growing with a momentum that seemed destined to push U.S. troops out. The U.S.-created constabulary was weak, untrained, under-equipped, and hated--a symbol of treason among Dominicans. One year later, in late 1922, a provisional Dominican government had taken the place of the military government, the resistance was effectively broken, and the constabulary--though still small--was larger, more efficient, better supplied, and widely accepted, even if only as a necessary evil. By the time of complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in mid- to late-1924, the constabulary was a fixture of Dominican society, not widely respected, but supported by the constitutionally elected Dominican government. The strong show of united Dominican resistance to occupation in 1920-1921 empowered Dominican politicians to demand withdrawal. As popular opinion in the United States geared up and publicized protests against both the occupation and its costs to the United States, the State Department decided that U.S. forces were fighting a losing war. State Department representatives butted heads again with the Navy Department, which under successive military governors insisted that with just enough funds and time they could improve the constabulary and thereby quell resistance.

The events of 1921, though, had belied the idea that a strong military force alone could end resistance and bring order. Through 1921, it became clear to occupation forces that the united nationalist resistance now included wide sections of the peasantry, the clergy, intellectuals, politicians and lawyers, many urban middle-class merchants, guerrilla forces, and

even large landowners, who had long become disillusioned with occupation forces' inability to end guerrilla warfare in the East and with the general disruption in the country's economy. Resisting groups were working together, sometimes in collaboration with Haitian resisters, while the hated constabulary came under increasingly public, and sometimes violent, attack. The Harding administration's early attempts to impose a unilateral withdrawal plan brought such increased resistance that the focus shifted, in 1922, to a compromise withdrawal. Many on the Dominican side, led by ardent nationalist *de jure* president Henríquez y Carvajal, were unwilling to accept any compromise, but the leaders of the strongest Dominican political parties, who had supported the united resistance, gradually began to talk with U.S. representatives in 1922 to negotiate a compromise. Prominent lawyer Francisco J. Peynado worked secretly with U.S. representatives to negotiate a withdrawal that would be acceptable to the Dominican people, and he and other party leaders signed an agreement before its details were made public.

I argue that the compromise withdrawal itself is what made the constabulary a tenable force. First, the combination of another U.S. loan and the subsequent signing of the Hughes-Peynado Plan effectively broke the resistance. The withdrawal agreement marked the first time that Dominicans had officially signed any agreement with occupying forces. Once the plan was in place, there was little that nationalists could do, and no justification for guerrilla warfare that would disrupt a provisional Dominican government. Furthermore, the gradualness of the withdrawal plan gave U.S. forces two years to train and improve the constabulary and to find ways to increase its legitimacy and its physical presence. Political action and division among Dominicans led to a shifting of concerns and of blame: Those compromising blamed nationalists for complicating imminent withdrawal, while nationalists blamed party leaders for compromising the nationalist movement. Through a long two years, while these arguments and

preparations for an eventual presidential election divided Dominican politics, the constabulary worked actively to present itself as apolitical while still under two years of marine protection.

The constabulary was still a hated institution. Its officers were not respected and it did not enjoy the support of any significant sectors of the Dominican population in any region. The task of working to make it viable was a daunting one, made urgent by the need to withdraw all U.S. forces from the country in 1924. The historiography has skimmed over the development of the constabulary in this period, pointing out only that occupation disarmament and training and improvement of infrastructure gave the constabulary a great deal of power.¹ With the wide public disdain for the constabulary and occupation institutions, however, this explanation is insufficient for understanding the growth of constabulary power during the 1920s. The relative power of the resistance over the constabulary and the absolute lack of respect for constabulary members in 1921 prove that disarmament and improved military efficiency were not enough to make the constabulary a tenable force for maintaining order. A close examination of the record demonstrates that changes during the years 1922-1925 were instrumental in making the new military viable. Compromise that led to gradual withdrawal had three vital effects on the course of constabulary history: First, it gave marines two years in which to train and shore up the new military with no attention to anything else, because a Dominican provisional government took

¹ This aspect of the constabulary's rise to military power throughout the country is important and widely accepted, though it has been put forth with the post-occupation return of caudillo politics as the only real reason for the constabulary's later power. The standing argument maintains that the power of the constabulary in Dominican society came from the creation of a powerful and unified military force alongside the removal of any effective counterforce by disarming of the Dominican population. Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 336-337; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 61; Bosch, *Causas de una tiranía*, 144; Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*, 80. Crassweller, in his important biography of Trujillo, states simply that the withdrawal of Marines was bound to make the constabulary a more important and prestigious force. Crassweller, *Trujillo*, 49. Valentina Peguero also stresses the importance of the military in Dominican society from independence, but her claim that tradition made the new military the natural conveyor of culture is problematic and incomplete because the constabulary was in 1922-1924 by no means seen as either a legitimate or a traditional Dominican armed force. Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*. Luís F. Mejía deals only with the strengthening of the constabulary after 1924. Mejía, *De Lilís a Trujillo*, 210, 215-218. Bernardo Vega provides a vital addition to the history by tracing Trujillo's individual friendships with Marines, but in so doing also contributes to the explanation of the constabulary's power *after* 1924, and especially after Trujillo takes office in 1930. *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*.

over the administration of government; it gave them time to work on military-civil relations under the umbrella of a domestic, Dominican government, thereby lending further legitimacy to the military and allowing the population to come to gradual acceptance over time. Second, although a large portion of the Dominican population supported only unconditional U.S. withdrawal, the signing of a compromise agreement effectively broke resistance. Further armed resistance would only cause the potential for further U.S. intervention, especially with the marines still in the country. Third, the extension of withdrawal for a period of two years left ample time for politics and historical revision. This chapter traces the ways that politics widened the gap in the national unity of previous years, which had after all only been a loose alliance based on trying to push the United States out. National unity was silenced over the course of the long withdrawal period, and those national party leaders who had signed the agreement were pitted against those who had hoped to see extensive change in society.

The sheer length of time under which Dominican politicians or nationalists were still fettered by the presence and threat of marines and possible further intervention gave time for many things to occur: the economy improved while the U.S. forces were still on the ground in the country, histories were revised, tempers cooled and political attention was re-directed toward the concerns of a post-occupation Dominican Republic. During the withdrawal period, those who were in the political pilot's seat because of their 1922 agreement with the U.S. government were interested in mild change, and therefore enjoyed the support of elites, whose power in society would have been under further threat from an overhaul of the Dominican system. Those who were militarily in the pilot's seat--the marines and the constabulary--sought change based on building and maintaining a powerful, popular, and apolitical armed force. The result of these developments was a withdrawal period that brought gradual abandonment of governmental and

political centralization alongside a growth of military centralization. The constabulary, built and protected by marines who believed that the military could effectively change Dominican society, gained in power through the period. Institutions and trends that congealed during these years also facilitated the constabulary's course toward legitimacy and power.

From Resistance to Compromise

In 1921, as the Dominican economy continued in rapid decline and a nationally uniting Dominican population stood firm against the occupation, Warren Harding's June proposition for withdrawal sparked an outcry that solidified resistance. Harding's plan called for a Dominican government ratification of all military government laws, approval of another U.S. loan, U.S. supervision of 1922 elections, and continued U.S. troop officer-ship of the constabulary through marine "military missions" to be approved by the new Dominican president. The proposed military missions were to remain in the country after withdrawal of U.S. military government--a clear indicator of U.S. officers' faith in military might. The Harding Plan and its military missions sparked heavy popular resistance through 1921. Dominicans were well aware of the potential power of military leaders who were not accountable to popular opinion. Party leader and former president General Horacio Vásquez, one of the key leaders of the nationalist resistance of the time, argued that these missions would give U.S. officers the potential to become effective dictators.² To strengthen and institutionalize opposition, Vásquez, Henríquez y Carvajal, and other major party leaders joined with prominent members of urban society such as lawyers, clergy, and journalists to create the Comité Restaurador. The Comité began in Puerto Plata in December of 1921, headed by *de jure* president Henríquez y Carvajal, and put forward

² "Lo que dijo el Contraalmirante Robison," *Ecos del Valle*, 17 November, 1921, page 1. Reprinted from *Diario Nacional*. This protest against the military missions was picked up by other prominent Dominicans, including Federico Velásquez, Ramón Báez, and Luis Felipe Vidal. Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 22.

the Pact of Puerto Plata, seeking to unite Dominicans against Harding's plan.³ The pact called for a boycott to any elections called by the military government, and specifically invited all officers who performed military service in the country from 27 February 1844 to 28 November 1916 to register their names and make a formal declaration that they would not serve as members nor help in the formation of any military force that the occupation government made on Dominican territory.⁴

Concurrent with the work of the Comité Restaurador, and with the U.S. Senate investigation into the occupation of the Dominican Republic and Haiti in late 1921 to early 1922, was the strong push toward improvement of the constabulary that came with U.S. planners' realization of impending withdrawal. While controversies and arguments escalated as to how withdrawal would be carried out, occupation planners shifted their focus from the building of schools and hospitals toward building a viable military force. This was difficult when no one knew when or how withdrawal would occur, and under the weight of a continued lack of funds. It was also doubly charged by events and rumors in the resistance of 1921, in which nationalists and many throughout society threatened to take over the constabulary upon withdrawal and to punish those in it who had worked for the military government.⁵ From his appointment in charge of the marine Second Brigade in mid-1921, Brigadier General Harry Lee worked feverishly to improve the constabulary. Reporting that constabulary "officers and men were without training" and that "their value as a military force was nil," he focused on rapid training.⁶ Marine Lieutenant Edward A. Fellowes, who served as a Captain in the constabulary in 1921, estimated

³ The only significant party leader to reject the pact was Federico Velásquez. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 214.

⁴ "Instalación del Comité Restaurador," *El Diario*, 31 March, 1922, quoted in: Intelligence Reports, File 8, 3 April, 1922, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

⁵ See Chapter Five.

⁶ Quoted in: Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 59.

that in mid-1921, no systematic constabulary training or organization existed; previous reforms had all functioned at local levels, and were seldom enforced systematically.⁷

Even when standard training began in late 1921, it was slow and inadequate. Lee and constabulary commandant Rixey established two training centers, one at Haina near Santo Domingo to train officers and one at Santiago for basic recruit training. The program intentionally brought constabulary members from far-flung regions to participate, in a rotational cycle, in standard training.⁸ The first officer training took place in late 1921 at the height of Dominican nationalist resistance. Marine Lt. Fellowes was charged with building an officer training school to train the force's first thirty Dominican constabulary officers.⁹ The partially developed agricultural school at Haina, abandoned like many other projects due to lack of funds, provided a ready location. When the first officer trainees arrived, the school already contained necessities such as a mess-hall, a "well-equipped" kitchen, office space, class rooms, and dormitories. It was by no means ideal, however. Its commanding officer openly disdained Dominicans, and spoke little Spanish; water was scarce; the school's windmill broke down repeatedly. Lacking funds for necessary repairs, the school often did not receive daily rations because they were delivered from the capital city by an old truck that frequently broke down.¹⁰ Fellowes's description of the officers and their arrival makes clear his racist and degrading approach, and he made light of officer complaints. Dominican officers, for their part, were

⁷ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 216.

⁸ General Order No. 44 (1921), 6 September, 1921, Box 3, File 15, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

⁹ The choice of locations in itself was significant, though it is unclear whether U.S. planners recognized the fact. Haina was just outside of Santo Domingo, while the military school for enlisted men was located in Santiago. Given the traditional struggles in the country between intellectual liberalism from Santiago and military might from Santo Domingo, the placement of the officer school near the capital might have given added symbolic legitimacy to national domination of regions from a Santo Domingo-based military.

¹⁰ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 218-220, 225-226.

unsurprisingly loath to trust his sanitation regime and sick bay.¹¹ Training was made possible only by the addition of constabulary Major Joseph M. Feeley, who had served four years as a constabulary officer, spoke Spanish fluently, and was more familiar with Dominican customs, and by Fellowes's enlistment of officer trainees to correct his Spanish for lectures.¹²

Despite the many problems in the program, the first twenty-one officer trainees out of Haina passed the basic officer training course and were reattached to their units in December.¹³ The other nine were recommended for dismissal during the course of the training, a message to the others that Marines leading the training "meant business."¹⁴ Training consisted of "military administration, tactics, musketry, topography, first aid, hygiene, and agriculture," and "guard duty, discipline, personal cleanliness and hygiene, and above all, marksmanship," to give them "a clear tactical advantage over the average Dominican bandit."¹⁵ Marine commanders expected officer training to go a long way toward improving Dominican opinions of the constabulary. Standard training, they hoped, would also give the constabulary a sorely lacking image of legitimacy, while improving the men's effectiveness. Rixey also insisted that, due to the lack of accountability and control of enlisted men, company officers must be quartered in the barracks with their men at all times.¹⁶ Even with training, however, one of the biggest controversies continued to be that the constabulary's top officers were U.S. rather than Dominican. The

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 219-220. Second lieutenant José Arias complained the first night that someone had stolen his pillow, and Fellowes's description mocks the officer, stating that "this shouldn't have seemed such a dire calamity to him, in view of the fact that his pillow in the past had been either his saddle, or a projecting root, but to him the theft appeared as an insult and irreparable loss, to say nothing of an affront to his dignity. And these people can be dignified, when they try. The only discrepancy in their dignified bearing is that it appears to be the dignity of a child playing grown-up, and is soon discarded for some childish squabble, or youthful frivolity."

¹² *Ibid.*, 220.

¹³ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 51; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 59.

¹⁴ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 221.

¹⁵ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 49, 51. Agricultural classes, a seemingly odd choice for officer recruits, was taught by the former extension agent who was still living at the station. It was justified on the basis that Rixey's assistant, Lt. Fellowes, thought it might aid officers in helping to better the people's living conditions. Trujillo would later use his agricultural experience later in campaigns to woo the peasantry.

¹⁶ "Memo" dated 10 January, 1922, Box 5, File 213, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

constabulary continued to follow then-commandant Thorpe's 1919 prescription for high-ranking constabulary officers: that they be "100 per cent" American.¹⁷ As 1922 dawned, and withdrawal was imminent, all of the constabulary's commissioned officers were still U.S. forces, and they continued to be regularly ranked higher in the constabulary than they were in the Marine Corps.¹⁸

The second training period, to begin in January of 1922, took lessons from the mistakes of the first training period. To move men more quickly through the training centers and possibly begin to promote more Dominicans into higher officer positions, training centers at both Haina and Santiago were to bring in two companies each of enlisted men for this training period. The sheer numbers of men moving through the training centers brought new difficulties, especially as funds and supply lines had not been improved since the first. Fellowes, for his part, went into the training period with an attitude that cannot have impressed the recruits who showed up for training. He called the new arrivals two hundred "wild bushwhackers, who had never been in a military camp, knew nothing of the meaning of discipline, and were bound to be difficult to manage."¹⁹ The military government sent a contractor from the Marine Intelligence Office to grade land to make room for housing the two hundred recruits at Haina. He carried the work out quickly by use of prison laborers from the nearby National Penitentiary at Boca Nigua. Constabulary headquarters sent back the two "most promising graduates" from the first training period, José Navarro and Luis Alfonseca, to serve as assistant instructors.²⁰ Due to the difficulties and slow progress inherent in establishing national training centers for the military, Lee and Rixey planned rotating phases of training for the men. This first phase of training was

¹⁷ Thorpe, "Dominican Service," 320.

¹⁸ Constabulary Inspector Thomas Watson noted on 5 January of 1922 that all of the USMC and Navy men in the constabulary were ranked first lieutenant and higher in that organization, but that a number of them were only corporals or first sergeants in the Marine Corps. "Memorandum from T.E. Watson," Box 5, File 213, Ejército Nacional, AGN.

¹⁹ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 223.

²⁰ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 223-224. From 1919, the Military Government also made full use of prisoners for building and improving roads, even in the East. Thorpe, "Dominican Service," 317-318.

to focus on elementary military principles. After two months of drill, guard duty, and target practice, troops would be detached to their posts, and rotated through later for further training.

Through 1921 and early 1922, the military government administration was unable to carry out major change while facing wide protest and lack of funds. Plans for the constabulary focused foremost on training, recruitment, road building, and surveying. As Fellowes noted, orders were to build the constabulary so that it would be "sufficiently large and efficient to support the Government established when the new Constitutional President will have been elected," though no one knew when that would be.²¹ One marine who took part in this training said that the goal was "ninety officers and twelve hundred men" adequately trained in military and civil duties with infrastructure sufficient to make them nationally efficient, and stated that "this comparatively small total was conditioned on the completion of the main highways, which with the proper transportation facilities would make the Policia a highly mobile force."²² In addition to improved roads, marine constabulary officers began to plan a more strategic geographical placement of constabulary outposts. While they emphasized first the need to try to recruit "the right sort of men" and pass them through basic training, they also began to plan the establishment of outposts at road and commercial centers.²³ As a system developed through the course of the second training period, supplies became more regular despite the severe shortage of funds. Dominican constabulary members worked with improvised targets built from scratch, and continued to use Krag-Jorgensen rifles and ammunition that were in "very poor condition," some from production as far back as 1898-1899.²⁴

²¹ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 215.

²² Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (August, 1935), 53.

²³ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 217.

²⁴ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 227. Not until 1923, when constabulary training was under the command of Colonel Richard M. Cutts, were these being replaced by newer Springfield rifles. *Ibid.*, 229; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 43.

Under such conditions, especially with the hostility that the nationalist resistance demonstrated toward those in the constabulary, the men's morale was a major concern for constabulary leaders. Despite extensive financial difficulties, headquarters issued a general order that authorized the awarding of medals and the extra pay of \$1 per month to those who qualified as marksmen. This served the dual function of improving morale and encouraging efficiency--a necessary military element in fighting the expansive armed resistance throughout the country at that time. Fellowes demonstrated his condescending lack of respect for the men when he stated that "the men didn't value the extra pay as much as they did the new shiny silver medal, which they could pin on their breasts and exhibit before the dark eyes of the señoritas who paraded their dusky charms in the lighted plazas in the evening."²⁵ But the morale-boosting initiative did help. For the first time in the constabulary's history, the men could boast some actual military knowledge, had semi-regular supplies, and were being recognized for their achievements. In addition to increasing morale and pay, the training and the marksman program seem to have had a powerful effect on the solidarity of the men, who cheered together at the successes of other men in their details. Twenty-four of the first 200 enlisted men passing through Haina made marksman. Fellowes admitted with apparent surprise that some of the men were so good that he would put them up against any marine expert, and pinpointed the lack of marksmanship training among Dominicans as responsible for the low marine casualties in the battles of 1916.²⁶

The second training period moved four entire companies through basic training--the first time in its five years of existence that the majority of enlisted men had any standard training. As agitation for withdrawal grew in early 1922, Lee quickly pushed the next group of full companies through in a third training period. The rapid training system, which guaranteed that

²⁵ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 227.

²⁶ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 228.

all men had an introduction to basic drill, hygiene procedures, and marksmanship, presented advantages and disadvantages. By giving enlisted men hope that the organization would provide them a possible future in a military career, it heightened morale. It also led to the first commissions of Dominican officers, enabling some of them to gradually take command of constabulary companies as captains through 1922. The constabulary still battled resistance, and its prestige was incredibly low. The shuffling of four entire companies at a time through training centers left many posts guarded completely by marines at the same time that the resistance was carrying out a campaign against the suggested post-occupation marine military missions. After the second training period, constabulary headquarters adjusted so that only one company at a time was moved through training centers.²⁷ U.S. approval for another loan of \$10 million in March significantly improved training in the third period, and increased pay and incentives did bring an increase in recruits [See Table 7.1]. \$1.6 million, a significant portion of the first \$6.7 million to be remitted, was immediately slated for the completion of roads and the improvement of the constabulary.²⁸ It was with this loan that the constabulary training improved in earnest.

The timing of the March, 1922 loan was not coincidental. It was a product of the desire of both U.S. government and Dominican party leaders to begin negotiations toward an acceptable compromise withdrawal, and thereby end the long stalemate that was crippling the country. The 1921 resistance had handicapped the military government administration and made the State Department hesitant to authorize any new loans, because loans were one of the central points of protest. Despite the strength of the December Puerto Plata Pact and the nationalist movement, growing signs of a U.S. withdrawal had also re-awakened partisan interests. Party leaders, who now had the ability to travel quickly through the country and had

²⁷ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 226.

²⁸ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 80.

the ear of the majority of the Dominican population, began planning for their futures. They could likely count on the support of many Dominican elites if they secured a reasonable compromise, as the unification of resistance in the previous year had united a peasant base and begun to include more radical elements of the population--such as the growing labor movement--and to include calls for fundamental change in society. Horacio Vásquez was in a strong position to gain followers for the Partido Nacional (previously the Horacista Party), both as a respected pre-occupation general and former president, and as one of the major leaders of the nationalist resistance movement. As early as August and September of 1921, and increasing through the same months that brought the Comité Restaurador together and into action, gatherings throughout the country began to focus on future politics as well as demanding U.S. withdrawal.²⁹ October constabulary intelligence reports even noticed partisan maneuvering in civil government, where civil officials sympathetic to Vásquez removed from office alcaldes who were not, replacing them with alcaldes who would be more sympathetic to the party.³⁰

Those trying to maintain a unified resistance demonstrated rising concern about partisanship as withdrawal discussions began. Led by Henríquez y Carvajal, they recognized the fragility of their movement and emphasized that the attention of the U.S. and international community was vital. They pointed out that U.S. forces had justified intervention as "humanitarian" aid to a country that was historically fraught with political instability and civil disorder that led to violence, and insisted that growing partisanship, rather than solid national unity, might be used to prove the point and to justify present and future intervention.

²⁹Constabulary communications reporting increased party activity through February, 1922, "213 Memorandum," Box 5, Ejército Nacional, AGN. See also: Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 333-336; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 220-229; Report from C.C. Riner to Colonel Commandant, 30 September, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

³⁰3rd Co. Weekly Memo to Colonel Commander, 17 October, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.

Partisanship would kill nationalism and destroy the country.³¹ One anonymous author wrote that the resurgence of partisan interests that had sadly been resuscitated was breaking the pure patriotism of the resistance, an occurrence that "is only going to demonstrate to the eyes of the intervening power the continued existence of the consummate caudillos who brought our unfortunate Republic into the abyss from those mournful days of 1916."³² President Henríquez y Carvajal, fully aware of the growing breakdown in national unity in late 1921, believed that the successive proclamations and proposed plans for withdrawal from the military governor were issued intentionally to perpetuate partisanship and break unification. Promising that he would not submit his name for any public office, so that his words could not be discredited as political maneuvering, he argued that the Harding Plan's proposed military missions were meant to set *caudillismo* against nationalism. The latter, he held, was the only possible salvation; if the military governor succeeded in breaking it, the Dominican Republic would find itself in a situation like the one in Nicaragua.³³

When U.S. representatives seemed willing to work toward eventual withdrawal, especially in late 1921 and early 1922, political leaders worked with the resistance while also approaching U.S. representatives to make clear their interest in negotiating toward a withdrawal acceptable to the Dominican people. When withdrawal negotiations seemed more possible, the rift between Dominican groups widened as Henríquez y Carvajal had envisioned. A definite

³¹ Virgilio a Peña, "Los ismos matarán al nacionalismo," *Ecos del Valle*, 27 August, 1921, page 2; *Ecos del Valle*, 8 September, 1921.

³² "Incognito," "Nuestra lema irreductible," *Ecos del Valle*, 15 September, 1921. See also the editions of 29 September, 1921 and 3 November, 1921 for similar articles.

³³ Letter dated 13 September, 1921, from New York. Henríquez García, *Cartas del Presidente*, 51. Accusations that U.S. forces were purposely breaking up nationalist unification were widespread for months, and gradually became more serious. One journalist, for example, editorialized in April about the frequency of raids by Haitian Gendarmes over the border into Dominican territory. He asks why such a system of abuses should be tolerated by the Military Government, as the Gendarmes are also under the command of U.S. officers, and suggests: "are these frequent raids for the purpose of sowing discord between the Dominicans and the Haitians who have just begun to find out that they ought to be united for the defense of their small island?" "¿A Quién la culpa?" *El Diario*, 27 April, 1922, translated in File 8, Intelligence Reports, 1 May, 1922, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

split formed in the early months of 1922. On one side were the nationalists, led by Henríquez y Carvajal and composed of prominent intellectuals such as novelist Tulio Cestero, poet Américo Lugo, and journalist Fabio Fiallo. They called for withdrawal *pura y simple*, unconditional and absolute, and many among them insisted on punishment for those who collaborated with the military government and constabulary. The nationalists were ready to accept major change for modernization, but refused to do it by U.S. rules or under U.S. supervision. On the other side were party leaders who split with Henríquez y Carvajal's nationalists. These party leaders saw unconditional withdrawal as unrealistic, and hoped to take the reins of Dominican government upon an end to the occupation. When party leaders began to communicate directly with U.S. representatives to bring about withdrawal negotiations, they insisted that the compromise be an agreement that would not be political suicide for them. Mutual promises between party leaders and U.S. forces to keep the new constabulary apolitical, for example, made discussions possible.

Nationalists were concerned by rumors that political leaders were negotiating with U.S. forces.³⁴ While both sides in the debate were united in their desire for withdrawal, the language of the two groups was divisive through January and February. Nationalists reiterated the importance of not signing any agreement with the occupying forces. The strongest legal claims against the occupation, and a major source of inspiration for resistance, had always been that no Dominican government official had ever signed an agreement to occupation. Any agreement for withdrawal, unless it demanded unconditional withdrawal based on the illegality of the military government, could retroactively legitimate the occupation. *El Diario's* 18 January editorial, for example, criticized the tendency of some Dominicans to advocate cooperation with occupation forces. The author argued that U.S. enemies of Dominican sovereignty worked to effect the ruin

³⁴ "Propósito de Resistencia," *La Información*, 20 January, 1922, and "Rumores Peligrosos," *El Diario*, 20 January, 1922, printed in: Intelligence Reports, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

of nationalists and the country, to bankrupt the Dominican treasury, contracting loan after loan as a means of keeping the Dominican Republic under "an enormous weight of debt," and sought to impose a false independence under the conditions of a protectorate. The Harding Plan, the author argued, would create a puppet government like the one that "Dartiguenave, the celebrated Haitian traitor," consented to have.³⁵ Henríquez y Carvajal, too, repeatedly drew attention to how compromise and agreements had led to the situations of occupation in Haiti and Nicaragua, and condemned Dominican cooperation with occupation forces:

Gentlemen, should we, at some unguarded moment, convert ourselves into a Haiti or a Nicaragua, such a thing would not only be a shame but the height of ignorance, as we would completely lose all the rights of a free government. Our presidents would then be puppets like Dartiguenave. This man has the title of President, but is deprived of all rights. If by chance he finds himself on the streets late at night, he cannot enter his palace because martial law prohibits it; that he is nothing else but a prisoner, incapable of doing right or wrong.³⁶

Henríquez y Carvajal's speeches were well received by many throughout the country, and one Dominican proclaimed him the apostle, a man who would "give us a republic in which the president will have no need to obtain permission from a Yankee Sergeant, dressed in khaki, before entering his palace; a republic we want in our hearts, and as we dream of, rid us of those elder brothers, who have converted Santo Domingo into a gallows."³⁷

With strong language that drew on Dominican patriotism, the nationalists were a powerful force for change in society, and by early 1922 their broad base of support seemed increasingly dangerous to moderates. Already removed from leadership positions in the military, elite families sought to maintain some control and halt rapid change. Old powerful elite families like the Ramírez in the Southwest, who had been strong allies to the 1921 resistance, began to

³⁵ "El Bien y el Mal," *El Diario*, 18 January, 1922, copied in Daily Intelligence Report of the District Intelligence Officer, 19 January, 1922, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

³⁶ Printed in *El Diario*, 11 February, 1922.

³⁷ Casio, "El Apostol Anoche," from *El Progreso*, 27 January, 1922, quoted in: Intelligence Reports, 27 January, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

work with occupation forces.³⁸ They could justify the cooperation as long as the apparent end was withdrawal of U.S. forces and return of local autonomy. Nationalists' alliance with the peasantry, which empowered the lower classes and rural populations and gave force to their voices, must have also seemed threatening to the elite classes. As 1922 dawned with rumors of secret negotiations and plans spreading throughout the country, nationalist calls for punishment of collaborators increased. Some stated that a return of an unfavorable ruling by the U.S. Senate Inquiry might lead to a widespread armed uprising; others feared that the U.S. government might appoint a *de facto* Dominican government.³⁹ Prominent nationalist Cibao lawyer Rafael Estrella Ureña--who would later be a pawn in Trujillo's rise to power--gave a speech in February, stating that it was the duty of every native government employee to resign as long as the military government was in place. He argued that any employee failing to resign should be ostracized, his friends and acquaintances refraining from greeting him, native merchants refusing to sell him the necessities of life, and that even the air that he breathes should be denied to him.⁴⁰ Calls to punishment for cooperation appeared more and more dangerous to those hoping to bring about an orderly end to the occupation. They were also a clear threat to the military forces being trained to take over the constabulary. Only a carefully constructed compromise agreement for withdrawal could calm fears and guarantee the possibility of order under the constabulary. Nationalists' fiery language therefore served to strengthen the U.S. forces' argument that withdrawal must be gradual. Further, on the eve of withdrawal negotiations, the divisions arising from these arguments came to seem more frightening to many than the occupation itself. Even

³⁸ Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 125-127.

³⁹ Intelligence Report summary, 2 February, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

⁴⁰ Agent Intelligence Report, 28 February, 1922, File 8, "Intelligence Reports," "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

among those who stood firmly with the nationalists for unconditional withdrawal, some began to condemn calls to denationalize collaborators upon the return of sovereignty.⁴¹

Discussions were complicated by the nature of the military government itself. In February, the State Department issued orders for Robison to reach a compromise. He called a meeting of Dominican party leaders and other prominent citizens, including politically active lawyers and Archbishop Nouel, to bring about a negotiation acceptable to all parties. Unsurprisingly, the gathering reached no such agreement. Robison was concerned primarily with military aspects of withdrawal, and insisted on continued U.S. officer-ship of the constabulary and the two-year prolongation of the marine presence, as well as the Dominican government's agreement to another large U.S. loan. When agreement failed, he announced that the military government would continue until at least July of 1924.⁴² Horace Knowles, who had represented Dominicans during the Senate Inquiry, wrote to the State Department in February that he found it strange that Military Governor Robison and U.S. Minister Russell still failed to understand the wishes of the Dominican people. The language in his letter was harsh, and he pointed out proofs that the "Military Occupation has been unjustified and that the administration of the Military Government has not only been deficient but in many cases shameful and ignominious."⁴³ The publicity surrounding Knowles approach, and that of many nationalists and U.S. anti-imperialists, made acknowledgement of their arguments dangerous for the U.S. government and the Navy Department. The need to withdraw without international

⁴¹ See, for example: "Un Recuerdo de Bolívar," *La Información*, 25 March, 1922, reprinted in: Constabulary Intelligence Reports, 20 March, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN. The author of this article, quoting Bolívar's great speech at Trujillo, Venezuela, advocating that all Dominicans at this moment of peril to the country pardon their brothers for wrongs done. Francisco Billini's *Ecos del Valle* was one of the major venues both for nationalist publications and for calls to unity against the growing divisions in the country.

⁴² See Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 218-221.

⁴³ From a letter dated 27 February, 1922, reprinted in *La Información*, 16 March, 1922. Constabulary Intelligence Reports, 3 April, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

embarrassment, and to legitimate the U.S.-created military, weakened the direct effect of arguments such as that made by Knowles even while the publicity that he and others received made clear the urgency of a compromise withdrawal.

Discussions for withdrawal were also, of course, complicated by Dominican politics and the country's poor financial condition. Despite their initial willingness to discuss a compromise withdrawal, party leaders could not agree to another U.S. loan, especially after they had taken part in centering so much resistance against the proposed loans of 1921. U.S. government representatives realized the need to push a loan through unilaterally before Dominican politicians could negotiate any agreement.⁴⁴ Before early negotiations for a bilateral withdrawal began, therefore, the State Department finally authorized the loan of \$10 million in March. The passage of the loan without the signature of any Dominican politicians furthered the breakdown of resistance on two major levels. First, it opened the possibility of negotiation for compromise withdrawal, which deepened the split between nationalists and party leaders. Second, the infusion of funds improved the economy. After so many months of stalemate between military government and resistance through the continual decline of the economy, the country was in incredibly poor economic condition by March. Farmers in the Cibao could not find markets for their crops or had to sell cacao at less than one third of value. Many throughout the country had nothing to sell at all: a growing drought in the Northwest killed livestock in such numbers that their carcasses could not be efficiently removed, and starvation spread through the area.⁴⁵ After the drawn-out suffering of the past eighteen months, any solution that answered to immediate concerns such as hunger would appease much of the population. Protests to the loan were loud

⁴⁴ Grieb, "Harding and Withdrawal," 432.

⁴⁵ Constabulary Weekly Memoranda, January-March 1922, Box 5, File "213 Memorandum," Ejército Nacional, AGN1. 4th Co. Weekly Memorandum dated 30 April, 1922 gives an overview of the devastation caused by the drought in Monte Cristi Province.

and immediate, but came from intellectuals, politicians, and many among the elite class. Those concerned with immediate survival began to withdraw from political activity after their brief unity with the resistance movement. Funds for the nationalist movement had declined, and attempts to rebuild nationalist finances failed in the poor economy, which gradually brought an end to the nationalist publicity campaign in the countryside. When the U.S. loans returned the military government to normal functioning, resistance became much less attractive to the rural population through much of the country.⁴⁶

As a respected Dominican lawyer who also had important connections in the sugar industry, Francisco J. Peynado was a logical choice of representatives for negotiation. He traveled to the United States at the end of March to begin working toward signing a compromise withdrawal, thereby circumventing both the reticent military government--which rejected negotiations on the grounds that they would weaken the constabulary and training--and the adamant nationalists with their calls for unconditional withdrawal.⁴⁷ Peynado worked closely with Secretary of State Hughes, State Department representatives, Horace Knowles, and Sumner Welles. Welles, a diplomat with extensive Caribbean experience, mediated between the U.S. State Department and Navy Department. During these secret discussions, various political groups in the Dominican Republic began to come forward to try to reach compromise with the military government. Rumors, controversy, and reaction flourished in the coming months while party leaders--primary among them the heads of the two largest political parties, Horacio Vásquez and Federico Velásquez--stepped forward to negotiate, and gradually quit going to the

⁴⁶ The East, which is discussed later in the chapter, continued to be an exception.

⁴⁷ Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 142-143.

meetings of the Comité Restaurador.⁴⁸ Military Governor Robison and the upper-class Dominicans of Santo Domingo's local government began discussions, in which Robison proposed a national convention of ayuntamientos. His proposal at this convention would not only elevate the power of the ayuntamientos beyond any power they constitutionally held, but would include their approval of a municipal military commission, a withdrawal plan that would leave marine military missions in provincial capitals during a gradual evacuation.

Welles's later history of the Dominican Republic demonstrates the continued lack of understanding among U.S. forces and representatives about the problems of such military missions. Welles stated that of all objections to the Harding Plan, the strongest was against military missions after withdrawal which, he argued, "might have seemed the least offensive of the proposals made."⁴⁹ The reasons for such a strong reaction against the idea were not kept secret; reactions were widely publicized in the press. They were not, as Welles conjectured, unfounded fears that the military missions were a trick to continue occupation or control the post-occupation military through the U.S. government.⁵⁰ Certainly, both of those were possible--and legitimate--concerns. But the problem with military missions also related to much more fundamental issues. Missions would form another step in the long-term military government effort to rearrange power relations, this time through the elevation of power of the ayuntamientos, and they might call into question the very possibility of a democratic future by destroying the centralization of government that had occurred during previous years.⁵¹ They

⁴⁸ A 22 May, 1922 article in *El Diario* entitled "Negativa Censurada" stated that the refusal of party leaders Horacio Vásquez and Federico Velásquez to attend Comité meetings was under wide discussion, as the two attended every meeting to which the military government invited them.

⁴⁹ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 848.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ One article referred to the discussions as "the most flagrant unwarranted proceeding against the liberty and sovereignty of the Dominican people, and a blot on the pages of the history of the present American administration," and closed with: "It is clear that it will never be possible for us to come to an understanding with Americans while they believe they ought to treat us as though we were a conquered country." "Contra la última proclama," *La*

would also, many argued, invest too much political power in the military, giving U.S. officers powers of representation that they possessed neither institutionally nor popularly, "entitling them to form economic and political plans which will never receive the sanction of a people who are instinctively defending themselves from the snares which the invader and his emissaries are continually preparing for the purpose of carrying out their plans of economic slavery and political influence."⁵² Another article, calling for ayuntamientos to abstain from meeting with the military governor, called the idea "sinful."⁵³ The possibility of an agreement between the military governor and the ayuntamientos that left military missions in the country actually seemed poised to become the spark that could reignite a unified nationalist resistance.⁵⁴

Other protests grew concerning foreigners' salaries paid by the Dominican Republic under the military government. Dominican money paid out by the military government to foreigners was already as controversial as occupation loans contracted without Dominican representation. Before the approval of the March loan, when the military government suggested the reduction of the salaries of public employees by 50%, many reacted against the suggestion as long as the Dominican treasury paid foreigners without Dominican representation. This controversy had broad potential implications for the constabulary due to its leadership by foreign officers, who were being paid from the Dominican treasury through the occupation government

Información, 9 March, 1922, quoted in: Constabulary Intelligence Reports, 10 March, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

⁵² "Una Sugestión Peligrosa," *La Información*, 13 March, 1922, reprinted in: Constabulary Intelligence Reports, 14 March, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

⁵³ "De ningún modo," *El Diario*, 13 March, 1922, reprinted in: Constabulary Intelligence Reports, 14 March, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN. See also: March Intelligence Reports, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN; M.M. Sanabia, "Cuestión palpitante," *El Diario*, 21 March, 1922.

⁵⁴ See, for example: "La actitud del pueblo capitalino ante la peligrosa sugestión," *La Información*, 14 March, 1922, reprinted in: Constabulary Intelligence Reports, 16 March, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN; "El Congreso Regional del Este patrióticamente interesado en mantener el pacto de Pto. Plata, resuelve la constitución del Comité Restaurador," and "La Conferencia del Bonao," *La Información*, 10 March, 1922, reprinted in: Constabulary Intelligence Reports, 11 March, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN; "La nueva comisión," *El Diario*, 3 May, 1922.

despite wide disdain for the constabulary. One editorial decried the plan to economize by reducing the salaries of public officials as long as the Dominican treasury was paying the high salaries of so many U.S. officials: "we are in favor of a reduction of the very large salaries paid to foreign employees whose services are by all means unnecessary. This is the measure with which the Military Government ought to initiate its programs of economy."⁵⁵ The proposal for a reduction in civil officials' salaries, though eventually unnecessary due to the loan, was still fresh in the public mind when the military government authorized increased expenditures in the constabulary through March and April which seemed to demonstrate continued prioritization of military power over that of civil government.

March, after all, marked the beginning of the constabulary's third training period. Events of February and March only intensified the urgency of rushing forces through training. At the same time, the breakdown of the efficient and unified resistance, which had so roundly attacked the constabulary in 1921, allowed occupation forces to place a greater focus on the military. The third training period was therefore accomplished quickly, and included added programs to increase constabulary morale. Constabulary headquarters made use of the new infusion of money to authorize contests with cash prizes for neatness.⁵⁶ They also reinstated constabulary funding for inter-company baseball programs, rewarding the most efficient officers and enlisted men with positions on the teams.⁵⁷ Over the months, they added a rifle team competition, creating further incentive for improvement and impetus for improved morale. Each constabulary department was to provide its top twelve baseball players and its top twelve riflemen for the

⁵⁵ "Sobre la Reducción de Sueldos," *La Información*, 14 March, 1922, reprinted in: Constabulary Intelligence Reports, 16 March, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN. This editorial was in response to a San Francisco de Macorís article in *La Tarde*, which it quoted at length.

⁵⁶ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 231.

⁵⁷ Memoranda, March-June, 1922, File 3, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN. None of the men who were to rise high in the ranks of the constabulary, such as César Lora, Rafael Trujillo, or Luis Alfonseca, were on the list for the ranks of baseball team or marksman.

competitions.⁵⁸ Through the first half of 1922, before the official announcement of the Hughes-Peynado withdrawal plan in June, the military focused on morale boosters, incentives, and establishing programs to improve training and military transportation and communications. While headquarters funneled a large number of troops through the third training--which would last two months and complete basic training for all companies--they used others to rapidly complete infrastructural projects while the marines were still in their posts throughout the country and able to help police populations. Once out of training, constabulary units were sent to patrol areas experiencing armed resistance, and also finished the extensive mapping and surveying programs that marines had begun in mid- to late-1921.⁵⁹

As withdrawal discussions became more public and more urgent, constabulary headquarters opened wide a recruitment campaign for early May, as soon as all present members were through the basic training. They advertised \$17 per month pay, incentives and training, and the fact that the constabulary was to be the force for control in society after withdrawal of U.S. forces. With a goal of 1,200 enlisted men and 90 officers by the end of the year, they planned to outfit and give preliminary instruction to all new recruits at department headquarters, move them through training centers as possible, and then detach men to company posts.⁶⁰ Marines acknowledged, however, that even the constabulary's planned numbers were small. As Miller pointed out, they knew that the total planned, 1,290 out of a population of nearly one million, was not enough to protect the sovereignty of the country when marines were gone. Furthermore, actual numbers were only half of the authorized strength [see Table 7.1]. He later wrote that, during 1922 withdrawal negotiations, the constabulary was "in no position to recruit and train

⁵⁸ Memoranda, June 1922, Box 5, File "213, Memorandum," Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

⁵⁹ Correspondence, January-June, 1922, Box 5, File "213, Memorandum," Ejército Nacional, AGN1; Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (May, 1935), 21-22.

⁶⁰ Memorandum for all officers from John Dixon, Chief of Staff, 21 March, 1922, File 3, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

some ninety officers and twelve hundred men, let alone garrison the Dominican Republic, a mission which formerly called for the services of twenty-five hundred marines," and even that the "facilities and means to attain a high state of military efficiency were not to be found within the Policia" as late as June of 1922.⁶¹ How the constabulary would deal with these problems was unclear through 1922. Economic problems continued, and increases in authorized strength were unlikely due to budgeting, lack of interest among the population, and even a possible reaction to any increased prioritization on the military. Constabulary officers raised pay and offered monetary incentives where possible, but cut some corners when it came to cost. For example, all constabulary officers were to provide their own Colt automatic caliber 45 model 1911 and their own ammo from May 1922, thus insisting on better weaponry, but having officers pay for it--a practice that reinforced the tendency to elevate the middle class in the officer ranks.⁶²

Marine and Dominican constabulary officers worked to build up the constabulary's image. The majority of the civilian population still refused to take any actions that demonstrated approval of the military government or constabulary. For example, in an attempt to stimulate positive press the military government planned a grand ceremony to celebrate the opening of the long-awaited and delayed Carretera Duarte, named after the Dominican independence hero Juan Pablo Duarte. The road would effectively connect all traffic, civilian as well as military, between north and south. U.S. officials invited Dominican civil officials to take part in the celebration of 29 April and 6 May.⁶³ Nationalists refused to attend the celebration, and insisted that Dominicans abstain from attending.⁶⁴ One author stated in his call to abstention that if Dominicans attended the celebration it would validate occupying forces' actions, proving

⁶¹ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (August, 1935), 53.

⁶² General Order 18 (1922), 2 May, 1922, Box 5, Folder 53, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

⁶³ M. Curiel R., "Inauguración de la Carretera Duarte," *El Diario*, 28 March, 1922. Quoted in: Intelligence Reports, File 8, 3 April, 1922, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

⁶⁴ Constabulary memoranda, April and May 1922, Box 5, "213, Memorandum," Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

that those who received only a "filthy and loathsome pittance there, thrown at them like scraps of food at hungry dogs can celebrate as a sign of their gratitude with the kicks and blows received from that ruffian."⁶⁵ Photos of the highway's opening show very few in attendance, mostly navy engineers, marines, and constabulary.

In spite of difficulties with press, the constabulary recruitment campaign in May was so successful that by the end of the month some companies were full, to the point that in the regions with strong military traditions such as Santo Domingo and Monte Cristi men were turned away because companies had met recruitment quotas.⁶⁶ One of the reasons was that, as peasants throughout the country withdrew from politics, constabulary recruiters worked specifically to draw in rural enlistees.⁶⁷ They also accepted men with backgrounds in the pre-occupation military and the early years of the constabulary.⁶⁸ By May of 1922, each company had a radio outfit and access to plane service if needed, maps or partial maps for most areas of the country made with the help of marines and the Public Works Office, all of which improved the constabulary companies' military efficiency, cooperation and mobility. Marines and constabulary in separate posts used mounted squads and telephone to communicate regularly about intelligence and troops movements--a drastic change from previous years.⁶⁹ By August, the constabulary topped out at just over nine hundred men, its highest number since early 1920.

The changes made the constabulary a new force in many ways, which probably did more for the recruitment campaign than any propaganda. The military government was gradually

⁶⁵ M. Curiel R., "Pro Inauguración," *El Cibao*, 29 April, 1922. Quoted in: Intelligence Reports, File 8, 3 April, 1922, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

⁶⁶ 4th Co. Memorandum, 27 May, 1922, Box 5, "213, Memorandum, "Ejército Nacional," AGN1.

⁶⁷ Memo from Charles E. Grey, 8th Co., to the Inspector, 10 April, 1922, File 3, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

⁶⁸ Memo from Harry Hurst, 4th Co., to the Inspector, 5 April, 1922, File 3, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

⁶⁹ "Control of Field Forces by Regimental Headquarters, 15th Regiment," From William C. Harllee District Commander, Eastern District, to Brigadier General Harry Lee Commanding General, 2nd Brigade, 2 January, 1922, Geographical Files, "Dom Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

answering to all of the major complaints against the constabulary. The strongest complaints had been lack of training or Dominican officers, the presence of so many foreigners in the force, and lack of control.⁷⁰ Systematically, with withdrawal imminent, they worked on each of these problems through early 1922. Lee also gave the constabulary more prestige by diminishing the police role, and envisioning it as a military. Before 1922, the constabulary's units had been set in provincial capitals with most detachments along the border. "Its principal duties were those of a constabulary force," defined as "the suppression of outlawry and other crimes, apprehension of fugitives. . . prevention of smuggling, execution of court orders, care and custody of civil prisoners," general law enforcement, and working with marines in areas experiencing guerrilla warfare.⁷¹ The vision of constabulary commandant George Thorpe for the force in mid-1920 also made clear his disregard for the resilience of Dominican military tradition. This was a common mistake among occupying forces, who argued that the country had no real military before the occupation and therefore did not account for the power of military tradition. Thorpe's earlier vision for the constabulary emphasized that that "This organization being new, has no traditions to live up to, but has maintained a very satisfactory *esprit-de-corps* [*sic.*] . . . In a few years this organization will have behind it a tradition to live up to and will be classed with the highly efficient Canadian Mounted Police, Pennsylvania State Constabulary and the Capetown Mounted Police."⁷² While it still held the name *Policía Nacional Dominicana*, 1922 changes decided once and for all the long-standing argument between marines and navy administrators over whether it would serve as a military or a police force. The force gradually turned policing

⁷⁰ Enlisted men in the ranks and others felt less inclined to obey U.S. officers than they did Dominican officers. Constabulary member Octavio Félix, for example, was in prison in early 1922 for insubordination toward his company's commanding officer. Gilbert recounts this, but excuses the insubordination based on the fact that the company's captain was a U.S. Marine. *Mi lucha*, 236.

⁷¹ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (May, 1935), 19.

⁷² Letter from constabulary commandant George C. Reid to commanding general of the Marine 2nd Brigade, 7 August, 1920. File 1920, Geographical Files, "Dom Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

duties over to municipal police, and the constabulary's military functions became the center of planning and training. Concerns about potential "disorder" with upcoming marine withdrawal forced marine constabulary officers to see the situation as Pendleton had argued in 1916 and 1917: unless marines planned to return to the country regularly, and unless Dominicans wanted to accept a very limited sovereignty, a small police force was not sufficient.

Marines, constabulary, elites, and party leaders also all knew that before the U.S. forces could withdraw, guerrilla warfare had to be ended. New doors for cooperation were opened with discussions of withdrawal between Dominicans and the U.S. government, while the population's support for guerrillas was withdrawn.⁷³ In the Interior, North, and Northwest, guerrilla movements had never been consistent or unified, and fell apart as the year progressed. Their network was largely broken by decreasing cooperation from other population sectors, and their loss of aid and coordination were mirrored by a growth in coordination among the constabulary. Without sufficient support, they were powerless in many areas as constabulary and marines used improved roads, communications, and maps to capture and imprison many armed resisters during early 1922.⁷⁴ While many fugitives continued to hide in the mountainous interior for years, refusing to surrender to the constabulary for crimes committed during the occupation, one group of disillusioned rebels justified raids on the local civilian population to sustain their effort. This group, led by fugitive Perun de la Cruz, functioned around Santiago through 1922 and until after the final withdrawal of U.S. forces. Perun refused to surrender to U.S.-officered forces, and carefully worked to negotiate his surrender in 1923 through Dominican officers, when U.S.

⁷³ The brief growth in support for guerrilla movements is explained in chapter Six.

⁷⁴ *Gaceta Oficial*, 1922 editions; Company intelligence reports, intelligence summaries, and operational reports, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

forces still held strong influence.⁷⁵ The group's machete-armed raids on Dominican populations actually seem to have provided local Dominican-officered constabulary units with legitimacy. In the largest clash between his group and the constabulary, in August of 1922, a 10th Company constabulary unit under Lt. Pedro Nicasio captured nine of Perun's men, including Benjamin Almanzar, who had been one of Perun's top leaders.⁷⁶

Olivorio's movement in the southwestern provinces had long presented a unique challenge to the constabulary, the military government, and local inhabitants. While the armed forces under Olivorio and his men accepted fugitives from around the country, and were connected with fugitive networks in the central mountains, they remained largely isolated and separate from the other insurrections. A messianic movement made up of lower- and middle-class segments of the population, they struggled against rapid modernization and became a target for occupying forces. Olivorio and his followers enjoyed the support of the area's most prominent elite family through the occupation and, although many merchants saw the movement as backward and threatening, most refused to cooperate with the constabulary persecution of Olivoristas. The changing atmosphere of early 1922, however, led to the forceful realignment of political relationships. Many "progressives" among the middle and elite classes who had withheld direct support from the occupation stood to benefit a great deal with the modernization of Barahona and Azua Provinces. The growing public split among nationalists--who they had stridently supported in 1921--allowed for a changed approach toward the occupation forces and constabulary. Maneuvering to erase the "backwardness" of such traditions as Olivorismo, and to

⁷⁵ Memos between Director, Department of the North César Lora and 6th Company commanding officer Captain Rafael Trujillo, May, 1923, File 19, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes, 1923," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

⁷⁶ 10th Company Operational Reports, August 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

gain positions of power in the new, post-occupation power structure, prominent Dominicans in the area began to provide intelligence to constabulary forces.

The constabulary hunt for Olivorio and his followers thus took a major turn in May of 1922. With intelligence that had been impossible to gain in earlier years, when even anti-Olivorio elites were loath to work with the constabulary, a detachment of the 7th Company from Santo Domingo began a new campaign. With new marksmanship and basic training, and led by Marine constabulary officer Captain George Morse and Dominican Lieutenant Luna of the first Haina-trained group, they quickly came upon an unsuspecting camp of Olivorio's followers, opened fire from the bushes and shot indiscriminately. They killed twenty-two, including eight women and two small children.⁷⁷ Fellowes bragged about the efficiency of training demonstrated by this encounter, saying that with training the constabulary was finally able to make "a big impression on the natives."⁷⁸ The constabulary troops' improved training no doubt had a strong effect on their growing successes against Olivorio's followers, but the most significant change in those months was the local population's support. In previous years, residents not only refused to give constabulary information, but developed systems to alert the fugitives' of the constabulary's movements.

The devastation of the eastern provinces after so many years of extensive guerrilla warfare made the situation there much more complicated. Calder provides an extensive and accurate portrayal of the ending of guerrilla resistance in these eastern provinces in 1922, arguing that the real end to guerrilla warfare in the East was primarily due to highly publicized withdrawal negotiations and the flexibility of new military government leaders and a Dominican

⁷⁷ Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 117-123. Lundius and Lundahl's account is based on Captain Morse's reports.

⁷⁸ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 229. Fellowes exaggerated the number of deaths, reporting it as "around forty," and omitted the mention of women and children.

population seeking to re-examine the war.⁷⁹ Ducoudray uses the words of surrendering guerrillas to make a similar argument: the final negotiation for withdrawal was what led to the heavy surrenders of guerrillas in mid-1922. With the occupation ending, a continuance of guerrilla warfare would mean Dominican attacks against Dominicans, rather than outside invaders.⁸⁰ As elsewhere in the country, the pending reality of withdrawal had a much stronger effect on the ability of the marines and constabulary than did any training, improved supplies, or new approaches. That Dominicans could no longer justify carrying out civil war in those provinces is highly significant in itself, and demonstrates real change brought about by the occupation. Caudillos and others had fought in the East in pre-occupation years in reaction to rapid modernization and capitalization of sugar, and in defense of traditional autonomy. Alliances to end resistance, of which these guerrilla fighters had become a strong part, paved the way for a change in their political ideology so that an end to occupation also meant an end their call to war. Guerrilla warfare that was begun to defend local autonomy and keep out a centralized state and military apparatus was brought to a conclusion even while the modernization of sugar and the destruction of traditional communal land tenure advanced more rapidly than ever.

The state of the eastern provinces after protracted guerrilla warfare was as much responsible for this change as was ideology. As Calder describes, the eastern provinces had settled for years into a stalemate that devastated economy and a way of life, with populations abandoning their land and entire towns to avoid the conflict, and the production of sugar in severe decline. "The east," he states, "became the barracks, and an occasional battleground, for an army of occupation." The two provinces held twenty marine posts concentrated mostly around

⁷⁹ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 166-182.

⁸⁰ Ducoudray, *Los Gavilleros del Este*, 20.

the sugar centrales, and marines there had long settled into a policy of containment.⁸¹ The warfare was not only between guerrillas and an army of occupation, however. Dominicans in the constabulary played a large role in patrols. In Calder's research and other studies, the constabulary is left almost completely out of the discussion. The constabulary was, in fact, less progressive or powerful in the East due to the high concentration of marines in the region and the fear of giving leadership positions to Dominicans there. Furthermore, the majority of constabulary records are missing from the archives for this period, during which later-dictator Rafael Trujillo was a subordinate officer in the area.⁸² For the question of how the constabulary became a tenable force in those provinces, however, it is necessary to understand their role in the guerrilla warfare and its ending. The conspicuous lack of involvement of the constabulary in new eastern initiatives in 1922 actually helped its later reputation. Marine withdrawal would allow new eastern Dominican constabulary officers to distance themselves from many of the most recent atrocities and devastation of the East, while their presence in patrols still made them a visible force.⁸³ During all new initiatives, the constabulary played a central role in the

⁸¹ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 156.

⁸² Records of the constabulary in the eastern provinces are, indeed, difficult to find, though constabulary reports and records in the Marine Corps archives contain some useful documents. Many records that had involved Trujillo were removed from the archives from the 1920s to the 1930s, part of a campaign in which the constabulary-captain-turned-dictator had the history of the period re-written to erase the voices of guerrilla fighters and promote purely fictional stories of his own patriotism and heroism in the East during those years. See, for example, the work of Gilberto Sánchez Lustrino, *Trujillo: El Constructor de una Nacionalidad*, (Habana: Cultural, S.A., 1938). Vega also discusses the creation of a new history about the east during the occupation, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 13, including reference to the official history, *Cronología de Trujillo*, by Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi. See also Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 491-496 for useful bibliographical notes about the literature of the Trujillo Era.

⁸³ In patrols versus the guerrilla fighters in the eastern provinces, Marines reported twenty of their own killed and seven wounded, against a reported 1,137 "bandits" killed or wounded. Brigadier General Harry Lee, "Special Report of activities of the 2nd Brigade, U.S. Marines, Dominican Republic, for the Year ending 30 June, 1922," 24 August, 1922, Geographical Files, "Dom Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico. The actual amount of guerrillas in this number is impossible to determine because Marines lumped all non-cooperative Dominicans together as "bandits." Further, as Calder points out in his study, the lack of other ways of showing any progress made the ability to report any numbers especially important for marines through the entire period of stalemate. The numbers of casualties among the constabulary demonstrate its active involvement too. In a reported 5,500 patrols over the years of guerrilla warfare, the constabulary claimed 320 "enemy" killed or wounded, and losses of three officers and twenty-four enlisted killed and one officer and forty six enlisted men wounded. Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 48.

coordination of measures to seek out guerrilla leaders, though its officers were less directly involved in the special initiatives of early 1922 that so angered the population. Importantly, the constabulary formed much of the manpower in beginnings of infrastructural development there during 1922. Whereas previous years had been notable for the lack of cooperation or communication between marine and constabulary posts, early 1922 brought serious efforts at coordination that included (for the first time) important members of the region's population. With real discussions for withdrawal, many sugar *central* managers gradually began to give prompt reports to Marines, who then communicated them to constabulary officers.

As elsewhere, major changes in the conduct of the resistance and guerrilla warfare did not take place directly after the entry of Harry Lee as commander of the marine brigade and P.M. Rixey as constabulary commandant in June of 1921. Rather, Dominican initiatives forced changed approaches. In the East, the diplomatic initiative of the most powerful guerrilla leader of the time, Ramón Natera, brought about forced change. Natera, in September of 1921, kidnapped Thomas J. Steele, the manager of La Angelina sugar estate, for having refused to concede to Natera's demands for five thousand dollars in support. Natera did not harm Steele, but released him two days later on the condition that he and other estate leaders bring his message to U.S. officials. Under threat of death if he did not transmit the message, Steele joined with the managers of the six most important U.S.-owned sugar centrales to send the message to Washington. Natera's message explained the patriotic goal of his movement, demanding only that the United States withdraw its forces and return Dominican sovereignty.⁸⁴ The immediate response among the military leaders of the marines and constabulary in the East was to step up the hunt for Natera. Marine units were reformed to be sure that each unit working the East included a marine who could speak Spanish--still a rarity in those provinces.

⁸⁴ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 166.

From the end of 1921 through March of 1922, marines and constabulary initiated a new campaign that included drastically improved radio communications and the use of air service for "strictly confidential or secret messages" so as to counteract guerrilla interceptions.⁸⁵ They also worked to improve roads in the East, using prisoners to cut paths where no roads existed.⁸⁶ With a growing number of informants and a system to protect their identity, marines carried out intrusive sweeps of the population aimed at identifying those who were serving as part-time guerrillas or collaborating. This "systematic drive" was initiated specifically to end guerrilla warfare with an eye toward upcoming withdrawal. In nine coordinated, large-scale cordon operations, using air-dropped communications, military units "rounded up" all adult males and brought them to a "central collecting point" at which "the detained men would be lined up under bright lights while native informers, hidden in tents or behind canvas screens, identified known bandits." Over 600 men were arrested through this cordoning system before March of 1922, when Brigade commander Lee called a stop to the system because the system and subsequent trials of men caused an uproar among the population. Meanwhile, it had also failed to capture guerrilla leaders of importance, and it even led to an increase in guerrilla activity.⁸⁷

The solutions that the marines and constabulary finally put in place in March and April of 1922 came from Dominican suggestions, another indicator of the opening of cooperation. The first was a general amnesty to those who surrendered, a recognition that "bandits" were

⁸⁵ "Control of Field Forces by Regimental Headquarters, 15th Regiment," from District Commander, Eastern District William C. Harlee to Commanding General, 2nd Brigade, Brig. General Harry Lee, 2 January, 1922. Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," 1922, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

⁸⁶ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 170-171. For the constabulary's growing role in road-building, communication, and especially in continuing patrols, see reports from Captain Williams and constabulary commandant P.M. Rixey, 1921 and 1922, in "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN; "Reports from Seibo," File 1, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN; Thorpe, "Dominican Service," 317.

⁸⁷ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 43; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 166-172.

revolutionaries with political grievances.⁸⁸ The second, long suggested by Dominicans and clearly related to the tradition of local power from the sugar centrales, was the organization of civil home guard units from the plantations. Lee's authorization of these civil home guards, under the leadership of marines, was a drastic shift from previous attempts to keep all power and arms out of the hands of Dominicans. The units were, in fact, assembled and funded by plantation administrators and local civil authorities, each consisting of about fifteen Dominicans deemed reliable by local authorities.⁸⁹ It was, in other words, a Dominican solution suggested and implemented largely by Dominican planners. At first, the authorization for the training and use of civil home guards was rare, but once it was accepted, civil authorities pushed for more of them as the solution to problems in the eastern provinces.⁹⁰ By April, they were in wide use.⁹¹ Throughout May, Dominican elites and civil authorities in the region negotiated the surrender of the most prominent guerrilla leaders--with whom, of course, they had regular contact.⁹² Upon the surrender of major guerrilla leaders who had been cooperating with civil officials and elites, marines and sugar plantation administrators found it easier to recruit for civil home guard units to bring in those guerrillas who had not surrendered. Ramón Natera surrendered on 4 May through negotiation. Ramón Batía surrendered four days later. Cabo Gil, the last of the strongest guerrilla leaders in the East, surrendered on 20 May, leading the marines to report an "end to organized banditry." Those who surrendered were placed on immediate parole.⁹³

⁸⁸ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 45; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 173-175.

⁸⁹ Franks, "Transforming Property," 208-209; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 176.

⁹⁰ Miller, Charles J., Lt. Col. "Diplomatic Spurs: Our Experiences in Santo Domingo." *The Marine Corps Gazette*, 19:2 (May, 1935), 19.

⁹¹ For example, in one eleven-day period in April, from the 19th to the 30th, such units engaged in six "major contacts." Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 45.

⁹² See Chapter Five. Ducoudray, *Los Gavilleros del Este*, 69-71, 94-95, 97-100; *El Listín Diario*, 5 May and 18 May, 1922; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 45.

⁹³ "Conditions in the Eastern District," from Harry Lee to Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, 5 July, 1922, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

With the surrender of the guerrilla leaders by late May, marines laid claim to the successes, and began to train and increase civil home guards. They organized the forces from the largest sugar plantations, detailing to each a marine officer, a marine non-com officer, and a marine private. With Lee's approval, marines in the East began to institutionalize the approach in June. Lee called for a "perfection" of the organization of civil guards, forming four standard patrol units at major guerrilla areas of operation, and rifle training for those Dominicans working with the marines.⁹⁴ Lee even called for improvement of the civil guards' efficiency "against the time of any coming emergency that may require their service."⁹⁵ The system, and the authorization of further use of such civil guards, encouraged the primacy of military force as an answer to problems, and brought a new set of problems. Some marines recognized that the practice, despite leading to some important arrests, was problematic. It contradicted the occupation aim of divorcing civil authorities and politicians from military connections.⁹⁶ The ad-hoc nature of this program on the eve of departure, and the problems stemming from it, are clear in an example given by one marine: A prominent Dominican in Seibo Province, authorized to gather fifty followers for patrols to find a certain "bandit leader," did irreparable damage, his group an embarrassment to the military government that made enemies among all classes of Dominicans; the leader abused the position and committed "depredations" against peaceful inhabitants, a story reported to be characterized by "pillage and lawlessness."⁹⁷ The marine response in such situations was to immediately disband and disarm the groups and place the leaders under surveillance, but as in other initiatives, the damage was done.

⁹⁴ C.C. Carpenter, "Operations," HQ Eastern District, 12 June, 1922, File 1922, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Memo from Harry Lee, 18 June, 1922, File 1922, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

⁹⁵ Memo from Harry Lee, 18 June, 1922, File 1922, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

⁹⁶ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (May, 1935), 20.

⁹⁷ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (May, 1935), 20.

The use of civil home guards drew on long Dominican traditions of local autonomy and the rights of landowners to hire their own militias. Yet it was also an institutionalized perpetuation of the civil war in those provinces, one in which marines helped to re-empower landowners and their employees. Landowners and marines specifically sought out Dominicans for these units who had personal grudges against certain guerrilla leaders. Marines also understood how the changing atmosphere surrounding withdrawal negotiations made this technique possible. As one marine argued, the system would probably not have worked in the “early days of the Occupation in the face of the general opposition to the Military Government and the mistrust of its purposes.”⁹⁸ Dominicans in the area had long sought to take control of the situation, eventually doing so by dealing with guerrilla leaders behind the backs of military government officials and the constabulary. Occupying forces failed to see the potency of the culture and tradition behind this system, and seem to have believed that they could erase it through organization.⁹⁹ Civil home guard units were accepted mainly due to their Dominican-ness and their empowerment of Dominicans to control the situation in the east, which many had argued for years that they should have the right to do. The major differences that led to a change in marine attitudes in 1922 were not an improved trust for the population, but a combination of the provinces' devastation and the urgency of finding a solution, an opening for compromise and conciliation similar to those occurring throughout the country in the same months.

The most important facet of these new approaches for the constabulary was that its members were kept out of the population sweeps and civil home guards. While they shared intelligence and helped coordinate information, those actions were not public, and the constabulary was therefore not visible in these more controversial aspects of ending guerrilla

⁹⁸ Miller, “Diplomatic Spurs,” (May, 1935), 21. The importance of finding Dominicans with personal grudges against area guerrillas is also mentioned in Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 45.

⁹⁹ Miller, Charles J., Lt. Col. “Diplomatic Spurs,” (May, 1935), 20.

warfare. Rather, in maintaining regular patrols while the sugar companies and marines conducted a series of experimental techniques to try to end conflict, the constabulary was actively distanced from the controversy. The new techniques, the tangled negotiations, and the constabulary's role all had major long-term implications for the shifting balance of powers in the region. The events of 1922 in the eastern provinces had the effect of encouraging, rather than discouraging, regional response to regional problems; the centralized military in the form of the constabulary remained largely outside of the specific regional fixes--ironically, with the intended goal of keeping its members out of any direct connection to political questions. Such distancing, while it had the end result of encouraging some aspects of regionalism, was instrumental in the gradual shifting of blame over time from the constabulary and its forces to other groups.

The Hughes-Peynado Plan and the Constabulary

The effects of the new loan, widespread concerns about growing political divisions, and concerted efforts to publicize the illegality of the occupation were all eclipsed in June by the sudden announcement of the Hughes-Peynado Plan. By the time the Dominican population learned the details of the plan, a tentative agreement had already been signed--though as yet it had no legal basis.¹⁰⁰ The plan called for the establishment of a provisional government composed of and selected by representatives of the Dominican people, to plan for a new constitutional government "without the intervention of the authorities of the United States." The military government was to cede all administrative power over the country upon installation of

¹⁰⁰ The 30 June, 1922 plan was signed by Peynado, Archbishop Nouel, party leaders General Horacio Vásquez and Federico Velásquez, and Dominican lawyer Elías Brache who was by then heading the old Jimenista party. It was a tentative agreement, solidified by a permanent agreement in September of 1922 by the same parties. For Peynado's relationships in the United States, and the secrecy with which negotiations were conducted, see Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 221-225; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 855-856; Mejía, *De Lilís a Trujillo*, 180-181. The text of the final agreement of 19 September, 1922 is also reprinted in Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 866-871.

the provisional government, with a Dominican provisional president chosen by party representatives. The new provisional president would appoint Dominicans to all Cabinet positions, and all marine forces would be concentrated in three centers, ceding the military power throughout the country to the constabulary. The provisional government would then designate Dominicans to negotiate a new convention that would recognize all legal changes made and loans contracted under the occupying government. Elections for the constitutional government would not be held until the National Congress approved the agreement's clauses.¹⁰¹

The agreement contained important clauses intended to mollify both sides of any potential debate, but that also had significant implications for the withdrawal period. First, it contained careful language with regard to Dominican nationalist sentiment, including the words "the Dominican Republic has always maintained its right to self-government, the disoccupation of its territory and the integrity of its sovereignty and independence," and "although the Dominican Republic has never delegated authority to any foreign power to legislate for it...." The power of these words was dulled, however, by the act of signing itself. The Hughes-Peynado Agreement sparked immediate controversy and reinvigorated anti-election groups rejecting compromise, leading to a more decisive split between nationalists and the party leaders, who now spoke for the growing number of moderates across the country.¹⁰² Reactions to the withdrawal plan were mixed, and many chided Peynado and party leaders for what they saw as traitorous action. In an important way, however, the damage was already done. To this point, one of the strongest and most inspiring facts uniting the resistance had been that--unlike in Haiti-

¹⁰¹ "Convention of Ratification between the United States and the Dominican Republic as contained in the Agreement of Evacuation of June 30, 1922," *The American Journal of International Law*, 20:2, Supplement: Official Documents (Apr., 1926), 53-64; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 856-859.

¹⁰² 13th Co. Summary of Intelligence, 13 July, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN; "Palpitación Política," *Ecos del Valle*, 29 June, 1922, page 1; 8th Co. Operational Reports, 31 August, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

-no Dominican had signed a formal agreement allowing the United States to occupy their country or otherwise intervene militarily. This had been the strongest measure of the occupation's illegality, and had been one of the essential elements of the nationalists' campaign. Dominican party leaders' signing of the agreement robbed Dominicans of that source of inspiration.

The extensive campaigning and growing split between nationalists and intellectuals on one side and party leaders and moderates on the other had the effect of lessening hatred of the constabulary over time. While the economy continued to present difficulties in the countryside, pockets of armed resisters could no longer find support; party leaders moved through the country giving speeches in favor of the withdrawal plan and in preparation for eventual elections; and rumors spread widely about the future of the military.¹⁰³ By July, with preparations to install a provisional government in October, party leaders denounced any who spoke out against the plan. Many politicians, while supporting the plan and the upcoming provisional government, also still used political opponents' past or current collaboration with the U.S. forces to discredit them.¹⁰⁴ Many in the rising middle class cooperated once the withdrawal was signed, taking advantage of the atmosphere surrounding withdrawal to build up their businesses, seek U.S. investment, and maneuver politically within their provinces. Regional elites, too, were able to take advantage of the atmosphere to work to maintain their regional power while dealing cautiously with Dominican politicians.¹⁰⁵ All of these groups thus became increasingly interested in a maintenance of political order that would please the United States enough to allow successful withdrawal. They still widely disdained the constabulary and saw it as a source of trouble, but

¹⁰³ 13th Co. Summary of Intelligence, 13 July, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹⁰⁴ Intelligence Memos, June, 1922, "213 Memorandum," Box 5, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, Lundius and Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion*, 124-134.

fewer sought to sabotage it openly as they had the previous year.¹⁰⁶ Those signing and supporting the agreement gave every indication that they believed they could control the military with U.S. and politicians' assurances of keeping it apolitical. Months of political maneuvering and widening cooperation therefore gradually allied many groups loosely with the constabulary.

Nationalists, meanwhile, shifted blame gradually from the occupiers and constabulary to those who had signed the withdrawal agreement. That such a number of well-known and politically active *gente de primera* had put their signatures to an agreement with the U.S. government brought a new focus for blame. They held that party leaders had compromised the position of a resistance movement on the verge of achieving unconditional withdrawal. The argument they made is summarized well in the words of poet and nationalist Américo Lugo. Lugo argued that the withdrawal plan doomed the country, that when wide public opinion rejected North American propositions, "when our miniscule state shone with brilliant light over the heart of America like a beautiful diamond; when all that remained, to triumph, was slightly more passive resistance," some Dominicans "renounced at that moment their ancestry and their history" by accepting a compromise withdrawal plan. The result, he argued in 1932, was that "as always, the Dominican people continued blindly following their resuscitated caudillos." Lugo set himself as an enemy of the withdrawal agreement in 1922 with the foundation of a new newspaper that denounced U.S. destruction of Dominican institutions, including the Dominican military.¹⁰⁷ Instead of taking advantage of the moment for change and improvement, the

¹⁰⁶ One editorial, entitled "La Hecatombe de Hayna," decried the violence of the force against unarmed citizens and called it the "so called Policia Nacional." *El Diario*, 25 May, 1922, in Intelligence Reports, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN. This article also calls attention to the disarmament of citizens, holding that the prevalence of arms in pre-occupation society had been instrumental in keeping the military in check.

¹⁰⁷ Julia, *Antología de Américo Lugo*, Vol. III, 72. Peguero, *The Militarization of Dominican Culture*, 42. He was also an immediate enemy of the Trujillo regime when it came to power.

nationalists argued, self-serving Dominicans had doomed the country to repeat its past perpetually.

Party leaders had the backing of U.S. forces and the constabulary, which worked together to discredit nationalist publications against the withdrawal plan. While nationalist leader Henríquez y Carvajal reiterated his promise not to become involved with any political party, or to seek any political office, constabulary reports repeatedly refer to the nationalists as the "Carvajal Party."¹⁰⁸ Welles toured the country as Harding's representative in the months after the plan's announcement, and reported "overwhelming" approval for the program, with exceptions only in Santo Domingo and Santiago, which he attributed to being a case of "extreme agitators" with no following.¹⁰⁹ In reality, the opposition did lack wide popular support in many regions. While they enjoyed support in much of the Cibao, the idea of prolonging occupation to demand unconditional withdrawal was upheld by a shrinking group of intellectuals and elites in areas such as Santo Domingo. Intelligence and operational reports in the constabulary demonstrate that wide segments of the population in some regions were, in fact, very strongly against the plan in the months between its signing and the installation of the provisional government. Santiago's constabulary company reported sabotage and "quite a lot of feeling shown against" Peynado, Vásquez and Velásquez upon their return to the country. "Unknown parties" burned two bridges between Santiago and Monte Cristi in July to keep them from reaching the city to speak about the plan. When the constabulary repaired the bridges and the three arrived and spoke, constabulary members attending reported that "their speeches were not received very

¹⁰⁸ Welles referred to them as the "Nacionalista faction." *Naboth's Vineyard*, 863.

¹⁰⁹ Whitney Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 1981, 143. For Welles's later description of this tour, in which he demonstrates much more understanding of the split opinions of the population during the months before the installation of the provisional government, see *Naboth's Vineyard*, 860-862. Welles states that opposition was so strong that the entire plan would have been deadlocked had it not been for the cooperation of the "Commission of Representatives," composed of those who had signed the withdrawal plan, but he also belittles those supporting Henríquez y Carvajal, calling them "the more excitable elements of the population."

enthusiastically and the audience was very divided. The representatives did not appear to be in popular favor."¹¹⁰

Disapproval was not limited to the major cities. In Monte Cristi, for example, the majority demonstrated open resistance to the plan, and held that party leaders signing of the plan without the consent of the republic made them traitors; some argued that Peynado, Vásquez and Velásquez should be hung, and constabulary reports record rumored attempts to assassinate Peynado.¹¹¹ Juntas Nacionalistas continued to hold meetings denouncing the plan, and outspoken labor leaders such as Eugenio Kunhardt spoke to wide audiences against it. Nationalist groups had the open support of prominent members of society in Puerto Plata, which had long allied itself with the Cibaeño elite, including the provincial governor, clergy, and author of the Dominican national anthem Dr. Emilio Prud'homme. Despite the strong, public, and geographically diverse reaction against the plan by such prominent members of society, constabulary reports disparage the nationalists and minimize their importance, saying that they "have more or less a following among a certain class of people. The better class of people and the majority of the politicians are in favor of the plan as they understand it."¹¹²

The wording of the Hughes-Peynado Plan also had repercussions on military development through the withdrawal period, in large part because it connected the signatures of prominent Dominicans to an agreement that guaranteed the continuation of the U.S.-created constabulary as the sole and permanent armed forces of the country.¹¹³ The plan was a strong compromise not only for Dominicans, but also for U.S. forces, especially in that it called for complete Dominican officer-ship of the constabulary immediately upon the installation of the

¹¹⁰ 10th Co. Report, 20 July, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹¹¹ 6th Co. Report, 20 July, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹¹² 8th Co. Report, 10 August, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹¹³ Bosch, *Trujillo*, 128.

provisional government. It left the military government in place as a separate entity, however, stipulating that Marines would remain in the country, under severe restrictions of movement, until mid-1924 to train the military. When military leaders protested that they could not promise military efficiency without keeping the constabulary under U.S. officers, the compromise solution stipulated that the force would be broken into two parts at the installation of the provisional government: field forces and training-center forces. Marines were to hand over officer-ship of all constabulary field units to Dominican officers, and marine constabulary officers would hold authority only in training centers. The military government would be placed under the control of Brigadier General Harry Lee with the sole function of overseeing training-center forces. While in training, Dominicans would be under the command of U.S. officers until marine withdrawal. The plan contained another important clause to appease U.S. military forces fearing a breakdown of order with the plan's implementation: While it adhered to the wide Dominican refusal to accept military missions, it specified that the constabulary would maintain peace and order "except in the case of serious disturbances which, in the opinion of the Provisional Government and of the Military Government, cannot be suppressed by the Dominican national police [constabulary]." ¹¹⁴ The events of the following year would show that the open threat that of intervention by U.S. forces inherent in this clause was to have a strong, indirect effect on how gradual withdrawal played out.

The negotiations for a final signing of the Hughes-Peynado Plan were contentious through the year. Robison continued to see the entire set of negotiations as a purely military matter. ¹¹⁵ He and the U.S. Navy Department insisted on military changes to the plan, including a

¹¹⁴ Quoted from original publication of the plan in: Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 857-858.

¹¹⁵ For his attempted revisions to the plan, and marine frustration about the installation of the provisional government, see: Miller, Charles J., Lt. Col. "Diplomatic Spurs," (May, 1935), 19; Grieb, "Warren G. Harding and the Dominican Republic," 434-437; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 872.

longer U.S. control of the constabulary and marine supervision of presidential elections, but Dominican representatives rejected such changes. Robison's demands were shut down by the State Department, represented by Sumner Welles. Nationalists continued to refuse participation in the discussions, publishing texts against the plan throughout the year. Welles wrote, in fact, that the extent of contention from different groups was so strong that the plan of evacuation could not have been carried out at all without the close cooperation of the Dominican Commission of Representatives.¹¹⁶ Between the 30 June announcement and the September ratification, nationalist continued to publish strong opposition, but lacked funding. Too many of the elites and merchants who had provided nationalist funds were now cooperating with the U.S. forces, the constabulary, and Dominican parties to effect withdrawal. Disillusioned with the inability to gather sufficient funds and with the growing divisions in the resistance movement, nationalist spokesman Henríquez y Carvajal withdrew back to Cuba and gradually became silent, many of his supporters coming to accept the agreement by September and October.¹¹⁷ With some opposition to continued U.S. controls over Dominican economic affairs, especially regarding repayment of loans, the final version of the Hughes-Peynado agreement was accepted and signed by the Dominican Commission of Representatives in September of 1922.

By the terms of the Hughes-Peynado Plan, Dominicans were soon to be given control of all internal and military affairs with the exception of the marine training schools. Further, remaining U.S. marine and navy officers were to wear Dominican uniforms, but be paid strictly by the U.S. government and not the Dominican one—a drastic and mostly effective change made

¹¹⁶ Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 862.

¹¹⁷ Grieb, "Warren G. Harding and the Dominican Republic," 433; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 218-219.

to decrease resistance to their continued presence.¹¹⁸ The official end of the military occupation would not come until July of 1924. Until then, marines in the training schools would try to carry out all officer training that was to have been done over the previous years.¹¹⁹ While negotiations between the U.S. government and the Dominican Commission of Representatives were under way, the military government had just under four months in power, at the end of which all constabulary field forces would be under the exclusive command of Dominican officers. Around plans for the concentration of marines and the transfer of constabulary leadership, marine Brigade commander Lee worked to clearly define goals for the constabulary. June to October of 1922 was a period of balancing Dominican opinion and interests with U.S. interests. For constabulary planners, it was a time for training and improving the constabulary while trying to guarantee its disassociation with politics. Under increasingly Dominican leadership, companies also focused on building military infrastructure begun in previous years.

By the time the Hughes-Peynado Plan was announced, marine constabulary officers had carried out a massive basic training program and laid plans for successive waves of more advanced training, had begun a broad recruitment campaign, and had improved the equipment and coordination of constabulary units. Throughout the year, constabulary units took the place of marines in posts throughout the country. Thus the opening of withdrawal also allowed for growing cooperation between armed forces and other segments of society. The earliest posts from which marines withdrew were in those areas that civil officials first showed strong cooperation. Marines pulled first out of small posts in the interior provinces of Espaillat and La Vega, then out of the southwestern provinces of Azua and Barahona, and then out of Monte

¹¹⁸ This was especially important in the still-difficult economic atmosphere. In September of 1922, the constabulary also decreased rations for enlisted men from thirty-five to twenty-five cents per ration "owing to prevailing conditions." General Order 26 (1922), 15 September, 1922, Box 5, Folder 53, Ejército Nacional, AGN1.

¹¹⁹ The training budget and all of the transportation of men to and from training centers were paid for by the Dominican government under the constabulary budget.

Cristi and Samaná.¹²⁰ The next major goal for the constabulary was institutional reform and development. To facilitate this, the military government approved an amendment of the constabulary's annual budget from \$500,000 to \$666,664.¹²¹ In company posts, constabulary officers--some marine and some Dominican--even appointed private tutors to enlisted men.¹²² They increased emphasis on recruitment and incentive programs.¹²³ While marine planners had initially hoped to bring the next group of officer recruits for a year of training, and use them during the last half of that year to help train enlisted men, they revised the arrangement when the withdrawal plan was put into motion, shortening the proposed training.¹²⁴ The late 1922 training of a new officer group managed to bring sixty officers from "the older and more experience non-commissioned officers" of the constabulary and even from civil positions throughout the country. About half of them graduated as second lieutenants after having passed a course identical to the one given to the first officer trainees in late 1921.¹²⁵ Those from the first group were promoted to the ranks of first lieutenant and captain as this second group was reattached to posts.

Lee also initiated major changes to the constabulary as an institution, with the goal of increasing the visible legitimacy of the constabulary as a Dominican government entity with a carefully defined role in society. The months before the provisional government's installation were crucial because changes made during that time might be included in withdrawal promises to maintain the laws put into place under the military government. Executive Order 800 of

¹²⁰ "Duties of the 2nd Brigade," from Harry Lee to Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1 July, 1922, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Special Report, "Development of Policia," 4 August, 1922, Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

¹²¹ Executive Order 774, 19 July, 1922.

¹²² Operational reports, July, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN. The reports do not specify what the tutors were teaching in these meetings, but the heavy emphasis on recruiting and maintaining a literate constabulary force, and the continued problem of discovering illiterate men among its ranks, makes it likely that some of the tutoring revolved around literacy.

¹²³ Memoranda, June-July, 1922, File 3, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

¹²⁴ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (August, 1935), 53.

¹²⁵ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 229.

September 1922 revised the 1917 laws and those military institutional laws that had been passed under previous governments--specifically the organizational laws of 1876, 1885, 1910, and 1912, setting future enlistment at two years and specifying that enlistment was to be voluntary. Lee also set up the plan to eventually allow enlargement of the force to 3,000 men. Executive Order 800 emphasized the imperative of demonstrating the absolutely apolitical nature of the constabulary. During withdrawal implementation, no other gradual effort was more instrumental in making the constabulary acceptable than its active distancing from political connections or concerns. This executive orders therefore worked to guarantee a change considered vital by both Dominican Commission representatives and U.S. forces. Article four of Order 800 provided that the top officers of the constabulary were to be appointed or promoted by the executive power with the advice and consultation of the Secretary of State of the Interior and Police.¹²⁶ The irony of this clause and other September and October orders aimed to depoliticize the force, of course, is that they would in the end be the tools by which later dictator Trujillo would come to power.¹²⁷

As the prospect of imminent withdrawal affected constabulary plans through 1922, officers knew that one of the most urgent facets of constabulary design would be this attempt to guarantee an apolitical military.¹²⁸ From the announcement of the Hughes-Peynado plan to the installation of the provisional government, efforts to depoliticize the actions of constabulary members and officers increased. Political questions surrounding withdrawal and the post-occupation balance of power became increasingly contentious through the year, and political meetings in different regions sometimes resulted in violence. When political divisions increased

¹²⁶ Early executive orders of the military government had fused the Secretary of War and Marine with that of Interior and Police. See chapter Three.

¹²⁷ A point made by many historians in examining Trujillo's rise to power. See, for example: Crassweller, *Trujillo* and Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*. See also Executive Order 809 of 9 October, 1922.

¹²⁸ See, for example, "Memorandum to all Department and Company Commanders," April 9, 1922, File 5, "Ejército Nacional," 1922, AGN. This communication reminded company commanders to continuously reiterate the importance of remaining apolitical.

in September and October as groups vied for power, the constabulary even reported machete battles between some political opponents.¹²⁹ Rather than despair about disorder, constabulary leaders took advantage of this potentially damaging situation by promoting the apolitical reaction of the constabulary during such events and insisting that it not interfere with any public or political meetings unless they resulted in public "disorder." Inspector Watson went as far as to order no constabulary interference in any political meetings "other than to see that feeling does not run so high that there will be danger of any armed resistance."¹³⁰ Instead of breaking up meetings, as the constabulary had done in past years, they simply required twelve-hour advance notice of meetings and watched for signs of violence.¹³¹

Marines were convinced that the primary source of problems in previous Dominican governments had been a disorganized military that involved itself in politics; they believed that they could fix the problem by training Dominican soldiers to embrace the military mission of upholding stability while staying removed from politics. During the withdrawal period, they made this argument in internal constabulary and navy-marine communications, but also to the public, seeking to quell concerns about the post-occupation military and to build popular legitimacy for the force. One marine stated that "no other feature of the disoccupation plan received greater consideration, or was more discussed, or the subject of more varied and diversified opinion" than the constabulary. His estimation of both the problems at hand and the highest priorities of constabulary-building in those months summarizes the primary marine argument: pre-occupation military forces had led to armed revolutions, and that the destiny of

¹²⁹ Memo from McLaughlin to Director, 6th Co., 3 October, 1922, File 3, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

¹³⁰ Memo from Watson to PND Colonel Commandant, 4 October, 1922, File 3, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

¹³¹ Memo from McLaughlin to Director, 6th Co., 3 October, 1922, File 3, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, AGN.

the country now depended on the creation of a permanent, efficient military force. Without such a force, he argued, it was unlikely that any constitutional government could remain in power.¹³² Arguments focusing on the need for a strong, apolitical military were a central point of agreement between U.S. forces and political leaders.¹³³ In an effort to guarantee this promise, the U.S. government left a large force of marines in the country during the intermediate period of withdrawal, from 1922 to 1924. Throughout this period, despite their concentration, the number of marines remained steady until after the installation of the constitutional government in 1924 [see Table 7.2]. The continued presence of marines, and the strong U.S. interest in the new government's success, all indicated that there would be external checks on the political power of the new military. The provision that left higher promotions in the executive's control also provided what seemed a strong internal check on its power, thus making the agreement acceptable to those Dominicans involved in the negotiations. While actively distancing constabulary units from any political tensions was meant to improve civil relations and make the withdrawal functional, it also had the gradual effect of removing the constabulary from political and nationalist discussions in which it had so highly figured throughout the occupation.

As one of the commanding marine officers in the training centers, Fellowes emphasized the need for a more powerful military before the withdrawal of U.S. forces, arguing that the pre-occupation armed force "was undermined by politics," and therefore weak and inefficient.¹³⁴ He combined a racist approach--in which he held that Dominican society suffered from a lack of responsibility and initiative and a "moral sense"--with the belief that military training made Dominicans "as a whole courageous and dependable."¹³⁵ The byproduct of this approach, of

¹³² Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (August, 1935), 52.

¹³³ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 334; Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 22, 44.

¹³⁴ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 215-216.

¹³⁵ Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 232.

course, was the sentiment that Dominicans who did not have military training were inferior, less qualified to keep order or maintain a government. In a sense, the thrust of his approach left the unstated theory that a force undermined by politics would be worse than politics undermined by an armed force. Over-correcting for what he saw as the political problem, Fellowes and other marines made evident their distrust of the political element. The constabulary and its intelligence office thus closely monitored the actions of politicians and nationalists, and whether members of the pre-occupation military attempted to involve themselves in politics.¹³⁶

Meanwhile, they strengthened the military and put faith in the ability of a well-organized and trained military to maintain order. Miller estimated in 1935 that "any failure of the organization, should it occur, will not come from within, but will emanate from sources over which the Policia will have no control."¹³⁷ As this statement was made five years after the constabulary's commandant had carried out a *coups d'état* and placed himself in power as a military dictator, Miller clearly did not see a military take-over of politics as a failure of the organization.

While trying to demonstrate an apolitical character, the constabulary also had to deal with the populace and civil government during the adjusting of laws that accompanied withdrawal. The atmosphere of compromise and the effective breaking of unified nationalism made it possible to push laws through before the provisional government took office. For example, despite efforts in previous years, it was not until August of 1922 that an executive order made *guardas campestre* directly responsible to the constabulary.¹³⁸ Before withdrawal was in motion, traditions of local autonomy and land-owners' sovereignty had frustrated attempts to do so. In August, the constabulary also began to work toward greatly reducing civilian arms permits that

¹³⁶ Intelligence Reports, July, 1922, File 24, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹³⁷ Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (August, 1935), 55.

¹³⁸ Letter from constabulary commandant Richard M. Cutts to Robison, 21 August, 1922, Box 106 (1916-1924), "Gobierno Militar Americano," AGN1.

had been granted through the course of the occupation. The order's language demonstrates the prioritization in the new balance of power: merchants, high-ranking government officials, and the military were to have control of firearms in the country. As the constabulary took control of localities from marines, arms permits were reevaluated, with the goal of leaving arms only in the hands of municipal police, civil officials who needed them, banks, "reputable business houses," and "reputable American [sic.] engaged in business or in the service of the government."¹³⁹

High-ranking constabulary officers and marines struggled with the fact that Dominicans saw even the occupation marine forces as a more legitimate force than the constabulary. On the eve of the provisional government's installation, Dominicans were still petitioning U.S. forces rather than the constabulary for help.¹⁴⁰ Attempts to get Dominicans to turn instead to the constabulary revealed the urgent need during the period to stress reforms that improved the reputation and general legitimacy of the constabulary. The progressive "Dominicanization" of the constabulary through the year, allowing trained constabulary units to take over interior garrisons, answered to the strongest charges against the foreign-officered military.¹⁴¹ It did not, however, drastically improve the institution's reputation. Only time could have that effect, and the gradual withdrawal plan guaranteed such time for the constabulary during which marines would be present in large numbers in case of any civil disorder that threatened the constabulary's

¹³⁹ "Exchange of arms permits in provinces where Policia has assumed control," 10 August, 1922 and memo from Inspector T.E. Watson, "Arms Permits," 14 August, 1922, Box 4, File "73, autorizaciones," "Ejército Nacional," AGN1. In other words, this order reinforced the method of the occupation years.

¹⁴⁰ Memo to Commanding General 2nd Brigade, 6 October, 1922, File 24, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

¹⁴¹ *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1922*, 35, 839; Heintz, Robert Debs Jr. *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962*. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1962, 251; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 62-64. By the time the provisional government took power, all marines outside of training centers were concentrated in Santo Domingo, Santiago, and Puerto Plata, with the exception of two mounted marine detachments that continued to aid the constabulary in the field in the Eastern District. This group of marines was justified by the clause in the withdrawal agreement that authorized marine intervention under the provisional government in cases of necessity. Special Report, "Development of Policia Nacional," 11 December, 1922, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

power. Before the beginning of the provisional government, marine constabulary officers took one last action designed to help Dominicans accept the constabulary as something other than a foreign imposition: Rather than appointing the institution's new commandant from among the ranks, they recruited the highly respected pre-occupation Colonel Buenaventura Cabral.¹⁴² Cabral, military officer and *gente de primera* from one of the old elite families, was the grandson of former president Buenaventura Báez. Many nationalists could also accept him due to his progressive record as governor during the occupation.¹⁴³ As Vega points out, Cabral's appointment as commandant allowed the constabulary to claim some legitimacy and continuity from the pre-occupation past.¹⁴⁴ His appointment probably had a large impact on nationalists' gradual acceptance of the constabulary. To justify this appointment after claiming that the 1922 development of the constabulary had been "the greatest advance in the military government in several years," Marines reported home that the man they had made commandant was "a Dominican who has risen up through the ranks" under U.S. training.¹⁴⁵

Conclusion

The constabulary was not turned into a legitimate national armed force simply upon the withdrawal, and nor was it a rapid transition during the occupation. Instead, the constabulary's growing success began by default with the breakdown of the nationalist camp, improved little by little over time as changes were made, and was still an issue of contention upon marine withdrawal from the country. The breakdown of unified resistance over the course of many

¹⁴² General Order 35 (1922) effective 21 October, 1922. Box 5, File 53, Ejército Nacional, AGN1. In 1917 and 1918, Marines had specifically worked to keep Cabral from participating in the new military, placing him in successive provincial governor positions. See Chapter Three.

¹⁴³ See, for example, "Anunciamiento de la inauguración del puente Yaque del Sur por el Departamento de Obras Públicas," *Ecos del Valle*, 13 October, 1921, 4.

¹⁴⁴ Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 45.

¹⁴⁵ *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1922*, 31.

months was a product of various factors and of the conduct of the many national and international actors involved in the occupation. The compromise agreement to end the occupation, which itself could only come together through gradual alliances and negotiations, bred further alliances and negotiations. The sheer length of time during which these negotiations played out under the protection of U.S. marines allowed many other processes to evolve. It was only through these sets of processes and compromises that the constabulary came to be seen as legitimate, and to gain the guarantee of future U.S. military and Dominican political support in its rise to power. The gradualness of the compromise withdrawal allowed the newly infused U.S. loans to begin an improvement of the Dominican economy over time, so that the economy did not appear to improve at the moment that U.S. forces left the country. Two years of incremental withdrawal allowed the marines to improve their standing among the population and, more importantly, to build their relations with and empower the Dominican constabulary. It allowed time for the guerrilla movements to fizzle and be largely forgotten, and for the less accurate versions of the guerrilla warfare to become common-place. It gave marines time to train their recruits, and the latitude to allow the appointment of a pre-occupation and largely nationalist Dominican officer over the constabulary with the knowledge that his command would be limited, and that their trainees would be in the highest officer positions and ready to take control of the constabulary.

Table 7.1. Total Actual Constabulary Strengths, 1916-1924.¹⁴⁶

Jul, 1917	575
Oct, 1917	600
Aug, 1919	1,186
Feb, 1921	346
Aug, 1922	902
Nov, 1922	1,201
Dec, 1922	1,213
Jan 1923	1,227
Feb 1923	1,268
Mar 1923	1,183
May 1923	1,252
Jul 1923	1,249
Sep 1923	1,270
Nov 1923	1,270
Jan 1924	1,266
Mar 1924	1,272
May 1924	1,243
Jun 1924	1,243

Table 7.2 Total Marine strength in the Dominican Republic 1920-1924.¹⁴⁷

Mar 1920	1,838
Nov 1920	2,267
Jul 1921	2,323
Oct 1921	2,811
Jan 1922	2,576
Nov 1922	2,189
Feb 1923	2,305
May 1923	1,946
Mar 1924	2,076
Jul 1924	890
Sep 1924	133
Oct 1924	0

¹⁴⁶ We lack the exact numbers for overall constabulary strength in 1920, but we do know that mid- to late-1919 successful recruitment was short-lived. March 1923 was the first major period of reenlistment after the withdrawal plan announcement. Records were neither standardized nor complete through the early years of the occupation, and the exact number of Dominicans in the constabulary was at many points unclear. Also, full strengths, when listed, do not differentiate between Dominicans in the constabulary and those from the United States or other foreign countries who often populated its ranks. Many reports do not mention the numbers at all until they began to reach full enlistment for the first time in 1922, presumably because the low recruitment contradicted reports of progress. The numbers in this table are gleaned from a variety of sources: Communications within "Gobierno Militar Americano," (1916-1920), AGN1; Goldwert, *The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua*, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), 12; *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1917*, 840; Special Reports, "Development of Policia Nacional," from Commanding General, 2nd Brigade to Major General Commandant, USMC, 13 September, 1922 and 11 December, 1922, Geographical Files "Dom Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 47, 88.

¹⁴⁷ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 89. The constitutional government came to power in March of 1924.

CONCLUSION

The Constabulary under Dominican Government: Legitimacy, Revision, and the Tools of Dictatorship

With the combination of new alliances of convenience that came together to end the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic in the years 1921-1924 came compromise groups necessary to make withdrawal possible. As a side product, the same set of relationships combined with Dominican leadership to make the constabulary a mildly acceptable institution in society. Those Dominicans who had the ears of U.S. authorities--meaning those party leaders and constabulary officers who cooperated with the efforts of Commissioner Sumner Welles and Minister Russell--were clearly to have a say in the construction of a post-occupation society. As this fact gradually became more clear through 1922, those who cooperated increased, and those who dissented were silenced or discredited as possible--a trend that continued to build momentum through the withdrawal period, and after withdrawal, would be carried with the growing power of the constabulary in the Trujillo Era. For those who increasingly cooperated in withdrawal efforts, or even those who sought to be uninvolved and stay outside of controversy, cooperation with the withdrawal effort became synonymous with at least surface cooperation with the constabulary. During the final years of the occupation and withdrawal, a growing number of elites, merchants, and politicians fell in line with the withdrawal plan. In so doing, with the long-extant potential threat of marine intervention (a potential both real and imagined), they allowed the constabulary to become what U.S. forces insisted it must become: a permanent institution serving as guarantor of basic political order.

Many Dominicans were reassured by promises that the force would remain out of politics, especially over the course of a seventeen-month withdrawal period that included improved training, professionalization, and Dominicanization of the force and its leadership. The process of building and maintaining alliances for acceptable withdrawal, and thus against those who demanded unconditional withdrawal, strengthened through 1922, but solidified with the final signing of the Hughes-Peynado Plan on 23 September and the 21 October installation of the long-awaited Dominican provisional government. While the constabulary continued to focus its resources and men on training and on presenting itself as apolitical, the Dominican Commission of Representatives settled upon Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos as provisional president, and set to work on campaigning for the March, 1924 elections for a constitutional president. Politicians and U.S. forces alike agreed that Vicini Burgos was a good choice, as he was a Dominican elite with no previous political affiliation, a wealthy man from a traditional family that owned extensive sugar estates.¹ The actual moment of appointment of a Dominican president had as much effect on compromise and legitimizing of the new authority as did the appointment of Cabral at the head of the constabulary. For example, most of the guerrillas remaining in the field turned themselves in as soon as his government was in place.² Vicini Burgos worked closely with marine and navy officers who had staffed cabinet positions, and worked well with Sumner Welles, facilitating the delicate task of switching governments.

Despite the optimism that accompanied the installation of a Dominican government, the military question continued to be contentious. While the new provisional government got its bearings, marine and constabulary officers struggled with the inherently difficult task of splitting the force into two parts with two different commands. The return of sovereignty and the prestige

¹ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 334; Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 229-230; Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (August, 1935), 55; Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 65.

² Again, with the exception of Perun de la Cruz.

of a military now run by a respected Dominican officer of the elite class improved enlisted constabulary morale and aided recruitment, and it was with the installation of Cabral and the Vicini Burgos government that the constabulary finally reached full recruitment numbers and maintained them [See Table 7.1]. The installation of an actual Dominican government, as much as negotiations and discussions for withdrawal, was a clear step toward making the constabulary seem legitimate to those it might recruit. Those who joined during the withdrawal period and provisional government could not be accused of working for the foreign occupying government, nor for accepting the command of foreign officers. Further, once again apparently under the command of one of the old elites, the constabulary seemed a well-armed and organized Dominican military, a potential source of pride.³

Those who had been accused of working under the Americans, or of being "Americanized," were also safely in the highest officer ranks below commandant before withdrawal, responsible for command of department headquarters, company posts, and the Intelligence Office. At the time of the provisional government's installation, all of the Dominican officers who had passed the first officer training in Haina the year before were in high leadership positions of the constabulary, most in administrative officer ranks. Four of them, including Rafael Trujillo, commanded companies.⁴ Widely respected Dominican nationalists like Américo Lugo published denunciations of the constabulary and its claim to continuity with the past, insisting that the old military and all it represented had been destroyed by occupation. Constabulary officers' morale was high, however. They had gained rapid training and promotions, and now looked to a near future with wide possible increases in rank and prestige.

³ Despite marine insistence that the country had no military tradition, it had a powerful one, and in spite of problems with previous militaries, a pride in the Dominican armed forces was a vital force in Dominican society from the time of independence.

⁴ Rosters in: File 31, Bundle 19, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes, 1923," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

Earlier threats to overthrow the constabulary or its leadership vanished as the political questions of election--or rejection of elections--took precedence, and constabulary officers' ranks were safe due to both the tacit support of so many groups in society and the long-continuing presence of marines in the country after the installation of Vicini Burgos's government.

Many groups of men enlisting before and during 1921, who had worked together through and after the constabulary cutbacks early in that year, had developed some *esprit-de-corps*. This was perhaps strengthened by remaining together through the trial of remaining together against the extensive resistance against the constabulary. Indeed, one of the goals of passing entire companies through training together was to build camaraderie. Marine commanding officers in the training centers were re-indoctrinated to adopt a different, and less blatantly racist, attitude when working with Dominicans, and were reminded that they were in the country as friends and not as an occupying or oppressive force.⁵ The praise that they lavished on those moving through the training centers reminded those men that they had remained loyal to their force and stuck together while so much of the population had been against them.

The sustained presence of marines until late 1924 was not the only continuing U.S. influence. As many anti-compromise nationalists would point out, the influence of the wishes of U.S. diplomats and military forces played a strong role in the political and institutional development of the withdrawal period despite the agreement's promise that they would not. The gradualness and extent of compromise involved in making the withdrawal work allowed continuous U.S. interference outside the military training centers. From Vicini Burgos's close working relationship with Sumner Welles, and the latter's work with U.S. Minister Russell, came continued gradual compromise. The provisional president's exact responsibility for allowing

⁵ Special Reports, "Development of Policia Nacional," from Commanding General, 2nd Brigade to Major General Commandant, USMC, 4 August, 1922 and 11 December, 1922, Geographical Files "Dom Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

Welles an active role is unclear. Regardless of whether Vicini Burgos requested intervention in elections plans or was pressured to allow it, Welles remained in the Dominican Republic and played a decisive role in moderating between the desires of Dominicans and occupation forces.⁶ He traveled the country at length, authorized as a minister and representative of the U.S. president, speaking to Dominicans and working to balance the desires of U.S. business and military forces with what he thought might be acceptable among the Dominican population.⁷ His main goal, in addition to making the withdrawal work as smoothly as possible, was to foster more friendly relations between Dominicans and the U.S. businesses and government. His presence and authority in the construction of a withdrawal and a new electoral process were decisive, but also problematic. Welles had no official authority within the Dominican Republic, in that his active role was not authorized in the Hughes-Peynado Plan. It was, therefore, a highly influential but unofficial position, validated only by the lack of protest from the president. As one Dominican scholar describes, Welles's plan left the electoral review process in the hands of a small number of Dominicans who would cooperate with his vision.⁸

In addition to making the gradual withdrawal process function more smoothly while guaranteeing the strength of U.S. interests, this contentious (and unofficial) cooperation between Welles and the provisional government was the center of a wider atmosphere of unofficial U.S.

⁶ The U.S. government held that Vicini Burgos himself requested Welles's mission to continue through the life of the provisional government. Grieb, "Warren G. Harding and the Dominican Republic," 438. This comes from the communications of U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. Ortega Frier, in his *Memorandum relativo a la intervención de Sumner Welles*, describes attempts by Welles to get Vicini Burgos to act as his front man and pass off Welles's ideas as his own. Frier holds that when the president refused to do so, wishing to maintain neutrality between the parties, Welles was able to assert his will due to lack of direction from the provisional government, political infighting, and Welles's ability to communicate between all groups involved. Frier outlines this discussion on pages 17-19. Both Grieb and Frier note initial opposition to and eventual acceptance of Welles's interventions among Dominicans. Grieb, "Warren G. Harding and the Dominican Republic," 433; Ortega Frier, *Memorandum relativo a la intervención*, 20.

⁷ Letter from Sumner Welles to U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, 13 October, 1922, File 1922, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Grieb, "Warren G. Harding and the Dominican Republic," 433-439.

⁸ Ortega Frier, *Memorandum*, 5-14.

involvement in the shaping of the post-occupation Dominican Republic. This was evident, too, in marines' continued advising of military forces outside the training centers, in the East, through communications, and with the continued presence of marines in administrative constabulary posts.⁹ Advising marines argued that the transfer of power had to be gradual rather than hasty. "The provisional government has a great deal to do in order to establish a constitutional government which will be insured of stability and success. The provisional government is therefore more or less on trial in the eyes of the Dominican people and in the eyes of the world. The Policia Nacional Dominicana [constabulary] is on trial in maintaining peace and order in the Republic. That military body is a product of our own labors, and its success will be our success."¹⁰ Marines in the country therefore felt they had a strong stake in the success of the military. In part, they were able to convey their aims during training, as the training program was still the top military priority for the provisional government. The constabulary correspondence of 1923 demonstrates a heavy emphasis on transporting men for training and returning them to their companies, and on how the movement was facilitated by the improved infrastructure, the lack of guerrilla warfare, and the population's general focus on the political scenes and upcoming final withdrawal of U.S. troops.¹¹ Marines estimated that the end result was a resounding success. Fellowes argued in 1923 that during the years of training and withdrawal the force had "progressed from a stagnant body of underfed, badly equipped" force to

⁹ Much like the cooperation of Vicini Burgos with U.S. officers through 1922 and 1923, Cabral's cooperation with previous U.S. commanding officers of the constabulary was necessitated by his lack of experience with the new organization. Marine Thomas F. Norris was the constabulary's Intendant General, in command of administrative records, through 1923.

¹⁰ Kilmartin, "Indoctrination in Santo Domingo," 383. These words come from the speech prepared by Lane for marine training during the withdrawal period.

¹¹ See Special Orders, File 19, Box 34, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes," 1923, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

an efficient, well-trained, and well-armed force of 1,200 men with sufficient vehicles and the ability to move across the country from Santo Domingo to Santiago in four hours time.¹²

While moving companies through training centers in 1923, however, the "well-trained and loyal" force that Fellowes describes continued to be plagued by discipline problems and an overall lack of respect for civilians. Throughout the year, reports by civilians demonstrate that many constabulary members continued to abuse their power, and that civilians continued to be afraid to report incidents. The attacks on civilians included physical attacks on literate and middle class civilians, and on women, as demonstrated by the case of Señora Petronila Almanzar, who was physically attacked at a dance in February by constabulary Sergeant Mario Santos of the 3rd Company.¹³ Constabulary members also continued to be accused of extorting money from the populace. In one case in August, a sixty-year-old farmer who said he had been afraid to report the incident for a month came forth to report that a constabulary unit had brought a gun into his home while searching it for arms, and then demanded \$35 to pay the fine.¹⁴ Similar incidents were common, and many accusations came with multiple witnesses.¹⁵ In turn, many Dominicans continued to lack respect for the force. Company reports for the year include, for example, frequent problems with civil authorities refusing to cooperate with constabulary

¹² Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 233. Fellowes's reporting of the racial composition of the pre-training military is especially interesting as a technique for "demonstrating" the success of training, because the racial composition of the forces changed little if at all during the years of training described.

¹³ Investigation, including written statement of Sra. Almanzar, dated 1 March, 1923, File 19, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes, 1923," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

¹⁴ Investigation reports, 7th Co., 12 September, 1923, including a transcript of the statement of Sr. Saba Hernández, File 19, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes, 1923," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

¹⁵ See, for example, the investigation reports in the case of Sr. Domingo Valerio, a thirty-five-year-old farmer, dated 11 September, 1923, File 19, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes, 1923," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

efforts.¹⁶ Further, when civil authorities did make arrests, constabulary officers sometimes overturned the arrests without explanation.¹⁷

With many men removed from companies for training or in transit at any given time throughout the year, and around the continuance of such accusations, Cabral struggled to improve military-civil relations. He reprimanded the force for outrages against Dominican civilians and U.S. engineers working for the Office of Public Works. His memoranda reminded commanding officers of the need to demonstrate Dominican ability to self-govern, a problem brought to his attention by the central government. He stated that disparaging conduct and disrespectful actions against Public Works officials, which sometimes included violent demonstrations by constabulary officers, would "be seen as anti-patriotic and a demonstration of ineptitude."¹⁸ Due to the especially sensitive nature of such interactions with a department that included U.S. engineers, he also had the constabulary officers in charge of the regional departments specifically designate appropriate officers for interaction with the Office of Public Works.¹⁹ As part of the focus on military-civil relations and withdrawal, the constabulary also brought all officers through an instructional program in Santo Domingo for marine-aided training in civil-military relations and the portrayal of the occupation status to Dominican.²⁰

The constabulary also struggled with continued difficulties of insubordination within the chain of command. The attitudes of subordinates in constabulary posts was as chaotic after the

¹⁶ Reports, File 19, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes, 1923," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

¹⁷ For example, Captain José Arias, the head of the Intelligence Office in May of 1923, was in the 10th Company barracks in Moca when he learned of the arrest of a resident who tried to visit a prisoner but was found to have a gun on his person. When Arias was informed of the arrest, he sent a telegram ordering the release of the prisoner. Constabulary Investigations dated May and June, 1923, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes," 1923, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

¹⁸ See especially "Memorandum to all post chiefs," 1 October, 1923, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes," 1923, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

¹⁹ Memorandum, 9 October, 1923, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes," 1923, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

²⁰ Special Order 165-1923, 9 October, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes," 1923, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

installation of the provisional government as it was the year before. Investigations of blatant insubordination were still common in 1922-1924. With the gradual removal of marines from constabulary posts, Dominican constabulary officers had great difficulty getting men to obey orders. In Samaná, for example, a long investigation was begun due to the typical insubordination of a private. Sergeant Marcelino of the 13th Company ordered Private Juan González to clean the barracks, at which the latter promptly returned to his house to drink coffee instead. When Marcelino and another private went to disarm and arrest González for insubordination, the latter ran for the barracks, took up a rifle, and pointed it at his superior officer. A gun-fight was stopped only by the intervention of a citizen. After the incident, Marcelino snuck up on González to arrest him, and hit him on the back, leading to a fist fight between the two. When two privates broke up the fight and took González to the prison, the jailor refused to confine him, and he returned back outside and began to throw rocks at Sergeant Marcelino.²¹ Such incidents continued to be common over the course of the next year, insubordination common in constabulary barracks.²²

By the middle of 1923, in addition to general insubordination, a clear division had formed within the ranks between those who had served in the constabulary longer and under U.S. occupation, and those who joined in 1922. Many of the new constabulary officers of the second officer-training program, second lieutenants and some first lieutenants, found themselves quickly at odds with the earlier officers who had worked under marines before the withdrawal period had begun. One reason was that newer officers tended to try to apply traditional regional fixes to problems in ways that the 1921 period had discouraged. Along the border with Haiti, especially,

²¹ 13th Co. Report, 4 January, 1922, Statement of private Domingo Peñalo, 14 January, 1922, Statement of Juan Marcelino, 5 January, 1922, and statement of Juan González, 3 January, 1922, File 7, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN.

²² Investigations, File 19, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes, 1923," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895.

constabulary men who knew the area continued to authorize now illegal cultural festivals and celebrations, whether for monetary gain or the smoothing over of tensions with the local populations.²³ More sinister to the success of the constabulary's chain of command, however, was a growing power struggle in which the newer officers and enlisted men exchanged warnings about their superiors. The communications that survive in the record demonstrate a strong lack of trust, and accuse the higher ranked officers of being untrustworthy or poor friends and of committing illegal acts. Second Lieutenant Manuel M. Santamaría reported in an investigation that first lieutenant Bruno Zapata had told him that Captain Rafael Trujillo was a poor friend, and that Santamaría and others should not trust him.²⁴ One private reported to Colonel García denouncing acts of violence, drunkenness, and immorality by Captain José Navarro, who insulted and outraged "humble people." The private demonstrated his concern not only that these actions disgraced the name of the constabulary, but also a concern for his own position because he believed that Navarro had a personal grudge against him.²⁵ Such internal power struggles and concerns were widespread through 1923, and tapered off in 1924; many of those making the complaints chose not to re-enlist in 1924, while officers such as Trujillo and Navarro continued to gain rank--the first constabulary officers being the clear winner in the power struggle by the time of U.S. troops withdrawal in mid-1924. Those constabulary officers who had worked longest with U.S. officers, many since before 1920, were clearly in positions of relative power--and not only by rank. As Vega points out, even the aging Cabral was appointed as a temporary figurehead, to be replaced upon his retirement by one of the U.S.-trained officers. The officer

²³ Constabulary investigations, June 1923, File 19, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes," 1923, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN. These celebrations, like cock-fighting, had been made illegal during the course of occupation reforms that attempted to reform the Dominican Republic and Haiti culturally.

²⁴ Investigation, 17 August, 1923, File 19, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes," 1923, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

²⁵ Letter from Private Francisco Gil to Colonel García, 25 June, 1923, File 19, "Correspondencia, Ordenes, Informes," 1923, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007895, AGN.

under him who had the most friends among marines was guaranteed promotion beyond his ranks when César Lora, the Director of the Department of the North, was killed in early 1924. Vicini Burgos, pliant as always, was persuaded to elevate Trujillo over his superiors to replace Lora.²⁶

Through compromise and gradual development, the withdrawal period generally allowed a great deal of U.S. intervention, and the constabulary was shaped as the marines who had created it hoped it would be. During the withdrawal period, many processes were at work that affected the balance of power in the post-occupation military. While various actors worked to make the constabulary respectable and apolitical, many forces were also elevating it to increased authority, and political currents were already running through it. Its officers struggled for power while marines supported the careers of some over others. Many within the ranks saw the constabulary as a continuance of the traditional Dominican military path to social power, but it came with significant changes, from the lack of involvement by the *gente de primera* and the support of marines--both characteristics that made many Dominicans not take the constabulary seriously. The *gente de primera* and political party leaders did not take it seriously as an authority, but neither did they seem to perceive it as a serious threat to their position. Party leaders maneuvered for power in the country's wide political division during a long and contentious withdrawal process, but worked against the counter currents of the demands and concerns of marines and the military government, nationalist literature, and a pliant central provisional government with a president who was uninterested in politics. Welles got statements from both candidates guaranteeing that the military would be kept out of politics.²⁷ Party leader Horacio Vásquez already had plans, however, for how to use the constabulary to his benefit in the event of his election.

²⁶ Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 44-45; Crassweller, *Trujillo*, 48-49; Peguero, *The Militarization of Culture*, 47-48.

²⁷ Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 1981, 145.

When national presidential elections were held on 15 March, 1924, they occurred with a lack of disturbance and a high voter turnout.²⁸ As per Welles's intervention, marines remained in their barracks during the voting, quelling Dominican fears of further intervention. The clear and unsurprising winner in the election was General Horacio Vásquez of the Partido Nacional, who had formed an alliance with the Partido Progresista that made Federico Velásquez his vice president.²⁹ Vásquez, an old general and caudillo from the pre-occupation era, was a man who used traditional methods of building alliances, and whose traditional background seemed comfortably Dominican. His traditional military background probably played an important role in the success of his presidential campaign.³⁰ Marines, for their part, seemed confident that the constabulary would be able to restrict his power. Despite his use of the infrastructural change and new physical unity of the country during the nationalist campaign and then his presidential campaign, Vásquez did not understand the extent of change that had occurred and how it would affect his presidency. This played well into the immediate desires of U.S. forces, who had hoped to set changes in motion that would be continued by the new constitutional government. Vásquez took office on 12 July, 1924, and the marines ended their direct involvement in training and withdrew from the country. Yet many scholars have called the post-occupation government, at least to some extent, "merely an extension of the U.S. occupation," so completely did it follow the programs put in place under the occupation.³¹ For his part, Vásquez was glad to continue the programs that improved the country's infrastructure, and oversaw a government with wide respect for civil liberties and a broadly involved electorate.

²⁸ Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, 144.

²⁹ Francisco Peynado, author of the Hughes-Peynado Plan, was the defeated party in the elections.

³⁰ See Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 335.

³¹ Moya-Pons, *The Dominican Republic*, 341.

Vásquez knew from experience with the nationalist movement that Dominicans would not accept a continuation of the marine training mission, and turned down the request when U.S. officers proposed it.³² He also knew from experience that the best way to assure his government's stability was to promote the power of the military and befriend its officers, and made a strong point of offering the highest constabulary ranks to those officers he thought would be most loyal. Already, in 1924, he planned to push Cabral into retirement and elevate either Jesús García or Rafael Trujillo. His Secretary of Interior and Police, Angel Morales, was a long-time Horacista who had also been Minister to Washington. Morales was quick to see to the promotion of Trujillo by helping to push Cabral into retirement.³³ The power of the executive to handle promotions in the military, of course, gave Vásquez the power to choose for the commandant's replacement the officer he believed most loyal to him. The ambitious Trujillo made himself that man. Through 1924 and 1925, many noticed that the constabulary was already becoming politicized. U.S. Minister Russell stated in mid-1925 that "politics is fast destroying the efficiency of the Dominican National Police," and pointed to several "purely political" personnel decisions--especially the forcing out of Cabral and the promotion of pro-Vásquez officers Simón Díaz and Rafael Trujillo.³⁴ The process begun with the withdrawal agreement by which party leaders gradually became allied with the constabulary ironically had the effect of guaranteeing the constabulary's involvement in politics after the removal of U.S. forces. In other words, the process by which Trujillo and Vásquez worked together to politicize the constabulary was unintentionally built into the gradual withdrawal compromise in 1922-1924.

³² Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 60, end note 88 on pages 267-268.

³³ Vega, *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 44-45.

³⁴ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 61.

Another gradual process at work during the withdrawal period, which contributed to the symbiotic relationship of military and politics by gradually helping to build the legitimacy of the constabulary over time, was the revision of important aspects of the occupation's history. The sources of revision were multiple, sometimes accidental, and emanated from various sources, many of whose motivations for revision had no direct relation to the constabulary. The process had begun, of course, with the occupation forces' discrediting of guerrilla fighters and their downplaying or ignoring of any patriotic or nationalist aspects within the guerrilla movements. Their effort was unintentionally aided by the refusal of nationalists to support the armed resistance openly. The publicity strategy of even the most unified nationalist campaign in 1921 had sought international legitimacy through demonstrating the more "civilized" use of passive resistance, leading some of its members to support guerrilla movements only secretly. Similarly, as the nationalist strategy emphasized the desire and capacity for self-rule, they drew attention to complaints against marines and foreigners while often de-emphasizing complaints against Dominicans--even those in the constabulary.

The two-pronged process of silencing many aspects of the constabulary-guerrilla warfare multiplied in force with compromise for withdrawal. By 1922, it quickly became clear that the withdrawal set in motion would not occur without the constabulary, and of course would not occur with any continuation or justification of armed resistance. In this sense, nationalist opponents of compromise withdrawal were right in their argument that the compromise vindicated some aspects of the hated occupation. As even the most respected guerrilla leaders surrendered and were placed on parole and monitored by extensive constabulary intelligence, their presence and power in society passed into historical silence. Already, with surrenders in May of 1922, newspapers were beginning to discredit the guerrillas and their movements.

Newspaper stories began to repeat the marine characterization of the "bandits" who had caused such great destruction in the eastern countryside.³⁵ Marines described the guerrillas as "armed groups who preyed upon the Dominican people and lived in the countryside. Some of these styled themselves as patriots or revolutionists opposed to the American occupation. Whatever their status, they were preying upon the Dominican people. . . Our forces have kept them on the run and made life pretty uncomfortable for them, until finally, the remaining few decided that banditry was not such a great life after all and surrendered themselves and their arms."³⁶ This description, widely repeated, made no mention of the pre-occupation guerrilla warfare in the East. It made no mention of the significant involvement of the constabulary, or the Guardia Republicana, sugar estates, or civilian home guards. In fact, the description left all Dominicans out of the equation except for those who had fought the armed resistance, making it easy to write off the entire affair as a product of occupation, the fault only of occupation and disorderly forces.³⁷ Over the course of the constabulary's rise to power through the 1920s, backed by this disregard for the complexity of the history of guerrilla warfare, the previous guerrilla fighters were physically silenced, as well. Ramón Natera, for example, was killed in 1923 in an altercation with a *guarda campestre* sent by an official of the local constabulary post. Reports were based solely on the testimony of the officials.³⁸ Those guerrilla leaders who did survive the 1920s remained under close watch of the constabulary intelligence office, and were killed in the early 1930s after Rafael Trujillo rose to the top ranks of the constabulary and overthrew the constitutional government.

³⁵ See, for example, the 17 May, 1922 edition of the *Boletín Mercantil*, a San Pedro de Macorís newspaper. Ducoudray discusses the shifting politics of this newspaper in: *Los Gavilleros del Este*, 93-95.

³⁶ Kilmartin, "Indoctrination in Santo Domingo," 382-383.

³⁷ In Condit and Tunbladh's history, *Hold High the Torch*, the section about the marine operations in the eastern provinces of the Dominican Republic never mentions the constabulary at all.

³⁸ Ducoudray, *Los Gavilleros del Este*, 69-71; *Listín Diario*, 27 November, 1923.

During the withdrawal period and thereafter, marines had a strong interest in providing an over-simplified portrait of the guerrillas mainly due to the need to improve marine morale and cover the blemish that the occupation had caused on the marines reputation. Both of these needs had defined marine descriptions in earlier years, and both increased and were expanded to descriptions of the general occupation in the 1922-1924 period. The maintenance of around 2,000 marines in three concentrated areas in Santo Domingo, Santiago, and Puerto Plata also made the situation very difficult for the men. Their activities and authority were greatly restricted. While the forces maintained provost courts for incidents involving direct assaults on U.S. military personnel or thefts of property, even then their jurisdiction excluded clergy or employees of the Dominican government. They "could not carry arms outside their assembly areas and could travel on liberty only in the vicinity of their camps." They required permission from Dominican authorities to move troops.³⁹ In addition to the restrictions and new and very limited official role, they were still widely hated. Through 1922 as they concentrated their forces, and even for months after the installation of the provisional government, marines were regularly attacked and insulted by Dominicans.⁴⁰

In their frustration, marines also initiated attacks on Dominicans, beginning fist fights in restaurants in the cities, for example.⁴¹ Such tension was a great source of concern to the commanding marines. At the same time that withdrawal made urgent the centralization, growth,

³⁹ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 66.

⁴⁰ Constabulary Intelligence Reports, 16 March, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN; Statement of Sergeant William G. Hoffman, 5 August, 1922, File 1922, "Gobierno Militar Americano 1917-1924, varios sin clasificación," "Gobierno Militar Americano, Box #119, AGN1; Report of W.M. Quigley to Department of Interior and Police, 19 August, 1922, "Disorder in San Pedro de Macoris," File 1922, "Gobierno Militar Americano 1917-1924, varios sin clasificación," "Gobierno Militar Americano, Box #119, AGN1; Report of 15 September, 1922, File 1922, "Gobierno Militar Americano 1917-1924, varios sin clasificación," "Gobierno Militar Americano, Box #119, AGN; C.H. Lyman, "Indoctrination Report," 5 January, 1923, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico. This document describes a case in which a "mob" of Dominicans "with unquestionable premeditation stoned a number of marines."

⁴¹ See, for example, "Disturbance, Report of," 8 August, 1922, File 1922, "Gobierno Militar Americano 1917-1924, varios sin clasificación," "Gobierno Militar Americano, Box #119, AGN1.

and improvement of the constabulary and its training, the marines and navy--embattled internationally and at home from the publicity the occupation and brutalities received in 1920-1921--were on a reputation-saving mission during these years. Marines faced scrutiny from the United States as well as the Dominican population, and the gradual character of withdrawal allowed them to focus on this problem and on legitimating their primary claim that they had restored order. The gradual withdrawal gave marine commanders time to work on improving both morale and the marines' reputation, which they did through a partial revision of history. First, they explained away the "slow start" of the constabulary experiment. Fellowes blamed it on "the lack of funds, the absence of practical ideas, the usual procrastination found in tropical countries and the effort required to get any idea past the barrier of limited native intelligence."⁴²

Rufus Lane and Harry Lee also wrote detailed speech for re-indoctrination of marines that sought to address the problems by accentuating the importance of improved relations with Dominicans during the withdrawal period. Brigade Law Officer Kilmartin prepared lectures explaining marines' new mission, and "before distribution to unit commanders, these lectures received the personal examination and approval of Major General Commandant John A. LeJeune and other high officials."⁴³ To aid the indoctrination, commanders restricted marine contact with Dominican civilians and built new recreational facilities to improve marine morale.⁴⁴ Lee emphasized, from 1922 to 1924, the importance of good conduct at the end of the occupation as being much more relevant than conduct over the course of previous years of occupation. He stated that "any action resulting in adverse criticism at this time would be fatal to the Occupation, and would greatly tend to destroy our splendid achievements," a statement that both warned about negative perceptions and offered the impression that marines previously in the country had

⁴² Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 216.

⁴³ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 65.

⁴⁴ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 65.

brought about noteworthy change. He reminded enlisted marines that "from now on our conduct and attitude towards the inhabitants will be accentuated for good or evil; the impressions gained during the last days of the occupation by the Dominicans, and people of other nations interested in the future welfare of the Dominican Republic, will not only be measurable to our past performances, but will be the basis on which future generations will judge the military rule of the Dominican Republic by the United States Marine Corps." He added, on the eve of withdrawal, that "the inhabitants in the past have viewed our intervention with suspicion and grave misgivings, but this feeling has been fast disappearing, due primarily [*sic.*] to the exemplary behavior of the Occupying forces...."⁴⁵ The re-indoctrination had an apparent effect on the conduct of marines in the country, and--as Fuller and Cosmas report--instances of friction between Dominicans and marines dropped off through the course of the withdrawal period.⁴⁶

Gradual withdrawal also allowed the marines to focus on improving their relations with the constabulary--a move that allowed them to intervene as advisors through the months in which Cabral headed the organization's field forces. This priority was also intended to improve the poor reputation of the constabulary. While the constabulary worked to distance itself from politics and more controversial aspects of withdrawal, it also worked closely with the Marine Corps. Through the withdrawal of marines, Lee commended the cooperation of constabulary officers, addressing them as equals rather than subordinates: "In relinquishing control of the Policia Training Centers, the Military Governor desires to express his admiration to the officers and men of the Policia for the cheerful, apt and responsive manner in which they submitted themselves to training, without which they could never acquired [*sic.*] a high standard of military

⁴⁵ Memo from Harry Lee to Officers and Men of the Second Brigade, 30 May, 1924, Geographical Files, "Dom Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

⁴⁶ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 88. The individual records of "Reports of Friction" are also available for the entire period in the USMC Historical Division's Geographical Files.

excellence. He is convinced that this same spirit will be instrumental in preserving the future peace and integrity of the Dominican Republic, and moreover is assured that these same officers and men will hold duty, loyalty and love of country above all other consideration."⁴⁷ Marine commanders stressed the changing role of marines from "that of an occupying force in full control to that of allied troops temporarily stationed in a friendly sovereign nation."⁴⁸ Lectures to marines particularly stressed the need for marines to show respect to the constabulary; they were in the country to lend "moral support," and should therefore never interfere with constabulary members or municipal police.⁴⁹ This was, therefore, a greatly empowering two-year moment for the constabulary.

With the upcoming withdrawal of U.S. troops from Dominican soil, the military forces commanding those troops issued statements about the withdrawal and history of the occupation, extolling the occupation's positive contributions. U.S. newspapers, placated perhaps by compromise and a withdrawal plan, reported these statements in 1922 with little attention to their veracity, or to the fact that they contradicted the stories of years previous. In effect, the gradual and compromise character of withdrawal dulled the U.S. national protests and many other international protests. Because of the decreased international media attention, the disposition of reporting changed, and marine statements were often published without investigation. One highly unfortunate result of this was that these reports gave the U.S. public the impression that, in the end, the occupation had been successful and was now coming to a close. Equally important, the vague reporting and general lack of understanding of Caribbean geography among

⁴⁷ Memo from Harry Lee, "Turn over of Training Centers and Military Hospital to the Constitutional Government," 2 July, 1924, Geographical Files, "Dom Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico.

⁴⁸ Fuller and Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic*, 65.

⁴⁹ Kilmartin, "Indoctrination," 381, 384. Marine officers also emphasized the moral imperative of being the "bigger man," using the continued belief in U.S. superiority in order to train Marines in relations with the new constabulary. Part of the lecture asked Marines: "Don't you pride yourself that your intelligence is superior to theirs? Then isn't it up to *you* to avoid trouble?" Kilmartin, "Indoctrination," 384. Italics in original.

the U.S. public meant that reports also gave the false impression that Haiti was de-occupied at the same time as the Dominican Republic. This decrease of attention contributed, therefore, to a decline in Haiti's struggle to end marine occupation there.

Ironically, the most glaring example of how the press inadvertently legitimated the claims of the U.S. military came from the *Chicago Defender*, whose confusion in reporting the withdrawal led its journalists to entitle their August 1924 article "U.S. Troops to Evacuate San Domingo," and then to sub-title it "Haitian Government is Free Again." The report is rife with such conflation of the two countries. For example, it begins:

With the announcement by the United States government that the marines and all American forces have been ordered to evacuate Haiti, beginning next week, a feud of long standing between the two countries has been brought to a close. While the island actually has been a self-governing community since the election of President Horacio Vasquez and Vice-President Federico Velasquez, in July, it will find itself entirely independent of all American interference and influence after the first of next month, if present plans are carried out.⁵⁰

As the report continues, the fact that it makes no distinction at all between the two countries is increasingly evident.⁵¹ Forgotten in the article are the years-old reports of atrocities, printed frequently in the *Chicago Defender* of 1921, of the occupying countries being made up of liberty-loving patriots. In their place readers now found only the reassurance that the countries—again, conflated into one—were but a financially stricken and “rebellion ridden island” when the military government was installed. Forgotten are discussions of the illegality and forced nature of the occupation governments, replaced by the claim, made twice in this article, that Dominican President Jimenes requested the military governorship of the Dominican Republic—and even claiming that he requested it to “prevent further bloodshed and protect American property and life.” In place of the stories of brutality, torture, and the usurpation of the

⁵⁰ “U.S. Troops to Evacuate San Domingo,” *The Chicago Defender (National Edition)*, 9 August 1924, pg. 2.

⁵¹ The marine occupation of Haiti did not end until ten years later.

free will of the people, readers found only praise of the military government, which had “done for the Dominicans what it did for Cuba,” a description of a country connected by a network of American roads, American methods of education, hospitals, a treasury department (as though the Dominican Republic had not previously had one), and sanitation systems. The article claims that Dominicans were guilty of having not kept their end of the 1907 treaty, and even that “the treaty was soon forgotten. Gradually the impoverished people drifted into a state of revolution.” It elides the realities of Dominican care to the 1907 treaty, which was central to government policies in the worst of civil wars, and it elides the reality of a Dominican population that was involved and interested in the occurrences of 1922. The article claims that “the four political leaders” came to the United States to negotiate in 1922, simplifying to an extreme the politics of the entire situation, and touts the U.S. reduction of the Dominican foreign debt.⁵²

This article, much like others, ends with two equally loaded statements. The first is that with the recent election of President Vásquez and Vice-President Velásquez, “the United States determined to evacuate,” removing all Dominican initiative in the matter, and ignoring the years of national and international struggle—much of it carried out by the press of this very newspaper—that had brought about that evacuation. As final proof that it reported according to the statement of involved military officials, it ended with that statement that “most remarkable of all American accomplishments in the Dominican republic has been the organization and training of a national police force of some thousands of men who will be able to keep peace and enforce order, should the departure of the United States from off Dominican soil lead to a return of the old-time conditions.”⁵³ In the end, the picture presented to the American public by the press was

⁵² All of these points are practically word-for-word reprints of the public statements of marines in 1924, and are widely inaccurate. For example, the occupation substantially increased the Dominican foreign debt.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

one that erased any past problems with the occupations and also covered up current ones, such as the continuing occupation of Haiti and the relative power of the Dominican military.

In the end, the general Dominican hatred of marines and poor relations between marines and constabulary were eased enough, through the long course of withdrawal, to allow the frequent return of marines as advisors and guests through the 1920s. In addition, the lessening of hatred for the marines aided the lessening of hatred for the constabulary that replicated so many of their institutions. U.S. reporting affected not only the U.S. public's awareness and understanding of the occupation, and not only the subsequent historiography of the occupation as presented from the United States, but also broadly affected the Dominican Republic in two major ways. First, this perception in the United States ended condemnations and--with them--scrutiny of the U.S. military's involvement in the country, thereby leaving the marines a free hand to continue to involve themselves unofficially in the course of the Dominican military's development through the 1920s. This new perception in the United States also paved the way for the U.S. government's acceptance of Trujillo's coup d'état in 1930. When Trujillo's overthrow of the constitutional government prompted the U.S. government to send former constabulary commandant Richard M. Cutts over from Haiti, Cutts met secretly with Trujillo and seems to have informed his former mentee that the U.S. State Department would accept his government if it were constitutionally elected. He informed the State Department that Trujillo would most likely establish a dictatorial government, but that the head of the Dominican military was more popular than the concerned U.S. legion believed, and that he would run the country and maintain order well.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Crassweller, *Trujillo*, 68; Vega also presents evidence that Cutts was involved in encouraging Trujillo's coup in 1929, before it happened. *Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas*, 51-54.

The sets of alliances and relationships built through 1922-1924 allowed a continuation of withdrawal processes even after the marines were no longer in the country. Vásquez saw in Trujillo a guarantee for maintaining himself in power, while also believing the repeated promises and propaganda--and continued assurances of both U.S. representatives and the constabulary--that the constabulary would be forced to be apolitical. In December of 1924, Vásquez promoted Trujillo to Lt. Col, giving him drastically increased power in the organization.⁵⁵ Over the next two years, many U.S. observers noted with concern that the constabulary was rapidly becoming a political instrument, and in 1926 Vice President Federico Velásquez pointed out that the constabulary was deeply involved in the political process, that Trujillo's constabulary intelligence service set spies on meetings and other political events.⁵⁶ In June and August of 1927, with Trujillo's continued assurances that he was uninterested in politics, and even that he might retire within a year or two, Vásquez promoted him twice.

One of the primary authors of the constabulary's rise to dominance after the marines withdrew their last U.S. flag and their last troops, Rafael Trujillo seized on patterns of oppression learned during guerrilla warfare in the East, on the centrality of having a wide intelligence office, on the pattern of military control of the civilian government. He also proved adept at using the purposeful revision of history to maintain power. It was through a similar effort at revising Dominican history while controlling the population through an efficient military that Trujillo was able to build a legacy for himself that both declared intense nationalism while silencing the nationalists; to generally condemn foreign intervention while having come to power as a product of it; it allowed him to incorporate elements of the pre-occupation military and show off his pride in a long continuity of Dominican tradition, such as in his uniforms' imitation of those of

⁵⁵ Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 61.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

previous dictator Ulises Heureaux, while patterning operations and intelligence after the reforms brought by the marines. He worked to increase the legitimacy of the organization, renaming it the Dominican National Army in 1928 and gradually increasing its numbers to over 3,000 by the time Vásquez fell ill in 1929. His organization was therefore ready in 1929 and 1930 to be the tool by which he orchestrated his rise to power as military dictator of the Dominican Republic for thirty-one years. The only tool he used in this rise to power that had not been set in place during the gradual withdrawal was his call to the sovereign Dominican past and the glory of Dominican military tradition.

U.S. occupying forces led by the Department of the Navy in the years 1914-1916 sought to initiate a full military occupation both to expand and increase U.S. military control in the Caribbean region and to perform an experiment in government that was intended to bring U.S.-defined "progress" and political stability through the creation of a new government. Multiple forces and motivations went into the making of this occupation, justified to the public as a generous gift of U.S. tutelage that would open new land for U.S. markets and investment. These plans were quickly and continually revised on the spot, however, as the intervention and occupation unfolded over the years. Primary among the forces affecting U.S. plans was Dominican reality and widespread rejection of occupation forces' goals and methods.

For Dominicans, the long-term effects of the U.S. occupation included broad change in society, which was restructured through the military and compromise agreements for withdrawal. The highly regional country exited the occupation in 1924 with a more centralized government and national infrastructure and a centralized and largely professionalized military. Stability by any definition was, however, lacking, the old structures of political power relationships overthrown and new ones only beginning to solidify to take their place. Even as the withdrawal

brought about the occupation's end, and the heavily supported new Dominican military was professionalized and able to move long distances quickly, stability remained a precarious balancing game backed by further threat of U.S. force. It in many ways united rural and urban areas, especially in terms of opportunities that it opened for poorer rural groups who were previously un-integrated into many of central society's structures. This was, of course, a two-pronged process: It stimulated some new forms of social mobility and involvement, but also meant central state encroachment on previously isolated areas, and decreased the mobility of many peasants who--before the occupation--had maintained the possibility of simply moving to new and unoccupied land throughout the country. While it increased social mobility by class through the military, therefore, it decreased physical mobility and people's ability to avoid centralized imposition.

Over the course of the occupation, these changes influenced and damaged the country's regional traditions, but withdrawal agreements and the revisions undertaken by Trujillo's government used a combination of occupation military structures and traditional Dominican ones to consolidate and maintain centralized governmental and military power. Trujillo co-opted regionalism to try to make it work to his benefit through structures created under the occupation constabulary. This process began during the occupation, through processes of adaptation and negotiation by which occupation constabulary units adopted combined aspects of U.S. plans and regional cultures. The ideas and structures being pushed by the first commissioned Dominican officers of the constabulary were those worked out in tandem with U.S. forces over the course of the occupation. Revisions of occupation history, carried out especially during the 1920s, led to the blending of U.S. imperatives and Dominican traditions through an invested military that was centralized and powerful enough to dominate the reinstated central government.

For many in the United States, including political actors and some military and economic planners, the occupation's end and result came to represent a clear need for change in foreign policy. With the hindsight of political ramifications of such occupations clearer in hindsight, Warren Harding was one among many who urged a revised approach to U.S. relations with Latin American governments. Taft's Dollar Diplomacy, and the U.S. military intervention that had risen to back U.S. investment and influence, needed to be redefined as global diplomacy changed following World War One. This was especially true as groups throughout Latin American countries began to unite against U.S. military pressure, and as many within the United States called for anti-imperialist politics. From the original U.S. occupation plans, then, through the structures of compromise bringing about withdrawal, the Dominican occupation of 1916-1924 provides a window onto a changing international diplomacy and the wide redefining of Latin American identities in opposition to U.S. attempts at wide hegemony.

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