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THE COMMUNICATION OF EMOTION ACROSS LANGUAGES AND CULTURES: AN EXPLORATION OF DISPLAY RULES IN FOREIGN LANGUAGE LEARNING

BY

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Educational Psychology
in the Graduate College of
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012

Urbana, Illinois

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ABSTRACT

Communicating emotion can be a problem. Goleman (1995) invokes Aristotle to contend that "the problem is not with emotionality but with the appropriateness of emotion and its expression" (p. xiv). Disentangling the various factors involved in cross-cultural emotional communication and particularly *misinterpretation* can seem a herculean task, given that the literature remains divided as to whether emotions are universal or relative (see for example, Ekman, 1997, and Wierzbicka, 1999). This study explores through a phenomenological and mixed methods framework the differences in recognition and interpretation of emotional cues across cultures in dynamic communicative acts. It uses focus group methodology to examine how South Korean English teachers and North American English teachers living in Korea interpreted video excerpts from a South Korean comedy released in 2003. Research questions include: How well did out-group individuals interpret emotional meaning across cultures? Which channels for cues did each group use for interpretation? What happened when interpretations failed? The ultimate goal is to gain insights for foreign language educators and their teaching practice. The study revealed that while basic emotions like anger were understood in similar ways by both groups, participants revealed stark differences in their understanding of more complex emotions like guilt and frustration. Consequently, such complex or subtle emotions were found to be one potentially important site for cross-cultural misinterpretation. While groups displayed differences in their identification of which emotions were being displayed, they displayed similarities in the cues that marked them. All groups reported that they focused most on non-verbal cues and frequently on situational appraisal, but only rarely on lexis or semantics. Moreover, the participants almost always relied on a combination of cues from multiple channels in identifying which emotions the actors were displaying. Last, display rules

did play a major role in cross-cultural misinterpretation. Ultimately, foreign language educators can use these findings to train students to better interpret emotions, as well as to manage their own cross-cultural experiences.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincerest thanks go to my dissertation committee that stuck with me through the entire process: Adrienne Lo, Erica McClure, Tom Schwandt, and Fazal Rizvi. Without your direction and support this project would have been impossible. I remain in your debt.

My thanks also go to the participants and others who helped out with the research in so many ways, particularly Hyojin, Scott, Justin, and Jinyoung.

Most important, I am in eternal awe of Yoonhwa and Yoojin. They provide the bedrock on which I stand every day. Their love and care make life joy.

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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

And the same thought had occurred to me then that I carried with me now as I left the movie theater with my mother and sister: the emotions between the races could never be pure, even love was tarnished by the desire to find in the other some element that was missing in ourselves. Whether we sought out our demons or salvation, the other race would always remain just that: menacing, alien, and apart.

Barak Obama, Dreams from My Father. Page 124

In 1988 at the Seoul Summer Olympics, South Korean bantamweight Byun Jong-Il waged a close, hard-fought preliminary round match against Alexander Hristov of Bulgaria (Alfano, 1988a; Callahan, 1988; Times, 1988; R. White, 2003, p. 652). In the heat of the battle, Byun was penalized two points for head butting—marring his performance in the match. After the final bell, the hometown crowd was electrified, anticipating Byun's victory, but it was Hristov's arm that match referee, Keith Walker, raised in triumph. Drama such as this is common in Olympic boxing, what ensued *immediately after* the match, however, was unusual. Supporters of the Korean boxer stormed the ring. During the melee, referee Walker was attacked by two officials from the South Korean team. Byun Jong-Il himself, refused to leave the ring for 67 minutes, delaying the other matches. In fact, he did not leave the arena until the lights were shut down. Callahan (1988) described the end of the event this way, "When the smoke cleared, Byun was sitting in his corner. For over an hour he sat. After the lights were switched off, he lingered another long moment in the glow of a TV camera before clambering down. Remembering something, Byun suddenly bolted back into the ring, bowed to the four corners in courtly style

and departed" (Callahan, 1988).[1]

How are we to appraise this display in the international arena? Why did Byun do it? What do we imagine he was feeling at that time? Perhaps more important: Are we all imagining the same feelings? How are we to judge his character based on his behavior? Intercultural communication is a staggeringly complex yet fundamental question for foreign language education. In this study, I hope to delve more deeply into an area that has not been extensively explored in educational research: the communication of emotion across cultures. But first let me go back for a moment to the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics. Certainly, Byun Jong-Il's hour-long display of "the agony of defeat" still lives in memory. Moreover, the wide variation of interpretations of emotion and character extrapolated from Byun Jong-Il's actions also reveal the difficulty of interpreting emotions across cultures. To explore just what people from around the world thought of Byun Jong-Il's sit down strike, I searched the Internet and found an interesting range of adjectives applied to the emotional state of the boxer and the rest of the Koreans present. Terms like bizarre, bitter, bedlam, and quite often "sore loser" were applied. According to the New York Times, "Anwar Chowdhry, president of the International Amateur Boxing Federation, called the incident the most disgraceful he has ever seen in the sport" (Alfano, 1988b). Roland White of the UK's Sunday Times named Byun Jong-Il the number four all time "bad loser in the history of sport" (R. White, 2003), worse than Hitler, but not quite as bad as Tonya Harding or John McEnroe!

Yet, all of the interpretations were found by searching for the English spelling of "Byun Jong-Il" and, therefore, they were predominantly from the English language press—not the

[1] Sport, in general, and Olympic boxing in particular, is an excellent metaphor for this topic. I can hardly think of another human endeavor so emotionally charged, yet governed by rational rules to restrain the emotion.

Korean press. In a classic case of polar opposite interpretations, Koreans might interpret: "He had lost face [*chaemyeon, 체면*], and his refusal to leave the ring was his way of restoring it. Only after much coaxing did he begrudgingly leave. The coaxing helped to restore his feelings of *chaemyeon* and provided him a forum to appear gracious when he did finally leave and allow the games to continue" (Oak & Martin, 2000, p. 32).

Nature and Purpose of this Project

The topic of my study is the communication of emotion across cultures. In particular, this study strives to explore one of the central disputes within the academic study of emotion: Are emotions universal or culturally specific? Central to this question is the character of display rules and cultural scripts—which regulate how emotions are outwardly demonstrated in social, "polite" conversation—actually function in natural, "normal" conversation, and, most importantly, how the emotions communicated in a culturally appropriate fashion via those display rules are perceived across cultures. Moreover, the success or failure of relations between cultures is almost always based on our appraisal of that culture, which is in large part based on the way we perceive their emotional communication: "Speech communities may differ in baseline rate of articulation, and in particular in strategic uses of pauses and silence, which can cause significant intercultural misunderstandings" (Pavlenko, 2005, p. 53). For good or ill, we humans tend to use those appraisals of a situation to determine the cultural script for the display of emotion. Differences in cultural scripts and display rules may well result in stereotypes about different cultures and the individuals from different cultures. At the root of the appraisals, and consequently, the stereotypes, lies an inextricable link to an emotional assessment of the behavior of individuals from the "other" culture. While this line of reasoning may seem obvious, academic research, in a wide range of individual and disparate fields of study including

psychology, sociology, anthropology, education, and linguistics, have turned a blind eye to the study of emotions and their communication. Fortunately, however, the last decade or two have seen a significant upsurge in research in emotional communication. My hope is that this study can contribute to that expanding endeavor.

Adding to the import of this study, the relations between the United States and Korea are marked by deep social, political, and individual connections—from the Korean War, through Los Angeles' "Rodney King" riots, to the "inscrutability" surrounding the perpetrator of the massacre at Virginia Tech.[2] Finally, foreign language education is itself a field, along with the fields it rose from—linguistics and applied linguistics—which has shown a particular disinterest in and disregard for the place of emotions as an element of communication.

Emotion and appraisal

Before proceeding further, allow me the opportunity to clarify the technical meaning of appraisal in regard to emotions. Within cognitive psychology the core concept of appraisal theory, is "the claim that emotions are elicited and differentiated on the basis of a person's subjective evaluation or appraisal of the personal significance of a situation, object, or event on a number of dimensions or criteria" (K. R. Scherer, 1999, p. 637). Thus, roughly stated, proponents of appraisal theory argue that the cognitive appraisal precedes emotion. In other words, appraisal is inherently "emotion *antecedent* appraisal." I have used the term appraisal in a more vernacular and generic sense—using appraisal not only in terms of how emotions are created, but also in terms of how stereotypes come to be and how those stereotypes function in daily practice. This sort of daily life interpretation of the notion of appraisal would include such

[2] I firmly believe that Cho's acts were in no way, shape, or fashion linked to his Korean heritage, but the public media strove valiantly both to ignore the cultural aspects, and alternatively to interpret their cultural import.

things as job performance appraisals (Bauer & Baltes, 2002; Dipboye, 1985; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000) or appraisal of products as part of marketing or marketing research (Bryce & Olney, 1991; Karande, 2002; Qualls & Moore, 2006). Within the context of this dissertation proposal, I will generally use the more generic interpretation of the word. For my purposes, what is most important to note about appraisal, is that all of these models, whether from cognitive psychology or professional and personnel psychology, point to an intense intertwining of emotion, appraisal, and stereotypes – which is antecedent to the others, or if there ***is*** an antecedent, is not nearly as important to this study as the fact that they work together—and how these mechanisms accomplish the end.

Blind eye syndrome

For much of the 20th century, emotions as a research subject have proven a difficult, virtually unaddressed topic across many academic fields (Besnier, 1990; Ekman, 2003; Pavlenko, 2005; Planalp, 1999; Schumann, 1997; Turner & Stets, 2005). Sociologists Turner & Stets (2005) seem genuinely perplexed as to why the issue of emotion has not been researched more fully in their field, "In hindsight, this late date is remarkable in the light of the fact that emotions pervade virtually every aspect of human experience and all social relations. How could sociologists have turned a blind eye to emotions?" (p.1). Applied linguistics, and in this instance the overlapping field of intercultural communication, is certainly in the early stages of research into the role and nature of emotion in intercultural communication. Precisely why intercultural emotional communication is the victim of this blind eye syndrome is not a simple question to answer. Certainly, the Western conception of emotion as the antithesis of logic and rationality does not prompt the academy to view emotions with a scientific lens. Besnier (1990) introduces his review of the literature on *Language and Affect* by referring to Lyons' (1977) discussion of

the semantics which describes the idea that linguistic meaning consists of three components: descriptive, social and expressive. Emotion lies in the final realm, which "has been consistently set aside as an essentially unexplorable aspect of linguistic behavior, a residual category to which aspects of language that cannot be handled conveniently with extant linguistic models were relegated to be forgotten" (Besnier, 1990, p. 420). Thus the avoidance of emotion in foreign language education (FLE) is unsurprising—where the primary focus is teaching the meaning of words and grammatical structures, and, consequently, emotions are rarely considered. Only one area of the emotional milieu has been explored in FLE—how emotions affect motivation (eg. Krashen's affective filter). The more detailed questions about the communication of emotional state or emotional content have not been explored. Pavlenko (2003) points out that while several monographs and editions have been published recently that view the issue from a wide variety of academic perspectives, all of these collections approach the issue entirely from the monolingual's perspective, or as she phrases it more precisely:

> My discussion so far demonstrates that emotions remain undertheorized in the study of bilingualism and SLA, and that the questions asked about the role of emotions in additional language learning and use are extremely limited. Researchers also continue to frame the issue as the relationship between languages *and* emotions leaving out languages *of* emotions or multilingual performance of affect." [emphasis in the original] (p. 35)

Clearly, the social sciences in general and foreign language education in particular have turned a blind eye to questions surrounding emotion.

The social sciences awaken to the study of emotion

While much of the last century saw little effort in the area of emotions in intercultural communication, the waning years of the 20th century saw a "burst of new interest," (Planalp, 1999, p. 1), and "a great deal of work," (Wierzbicka, 1999, p. 49), and saw sociologists make "up for lost time" (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 1). These areas of research corollary to FLE have, recently, made significant inroads in exploring emotion in communication. Psychologist Paul Ekman (1993, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2003) has made a strong case for emotional universals, which is decidedly not my approach. Yet, Ekman's research provides what is perhaps the key element of this study: his finding that in many cases, "*display rules* for managing facial expressions" (1999b, p. 312) come into play during the expression of emotions in social situations. Other researchers have looked at emotions ranging through social, moral, psychological and developmental models (see Damasio, 1994; Ekman, 2003; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Greenspan, 1997; LeDoux, 1996; Planalp, 1999; Turner & Stets, 2005). The cumulative impression left by these research studies is that the assumption of a polar difference and divide between emotion and cognition is simply inaccurate. We cannot help but conclude that emotion and cognition are intricately intertwined – just as Schumann (1997) has concluded that the same integrated emotion/cognition character exists in communicative events.

In contrast to this contemporary integrated approach, studies that are influenced strongly by linguistic approaches have maintained a positivist perspective/methodology in considering emotions in communication, primarily investigating paralinguistic expressions (Birdwhistell, 1952; Feldman & Rimé, 1991; Hall, 1959; K. R. Scherer, 1982; K. R. Scherer & Ekman, 1982). In general, these studies look for one-to-one interpretations of paralinguistic cues. Within a similar vein, a significant number of studies have explored the nature of 'vocal cues' for emotion

in intercultural communication (see Pavlenko, 2005 for a review of these studies). Many of these vocal cue studies have attempted to integrate different elements, and at least one of these studies allowed for not only audio cues but video cues as well (Nakamichi, Jogan, Usami, & Erickson, 2002). The limited methodological options used to date will be critical to my methodological proposals.

Finally, some linguists have explored more interactive and elaborate interpretations of emotion in communication, for example, emotional scripts (Planalp, 1999; Wierzbicka, 1999)—which bear a close resemblance to the study of display rules in practice. In spite of the increased interest and research into language and emotions, even those fields that seek to integrate areas of communication, such as sociolinguistics and pragmatics, keep language and emotion segregated. They rarely consider emotions as a critical element of what is communicated in conversation: what Pavlenko (2005) called "languages *of* emotions or multilingual performance of affect" (p. 35). The study of emotions within intercultural communication has clearly suffered from a blind eye syndrome, and one goal of this dissertation is to shed some light on the issue.

Foreign language education rarely considers emotion

While many foreign language teachers consider emotions critical as an element of both the curriculum and the methodology of foreign language education, the curriculum they teach often does not. As case in point to the national standards for foreign language education produced in part by the American Council of Teachers of Foreign Languages places the education of emotions front and center—in their very first curricular standard: "Standard 1.1: Students engage in conversations, provide and obtain information, express feelings and emotions, and exchange opinions" (ACTFL, 2005, ¶ 5). Unfortunately, however, that instance is the only mention of emotions in the main standards. Therefore, in a similar sort of oversight as

in the university research fields mentioned above, the applied field of foreign language education also recognizes the importance of emotions as part and parcel of the foreign language classroom, yet simultaneously turns a blind eye to what emotional communication means and how to accomplish the instruction of intercultural emotions.

The reasons for this oversight are varied and difficult to pin down. One place to look for this oversight would be within the metaphorical parents of foreign language education the academic fields of linguistics and applied linguistics. Both of these fields, as anyone who has taken an introductory linguistics course can attest, are products of a highly analytical and rational approach to foreign language (Besnier, 1990), and, consequently, just do not turn their attention to emotions as an element of the language. Similarly, the differences between native language education, second language education, and foreign language education are well documented. The amount of curricular time spent in each, the amount of daily life spent on native language versus second language versus foreign language, as well as the intrinsic and extrinsic goals of the students, require compromises in learning time invested– resulting in the education of emotion in the foreign language class being left on the back burner, if not on the chopping block.

This is not to say that emotions are not considered at all within the realm of foreign language education. Indeed, a great deal of attention has been directed at emotions within some aspects of foreign language education. Beginning in the 1980s with Krashen's (1982) notion of the affective filter and Acton's (1984) oil well "gusher" of emotion, language educators turned their eye to emotion, but that attention focused almost exclusively on emotion as something that assists or hinders learning rather than as something that needs to be learned. Perhaps, Krashen's influence explains why the term "affect" is used much more often than the term emotion within the literature of FLE. The study of affect in language education has led to some extensive study

of motivation for foreign language learning (see Gardner & Lalonde, 1985). The Cambridge publication, *Affect in Language Learning*, edited by Jane Arnold (1999) covers a wide range of topics from anxiety, to neurobiology, to self-esteem, to group dynamics, to personal development, to cooperative learning, to culture and humanism, but none of the topics approaches the question of emotions as something that we learn and, consequently, that we might be taught. One final plausible explanation as to why foreign language education does not address the issue of emotion as part of the curriculum may be found in the cultural variability of emotional expression. Simply put: "Studies to date … have little to offer either classroom teachers or other scholars by way of information about particular languages" (Pavlenko, 2005, p. 75). In our desire to be both sensitive to other cultures as well as politically correct, the task of "teaching our students appropriate emotion" may become a slippery and insurmountable slope.

History of Korea and the United States

Any study in language and intercultural communication must narrow the languages involved. I propose to work with Korean and English, and more narrowly American English. Of course, this choice is in part one of convenience for the researcher, but to a greater extent, the intercultural relationship between Korea and the United States needs to be explored in terms of the critical element of emotion within intercultural communication. Misunderstandings abound on both sides of this cultural divide. While the history of relations between the United States and Korea is not long in absolute terms, the more than 100 years of relations between the US and Korea have been both turbulent and important:

> Korean Americans are celebrating year 2003 as the 100th anniversary of Korean immigration to the United States. However, Korean American history goes back further than that to 1882, when the U.S. signed a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with

> Korea, allowing each country to establish a diplomatic mission in the other's country. From then on, Koreans began to arrive in the U.S. as diplomats, political exiles, merchants, or students. (J. H. Kim, 2003)

The Korean War, or "conflict," was America's first full-scale war in the Cold War era, and provided in the first point of interaction in the collective psyche of the vast majority of Koreans and Americans. While the one million Chinese casualties and perhaps 150,000 American and UN casualties were a terrible price to pay, they pale next to the four million Koreans killed. The Korean War was simply devastating for the Korean people: a war that left the country decimated—not only the poorest country in the world, but divided against itself. Of course, in the aftermath of the Korean War, Korea experienced a continued US military presence (which some have called an occupation), a heavily militarized demilitarized zone, a series of dictatorial governments, and, in contrast, the greatest economic recovery of any nation in history in South Korea matched by appalling poverty in North Korea.

Of course, the shared history of Korea and America did not simply occur unidirectionally from a beneficent America: Korean immigration to the United States has had a tremendous impact in both countries. Korean-Americans represent about 0.4 percent of the US population. As a subset of the United States' Asian American population, they are slightly more than 10 percent. Importantly, the Korean-American population is increasing at a rate of about three times that of the general population ("U.S. Census Bureau," 2007). However, the integration of Koreans into American society has not been without stress and strain.

Immigrant Koreans have found themselves inserted into the "demilitarized zone" of America's black/white racial conflict. The oft cited and most serious case of miscommunication between Korean-Americans and African-Americans occurred during the Rodney King riots in

Los Angeles in the early 1990s. The broad details of the riots that followed the Rodney King decision are, of course, familiar, as well as their inter-ethnic implications. However, the troubles between Koreans and Blacks began earlier. Many analysts set the starting point for the difficulties at the point when several Korean merchants were shot and killed during different robberies and then a black teenage girl was shot and killed by a Korean grocer. The tensions were exacerbated when the Korean grocer in question was sentenced *not* to time in prison, but merely to probation and a fine. Rodney King's trial came on the heels of these events. With such dramatic life and death events occurring, cross-cultural tensions were strained to the breaking point. Few who knew this situation in East Central Los Angeles were at all surprised when the community exploded in self-destruction. However, my purpose is to analyze the intercultural interaction between Koreans and African Americans through this event. Kim (1993) reports that, "About half the approximately $770 million in estimated material losses incurred during the Los Angeles upheavals was sustained by a community no one seems to wants to talk much about [Korean Americans]" (p. 1). Of course that economic loss is "only money," yet the relative economic loss is significantly disproportionate to population. In some small enclave communities Asian Americans constitute the majority, but the Korean Americans are not the majority in any community—even in Koreatown where they constitute about 25 percent of the population. What made it OK to loot and destroy Korean property? One explanation is cross-cultural miscommunication. When Bailey (2000) examined the envirnment and communication in that part of Los Angeles, he concluded, "Face-to-face interaction between Korean immigrant retailers and African-American customers in Los Angeles often leaves members of each group feeling as if the other has behaved in insultingly inappropriate ways" (p. 86).

Because the social and political interaction between Americans and Koreans has been dramatic and emotional, we would naturally assume that the language interaction between Americans and Korean is marked by the presence of strong emotions, emotional language, and the communication of those emotions. Indeed, such strong emotions are reflected in the events outlined above. Moreover, when the relationships between people of two cultures are caught in such emotional situations, we know that the individuals will be making judgments and attributions based on their interactions. Consequently, the accuracy of the assessments that people on both sides of each conversation are making will become critical to the future state of interpersonal interactions across the two cultures and, by extension, broader issues of effective, productive, and positive intercultural communication. Therefore, one of my purposes in conducting this research is to determine how well individuals assess and process the emotional intent of speakers from both their own language, in this case Korean, as well as another language, in this case American English.

Current Status of Research Conclusions

Chapter two will address in much greater detail the research conclusions on the topic of emotional communication in foreign language education, but broadly speaking two major trends mark the research on this topic: the nature vs. nurture debate, and the different perspectives of the individual fields conducting research in this area.

Nature versus nurture

The nature versus nurture debate is in many ways fundamental to many fields in the social sciences; therefore, to find a nature versus nurture debate in the study of emotions is not surprising. On the nature side of emotions is the argument for emotional universals: the major proponent of which is Paul Ekman (Ekman, 1993, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Ekman, et al.,

1972). The vast majority of Ekman's research into the emotional universals has been through the exploration of facial expressions—an idea of which dates back at least 135 years to Charles Darwin (1998). Ekman concludes through a series of forced choice experiments that only a limited number of universal and basic human emotions exist. Specifically, he proposes, "that the following list of emotions will be found [to be "basic"], and to be distinguishable one from another: amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness/distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame" (Ekman, 1999a, p. 55). Indeed, few if any involved in the field would argue that no biological component to emotions and their expression exists, but there remains a heated debate about the level and variability of emotions across cultures.

Thus, in contrast to the universalists' naturalistic perspective, much of the work in emotional expression in the middle part of the twentieth century from the anthropological and sociological perspectives, particularly that research which explored across cultural boundaries, pointed toward socialized variability in emotional expression. Margaret Mead (Ekman, 2003), along with Hall (1959), Birdwhistell (1952), and others were the primary proponents of this perspective. More recently, the debate has heated up again with the heirs to both the nature and nurture perspectives on this issue. Recent anthropological/sociological endeavors in the study of emotions have included such topics, approaches, and personalities as, Lutz's (1990) exploration of engendered emotion, Pavlenko's (2005) important research into bilingual and multilingual individuals expressing emotions differently across cultures, Planalp's (1999) study of the processes—social, moral, and cultural—involved in communicating emotion, Saarni's (1989) work with socialization and competence particularly with children, Tannen's (1990) popular works in communication particularly with gender differences, and Wierzbicka's (1999) extensive

writing about the language of emotions in different cultures. The first chapter of Wierzbicka's *Emotions Across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals* provides an excellent summary of the nature versus nurture debate, and indeed her own disagreements with Ekman. Wierzbicka (1999) writes, "Undoubtedly, the 'emotion lexicons' of different languages show similarities as well as differences . . . but it is essential to recognize the diversity, too, and to abandon the idea that all languages must have words for something as 'basic' and as 'natural' as 'sadness', 'anger', 'fear', 'happiness', 'disgust', and 'surprise'" (p. 25).

While researchers on either end of the spectrum often seem to be at loggerheads there is at least one other explanation that may serve to resolve the differences between the two groups. That perspective could be called the brain evolution perspective. We are all aware that while some elements of our emotional experience have physiological components (e.g. autonomic responses to fear), the processing and comprehension of those emotions resides entirely in the brain. Given that fact the neuro-physiological character of the brain is likely to have tremendous impact on emotions and our understanding of them. Moreover, as Cziko (1997) explains, the human brain developed over millennia in ways that should effect all aspects of human experience. First we have really big brains:

> The neocerebellum ("new cerebellum") is added to the cerebellum, looking much like a fungal growth at the base of the brain, and the neocortex ("new cortex") grows out of the front of the forebrain. In most mammals, these new additions are not particularly large relative to the brain stem. In primates they are much larger, and in the human they are so large that the original brain stem is almost completely hidden by this large convoluted mass of grey neural matter. (p. 54)

On top of the simple volume differences, Cziko (1997) contends that the new hierarchical

character of the brain might directly impact this dual perspective on emotions, suggesting that the neocortex "took over control from the previous additions and in effect became their new masters. Accordingly, the initiation of voluntary behavior as well as the ability to plan, engage in conscious thought, and use language depend on neocortical structures" (p. 54). Thus, if we follow the basic premise of the brain evolution model, basic emotions are found in lower organisms and under the control of "previous additions" to the brain, while more complex human and secondary emotions are only found in humans where they are under the control of the neocortex and governed by "voluntary" (and by inference social) behavior and conscious thought. Consequently, the two perspectives may not at all be incompatible.

A wide variety of perspectives from the field

In any study, the goal of narrowing the breadth of research to be considered in the literature review is critical. Yet, both the fields of educational psychology and foreign language education are, by their very nature, synthetic and hybrid fields of study. Moreover, educational psychology and foreign language education exist much more in the realm of applied research than in the realm of basic research. Consequently, this research project will rely heavily on influences from a wide variety of more self-contained fields of study—in no small part because the topic has been under researched. I have already indicated several of the important areas of research in emotion and communication across cultures in the previous sections of this introductory chapter. Clearly, input from the fields of psychology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, and communication studies along with specific research into individual's ability to both express and perceive emotional cues across cultural boundaries will be critical for this study.

Significance of and Justification for Conducting the Study

Two key factors provide justification for and increase the significance of this study: the economic, political, and social connections between Korea and the United States, and the manner in which these globalizing influences are particularly associated with English education in Korea. In terms of the connections between Korea and the United States that represent globalization, the New York Times reports that the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben S. Bernanke, stated that the "pace of globalization today was faster and more sweeping than at any time in world history" (Andrews, 2006), which has a significant impact on all intercultural communication projects. Within the economic realm, as a key aspect of overall globalization, the trade relationship between the United States and Korea has been very important with Korea remaining a top ten trading partner for years("Foreign trade statistics," 2007). Of course, those trade figures are based on South Korea's trading relationship. North Korea's relationship with the US is significant not as a political and economic ally, but as a political and economic adversary. President G. W. Bush stated in the 2002 State of the Union Address, "North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. … States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil" (Bush, 2002).

Directly to the US-South Korean relationships, the intertwining of globalization forces with English education in Korea has resulted in the phenomena of "English fever." That phenomenon springs from the passion of South Koreans to learn English and acquire an American university education—often continuing through graduate school. The Korean national curriculum requires English training from elementary school and throughout public education, and most universities continue required English courses through university. Private institutes, *파완, hagwon*, are multimillion dollar businesses and provide English training for preschool

children up to retirees (S. Krashen, 2003; Park, 2009). The phenomenon of *조기유학, chogi yuhak*, or early study abroad, which refers to parents taking their children to other countries for educational purposes in their public school years, particularly in the pre-adolescent and early adolescent years has caught national and international attention. Tens of thousands of Korean public school aged students are studying abroad each year (Ministry of Education Science and Technology, 2009, 2011). That passion for study abroad, particularly for the purposes of learning and improving one's English language skills, continues through university as well as Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea explains "the U.S. has more Korean students than from any other foreign country, including China and India. In 2005, more than 87,000 Korean students chose to study in the United States, making Korea our number one source of foreign students" (Vershbow, 2006). America's bi-lateral relationship with Korea is critical; therefore, understanding the emotional communication embedded in this relationship is critical to foreign language education.

Guiding Research Questions

The primary research question of this study is as follows. Display rules "are cultural norms that dictate the management and modification of emotional displays depending on social circumstances" (Matsumoto, Seung Hee Yoo, & Fontaine, 2008, p. 58). They represent a disconnection between what *ought* to be *felt* and what *ought* to be *shown* and are inherently culture specific. We can anticipate miscommunication across cultures when those required displays are in direct opposition to what is felt. This study will examine in-group conversational data about emotional communication using methodological approaches from the research bases of nature and nurture perspectives on emotion, in hopes of better understanding how (and how

well) we interpret emotional cues across cultures. In that examination, several sub-questions need to be addressed:

- How well do out-group participants' interpretations match those of in-group members?
- Which of the various channels for interpreting emotions are used by each group?
- When differences arise, how are they characterized?

CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW

Before Beginning

A fundamental question that needs to be addressed before conducting research into emotional communication across cultures is whether or not "emotional communication across cultures" is germane to educational psychology. I have already suggested that psychology has in the last half-century reframed our academic perspective on emotion and the study of emotion to a large extent. The "traditional" characterization of emotion has been as a virtually pathological entity antithetical to cognition, "in the West, emotion, . . . , has typically been viewed as something natural rather than cultural, irrational rather than rational, chaotic rather than ordered, subjective rather than universal, physical rather than mental or intellectual, unintended and uncontrollable, and hence often dangerous" (Lutz, 1990, p. 69). Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead (2005) emphasize that this interpretation is particularly associated with social norms, "Western culture imposes relatively strict norms about social conduct, and when these norms are transgressed, the reaction is often interpreted as 'emotional,' and hence as irrational" (p. 48). As Hochschild (1979) puts it, "social psychology has suffered under the tacit assumption that emotion, because it is unbidden and uncontrollable, is not governed by social rules" (p. 551). Only recently has the paradigm shifted toward emotion as an integrative and healthy cognitive process. Moreover, I will suggest that educational psychology has yet to catch up with this paradigm shift. Simultaneously, language acquisition has exploded as a field of study with the creation of psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, and neurolinguistics into important fields of study that are moving dramatically away from the purely analytical "grammar and translation" focus in linguistics which dates back to the study of philology. In a like manner, Americans have—and by inference, American education has—"long been unsure of how to handle their emotionality

and are given remarkably little explicit tutoring in this complex task" (Greenberg, 2002, p. ix). Finally, America's formal education system has undergone its own paradigm shift regarding the place and importance of language and literacy, in part because of fundamental changes in our understanding of first language acquisition, as well as dramatic increases in the number of students in our schools with limited English proficiency. Sadly, foreign language education methodologies and practices lag even further behind these advances both in linguistics and in curriculum and instruction. Consequently, the presence of these gaps in educational psychology and foreign language education makes the topic of emotional communication across cultures an excellent fit for educational psychology research.

Centering the Question Amidst Many Fields

Starting from the position that issues surrounding the communication of emotions across languages and cultures are very sparsely addressed in the educational psychology and foreign language education literature, my approach in this literature review is to examine those issues from a variety of perspectives to arrive at some sense of both the consensus and the disagreements on the topic. To center the questions and survey the literature, I will do my best to respond to the following questions: What is our historical perspective on emotion? What is a current plausible definition of emotional communication? Which academic fields have explored the questions intertwining emotion, language, and culture—how peoples' emotions are displayed and read across cultures—in ways that informs foreign language education and educational psychology?

History

Modern research into emotion begins in the Age of Enlightenment. Charles Darwin and Guillaume-Benjamin Duchene de Boulogne conducted what is generally agreed to be the first

"scientific" research into emotions when they set out to determine how emotions are revealed on human faces (Darwin, 1998). Darwin's research was a careful anthropological examination of children's faces, while Duchene conducted clinical research on adults in a medical setting. Simultaneously, early psychologists were building the foundations of how emotions shape our personalities. They established, for example, that our recognition of the autonomic responses (E.g. fight or flight instinct) within our bodies is how we recognize emotions and give those 'feelings' their name. Indeed, contemporary neurobiological research continues to support these notions, down to the specific emotional neural pathways in the mammalian brain (Panksepp, 2011). Unfortunately, Darwin (1998) himself "did not explain the origin of emotional expressions in terms of their communicative value" (p. xxxiii from introduction by Paul Ekman). Furthermore, the natural and universal—or in contemporary terms, genetic—implications of Darwin's research ran contrary to the traditional notions of emotions as an entity which could take our better reason. In addition, the rising democratic view that humans should be able to control their own emotions began to dominate the layman's conception of emotion. Consequently, what little research was conducted in the intervening decades downplayed the role of emotion:

> There is a long history of casting a disparaging intellectual gaze at the emotions. A tradition that dates back to Plato (1956) and continues through Freud (1924/1960) and still resonates today, understands the emotions as rendering one vulnerable to thoughtlessness. The emotions were conceived as powerful, but also brute, disorganizing and stuporous (Sartre, 1948). This conception has had a stranglehold over our sense of who we are with regard to this very important part of ourselves. It has led many an investigator to leave emotion out of their sphere of inquiry, since they were viewed as

mostly noise. (Schulkin, Thompson, & Rosen, 2003, p. 15)

As Schulkin, Thompson, and Rosen (2003) indicate, a serious study of emotion starts at a disadvantage in the intellectual world, because of a fundamental predisposition in academia to view emotion as the antithesis of reason, logic and research—"as mostly noise." Those who research emotion approach the study from a variety of different perspectives and are often at odds as to the fundamental meaning of "emotion" to such an extent that "consensus about the definition of emotion eludes us" (Campos, Campos, & Barret, 1989, p. 394). Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) document fully 92 distinct definitions of emotion that they group into 11 different categories. From the breadth and variety of those definitions we can infer that, "emotion" is the sort of thing that we can all recognize when we see it, but we cannot define with a single consistent voice.

During the early Industrial Age, prior to the turn of the twentieth century and the start of the Modern Period, "emotions were commonly conceived of as discrete, episodic and purely affective states of consciousness, states whose connection to cognition, physiological activity, and conduct was that of either cause to effect or the converse" (Deigh, 2001, p. 1247). According to Deigh, Freud and James introduced "innovations of the highest order" in the psychological study of emotion. For Freud, "Emotions are synonymous with "psychic energy" and are linked to instinctual, largely unconscious drives, which must be made conscious ("where id was there ego shall be") in order to be "tamed" and socialized" (Hudlicka, 2004). Echoes of this Freudian characterization are apparent in the current concept of Emotional Intelligence. In Goleman's (1995) seminal assemblage of work on emotional intelligence, he harkens back to Aristotle, "In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle's philosophical enquiry into virtue, character, and the good life, his challenge is to manage our emotional life with intelligence . . . the problem is not with

emotionality but with the *appropriateness* of emotion and its expression" (p. xiv, emphasis in the original).

Similar contemporary echoes are seen in the fact that Freud focused extensively on anxiety as the most important emotion. For Freud, anxiety signals a repressed emotional experience that needs to be dealt with. As indicated by the epigram at the beginning of this section, Freud took a rather disparaging attitude toward the study of emotion and his perspective has had tremendous influence on psychologists that followed in his footsteps. Indeed, even in the late twentieth century, scholars, like Jack Block of UC Berkeley, still take this Freudian position on emotion with blunt statements like: "the basic emotion is anxiety and that one tries to avoid anxiety." ("EQ Today - What Are Emotions?," 2002).

The Shift

The final decades of the twentieth century saw a dramatic shift in our paradigms of emotion. Starting with a trickle of "new" research in the 1980s and reaching a watershed moment in the mid-1990s, the sources of emotion have been clearly identified in the brain, and the integration of emotion and reason has become undeniable. Five texts are significant markers of this paradigm shift in both the popular and the academic consciousness: Howard Gardner's (1983) *Frames of Mind*, Daniel Goleman's (1995) *Emotional Intelligence*, Stanley Greenspan's (1997) *The Growth of the Mind*, Joseph Ledoux's (1996) *The Emotional Brain,* and Antonio Damasio's (1994) *Descartes' Error*. Significantly, each text marks an important perspective for this study. In 1983, Gardner took the first giant leap in changing the paradigm when he broke the narrow hold that IQ testing—which focuses almost exclusively on logic and language—had on our concept of intelligence. His theory of multiple intelligences states that "intelligence" is a complex and integrative process which is both multiple and fluid—more akin to a variety of

talents with relative levels of both nature and nurture components. Therefore to relate intelligence to a single skill or with a single number (IQ) is simply not possible. In particular, this notion of multiple in conjunction with intelligence opened the door for Goleman's enormously popular work which turns the traditional opposition of emotion and reason—and the traditional view that Goleman's title is an oxymoron —on its head through a careful collection and review of a vast range of groundbreaking work integrating emotional and intellectual life. Similarly, psychiatrist Greenspan presents a developmental model of the mind that integrates social, emotional, and intellectual skills and capacities. Ledoux's work has linked the systemic workings of emotions to the amgydala in the brain and made it impossible to imagine emotions as anything other than a brain function—albeit with direct and rapid effects in the body. Finally, neurologist Damasio presents a physical and cognitive justification of the function and integration of emotion within the brain and the integration of emotion and reason as related cognitive processes. These works and the wide variety of research that they review characterize the paradigm shift and most importantly lay the foundation for a new perspective on emotion and reason—an integrated model which needs to be addressed in educational psychology and foreign language education.

Defining Emotion

Research into the topic of emotional communication certainly faces some definitional problems. Turner and Stets (2005) address the definitional issue broadly: "What are emotions? Moreover what do we mean by notions of sentiments, moods, affect, feelings, and other terms … surprisingly there is no definitive answer to these questions" (p. 2). Prior to the paradigm shift in emotion research much of the work that was closely aligned to the fields of language and communication tended to be descriptive and sought to focus on causes and elements of emotion

and emotional expressions—rather than interactive emotional *communication*. For example, Collier (1985) takes the reductionist approach seeking to divide the elements of emotional expression into constituent parts:

> Emotions differ from other psychological states in that the body is noticeably involved. … Emotional expression is often treated as an aspect of verbal and non verbal communication. … Most researchers are aware that channels of emotional expression (as separate sources of information) are necessary abstractions that do not exist during normal social interaction. (pp. 2-3)

The critical points for our definition of emotion are the lack of distinction between feelings and emotions, and the breakdown of emotional expression into the "channels" that he uses to structure his text – they include touch, body movement and posture, facial expressions, eye behavior, personal space, tone of voice, grammatical features, and verbal content. Somewhat paradoxically, Collier, while studying these channels, agues against their presence in "normal social interaction," bluntly stating that the channels are "abstractions" that "do not exist." Indeed, his contradictory stance opens the door to precisely the sort of research I am attempting here. In this study, we will look at each of these channels when necessary, but try to focus on the *holistic* impression of each emotional communication incident. I find it critical to point out that a distinction between feelings and emotions does indeed exist, and that distinction is an important element of the social aspects of emotional communication. Wierzbicka (1999) draws our attention to the vital contrast between "feelings" and "emotions"—the first bound to the body and therefore universal, and the second a broader and culture bound notion:

> Thus while the concept of "feeling" is universal and can be safely used in the investigation of human experience and human nature, … the concept of "emotion" is

> culture-bound and cannot be similarly relied on. … But there is absolutely no reason why we should make such choices, linking "emotion" either with bodily processes, or with feelings, or with thoughts, or with culture. The very meaning of the English word *emotion* includes both a reference to feelings and to thoughts (as well as a reference to the body), and culture often shapes both ways of thinking and ways of feeling. (pp. 4-5)

Thus, while some elements of the "pre-paradigm shift" definitions of emotion do have usefulness in this study, other elements need to be reconsidered.

In attempting to summarize and find a consensus among those ninety-two definitions of emotion mentioned earlier, Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) provide the following definition of emotion:

> Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, mediated by neural/hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to affective experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals, labeling processes; (c) activate widespread physiological adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not always, expressive, goal directed, and adaptive. (p. 355)

Certainly, Kleinginna and Kleinginna were guilty of trying to cover all of their bases, so an element of the "kitchen sink" is apparent in this definition. However, they provide a good first stab at creating the operational definitions necessary for this research. Akin to Kleinginna and Kleinginna's definition, another important and more contemporary perspective on emotions—particularly critical in terms of emotion as a social, communicative event—is the conception of emotion as a process. Planalp (1999) summarizes both the definition and that critical elements of emotion as a process:

> Process theories of emotion can be formally represented in several ways – with diagrams of prototypes, flow charts, or simple verbal descriptions – but they all describe emotion as a process made up of several definable subparts or components that operate together to produce emotion. Although theorists may disagree about what specific components are essential to emotion, five appear in most theories in one form or another: (1) *objects, causes, precipitating events*, (2) *appraisal* (3) *physiological changes*, (4) *action tendencies/action/expression*, and (5) *regulation*. (p. 11)

All of Kleinginna and Kleinginna's items appear to be contained within Planalp's process definition. Planalp, however, adds the precipitating impact of external reality, as well as the subsequent and socially mediated effects of self-regulation.

One other salient distinction in defining emotions will be important for our analysis—the notion that our conception of emotion exists on multiple levels. Parkinson (1995) recognizes that emotions need to be understood on a variety of levels. He offers three common sense levels of emotion:

> Thus, according to common sense, there are three apparently separate levels of phenomena relating to emotion, the individual (experience of emotion), the interpersonal (communication of emotion), and the representational (ideas about emotion), but its essence is still properly considered to live at the first level inside of private psyche. Each of the upper levels in some sense is considered as dependent upon this basic level and you give only a degraded and inaccurate picture of what goes on there. … Although no academic analysis of emotion would import wholesale such a theory of emotional functioning, the intuitive conceptions still get smuggled into psychological discourse somehow. (p. 14)

Studying the first level—internal *and* individual experience--is inherently problematic. Parkinson (1995) himself reminds us that part of the issue in clearly defining the internal level of emotion is corollary to Wittgenstein's (1958) "beetle argument" regarding private language as a language game – or more properly *not* a language game. Wittgenstein presents a beetle in a box as a metaphor for the mind or any other purely interior mental process (which would include emotions). Even though everyone has a box with something inside it, we have no way of ascertaining precisely what is inside another person's box; therefore, "if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'objective and designation' the subject drops out of consideration as irrelevant" (p. 100). Parkinson's (1995) point, then, is that while "[i]n the common sense individualistic view, emotion may be expressed to other people, but it is not necessarily communicated in any way" (p. 17). While some elements of a methodological problem of studying this level will be addressed later in this paper, examining the problem itself is one of the major purposes and goals of this research. Thus second and third levels that Parkinson describes are less problematic for this research, because the interpersonal level is the subject of the study, and the representational level is the method and product.

Finally, some definitions become so broad that they cease to be useful for our analysis in the realms of foreign language education and educational psychology. From a sociological perspective, Turner and Stets (2005) offer such an inclusive definition, "in the emphasizing the term *emotions* in this book, we are asserting that this concept subsumes the phenomena denoted by other labels – sentiments, affect, feelings, and the like – which are often employed by theorists and researchers" (p. 2). This sort of definition that accepts *anyone's* definition of emotion simply goes too far and does not allow us to narrow the topic sufficiently to conduct a reasonable and efficient study.

Academic Perspectives Outside of Educational Psychology

While emotion has proven difficult for researchers to define, the importance of emotional communication is undeniable: "the interpersonal communication of emotional states is fundamental to both everyday and clinical interaction. One's own and others affective experiences are frequent topics of everyday conversations, and how well those emotions are expressed and understood is important to interpersonal relationships and individual well-being" (Fussell, 2002, p. 1). Moreover, Goddard (2002) warns us of the risk of becoming too ethnocentric: "the tendency for people to assume that the folk taxonomy embedded in their mother tongue represents a reliable guide to an independently existing, objective reality" (p. 22). My goal in the next section of this literature review is to establish the framework within which previous work has been conducted into the topic of emotional communication across cultures—theory and research for several academic fields. Trying to bring together research from these disparate academic fields is not an easy task and not one that I undertake lightly, but it is clearly a task needs attempted, as Scherer (2003) reminds us, in general emotion research has "one major shortcoming – lack of interaction between researchers from various disciplines working on different angles and levels of the problem – [and that shortcoming] remains unresolved" (p. 250). A second, and for me equally important, reason to bring together disparate academic paradigms for this approach is that little research has been conducted into emotional communication within the fields of educational psychology and foreign language education. A third reason is that "collaboration, or at least triangulation of the data from different paradigms, is also necessary to address the third shortcoming of the current work [*in communicating emotionally across cultures*], the overreliance on studies conducted in laboratory contexts" (Pavlenko, 2005, p. 76). Thus, the first section of this review will establish where such study has been conducted. The

particular fields in which research can shed important light on this study include cognitive psychology, and the distinctly different approaches and findings of anthropology, sociology and social psychology, as well as many of the subfields of linguistics and communication studies. To categorize the literature in each of these academic areas, I will explore four divergent yet interrelated questions regarding the research into emotional communication for each field: 1) what is the philosophical perspective on emotion and communication in that field, 2) methodologically speaking, how has each field conducted research into emotion and communication, 3) what sorts of results were found in the research—which will answer questions about how cultural differences in emotional display are expressed as well as the more unitary question of how emotion is communicated, and 4) how will that research impact this study?

Before embarking on an exploration of the literature, a final definitional issue affecting both our understanding of emotion and this research in particular is embedded in the question of if and how humans communicate emotion to one another. Research to date has yet to provide a clear framework for precisely which conversational acts produce what sort of effect. This missing framework in turn presents us with a real quandary in determining just exactly what an emotional communication is. Is it just some difference in prosody or some other behavioral act? Or is it the act of attribution? Do we interpret those clues as personality traits? Do we interpret them as emotional states? Are they temporary? What happens when the person is, actively and intentionally, doing some sort of manipulation with the emotions they are trying to communicate: for example berating or flirting? When is the emotional communication intentional and when spontaneous? Pavlenko (2005) passes along the following terms to help us categorize emotional events: emotional communication and emotive communication. "In emotional communication,

interjections "wow!" or "really?" are uttered in a genuine surprise, while in emotive communication the same the interjections are uttered in a ritualized manner, to express conversational engagement and support" (p. 49). Thus far in this paper, I have used the term "emotional communication" as a super-ordinate term covering both categories; however, the second category of emotive communication is the primary focus of this research. Emotive communication is clearly related to the notion of display rules: by definition, display rules are among the communicative conversational tools of the specific culture.

Cognitive perspectives

Philosophical foundations of cognitive research in emotion.

In that traditions and metaphors of many cultures emotions have been attributed to organs in the human body *other* than the brain. In the Hindu tradition, a series of chakra in the body are the sources of emotion. In traditional Chinese medicine, the emotions are associated with elements and the elements in turn with organs, connections which one Chinese medicine website describes as follows: "The Liver is associated with Wood and therefore with Anger, the Heart with Fire and Joy, the Spleen with Earth and Pensiveness, the Lung with Metal and Grief and the Kidney with Water and Fear" (Zhao & Morgan, 2004, p. ¶ 5). In Western traditions, both the heart and the spleen have been implicated as sources of emotion. Modern science tells us that a critical distinguishing element of emotion is the body's reaction—Planalp's (1999) "physiological changes"—to the emotion-producing stimulus. Our hearts race, we feel nauseous, or we break out into a cold sweat: folk theories thus attribute emotions to the other organs than the brain. Our modern understanding of emotions links them directly to activity in the brain; consequently, the fields of psychology and neurology have been active in research into emotions. I will consider both fields together trying to make careful distinctions between the two as we

move along.

Here again, I take the risk of over-generalizing regarding the philosophical approach of psychology. At a very fundamental level, psychology attempts to understand that the workings of the human mind, or "psyche," by observing and analyzing overt behaviors. In analyzing those behaviors, a primary goal is to determine which emotions, if any, are basic, universal, and fundamental emotions for every human. As part of mainstream practice, one would not consider social and cultural issues to be primary in psychological research. Although both social psychology and cultural psychology are active fields of research, neither has been particularly active in research into emotions and communication. The various fields of neuroscience have a significantly different philosophical perspective in research. The primary focus has been to determine if and how all the brain respond us differently to different emotionally charged stimuli, which we would expect to produce different cognitive and physiological responses.

Methodological preferences within cognitive research in emotion.

Within psychology, recent research has been dominated on one hand by basic emotion studies from, notably, Ekman, Izard, and others (Ekman, 1993, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Ekman, et al., 1972; Izard, 1977, 1991, 1994; Oakley, 1992), and on the other hand by appraisal studies most notably from Ellsworth and Smith, and Scherer (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Gehm & Scherer, 1988; K. R. Scherer, 1993, 1999; K. R. Scherer & Ellgring, 2007; Schumann, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987). Ekman's (Ekman, 1993, 1999b, 2003) studies of the facial expression have been extensive and highly influential. The basic methodology of these studies is a forced choice task with photographs of faces displaying staged expressions of emotion. Prior to beginning the research, Ekman needed to select which emotions to have modeled, then photograph, and finally to show to the subjects. Ekman (1993) states that these emotions and the

particular facial movements that are indicative of them meet "*a priori* criteria for what configurations should be present in each" (p. 305). However, Ekman, and simultaneously Izard, discovered that some models were better at creating the configurations for being photographed then others were. Consequently, the researchers chose to select the "better" photographs. In Ekman's case, the researcher selected based on those *a priori* criteria, while in Izard's studies(1977, 1991, 1994) American undergraduate students were asked to judge the photographs, then the ones which showed the highest rate of agreement on emotion expressed were used. The next step was to show the photographs to people from different cultures. The "forced choice" aspect of the study comes in the fact that these subjects were only given a small number of emotional words to choose from for each photograph. Generally, six (or so) emotion words were used in the list, including: happiness, anger, fear, sadness, surprise, disgust.

In studies of appraisal theory, the primary methodology has been the use of surveys of recalled events to analyze individuals' appraisal mechanisms and which emotions are associated with which sort of appraisals. More descriptively, the respondents would be asked to recall an emotionally charged situation that they had experienced, then they are asked a series of questions regarding that event. The questions are directly associated with the elements of appraisal in the theory the researcher is attempting to validate. For example, Ghem and Scherer (1988) asked questions to check five elements of their hypothesis: novelty, intrinsic pleasantness, goal significance, coping potential, and norm compatibility. What is philosophically and methodologically important with this particular set of research is, first, the desire to test appraisal theory – often in a specific version of appraisal theory, and, second, the use of recalled emotional experience (Schumann, 1997).

A second field of study is important research into emotion and communication with a

broadly cognitive perspective is neurobiology. Like the field of psychology, the primary focus of emotion research within the field of neurobiology is on the study of "basic" emotions – that is, neuroscientists begin with some fundamental assumptions about the existence of basic emotions in order to search for them; moreover, these have neuroscientists have sought to pinpoint the locations within the brain where emotions in general are processed and where specific and "basic" emotions are processed. As research in their neurobiology is quite distinctly in the medical field, the research methodology differs significantly from the research used in psychology. Research in neurobiology is driven by technology, which has seen quantum leaps in recent decades, as well as a quantitative approach to analyzing research data.

Historically, the relationship between brain function and language use has been studied inferentially through work with individuals who suffer from aphasia – a loss of language skills due to brain damage typically caused by physical injury or disease (Sacks, 1985). Quite commonly, these studies of aphasia implicated damage to emotional communication processing, as well. The location and extent of that damage is then related to the specific type of communication function loss. By relating the damaged area and specific function lost, researchers then infer that the specific area where the brain damage occurred is responsible for that specific function. Such procedures suffer from a number of admitted flaws. Rarely does brain damage occur in a sufficiently precise way to produce the desired effects--e.g. an inability to communicate non-verbally. Also, since identical brain injuries are virtually impossible, how individual differences affect the manner in which different people process and store language/emotion information in their brains had, therefore, been virtually impossible to study through these inferential and secondary methods. Moreover, natural processes in the brain allow areas neighboring damage to take over some of the function of the damaged area. Diamond and

Hopson (1998) cite several examples of brain damage that does not match such maps of the brain in a wide variety of ways. Because of these weaknesses in traditional studies of neurobiology and communication, recent breakthroughs in technology, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) are critical, dynamic, and breathtaking opportunities to peer into healthy, active brains and watch them at work in ways that would have been unimaginable only a few years ago. Indeed, these tools have helped dispel some long held myths about how we process language in our brains. From a process perspective, the primary message of neurological research into language, emotions, and communication has been as follows. First, the subjects are placed inside of these large brain scanning machines (fMRI or PET). Next, the subjects are shown some type of stimulus for either language or emotional response –e.g. slides of words or video of emotionally charged situations. The machines record the neural activity as well as the location of that activity with different levels of specificity. Finally, the neural activity data is translated by computer into images, which are then read and interpreted by the neurologist (see figure 1). The images indicate where the most activity is in the brain while a particular event is occurring. From this information, we interpret which part of the brain is involved in a specific function. Recent advances in the overall technology particularly in regards to computer processing have allowed neuroscientists to go beyond the sorts of two dimensional still images of the brain that we can see in figure 1 to provide three-dimensional, "movie like" images of the brain activity (see http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/education/fmri/introduction-to-fmri/ (Devlin, 2008) for a description).




Figure 1. A brain scan image showing emotional response. The online caption reads "This figure shows functional magnetic resonance images, fMRI, (top row) and positron emission tomography, PET, images (bottom row) from two individuals. Information from the fMRI helped identify the precise location of the area of the brain called the amygdala while data from the PET scan revealed activity in the amygdala." (http://www.news.wisc.edu/packages/emotion/media.html, ("Brain and Emotions Research at UW-Madison: Photos, images and animations for media," 2001)

In summary, critical methodological perspectives from neurobiological research are markedly different from the techniques suggested for this study. Where neuroscience relies heavily on quantitative methods, the study will incorporate qualitative methods, and where neuroscience relies heavily on technological tools and analysis, the study will use ethnographic tools particularly focus groups.

Critical findings within cognitive research in emotion.

Facial expression research in the study of emotion has generated a significant body of work. Indeed in the more than 30 years since the initial studies were conducted, a great deal of criticism and analysis of both the results and the methodology have occurred in the literature. Some good portion of the interest in the topic and the studies can be attributed to the fact that the

findings ran counter to the prevailing academic perspective that facial expressions associated with emotions were socially constructed. Moreover, that "prevailing academic perspective" ran counter to the commonsense interpretation that emotions are written "all over one's face," or as Ekman (Ekman, 1993) writes, "That this contradicted what every layman knew made it all the more attractive. Psychology had exposed the falseness of a folk belief, a counterintuitive finding" (p. 384). In summary, Ekman concludes that those six emotions are universal across cultures of all sorts Western, Eastern, and even several preliterate cultures:

> Our evidence, and that of others, shows only that when people are experiencing strong emotions, are not making any attempt to mask their expressions, the expression will be the same regardless of age, race, culture, sex and education. That is a powerful finding. (Ekman, 1998, p. 391, cited in Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 59).

Indeed, those results *are* a powerful finding; however, the caveats themselves represent equally interesting and powerful representations up how people communicate with emotions—the sorts of loopholes one could drive a truck through. To reiterate, the two significant caveats are: first, the strength of the emotions, and second, whether they are making an attempt to mask their emotions. Both of these caveats are critical to this study, and I will discuss them in more detail shortly. The important conclusion from this body of research is fairly straightforward. A weak interpretation, and therefore "universally" accepted, would be that, and statistically significant ways, several basic emotions are universal to the human species, because people can recognize the facial and vocal expression of those emotions across cultures from Eastern and Western--from preliterate to literate.

The second strand of research within psychology, appraisal studies, also presents some interesting and important findings in understanding how human beings deal with emotions.

Scherer's studies (Gehm & Scherer, 1988; K. R. Scherer, 1993) have shown that different sorts of appraisals analyzed through "stimulus evaluation checks" are indeed well correlated to some basic emotional phrases. Indeed, Scherer (1993) conducted a novel study in which a computer was programmed to predict the emotion that subjects were recalling. In other words, subjects were asked to recall an emotionally charged experience, then responded to the evaluation checks, and in the computer used to the previous correlations to predict which emotion the subject was recalling. The computer's accuracy was quite high ranging from 65 to 80%; thus, Scherer concludes: "with 14 emotion alternatives one would expect 7.14% accuracy if the system operated on chance level, this result seems quite respectable" (p. 347).

In their studies of appraisal Smith and Ellsworth (1985, 1987) also looked at various dimensions of appraisal using a questionnaire to analyze the informant responses. One of their studies (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987) is particularly notable in the fact that the researchers analyzed not recalled experiences but a stressful experience – taking an examination – both before and after that experience. A particularly interesting finding of the study was that "subjects usually experienced blends of two emotions both before the exam and after feedback, but the patterns of appraisal were very similar to those found in" their previous research (Schumann, 1997, p. 15). Also notable is the distinction that "lived emotions" produced blends of emotional experience while in recalled experiences, psychologically at least, the participants' emotions can more readily be separated, psychologically at least, into individual basic emotions.

Research in that second field of study, neurobiology, has produced important results for our understanding of emotion and communication. Neurobiological research, in significant part due to those recent advances in technology, has produced findings that inform this study in several ways: an accurate picture of the neurological basis of language processing, a better

understanding of the neurological basis of emotion, and particularly in how language use, as well as linguistic and emotional processing work together to create emotional expressions and emotional understanding.

To begin with, findings regarding the locations of language processing, through those technological advances, have facilitated key changes in perspective by allowing us to "see" the locations and functioning of language use within the human brain dynamically and in real time. Perhaps the best example is the abandonment of the "single circuit" notion: "until recently, scientists thought that all language skills—reading, writing, and rhyming—were contained within a single brain circuit. They were wrong" (Begley, 1992, p. 69); thus, traditional tried (but untrue) notions are being turned on their head. Similarly, the logical notion that the brain processes the sounds in order to store words proves untrue, and moreover, researchers currently believe that people can store the information about words via *either auditory or visual* signals (Begley, 1992). This fact is supported by extensive anecdotal evidence about foreign language learners who are able to read and not speak, and vice versa. Perhaps more importantly Raichle's research indicates that a speaker's auditory centers do not process sound when that speaker is speaking--"you don't process what you say in the same way that you hear what others say" (Begley, 1992, p. 69). Our brain functions in many ways defy the very logic that we create using those brains. In support of critical period theory, but contrary to the notion that the brain is a static entity, researchers have discovered that language processing is nowhere near as localized as was once thought. Further evidence indicates that many different areas of the brain are in use when learning and when using language. Mills, Coffey-Corina and Neville (1993, 1997) show that language is processed *throughout* the brain in infants and later becomes localized in patterns that are similar for healthy adults, yet still in broader areas of the brain than in the single circuit

notion. Similarly, a study by Buchanan et al. (2000) presents "findings [that] illustrate bilateral involvement in the detection of emotion in language while concomitantly showing significantly lateralized activity in both emotional and verbal detection, in both the temporal and frontal lobes" (p. 227). Similarly, the results of McNeeley and Parlow's (2001) study supports the suggestion that "verbal and nonverbal processes may be lateralized to the left and right hemispheres, respectively; however, distinct (i.e., unrelated [and unlateralized]) mechanisms underlie these differences in lateralization" Ultimately, Damasio (1994) provides what is currently the best idea of the language data storage process. His research determined that the brain stores different aspects of a concept in different regions at the rear of the cortex. Other areas, which he calls convergence zones--located more toward the front of the brain--seem to access the different pieces of information, combine them, and enable us to recognize the concept, but this process is not available to our conscious awareness.

Because we clearly cannot be conscious of our learning and thinking processes—at least when we are considering which areas of the brain are managing which skills and how they handle that management—we will need to rely on this rapidly growing field of neurobiological research to design our foreign language instruction to meet the learning and thinking within students' brains. Regardless of the potential of "brain scans" and other technologies, we still have far to go to understand how the brain learns language and much work to do to develop methodology to match that learning. The most important factor for this study is the new understandings that are developing out of this research regarding the connections between language processing and emotional processing in the working brain.

The technological advances that allow us to better understand language processing also aid our understanding of emotional processing. Similarly, more holistic notions are supplanting

older notions of emotional processing as Schumann notes: “But what emerges is the notion that processes that may be seen as separate and independent at the psychological level may be united or at least highly integrated at the neural level” (Schumann, 1997, p. 237). From Schumann’s perspective, cognition and emotion appear separate in our daily lives, but are intertwined within our brains. If this is the case, we need to carefully consider what impact that fact has on foreign language teaching.

Basically, the amygdala, in the evolutionarily older areas of the brain near the brain stem, processes much of what we call emotion. It has direct links to the hormone producing hypothalmus, which when activated makes us “feel” our emotions through enhanced bodily functions--heart rate, pupil dilation, etc. Those processes, however, are interrelated with cognitive functions, as well as memory. Ledoux (1996) and Greenspan (1997) are primarily concerned with how we feel emotion, i.e. the mechanical nuts and bolts of emotion. Schumann (1997) and Goleman (1995), on the other hand, explore how these emotions are interpreted in society. While these issues can be considered problems of pragmatics--the study of the relationship of language to the environment in which it occur--to a certain extent, my approach here is to start form the emotions rather than the situation or the language. In either approach, the communication and recognition of emotional clues, as well as the culturally specific negotiation associated with them (whether appropriate or not), are certainly processed to a great extent in the prefrontal lobes and other areas of the cortex. This processing occurs simultaneously with the language processing in the rear of the brain described by Damsio (1994), which leads us to consider how the two processes are related as elements of a holistic communication process.

Through these lines of research we see the familiar, traditional paradigms for language processing in the brain that language processing--specifically grammatical processing--occurs in the left hemisphere of the brain disproved. Several researchers (Brownlee, 1998; Mills, et al., 1993, 1997; Mollica & Danesi, 1995) have shown that prior to three years of age such grammatical processing occurs throughout the brain, but then moves to a very tight area of the temporal lobe just above the left ear. Ultimately, the memories of words and their meaning appear to be stored throughout the cortex, particularly toward the back of the brain, grammar functions are processed in the left side almost exclusively. Some portions of the language learning and using process can be localized (E.g. grammar rules), but many other important ones (E.g. lexis) are spread throughout the brain. Furthermore, they overlap and co-reside with areas that are involved in emotions. Integral to the remainder of this essay, the right temporal lobe contains the information regarding emotional content of language--cadence, pitch, and rhythm.

Impact of cognitive research in emotion on this study.

The impact of cognitive research in emotion on this study involves both the critical new insights that this research provides as well as the gaps and weaknesses of this research. This short section will explore each in turn: how psychological and neurobiological research has provided useful insights, and how that same research has revealed gaps and weaknesses in both assumptions and methodology.

On the psychological side of cognitive research, the idea that facial expression and vocal inflection can, to a great extent, convey information about emotions is critical. Moreover, cross-cultural research that has shown both similarities and differences in emotional expressions reveals that the question of basic or universal emotions is still unanswered. As I have related, Ekman's own definition of our ability to recognize basic emotions carries with it several caveats,

specifically, the relative strength of the emotion expressed, and the masking of those emotions (Parkinson, et al., 2005). This research will attempt to address both of those caveats – in my interpretation "gaps" – by presenting dynamic video expressions of more naturalistic emotional displays, while allowing research participants to rate their interpretation of those factors.

One weakness often pointed out regarding facial expression research is the relative inability of the pre-literate civilizations to accurately name expressions in the forced choice still photo studies. Parkinson, et al. (2005) review several studies and articles that bring into question the relative accuracy of preliterate civilizations in judging emotions, as well as Ekman's suggested solutions to this problem. They conclude:

> It is clear that emotion relevant faces are interpreted with some consistency across cultures, suggesting a universal link between facial position and at least some aspect or correlate of the emotion. However, it is also apparent that variation exists both within and across societies in the extent of this consistency. This suggests at a minimum that cultural expertise and socialization play some role in the attribution of emotional meaning to facial expressions. (Parkinson, et al., 2005)

Their conclusion that socialization and cultural expertise are important to provide excellent reason for this research to further define and explore how social and cultural factors play a role in emotional expression and particularly in how we might find ways to incorporate those factors into foreign language education.

Additionally, the idea that masking of emotions frequently occurs in social interaction is, of course, critical to cross-cultural communication. Display rules are by definition this sort of masking. In general, few would argue that cultures do not in some way regulate the display of various emotions: "a culture that disapproves of anger (e.g., Briggs, 1970) may encourage its

members to cover up or suppress any expression of this emotion on the face" (Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 63). However, Parkinson et al. continue to state that many in the field have argued that display rules should not affect the comprehension of someone else's expression of a basic emotion – and additionally that *conscious* mechanisms of decoding display rules would be inefficient and improbable unless those mechanisms became very intuitive for the members of a culture. Indeed, when display rules differ across cultures in dynamic cross cultural conversation, particularly given "that display rules sometimes become so ingrained that their operation goes unnoticed" (Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 63), we would expect cross-cultural misunderstandings based on the fact that the person from the other culture was too emotional, not emotional or expressed emotions in a peculiar way based on our own culturally modified *appraisal* of the appropriate expression given the situation. Because culturally established emotional masking and display rules are admitted factors in the expression of emotions and clearly the most likely source of miscommunication of emotion, I will attempt to explore those issues more fully in the study.

Also under the umbrella of cognitive psychology research, appraisal theory and studies provides both a foundation for and openings for the study I am conducting. The survey-based methodology of this research is much more in the direction of the sort of qualitative approach I will take. Many social and cultural mechanisms, preferences, and attitudes are embedded within the assumptions of survey research – moving away from notions of basic, universal, or genetic character of emotion and emotional expression. That our appraisal and evaluation of the situation we encounter is highly predictive of the emotions that we experience and express is an important factor in explaining the sorts of cross-cultural misunderstandings that I intend to explore. By presenting more detailed information about the situation in which the emotions are expressed I

hope to discover if cross-cultural interpretation of the emotions expressed is more or less problematic. Certainly, the finding that appraisal characteristics are both descriptive and predictive of emotional expression (Gehm & Scherer, 1988; K. R. Scherer, 1993) will be useful in this study.

One gap in appraisal studies that is also present in facial expression studies is the effect of mixed emotions being expressed at the same time. Ekman's work begins with the *a priori* assumption of a single emotion being expressed, preventing any analysis of mixed emotion. Indeed, Greasley, Sherrard, & Waterman (2000) note that assumptions underlying basic emotion research using forced choice methodology are somewhat problematic in terms of mixed emotions:

> While this experiment has shown that free choice labels are largely consistent with "basic emotion" labels, we have also seen that for 46% of our "negative emotion" samples there was no clear similarity across judges' responses to which "basic emotion" label was most appropriate to describe the emotional state of the speaker. These results indicate that a fixed choice mode of response giving subjects choice of just one label from a small range of "basic emotions," may not allow the subjects of an adequate level of discrimination in identifying a speaker's emotional state. (p. 364)

Pavlenko (2005) elaborates on these findings relating that more naturalistic approaches may enable participants to disentangle the emotions that occur in the course of normal conversation. Similarly, Smith and Ellsworth (1987) note an important finding that—in the stressful situation of taking a college examination—mixed emotions are usually experienced. Remember also that many of the other appraisal studies reliant on residing at on participants relied on the participants' *recollection* of their previous experience of a specific emotion, much in the same

way that facial expression studies present only a single expression of a single emotion. Neither of these situations represents the lived experience that human beings have every day. We are always presenting emotions "on-the-fly," in all probability in combination with other emotions, and almost certainly to varying degrees of intensity based on the situation. While in our intellectual discussion each emotion is presented quite distinctly, in practical reality emotions almost certainly fit into the category of cognitive events which Schumann (1997) describes as, "separate and independent at the psychological level [that] may be united or at least highly integrated" (p. 237). Clearly, the practical reality of mixed emotion represents emotions beyond the basic level: the sorts of emotions which Turner and Stets (2005) described as secondary emotions (in opposition to primary emotions – which are Ekman's basic emotions), and which we will consider in more detail in the following subsection. For the purposes of this study, the gaps in consideration of mixed emotions and emotional intensity brought about by forced choice methodology prompt me to make use of two methodological tools: first, allow participants to describe emotion with free choice vocabulary and second to rate intensity of forced choice "basic emotion" options.

The other cognitive area of study that we are considering in this dissertation is neurobiological research. Indeed, neuroscience research, in significant part due to those recent advances in technology, is the catalyst that drove the paradigm shift in emotional research. Specifically, we were able to see ways in which aphasia studies and psychological studies are quite limited in their ability to analyze the working of the human brain. Neuroscience has provided a broadly different view of emotion and language that research informs this study: a picture of the neurology of language and emotion processing—how linguistic and emotional processing work together to create emotional expressions and emotional understanding. Clearly,

language is continually being processed throughout the brain, and a whole brain is required to process even the most pedestrian conversations and their emotional import. Consequently, if we do not incorporate these facts into our foreign language teaching curriculum and methodology, we will miss an opportunity to serve our students. At the same time, however, because of the restrictions of that technology (an fMRI machine is *big*) this sort of research is unable to delve into both the natural occurrence of emotional communication, as well as the social and cultural factors involved in emotional communication. I will explain the methodological procedures in more detail later, but while I take the findings of neuroscience research into emotion and language into consideration in developing the study the methodological tools I will use will be very different.

Social and anthropological perspectives

All the world is a stage, and all men and women merely players

Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, Act II, Scene 7

That I turn my attention to social perspectives next would seem to me particularly fitting in that anthropology, sociology and cognitive psychology have tried to establish very different research methodologies, agendas, and perspectives – some would argue polar opposite perspectives – which also explore the same topics. I must point out however, that I use the term "social perspectives" here because of the significant crossover between anthropology, sociology, social psychology and a few other fields with like perspectives – I will do my best to distinguish between general social perspectives and sociological perspectives in particular. Moreover, while I have stated this before, I wish to emphasize once again that this study will explore emotion from within the construct of the display rules that govern the expression of emotion and the

comprehension of emotional meaning. Thus, this study seeks to present a contrast to the premise that emotional universals are the most critical element of our emotional lives, particularly when those lives interact across cultures and engage "the Other." While not denying the existence of emotional universals, the idea that emotional expression as governed by display rules implies that emotional communication represents an inherently social event. Moreover, the idea that, as social constructs, emotional communication events must therefore differ across cultures is the fundamental premise of this study. Perhaps more simply, the intercultural differences in emotional expression are where problems of intercultural miscommunication arise.

"One of the key issues of current debate in the psychology of emotion concerns the universality versus cultural relativity of emotional expression" (K. R. Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001, p. 76). We have reviewed Ekman (1999a) and others arguments for universal and basic emotions. Consequently, I suspect that few if any human beings have not felt each of those "basic" emotions. Yet we have seen in a variety of ways that the research that suggests and supports the universality of these specific emotions is highly structured and suffers from gaps and weaknesses. Ultimately, the vast majority of the research is both designed and structured through and American and English language lens– a fact in itself supporting the validity of Wierzbicka's (1999) argument that language inherently mediates and differentiates our understanding and use of emotion in significant ways. Planalp (1999) extends the argument against the ethnocentricity of the basic emotions position, "because it assumes an individual, internal state model of emotion that is hidden and is expressed rather than a model in which participants enact an emotional event or situation together in public" (p. 213). A simple thought experiment indicates that basic emotions are only part of the story. For a moment, imagine you are a participant in one of those appraisal studies we discussed earlier. Picture some powerful

emotion you have felt. Did that emotion involve other people? Perhaps you, like me, have difficulty in imagining an emotional experience that does not involve other people. Let's expand that experiment a bit more, imagine an emotional experience that you were having in solitude, but you were interrupted—perhaps you were reading a book, or watching a program on television or a DVD or video and someone else heard you laughing, or crying and came in to see what was going on. Did your expression of that emotion change in manner or intensity in the presence of another person? Did you try to stop crying, or not laugh as loud? Did you use your emotions to draw the other person into your experience? Unsurprisingly, this thought experiment has been carried out in a number of experimental studies (U. Hess, Banse, & Kappas, 1995; Jakobs, Manstead, & Fischer, 1999a, 1999b, 2001; Yamamoto & Suzuki, 2006). In general, experimental participants in these studies were placed in either in isolation or in groups/pairs of either strangers or friends and then shown stimuli that elicited emotional responses of varying intensity. All of the studies found a social element to emotional expressions and showed a complex interaction of social factors. One early experiment concluded and was supported by later studies regarding the interaction of three factors of sociality (participants in isolation or in groups), intensity of emotion displayed, and relationship (participants in the groups either friends or strangers): "The results indicate that the intensity of expressive displays cannot be satisfactorily predicted by either of these factors alone but is influenced by a complex interplay of all 3 factors" (U. Hess, et al., 1995, p. 280). Clearly, we are hardwired for some basic emotions that can to be traced far back down our evolutionary tree, but nearly as far back in that evolutionary tree, we see that emotions are intricately, inseparably intertwined with the social needs, skills and, talents that distinguish humans for "lesser" animals.

Thus, the social perspective on emotion must be included in the constellation of fields that inform our understanding of cross-cultural emotional communication.

Philosophical foundations of social and anthropological research in emotion.

While I have titled this subsection "philosophical foundations," I will cover a bit more herein. We will look at the how and why of emotion from a sociological point of view, address the question of rationality versus emotion through the sociological lens, and consider some major themes of sociology as they relate to the study of emotion.

You may recall that Turner and Stets (2005) in *The Sociology of Emotions* offered the broadest definition of emotion that I could find: "In emphasizing the term emotions in this book we are asserting that this concept subsumes the phenomena noted by other labels – sentiments, affect, feelings, and the like – which are often employed by theorists and researchers" (p. 2). Their rationale for this all-inclusive definition is as follows: "Surprisingly, there is no definitive answer to these questions (Van Brackel, 1994). Indeed, there are almost as many answers as there are theoretical approaches examining the dynamics of emotions" (p. 2). Frankly, I had to ask: why would the authors offer such a broad definition – a definition, that I suggested earlier goes too far? At one level, the author's intention is to write a text that surveys the existing literature, so they clearly hope to cover as much as possible. Another possible reason is that recent paradigm shift in the explosion of theory and research associated with it. In both cases the important implication for my research is that anthropology and sociology have not completely solidified their perspectives methodology and research targets in terms of emotion, in general, and the communication of emotion, in particular.

Parkinson et al. (2005) point out that as a psychological and anthropological project – and therefore a sociological one – the task of leading differences in emotions and emotional

communication across cultures raises some important questions:

> Are people talking about the same things when they talk about "emotions" in different cultures or at different times? What exactly counts as an emotion in one culture compared to another? Is they are precisely the same variety and number of "emotions" in all cultures and languages? Is it self evident that there must be phenomenon corresponding to our own idea of what emotions are in all other cultures?
>
> The answer to each of these questions is no. (p. 29)

The sociological perspective on the communication of emotions across culture must be one that is looking at the differences and hoping to better understand them. Recognizing that the differences in emotional communication are the fundamental research problem in sociological studies into emotion, Parkinson et al. (2005) offer a three level framework[3] to both describe the types of current analysis and guide future analysis of the sociological questions associated with emotional communication:

> The first and most obvious level is the interpersonal level which focuses on direct relations and interactions with other people and on how their conduct influences and is influenced by our own … a second level permits consideration of how individuals' conduct is shaped by the fact that they belong to groups. … as groups get larger over the course of history they tend to subdivide and stratified to develop traditions and rules, no formal and informal. … Distinctions between interpersonal, group, and cultural factors often get fuzzy.

Indeed this three-level distinction of how people communicate their emotions can be difficult to tease apart. In the practical reality of this proposed study, all three levels must come into play.

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[3] Rephrasing the perspective previously cited from (Parkinson, 1995).

Each participant will be having their own emotional experiences at the first level as well as trying to describe them. Also, as this will be a focus group study, the factors of the focus group at the second level will be critical. Finally, the fundamental purpose of the study is to determine if cross culturally distinct emotional communication factors can be uncovered, and therefore be germane foreign language education, is the ultimate goal of the study. Clearly, these "hows and whys" associated with sociological studies into emotional communication will be critical for my research.

As I have discussed, Western science has drawn a stark contrast between rationality and emotion: "Historically, in Western thought, emotion and reason were considered opposing forces with emotions and irrationality at one pole and cognition and rationality at the other pole" (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 21). This conceptualization within Western thought has been a major cause of both the lack of research into emotion as well as the "diminishment" of emotion research – attempting to turn what research is being done into a sort of "second tier" branch of study. Thus, the question of rationality versus emotion is pivotal to the sociological understanding of emotional communication. Indeed, one conception of the field of sociology is as a bridge between the "hard rationality" of science and the "soft relativity" of human experience: "For example, Max Weber (1922/1968) conceptualized action as 'rational' and 'affectual'" (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 21). Collins (1993), in an argument reminiscent of Nash's equilibrium theory (Nasar, 2001), contends that emotions are the "common denominator of rationality" because our rational actions inherently depend upon our ability to judge the affect bestowed in a particular situation. Moreover, the *e*ffect which the *a*ffect contributes to the individual's assessment of the utility of one or another course of action leaves the idea of display rules a short step away from a Nash equilibrium. In this case, the equilibrium definition of a

display rule would represent an emotionally charged situation where any individual's best strategy for emotional expression would be to follow the display rule, and, additionally, any alternative strategy that might improve the individual's situation would also result in an improvement of the situation for the entire cooperative group. Consequently, a sociological treatment of emotion must ultimately explore "cultural ideologies, beliefs, and norms as they impinge on social structures define what emotions are to be experienced and how these culturally defined emotions are to be expressed" (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 2).

Methodological preferences within social and anthropological research in emotion.

Just as the cognitive and social perspectives have different philosophical approaches to question of emotional communication across cultures, the methodologies employed in research in anthropology and sociology are strikingly different than those used by cognitive researchers. The broad generalization that cognitive approaches are generally quantitative while sociological approaches are qualitative is broadly true with the study of emotion within each field as well. Specifically, we have seen how cognitive methodologies often involve experimental studies done in a laboratory setting that are analyzed through statistical and quantitative procedures. In contrast, sociological studies rely on questionnaires, interviews, participant observation and other ethnographic procedures; however, "anthropological investigations too often have tended to concentrate on semantic aspects of emotional meaning" (Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 44). Though we find a range of methodologies in both cognitive science and anthropology/sociology, a fair characterization of the preferred methodologies of each would place them at opposing ends of the quantitative/qualitative spectrum.

The methodology that overlaps with cognitive studies is survey research – and while I do not intend to conduct a large-scale survey, questionnaires are certainly part of my intention for

this study. Such surveys however suffer from several limitations. For one, the detailed analysis of forced choice, individual word meanings can provide information about the general interpretation of "category exemplars, but tell us very little about how words are actually used in less abstract contexts" (Parkinson, et al., 2005, pp. 43-44). Additionally, questionnaires rely on inherently imprecise translations of the key emotional vocabulary. Unfortunately, in a cross-cultural study it becomes very difficult to tease out whether the differences in response are based on differences in cultural interpretation or differences in translation of the vocabulary: "in fact it may simply be that the different emotion words presented to members of the two cultures lead them to pick out a different phenomenon or different aspects of the same phenomena"(Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 84).

While ethnography, as well as the interviews and participant observation that are part and parcel of an ethnography, are also subject to translation problems, the more intense and long term interaction of the researcher with subjects can quote get around these issues can "get around these issues to some extent by making more direct observations of the emotional phenomenon in question" (Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 85). Also, qualitative methods in general, and anthropological ethnography specifically, are somewhat more subject to bias created by the researcher's own frame of reference, as their "observations are bound to be conditioned by the anthropologist's own cultural perspective" (Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 85). In the end, my methodological conclusion in relation to the divide between cognitive and sociological methodologies is that some sort of mixed method may be appropriate in this case, as Parkinson et al. (2005) suggest: "in principle, these pragmatic functions of emotion language may be identified from ethnographic analysis, and intensive, qualitative studies of this kind may help supplement the more quantitative findings" (p. 44).

Critical findings within social and anthropological research in emotion.

As any academic field has particular themes and topics of interest, the study of emotion within anthropology and sociology has been guided to some extent by themes within the fields of study. The major theme I will review is clearly the most prominent issue to be addressed in sociological study of emotional communication – the social construction of emotion and emotional expression within cultures. In addition, I will explore some less prominent issues surrounding emotional communication that are also central themes in anthropology and sociology including: gender, power, and cultural differences that frequently "get hogtied" into the marco-concept of individualism/collectivism.

At the outset, we should recall that the notion of social construction is critical not only to anthropology and sociology but to education as well making this theme doubly important to this proposed study. You will recall that Ekman began his research when the dominant notion in the field of psychology – championed by Margaret Mead and others – was that emotions were created culturally. In contemporary parlance – emotions represent a social construction. Even now in the 21st century, Turner & Stets (2005) explained that "for most sociologists, emotions are socially constructed in the sense that what people feel is conditioned by socialization into culture and by participation in social structures" (p. 2). Pavlenko (2005) points to two distinct paradigms in the study of emotion and communication as emotion research moves into the 21st century. One, the "*communication of emotions*," sees "language and emotions as largely separate phenomena and posits a one to one correspondence between emotions as inner states and their perception, interpretation and expression" (p.114). The other, the *"discursive construction of the emotions*, … focuses attention on rhetorical alternatives available to speakers, … in the ongoing negotiation of meaning in the context of emotional, social, and power relations" (p. 114,

emphasis in original). The first paradigm has a great deal in common with the basic/universalist approach to emotion typified by Ekman, while the second paradigm is clearly a sociological/cultural one. At first glance, one might conclude that these two paradigms are simply opposite ends of the spectrum and, therefore, completely incompatible: however, that conclusion would drastically misrepresent the totality of this particular case. Pavlenko (2005) continues:

> Many scholars working on communication of emotions acknowledged that speakers use emotion categories to accomplish social goals (cf. Planalp & Knie, 2002). Similarly, the work on discursive construction of emotion recognizes the embodied nature of emotional experience (Abu-Lughold and Lutz, 1990) and the role of conventionality in effective displays (Arndt & Janney 1991; Irvine, 1990). (p. 114).

Thus, the two paradigms are at least partially compatible in the minds of many researchers who predominantly adhere to one paradigm or the other. So too, sociologists Turner & Stets (2005) find some middle ground: "what the social constructionist perspective neglects is that the activation, experience, and expression of emotions are intimately connected to the body" (p. 3). Thus, finding a way to tread the line between these two perspectives is critical in developing a whole and complete notion of the practice of emotional communication.

Moreover, a considerable volume of the sociological research into emotions focuses not only on basic emotions, but on more complex and mixed emotions. Plutchik's (2001) argument is that emotions can be analogous to colors arranged in a wheel (see figure 1) with the third dimension of intensity, allowing for the blending of emotions reminiscent of secondary colors




Figure 2. Two Plutchik's three-dimensional circumplex model of emotions (from http://www.fractal.org/Bewustzijns-Besturings-Model/Nature-of-emotions.htm)

in that we remember from studying the color wheel in elementary school art class. What is important for this discussion is that the study of color terms already has a long history in language learning in general, and linguistic relativism in particular (Ember, 1978; Kay & Kempton, 1984; Regier & Kay, 2009; Roberson & Hanley, 2009; Roberson, Hanley, & Pak, 2009). The basic argument of the supporters of linguistic relativism with reference to color terms is that different cultures have different systems for naming colors–referred to as a color lexicon. Some languages have two different basic color terms, some three, and at the high end some cultures have twelve in their color lexicon. Yet, patterns have been discovered in the way that those particular color lexicon are categorized by the different cultures [e.g. If there are only two colors they're basically "dark" and "light"]; thus, embedded within the fact that color terms are quite different across cultures, there is also support for universalist patterns. However, if we

attempt to extend this analogy to the realm of emotions we were in into one significant stumbling block: all colors have real, natural, physical representations associated with the properties of light that can be scientifically categorized. For example, if one combines yellow and blue light, and the result will always be green. At this point in the scientific study of emotions, we cannot consistently point to real, natural, physical representations directly linked to each emotion. Thus, the analogy is bound to unravel, because, for example, were we to mix one person's "joy" with of their "trust," we cannot guarantee that the results would be "love." As Plutchik (2001) himself suggests, "But in the final analysis, this is a theoretical decision to be evaluated in terms of the inferences and insights to which it leads, the research it suggests and the extent to which empirical data are consistent with it" (p. 348). Finally, one study in particular adds an insight that may prove useful in this research. Roberson, Hanley, and Pak (2009) explored whether English and Korean speakers who have different color term categorization systems would have any differences in their ability to distinguish subtle distinctions in color based on their respective categorizations of color and determined that "at least for the domain of color, categorical perception appears to be a categorical, but not a perceptual phenomenon." (p. 482). One goal of this research will be to see if the analogy holds true for emotions as it does for colors. In other words, regardless of the differing categorical systems in the two cultures, will we find that emotional distinctions are perceptible across cultures? Perhaps a practical example will help illustrate: German has a word for feeling pleasure at another person's pain, *schadenfreude*, but American English does not. English speakers are perfectly able to distinguish this emotion, yet lacking a word for it may affect our ability and proclivity to discuss and consider it. Certainly, the fact that many English language authors use the term *schadenfreude* when writing offers a clue. Will the perceptions of individuals from the different cultures of Korea and North America

"retain a smooth continuum of perceptual space that is not warped by stretching at category boundaries or by within-category compression" (p. 482) with emotional distinction ability as was found with their color distinction ability?

By all accounts, the most obvious example of how social forces have a direct impact on emotional communication is through display rules – a central concept in this proposed study. For sociologists, two central questions are: "what kinds of symbol systems do humans develop and how do they use them to regulate their conduct?" (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 23) – questions when applied to emotional communication lead directly to a study of cultural scripts and display rules. While I will address both scripts and display rules from the point of view of linguistics and/or communication studies in the language perspectives section of this chapter, considering the social point of view in this section is also critical. In terms of sociology, an obvious place to start is with Goffman's dramaturgical model that suggests the notion of scripts in cultural interaction. Without going into detail on the model, Goffman's point is that, like Shakespeare's actors on the stage, individuals perform in a group setting according to certain elements of the cultural script established for the particular situation or ritual. Goffman did not, however, see the individual as completely bound by the cultural script, but having some sort of flexibility in manipulating "the expression of gestures to present themselves in a certain way" (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 28). For Goffman, emotional communication was not the central theme of the cultural script, but was certainly an element of that script. Consequently, a description of the paralinguistic (facial expression, vocal cues, gestures, etc.) symbols used within the cultural script may, in fact, also be a description of the functioning of display rules: "Individuals are strategically motivated to manipulate gestures so that their presentation of 'face' and 'lines' are seen by others to conform to the cultural script, and in so doing, they reinforce the implicit morality of the cultural script"

(Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 30).

Hochschild's (1979) offers two alternative methodological approaches for dealing with the social aspects of emotion: one, to explore how social events induce emotions – "emotions passively undergone," and another to explore the "secondary acts" through which we regulate the experience of emotion. In this vision, display rules are "secondary acts" and therefore fall under the umbrella of emotion work, emotional management, and feeling rules. Consequently, display rules can be viewed as a form of symbolic interactionism – mechanisms through which we engage in the cost-benefit analysis and trading of social symbols. Moreover, the exchange of these displays exist both on a superficial level of maintaining "normal" social relations, as well as on the level of emotion work:

> The exchange of gestures has, in turn, two aspects; it is an exchange of display acts (Goffman 1969, 1967) – that is, of surface acting – and also an exchange of emotion work – that is, of deep acting. In either case, rules (display rules or feeling rules), once agreed-upon, establish the worth of a gesture and are thus be *used* in social exchange as a medium of exchange. (Hochschild, 1979, p. 568, emphasis in original)

Thus, Hochschild's work is the theoretical postulation of the various rules (emotion, feeling, display) that go along with the functioning of emotion in a social setting. Turner and Stets (2005) add the suggestion that emotion work "will be most evident when people confront emotion ideologies, emotion rules, and display rules that go against their actual feelings, and especially when they are required to use those rules to express and display emotions that they do not feel" (p. 40). Here they describe precisely the sort of situation that I would hope to explore with this study – the cross-cultural interpretation of differentiated display rules and the effect of such interpretation on the practical application of the rules.

A few studies have provided examples of display rules as acts of emotional work. In her own monocultural work, Hochschild (1983) explores some professions that require very different performance of emotion: flight attendants and bill collectors. In a frequently cited example, two ticket agents are working at an airline counter. The more experienced agent has taken a break, and the novice/trainee gets tied up with a difficult ticket reissue. Ten minutes pass. The line backs up. Everyone is getting anxious. When the experienced agent returns:

> The novice says, "I was looking for you. You are supposed to be my instructor." The instructor answers ironically, "Gee, I'm really sorry, I feel so bad." And both laughed together.
>
> The experienced agent is not sorry that he wasn't available to help the novice. His apparent misfitting feeling does not put them in debt, however, because the more general feeling rule – "we should both take this seriously" – is poked fun at. (p. 79)

This incident relates an interesting case where multiple rules for emotion come into play: the "we should be serious" rule in contrast to the "we should enjoy life" rule. In this instance, humor appears to win the day; however, in Hochschild's exchange-based model, we cannot be certain about future events – e.g. hidden grudges brought about by such emotional events.

At this point I should point out the importance of Hochschild's clear distinction between feeling rules and display rules. For Hochschild, the feeling rule determines *how we should feel* in a particular situation, as opposed to the display rule that dictates *how we should show our feeling* in the same situation. While the distinction may seem subtle – and we may be hard-pressed to find instances where the two expressions would be different – her point that the two rules may not always be the same is well taken. Recognizing the inherent philosophical problem raised by Wittgenstein's beetle argument, I cannot determine a way to reliably distinguish between

physical expressions resulting from the two different rules in this proposed study, as I will not have the ability to access the individuals present in the video stimulus used for the study. Consequently, I will use the term display rules to indicate both feeling rules and display rules.

Cahill and Eggleston (1994) study of the emotional management of wheelchair users provides an example of Hochschild's model. Clearly, Cahill and Eggleston are investigating situations that are just those sort of conundrums where an individual is required by display rules to show the diametrically opposite emotion. Some of the section headings in their paper are simply, classically, wonderfully oxymoronic – "humoring embarrassment," "embarrassing anger," and "ingratiating sympathy" – going a long way to prove their point. In the study, I noted three prominent instances of display rules for wheelchair users including: when a wheelchair user pretends not to hear a child's inappropriate question regarding their disability, when someone treats them as if they are a non-person – that is, talking to their non-wheelchair user associate or speaking about them in the third person – they mute their anger, or finally, in a situation when a person offers assistance that is unneeded, but the wheelchair user thanked the "assister" graciously. In each of these cases, the wheelchair user chooses a display rule function that is diametrically opposite to their actual emotional state – "they will publicly express what they did not privately feel" (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 43). Pierce's (1995) ethnographic study at two law firms also provides examples that support Hochschild's model. For example, Pierce relates to a particular incident during a job interview where some important aspects of Hochschild's model are clearly present – the explicit statement of both the feeling and the display rules in situations when feelings cannot be expected to match the required expression:

> As the personnel director for a private law firm told me in a job interview, "It's important to maintain a pleasant manner while attending to the not-so-pleasant-side of the job, don't

> you think?" Being pleasant not only involves inducing a feeling – being cheerful – but also calls for a specific facial display – a smile. (p. 98)

Here, the personnel director explicitly states that while the normal feeling rule – in many situations at this workplace – would result in a negative emotion, the required display rule is a pleasant manner and a smile – a polar opposite.

In sum, the distinction between the cognitive perspective on display rules and the social perspective on display rules has become clear. The cognitive perspective sees display rules as instances where society and culture intervene to modify biologically based "universal" emotional display. On the other hand, the focus in sociology has been to, first, emphasize the situational – and thus process-based – force that produces *"what we ought to feel"* which is defined as a feeling rule, and second, to clarify that display rules represent instances where what we ought to *feel* does not match what we ought to *show*. In addition, the sociological research that I have reviewed here has generally been mono-cultural; consequently, the question of display rules across cultures has not been addressed therein. As cultural differences in display rules is the primary target of this proposed study I will need to pay close attention to whether or not these examples from Western culture apply in Korean culture.

In addition to the notion of the social construction of emotional display rules, other fundamental themes in anthropology and sociology are apparent in sociological emotion research. Allow me to continue by exploring the questions of gender, power, and individualism/collectivism. Pierce (1995) relates the gender-based differences in the way that display rules are structured in the legal profession. She observes that "many women paralegals (but not men)" are subject to sanctions as the result of the double standard in the display rules for a particular emotional communication marker—the smile—as they "grimly reported the

consequences of not smiling" (p. 99). She continues that those consequences are generally issued from the mouths of men to women: "Such remarks were typically made by male attorneys, clients, and witnesses to female legal assistants" (p. 99). In summary, Pierce argues that women at law firms face a completely different set of rules – display rules – for emotional expression. Furthermore, the repercussions of their emotional expression are both double standards and double binds. Pierce concludes that for these women:

> producing a smile, a mood, or a feeling for the job is even more problematic because they confront a double bind that men do not. Women and legal assistants who are nice are subjected to never-ending emotional demands from lawyers for whom they work, while those who are not nice are considered problematic and are sanctioned. Female attorneys who are pleasant and nice are not considered a tough enough to be good litigators, but when they are tough and aggressive, they are criticized for being difficult, strident, or shrill. The constraints created by these double binds give women workers even less control over their emotional integrity than men have.
>
> Emotional double binds, sexual overtures, sexual innuendos, teasing, and exclusionary practices are not isolated incidents but rather systematic and patterned forms of harassment. (p. 183)

For the purposes of this study, being cognizant of the potential for gender differences in emotional expression will be important in disentangling the question of whether any differences found in emotional expression in the study are artifacts of cross-cultural differences or simply "generic" gender differences.

Adding to the level of complexity is, of course, the influence of power and status differential in emotional communication. The effect of power on emotional communication is

not new to the scientific study of emotion: even Darwin (1998) recognized the "submissive" posture of dogs, in his early descriptions of emotional expressions. In more recent history, "disempowered" groups have taken an active role in using emotion as a tool for increasing their group's solidarity and power, as in the Black *Pride* and Gay *Pride* movements. Indeed, coming on the heels of our consideration of gender differences, we have to recognize that at least some element of gender differences in emotional expression can be tied to the power and status differential between men and women. Parkinson et al. (2005) points out this entanglement — the "intriguing links between perceptions of gender typicality, status, and emotion" (p. 149). The authors conclude that in relation to the specific nonverbal expression of smiling that "it is not simply the presence of another person that makes a difference to smiling, but also that other person's relative degree of influence [i.e. power differential] on what is happening, as well as their socialized gender role" (p. 162).

Social research into emotion and power has more often than not dealt with power as a *cause* of emotion than display rules for the expression of emotion as an *effect* of power differential. Certainly, this conclusion can be inferred from Turner and Stets (2005) review of a number of studies: "inequalities in power and prestige or status also have important effects on emotions… with high-ranking individuals more likely to experience positive emotional arousal than lower ranking persons" (p. 295). My contention is that these recognized differences in display rules for emotional communication are both part and parcel of the power differential that is often a critical and signifying element of intercultural/international communication. Unfortunately, teasing apart what are the causes and what are the effects in these instances is a "chicken or egg" conundrum for research into cross-cultural emotional communication. An example of this conundrum can be found in Hewstone and Greenland's (2000) analysis of the

conflict in Northern Ireland where positive emotions are held for in-group members and negative emotions are directed toward out-group members—and all of these assessments/emotions are supported by power differentials in the community. So which came first: the hatred, the power, the oppression, the violence? To assume that similar highly entangled emotional assessments would be found in in-group/out-group relationships in other conflict areas is only natural. Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick (2002) noted similar results in their mono-national, multi-group analysis of prejudice and the emotions associated with it. They describe two "systematic dimensions of stereotype content," competence and warmth, from which they "find intergroup emotions: Prejudices follow from perceptions of relative status, threat, and intent" (p. 248). Using these two dimensions, they were able to strongly predict when a variety of emotions—pity, envy, contempt, and pride—would be directed toward other groups.

Another suggestion is that emotional contagion ("catching" the emotion of others – which has also been called mimicry) may also be regularly influenced by power differential. Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson (1994) hypothesized that those with less power would be more likely to "commit" emotional contagion than those with more power. However, the results of their research did not support that conclusion: "the results were somewhat surprising. As predicted, subjects in all conditions did tend to catch the emotions of others. There was, however, no evidence that powerful people were more resistant to emotional contagion than were their powerless counterparts!" (p. 176). Later in the same discussion, they argue that what the research had evaluated was not *power*, but *responsibility*. Some subsequent research supported this notion, but the authors conclude that more research "is needed to determine just how power and contagion are linked" (p. 176). Disentangling the various elements that have influence on emotional communication is a significant problem. However, the authors point out that

professionals in the field behave as if a definite relationship between power and emotion exists. Moreover, I am certain that our individual experiences will confirm that both academics and non-academics alike behave in ways that support power/emotion links – which in turn become examples of emotional communication.

Anthropological view of unique Korean emotions

Substantial anthropological work has looked at the question of classifying emotion within other cultures. Wierzbicka (2005) explores differences between Anglo, Russian, Korean, and Japanese conceptions of the body-mind duality including the critical element of emotion in that conceptualization – finding significant distinctions across these cultures. Schmidt-Atzert and Park's (1999) fascinating study sought to explore the cross-cultural "interpretability" of two particular Korean emotions, *dapdaphada* and *uulhada*, precisely because they could find no adequate translation of the terms into German. Rough translation into English would be "frustration" and "gloom" respectively. Two conclusions critical to this study should be noted. First, "the words *dapdaphada* and *uulhada* seem to denote emotional feelings restricted to specific situations … [thus] the words *dapdaphada* and *uulhada* should be regarded as specific to the Korean language" (Schmidt-Atzert & Park, 1999, p. 652) which would make them the sorts of emotions we may find and compare through this study. Other "negative" emotions have been categorized in the sphere of Korean emotional expression, prominently those associated with depression such as *han*, *hwabyung*, and *shingyungshayak* (Arnault & Kim, 2008; Pang, 1998, 1999). Pang (1998) defines the three emotions: "*Han* can be described as a passive, chronic regret and resentment syndrome … *Hwabyung* … has been described as an anger syndrome that encompasses elements of depression, resentment, somatic illness, and neurotic symptoms … *Shingyungshayak*, an emotional, psychic, and bodily disorder" (p. 96). However, certain

"positive" emotions can serve as coping mechanisms and are themselves arguably unique to Korean culture. Pang (1999) contends that several Korea specific emotions serve to aid those suffering from depression: "To attain harmony within the self and with others, they practice noonchi (measuring with the eyes), chenyom (right thinking), chemyun (face-saving), and confiding in others" (p.134). A goal of this study will be to search for these characteristically Korean emotions to present them for American interpretation in hopes of teasing out what makes them uniquely Korean.

Impact of social and anthropological research in emotion on this study.

While a great deal of research into emotions expressed across cultures has been conducted within the framework of cognitive studies, the fundamental philosophical approach of such research has been to seek universal/basic emotions that do not differ across cultures. This perspective is particularly unsatisfying when we recognize that virtually every person who has intercultural experiences finds some level of cross cultural misunderstanding. That social perspectives on the communication of emotion across cultures choose to focus on the differences rather than the similarities across cultures provides a window into the cross-cultural communication of emotion that will be essential for this study. One concern, however, is that social research into emotion has yet to solidify a perspective regarding preferred methodology and research targets, particularly in terms of the communication of emotion.

Thus, the starkest difference between cognitive research and social research into emotions is in methodology. The quantitative tools associated with cognitive research – from forced choice experiments to brain scanning – stand in bold contrast to the ethnographic tools employed by social research – from interviews to full-scale ethnographies. Moreover, while I have indicated that social perspectives hold greater sway in my philosophical approach, the use

of qualitative tools from cognitive research should help to verify whether my findings are in line with previous cognitive research. That said, ethnographic tools remain my overall preference. This literature review reveals some significant gaps in the methodologies used in social research into the communication of emotions across culture. Initially, much of the sociological research has been conducted in a mono-cultural environment with the tacit assumption that the results would apply across different cultures. Additionally, one particular social research tool, a focus group, does not appear to have been used in any significant way in research into the communication of emotions across cultures. As we shall see in the methodology section of this proposal, a significant case can be made that a focus group approach may be one of the best – if not the best – methodology for exploring many of the issues surrounding the communication of emotion across cultures.

The impact of the findings from social research into emotion reviewed here is the conclusion that some element, at the very least, of emotional communication is socially constructed. Certainly, the "nature versus nurture" debate regarding the communication of emotions that has waged between cognitive scientists and social scientists has yet to be resolved—and will continue to be argued in the future. However, nearly irrefutable evidence supports a mixed model in which emotional communication is some part biological and some part social construction. Moreover, much of the social (and cognitive) research into emotional communication points to display rules as a key area to explore for elements of the social influence on the communication of emotion. Importantly, social research has explored some mechanisms by which display rules are performed – for example, Goffman's dramaturgical model presenting the idea of cultural scripts. Goffman's model provides the groundwork for *emotional* scripts championed by Planalp that we will discuss in the next section. Critical for

this proposed study is the conclusion that the prime opportunity for finding examples of display rules in action is on those occasions where the specific cultural rules for the display of emotion are in conflict with rules for "natural" emotion – or "feeling rules" – rules that themselves are arguably social constructions. That the most crucial display rules within a culture are ones that represent a disconnect between what *ought* to be *felt* and what *ought* to be *shown* will prove central to the study, and most importantly when those required displays are in direct opposition to what is felt.

When sociologists have considered the question of the display rules along with the feeling rules associated with emotion in a social setting, several important sociological themes have been front and center. Prominently, questions of gender, power, and status have been found to have significant effects in the expression of emotion in mono-cultural studies. The mono-cultural aspect is important, because we cannot be certain whether effects uncovered in these studies are universal across cultures, or are culturally specific to the countries/cultures in which the studies were conducted. A second question raised through social research exploring the interaction of gender, power, and status with emotion is the question of cause and effect. Are display rules an effect of these differences in gender power and status, or do the ways that we communicate induce changes in those power and status structures. Therefore, the important and generalized impact on this proposed study will be to remain cognizant of previous findings regarding gender, power, and status and watch for their occurrence in this study – keeping the question of cultural specificity in mind while attempting to find appropriate opportunities for practical applications.

Language based perspectives

The very essence of literature is the war between emotion and intellect. When

literature becomes too intellectual -- when it begins to ignore the passions, the emotions -- it becomes sterile, silly and actually without any substance.

-- Isaac Bashevis Singer

In the final section of this literature review, I will turn my attention to language-based perspectives on emotional communication. The choice of the phrase "language based" as opposed to "linguistic" is an attempt to accomplish two goals. The first goal is to recognize that the philosophical divide represented by cognitive and social perspectives on emotion and emotional communication discussed is replicated within emotional communication is replicated within the field of linguistics. Many linguists take a decidedly cognitive approach to language and communication that is seen in linguistic studies of the communication of emotion. Alternatively, sociolinguists have a much more relativistic and social constructionist perspective. The second goal is to recognize that a significant amount of research on the fringes of linguistic study or, or even outside of linguistics has taken a decidedly "language and communication" perspective on important research into the communication of emotion across cultures – e.g. communication studies.

At the outset, a critical distinction between the cognitive, social, and language based approaches to the study of emotion and emotional communication becomes clear. Cognitive and social researchers are asking very different questions than are language-based researchers. In general, cognitive and social questions researchers are asking broader and more philosophical "why" questions of emotion, while language-based research focuses on more specific and applied "how" and "what." In this section, as in the previous two, I will present a summary of the research within language based studies into the communication of emotions across cultures focusing on the three areas of philosophical foundations, methodological perspectives, and

critical findings to determine what sort of impact the literature has on this proposed study.

Philosophical foundations of language-based research in emotion.

Within the broad range of language-based studies into cross-cultural emotional communication, three thematic areas have important connections to this proposed study: semantic/lexical research, emotional scripts research, and paralinguistic research. The semantic/lexical research, championed by Wierzbicka (1999) and others (E.g. Goddard, 2002), looks at the differences in the meanings of emotion words across languages – including how they function morphologically, syntactically, and rhetorically. The contention, in direct opposition to the universalist/basic emotions approach led by Ekman, is that subtle differences in the manner of interpretation of emotion words represent significant differences in the emotions of people in different cultures. Wierzbicka illustrates this point by selecting one of Ekman's universal emotions, the word *anger*, and conducting a detailed lexical semantic analysis of the word in English and Polish. She concludes, "that an apparently basic and innocent concept like *anger* is in fact linked with a certain cultural model and so cannot be taken for granted as a ' culture free' analytical tool or as a universal standard for describing 'human emotions'" (Wierzbicka, 1999, p. 32). Moreover, these differences are critical, because, in terms of intercultural communication at least, the differences are often problematic while the similarities are not. The second notion of emotional scripts is often found in communication studies research, for example Planalp's (1999) work. The idea of emotional scripts is akin to Goffman's dramaturgical model from sociology. Finally, paralinguistic research represents perhaps the most studied area in this group. Individual research studies in the paralinguistic aspects of emotional communication, however, tend to focus on very specific and discrete elements of communication.

Some elaboration on the character of paralinguistics and paralinguistic research is in

order. Gestures, proxemics, kinesics, facial expression, and vocal cues are common examples of those discrete mechanisms of the paralinguistic communication. Therefore, these different categories are attempts to subdivide different types of paralinguistic clues. Indeed, research into these subdivisions has a substantial history and tradition. Proxemics – the study of how we hold our bodies, standing, sitting, etc., in relation to those we are talking with – was initially studied by Birdwhistle (1952). Hall (1959) famously studied kinesics, which is generally what people tend to think of as "body language" in the vernacular. Additionally, Gumperz (1982) and Scherer's (1982) research into prosody, or the rhythm, tone, and music of oral language, has added great depth to our ability to understand how people communicate. All of these elements are essential to this study and constitute the current constellation of paralinguistic cues in relation to emotional communication.

In this long history of research into paralinguistics, the fundamental complexity of the types of information carried within the paralinguistic clues has presented a critical problem. These clues carry not only semantic and emotional intent, but all sorts of other information as Mozziconacci (2002) explains: "in addition to fulfilling a linguistic function such as to structure discourse and dialogue, and signal focus, prosodic clues provide information such as the speaker's gender, age and physical condition, and the speakers view, a motion, and attitude towards the topic, the dialogue partner, or the situation" (p. 1). While Mozziconacci refers specifically to prosody clues, similar complexity is found in other paralinguistic elements. Moreover, because many of these early studies – and much of the current research – are conducted from a semantic and/or pragmatic point of view, a substantial gap in both the philosophical approach and empirical results regarding the interpretation of paralinguistics cues when experienced in the realm of emotional communication remains: "Even though Mehrabian

and Wiener in 1967 expressed the need for studies on the nature of the interrelation between emotional prosody and semantics, few research studies have been conducted in this subject" (Wambacq & Jerger, 2004, p. 427). Pavlenko (2005) adds that "little systematic information is available on cross linguistic similarities and differences in conventionalized affective meanings of particular combinations of vocal cues. The scarcity is understandable: Attention to affective meanings of prosody is a relatively recent development in applied linguistics" (p. 76).

The relative immaturity of this subfield is only part of the problem – the fact that prosody also the carries a lot of different information results in "theoretical and methodological difficulties inherent in deciding what meanings should be attributed to particular contours, in particular when research is conducted in a second language" (Pavlenko, 2005, p. 76). Another piece in the puzzling task of teasing out how paralinguistic cues serve to convey emotional communication are Scherer, Helfrich, & Scherer's (1980) so-called "push and pull" effects. In brief, push effects are caused by internal activity that is biologically motivated – those uncontrollable expressions. On the other hand, pull effects are those that we generate to match our appraisal of the social situation. In some sense, these effects are virtually identical to the distinction between biologically caused or socially motivated emotional expressions that we have discussed previously. Ultimately, we are led to Pavlenko's (2005) question:

> … cross-linguistic differences in mean values and social meanings of conventionalized vocal cues to emotion that are further complicated by individual and contextual variation. Considering the potential implications of these differences for intercultural communication, we can now ask: *Are vocal cues sufficient to decode the intended affective meaning of the speaker's utterance in a second or foreign language?* [emphasis in the original] (p. 55)

Indeed, determining whether vocal cues are sufficient as well as the relative importance of various other paralinguistic cues is an essential element of this proposed study. The inherent complexity of emotional communication is reflected in the variety and complexity of the methods we have used to analyze emotional communication – and the challenges for future research.

Methodological preferences within language-based research in emotion.

Unsurprisingly, methodological preferences within language-based research into emotional communication follow a pattern similar to the distinctions noted between cognitive research and social research into emotional communication. Methodological preferences for emotional scripts research tends toward the qualitative side generally using ethnographic techniques, while paralinguistic research is generally quantitative and experimental using a wide variety of technologies to assist in procedures. The third category of semantic/lexical research methodology is significantly different than both the quantitatively influenced methodologies seen in cognitive and paralinguistic research and the qualitatively influenced methodologies seen in social science research. Finally, semantic/lexical research has much in common with literary and linguistic analysis relying on an in-depth textual and conversation analysis (and even contrastive analysis) using native informants for triangulation. As the methodological preferences of emotional script research and paralinguistic research share many of the methodological tools that we explored in discussing social and cognitive research, respectively, many of the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps of those research areas are also common to emotional script and paralinguistic research. Consequently, I will not add any additional comments here, but refer you back to the previous sections for that analysis.

Critical findings within language based research in emotion.

Because semantic/lexical studies begin with the assumption that different languages/cultures have both the similarities and differences in the way that they understand and interpret emotion, individual studies in this area, tend to look for the similarities and differences in the lexis and semantics of the individual languages. Both anecdotally and through research studies, we are aware that a variety of emotions seem to be culturally specific. For example, the German emotion/concepts of *angst* and *schadenfreude*[4] are often cited, as are *amae* and *oime*[5] in Japanese, and *song*[6] in Ifaluk (Parkinson, et al., 2005; Pavlenko, 2005; Wierzbicka, 1999). Schmidt-Atzert and Park (1999), who conducted their study without the benefit of Wierzbicka's NSM – but following similar procedures otherwise, looked at a pair of emotion words that are frequently characterized as peculiarly Korean in character: *dapdaphada* and *uulhada*. In the study, the authors combined scenarios for several universal emotions from previous studies, and used some of Ekman's own photographs of facial expression for some universal emotions, and finally added scenario descriptions for *dapdaphada* and *uulhada*. The authors sought to determine if respondents of Korean and German backgrounds would have equal success in labeling the scenarios with words, and photographs. If the Germans and Koreans had equal success, that would point to the universality of these emotions – that is both Germans and Koreans felt emotions nearly identical to *dapdaphada* and *uulhada*, only the Germans did not have words for them. However, the Koreans did markedly better than the Germans in particular with *dapdaphada* and *uulhada*; therefore, we have to conclude that *dapdaphada* and *uulhada* are

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[4] Roughly, feeling pleasure at others' misfortunes.

[5] "A fondness of dependence" and "the unpleasantness of being indebted" respectively.

[6] Morally justifiable anger

somehow distinctly Korean (at least relative to informants from a German cultural background).

The information carried in lexis is also only part of the lexical semantic story. Wierzbicka (2002) reminds us that "while it is generally agreed that, metaphorically speaking, words are carriers of meaning, it is less widely recognized that grammatical categories of a language, too, encode meaning" (p.162). Pavlenko (2002b) set out to test Wierzbicka's contention that Russian language encodes emotion differently in a syntactic sense than does English: specifically the contention that English relies more heavily on conveying emotion through adjectives, while Russian relies heavily on conveying emotion through verbs. The author elicited narratives on the same task using "the same visual stimuli" from Russian speakers and English speakers. After analyzing the narratives produced by her informants, Pavlenko concludes:

> The results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the narrative corpus support Wierzbicka's claims, suggesting that 'the reading of the body' is not a culture- and language-free experience, but is shaped by cultural, social, and linguistic forces, as well as by individual differences. (p. 207)

While the lexical semantic analysis we have been discussing relies in part on prototypes, which have much in common with scripts and appraisals, the study of emotion scripts as a "stand alone" research project has not come under such heavy criticism. For the most part, cultural and emotional script research looks at a single culture – although often a Western researcher is looking at a culture other than their native culture (Goddard, 1997; Larsen, Clore, & Wood, 1999; Carolyn Saarni, 1989; Wierzbicka, 1996, 1998). Amongst the few that explore more than one culture, Pavlenko (2005) lists five studies that are truly cross-cultural using bilinguals (Heider, 1991; Panayiotou, 2004; Pavlenko, 2002a; Stepanova & Coley, 2002; Toya & Kodis, 1996), and I found one other using cross-cultural scenarios (Schmidt-Atzert & Park, 1999).

What Pavlenko concluded also holds true for Schmidt-Atzert & Park's (1999) study, "cross-cultural linguistic differences in emotion scripts can be identified in verbal performance, and dissertation, and categorization tasks … and in bicultural bilinguals' perspectives" (p. 105). Moreover, these studies allow us to note cross-cultural differences in all of the steps in a process approach to emotion, specifically: antecedents, appraisals, physical reactions, actions in response, and emotion regulation. Also important for this proposed study are the ways that these individual studies have demonstrated both translation issues and questions of emotional display/display rules.

The next significant area of language-based research into emotional communication is paralinguistic research, and as I indicated earlier, this area is rather broad. Allow me to forgo consideration of paralinguistic research into facial expression as language based, because we have already the topic discussed that under cognitively influenced research, and focus specifically on vocal cue research in this section. In general, and much like facial expression research, those studies are primarily experimental in nature. Moreover, along with facial expression research, vocal cue research has produced a great number of individual studies. That being said, however, few of these studies link emotions, cultural differences, and interpretation to the vocal cue differences that are uncovered. Consequently, plenty of work still needs to be done – as Pavlenko's (2005) contends: "to date, little systematic research has been conducted on voice quality and affect (see however Scherer, 1986), and even less is known about cross linguistic differences in meanings of paralinguistic features" (p. 50). Consequently, I will focus on a few studies here that emphasize key points for this proposed study's research focus – first we will look at monocultural studies, then cross-cultural ones.

In an early monocultural study, Williams and Stevens (Williams & Stevens, 1972) did

not find clear vocal cue indicators of different emotions, "at present it is certainly not possible to specify any quantitative automatic procedures that reliably indicate the emotional state of a talker" (p. 1249). What they did find that is particularly useful for understanding emotional communication is that, "attributes for a given emotional situation were not always consistent from one speaker to another" (p. 1238). In other words, we need to understand the individual's manner of speaking and then recognize differences in that manner of speaking to interpret whether the current vocal cues reveal a specific emotional state for that specific person.

Russell, Bachorowski, and Fernández-Dols (2003) reviewed a number of the monocultural studies into vocal cues interaction with affect and drew a few important conclusions. First, regarding "linguistic vocalizations," such as laughs, cries, and yawns, the conventional wisdom that emotional state causes the production of these vocalizations does not seem to hold true in the light of, "mounting evidence, [which] questions whether such vocalizations are each linked to a specific, discrete state" (p. 339). In other words, the folk wisdom that, for example, "we yawn because we are bored" is not well supported. A second conclusion that the goal of finding a specific "vocal signature for each hypothesized basic emotion [as in Paul Ekman's basic emotions], however, remains elusive" (p. 340) again disproves the hopeful hypotheses of many researchers. However, Russell et al. found substantial support for the folk theory that we can judge the level of excitement of the speaker through vocal cues: "studies again confirm the link of vocal expression with sender's general arousal, and, importantly, sometimes show different patterns than those obtained with acted portrayals" (p. 340). That actor's portrayals do not consistently match naturalistic samples is important for methodological choices in future research. Russell et al. present a weak view of the utility of vocal cues in the interpretation and/or communication of emotion in a monocultural situation –

much the same conclusion to which Pavlenko (2005) arrives: "the most we can say is that emotional intensification tends to be accompanied by wider pitch contrasts" (p. 55).

The final monocultural study is particularly interesting because it was the only one that I was able to find that attempted to assign emotion tags to various body postures – a kinesic analysis. Coulson's (2004) study found a wide variance in subjects' ability to recognize specific emotions from body postures from 0% accuracy to 90% accuracy – dependent upon the posture and the emotion. In addition, the author concludes, "Analysis of the confusion matrix suggested a circumplex solution with happiness and surprise sharing a similar position, and few confusions between the other four emotions" (p. 117). Clearly from this study kinesic clues are unreliable in many areas, but some kinesic clues are very clearly understood.

An excellent place to start analyzing cross linguistic studies of vocal cues and emotional communication is Gumperz' (1982) seminal work comparing the intonation patterns of South Asians speaking English with British speakers of English chronicled in *Discourse Strategies* – which relates in part some of the content of the film/video *Crosstalk* (Twitchin, 1979) . While Gumperz' overall purpose was not the investigation of emotional communication per se, the topic was nearly impossible to avoid as he concludes, "the prosody of Indian English described here… [in] encounters among speakers of Asian and Western English reveal communication difficulties that are far more pervasive and fundamental than those associated with the sentence-level grammatical and lexical distinction" (p. 129). Clearly, from Gumperz' use of emotionally charged words, his statement reveals the importance of these vocal cues in appraisal and emotional impact is critical. Indeed, in the *Crosstalk* video, speakers on both sides of an interview situation, English and South Asian, experienced frustration resulting in strong emotional response. Indeed, each appraised their cross-cultural interlocutors in negative ways

(e.g. the English interviewers felt the South Asian was rude, and vice versa). As Pavlenko (2005) relates from Gumperz study, the day-to-day workplace often sees difficulties in emotional communication, for example "between staff and customers in a British airport cafeteria. The supervisor and the customers continually complained that the newly hired Indian and Pakistani women were surly and uncooperative, while the women… did not know what they were doing wrong" (p.65). Similar results were found by Holden and Hogan (1993) an experiment where the intonation patterns of English and Russian were transposed: English speakers judged in a negative way English utterances with Russian prosodic patterns.

In a very thorough analysis of cross linguistic studies of the identification of emotional information from vocal cues, Pavlenko (Pavlenko, 2005) reviews fourteen studies of this type from 1964 through 2002. In all of the studies reviewed, the researchers isolated the sample expressions to best match the desired emotions before delivering them to the participants. Some variety was represented across the studies regarding the source of the utterances, that is, whether the utterances were produced in a studio by professional actors or amateur native speakers, or gathered from other sources such as radio or television – these "other sources" being as close to naturalistic recordings as were seen. In addition, many of the researchers made efforts to neutralize the linguistic elements of the utterances either by mechanically filtering them to the point where the words could not be recognized but the vocal cues could be, or in one case using scrambled syllables selected from the target languages. Allow me to explore a couple of the studies in some detail before relating Pavlenko's conclusions from her informal meta-analysis of the studies.

In an early study, Rintell (1984) used the unusual methodology – at least within this group of studies – of narrative recordings where speakers attempted to communicate the emotion

without naming the emotion. The recordings were then played to 127 non-native speakers of English as well as 19 native English speakers. Amongst the non-natives were 66 Spanish speakers 20 Arabic speakers and 17 Chinese speakers. Compared to the other studies, one might expect that the longer narratives as well as the lexical content would assist the English learners judge which emotion was being expressed. However, the performance of non-native speakers was similar to the performance of foreign-language listeners in many of the other studies: native speakers performed significantly better, at 76% accuracy, while the non-native speakers performed worse, at 33%. Moreover, the Chinese speakers, who are arguably the furthest removed culturally and linguistically from native English speakers, performed least well.

A similar pattern is found in the study by Scherer et al. (2001). The authors in this study selected participants who were speakers of six European languages and Indonesian. They then used meaningless combinations of syllables from the European languages formed into meaningless sentences delivered by professional German actors instructed to express the meaningless sentences with a specific *and meaningful* emotion. The results showed similar gaps in recognition accuracy as the native language and culture of the subjects was more removed from German. The group with the highest accuracy was not surprisingly native speakers of German at 74%. A second cluster, Swiss speakers of French, English speakers from Britain and America, Dutch speakers, Italian speakers, and French speakers were tightly packed in the in 69-66% accuracy range. Spanish speakers were slightly removed from them at 62% accuracy. As I suggested earlier, the Indonesian speakers were the least accurate at 52%.

I want to briefly present the results of a final study that has particular significance for my proposed research. Nakamichi, Jogan, Usami, & Erickson's (2002) study was the only one that either Pavlenko or I was able to locate which used video recordings. The obvious advantage of

that is that the viewers would be able to read able to read the kinesic, facial, and gesture cues as well as the vocal cues in judging which emotion is being expressed. The researchers selected scenes from "Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone" in the original English as well as dubbed into Japanese. As in the other cases, the accuracy was much higher when viewed in the speaker's native language, 91%, then when viewed in a foreign language, 72%.

Pavlenko (2005) is able to draw several conclusions from her analysis of the studies. The first is that native speakers do better than non-native speakers in judging the emotion being presented, "even when utterance content is neutral or unintelligible," (p. 63) while non-native speakers and non-speakers of the target language performed less well. However, they do better than would be predicted by mere chance, which, in turn, "points to some overlap among languages in the meanings of vocal cues, while the difference between native and non-native speakers points to linguistic and cultural specificity of some of the cues" (pp. 63-64).

One of the authors that I quoted earlier states that little *systematic* research has been conducted in the area of language-based research into emotional communication. Indeed, while I have been able to find a good deal of research, the collection of language-based research I reviewed here is, indeed, not particularly systematic. Before moving on to the impact this literature review of language-based research will have on my study, I would like to point out a few additional research conclusions. As with some of the experimental facial expression research and forced choice methodology, the overwhelming impression from language-based studies is that context IS important. Beier & Zautra (1972) provide some interesting results in this area. While I would argue against their leap from "agreement across cultures on the mood expressed is high" all the way up to the "results suggests the presence of a universal emotive language in the vocal channel" (p. 16), the results *do* suggest clear evidence of some sort of universal

mechanisms which may be mediated by other, perhaps social or cultural, mechanisms. In terms of context, and importantly for this study, Beier & Zautra determined that "accuracy in response increases with the length of the expression to be interpreted" (p. 16). A great number of possible interpretations leapt to mind as to why this would be true: increased understanding of the semantic and situational context, or, as Pavenko (2005) suggests, adjustment to the speakers norms of vocal patterns, "longer speech samples offer more information about the speakers baseline values and thus allow for judgments of relative rather than absolute values" (p. 74).

Therefore, in summary of the results from language-based research in the communication of the emotions across cultures, Pavlenko (2005) offers this interpretation:

> without lexical or contextual cues we cannot reliably label a tone contour as conveying a particular aspect of meaning. Linguists agree that while in each speech community there exist conventionalized patterns of prosodic usages, a match between a particular contour and meaning is never absolute – either within or across languages – and the ultimate interpretation is always carried out in context. (p. 55)

Ultimately, we have to conclude that this complex system is not wholly dependent upon any of the individual parts: whether biological or social or language based. The language based elements, however, are the actual channels that must be analyzed to understand broader biological/cognitive or social/cultural effects. Moreover, language effects analysis will allow us to determine how broader mechanisms cause or are caused by similarities and differences in emotional communication across cultures. Between and amongst lexis and semantics, facial expressions, vocal cues, gestures and the like in the realm of language based emotional communication reside all the mechanisms of emotional communication that I propose to analyze and study. Consequently, a good, precise, and detailed understanding of how these mechanisms

function in human interaction provides a foundation from which we can begin to draw conclusions about the broader cross-cultural issues associated with emotional communication.

Impact of language-based research in emotion on this study.

This final subsection of my literature review is designed to examine how language based research into emotional communication will influence the proposed study. Clearly, the complex interactions of cognitive/psychological, social/cultural, and language based perspectives and mechanisms for the communication of emotions and particularly the communication of emotions across culture are important in the expression and interpretation of emotions between human actors. As is the case with much academic emotion research, the individual researcher's task has been to isolate an individual mechanism and analyze if and how that mechanism functions in the communication of emotion. Consequently, research in this area has rarely taken a holistic view. The first impact of language based research into emotional communication on this proposed study is to force a recognition of the impulses driving researchers to look narrowly at a specific topic and reject a holistic analysis. Because I propose a mixed and more holistic analysis, I have to understand the opposing, and dominant, perspective in the field. Along those same lines, we see the quantitative and experimental methods of cognitive/psychological research [e.g. Ekman (1993, 1999a, 1999b, 2003), Izard (1977, 1991, 1994), and Scherer (1982, 1986, 1993, 2003)] contrasted to the qualitative and ethnographic methods of social/cultural research [e.g. Gumperz (1982), Lutz (1990), Markus & Kitayama (1994), Pavlenko (2002a), and Rintell (1984)]. Moreover, these quantitative to qualitative and experimental to naturalistic dichotomies are reflected in a variety of the language based research reviewed here – with the important addition of lexical semantic methodology. All of these methodological choices that have produced results at variance with each other that certainly points to a need for additional, or perhaps initial, mixed

methodology study into emotional communication.

In terms of the populations sampled, American and European participants and cultures are ubiquitous. “Japan, China, and India are well represented. Isolated/aboriginal cultures are fairly common. Koreans and Korean culture, however, are underrepresented in the collected studies. Therefore, the addition of a study of Korean emotional communication and cross-cultural situations is certainly a worthy research choice. In a similar fashion, the critical importance of revealing process and context through understanding the emotional scripts that are indeed being performed and communicated is another worthy research addition.

Finally, extensive criticism has been directed at the lack of naturally sampled emotional communication in these studies – particularly in the experimental research. Three important elements of this criticism will impact my proposed research: the use of multiple channels of emotional expression, providing a significantly long sample, and allowing free choice over forced choice. As stated earlier, language based studies in general attempt to isolate the channel of emotional communication as much as possible, for example facial expression, body posture, or vocal cues. However, much of the research indicates that a variety of mechanisms function in emotional communication. Yet to my knowledge only one study has been conducted using video recordings – a delivery method that would provide facial expression, body posture, and vocal cues simultaneously – and even that study relied on trained actors performing in a film, as opposed to natural interactions. Consequently, combining the channels of emotional communication through video is definitely indicated. Similarly, many of the studies presented extremely brief samples for interpretation, in spite of the fact that Beier & Zautra (1972) had indicated that longer samples improved identification accuracy. As the last impact, the use of forced choice in selecting emotion terms has been roundly criticized. Using free choice

elicitation procedures should not diminish the researcher's ability to categorize the free choice emotions offered to compare them with "basic" emotions, while simultaneously allowing the exploration of variety and intensity differences in emotional interpretation.

Final Thoughts

This literature review covers a breath of research that I had initially intended *not* to reach for; however, I find that the reach has been necessary. A major goal for this proposed research is to conduct a holistic analysis. My reason to strive for a holistic view is the core conflict between the biological/cognitive perspective and the sociological/cultural perspective on emotional communication. I hope that an increased understanding of many perspectives on the questions of emotional communication will be better enable me to construct and analyze a mixed methodology study of the communication of emotion across Korean and American cultures.

CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY

This methodology section presents a justification of the research methodology, describes the participants, data collection, data analysis, and the limitations of the researcher's positionality.

Why focus groups?

When I began my review of the literature, I was under the impression that only a limited amount of research into emotional communication across cultures had been conducted. However, I soon learned that emotions, communication, and culture had been studied in a range of disciplines, including sociology, neurology, linguistics and others using a wide variety of research methodologies. Thus, I conclude here, as Pavlenko (2005) does, that "little systematic information is available on cross linguistic similarities and differences in conventionalized affective meanings . . ." (p. 76). The key word here is "systematic." Given the variety of methodologies employed across these studies, a reasonable approach to reconciling the various and often contradictory conclusions reached in the studies is through a mixed methodology design with focus groups as the primary method.

As we have seen the philosophical and methodological split in the research on emotional communication mirrors in many respects the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative methods. Two major research design clusters are found in the literature: one primarily ethnographic, and another substantially experimental. Each design cluster reflects the preferences of its field, and offers both strengths and weaknesses for the study of emotional communication. On the experimental side, three particular limitations exist: the use of static samples to represent the communication of emotions, reliance on forced choice methodology, and the reliance on a ethnocentric interpretation of the emotion words from the outset. On the ethnographic research

side, the limited generalizability for teaching emotional communication in foreign-language classrooms reduces the usefulness of ethnographic research in the study of emotional communication. Finally, neither research methodology has effectively explored the cross-cultural elements of emotional communication.

The use of methodologies from these two design clusters in the studies reviewed here leads me to conclude that, at this stage, the proper research approach is a mixed methodology strategy with focus groups being the primary data collection method relative to other methodological choices is that the results presented to the readers are transparent:

> The results of a focus group are extremely user-friendly and easy to understand. Researchers and decision-makers can readily understand the verbal responses of most respondents. This is not always the case with more sophisticated survey research that employs complex statistical analyses" (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007, p. 16).

Participants

A total of 18 participants took part in this study. All of the participants were:

- women
- between the ages of 22 and 32
- university graduates with at least bachelors' degrees

All of the South Korean participants had lived in South Korea for their whole lives, while the North Americans had been working as language teachers in South Korea for less than one year. The participants were recruited through open calls for participation at the researcher's university and snowball recruitment. Specifically, NL focus group 1 was composed of Master's Students in counseling from a highly ranked women's university in the nation's capital. NL focus group 2 was composed of Korean public school teachers recruited through an MA TESOL program at a

private university located outside of Seoul. The FL focus groups were composed of English language instructors from the same private university and in the local community. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the collected personal information on the focus group participants.

Participant	Age	Highest degree	Profession	English level (self assessed)	US culture knowledge level (self assessed)
NL Focus group 1 (Korean)					
"U"	24	BA (MA Student)	Counselor	Intermediate	High beginner
"V"	24	BA (MA Student)	Counselor	Low intermediate	High beginner
"W"	25	BA (MA Student)	Counselor	High intermediate	Intermediate
"X"	23	BA (MA Student)	Counselor	Intermediate	Low intermediate
"Y"	31	BA (MA Student)	Counselor	Intermediate	Intermediate
"Z"	24	BA (MA Student)	Counselor	Intermediate	Low intermediate
NL Focus group 2 (Korean)					
"Q"	32	BA (MA student)	Teacher	High Intermediate	High beginner
"R"	25	BA	Teacher	Intermediate	High beginner
"S"	27	BA (MA student)	Teacher	High intermediate	Low intermediate
"T"	27	BA (MA student)	Teacher	High intermediate	High intermediate

Table 1 – NL focus group participant data (Koreans)

Participant	Age	Highest degree	Profession	Korean level (self assessed)	Korean culture knowledge level	Nationality
FL Focus group 3 (North American)						
"A"	27	BA	Teacher	High beginner	High Intermediate	USA
"B"	26	MA	Teacher	Beginner	Intermediate	USA
"C"	27	MA	Teacher	Beginner	Intermediate	Canada
"D"	24	BA	Teacher	Beginner	High intermediate	USA
FL Focus group 4 (North American)						
"G"	28	BA	Teacher	High beginner	High intermediate	Canada
"H"	30	BA	Teacher	Low beginner	Low intermediate	Canada
"I"	26	BA	Teacher	High beginner	Intermediate	USA
"J"	24	BA	Teacher	Beginner	High beginner	USA

Table 2 – FL focus group participant data (Koreans)

Data collection procedures

Data collection consisted of the three separate and consecutive phases. Phase one was the initial selection of the video clips by the primary researcher and research assistant. Phase

two was the presentation of those clips to native speakers including the selection of the final two video clips. The third and final phase was the presentation of selected video clips to non-native speakers.

As described above, the primary data elicitation tool was a Korean commercial film *선생 김봉두* (Kim & Jang, 2003), which was distributed under the English title of "My Teacher, Mr Kim." A plot summary can be found in appendix D. For data collection all of the focus groups watched two scenes from the film. Each scene was about one minute long. In the first scene, a parent interrupts a faculty meeting screaming, "Which one of you is Kim, Bong-du?" He wants to find Mr. Kim, because Kim has been hassling his son for bribes. In the second scene, Mr. Kim attends a business meeting over dinner at a barbeque restaurant. He meets with two men who discuss their plans to close down the country school in order to open a survival game site. English translations of these segments are provided in appendix E. They were asked to describe and discuss the emotions that they saw each character display and what clues indicated those emotions. A moderator facilitated each focus group. The primary researcher moderated the North American groups, and the Korean research assistant moderated the native Korean groups. Each focus group discussed the clip for 60 minutes. These discussions were audio recorded. The moderators then transcribed each discussion, and the Korean research assistant translated the Korean transcripts into English.

Data analysis procedures

As mentioned above, this study attempts to compare some of the different data analysis methodologies from previous studies in emotional communication. Therefore, three separate data analyses were conducted on the transcripts. These data analyses are paired with the three major sections of the discussion chapter on the accuracy of non-native interpretation, the

different channels for emotional cues, and when emotional cues fail across cultures. For that first section on the accuracy of interpretation, the quantitative data from the notetaking worksheets was analyzed using descriptive statistics (see for example, Aron & Aron, 2002). Likewise, descriptive statistics were used for the frequency counts of the emotion words for the non-native group. However, in order to determine which "non-Ekman" emotion terms would be included in the frequency counts, the primary researcher reviewed all of the words in the text from the two alphabetical indices created by the Word and TAMS analyzer software programs. The specific details of why these programs were selected, as well as how they serve to provide deeper analysis of the collected data, are covered with greater precision in the discussion chapter of this dissertation (see pages 128 through 145).

In the case of the other two sections on communication channels and failures to interpret, that qualitative data was analyzed following the four steps Creswell (2006) outlines: first, all of the transcripts were reviewed; second, the researcher's initial reactions were "memoed" in the margins; third, those memos were described classified and interpreted; and fourth, the resulting codes were represented and visualized. In addition, a fifth step, member checks, was included for the purpose of data analysis verification. Four member checks were conducted before creating the final version of the discussion chapter, and the revisions recommended from those member checks are included therein.

Coding

Each focus group transcript was then coded according to Creswell's (2006) coding system. A priori codes, ones that are "preexisting" (p. 152) in the literature, were used for Ekman's seven basic emotions—sadness, fear, disgust, surprise, anger, contempt, and enjoyment. A priori codes were also used for the emotional communication channels:

- *Appraisal* – used when participants described understanding the emotion based on the appropriate emotion for a specific situation. E.g. “He was mad, because the teacher had come in late.”
- *Lexical Semantic* – used when the participants either directly referenced words from the movie script, or the meaning of a phrase or sentence used by a character. E.g. “The character said, ‘I'm unhappy.’”
- *Behavioral* – used when the participant described cues for emotion, in the literature these are further broken down into the following codes:
    - *Face* – used when the participant described a particular facial expression. E.g. “He was smiling.”
    - *Gestures* – used when the participant described a gesture made by the character. E.g. “He shrugged his shoulders.”
    - *Kinesic* – used when the participant described a physical action that the character did; however, this needed to be a larger physical action than a gesture. E.g. “He threw the books across the room.”
    - *Prosodic* – used when the participant described changes in the pitch or volume of the characters voice. E.g. “He was screaming.”
    - *Proxemic* – used when the participant described differences in physical positioning of the characters. E.g. “He was frightened, because he was backing away from the man.”

The seven codes were selected from the literature on non-verbal communication (see for example, Birdwhistell, 1952; Ekman, 1993; Fast, 1970; Mehrabian, 2007; K. R. Scherer, 1982, 1999; Wierzbicka, 1999). In addition, an eighth code, *Circular*, was used in those cases where

the participant used circular descriptions to describe the emotion that they interpreted: E.g. "I thought he was angry because he looked mad." An extensive example of the coded transcript can be found in the discussion chapter on pages 152-153.

An extensive list of in vivo codes, or "names that are the exact words used by the participants" (Creswell, 2006, p. 153), were generated for linguistic items. These codes were then grouped into the following categories: "non-basic" emotions, and emotionally laden terms, as well as slang, metaphor and archetypal phrases. The second and most extensive area of in vivo coding was the emergent themes that arose in the participants' discussions: the social construction of emotional acts, "reverse" situational appraisal, participants' recognition of display rules, contradictory/masked, or diminished/exaggerated display rules, and dissonance caused by "breaking" display rules.

Limitations

This study brings with it some inherent imitations. While focus groups provide some benefits, they also only function with small numbers of participants. Thus, the mere handful of participants limits the generalizability of the study. Additionally, the film and genre, as well as the video clips themselves limit the range of expressions that were considered and, therefore, the breadth of the study. Moreover, the fluidity and trans-nationality of communication practices leaves some of specifics of this study bound in the brief time window of the research.

CHAPTER FOUR - DISCUSSION

The primary purpose of this study is to shed light on the debate over whether emotions are universally basic or culturally relative in character. In other words, *how and when* do out-group participants' interpretations of emotions displayed in a particular movie scene *match* and *mismatch* those of in-group members? Moreover, how do those basic and relative interpretations *interact* in the process of cross-cultural communication? The participants met for homogeneous focus group discussions and were asked to describe the emotional expressions they saw and how they understood those emotional expressions. This discussion reviews and integrates the evidence that supports each perspective and explores the interactions. The literature review indicates that the vast majority of researchers on both sides of the issue accept some level of value and validity in the other perspective (Besnier, 1990; Coggins & Fox, 2009; Ekman, 2003; Matsumoto, 1991; Planalp, 1999; Turner & Stets, 2005; Wierzbicka, 1999). Moreover, this study utilizes the methodological approaches of both the nature and nurture perspectives on the same data set to determine if one perspective or the other provides a better description of emotional communication across cultures. The simple answer to that primary research question is that the "nature" argument for basic and universal emotions is well supported by the data, but substantial and often contradictory interpretations are also present in the data which are better understood via a social mediation perspective. Moreover, the character of the emotional expression mechanisms used by out-group members to negotiate those differences provides important new insights into cross-cultural emotional communication. This discussion will explore the evidence regarding which of the various channels for reading emotional communication—appraisal, nonverbal communication, or direct communication—Koreans and North Americans use to interpret emotional cues. Finally, this chapter reviews the character of incidents where marked

differences were noted in interpretation, with a specific focus on aspects that offer opportunities to improve cross-cultural communication and foreign language instruction.

Accuracy of Non-native Interpretation of Cross-cultural Emotional Communication

The consideration of accuracy of nonnative interpretation of the emotional cues that native speakers use is essential to determine if cross-cultural differences exist between these two national groups in emotional cue interpretation. The literature offers two suggestions for how accurate the nonnative speakers' interpretations will be. Ekman (1993, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; 1972) and others (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Kohler, et al., 2004; Matsumoto, 1991; Matsumoto, Yoo, Hirayama, & Petrova, 2005; Panksepp, 2011; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 2010) suggest that emotions and emotional cues are essentially universal, so there should be little difference in interpretations, while Mead (1967) and others (Dewaele, 2008; Jack, Blais, Scheepers, Schyns, & Caldara, 2009; Pavlenko, 2005, 2008; Planalp, 1999; C. Saarni, 1989; K. R. Scherer, 1999; Wierzbicka, 1999) imagine that we will find striking differences. The data from this study suggest two windows into the question of accuracy. Transcripts of the focus groups' discussions offer one window into the accuracy of nonnative interpretations, while the note taking worksheets add another method of measuring the accuracy of nonnative interpretations of any cross-cultural interpretive act.

As the use of focus groups is an underutilized methodology in foreign language learning, data analysis requires a different conceptualization from that used more commonly in FL research. The examination of the audio recordings and transcripts in terms of accuracy raised four issues: a holistic view of nonnative accuracy, translation effects, word choice differences, and intensity variation. While the note taking worksheet data allow us to look at four separate,

but interrelated issues: the range of responses, the worksheet as a frame, a statistical analysis of relative accuracy and a separate statistical analysis of intensity differences.

Researchers' gut reactions.

While objective research rejects subjective opinions in general, this section begins with the subjective responses of two individuals heavily involved in the project. Clearly, one of the fundamental realities of intercultural communication is that, in purely practical ways, a statistical analysis of interpretation accuracy of members of another cultural group is not sufficient to judge intercultural acuity. Even intra-culturally, a wide range of subjective terms and phrases is used to describe one's sensitivity to another's intentions, or *lack* of sensitivity. In America, our subjective judgments of other people's sensitivity lead us to suggest that someone "is savvy," that someone "gets it," or, alternatively, that someone "is clueless." Arguably, a more holistic approach may prove useful. Indeed, a gut reaction is exactly what we would rely on in our normal lives. Importantly, that phrase "gut reaction" refers directly to the physical, autonomic, emotional response we have in these situations: we feel emotions in our bodies; in our gut. Of course, such a holistic analysis is by definition subjective, and the potential for bias is duly noted, yet this holistic response is precisely the opposition of expectations to the reality that underlies many cross-cultural communication conflicts.

The primary researcher is the person most "embedded" within this data set. What was my initial gut reaction in analyzing the accuracy of the nonnative interpretations? In the moment, I generally thought that the nonnative participants did a respectable job in interpreting the Korean emotional cues in the same way the Korean focus groups had. You will recall that one of the steps was to "reveal" to the North Americans how the Koreans had interpreted and identified the emotional cues. In one of these "comparison phases," I stated "many of the things

that you guys said, and even some of the direct references to how they saw the emotions, and where they saw them [were the same].” In another instance, I stated, “I think that you guys pretty much sussed it out.” Clearly, my analysis and interpretation of the data during the focus group process was similar to the results of the analysis of the “presence or absence ratings” in the previous sub-section: Neither perfectly off target, nor perfectly on target, and substantially more accurate than inaccurate, as Elfenbein & Ambady (2002) argue, “Emotions do not lose all meaning across cultural boundaries—but they may lose some meaning” (p. 231).

However, while I felt that the nonnatives were clearly “in the ballpark” I raised questions in the moment about the absolute precision of their interpretations “although they didn’t say that they were two peas in a pod, the businessman and the middleman, they saw almost the same expressions on both the businessmen and this man in the middle.” In addition, even during the focus groups, there was some serious questioning of the intensity of the emotions displayed. In a few instances, the nonnative ratings of intensity differed substantially from the natives as we will see more clearly in another analysis. Alternatively, during the focus groups, I pointed to a few clear examples of the nonnative missing a cue completely. In one case, I stated, “Mr. Kim was a little bit contemptuous of the other two people. I don’t know if you guys saw that at all.”

While my responses are the responses of a “first-culture American,” I wanted to measure my own assessments against other holistic data. Consequently, I asked the Korean focus group facilitator, Yoonjin (pseudonym), who translated the Korean transcripts into English, to review all of the transcripts and provide a “first-culture Korean” interpretation. During this interview, she related, “I wouldn’t say they did as well as Koreans did.” But she later added, “I thought they did quite well.” Importantly, she wished to specify the differences between what the non-natives understood well, “very, very big gestures and obvious feelings *like anger*” (emphasis added), and

what they had more difficulty with, “when it gets to be more subtle, there were more interpretations.” Yoonjin’s analysis of the specific emotions which are generally more clear is in line with the results of Elfenbein & Ambady’s (2002) meta-analysis of the cross-cultural emotional communication research that concluded in terms of Ekman’s basic emotions that anger was most likely to be accurately interpreted by non-natives, “anger showed a relatively small in-group advantage in both face and voice” (p. 222).

Clearly, the nonnative participants were less than perfect in their interpretations--even though the primary researcher’s initial reaction was that they had done quite well in interpreting the emotions displayed in the same manner as the native culture participants. Again, we are forced to consider the threshold question. How much misunderstanding is enough to cause difficulties in communication? Moreover, is it possible to train and educate individuals involved in cross-cultural situations in the required flexibility to overcome a moderate level of misunderstanding that would seem natural in most intercultural situations.

Participant worksheets -- presence or absence ratings.

The most obvious way to compare the accuracy of the non-native’s ability to perceive emotions in the same way "native culture" members do is to ask if they see the same emotions. In this study, appendix B is the note taking worksheet that the participants used in recording each participant’s judgment regarding the presence or absence of Ekman's basic emotions. At the bottom of that page, each primary character in each scene was to be rated on Ekman’s seven basic emotions. The reason participants were limited to the seven basic emotions was to allow an apples to apples comparison (Erkut, Alarcón, García Coll, Tropp, & Vázquez García, 1999) of their intensity responses. Consequently, these results provide a method to quantify the relative

difference between the native culture participants' judgments of the emotional intensity and the non-native participants' judgments of the same emotions.

The participants indicated which emotions each character in each scene displayed. They then rated the intensity of each of the seven emotions—sadness, fear, disgust, surprise, anger, contempt, and enjoyment—on a five-point scale. Thus, with seven emotions and three characters in each of the two clips, a total of forty-two emotions were evaluated. In evaluating the ratings, the results were examined using two separate lenses, representing lower and higher standards of agreement. In the lower standard lens, a simple majority of responses in each national group was considered to be agreement as to the presence or absence of the emotion. If the responses were equal in number, the results were considered ambiguous. Under the higher standard of measurement, if 75% or more of the nationality group stated that the emotion was present or absent, then that result was considered a clear indication of the presence or absence of the emotion. If the response was between 25 and 75%, then the result was considered unclear. This analysis regarding the presence or absence of emotions could support a variety of results: the two groups could differ in a contradictory fashion—i.e. one group clearly seeing the emotion, while the other clearly did not see the emotion—or one group could have a clear response while the other group's response was unclear, or the two groups could agree.

When applying the simple majority standard to the forty-two cases to be evaluated, the Korean and North American groups agreed 86% of the time. In just less than 10% of cases, the two groups had contradictory results–one group stating that they saw the emotion, while the other group did not. While the other 4% of cases represented instances where one group was uncertain, while the other group perceived the emotion. Eighty-six percent agreement would seem a relatively high level. Indeed, 86% exceeds the level which Ekman set for his cross-

cultural studies, in which a majority of people from the culture selecting the same emotion was considered the gold standard (Ekman, 1999b). When we use the more stringent 75% standard of agreement in the monocultural groups, which requires 75% or more of the individuals in the cultural group to agree on the presence or absence of the emotion, the results reveal a large increase in the number of ambiguous responses. Indeed, in about 35% of the cases one group's response was unclear well the other group clearly saw an emotion or did not see that emotion. However, the Korean and North American groups still agreed almost 65% of the time, including a few cases where both groups were unsure. Perhaps more importantly, in no cases under this higher standard, were contradictory results returned, where one group perceived an emotion, while the other one did not. This lack of strongly contradictory results seems particularly salient in terms of cross-cultural *mis*communication, because if one culture clearly and strongly perceived an emotion that the other culture clearly and strongly did not perceive, then the results would indicate a strong case of linguistic relativism indicating serious difficulties in the intercultural communication of emotional cues between these two groups.

A strong case can be made that the nonnative participants in this study have a fairly broad capability and in the large majority of cases to accurately perceive the same basic emotions that the native Koreans perceived. While this result was in line with Ekman's research, and, therefore, not entirely surprising, the fact that substantial disagreement was found in this study raises a pertinent question: Is there a threshold level where the misinterpretation of displayed emotional cues results in problems for intercultural communication? Is eighty percent accuracy enough for effective and courteous interaction, or would a "one in a million" misinterpretation be sufficient to cause communication problems between individuals? In addition to determining the presence or absence of the emotions and when the Korean and North

American groups are in agreement, the rating scales can be used to examine differences in intensity ratings for observed emotions across the cultural groups. This question of ability to interpret the intensity of emotions will be addressed later in this section of the chapter.

Translation questions.

Before proceeding further, one fundamental consideration in a number of cross- and inter- cultural research studies—the issue of translation—needs to be addressed. The translation problem is exacerbated when dealing with issues of emotion, which have a tendency to be more subjective (Pavlenko, 2005; Wierzbicka, 1999). Consequently, that issues of translation arose in determining the accuracy of the cross-cultural interpretations is unsurprising. At the most basic level is the cluster of words and phrases that "just do not translate" to the target language. In addition, participants used a number of notions that have multiple correlates in the other language, and ultimately, the words do matter. *Jjeol-jjeol-mae-da* (쩔쩔매다 - being at a loss), *dang-hok* (당혹; embarrassment), *hwang-dang-ha-da* (황당하다; absurd), *dang-hwang* (당황; confusion), *nun-chi* (눈치; read/study/sense other's faces), *ho-gam* (호감: a favorable impression), *ppeon-ppeon-ha-da* (뻔뻔하다; brazenfaced), *jeong* (정; affection) are examples of emotion concepts appearing in this study from the Korean participants for which the bi-cultural translator, a Korean native who lived in the United States for more than 15 years, had trouble finding adequate direct translations.

My intention here is not to suggest a strong version of linguistic relativism (Niemeier & Dirven, 2000). I do not suggest that Westerners cannot perceive or understand the notions of emotions presented in the Korean language. My position here is something more akin to what Kay and Kempton (1984) call "limited linguistic relativity and determinism" (p. 78). Indeed, that the Koreans have a single word or "catch phrase" to represent an emotional state, while the

North Americans do not have one, does not imply at all that the nonnative participants could not and *did not* describe something close to the emotional state the Koreans did. For example, the Koreans considered their concept of *nun-chi* (an attention to the feelings of others) to be clearly represented in the first video clip, and they also considered *nun-chi* to be uniquely Korean. Participant S explained, "I thought what the principal did was very Korean. He showed Korean workplace culture where *nun-chi* happens a lot where there is a manager." Yet at least one North American participant recognized something similar to *nun-chi*. Participant H says of Teacher Kim, "He's kind of trying to minimize the damage" and then, "He was analyzing the situation."

However, such analogues were not always seen in this study. Indeed, in the case of the nine Korean terms listed above that "just don't translate," the nonnative participants clearly attempted to convey something akin to the Korean term. Thus, this study provides support for the weak version of the linguistic relativity of emotional terms (Perlovsky, 2009) (i.e. when a culture/language does have a succinct word or phrase for a particular emotion, it does raise an individual's cognizance of that notion). Simply put, having a word for something makes it easier to talk about that thing, which in turn increases the likelihood that people will talk about the notion, and ultimately to raise the level of that notion in the consciousness of the society. This finding matches the in-group advantages in cross-cultural interpretation of emotion cues that Elfenbein & Ambady (2002) found in their meta-analysis.

Word choice/intensity.

Hand in hand with concepts that "just do not translate" is the concern expressed by Yoonjin, the Korean focus group facilitator, that subtle differences can and do matter. For example, in American English we might normally accept that the emotion terms "mad" and "angry" are interchangeable in most situations, yet it is easy to imagine situations where

someone would choose one over the other. Such subtleties are quite difficult to tease out of intercultural communication. One way that this study sought to explore those subtleties was to determine if the participants from each country offered similar or different intensity ratings for the emotions that they observed.

In general, Koreans rated the emotions expressed as more intense on the five-point scale. On thirty-three of the forty-two possible items, the Korean's aggregate rating was higher than North American's. That is to say that they thought the emotions expressed were stronger than how the North American's did—that the characters were more angry, more happy, more sad, etc. On average, their ratings were half a point higher on the five-point scale, or about 10%. Moreover, the presence/absence split in responses was roughly equal on both sides. In the lower standard, simple majority, "forced choice" evaluation, the Koreans found the emotion present 16 times, absent 25 times and in only one case were they tied. The North American's responses were almost identical with the participants finding the emotion present on 15 occasions, absent on 26, and in only one case tied. Consequently, the Koreans simply seeing emotions more often and thereby having higher overall numbers did not cause the difference in response level, rather in each individual instance they rated the intensity of the emotion more highly. Of course, a larger, randomly selected sample and appropriate analysis using inferential statistics would be a great deal more revealing than this analysis using only descriptive statistics.[7] However, the consistent pattern of responses is intriguing and indicates the potential for future research, which should include appropriate confirmatory inferential data analysis of any hypotheses suggested.

Arguably, considering only those cases where both groups judged the emotion present is more appropriate. In the lower standard, simple majority, "forced choice" evaluation, a total of

[7] Unfortunately, this small nonrandom sample prevents the use of inferential statistics.

13 cases existed where both the Korean and the North American participants interpreted the presence of one of the basic emotions. Again, the Koreans rated these emotions higher on the scale than did the North Americans–in nine of the 13 cases they rated the emotional level as higher than did the North Americans. Likewise, on average the Koreans rated the intensity of the emotion higher than the North Americans did, but the difference was less than the overall average. In the overall average, the difference per item was 0.56; while in these cases of agreement the difference was 0.35. Within those 13 cases, eight cases met the higher "75% or better" standard indicating strong concurrence by the members of the both national groups. The results here are similar to those in the other cases. In five of the eight cases the Koreans rated the intensity of emotion higher than did the North Americans. However, the range difference in these cases was much smaller. In these cases matching the higher standard of agreement within the groups, the average intensity difference between the Koreans and North Americans was only 0.04 points on the five-point scale. Essentially, the intensity ratings were the same for the two groups in these readily apparent emotions.

Understanding why the ratings for emotions where both groups indicated a strong consensus that the particular emotion was expressed by the character in the scene were nearly identical, in spite of the fact that more pronounced differences were seen for all of the other emotions is not entirely straightforward. In part, more intense emotions are likely to be skewed toward one end of the five-point scale, and therefore show less difference. Moreover, this may be some indication of basic, "hardwired" emotions of the sort that Ekman studied, and therefore are universal across cultures, even in the level of intensity that is judged to them. Again the questions arising from this intriguing finding cannot be answered with the methodological tools designed for this study; however, the findings do raise tantalizing questions for future study.

Language Used to Discuss Emotional Communication

This section reviews the language used in emotional communication, specifically in regards to lexical usage, while the semantic aspects of the language used in emotional communication will be saved for the discussion of the emergent themes, the fourth section of this chapter. Both experience and research have indicated a substantial question regarding accurate translation from one language to another–which is only exacerbated when considering the communication of emotion (cf. Besnier, 1990; Pavlenko, 2005; Schumann, 1997; Wierzbicka, 1999). Simultaneously, from the perspective of data analysis, a discussion of the language used in a conversation on emotional interpretation in these focus groups is a type of content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004; Wolcott, 2001). As a result of that theoretical background, data collection and data analysis, three important themes have emerged: word frequency analyses, lexical differences in cultural terms, and the interrelationship of those items to the relativism versus universalism of emotions debate.

Word frequency analysis—basic emotions.

Because universal emotions as framed by Paul Ekman really focus on single words to represent a small number of "basic" emotions, the analysis of this study starts from those basic emotion words. However, computer analysis of the total word counts of the transcripts, allowed us to look at every single word spoken in each transcript and get an idea of the rough frequency of each word. Consequently, a secondary analysis of additional secondary emotion terms and emotionally laden words (Pavlenko, 2008) that could not be readily categorized as one of Ekman's basic emotions was also possible, and, in fact, more revealing.

Initially, I will present frequency information for the basic emotion words. Two different frequency counts were provided through two different software tools. One "total" frequency

count was the raw frequency of the words conducted with the TAMS analyzer providing counts of every single occurrence of each word. A second "page" frequency count used the indexing feature in Word, which provides the frequency occurrence of each word on a different page. In other words, in a small intense discussion of a particular scene a word could occur very frequently in the total word count, but if the term has many page counts, the word occurred quite often across the full breadth of the interviews.

The total frequency count using the TAMS analyzer revealed some interesting information. As discussed in the methodology section, the TAMS analyzer simply presents the total number of occurrences of every single word in the text it analyzes. Subsequently, the researcher had to go back and select out those words that described basic emotions, secondary emotions, and emotionally laden words, which would have a significant impact on the study. In addition, the transcripts of the individual focus groups were analyzed separately and then placed into the same spreadsheet to compare word frequency across focus groups. Finally, the researcher needed to look at the frequency of the words to determine if they had an important role in the individual discussion. Because the question of universal versus culturally bound emotions is central to the general discussion of emotional communication, considering Paul Ekman's six basic emotions cannot be avoided. As one might expect given that the video clips were *not* selected to represent each of the six basic emotions, not all of these emotions were discussed in the same level of detail by all of the groups. Disgust was only mentioned twice and in only one group, and sadness only six times in just two groups. The logical conclusion is that disgust and sadness were not central to the scenes presented to the focus groups, and even a cursory review of the video clips supports that conclusion. Fear, surprise, and anger were discussed in some detail by all four groups, as was happiness; however, both of the Korean

groups used the word happiness much more frequently than did either of the North American groups. See Table 3 for a summary of these results. Similarly, the indexing feature in Word shows that disgust and sadness were only discussed by some groups and only infrequently. Consequently, analysis and discussion of the four of Ekman's universal emotions -- fear, surprise, anger, and happiness – that were considered thoroughly by the focus groups is justifiable.

Emotion	Different roots (occurrences)	Synonyms (occurrences)	Discussed by which groups?	Reasonably balanced or imbalanced?
fear	Afraid (19), fear (18), fearful (1)	Scared (9)	All groups	Reasonably balanced
disgust	Disgusted (2)		Group #3 (North American)	Imbalanced
sadness	Sad (4), sadness (2)		Group #2 (Korean) and group #4 (North American)	Imbalanced
surprise	Surprise (27), surprised (23), surprising (1)		All groups	Reasonably balanced
anger	Anger (35), angrily (1), angry (46)	Enraged (6), outrage (2), outraged (2), rage (11)	All groups	Reasonably balanced
happiness	Happier (1), happily (2), happiness (17), happy (28)	Enjoying (2), pleasant (2), pleasantly (2), please (7), pleased (2)	All groups	Imbalanced. Both Korean groups discussed happiness much more than either North American group

Table 3 – Summary of basic emotion term word frequency data from TAMS.

Of course, the main purpose of this section is to compare the Korean perspectives to the North American perspectives. To accomplish that task, we need to separate the word counts for the Korean groups from the word counts of the North American groups. Table 4 provides a

summary of those counts for the clusters of words very closely associated with the four basic emotions that were covered in enough detail in the focus groups to allow us to consider them in the study – fear, surprise, anger, and happiness. As mentioned above, we find relative parity in the intensity of discussion and in the frequency of use of the clusters of words associated with three of the basic emotions–fear, surprise, and anger–for both the Korean and the North American groups. That is to say, the total number of occurrences of the words in the fear, surprise, and anger clusters for each focus group, and each nationality were not substantially greater or less than those of the other groups–never rising above a two to one ratio. However, the discussion of happiness *was* significantly imbalanced with the Korean groups mentioning happiness about nine times as often as did the North American groups.

Fear cluster	Group	#1 (Korean)	#2 (Korean)	#3 (N. Am.)	#4 (N. Am.)	totals
	AFRAID	4	8	4	3	19
	FEAR	5	8	4	1	18
	FEARFUL	0	0	0	1	1
	SCARED	3	1	1	4	9
Totals		12	17	9	9	47
number per nationality		Korean	29	N. Am.	18	
percentage per nationality			61.7%		38.3%	
Surprise cluster	Group	#1 (Korean)	#2 (Korean)	#3 (N. Am.)	#4 (N. Am.)	totals
	SURPRISE	2	10	7	8	27
	SURPRISED	5	5	6	7	23
	SURPRISING	0	0	0	1	1
Totals		7	15	13	16	51
number per nationality		Korean	22	N. Am.	29	
percentage per nationality			43.1%		56.9%	
Angry cluster	Group	#1 (Korean)	#2 (Korean)	#3 (N. Am.)	#4 (N. Am.)	totals
	ANGER	7	18	9	1	35
	ANGRILY	0	1	0	0	1
	ANGRY	8	22	11	5	46
	ENRAGED	5	1	0	0	6
	OUTRAGE	0	0	1	1	2
	OUTRAGED	0	0	0	2	2

	RAGE	4	4	3	0	11
Totals		24	46	24	9	103
number per nationality		Korean	70	N. Am.	33	
percentage per nationality			68.0%		32.0%	
Happy cluster	Group	#1 (Korean)	#2 (Korean)	#3 (N. Am.)	#4 (N. Am.)	totals
	ENJOYING	1	0	1	0	2
	HAPPIER	0	0	1	0	1
	HAPPILY	2	0	0	0	2
	HAPPINESS	7	10	0	0	17
	HAPPY	21	4	2	1	28
	JOY	6	5	0	0	11
	PLEASANT	2	0	0	0	2
	PLEASANTLY	1	1	0	0	2
	PLEASE	4	1	2	0	7
	PLEASED	1	0	0	1	2
Totals		45	21	6	2	74
number per nationality		Korean	66	N. Am.	8	
percentage per nationality			89.2%		10.8%	

Table 4 – Frequency of four emotions words across groups from TAMS

Ultimately, while word frequency is a gross tool for analyzing meaning, it remains a useful tool for highlighting factors that may get overlooked by other analytic methods. The main conclusion that we can draw from this frequency analysis of the basic emotion words is that the two cultural groups discussed three of the four basic emotions—fear, anger, and surprise—with *somewhat* similar intensity and frequency. That is to say that all of the four groups discussed these three emotions in substantial volume and the ratio differences were less than two to one. They were "relatively balanced" and "in the ballpark." The discussion of the happiness depicted in these scenes, however, was discussed with a substantially different frequency and intensity. Interestingly, the fact that the Korean focus groups used terms directly related to happiness nine times as often as did the North American groups allowed a focus on exactly how the different focus groups were talking about this relatively imbalanced discussion on happiness. This result is intriguing, because happiness is shown to be relatively easily recognizable across cultures

(Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), yet the intensity of focus in these "free discussions" is graphically, substantially different. To provide a sense of the content from the video that they were discussing, happiness is only depicted in the video clip showing the meal and discussion between two businessmen and the teacher Mr. Kim. In the scene, the two businessmen are hoping to shut down the country school in order to open a "survival game" on the property. However, since Mr. Kim has come to the school, the community has become more enthusiastic about education as well as keeping their small country school. They are becoming resistant to closing down the school. The businessmen are hoping to persuade Mr. Kim to their cause so that the school can be closed down, and they can move ahead with their business plans.

Interestingly, in both North American focus groups, every reference to happiness was in a discussion of how the expressions of happiness that they saw in the businessmen in this scene were actually the feigned happiness typified by the non-Duchene smile (Ursula Hess & Bourgeois, 2010; Ursula Hess & Kleck, 2005; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009), the one where the corners of the eyes do not wrinkle. The Korean focus groups, on the other hand, while recognizing the false expression of happiness used for business purposes by both businessmen in this particular scene, also state that they see a genuine happiness expressed by the businessman when they complete their business deal. For example, Participant V described the two businessmen by stating that the mediator showed "happiness and relief, because he heard the teacher saying that the school would be closed soon. [While] the businessman … had a happy expression when he heard the school would close." Similarly, Participant T describes the mediator's emotional communication:

> I felt that his happiness in the beginning as fake. His mouth is open and laughing, but I felt he was tense/nervous inside. But he felt happiness that came from relief when he

heard from the teacher that the school was going to close. Fake happiness in the beginning and then later feeling joy without the tension and worries.

The North American focus groups did not mention this expression of happiness as genuine happiness at the completion of a business deal, only discussing that emotional communication in terms of the businessmen's "relief"—but not happiness—that Mr. Kim had already taken steps to facilitate the completion of their business deal. Participant G's response typifies this interpretation of the emotional expressions of the younger businessman, "First, he kind of looked concerned and then relieved … after we heard the talk about the game and then something about the students he said "oh great!" and you could really see his relief." Participant C in the other North American group made a nearly identical comment about both businessmen, "as soon as [Mr. Kim] said, 'Well, don't worry, they are all transferring.' This *relief* just washed over them."

Certainly, this difference in interpretation of happiness and particularly distinguishing between happiness and relief is a cultural difference between these focus groups. Moreover, the differences in focus raise questions about the depth and breadth of the universality of happiness—at least in this situation and between these two cultures. For the Koreans in these focus groups relief is a form of genuine happiness; however, for the North Americans relief remains somehow short of genuine happiness. These fundamental differences draw attention to and provide a foundation for a second area of analysis on word frequency: other emotion words and word clusters.

Word frequency analysis—the other emotions.

Because the concept of universal emotions and the number of basic emotions limits the sorts of emotions that can be discussed considering emotional communication, discussing "non-basic" emotions is essential as we wish to have a holistic analysis of the topic. Indeed, one of the

most striking impressions one receives when examining the list of words from both the TAMS analysis and the analysis using the index feature in Word, is that both lists contain many, *many* more emotion words than Ekman's six or seven. These words tend to be of two types. Some of the emotion terms are unique emotions themselves, which do not fit readily into Ekman's categories, for example, guilt, relief, worry. Of course, many of these terms for "non-basic" emotions can be found in more complex emotional coding systems such as Plutchik's or Parrot's (Plutchik, 1980, 1994, 2001; Turner & Stets, 2005). Other emotion terms used by the participants in the focus groups are, alternatively, are emotionally laden words or concepts that the layman may associate closely with emotions, for example, anxiety, arrogance, shyness. To provide a rough sense of the occurrence of these non-basic emotion terms, I eliminated all of the words from the TAMS word count data that were neither basic or non-basic emotions or emotionally-laden terms, and then hand coded into the three groups: basic, non-basic, or emotionally-laden terms or phrases. Table 5 provides a summary of the rough word count. In a

	Number of terms	% of total terms	number of occurrences	% of total occurrences
Basic emotion clusters	29	10.36%	297	28.50%
Non-basic emotion	104	37.14%	332	31.86%
Emotionally laden	147	52.50%	413	39.64%
	280	100.00%	1042	100.00%

Table 5 – Rough word count of the types of emotion words

cursory examination of the list, one immediately notices that only about10% of the words selected as either emotions or emotionally laden words can be categorized clearly as part of those basic emotion clusters. Moreover, about half of the words that were categorized from the transcripts of this study fell into the "non-emotion, but emotionally laden" category. However, in terms of frequency of use of these words in these discussions about emotional communication, basic emotion words were used more frequently, than either non-basic terms or emotionally

laden terms. In fact, in examining the word counts, we discover that many of the non-basic emotion words as well as many of the emotionally laden terms and phrases are used only one time. Thus, the greater count of basic emotion words does temper the striking 1 to 9 ratio of basic emotion words to non-emotion/emotionally-laden terms. In the end, however, these "other" emotion terms were at least twice as important to the focus group participants in the discussion of the emotions expressed than were basic emotion terms. This result is made more striking by the methodological focus on basic emotion terms as seen in the note-taking worksheets and in the preparatory remarks to each focus group. Ultimately and unsurprisingly, these data force us to conclude that in the communication of emotion between "real, live" human beings, basic emotion terms are woefully insufficient to cover the breadth of human emotional experience and communication.

Moreover, and more importantly, expanding our perspective on emotions to include other emotions allows us to see other important terms in the conversation that may lead to the sorts of cross-cultural emotional miscommunication that this study in part hopes to identify. Thus, using the same criteria for inclusion in the analysis used for the basic emotion terms, that is more than one group needed to discuss the concept, and the concept needed to be discussed substantially, using ten occurrences of a single term in the cluster as a minimum number, we can look specifically at a few more emotion terms. Table 6 lists the "non-basic" emotion terms that met the criteria for inclusion in the analysis.

Embarrassment cluster		#1 (Korean)	#2 (Korean)	#3 (N. Am.)	#4 (N. Am.)	totals
	EMBARRASSED	5	7	5	4	21
	EMBARRASSMENT	1	4	3	0	8
Totals		6	11	8	4	29
number per nationality		Korean	17	N. Am.	12	
percentage per nationality			58.62%		41.38%	

Guilt cluster		#1 (Korean)	#2 (Korean)	#3 (N. Am.)	#4 (N. Am.)	totals
	GUILT	0	0	0	11	11
	GUILTY	0	3	12	12	27
Totals		0	3	12	23	38
number per nationality		Korean	3	N. Am.	35	
percentage per nationality			7.89%		92.11%	

Loss cluster		#1 (Korean)	#2 (Korean)	#3 (N. Am.)	#4 (N. Am.)	totals
	LOSS	14	5	0	1	20
	LOST	5	4	0	1	10
Totals		19	9	0	2	30
number per nationality		Korean	28	N. Am.	2	
percentage per nationality			93.33%		6.67%	

Relief cluster		#1 (Korean)	#2 (Korean)	#3 (N. Am.)	#4 (N. Am.)	totals
	RELIEF	3	1	1	2	7
	RELIEVED	2	1	1	6	10
Totals		5	2	2	8	17
number per nationality		Korean	7	N. Am.	10	
percentage per nationality			41.18%		58.82%	

Worry cluster		#1 (Korean)	#2 (Korean)	#3 (N. Am.)	#4 (N. Am.)	totals
	WORRIED	6	3	3	4	16
	WORRIES	1	1	0	0	2
	WORRY	1	0	2	0	3
Totals		8	4	5	4	21
number per nationality		Korean	12	N. Am.	9	
percentage per nationality			57.14%		42.86%	

Table 6 – "Non-basic" emotion terms meeting minimum criteria

What is seen when we look at these frequency counts of "non-basic" emotions? First, the emotions on the list include—embarrassment, guilt, loss relief, and worry—and while they do not make Ekman's list, they are fairly 'basic' emotions in a layman's sense. As was the case with the basic emotions above, some of these non-basic emotion terms were discussed in relative balance amongst the groups: worry, relief, and embarrassment. That balance would indicate some cross-cultural similarity between the Korean and North American groups might be found.

On the other hand, two of the emotions, guilt and loss, while they would seem inextricably intertwined in a psychological sense, were discussed in rather imbalanced ways. Importantly, the Koreans discussed loss extensively, but the North Americans did not. Simultaneously, the North Americans focused extensively on guilt, but the Koreans did not. Given the intertwined nature of the two emotions in the Western psychological sense, the next task was to explore just exactly how the various focus groups were discussing guilt and loss. Were they describing the same events in the clips? Were they referencing the same emotional cues? Were they talking about the same things, but using different terms?

The easy answer to those three questions is, "no." However, to clarify the issue, we need to note that both of these emotions, "guilt" and "at a loss," represent a 'secondary' emotion (cf. Plutchik, 2001)--one that requires higher cognitive processing in order to exist. In other words, people have to "think about it" to feel this emotion. In general, Ekman's basic emotions are emotions that we can see in animals–particularly mammals. However, emotions termed here as secondary emotions, require some sort of conscious awareness of some other factors that enable us to feel these emotions—less autonomic processing and more conscious processing. We cannot feel guilty if we are not aware of the "right and wrong" of the situation, and we cannot feel 'at a loss' if we are not struggling amongst a variety of options and consequences available to us.

As the data show, the Korean focus group participants did not discuss guilt much. The one individual who discussed guilt talked about it in terms of the school principal in the initial scene, but no other participant from any of the four groups also described that emotion in that character. The Koreans, however, did talk about sensing that both the principal and Mr. Kim were "feeling at a loss," in the faculty meeting scene. To clarify the situation depicted, the scene occurs early in the film and is set chronologically before Mr. Kim is "sent down" to the

country school for soliciting protection money. In the scene, Mr. Kim arrives late to a faculty meeting. As the principal begins to approach Mr. Kim, an angry, screaming parent enters the room and instigates a melee over the "shakedown" of his son. Six of the eight Korean participants described the principal is being at a loss during the melee, and five of the Korean participants say the same thing about Mr. Kim. Interestingly, the Korean participants use two different words to describe the sensation of being at a loss with specific cultural implications, which I will discuss in a later section. The North American focus groups, on the other hand and as stated above, did not arrive at an overall conclusion that any character was "at a loss." Interestingly, North American Participant I does see essentially what the Korean participants saw, stating that the principal:

> starts off being stern and professional and all and kind of above everyone … but then the situation [*created by the angry parent causes the principal*] obviously to be surprised and everything. He wants to take control, but he's kind of at a loss.

However, Participant I is the only member of the North American focus groups to discuss that emotion. The conclusion we can draw is that the sensation of being "at a loss," which was so plainly obvious to the Korean participants is not *"unperceivable"* to the North American participants; however, that "at the loss" emotion was also *not* plainly obvious and worthy of discussion to the North Americans. Which supports Frank, Harvey, & Verdun's (2000) conclusion that non-natives are able to understand culturally specific varieties of emotion "even though the distinctions may not arise in everyday life nor be reflected in ordinary English usage" (p. 887).

Switching the focus to guilt, which the North Americans discussed in detail, but the Koreans hardly mentioned, we also find that they are not talking about emotional cues that were

perceived differently by the Koreans. Rather they are talking about a separate set of emotional cues that the Koreans did not discuss. Guilt, however, as a secondary emotion, is not a simple construct. Certainly, embarrassment is embedded in many expressions of guilt—but not every expression of embarrassment is caused by guilty feelings. The word frequency data from these focus groups indicates that both North Americans and Koreans discussed embarrassment in significant detail regarding similar events depicted in the video clips. The North Americans discussed guilt in terms of three separate situations in the two video clips. The first instance described as guilty was Mr. Kim's behavior upon entering the meeting late. This particular description is important in the subsequent discussion of channels for emotional cues, because the discussion implicates multiple channels through which they assessed this emotion. However, for the current discussion of how the North Americans and Koreans perceived the scene differently, the key factor is the fact that the Koreans did not mention that Mr. Kim was exhibiting cues for guilt upon his arrival at the meeting, nor did they describe them as being at a loss. Participant G describes Mr. Kim as feeling guilty: "I could feel … he feels a little bit guilty, too." Similarly, in the other focus group, Participant D describes Mr. Kim's emotional cues in the same way, "I thought he looked guilty. The way he came in and sat down, looked down and just kept his head and eyes down."

The second instance of guilt occurs later in the faculty meeting scene after the angry parent has entered. However, in their discussion some of the North Americans focus not on any emotional cues that reveal his guilt, rather they state that they did *not* see the emotional cues for guilt, in spite of the fact that Mr. Kim is indeed guilty of extorting "protection money" from the students. For example, Participant I described it this way, "I thought he just … wanted to stay out of it. He didn't want to get involved in what was going on, but I didn't see him feeling guilty."

Moreover, in the other focus group, Mr. Kim was not thought to be expressing guilt during the melee, rather participants described him as, "a bit of a coward when the whole kerfuffle was going on" (Participant C).

A third instance where the North Americans described guilt as an emotion occurs in the scene with the businessman when the younger businessman offers Mr. Kim a bribe. However, the participants again offer mixed interpretations. In one North American group the discussion centers on *not* seeing the emotion of guilt that they seem to expect from the younger businessman. Participant A suggests that the businessman offers the bribe "not in a guilty way … just to make sure that [*the business deal*] was sealed." While the other North American group describes seeing Mr. Kim express guilty feelings, as Participant J states, "I think he looked guilty and sad, because he is taking bribe money again, and this time he feels bad about it."

In addition, one "emotionally laden" term deserves attention based on the frequency data: respect. Table 7 shows the frequency data regarding the cluster of words around the notion of respect. Looking at those numbers, I am still taken aback. The Koreans did not mention respect at all in their focus groups, while the North Americans focused a reasonable amount of their analytical time and effort discussing the respect and disrespect depicted—and, in fact, focus group number four was quite fixated on the notion of respect and its role in the public school

Respect cluster	Group	#1 (Korean)	#2 (Korean)	#3 (N. Am.)	#4 (N. Am.)	totals
	DISRESPECT	0	0	0	1	1
	DISRESPECTFUL	0	0	0	1	1
	RESPECT	0	0	1	7	8
	RESPECTED	0	0	0	2	2
	RESPECTFUL	0	0	2	2	4
Totals		0	0	3	13	16
number per nationality		Korean	0	N. Am.	16	
percentage per nationality			0.00%		100.00%	

Table 7 -- Frequency of respect cluster words

situation. Given the fact that, one, the movie is set in public schools, and, two, the characters represent strong gradients of class and power, from students to parents to teachers to administrators, *and, three,* the focus group participants are teachers, this discussion of respect is particularly important. A great deal of writing, training and effort has been put into explaining the importance of Confucian ideals regarding respect for teachers to people from Western cultures. The data from this focus group shows that the North American focus groups were hyper-aware of this cultural norm, discussing it in great detail. Yet, the Korean participants did not even discuss the concept of respect. Why? This question, and several others, where not sufficiently supported by the evidence in the focus groups to come to a definitive answer. Therefore, follow-up questions were developed and key informants were interviewed regarding these issues. Two different interpretations were offered. Yoonjin, the bicultural facilitator and translator, offered that the North Americans were likely over-interpreting the interaction. In the faculty meeting, she suggests, "Koreans might have seen that [*Mr. Kim*] was respectful enough … it was within the limits of cultural appropriateness." She continues, "He was not particularly rude … he was not overly polite, but he was not over the line … [*the Koreans*] didn't seem him as respectful, but they didn't see him as disrespectful, *either*."

Before moving on to the next topic, however, I want to look a little more deeply into the word frequency counts regarding the different categorizations of emotion words as revealed in these focus groups which a previously presented in summary regarding the occurrence of "basic emotions" versus "non-basic emotions" and/or "emotionally laden" terms. Clearly, people and animals *do* have some basic emotions that mammals in particular both express and recognize (Darwin, 1998; Panksepp, 2011). Indeed, scientists have written about the existence of basic emotions for over a century, *and* humans have undoubtedly known about that universality for

immeasurably longer. In communication between and amongst cultures, those basic emotions unfortunately only cover an extremely limited scope of our emotional lives and, consequently, our emotional communication strategies and habits. Wierzbicka's (1999) argument to that end is well supported by the frequency count data in this study. Simply put, those non-universal emotions regulated by cultural specific display rules are at least as important as basic and universal ones.

While not directly linked to the question of non-natives' accuracy in assessing another countries emotional communication cues, a few interesting themes emerge out of that analysis to be addressed in this lexical analysis section. Ultimately, the focus group data reinforce the notion that emotional communication is both subtle and intricate. That data also reinforce the methodological notion that teasing out the threads of meaning is an equally complex and intricate process. I have argued that humans create a category of emotion that I have labeled "secondary," and that this category is inherently different from a basic, genetically universal emotion. Secondary emotions are different, because they require conscious processing to experience, for example, guilt and embarrassment. Moreover, Plutchik (1980, 1994, 2001) has argued for hierarchical categorizations of emotions. These categories suggest that many emotions can occur in combination, which in turn results in different and distinct emotional expressions. Critically, blending emotions can become quite complex quite rapidly, and offers enormous potential for culturally specific combinations. Certainly the focus groups discussed some elements of both complexity and cultural specificity. A final issue revealed through the lexical/semantic analysis was the fact that when the focus groups discussed emotions, they did not always rely on the academic terms for emotion that a scientist might use. Instead, they frequently resorted to slang,

metaphor and archetype to express their assessments of the emotions that the characters were attempting to communicate.

Before going into detail on these three emergent themes, I wish to clarify that much of the data for these conclusions comes from indexing data using Word. Because the TAMS software can only return counts of individual words, the ability to index phrases in Word allowed for a different characterization of the lexical data. Table 8 provides a summary of the frequency count data after those indexed words had been selected and then grouped into clusters.

summary		# diff words	G#1	G#2	G#3	G#4	Ks v. NoAms	page hits	% Korean	% NoAm
	emotion									
basic	fear	13	19	13	20	21	-9	73	43.84%	56.16%
	disgust/ contempt	8	9	8	4	3	10	24	70.83%	29.17%
	sadness	3	0	1	0	3	-2	4	25.00%	75.00%
	surprise	3	6	7	9	10	-6	32	40.63%	59.38%
	anger	12	22	25	21	12	14	80	58.75%	41.25%
	happiness	16	28	18	16	4	26	66	69.70%	30.30%
	totals	55	84	72	70	53	33	279	55.91%	44.09%
other										
	gen. arousal (anticipation)	4	3	2	1	2	2	8	62.50%	37.50%
	gen. agony (pain)	8	0	3	2	8	-7	13	23.08%	76.92%
	shyness	5	0	2	3	3	-4	8	25.00%	75.00%
	"weighing options" (nun-chi)	5	11	12	5	1	17	29	79.31%	20.69%
	gen. "nice" character	10	4	1	5	11	-11	21	23.81%	76.19%
	gen. "bad" character - arrogance	23	7	3	8	19	-17	37	27.03%	72.97%
	flattery	6	4	3	3	1	3	11	63.64%	36.36%
	archetypes	2	0	0	2	0	-2	2	0.00%	100.00%
	interest	4	4	6	4	1	5	15	66.67%	33.33%
	guilt (+shame, embarrassment)	10	8	15	14	26	-17	63	36.51%	63.49%
	anxiety	17	15	6	5	17	-1	43	48.84%	51.16%
	relief (post-anxiety)	3	4	2	2	4	0	12	50.00%	50.00%
	showing no emotion (calm)	18	20	12	12	8	12	52	61.54%	38.46%
	conflicted (mixed/	7	15	8	5	6	12	34	67.65%	32.35%

	confused)									
	totals	122	95	75	71	107	-8	348	48.85%	51.15%

Table 8 -- Frequency data from Word indexing

Because I have already offered a few examples of secondary emotions and discussed the secondary emotion issue in some detail, at this point I would only like to provide one example of a participant verbally processing from a basic emotion description to a secondary emotion conclusion. Indeed, we can trace the 'secondary' character of guilt in participant G's interpretive process regarding Mr. Kim in the faculty meeting. She begins describing him as fearful, when she agrees with Participant H's assessment of Mr. Kim as "sheepish, scared, [*and*] nervous." When the facilitator asks her to go into detail as to why she thought Mr. Kim was fearful, she points to his "the lack of eye contact" with the principal. As the discussion continues she makes a situational connection to Mr. Kim's late arrival, and concludes that he may have committed some prior indiscretions at work, "I noticed that, okay, he kind of … he did something." Finally, she appears to be linking the emotion of fear to the situation in the movie and ultimately describes him as feeling guilty: "it's a little bit questionable, like I could feel… he feels a little bit guilty, too." All of this negotiation and a conclusion process occur over about two minutes of the focus group conversation.

Clearly, many of the "other" clusters section of Table 8 are clearly blended emotions that fit squarely into Plutchik's (1980, 1994, 2001) hierarchy: anxiety, relief, anticipation, shame, curiosity, etc. Consequently, these data provide the opportunity to explore the question, "Would a secondary, blended emotion be any more or less likely to result in cross-cultural misunderstanding than a primary, basic one?" Yoonjin, the bicultural facilitator and translator, suggests that non-natives had more difficulties in the second scene "where the emotions were more interpretation based … A lot of cognition goes together with the emotions." An obvious

way to answer that question is to count the accurate and inaccurate interpretations of secondary emotions. However, this study was not designed to conduct that sort of analysis. The data we do have allow us to compare the relative intensity of focus on the particular emotions by the various focus groups. As already discussed, four of Ekman's basic emotions were considered in sufficient detail by the focus groups to allow for analysis, and three of the four were discussed in relatively equal intensity by both focus groups. Table 9 summarizes the data for the ten "substantial" secondary emotions coded in this study. As before, the overall average indicates a reasonable balance in focus. That is to say, about half of the overall other emotion words were in the Korean groups (49%) and half were in the North American groups (51%). However, as we

summary		# diff words	G#1	G#2	G#3	G#4	Ks v. NoAms	page hits	% Korean	% NoAm
	emotion									
other	gen. agony (pain)	8	0	3	2	8	-7	13	23.08%	76.92%
	"weighing options" (nun-chi)	5	11	12	5	1	17	29	79.31%	20.69%
	gen. "nice" character	10	4	1	5	11	-11	21	23.81%	76.19%
	gen. "bad" character - arrogance	23	7	3	8	19	-17	37	27.03%	72.97%
	flattery	6	4	3	3	1	3	11	63.64%	36.36%
	interest	4	4	6	4	1	5	15	66.67%	33.33%
	guilt (+shame, embarrassment)	10	8	15	14	26	-17	63	36.51%	63.49%
	anxiety	17	15	6	5	17	-1	43	48.84%	51.16%
	relief (post-anxiety)	3	4	2	2	4	0	12	50.00%	50.00%
	showing no emotion (calm)	18	20	12	12	8	12	52	61.54%	38.46%
	conflicted (mixed/ confused)	7	15	8	5	6	12	34	67.65%	32.35%
	totals	122	95	75	71	107	-8	348	48.85%	51.15%

Table 9 -- Frequency data on substantial "other" emotions from Word indexing

go down the list of the individual emotion clusters, we find cases of imbalance in some word clusters. Of the ten clusters, only two have ratios near one to one, four have ratios of about two to

one, and the ratios of the remaining four are about three to one. Relatively speaking, the imbalance between the Koreans and North Americans is greater in reference to the intensity of their focus on various secondary emotions than in the intensity of their focus on basic emotions. Since the overall use of secondary emotion terms is about equal, that means that over those ten secondary emotions, Koreans focused more intensely on some and North Americans focused more intensely on others. Interestingly, the two secondary emotions that are exceptions to the imbalance pattern were the discussion of "anxiety," and "relief," which seem to be interrelated, because we can interpret relief as the resolution of anxiety. In regards to discussions that were relatively imbalanced, the Koreans focused about twice as much as the North Americans on flattery, interest, conflict, and lack of emotional expression. They also focused almost four times as much on *nun-chi*/"weighing options"—which we discuss in on more detail later. The North Americans, on the other hand, focused about twice as heavily on the guilt/shame/embarrassment cluster, as previously discussed. In addition, they focused about three times the attention on general comments about expressions of pain, and interestingly about three times the amount of attention on emotionally laden character traits—both "good" and "bad" traits. Ultimately, I do not believe that the data warrant specific conclusions about specific emotions and emotions terms, rather the results suggest that as we move beyond "basic" emotions to secondary and blended ones, universality becomes extremely tenuous. Simultaneously, however, secondary emotions are important elements of our lives. Indeed, in these conversations secondary emotions warranted greater attention from every focus group than did basic emotions. Perhaps more importantly, the fact that the Korean and North American discussions focused on secondary emotions and emotion laden terms in roughly equal measure indicates that refining of emotional

definitions is equally important in both cultures—even though they tended to focus on different emotions.

Delving into those specific secondary emotions and emotion-laden terms is clearly warranted by the data. As stated in the previous paragraph, the Koreans focused more on flattery, interest, conflict, the lack of emotional expression, and particularly on *nun-chi*/"weighing options." The North Americans focused more on guilt, pain, and "good" or "bad" character traits. As each of these traits seems salient, and, at least in part, matches anecdotal conclusions about differences in these two cultures, a different methodology regarding each of these differences may prove the distinctions important and clear enough to warrant inclusion in a cultural assimilator or other training text or tool, but for the purposes of this study I want to look specifically at the question of non-natives ability to recognize different conceptualizations of emotion. You will recall Roberson et al.'s (2009) conclusion that the different color categorization systems in Korean and English in no way affected the ability of speakers of those languages to recognize "just noticeable differences" in colors. Do we see that North Americans are able to recognize Korean emotional categories? Two different instances in the video clips and in the focus group discussion with the representative Korean emotional categories can provide insight into this question. The emotion described in the first instance, when Mr. Kim arrived late for the faculty meeting, was *nun-chi*. The emotions described in the second one, when the entire meeting turns into a wild confusing melee, were *dang-hwang* and *jjeol-jjeol-mae-da*. Each of these emotions was discussed heavily by both of the Korean focus groups. However, as we might imagine, the North Americans knew none of these three terms. Consequently, the researcher needed to go back into the transcript and look for longer phrases and descriptions, that is to say, strings of words or phrases that represent essentially the same concept for which Korean has a

single word. Indeed, in each of these instances, something was found. In place of the concept of *nun-chi*, the North Americans used phrases like: "weighing his options," or being "thoughtful." Similarly, in lieu of *dang-hwang* at least one participant referred to Mr. Kim as appearing to be "at a loss." This recognition shows is that in spite of the lack of specific words to name the emotion, the non-natives were quite able to: 1) recognize these emotions, 2) understand their salience in the situation and 3) describe them with their own words. This finding matches the conclusion of Frank, et al. (2000). Raising again the question of cultural relativism: Can the lack of a single word to describe the emotions change the role of those emotions in the psyche of the individuals? Clearly from the indexed frequency counts, the Koreans talked more about *nun-chi* with 23 total pages referenced, while the North Americans only discussed equivalent concepts on six pages. Importantly, two of the *nun-chi* "page hits" for the North Americans occurred *after* the researcher described the Korean focus group results and introduced the *nun-chi* concept. Regardless of the infrequency prior to the facilitator describing the Korean concept of *nun-chi*, the North Americans responded with recognition and understanding when the notion was presented. For example in focus group 3, Participant A immediately recognized the emotion: "when he didn't speak I think that (*nun-chi*) is exactly what he was doing." Even more compelling is a North American discussion regarding what *nun-chi* is, and how it functions cross-culturally:

> Participant J: Oh yeah, now that [*nun-chi*] is mentioned. I kind of see that, but I wouldn't have really kind of picked up on it.
>
> Participant H: I think that it is a lack of words, because when we were saying that, like at the part when we were all kind of discussing how he was trying to control, before he

jumped from one emotion to taking control of the situation. Like when the parent came in, he [Mr. Kim] was analyzing the situation.

Participant G: Yeah, another thing there were just so many emotions. He was just going with what was going on, but it is so hard to kind of put all those in [one emotion word].

Participant J: You can't really verbalize in regular English."

We can see in this interaction how non-natives can see the emotion and associated behaviors of *nun-chi* when asked to focus directly at those behaviors. However, socio-linguistically at least, they have not been trained to focus on that unnamed notion. Therefore, they would be less likely to recognize *nun-chi* and certainly less likely to discuss it in any specific terms.

Similarly, later in the same scene, after the parent has already entered, kicked the furniture around, and confronts the principal, the Koreans discuss a couple of emotions with specific Korean terms: *dang-hwang* and *jjeol-jjeol-mae-da*. In this instance, the North Americans did not arrive at a specific word or phrase to describe the emotion – at least not as clearly as they had in describing *nun-chi* as "weighing his options." They did use words like "helpless," "timid," and the phrase "acting like a child," or, as Participant I put it: "when the parent came in, he [*Mr. Kim*] just wanted to stay out of it." The North Americans clearly understood the importance of those emotional expressions to the story, and the important of accurate interpretation of that expression to following the story. Participant I wonders what Mr. Kim is trying to express: "When he started jumping… did you see when he was jumping? Why? What is that?" and participant G concurs: "that was a little strange." In spite of their professed inability to understand the emotion being expressed, they actually arrive at many elements of the gloss of *jjeol-jjeol-mae-da* provided by Yoonjin, the translator:

> *Jjeol-jjeol-mae-da* feels like both action and feelings. It is when a person acts like he/she is at a loss of what to do, sometimes trying random things, because he or she feels embarrassed and/or apologetic—it usually happens when the party this person deals with is very angry.

For example, Participant C latches on to the random and ineffective actions of Mr. Kim, stating that his actions were "not very productive." In the other focus group, they latch on to Mr. Kim's distress—being at a loss—when Participants J and G discuss Mr. Kim's emotions:

> Participant J: I think he's jumping out of distress.
>
> Participant G: You think he's jumping out of distress? ... I can agree with that. I can agree with that.

Again, the non-natives are well able to perceive the emotional cues, but a lack of the proper vocabulary prevents them from discussing and identifying those emotions in the same way that native speakers can. Moreover, the problem is simply that some of these emotion terms just do not translate readily, and these two terms serve as prime examples. None of the dictionaries I checked had *any* matching words. The most used Korean - English dictionary, Essence, defines *dang-hwang* as "be confused (flustered, bewildered, embarrassed); be perplexed." Dictionary.com provides "embarrassed." Yahoo's Babelfish offers "bewilderment." Babylon returns "upset." Moreover, none of these match the gloss provided by Yoonjin: "at a loss with surprise and confusion." Definitions for *jjeol-jjeol-mae-da* are equally divergent. Again, Essence defines *jjeol-jjeol-mae-da* as, "Fluster oneself; be all in a hurry; be flurried (confused, flustered); lose one's head; be solely perplexed; be at a loss what to do." Babelfish returns: "Is nonplused." Babylon suggests, "slaphappy, dazed, stunned, bewildered, be at a loss, be at one's wit's end." While Dictionary.com does not even have an entry—returning only the

Romanization of *쩔쩔매*, "Jjeol-jjeol-mae." Ultimately, a single word or phrase seems completely insufficient to translate these secondary emotion terms. Please note that several of the offered definitions for both terms are the same: "bewildered," "flustered," "perplexed," or "at a loss." Thus, while the terms are certainly closely related, a Korean speaker is unlikely to confuse *dang-hwang* for *jjeol-jjeol-mae-da* or vice versa, any more than an English speaker would confuse "fluster oneself" for "at one's wit's end"—two of the definitions provided above. The issue of inconsistent, difficult, or simply absent translations may prove to be the most telling result from the study: Understanding emotions across cultures, particularly secondary and blended emotions, is simply "off the radar," including the radar of people that produce bilingual dictionaries.

A final area of interest in understanding the perception of cross-cultural emotional communication, particularly in reference to the emotional lexis, is the status of slang, metaphor and archetype in describing emotional communication. The importance of such metaphorical language is emphasized in a number of studies (Koven, 2004; Pavlenko, 2008; Wierzbicka, 1999) regarding the emotional communication of multilingual individuals. Indeed, these focus group discussions contain several instances of metaphorical language. Because of the directionality of the study—North Americans interpreting Korean emotional expressions—the results in this area tend to be North American expressions. Slang expressions like "power tripping" and "freaking out" appeared. Participants used metaphors like "buttering him up," "finger pointing," "cool as a cucumber," and "crawl under the table" to describe the emotions they saw. Some of these metaphors rose to an even higher level, one that I called "archetypes" in my notes. For example, Mr. Kim behaving like "Robin Hood," and the two businessmen behaving like the "Dynamic Duo"—alluding to Batman and Robin. The Koreans also used such

archetypes, describing Koreans as being like "cocks in a cockfight." While the total number of slang, metaphor and archetype usages was not huge, the numbers justify a discussion of figurative language here. Moreover, we have to wonder how much the academic research situation of the study might have limited the participant's use of such figurative terms. How much does the frequency of these expressions increase in conversations about the emotional behavior of "the other" which occur in private and casual settings between friends, at the pub or elsewhere, for example? Ultimately, as indicated in the introductory scenario with South Korean bantamweight boxer Byun Jong-Il, these informal settings, rather than academic ones, are more often the locales where stereotypes are built and reinforced. The deconstruction and disruption of such stereotypes are, however, likely to find *their* genesis in academic settings.

As stated, this study does not have the sample size, the methodology, or the data analysis tools to provide statistically significant evidence on the particular emotions viewed differently across these two cultures. Rather, the data here reveals that substantial differences in how the groups of the same gender, similar ages, and similar educational backgrounds reacted to the same scenes in free response focus group format. Moreover, when we examine the secondary emotions and emotion-laden words in particular, we can see more similarities amongst the national groups and more differences across national distinctions.

Thus, in partial summary of the focus groups descriptive language, the discussions that occurred in the various focus groups show both strong similarities and striking differences. With regards to Paul Ekman's six original "basic" emotions (and disregarding those emotions not depicted in the video clips shown to the participants), both the North Americans and the Koreans recognized the cues for those basic emotions based on the word frequency counts. The single exception to this conclusion was the discussion of happiness, where the Koreans concluded that

some expressions on the characters in the Korean film represented genuine happiness, as well as some that represented feigned happiness for social purposes, while the North Americans concluded that all of the expressions they saw were merely false expressions of happiness as a part of a display rule for the particular social situation. Simultaneously, strong support was indicated for the "diversity" of human emotions perspective suggested by Dewaele (2008), Pavlenko (2005), Schumann (1997), and Wierzbicka (1999). I do not believe that the two perspectives are incompatible. As suggested earlier, evolutionary brain development models (Cziko, 1997; Panksepp, 2011) suggest that emotions themselves may have evolved over time. Consequently, basic emotions may exist universally within portions of the brain that are evolutionarily older, while secondary emotions could be mediated by portions of the brain that are evolutionarily more recent (e.g., the neocortex) and could, therefore, be more adaptable to social mechanisms. Indeed, this duality with one involuntary element regulated on occasion by another voluntary and conscious element would seem to be the essential character of display rules. Thus, in resolving the primary question of this study in the most general and gross fashion, the data indicates that both nature and nuture are important in the communication of emotion, but that answer is not all al lunexpected and frankly not that intersting. What is interesting is the *how* universal nature and relative nurture effect the communication of emotion, and to get to that question we need a different set of tools for data collection and analysis. A first step in searching for that answer is to look at the various channels for reading emotional communication—appraisal, nonverbal communication, or direct communication—used by the groups in this study.

Different Channels for Emotional Cues

While analyzing the language used to describe emotions is an oft used and well-respected tool for understanding emotional communication, research comparing the different channels for

perceiving emotional communication messages is less common—to the point of being nearly non-existent (c.f. Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). In chapter 2, I reviewed the literature regarding three potential channels for the reception of emotional cues: Situational appraisal and cultural script based interpretations[8] (Planalp, 1999; C. Saarni, 1989; K. R. Scherer, 1999), non-verbal communication cues (Darwin, 1998; Ekman, 1999b, 2003; Ekman, et al., 1972; Ursula Hess & Kleck, 2005; Nakamichi, et al., 2002), and lexical-semantic indicators (Koven, 2004; Lutz, 1990; Pavlenko, 2008; G. M. White, 1990; Wierzbicka, 1999). The transcript data from the focus groups was the main data source for this analysis. To that end, the participants' stated reasons given for perceiving a particular emotion were coded into four broad categories: Situational/script based, non-verbal behavior based, lexical-semantic based, and a fourth category of "circular."

Raw results from channel coding

Allow me to provide an example of each of these code types to give a better idea of how they are distinct. Participant G provides an example of situational appraisal when she describes the young businessman. She saw, "concern and relief and after we heard the talk about the [*survival*] game [*plan succeeding*]." In this instance, the participant sees "concern" and "relief" expressed by the young businessman, because of how she expects someone to feel in a situation where a plan goes well. The lexical syntactic category code was used individual directly named their emotional state. As an illustration of this code, Participant G describes the young businessman's relief that their plan was going to move forward, when she states, "and he said, 'oh great!'" As discussed in more detail later in this section, the nonverbal communication cue category is actually subdivided into several subsections. However, one clear example occurs as

[8] Please note that I use the term "situational appraisal" as an umbrella term for both cognitive appraisal and cultural scripts. In part this is because while a person's appraisal of a situation is readily apparent, without secondary analysis, an individual's idiosyncratic appraisal of a situation is difficult to distinguish from a cultural script.

Participant T describes the principal in the faculty meeting scene, “He was looking flat in the beginning during the meeting and then saw the teacher coming in and quietly stared at him – I was feeling the scorn and annoyance in his eyes.” The final category, circular, describes those instances where the participant is unable to give an external reason for the character expressed that emotion. Participant V describes the older businessman/mediator in a way typical of this category. She explains that he shows “worry and anxiety because he looked worried.”

First, let me provide a summary of the results for the three channels that were not circular definitions. Chart 1 summarizes the results combining the two Korean groups and the two North American groups. Chart 2 shows the results for all four groups. Clearly, the relative reliance on each of the three channels is very nearly equal for both the Koreans and the North Americans.




Chart 1: Frequency counts for emotional cue channels for “national” focus groups




Chart 2: Frequency counts for emotional cue channels for each separate focus group

Moreover, each one of the individual focus groups shows the same pattern. In relative rankings, non-verbal channels were discussed most in all of the groups, appraisal and script justifications channels were second most frequent, and lexical semantic channels were least used—with wide margins between each rank. More specifically, all the groups discussed the non-verbal cues on the order of twice as often as appraisal/script interpretations and discussed lexical-semantic cues only a fraction as frequently as the other channels--between 0.7% and 8.5% of the total codes, with a total average under 5%. Table 10 provides the specific frequency counts, and Table 11 provides the percentages. Since this pattern was consistent across the groups, and since that result concurs with previous studies that find lexical-semantic cues less common/important in understanding emotional content (Hsee, Hatfield, & Chemtob, 1992; Mehrabian & Ferris, 1967),

Code	FG1	FG2	FG3	FG4	Korean tot	No. Amer. tot
Appraisal/Script	52	56	48	29	108	77
Nonverbal behaviors	99	119	70	53	218	123
Lexical-Syntactic	1	8	11	5	9	16

Table 10 – Raw frequency counts of the emotional cues by channel

Code	FG1	FG2	FG3	FG4	Korean tot	No. Amer. tot	total
Appraisal/Script	34.2%	30.6%	37.2%	33.3%	32.2%	35.6%	33.6%
Nonverbal behaviors	65.1%	65.0%	54.3%	60.9%	65.1%	56.9%	61.9%
Lexical/Syntactic	0.7%	4.4%	8.5%	5.7%	2.7%	7.4%	4.5%

Table 11 – Percentage reference for each emotional cue channel

we are led to conclude that such a rough pattern is indeed universal. The caveats remaining are the fact that the data source was a single film from a single country. Clearly, additional research following the same methodology using different films from different cultural perspectives would add weight to this conclusion.

When considering the different channels with the broad notion of non-verbal communication—for example, Mehrabian and Ferris' (1967) two channels were non-verbal physical cues and vocal cues—a similar, but slightly less consistent pattern emerges. Table 12 provides the expanded frequency counts, and Table 13 provides the percentages. To help simplify, I have provided two charts. Chart 3 compares the Korean totals to the North American totals. Chart 4 shows each of the focus groups separately. The final way I will present the raw numbers is to reduce them to the ranks within the channel of non-verbal cues. Table 14 shows these ranks, and table 12 show plus or minus variance from the average ranking for the separate groups.

Code	FG1	FG2	FG3	FG4	Korean tot	No. Amer. tot
Appraisal/Script	52	56	48	29	108	77
Nonverbal Summary	99	119	70	53	218	123
NVB>Face	40	41	24	31	81	55
NVB>Gestures	4	18	17	2	22	19

NVB>Kinesic	33	37	12	15	70	27
NVB>Prosodic	16	14	13	3	30	16
NVB>Proxemic	6	9	4	2	15	6
Lexical-Syntactic	1	8	11	5	9	16
Total codes in group	152	183	129	87	335	216
% of total codes	27.6%	33.2%	23.4%	15.8%	60.8%	39.2%

Table 12 – Raw frequency counts of the emotional cues by channel

Code	FG1	FG2	FG3	FG4	Korean tot	No. Amer. tot	total
Appraisal/Script	34.2%	30.6%	37.2%	33.3%	32.2%	35.6%	33.6%
Nonverbal summary	65.1%	65.0%	54.3%	60.9%	65.1%	56.9%	61.9%
NVB>Face	26.3%	22.4%	18.6%	35.6%	24.2%	25.5%	24.7%
NVB>Gestures	2.6%	9.8%	13.2%	2.3%	6.6%	8.8%	7.4%
NVB>Kinesic	21.7%	20.2%	9.3%	17.2%	20.9%	12.5%	17.6%
NVB>Prosodic	10.5%	7.7%	10.1%	3.4%	9.0%	7.4%	8.3%
NVB>Proxemic	3.9%	4.9%	3.1%	2.3%	4.5%	2.8%	3.8%
Lexical/Syntactic	0.7%	4.4%	8.5%	5.7%	2.7%	7.4%	4.5%

Table 13 – Percentage reference for each emotional cue channel

Code	FG1	FG2	FG3	FG4	Korean tot	No. Amer. tot	total
NVB>Face	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
NVB>Gestures	5	3	2	4	4	3	4
NVB>Kinesic	2	2	4	2	2	2	2
NVB>Prosodic	3	4	3	3	3	4	3
NVB>Proxemic	4	5	5	4	5	5	5

Table 14 – Rank of each non-verbal channel type within nonverbal channel codes

Code	FG1	FG2	FG3	FG4	Korean tot	No. Amer. tot
NVB>Face	0	0	0	0	0	0

NVB>Gestures	-1	1	2	0	0	1
NVB>Kinesic	0	0	-2	0	0	0
NVB>Prosodic	0	-1	0	0	0	-1
NVB>Proxemic	1	0	0	1	0	0

Table 15 – Rank variance to overall total rankings




Chart 3: Frequency counts for emotional cue channels for "national" focus groups




Chart 4: Frequency counts for emotional cue channels for each separate focus group

Frankly, these data are a lot to sort through. What I would draw your attention to first is the shape of the lines in chart 3. While admittedly these are categories and the order I placed them in the chart is simply alphabetical, the two lines always have the same sign of their slope—that is to say when one is rising, or falling, the other is also rising or falling with the single exception of the final data point of lexical-semantic cues. I will address the lexical-semantic exception in the next paragraph, but first I wish to examine the overall pattern in more detail. The rank order figures and the variance from the average data in Tables 13 and 14 make the adherence to the pattern across all of the groups clearer. Quite literally, the only substantial shift in ranks occurs in the third focus group with a shift between a somewhat greater number of codes for gestures and a lower number of codes for kinesics. Clearly, this data offers strong support for the idea that Koreans and North Americans tend to analyze emotion cues through similar channels when looking at the same communication events. However, I would caution against any attempt to generalize the relative importance of these various channels. No attempt was made to represent a cross section of human emotional experience in the selection of these video samples. Rather, the samples were selected because, one, they arose from situations that might be met in education, two, they represented authentic "Korean" communicative events, and finally, that they represented "clear" emotional expressions. Thus, the video samples cannot be considered representative of Korean emotional communication overall. The conclusion we can safely draw from this data is more narrow: When looking at the same emotionally evocative event portrayed from a Korean perspective, both Koreans and North Americans used remarkably similar communicative channels while exercising remarkably similar discursive weight in discussing their reasons for drawing their emotional communication interpretations.

Two thoughts come to mind when dealing with lexical semantic cues. First, the frequency is quite low; thus, the aberration may just be a result of the small number of codes made. In other words, in a study designed to statistically measure such differences, the distinction may prove insignificant. If, however, the difference is indeed a "real" distinction between how natives and non-natives decode the emotions in a communicative event, why would it be that non-native speakers would be more reliant, or at a minimum more interested in discussing, lexical-semantic markers of emotional communication than native speakers? At first glance, this result would seem counter-intuitive, because none of the North American participants were at all fluent in Korean. Thus, the potential for any of the North American participants to follow the spoken dialogue in Korean would seem limited. However, on more careful consideration, the North American participants might be more likely to comment on the lexical and semantic information *from the subtitles*. They may have been *more* cognitively involved via *reading* subtitles in English, than they might otherwise be when passively *listening* to dialogue.

Finally, as I mentioned at the start of this section, an additional set of codes were labeled "circular." That is to say, the participant was unable to provide an explanation of why they perceived the emotion without making circular connection to the emotion itself. While it would be possible to disregard these codes, they do reveal something about the process of interpreting emotions, particularly across cultures, but also within cultures. Moreover, the interpretations that were given circular codes amount to somewhat more than five percent of the total codes assigned. While this amount is relatively small, it is not insubstantial. In fact, the total number of "circular" codes was roughly equal to the total number of "lexical-syntactic" codes. Thus, the participants' descriptions of these scenes were just as likely *not* contain a clear explanation of why they thought the emotion was being expressed as they were to point to an overt lexical or

syntactic indicator of the emotion. This result lends support to one of the central premises of this study: Emotional communication is not something that we are actively taught, or that we overtly analyze. Moreover, the circular descriptions of emotions also suggest a deeper definitional understanding of emotion: the emotional expression is often seen *as the emotion* to the point of being viewed as one and the same in the vernacular definition. For example, just such an "expression=emotion" identity description was coded when Participant A describes the principal from the faculty meeting scene: "He [the principal] also looked pretty stoic, like he didn't give him [Mr. Kim] much emotion." These two realities—one, that emotional interpretation is often a less than fully conscious process appear and, two, that expression and emotion can become intertwined to the extent that they are one and the same thing—appear to run in parallel.

At the broadest end of the spectrum, this data supports the notion found in previous research into the relative importance of "literal" (in my study "lexical-syntactic") versus nonverbal emotional communication cues (Hsee, et al., 1992; Mehrabian, 2007; Mehrabian & Wiener, 1967). This particular study, however, did not address one of the major concerns in the field–the precise relative importance in statistically quantifiable terms (Mehrabian & Ferris, 1967)–due to sample size, selection procedures, and other issues. On the positive side, this study does provide several methodological advantages over some previous studies. The data source observed by the focus groups was video; therefore, the participants were able to analyze the communication in advance with as many different channels–situation, tone of voice, gesture, kinesthetic, etc.–readily viewable as possible, yet simultaneously allowing that data to be "replayable" in an identical fashion to each different focus group. Additionally, the "free choice" character of the focus group discussions allows participants to provide their own interpretations, rather than constraining them to one particular framework. Consequently, a more naturalistic

interpretation is possible. Finally, the focus group format provides additional insight into an individual's interpretation processes, as well as the social processes that go into the ultimate cultural norm/stereotype.

Using multiple channels for interpretation.

Certainly, exploring the raw results regarding the different channels used for interpreting emotional communications--situations/scripts, nonverbal cues, and lexical cues—provides important insights, particularly the striking similarity in the relative reliance each group had on each the various channels. However, these methods fail to give a full picture of the channels used to interpret emotional cues in normal social interaction. Moreover, two important weaknesses affect the interpretation of this channel data. First, many more varieties of nonverbal cues were coded, meaning that we would expect participants to identify nonverbal cues more often than situational or lexical syntactic ones. Second, the linguistic character of how we name nonverbal cues is substantially different from how we name situational appraisal cues or lexical syntactic ones. A phrase names nonverbal cues, for example, "pursed lips." On the other hand, situational/appraisal cues or lexical syntactic ones require a full clause: "The teacher had been guilty of accepting bribes in the past, so…" or " that younger businessman said, ' oh great!' The net effect of how the different channels can be named in conversation increases the probability that behavioral cues will be coded, while simultaneously decreasing the chance of the other types. However, given the vast difference between the number of codes for lexical-syntactic codes versus nonverbal cues and situational/appraisal cues, clear and meaningful differences exist between the different channels; however, the breath of the gap may be smaller than suggested by the raw numbers.

This conclusion leads us to a more fundamental distinction in discussing how the participants used different channels to interpret emotional communication cues. Simply put, when examining the individual interpretive acts, the participants more often than not used multiple, simultaneous cues via multiple channels to interpret the particular emotions being communicated at the particular point in time. All four groups and all participants followed this pattern. Allow me to provide some examples to illustrate how this interpretation of multiple cues actually functions in the participants' conversations. To focus more specifically, let me present comments from a participant from each of the groups looking at the same character, Mr. Kim, as his emotions and emotional cues shift from one to another. A fine example occurred when Participant X described the teacher's and the principal's emotional cues in the faculty meeting scene. For this first example, the coding marks are left in the text to illustrate what portions were coded:

> I thought his [Behavior>Kinesic] body language [/Behavior>Kinesic] showed that he was feeling apologetic and being aware of others and nun-chiboda [Appraisal] because he was late [/Appraisal]. Later, the teacher showed [Behavior>Kinesic] body language of anxiety and worry [/Behavior>Kinesic] because [Appraisal] he was afraid people might find out something he did wrong [/Appraisal]. He [Behavior>Kinesic] did not stand up straight; [/Behavior>Kinesic] instead his *nun-chi* and [Behavior>Kinesic] bending forward [/Behavior>Kinesic] and [Behavior>Face] studying others' faces [/Behavior>Face] – so I thought he was feeling nervous. Principal – He paused when the teacher came in late then [Behavior>Proxemic] slowly walked toward him [/Behavior>Proxemic], which shows he is about to express his anger toward the teacher. I believe his [Behavior>Face] face suddenly became expressionless [/Behavior>Face] I

> believe. Also I remember he was [Behavior>Prosodic] yelling [/Behavior>Prosodic] at the teacher [*at the start of the next scene*]. The principal's [Behavior>Face] pupils were dilated [/Behavior>Face] and he *heodoongdaeda* , and this shows he was feeling at a loss and confused (*dang-hwang*). Parent – [Behavior>Kinesic] Running into the meeting room [/Behavior>Kinesic] [Behavior>Prosodic] screaming [/Behavior>Prosodic] his aggressive [Behavior>Kinesic] body language [/Behavior>Kinesic] , and his [Behavior>Face] facial expression [/Behavior>Face], which led me to think he was agitated/aroused and enraged.

The individual codes are with in brackets, and the start of the coded section has no forward slash mark—[Appraisal]—while the end of the coded section is indicated by a forward slash mark—[/Appraisal]. In looking closer at Participant X's description, we see that she uses six different cues to inform essentially two different clustered and related emotions: *nun-chi* and anxiety (worry, fear, etc). By way of comparison, Participant Q is in the other Korean focus group, and, therefore, unaware of Participant X's analysis, described the teacher's emotional cues in the identical faculty meeting scene in much the same way as Participant X did:

> [Mr. Kim] was doing *nun-chi* as he was opening the door. He was walking in the room feeling afraid and apologetic. He was hiding when the parent first came in and then pretended he was trying to stop the situation and then he went outside [to the calmer edge of the fight] and was jumping up and down with intense emotion. That [jumping up and down] was quite impressive because he was worried that he could be caught if he had continued to calm the situation down. So he was feeling conflicted and lost.

Participant Q describes the same initial emotions, "apologetic/embarrassed" and "*nun-chi*" as does Participant X. Moreover, they both rely on similar kinesic and situation/appraisal cues.

Participant X describes, vaguely, "body language," while Participant Q describes how Mr. Kim was "opening the door" and "walking in the room." The situational appraisal descriptions were also strikingly similar. Participant X said, Mr. Kim "was afraid people might find out something he did wrong," while Participant Q said Mr. Kim "was worried that he could be caught if he had continued to calm the situation down" showing exactly the same situational appraisal and resultant emotional interpretation. When the parent arrives throwing things around, everyone's emotions shift, including Mr. Kim, and both note that shift. Participant X marks the shift saying, "Later, the teacher showed..." and Participant Q, with "when the parent came in and then . . ." While Participant X names the emotions expressed after the shift as varieties of anxiety, Participant Q arrives at the slightly different, but related, interpretation of "feeling conflicted and lost." Specifically, Participant Q focuses on the kinesic cue of Mr. Kim's jumping up and down. Clearly, both participants used a variety of cues from situation/appraisal as well as nonverbal communication channels to arrive at their conclusion; therefore, the synthetic analysis of a variety of emotional communication cues appears to be the strongest and most logical description of these participants' interpretation processes. To make cross-cultural connections we need to look at the North American's interpretation processes.

In the North American focus groups, a similar pattern of synthesizing a variety of cues from a variety of channels emerges. Again looking at the emotional cues used to interpret Mr. Kim's emotional communication in the faculty meeting scene, that pattern is seen in the first sentences of the first North American focus group's discussion:

> Participant C: Well, the teacher seemed to be quite shy and helpless, and I found him to kind of [trying to] hide behind his identity and not own up to whom he is—and let his coworkers get beat up on by this very angry parent.

Participant D: I thought he looked guilty. The way he came in and sat down, looked down and just kept his head and eyes down.

Participant B: He also had that "respectful thing"—that guy walked over, and he did kind of bow.

Participant B: I just saw him as timid. I didn't even connect that he was probably feeling guilty too.

Participant A: yeah, I have fear, embarrassment and shame.

The different conversational "group dynamic" of the different focus groups immediately strikes us as we compare the text from the two different groups. Allow me to address this difference latter in this chapter, but first we will examine how they use multiple and varied cues and channels. We see Participant C using situational appraisal—Mr. Kim is "shy and helpless," because "let his coworkers get beat up on." Other members of the group point out kinesic cues ("the way he came in"), facial expressions ("his head and eyes down"), and gestures (bowing). They added more cues:

PD: I added scared after we got the subtitles … and the parent came in and kind of looked around shiftily

PA: as far as the body language that his shoulders were slumped that he … you can see even in the picture right now where he was trying to come in and as quietly as possible because he doesn't want anyone to see.

PC: I also saw him as a bit of a coward when the whole kerfuffle was going on and he was… he didn't really get in and try to break up the fight. And you see him flailing his arms up and down and turning around.

They add more kinesic cues ("flailing his arms up and down and turning around"), more facial expressions ("looked around shiftily"), and more gestures ("shoulders were slumped") to the list. In addition, they provide lexical syntactic ("I added scared after we got the subtitles") and appraisal ("he doesn't want anyone to see" and "he didn't really get in and try to break up the fight") indicators to the list. As with the first two groups, these participants used multiple cues and multiple channels to interpret the emotions being expressed. Additionally, the eventual emotional interpretation (shy, embarrassed, and "hiding from something" which changes to fearful) is strikingly similar to what the Korean groups interpreted, with the previously discussed exceptions with notions of *nun-chi* and guilt. Finally, however, we need to explore the interpretation process of the final focus group.

Conspicuously, the final focus group's discussion style relies even more on short sentences or phrases and mutual negotiation than was the other non-native focus group. The first few lines of their analysis of their discussion of Mr. Kim's emotional communication cues in the faculty meeting are:

Participant H: Sheepish, scared, nervous

Participant G: By the lack of eye contact.

Facilitator: Okay, so you knew that by the lack of eye contact

Participant H: That his shoulders came down

Participant J: Well, when the principal walks over to him he does make eye contact … he sort of looks …

Participant H: Sort of scared, right?

Participant J: I thought he looked just like, like he didn't like the principal, that's what I saw.

Facilitator: disrespectful, or…?

Participant J: Just the sort look on his face, … he was kind of "half lidded" when he looked at him.

Participant G: Yeah, you're right … I noticed that he kind of … he did something …

Participant H: I thought the looking at him was like, more because of respect. He was kind of obligated to look this way … that he couldn't keep the gaze.

Immediately striking is the intense character of the negotiation amongst these participants, and we will discuss that in more detail later in this chapter. However, the answer to the immediate question of whether they were using multiple cues and multiple channels to arrive at a single interpretation is readily apparent. Facial cues ("lack of eye contact," "half –idded," "the gaze"), proxemic cues ("principal walks over to him"), and situational appraisal ("He was kind of obligated to look this way") were all described by the participants. Also, the specific emotions that they interpret ("sheepish, scared, nervous") are similar to those of the other three groups. Finally, they later arrive at a reverse situational interpretation that matches that of the Korean groups' interpretation, as Participant G states directly, "Something happened somewhere, and there was that moment of: 'I could have gotten away with it.' "

In summary, one of the principal emergent themes arising from the focus group discussions is the participants' use multiple cues to enable interpretation of the emotions being expressed. Notably, this use of multiple channels and multiple cues was seen in each of the scenes, in each of the video clips, by all of the focus groups, and by all of the members of the focus groups. Within this study multiple channel interpretation was universal. Consequently, we are left to conclude that the normal process for interpreting cues of emotional communication relies on multiple channels and multiple cues regardless of ethnicity or nationality. Moreover,

while the research methodology was not designed to test this question, no clear pattern was seen in the combination of cues. Frequently, combinations of nonverbal communication channels and situational appraisal channels were seen, as well as combinations of multiple types of nonverbal cues, as well as, combining a variety of situational appraisal cues. Because lexical syntactic channels were used less frequently, we could not expect them to be present in each of the different interpretations; however, when they were found, they were often found in combination with nonverbal behavior cues and situational appraisal cues.

Ultimately, the two key findings in terms of emotional communication channels are difficult to ignore. First, all of the groups' relative reliance on the various channels was identical: Non-verbal cues were most often cited, situational appraisal cues were moderately important, while lexical-semantic cues were hardly mentioned at all. Second, and much more importantly, emotional communication channels were almost never used in isolation. Participants always relied on a combination of cues, and almost always relied on cues from a *combination of channels* as well.

When Emotional Interpretation Fails across Cultures

The discussion of non-native accuracy in interpreting emotional clues of another culture—via their ratings and language—and the channels that were used in the participants' focus group discussions in the two previous sections of this chapter provide dramatic insights into the cross-cultural process of emotional communication. The following section looks specifically at three critical cases where non-natives struggle desperately to understand the emotions being communicated and then struggle to match their non-native interpretations to the interpretations provided by cultural natives. The first topic explores the sorts of emotional communicative acts that required the non-natives to use tools of social construction. Next, an

emergent notion, that I am calling "reverse" situational appraisal, will be considered. Finally, the importance of cultural script/display rules—the most obvious unifying element in these examples of confusion—will be examined.

Emotionally communicative acts that require social construction.

Emotional communication will on occasion fail—and will fail more often across as opposed to within cultures. In such cases we would expect the out-group members to work together to better understand the miscommunication. Thus, the items that required social construction are equally important. For example, the participants' interpretation of the parent's outburst in the faculty meeting was universally understood and transparently interpreted by all of the participants regardless of nationality. Everyone understood that the parent was enraged and outraged. But what sorts of emotions, scripts, or situations were not universally understood—which were not transparent? As Participant C observes, the emotional expressions in the business meeting scene were less obvious than in the faculty meeting fight scene, because those business expressions "were more subtle, it was harder to read, … I mean you can't really mistake the angry man for [someone] talking about rainbows."

Amongst the North American focus groups, the emotional expressions in just three specific incidents in the scenes required extensive social construction and negotiation in both of the separate focus groups: the interaction between the teacher, Mr. Kim, and his principal on his late entrance to the faculty meeting, the greeting and conversational rituals amongst the three people having the business meeting at the restaurant, and the final scene depicting the businessman's delivery of bribes to Mr. Kim. Assessing the commonalities of these incidents helps us understand how people work together to understand another culture. Consequently, we examine here the aspects of communication being negotiated and the knowledge being socially

constructed. What similarities can be seen across these incidents? All three incidents involved display rules and prescriptive scripts: cases where the appropriate expressions were strictly prescribed. Moreover, each case involved the display of emotions that were markedly different or even contradictory to the basic emotions that one would anticipate feeling in the situation. In addition, an aspect that all the incidents have in common is that the participants were careful to point to the specificity of setting and situation for each set of display rules that they were constructing together.

Regarding the prevalence of display rules/scripts in these particular incidents, Participants C and A point out discrepancies between the rules for a school principal at a faculty meeting in Canada and the Korean practice in the film:

> Participant C: I could imagine a meeting like this in my country and if a parent would come in raging like that and whoever was administering the meeting would be like …
>
> Participant A: You would look to him…
>
> Participant C: … would set things right. Yeah, exactly. You would look to him to get everything back under control and not to just go to the corner and [allow the other teachers to] be your front line for you … that's just foreign to me … what happens here.

Clearly both participants expect a different response from the principal including the kinesic elements of his emotional communication. Metaphorically speaking, he should not "just go to the corner." By inference they expect he should *act like a man*, and *stand his ground.* Indeed, these "metaphors we live by" (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003) in North American culture stand in stark contrast to the principal's behavior in the meeting. Moreover, the participants, in spite of their short time in Korea, inferred them to be typical of Korean culture, or "what happens here." As stated earlier, Sharifian (2009) argues that such metaphors are "cultural conceptions" and are

heterogeneously distributed. This study supports Sharifian's conclusion, because the social constructions and representations varied not only *across* the national groups, but *within* the national groups, as well. Thus, we must consider the situated character of display rules in both setting and interpersonal situation. Clearly, the North American participants' define the appropriate emotional expressions in the faculty meeting in ways specific to both the setting (faculty meeting) and to the situation (the principal's imminent discipline of Mr. Kim).

Similarly, the North American participants struggled to interpret and define interaction in the restaurant business meeting. Ultimately, they conclude that Mr. Kim, the middleman, and the young businessman follow a set of rules specific to the setting and situation of the slightly shady business meeting. Even smoking, a direct and simple act, is governed by rules with emotional elements. The participants discuss which setting and situation permits smoking, and even how one smokes:

> Participant A: He is smoking which… if he really thought they were superior I don't think he would have …
>
> Participant C: Really?
>
> Participant A: Yeah that's just my impression. That he looked really comfortable anyway.
>
> Participant D: I didn't notice that he was smoking.
>
> Participant C: Is that, like a Korean thing? Because I've umm…
>
> Participant A: Well the men always smoke together – like it's not a big issue.
>
> Participant C: and also, during a meal it felt kind of take like a "breather," bad choice of words, but have the smoke in the middle and like keep on eating, so . . .

Fascinatingly, they even discuss how the 'phase' of the meal when smoking is permitted as being culturally/emotionally regulated! Similarly, the Koreans had discussed the direction in which

smoke is expelled as part of the Korean script/display rule: "[Mr. Kim] blows the smoke right in front of another person, and this is Korean, too. It is very rude/selfish" (Participant T). The Korean groups previously established the appropriate rules/script for smoking in this situation, yet anticipate that the Korean practices will be different from the North American's rules as Participant T further outlines, "In terms about what is Korean [in the clip], like it was said before, smoking in the middle of the meal is Korean. America has a smoking area [in restaurants]. But here he didn't even ask if it was okay to smoke and was not particularly conversational with others while "barbequing away" meat – this seems Korean." Even the facilitator—who had been living outside of Korea for more than a decade—questions this interpretation, "Is it okay to smoke in a restaurant in Korea these days?" She asked. Participant T's response was, "It is not allowed, but at *samggyupsaljip* [*restaurants that specialize in inexpensive pork barbeque*] it is okay." At that point, Participant Q chimes in, "When they care, they have smoking and non-smoking sections."

This example emphasizes some of the issues surrounding the cross-cultural interpretation of cultural/emotional display rules. While display rules for emotions are by definition related to a specific situation (Matsumoto & Kudoh, 1993; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006), the subtleties of the application of those rules—as indicated by Matsumoto, et al's (2005) discussion of the masking, amplification, controlling, and qualifying of those expressions–are further seen in this example. However, the sorts of expressions governed by display rules, which in turn require negotiation and social construction amongst members of another cultural group are ***not*** inherently embedded in the notion of display rules. Looking back amongst the examples that we have considered so far, a few patterns begin to emerge. The first, and perhaps most important, key is that a display rule contradictory to the display rule in an individual's culture needs to be

figured out. In those cases, an individual is more likely to question the expression, and, given the opportunity, more likely to attempt to construct the display rules of the other culture. The preceding example regarding smoking in a restaurant during a business meeting is a clear case of a contradictory cultural expression. Moreover, the manner in which Mr. Kim was smoking in the meeting was judged to have emotional content, which emphasizes the intertwining of cultural scripts and emotional cues and the relevance of the incident to this study. Indeed, emotional content was noted in both North American and Korean focus groups. For example, Korean Participant Y saw, "*contempt* when he was smoking," while North American participant C was uncertain about the emotion being expressed (perhaps because the contradiction with her anticipated display rule expression), and suggested through reverse appraisal, "sometimes people smoke when they're *nervous*" [Emphasis added].

A second "type" of emotional expression governed by display rules that required social construction was seen in the case of complex and/or mixed emotions. We have already seen how the North American groups had some difficulty interpreting Mr. Kim's emotions while he was receiving the bribe from the young businessman, and they clearly indicate their belief that mixed emotions are involved. Participant C describes Mr. Kim's emotions: "I think he knows that he shouldn't do it, but for some reason he just wants, he just takes the money anyway" and later continues, "it would be interesting to see if he really is a bastard (spoken in hushed tone) or not." Participant G in the other North American focus group also points out the mixed and conflicting emotions she sees as Mr. Kim takes the bribe, "I put guilt, it … wasn't enough, since he's taking that money … [he is behaving like] I'm going to continue doing what I'm doing right now, because the payoff is can it be greater than anything guilt that I am feeling at the moment."

The focus groups' discussions strongly point to the social construction of these display rules. Importantly, the striking differences in the level of social construction in the non-native focus groups lends substantial support to the predicted need for greater social construction in non-native groups. Moreover, the particular items that were intuitively selected and isolated by the focus groups for reflection and social construction allow greater insight into the sorts of cultural/emotional expressions that require group interaction to develop principles for the interpretation and understanding of an emotionally communicative act. Specifically, we can isolate at least two broad types of emotional displays governed by emotional/cultural scripts that the participants struggled with in the process of socially constructing their understanding of these rules. One type involves cases where the display rule required contradictory expressions to the "natural and basic" emotion felt, or cases where the display rule modification was contradictory to the one required in their own culture. The second type involves cases where the individual displays complex or mixed emotions.

"Reverse" situational appraisal.

Before moving on to discussing the mechanisms that governed those specific examples of misconstrued emotional communication, allow me to address an interesting and emergent point that I call "reverse" situational interpretations. In these instances, after a participant viewed a particular emotion, they would infer a "backstory" from their own understanding of what sort of situation might cause that emotion to be felt and expressed. In fact, North American Participant J states this idea of reverse appraisal outright when describing a facial expression of the younger businessman in the business dinner/meeting, "in that look, I can just automatically see everything before the dinner." Both Koreans and North Americans used this reverse situational interpretation. For example, Participant R describes Mr. Kim as he arrives late to the faculty

meeting, “When his eyes met the principal’s, he was *nun-chiboda* and looked as if he was thinking, ‘oops, I was caught again’ . . .” Clearly, Participant R is inferring that Mr. Kim has been in trouble with the principal in the past. On the North American side, the participants in focus group number three offer several reverse situational interpretations in attempting to understand the rage of the parent at Mr. Kim:

> Participant B: When it was silent [*note: scenes were first played without sounds to focus on nonverbal communication*], I was thinking only anger. But when it came on again (*with sound*) for the first few seconds I was thinking… “drunk anger”? (Laughter) I’m not sure ...
>
> Participant A: The only thing I can think of is that the teacher did something to his daughter.
>
> Participant B: (talking on top of one another) Yeah… that was on my . . .
>
> Participant A: You see I was thinking that there is no other [reason for such extreme anger] … which might be a woman thing.

In this short vignette, we see at least three different reverse situational interpretations. First Participant B infers that the parent must be drunk and angry to interrupt the faculty meeting in such a raucous manner. Participant A agrees that some additional explanation is needed for the extent of the parent’s rage, offering her own interpretation that perhaps Mr. Kim had molested the man’s daughter. Finally, Participant A adds another layer of interpretation. She suggests that gender differences are important, although she does not clarify whether she is referring to her own interpretation of gender differences, or the importance of gendered differences in this particular scene–*or both*.

The “discovery” of reverse situational appraisal opens the door to a variety of possibilities in the interpretation of emotional communication. First, reverse appraisal illustrates

how deeply embedded situational appraisal is in our understanding of emotional experience, expression, and communication. Second, reverse appraisal illustrates the reciprocal fashion in which appraisal can function. For the most part, appraisal research has focused on the fact that we appraise the situation first and then interpret the emotion (Bryce & Olney, 1991; Dipboye, 1985; K. R. Scherer, 1999). In these instances, however, the participants conducted an appraisal of a situation that they were *not* privy to, one which occurred in a portion of the film they had not watched and had no knowledge of. Later in this section we will see how errors in such reverse appraisal can result in cognitive dissonance for the perceiver—particularly across cultures.

How did cultural scripts and display rules play a role?

While this paper focuses on emotional communication across cultures, in exploring how non-members of one culture interpret the emotional communication cues of another culture, cultural scripts are bound to play a role. Moreover, emotional cues and display rules are inherently embedded in virtually every cultural script (Planalp, 1999). Consequently, many researchers refer to emotional scripts as well as cultural scripts (Balconi & Carrera, 2007; Goddard, 2009). While a number of research projects have well identified a variety of cultural scripts and done much to establish the importance of cultural scripts in social interaction, research to date has not explored how individuals of different cultures interpret the cultural scripts displayed by members of a foreign culture. In this section, we will see how this process takes place. Specifically, the participants themselves relate how they see cultural scripts as being important. We will explore some of the mechanisms of cultural scripts that the participants point out. Additionally, the focus groups identified contradictory, masked, or diminished emotional expressions as potential causes of cross-cultural miscommunication. Finally, we will explore

how the "non-performance" or "mis-performance" of the appropriate cultural script creates cognitive dissonance.

Participants themselves recognize the importance of scripts.

A first step to understand how cultural scripts perform in emotional communication across cultures is to determine if the participants are aware of the importance and functionality of cultural scripts. All four groups directly identified the importance of cultural scripts in emotional communication. For example, when discussing bribery, Korean Participant Q recognizes that the proper script for giving a bribe will differ across cultures, "I think that bribery exists everywhere, but how it is done is different from one culture to another. In Korea, money envelopes sometimes get inserted in a book like a bookmark and often are handed in an envelope." Similarly, Korean Participant W describes the ritual of introductions as being an important Korean script:

> The mediator introduced the other two to each other, and this felt that the mediator was doing it on the basis of some kind of old boy social network and pleading for *chung*. Like, 'I know this person well, so please be good to him.' Appealing for *chung* is a Korean thing, I think.

The North American groups, without the background in Korean culture, still recognized the importance of the scripts that were performed. For example, Participant A describes the behavior of the two businessmen in their meeting with Mr. Kim as following a preordained script, "so they were playing a game … At least the businessman and the middleman." Similarly, Participant J recognizes the social structure of the dinner conversation with the businessmen—an age-based cultural script, "They have to explain to [Mr. Kim] what they want, but it's him, the one on the left, the older man's position to do that. He's the older one in their relationship, and it is his

responsibility to lay it out there." Briefly, then, all of the focus groups attend to cultural scripts and recognize that scripts are indispensable in communication. In the less structured and more emotional case of the parent's "kicking and screaming" entry into the faculty meeting, Participant I relates the cultural differences, the display differences and the emotional reactions those cultural differences would induce:

> If someone in my hometown were to be engaged in destroying the room and making a ruckus, it would be much more … intimidating. There was something kind of … non-calculated, and innocent about the way that he [behaved], but … I felt that it didn't come from like an extreme … obviously he was really upset, but I wasn't scared of him, … I wasn't intimidated by him, but it was like if a Canadian friend of mine came in here and started throwing desks around.

Ultimately, Participant I is talking about a situation where the emotional communication is clear. In situations where out-group participants struggled with the in-group interpretation, however, a different subtly different scenario emerges.

Indeed, even in the previously cited example of accurate interpretation of the cultural/emotional script associated with bribery, not all of the elements of the script where abundantly apparent to all of the non-native focus groups. One North American focus group clearly "picked up on" the bribery script. Even after they were apprised of the Koreans interpretation of the appropriate cultural emotional script involving the existence of the second envelope, the other North American group clearly stated that they did not understand the purpose of Mr. Kim's emotional expressions. Essentially, the Koreans clearly stated that a neutral, hesitant expression from the person receiving the bribe indicated that Mr. Kim, "the bribee," was looking for more money, as the group facilitator explains:

Facilitator: [The Koreans] had a pretty straight response that his lack of excitement at the first envelope meant, "give me more money" and

Participant C: Really!

Facilitator: Yeah. [My translator] says, "It seems like they thought it was a social script."

Participant A: Did any of us say that?

Participant C: I definitely didn't.

Participant D: I didn't think, I thought he just hesitated and that the businessman thought he was thinking (*extensive crosstalk -- unintelligible*)

Participant A: I don't think any of us thought that but him.

Facilitator: So you didn't know that he knew.

Participant A: Yeah

Clearly this definition of the appropriate cultural emotional script in the Korean context did not match what this group was anticipating. Indeed, three of the four members of the group explicitly state that they did not understand that particular expression to have the pragmatic purpose of asking for more money. Participant A summarizes the complete agreement of the entire group, "I don't think any of us thought that." An additional insight we can garner from their discussion that is particularly noteworthy for the social construction of cross-cultural understanding that was going on amongst the members of the group was the intensity of the crosstalk that became so boisterous as to be unintelligible on the tape as indicated by the phrase "extensive cross talk– unintelligible." Participant A continues to elaborate on the novelty and surprise associated with the Koreans interpretation of the cultural emotional script:

Participant A: I thought he was a little, yeah I didn't play him for such a … I did when he was sitting down, how come I didn't when he was outside?

Facilitator: You didn't catch it?

Participant A: It was like "surprise!"

This sort of "surprise" points directly to the cultural script/display rules that were the primary stumbling block in accurate out-group interpretations of emotional communication: Cultural rules that require contradictory, or masked expressions.

Scripts require can contradictory/masked, or diminished/exaggerated expressions.

While the notions of cultural/emotional scripts and display rules are quite similar, they arise out of different research traditions; therefore, we may need to consider than separately. The critical point of Ekman and Friesen's (1969) notion of display rules is the idea that culturally appropriate emotional expressions are contradictory/masked, or diminished (hidden)/exaggerated emotional expressions. In this section we explore the masks of display rules. First, let me provide a few examples of each of these two types of display rules: Contradictory/masked and diminished/exaggerated. Obviously, the most graphic example of a display rule is one that requires a contradictory expression–e.g. the beauty pageant runner-up smiling through the tears. A famous example cross culturally is the "enigmatic" Japanese smile which is frequently misinterpreted (Matsumoto & Kudoh, 1993). Indeed, the Korean Participant T noted precisely this sort of smiling when unhappy, "Koreans tend to smile when they are sorry."

In several instances, Korean participants noted acts of masking one emotion with a contradictory emotional expression. In discussing the mediator's expressions of happiness in the business meeting, Participant Y stated that he was actually "a little anxious and worried, but he was hiding it with laughter." Participant Z said much the same thing, "I thought it was fake smiling/laughing: A business smile," and in that statement she emphasizes the situated character of the display rule. After the facilitator requests clarification, Participant Y provides substantial

detail regarding the contradictory emotional displays: “The mediator is laughing comfortably, but his posture reflects that he is worried, so his laugh was obviously fake, and I think he was feeling worried and anxious.” Of course, these minute distinctions in emotional cues are precisely the sorts of subtleties that Duchene noticed (Darwin, 1998), and Ekman (1999b, 2003) elaborately codified in the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). Members of the other Korean focus group noticed similar use of contradictory expressions. Participant T notes, “In terms of the mediator, ... I felt that his happiness in the beginning as fake. His mouth is open and laughing, but I felt he was tense/nervous inside.” Similarly, Participant Q concludes even more strongly referring to both businessmen, “They were smiling and laughing all throughout the scene. So, if you don’t know what’s going on, you may say that they are happy. But there is no happiness from the beginning to the end. It is all about business, and smiling/laughing is strategic.”

Interestingly, while the participants in both North American groups recognized the incongruity of the mediator’s emotional expressions, they struggled to interpret them. Participant G even had trouble finding *any* words to describe the incongruity, much less the right words: “It’s very un-genuine in certain situations, because there is so many… there’s so many… if there’s no…umm… voice or words. Like there’s so many things going on there, that you just keep thinking, ‘What’s going on with this guy? Where is his genuine emotion?’” The difficulty was not restricted to Participant G, in the other North American focus group Participant D was similarly perplexed:

> What I wrote down for the middleman. He looked like a politician, because he kind of had this slight smile on the entire time. When there was no sound, I couldn’t read him. I was just like, “Is he serious? Is he enjoying himself?” I couldn’t really tell. Then when the

> sound came on and then I realized … the more we watched it, just like, he's just… he just looks like a politician.

What can we infer from these difficulties? Clearly the non-Koreans understand that *something* is going on with the mixed messages. Moreover, Participant D understands that the expressions the mediator is using have to do with the role he is playing, because she arrives at the "politician" interpretation—a role that would require him to follow certain scripted behaviors.

Such contradictory expressions are, by definition, *contrary* to those essentially autonomic basic emotions; consequently, they are strikingly apparent. However, cultural/emotional scripts also frequently require diminished or exaggerated expressions of emotion in a particular situation. A classic example of diminished expressions can be found in the injunction to male children that "big boys don't cry"—in other words, if boys are sad, they are not permitted to express the sadness through outward crying. As Korean participant Q relates the cross-cultural difficulties:

> I was talking with a foreigner [Anglo-phone non-Korean] who mentioned the facial expression thing. The foreigner said that it is difficult to read Korean's faces. For this person, foreigners' facial expression and body language fluctuates along with their emotions, but Koreans seldom change their face, which makes them difficult to read it.

At least one example of exaggerated expression went unnoticed by the North Americans. Participant T points out that the mediator and businessman engage in "frequent head nodding. Koreans tend nod their head a lot to express their agreement. I could see the businessman and the mediator do that. Usually it is very repetitive." No mention of this by any of the North American participants. I note this exception, because exceptions are critical to the accuracy question.

One exaggerated expression that received generous attention from all of the focus groups was the parent's behavior in the faculty meeting. As previously discussed, the North Americans found the parent's display to be completely "over the top." In one group, Participant B thinks that the parent had to be intoxicated to display such "drunk anger" in public at a school. Then in the next conversational turn, Participant A offers that the only explanation she could think for the exaggeration of his expression was that Mr. Kim had done something to the man's daughter—with sexual abuse implications. Of course, each of these interpretations reflect these participants' own cultural/emotional scripts, but Participant A further states her dissatisfaction with the eventual explanation revealed through the subtitles, when "he talked about money and I was like '*okay*… I guess *not"*" (sarcastic emphasis in original). In the other group, Participant J had a similar response to the parent's rage, "In a Korean movie, yeah. In real life, no. But I understand it's dramatized. It's made more exciting for a movie, but that sort of issues, about money . . ." She trails off struggling with the interpretation. Even after the facilitator explains the details specific to Korean public education, Participant A still has difficulties accepting the intensity of the parent's expressions: "when I realized it's just money, now I am not judging how angry he is anymore, now I'm saying 'come on, he can't really be *that* angry' " (emphasis in original).

Obviously, Participant A judges the situation through her own cultural/emotional lens and has difficulty 'putting on' the lenses of the Korean participants' explanations. Simultaneously, the Koreans appeared to recognize that the intensity of the parent's expressions might prove difficult for non-Koreans to accept. Participant V summarizes the thoughts of the members of her group regarding both the real world character of Korean parent's habit for expressing extreme levels of anger in defense of their children, and her own discomfort with this habit:

> I think similarly [responding to the comment of other members of her group]. The way the parent was yelling, "Who is Kim Bongdoo? Where is he!" I saw this behavior many times in real life. I think negatively toward this culture where parents can do whatever they want just because their children are involved, but this is Korean culture.

Ultimately, in drawing a distinction between cultural scripts and display rules that require either contradictory/masked expressions or exaggerated/diminished expressions, these two situational examples allow a comparison of non-members of a culture's varying ability to recognize, interpret, and accept those expressions. In these instances, the North Americans had much less difficulty recognizing the incongruity of the contradictory masking of emotions required by the Koreans cultural scripts, but found them perplexing. In the case of exaggerated expressions, they sometimes failed to recognize subtle exaggeration, for example agreeing cues offered by the businessman and mediator as part of the business negotiation script. However, they were strongly struck by the intense exaggeration of the parent's anger display in the faculty meeting scene. Moreover, some participants had difficulty in fully coming to grips with the Koreans' interpretation, even after they heard an explanation. These examples support the idea that differences in cultural/emotional scripts and their interpretation by non-members of a culture can contribute to negative stereotypes. Moreover, while cultural assimilation exercises can help, they may not always have the desired, immediate impact.

Dissonance created by "mis-performance" of scripts.

While the previous section emphasized fundamental differences in the character of cultural/emotional scripts, this section examines specific examples of how contradictory scripts can create cognitive dissonance. That dissonance can, in turn, result in misinterpretations of emotional expressions. However, what would such a "mis-performance" look like in this

setting? Initially, examples where a participant described a character behaving inappropriately were coded. They tend to include cases where a participant would remark "this was strange" or that a character "didn't do" something that was expected in the situation. Later they were reviewed and recoded to attempt to define any distinguishing features of each mis-performance. In this second layer of coding, two broad distinguishing types appeared: cases where the participant thought the performance was unusual in a universal sense, and cases where they thought that the situation was unusual in a culturally specific sense.

A fairly clear example of this second culturally specific case is found when Mr. Kim is judged to be insufficiently apologetic for being late to the meeting. North American group Participant G states "[Mr. Kim] wasn't more apologetic in a more fearful way. That is very much the Korean way. … You become used to that culture, and he was not like that. So he just puts out like there is something more to what you are seeing." From the same group, Participant I was similarly taken aback by the teacher's reaction to "getting caught" arriving late to the faculty meeting:

> You know what's really, really strange? The principal [understood] the teacher was late, and the principal was angry, and he felt very offended, because the teacher was late. But then, what I thought was really strange is when the camera is showing the principal walking toward [Mr. Kim], he has this really stern look on his face. He's really … it's kind of clear that he is unhappy with the situation. But the teacher, I mean, maybe it's Korean movies, I don't know if it's Korean or Hollywood movies, but in that situation I would normally see the person look sheepish: "Oh my god! I'm so embarrassed that I'm late," but he didn't. It was just like a calm, "I'm sorry I'm late."

Clearly, Participant I recognizes a difference in script, describing in detail the scripted steps: Mr. Kim is late, the principal sees it, walks over, is appropriately angry and offended. Then she emphasizes the mis-performance, "I would normally see the person look sheepish: 'Oh my god! I'm so embarrassed that I'm late,' but he didn't. It was just like a calm, 'I'm sorry I'm late.'" Importantly for this study, her explanation contains several emotion words, including two emotions, 'embarrassed' and 'calm,' an emotionally laden behavior, 'sheepish,' the adverb 'so' to intensify the embarrassment, as well as the exclamation 'oh my god!'—all of which point to the intertwining of scripts and emotions. Moreover, she recognizes that the problem may lie in a difference in the appropriate script for each nationality: "maybe it's Korean movies … I don't know if it's Korean or Hollywood movies." Clearly, she has no doubt about the particular script that she was anticipating—and the dissonance she feels at *not* seeing that script performed: "You know what's really, really strange?"

Another example of a North American suffering dissonance from a mis-performance of the script they anticipate—yet they believe to be the appropriate script for Koreans—and, moreover, one where the participant's interpretation is strikingly more blunt, occurs in the appraisal of the principal's actions when the melee erupts in the faculty meeting. Participants C and A explain:

> Participant C: I could imagine a meeting like this in my country, and if a parent would come in raging like that and whoever was administering the meeting would set things right.
>
> Participant A: You would look to him…

> Participant C: Yeah exactly. You would look to him to get everything back under control and not just go to the corner and "we'll [the other faculty will] be your front line for you" … that's just foreign to me what happens here.

This snippet of their dialogue illustrates the anticipated script—that the principal should "get everything back under control"—and that how it has been mis-performed—the principal should "not just go to the corner." Most critically for this study her explanation is rife with emotion, including an emotionally laden phrase, "come in raging," a moral judgment, "set things right," a war metaphor, "be your front line," and a strongly stated (even biased) appraisal, "that's just foreign." Ultimately, this participant's[9] interpretation shows where the foundations of stereotype formation may lie, and ultimately this may offer us a clue as to where to begin to educate about this process as well as regulate our own negative appraisals which could lead to negative stereotypes.

The Korean participants also noted dissonance when the scripts were not performed as expected. For example, Participant S struggles to understand Mr. Kim's literal script when accepting the young businessman's bribe versus the non-verbal cues in a different direction:

> What was interesting to me was the gap between [Mr. Kim's] facial expression, and what he was saying when he received the envelopes. Expression indicated that he was angry, because he felt the businessman saw him as a person who would take money from him, but he was saying "Thank you." This was strange. Also, I felt he was in agony – feeling conflicted. His hands were hesitant, but his face looked angry, and his words said "Thank

[9] I cannot make that interpretation without stating that I am familiar with this individual beyond the setting of this study and know her to be a gentle and unbiased individual. Yet, if we are to believe that words have meaning and value beyond their denotation, it is important to look for where those connotations might start.

> you." And this was strange. … I felt his conflict/agony began there. Maybe this is my cultural stereotype, but I wonder if I can say that bribery is a Korean thing.

Here, too, all of the elements seen in the previous North American example were present. She describes the behavior that causes the conflict, as well as her own interpretive appraisal of the situation, "He was angry, because he felt the businessman saw him as a person who would take money," and ultimately raises the question of whether these distinctions are universal or culture specific to Korea. Later Participant T supports Participant S's conclusions. When asked what salient parts of the scene indicated Korean specific behaviors, she replies, "the teacher's facial expression when he received the envelopes. The discrepancy between his face and his words."

Occasionally, participants would feel dissonance when the script they expected was not performed, but not attribute any cross-cultural component to it. For example, in describing the interaction between Mr. Kim and the principal in the faculty meeting when Mr. Kim arrives late, Participant S describes the principal's mis-performance of the script, but in interpreting the cause of mis-performance attributes the problem to the specific situation and a specific "sub-script" for that situation:

> When the principal and the teacher were interacting, it was different from a usual disciplinary situation, because the principal does not look at the teacher straight in the eyes. The reason why I think that the principal's anger is because he felt he has lost face was because he didn't look at the teacher in the eyes. Yelling at a person without looking at him indicates that he is doing this for a selfish reason.

As in the other cases we have examined, Participant S clearly states that the "usual" script for a disciplinary situation is not followed, and states why she draws that conclusion. Interestingly, however, she perceives this to be an example of a specific subcategory script (i.e. disciplinary

situations where the supervisor has lost face due to another selfish reason). Moreover, this description lacks the intensifiers found in describing other situations where the participants judged that a script was being mis-performed. For example, we often see them use intensifiers like "really, really," or repetition of the word "strange." Arguably, Participant S judges that this instance, because it is part of a subcategory, is a less striking or perhaps more common mis-performance.

The North American groups also had occasions where they did not mention a cultural cause for the mis-performance of script. In discussing the notion of reverse appraisal in relation to the intensity of the parent's angry outburst in the faculty meeting, Participant A suggested that the only appropriate script for such extreme anger would be if Mr. Kim had "done something" with his daughter—with "something" implying sexual abuse. However, in interpreting the cause of the mis-performance of script, Participant A does not look to a cultural difference: "when I hear later it's about money, I'm like "oh, he's angry," but come on its money. That's my judgment." Clearly, she is focusing on her personal interpretation of a script, and importantly we can infer that she perceives her interpretation to be the "more" universal.

The failures in the North Americans attempts at interpreting the Koreans emotional communication provide some of the most interesting data in the study. Three important points arise from examining these communication failures. First, the participants of both national groups were aware of the importance of scripts and display rules. Second, the failures arose predominantly when the display rules required masked, diminished, or contradictory expressions of emotion. Finally, the cognitive dissonance that arose in such cases was not easy to resolve: that is to say that many of the North American participants had difficulty accepting the Koreans'

explanations in such cases, particularly when the expressions ran diametrically counter to their expectations.

CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION

Even fifteen years or so into this current explosion of research in emotion and the communication of emotion, the various fields of study engaged in emotion research have yet to approach a consensus as to what emotion is, much less how to study it, and what the most critical aspects of our experience of emotional communication are. Consequently, our understanding of the communication of emotion across cultures remains in a state of flux.

The study sets out to shed light on the universalist/relativist debate over emotions by examining the cross-cultural interpretations of Korean's emotional expressions by North American women. In particular, how and when out-group participants' interpretations matched and mismatched those of in-group members, as well as the interaction of those interpretations in a broader process of cross-cultural communication. The first research question concerns how accurately out-group members interpret the emotional expressions of members of another culture. The answer to that question is not entirely straightforward. When we use the "significantly greater than chance" standard established by Ekman (see for example Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994), the North Americans in this study were clearly able to recognize basic emotions as identified by the Koreans -- on the order of 80% of the time. This finding points directly to some level of universality in emotions. Moreover, their judgments of the intensity of the emotional displays were also accurate at a level greater than chance, although not as accurate as the naming of the emotions they saw. However, the major caveat to this "universal" emotion conclusion is this: While the accuracy rate was greater than chance, the inaccuracy rate was much greater than zero. The inaccuracy of the interpretations *could* be the space in which cultural stereotypes are created. This finding, then, provides support for cross-cultural relativism in emotional communication as argued by Wierzbicka (2010) and others (see for example

Pavlenko, 2008; Planalp, 1999). A more fine-grained analysis of where the differences in interpretation occurred suggests support for a category of emotion that I have labeled "secondary," which is akin to Plutchick's (2001) "dyads" and Levy's (1994) "hypercognized" emotions. These emotions, such as guilt and respect in this study, are qualitatively different from a basic emotion in that they cannot exist with the feedback loop created by thinking about them.

The second research question concerning the channels used by each group for emotional cue interpretations generated important findings. Indeed, the subtle inquiry into the character of the emotional interpretation mechanisms used by out-group members is where the important new insights from this study arose. When I examined the relative level to which the participants relied on the each of various channels for interpreting emotional communication—situational/appraisal, nonverbal communication, or direct communication—I found a remarkably consistent pattern across the different focus groups. Regardless of national origin, the reliance on non-verbal cues was highest in all of the groups, appraisal was next most common, and direct, lexical semantic explanations were nearly non-existent. More importantly, in almost every instance the participants relied on multiple cues to identify the emotion, and more often than not, their interpretation was based on a combination of nonverbal and situational cues. To my knowledge, this sort of simultaneous, multiple cue, and multiple channel interpretation pattern has not been discussed in the literature.

In addition, display rules themselves are more likely to come into play when the emotions expressed are more highly cognized, and highly cognized emotions are more likely to be misinterpreted. Indeed, the data suggest that when display rules and cultural scripts were required the out-group members were more to likely misunderstand. This finding is generally in line with Ekman and Matsumoto's (Ekman, 2003; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Matsumoto &

Kudoh, 1993; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009; Matsumoto, et al., 2005) previous research. However, an emergent point was the case of "reverse" situational interpretation. Again, I have not found discussion of this phenomenon in the literature. In these reverse situational interpretations cases individuals interpret preceding situations from emotions expressed. These could prove critical in understanding the difficulties associated with misinterpretations, because the individuals become convinced that the emotional display witnessed matches a certain situation. Of course, the data in this study shows that in a substantial number of cases that the individual's cross-cultural interpretations will be inaccurate; consequently, the individual's ego will likely be more intensely drawn in when the inevitable misinterpretations occur. Further research is certainly called for in this area.

The third research question focuses us at the area we predicted at the outset would prove most thorny: What happens when people fail to interpret accurately? Fortunately, the data offers insights into the processes associated with cultural script and display rule interpretation. Specifically, all participants revealed a general understanding that cultural scripts and display rules are important in the cross-cultural communication of emotion. Additionally, the data show that the two critical factors causing the most confusion in the interpretive process were contradictory/masked expressions and diminished/exaggerated expressions. Ultimately, the out-group members' interpretation that the script was *mis-performed* lies at the root of their confusion. Both Korean and North American participants experienced a certain dissonance when the cultural/emotional scripts that they anticipated seeing were not performed. Often those feelings occurred when they were watching the same scene. Moreover, the emotions were described with the same appraisals—indicating that some similarities exist in the cultural/emotional scripts. However, a number of cases were interpreted differently across

groups, which indicates that opportunities for cross-cultural miscommunication arise from inappropriate appraisals from one culture or the other. In addition, these participants often indicated that the script performances that they were anticipating might be culture specific. However, they were not *always* aware of their own bias to their first culture scripts, and therein exists opportunities for better training and education in cross-cultural sensitivity.

The final question lurking behind all of the others is: What can we do with this information in the field of foreign language education? I would offer three suggestions. First, substantial areas of similarity were discovered in the naming of emotions in the two cultures. Our students need not be too shy in trusting their interpretations of how other cultures intent their emotions to be understood—particularly in cases where the expressions are "raw" and unguarded. However, we also need to prepare our students entering into cross-cultural endeavors that the social structures of the foreign culture do in a good number of cases regulate how the emotions should be expressed. Frequently, different cultures will require similar expressions, but often enough to create confusion—and sometimes cognitive dissonance—the required expression will be masked or limited in ways that are different from our own culture. We can teach students to be aware of those feelings of dissonance and work with them to suspend *their own* reactions to the cultural differences, and to ask questions of the people they are interacting with to resolve as much as possible that dissonance. A second suggestion for educators is to use the similarities in the channels of emotional communication to help students better read the language of emotional expression. Given that the channels for emotional interpretation proved remarkably similar, we can trust that individuals have an intuitive understanding of these mechanisms. However, if we can teach students to move that implicit understanding of how emotions are communicated to the explicit level, then, particularly for

those in the helping professions and those working in the interface between cultures, students will be better equipped to deal with emotionally charged misunderstandings. The third recommendation for educators is to learn the characteristics surrounding cases of miscommunication. By recognizing these characteristics, not only can we teach about them, but we can also teach *with* them. We can recognize our students' cognitive dissonance, discuss it with them and help them resolve their confusion and discomfort. Foreign language educators themselves live in a critical interface between cultures and can draw forth their own experiences—both successes and failures—to serve as a model for their students cross-cultural lives.

As might be expected, this research raises more questions than it provides answers opening new doors for future research. How precisely does the level of counter-intuitive expression required by a display rule affect the ability of out-group members to interpret the emotions expressed? Are there distinct neurological signatures for "secondary" and hypercognized emotions different from basic emotions? How can we further refine our understanding of the new finding in this study regarding multiple code and multiple channel usage patterns for emotional cue interpretation? Perhaps the greatest contribution of this study will prove to be allowing both teachers, students and research to see that emotional communication across cultures is a complex social phenomenon, that, while resistant to simple explanations, has regular patterns and practices which will allow us to better communicate across cultures if we approach our emotional expressions and interpretations with sensitivity, flexibility and compromise.

I will end with a brief discussion of this study's limitations and suggestions for future research and ways forward. This study brings with it some inherent limitations. Two issues in

particular create limitations for the study: risk in walking the fine line of essentializing lived experiences; the code as an essence of foreign language education. In *Researching Lived Experience*, van Manen (1990) states, "phenomenological research is the study of essence" (p. 10); yet, the richness of lived experience stands in stark and practical contradiction to our attempts to essentialize it. Indeed, both communication and foreign language education rely on mutually interpretable and inherently essentialized codes. To use, to improve teaching, to actually teach, from the results of this study requires something essential to teach. For good or ill, educational research and particularly phenomenological research is to some extent trapped within that framework. Moreover, the research designs sets the cultural constructs of Korean and North American in opposition in instances of bilateral cross-cultural interpretation. Further research is needed to explore emotional communication across other cultural dyads. In addition, further research should attempt to tease apart differences within these cultural groups. Also, the study limited participants by age and gender; thus, further research could explore how participants' interpretations varied by age, regional aspects within larger cultural groups, gender, and other factors. Ultimately, the greatest risk lies in how the research is consumed and used. If readers take away the impression that emotional communication, particularly emotional communication across cultures, is a static and calcified artifact, they will do this research, and themselves, a disservice. Indeed, that sort of stereotype creation is the polar opposite of this researcher's intent. To combat stereotypes, I urge the reader to focus their attention on the mechanisms and processes involved in the interpretation of emotion across cultures and allow the details of specific emotions discussed here to serve as illustrations of those processes, not as static, unchanging cultural differences. The goal of the study is to offer readers a better understanding of the mechanisms of cross-cultural emotional interpretation, so that they may be

less judgmental in cross-cultural interaction, and better able to ask better questions when working with people from any different background. So dear readers, take a deep breath and embrace the diversity of lived experience.

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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS ASKED TO NL INFORMANTS' FOCUS GROUPS

NL informants -- Introductory script

Thank you so much for your help on this project. I really appreciate that you are taking the time to assist my research into this aspect of language learning. Forgive me, but I need to start with some administrative work. I need each of you to sign this release form to continue with the study. Please read the form carefully before signing, but briefly it says that I will be recording the sessions, how I will use the recordings, as well as the goals of research – primarily my dissertation or perhaps a journal article in the future - and how I will contact you in the event of publication of this material. Please do ask if you have any questions about this form, OK? [wait for reply, and completion of forms]

Thank you for filling those out. Let me start off by telling you about the purpose of this study. We're trying to look at the communication of emotion across different cultures. So the basic question is, "do different cultures communicate or show their emotions in different ways?" If we find out that there are differences, then perhaps we can make cross-cultural communication better by redesigning the way we teach foreign language students.

Today, we're going to watch some video clips and trying to decide what emotions are being displayed, how strong those emotions are, as well as how and how well those emotions are being displayed. In addition, we are going to decide which of the several clips we see today will be best to show to Americans to reveal emotions that are particularly Korean. Once we have decided the best clips, I also will need your help to accurately determine a 'native' speaker interpretation of the way that emotions are shown in the scenes. Your interpretation of the emotions displayed will then be used in the second step of the research, when I show the clips to foreign language students.

Do you have any questions so far? [wait for reply]

Okay, great. Next, let me describe the process of our work today. I have a list of questions that we will be exploring in some detail, so let me review those questions:

- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip?
- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]
- For each individual on the worksheet do you see any of the emotions on the list? [sadness, anger, fear, enjoyment, disgust, contempt, and surprise] Please check all that apply. [note: include liker scale for intensity of emotion]

Any questions on the questions? [And wait for reply]

OK, now let me explain in a little more detail how we will accomplish the selection and description of these scenes. When we first watch the film clip, I am going to ask each of you individually to write some notes on what emotions you see – we will be working with the same questions throughout, but I would like you to write down some of your own thoughts before we move on to the whole group discussion. Then we will discuss each video clip as a whole group, before we decide which video clips are "the best." Finally, I want to ask you all if you think that any of these emotions are particularly Korean and therefore might be a problem for American people. Is that all right?

Great! Let's get started.

Some specific follow-up questions (or rewording of questions) for each clip:

Δ What emotions do you recognize?

- How do you know that this is the emotion? Is it the words, the context (setting, social or gender roles, etc.), facial expression, gesture, vocal tone, or something else?
- What about those universal emotions - do you recognize any of them?
- How do you know that this emotion is being communicated? Is it the words, the context (setting, social or gender roles, etc.), facial expression, gesture, vocal tone, or something else?

APPENDIX B: NOTE TAKING WORKSHEETS FOR KOREAN FOCUS GROUPS

(English version)

Emotional communication research project

Personal Information:

Name: Age: gender: M F

Mailing address:

Phone: e-mail:

Education: High School College undergraduate graduate school

Please rate your language skills for the following languages:

Korean 0 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 6 - - - - 7 - - - - Fluent
English 0 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 6 - - - - 7 - - - - Fluent
Other: _____ 0 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 6 - - - - 7 - - - - Fluent
Other: _____ 0 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 6 - - - - 7 - - - - Fluent

How well do you understand American Culture:
not much - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 6 - - - - 7 - - - - extreme well

Tell me a little about your experiences learning English:

Have you visited English-speaking countries? If so when, and how long?

Do you have important relationships with native English speakers? (eg. a relative or close friend?) If so, explain please.

Emotional communication notetaking sheet - ***Video 1 – the fight***

Name: _____

Please use the space below to write notes on the emotions you see in the video clips we watch.

- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip?

By the teacher	By the principal	By the parent

- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]

By the teacher	By the principal	By the parent

- For each individual character, do you see any of the emotions on the list? Please check all that apply.

Teacher			Principal		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?		Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	sadness	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
fear	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	fear	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
disgust	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	disgust	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
surprise	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	surprise	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
anger	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	anger	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
contempt	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	contempt	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
enjoyment	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	enjoyment	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5

Parent		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
fear	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
disgust	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
surprise	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
anger	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
contempt	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
enjoyment	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5

Emotional communication notetaking sheet - ***Video 2 – Lunch time***

Name: _____

Please use the space below to write notes on the emotions you see in the video clips we watch.

- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip?

By the teacher	By the principal	By the parent

- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]

By the teacher	By the principal	By the parent

- For each individual character, do you see any of the emotions on the list? Please check all that apply.

Teacher		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
fear	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
disgust	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
surprise	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
anger	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
contempt	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
enjoyment	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5

Girl		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
fear	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
disgust	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
surprise	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
anger	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
contempt	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
enjoyment	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5

Boy		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
fear	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
disgust	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
surprise	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
anger	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
contempt	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
enjoyment	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5

Emotional communication notetaking sheet - ***Video 3 – Parents meeting***

Name: _____

Please use the space below to write notes on the emotions you see in the video clips we watch.

- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip?

By the teacher	By the principal	By the parent

- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]

By the teacher	By the principal	By the parent

- For each individual character, do you see any of the emotions on the list? Please check all that apply.

By parents			By the teacher		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?		Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong	sadness	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
fear	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong	fear	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
disgust	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong	disgust	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
surprise	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong	surprise	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
anger	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong	anger	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
contempt	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong	contempt	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
enjoyment	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong	enjoyment	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong

Emotional communication notetaking sheet - ***Video 4 – Fighting farmers***

Name: _____

Please use the space below to write notes on the emotions you see in the video clips we watch.

- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip?

By the teacher	By the principal	By the parent

- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]

By the teacher	By the principal	By the parent

- For each individual character, do you see any of the emotions on the list? Please check all that apply.

By farmer #1			By farmer #2		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?		Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	sadness	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
fear	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	fear	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
disgust	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	disgust	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
surprise	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	surprise	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
anger	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	anger	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
contempt	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	contempt	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
enjoyment	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5	enjoyment	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5

By the teacher		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
fear	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
disgust	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
surprise	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
anger	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
contempt	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
enjoyment	No / yes	1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5

Emotional communication notetaking sheet - ***Video clip number five – Business dinner***

Name: _____

Please use the space below to write notes on the emotions you see in the video clips we watch.

- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip?

By the teacher (Kim)	By the older man	By the younger man

- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]

By the teacher (Kim)	By the older man	By the younger man

- For each individual character, do you see any of the emotions on the list? Please check all that apply.

By the teacher (Kim)		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
fear	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
disgust	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
surprise	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
anger	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
contempt	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
enjoyment	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong

By the older man		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
fear	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
disgust	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
surprise	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
anger	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
contempt	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
enjoyment	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong

By the younger man		
	Do you see it?	How strong is the emotion?
sadness	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
fear	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
disgust	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
surprise	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
anger	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
contempt	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong
enjoyment	No / yes	weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong

APPENDIX C: QUESTIONS ASKED TO *FL PARTICIPANTS'* FOCUS GROUPS

FL participants -- Introductory script

Thank you so much for your help on this project. I really appreciate that you are taking the time to assist my research into this aspect of language learning. Forgive me, but I need to start with some administrative work. I need each of you to sign this release form to continue with the study. Please read the form carefully before signing, but briefly it says that I will be recording the sessions, how I will use the recordings, as well as the goals of research – primarily my dissertation or perhaps a journal article in the future - and how I will contact you in the event of publication of this material. Please do ask if you have any questions about this form, OK? [wait for reply, and completion of forms]

Thank you for filling those out. Let me start off by telling you about the purpose of this study. We're trying to look at the communication of emotion across different cultures. So the basic question is, "do different cultures communicate or show their emotions in different ways?" If we find out that there are differences, then perhaps we can make cross-cultural communication better by redesigning the way we teach foreign language students.

So, today were going to watch a couple of short video clips from a Korean reality television program called "Love House" – which is similar to "Extreme Makeover: Home Edition." What you will be doing while we watch is trying to see what emotion, or emotions, you see in each of these scenes. Partly because the program is in Korean, and partly to help you see what is going on in the different elements of how people communicate, we are going to watch to watch the video in three different ways: First, we will watch it silently; next, we'll watch with the soundtrack added – in Korean; and finally, we will add English subtitles. Do you have any questions so far? [Wait for reply]

Okay, that's great. As you are watching the video clips, I would like you to take some notes, so that you will be better able to discuss what you saw during the whole group discussion [pass out the worksheet]. In a whole group discussion will be discussing the same questions that you're going to take notes on, so let me review the questions for you:

- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip?
- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]
- For each individual on the worksheet do you see any of the emotions on the list? [sadness, anger, fear, enjoyment, disgust, contempt, and surprise] Please check all that apply. [note: include liker scale for intensity of emotion]

Any questions on the questions? [And wait for reply]

Finally, after we have discussed the clips as a whole group and come to some sort of consensus about what's going on, I want to talk with you about what native Koreans said about these two video clips. I am not sure what we will find, but I'm curious if we will agree with the native speakers or not - and I'm curious what you will think after we discover whether you agree with them are not. Does that sound OK? [wait for reply]

Great! Let's get started.

Some specific follow-up questions (or rewording of questions) for each clip:

- Δ What emotions do you recognize?
  - Δ How do you know that this is the emotion? Is it the words, the context (setting, social or gender roles, etc.), facial expression, gesture, vocal tone, or something else?

- What about those universal emotions - do you recognize any of them?
- How do you know that this emotion is being communicated? Is it the words, the context (setting, social or gender roles, etc.), facial expression, gesture, vocal tone, or something else?

APPENDIX D: PLOT SYNOPSIS OF *선생 김봉두* - *MY TEACHER, MR. KIM.*

Kim Boong-doo (Cha Seung-woo - Break Out aka: Spark the Lighter) is a bad teacher. He's unkempt, constantly late for class, spends more time with his own extracurricular activities than his students curricular ones and to top it off, openly encourages parents to give him bribes to ensure their children get through his class okay. Unfortunately for Mr. Kim, his life is about to take a significant change of direction. While at one of his teacher meetings (which he was late to) a disgruntled parent bursts in looking to beat seven shades out of this Mr. Kim who demanded money from his son. The principal manages to defuse the situation, but gives Kim an ultimatum; retire or accept a vacant teachers role in the country. As you'd expect he is reluctant to leave Seoul but has no alternative but to take the job.

Upon arriving in the small village, Kim is given a warm welcome but all he can think of is trying to get out. He tries to get back into his habit of dishing out 'white envelopes' to his five pupils, but when the parents have nothing, what can they possibly give him? Finally Kim decides that if he can get all the kids to transfer to other schools, this small one will have to be closed and he too will have to be transferred back to Seoul. Thus begins his efforts to nurture their talents and the process of convincing them and their parents that Seoul is the best environment for their abilities. In the process of changing their outlook though their innocence and purity changes him for the better. (From: http://filmjournal.net/koreancinemahouse/2011/04/10/my-teacher-mr-kim/)

APPENDIX E: SCRIPT AND ACTION DESCRIPTION FOR THE TWO SCENES SHOWN TO FL GROUPS

"Video clip number one – the fight"

[Scene: a school library. The bookshelves are wooden and filled with books. There are large tables in the room, and adults are seated at them with about six teachers per table. A young male teacher enters the room wearing a dress shirt and slacks. The meeting has already begun. He moves to the last empty seat at the table near the door. His eyes looked down, and his shoulders are hunched over. The principal is speaking from his notes at the front of the room.]

Principal: To get better results from the curriculum, we will open special classes for each grade. Our school . . .

[The principal pauses as he notices the young teacher enter the room and take a seat. Without speaking, the principal approaches the young teacher who is looking at the documents on the table, not noticing the principal's approach. When the principal is within about two meters of the young teacher, the young teacher looks up at the principal. All of the other teachers at the table have their eyes focused down on the documents in front of them. The young teacher bows to the principal.]

[There is a pounding at the door. Everyone looks in the direction of the noise to see a parent followed by an administrative staff member enter the room.]

Male Parent: [yelling] Who the hell is Kim Bong-doo? Where is he? [He kicks one of the chairs a male teacher is seated in.] Is it you? You? Where's that bastard? [He throws a row of books off one of the bookshelves. And moves from male teacher to male teacher

searching for Kim Bong-doo] Where's Kim Bong-doo? You? Where's Kim Bong-doo? This school is a disgrace!

[The principal tries to intervene to calm the parent down, putting both hands on the parent's upper arms.]

Principal: Please calm yourself down

Male Parent: How can I calm down? You make a fool out of my son for not offering money? [The parent breaks the grip of the princial's hands. The principal backs away, and the parent moves forward toward him.] Let go of me!

[The young teacher, Kim Bong-doo, and several other male teachers try to intervene and hold the parent back as the principal recoils in shock. A melee ensues. Kim Bong-doo is seen jumping up and down. End of scene.]

"Video clip number five – Business dinner"

[Scene: A bulgogi restaurant. The grill is covered with sliced beef and vegetables barbecuing. I shot glass is extended across the table and filled with soju, a Korean hard alcohol made from rice, typically a 40 proof drink. Three men are seated at the table: an older man in a tie and sweater vest, a younger man in a white shirt and tie, and Kim Bong-doo in a dress shirt and slacks.]

Administrator: Say hello. This gentleman is a businessman from Seoul.

Kim Bong-doo: Hello.

Businessman: Hi, I'm Bak Soo-il.

[The businessmen extends his business card across the table to Kim Bong-doo, who takes it, glances at it briefly, and puts it in his back pants pocket.]

Kim Bong-doo: I'm Kim Bong-doo.

Businessman: I hope we can work things out.

Kim Bong-doo : Beg your pardon? [Talking with his mouth full.]

Administrator: Actually, he wants to turn the school into a survival game site. I know it won't be easy at the moment.

Kim Bong-du: A site for a survival game?

Businessman: Yes. [There is a pause. The administrator and the businessman glance at each other.]

Administrator: They decided to shut down the school next year, but they seem to be changing their minds after you came. [Pause] Mr. Kim . . .

Kim Bong-du: All the kids will transfer soon, so please don't worry.

[The administrator and businessman react in pleased surprise, showing wide smiling faces]

Businessman: Is that true? So the school will shut down automatically?

Kim Bong-du: Yes.

Businessman: That's great! [Administrator chuckles] Mister Kim, you're a fabulous teacher!

Administrator: Of course he is. The students will find it hard to adjust, but the learning environment will be much better in Seoul.

Businessman: Come on, kids need to struggle when they're young. I also had to struggle to work my way up.

[The businessmen and administrator are laughing. Mr. Kim just eats and glances from face to face]

Administrator: You're right, we had to walk 2 to 3 miles to go to school.

Businessman: Country kids are used to struggling anyway. [Administrator laughing.]

[Scene break: Outside the restaurant in the parking lot. Kim Bong-doo is walking to his car and taking his keys from his pocket.]

Businessman: Mister Kim. [The businessman reaches into his jacket pocket and pulls out a white envelop, which he extends Kim Bong-doo.] It's not much, but buy some cigarettes with it. [Kim Bong-doo slowly takes the envelope, and stares at it. Holding it in his hand. The businessmen waggles his head and reaches into his jacket pocket and retrieves another white envelope, which he extends to Kim Bong-doo, smiling.] Here's gas money.

Kim Bong-doo: Thank you, and good luck on your business.

Businessman [bowing]: Yes, thank you.

Kim Bong-doo: Good-night. [Quickly gets into his car and drives away. End of scene.]

APPENDIX F: FLOW CHART OF DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

Phase one: Choose emotional communication examples

Who's involved: Researcher

Tasks:

A. Choose representative video segment -- In Korean.
B. Select 7 emotionally significant clips.
C. Prepare a dub tape of the clips.

Phase two: Refine/ Code emotional communication examples with "native speakers"

Step 1:

Who's involved: focus group of *NL informants* (and researcher)

Tasks:

A. Watch the 7 clips and make notes on emotions seen.
B. Following the same questions from the note cheated, the focus group will discuss the implications of the video clip.
C. *NL informants* and researcher discuss implications of differences and similarities between *NL* and *FL*.
D. At the conclusion of the focus group discussion, the focus group will recommend 3 clips, from the 7 clips, that are 'better' for revealing the emotions of Korean people.

Step 2:

Who: Researcher

Tasks:

A. Combine the *NL informants'* detailed comments to code emotions. Before showing the clips to non-native speakers.
B. Create subtitles for the video clips.

Phase three: Present video examples to "non-native speakers"

Step 1:

Who: Focus groups of *FL participants* (and researcher)

Tasks:

A. Watch 'best' clip three times. First, without sound and subtitles. Second, with sound, but without subtitles. Third, with sound and subtitles.
B. After each viewing, note emotions and emotional clues.
C. Discussion of focus group members questions.

Step 2:

Who: *FL participants* (and researcher)

Tasks:

A. Researcher describes *NL informants* responses.
B. *FL participants* and researcher discuss implications of differences and similarities between *NL* and *FL*.