

THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ACTION: SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTS, PSYCHOLOGICAL  
TRAITS AND MOBILIZATION

BY

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DISSERTATION

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## ABSTRACT

When advancing our personal interests and our notions of the common interest, we must often act cooperatively with others to pursue common goals. The challenges that can arise are notorious. Citizens can benefit from outcomes, even if they do not contribute to the public actions that create them. When political goals require the efforts of many, and the benefits to the individual remain uncertain, citizens may refrain from taking action. Of course, if no one takes action, or if too few do, individual and collective interests can go unrealized. Understanding the challenges of mobilization therefore requires addressing the question of motivation. What motivates the individual citizen to participate in collective, public action?

For quite some time now, the dominant approach to addressing it has involved looking outward, toward the social processes and environmental conditions that shape the human experience. This approach has fostered a very popular image of the citizen. In this image, the citizen is a blank slate upon which external factors inscribe beliefs, values, and motivations for taking action. Based on this popular image of the citizen, the goal of mobilization is to create incentives and reduce disincentives to participate by changing the social environment the citizen experiences.

The central argument of this project is that this popular image must be revised. In addition to looking outward, toward the social environment, we must also look inward by considering how our biologically-linked psychological traits can influence our experience of social processes and environmental conditions. This part of our humanity is often overlooked in discussions of citizenship and public action. However, this project demonstrates that traits not only influence propensities for taking public action, but also influence the likelihood that citizens will be targeted for contact during mobilization efforts. In doing, the project illustrates how psychological traits contribute to the challenges we face in politics *and* strategies of cooperation that help us meet these challenges.

At the core of this project is an analytical framework that is sensitive to how citizen motivations can be influenced by both external, social factors and biologically-linked psychological traits. This framework is applied to examine the mobilization of publics in three different contexts: elections, jury service, and direct action organizing.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I began studying political science at the age of nineteen, I never imagined that I would find myself completing a dissertation ten years later. Back in those days, I did not even have the ability to imagine undertaking this type of endeavor. Such ambitions were for other people—namely, the intellectually gifted. While I always enjoyed learning and tried to work hard at it, I did not see myself as the type of person who would get very far with it. I certainly never thought I would aim to become a political scientist or a teacher of students. Then, several things happened.

As I began my second year of college at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, I found myself in Professor Michelle Brophy-Baermann's introductory course on American Politics. Professor Brophy-Baermann made political science and higher education accessible for working-class kids like myself. She directed attention to the pressing issues of our time and inspired us to think hard about our abilities and limitations as citizens. She also maintained very high standards, higher than any I had previously known as a student. This, and an ability to communicate complex ideas in simple and engaging language, helped to empower me and countless others. Somewhere along the way, Professor Brophy-Baermann became Michelle. In the process, I learned much about how to study politics, and even more about how to become a scholar and how to become myself. Without her inspiration, I would not have realized my love for learning, and helping others learn, as fully as I have.

During this same period of years, I also came to know Professors Dennis Riley and Bryan Brophy-Baermann, who along with Michelle, created a culture of teaching-and-learning that forever changed my life. Those of us who were students of theirs between the years of 2001 and 2005 got to be part of something really special. We learned about how to learn, and it is my privilege to carry those lessons with me.

Upon arriving at the University of Illinois in 2006, my good fortune as a student continued. I came to the University of Illinois to study politics primarily because of my interest in the work of Jim Kuklinski. As an undergraduate student, I became familiar with Jim Kuklinski the researcher, and was especially impressed by his attention to the “political” dimension of political science. As a graduate student, I became familiar with Jim Kuklinski the teacher, and I count this as one of my most important experiences as a student of politics. Every time I enter

the classroom as an instructor, I find myself drawing upon lessons I learned from watching Jim Kuklinski in action.

Several other scholars also influenced me profoundly during my years at the University of Illinois. I learned much from watching Tom Rudolph during seminars and during research presentations by scholars who visited our department. The precision of his thinking, particularly in posing questions is a quality that I have tried to emulate. From the example set by Damarys Canache I learned some of the important and practical lessons about how to be a political scientist. One lesson in particular warrants special attention here. Everyone in this business tells you to motivate your research questions with theory. Few provide such a vivid example to follow with their own work. Her 1995 article, “Looking Out My Backdoor” remains one of my all-time favorites, owing to its revitalization of resource deprivation theory. It remains my go-to example when talking with other students about how to think carefully and theoretically about the political world. Should I find myself a practicing political scientist in the years to come, I hope to demonstrate the same quality of mind in my own work.

The scholar who has influenced me the most during my graduate school years, however, is Jeff Mondak. In my second semester of graduate school, I took my first seminar with Jeff. It was by working with Jeff in that seminar that I began to develop my interest in trait psychology, and even more importantly, my confidence as a scholar. My interest in trait psychology, and my confidence, continued to grow the longer I worked with him. His ability to motivate and impart lessons about the research process has been instrumental in my development at every turn. His willingness to make time for students and his energy for talking through ideas has helped me forge the image of the scholar I want to become.

It was my privilege to have Jeff as my dissertation advisor and to have Jim, Tom, and Damarys on my dissertation committee. It was also my privilege to learn from several other individuals who I met at the University of Illinois. From Brenda Stamm and Julie Brown, I gained a whole new appreciation for the people who keep an academic department running on all cylinders. From Professors Kris Miler, Melissa Orlie, Scott Althaus and Jon Allen I gained a fuller appreciation of what teaching looks like when it is done really well. From Tarah Williams I learned what I regard as my most important lesson as a graduate student: success requires perseverance. Without Tarah’s support—intellectually and emotionally—I may not have completed this dissertation.

My greatest privilege in life, however, has been bestowed upon me by family—my mother Cindy, my father Jeff, and by brother Al. Throughout all my ups and downs as student and as a person, they have been there for me. Just as importantly, I owe them a tremendous debt for instilling in me the values of hard work and integrity. No matter what challenges I may face personally or professionally, they have given me the strength to preserve and the peace of mind that comes with knowing that I am never going it alone.

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## **CHAPTER 1:**

### **THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ACTION**

In a democracy, none of us can exert much influence as individual citizens acting alone. This is by design. In a democracy, decision-making promotes and even requires collective efforts. When advancing our personal interests and our notions of the common interest, we must often act cooperatively with others to pursue common goals. When political tasks require more than one citizen to achieve, this is our only practical option. Our actions as individual citizens are significant. Yet to be effectual, we must collaborate with and rely upon others. We must mobilize ourselves as publics.

Doing so requires us to reject the notion that “the public” exists automatically when some people are legally recognized as citizens. It requires us to reject the notion that “a public” is equivalent to an audience, created whenever ideas spread through a population. It requires rejecting the premise that citizens belong to a public simply because some actions or issues may affect their lives or the lives of those with whom they share a common identity.

For a public to exist, citizens who share common interests or preferences must take action to accomplish a political goal. These goals can take a number of forms. Citizens can attempt to select who holds elective office. They can attempt to shape the priorities of those elected. They can attempt to participate in the administration of justice by sitting on juries. They can attempt to disrupt social and economic practices they find unjust. Different as these goals may be, each involves influencing an authoritative decision-making process by taking action. Each involves many people directing their energy toward the same end.

Understood in this way, the capacity of publics to achieve goals comes down to the decisions of individual citizens. It is not inevitable that a public will emerge to pursue a particular goal. Nor is it inevitable that a public will succeed. To exist and to be effective, publics must be mobilized. Someone must organize efforts that appeal to citizens. Citizens must then participate in these efforts. The challenges that can arise are notorious. Citizens can benefit from outcomes, even if they do not contribute to the public actions that create them. When political goals require the efforts of many, and the benefits to the individual remain uncertain, citizens may refrain from taking action. Of course, if no one takes action, or if too few do, individual and collective interests can go unrealized. Understanding the challenges of

mobilization therefore requires addressing the question of motivation. What motivates the individual citizen to participate in collective, public action?

This question is a very old one, arguably as old as politics itself. For quite some time now, the dominant approach to addressing it has involved looking outward, toward the social processes and environmental conditions that shape the human experience. This approach has fostered a very popular image of the citizen. In this image, the citizen is a blank slate upon which external factors inscribe beliefs, values, and motivations for taking action. The citizen will participate in public action if past social experiences and current environmental circumstances encourage it. If citizens have been alienated from politics by past experiences, or if they presently face great obstacles to participation, they will be less likely to take action (McCarthy and Zald 2010; Inglehart 1997; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Based on this popular image of the citizen, the goal of mobilization is to create incentives and reduce disincentives to participate by changing the social environment the citizen experiences.

The argument of this project is that this popular image must be revised. In addition to looking outward, toward the social environment, we must also look inward, toward a part of our humanity that is often overlooked in discussions of citizenship and public action. We must look to a set of personal characteristics that we did not choose for ourselves, but which can influence who we are as people and as citizens in significant ways.

### **Looking Inward**

As human beings, we possess psychological traits which shape how we experience and respond to the world around us. These psychological traits—referred to collectively as “personality”—are largely inherited through biological reproduction and remain highly stable over the course of our lifetimes (Yamagata et al. 2006; McCrae and Costa 2003; McCrae et al. 2001; Riemann, Angleitner and Strelau 1997). They contribute to our motivations, with respect to both attitudes and outward behaviors.

Just as importantly, psychological traits differ across individuals in ways that we can readily observe. Faced with the same situations, people with different psychological tendencies respond in different ways. We have all known people who have always been out-going and others who have always been more reserved. We have all known people who have always been

diligent, and others who have always struggled to stay on task. We can all think of people who are consistently reliable when we need them, and others who are less so. These types of life-long tendencies reflect the commonly observable presence and influence of personality in daily life. Likewise, these enduring psychological tendencies may influence how the citizen responds when opportunities for public action arise.

In democratic politics, taking action can often require interacting with others and expressing one's beliefs openly in front of others. It often requires making commitments and following through on them. This is where trait-related differences can prove consequential. Some citizens may be especially predisposed toward these types of behaviors, while others may have contrary predispositions. By extension, some citizens might be easier to mobilize for public action. When a call to action is sounded, some may not hesitate to answer while others refrain. Some citizens may have a greater capacity for overcoming obstacles to participation while others may find the same obstacles more taxing to overcome. Some citizens may even be more likely to receive a call to action in the first place, because they are more accessible or out-going. Put another way, the psychological traits that individuals possess may influence their experiences of citizenship in significant ways.

The implications are all at once scholarly and practical, empirical and normative. By neglecting the function of psychological traits, we may leave an important aspect of mobilization in the shadows. As an empirical matter, we may not understand how mobilization efforts succeed and when they fail as well as we otherwise could. We may also risk losing out on insights that could help practitioners of mobilization refine their efforts. In normative terms, we need to think carefully about the implications for both democratic citizenship and for how we attempt to mobilize publics. Often we discuss what citizens *should* do in terms of participation. Seldom do we consider whether our approach to mobilizing for public action implicitly advantages or values some citizens more than others on the basis of inherent personal qualities. Yet if we find evidence that psychological traits can influence the dynamics of public action, these become issues we must face.

Accordingly, this project contributes to a growing body of scholarship that challenges a currently popular, but flawed image of the citizen. At the core of this project is an analytical framework that is sensitive to how citizen motivations can be influenced by both external, social factors and biologically-linked psychological traits. This framework is applied to examine the

mobilization of publics in three different contexts: elections, jury service, and local decision-making. By examining these different contexts for mobilization, this project advances two goals. The first goal is to shed new light on the human dynamics of public action. The second is to raise questions about the kind politics we may need, given that we are both shaped by our social environments and psychologically predisposed to experience the world in different ways.

### **The Question of Motivation and The Citizen as Human-Being**

The central argument of this project is that to better understand the dynamics of public action, we must seek a more nuanced understanding of *citizens as human-beings*. Taking into account both social environments and biologically-linked psychological traits can help us toward this end. Both sets of factors are fundamental aspects of human life, and both can matter as citizens make decisions about public action. There is never a time when the citizen, as a human-being, exists outside of a social environment. Nor is there ever a time when the citizen as a human-being lacks psychological tendencies that shape perceptions and reactions. Because this is our situation, it stands to reason that to reach a more nuanced understanding of citizen motivations, we must do more to recognize how social environments and psychological tendencies operate in combination. On this front, there is much work to be done.

For generations now, scholars have typically placed greater emphasis on the social and environmental factors that influence a citizen's participation. Every citizen, after all, lives in some type of environment and is shaped by a variety of social experiences. These environments and social experiences can create both incentives and disincentives for taking public action. Some people have more time for participation. Some people develop social identities and participatory skills that make them more inclined to take action. Others may have life experiences that lead them to be uninterested in politics or even alienated from it. From this perspective, even where psychological characteristics become relevant, they are typically explained by reference to social processes. Ideology results from socialization processes in the home, school, and broader community. Political efficacy results from life experiences and skill-building opportunities in the home, school, workplace, and other social organizations.

Following from this, scholarship on mobilization has often addressed how political actors might strategically alter the environments and social experiences of citizens they seek to motivate. What types of benefits are participants looking to attain? What types of costs deter

them? What types of outreach strategies are most likely to reach citizens and induce their motivation? These are the questions that have dominated our thinking, and without question, this approach to understanding citizen motivation has yielded great insight into how mobilization unfolds. At the same time, this approach has become so familiar and so central to our understanding that some critical assumptions have become practically invisible. Two assumptions, in particular, warrant re-examination. The first is that we can explain human behavior, primarily or entirely, by specifying the social and environmental factors that operate on an individual. The second is that all individuals will respond to social and environmental influences in the same way.

Evidence from the field of trait psychology challenges each of these traditional environment-centric assumptions about citizen motivations. To this end, over two decades of research has demonstrated that five trait dimensions, in particular, reliably summarize the bulk of personality trait structure. Known as “the Big Five” in trait psychology, these are *openness to experience*, *conscientiousness*, *extraversion*, *agreeableness*, and *emotional stability*. Each corresponds to a distinctive set of basic psychological tendencies across which individuals vary.

*Openness to experience* describes the extent to which individuals welcome novel experiences and social encounters. Individuals highly open to experience tend find such experiences appealing, while individuals more closed to experience display the opposite tendencies. *Conscientiousness* describes a form of impulse control that facilitates task-oriented, goal-directed behavior. Highly conscientious individuals have a psychological inclination toward honoring commitments and obligations. Less conscientious individuals exhibit this inclination to a lesser degree. *Extraversion* implies an “energetic” or assertive approach toward the social and material world, and is associated with a predisposition toward social activity. Introverts, by contrast, tend to be less assertive and more socially reserved. *Agreeableness* implies a communal orientation toward others, and is associated with an inclination toward cooperation and trust. Highly disagreeable individuals, by contrast, display a tendency toward competition. Such individuals also display less aversion to, and sometimes even an affinity for, encounters that involve conflict. Finally, *emotional stability* denotes even-temperedness and even deliberateness in decision-making, and is contrasted by neuroticism, which denotes the opposite tendencies (John, Naumann and Soto 2008).

Each of these five trait dimensions represents an internal psychological structure that is largely heritable (Medland and Hatemi 2009; McCrae et al. 2001; Riemann, Angleitner and Stelau 1997), highly stable over time, and predictive of human attitudes and behaviors (McCrae and Costa 2008, McCrae and Costa 2003, McCrae and Costa 1997; Goldberg and Rosolack 1994; Goldberg 1993). To put this in perspective, one of the most heritable human traits is height. For any given trait, heritability provides an estimate of the observed variance in a population of individuals that corresponds with the variance in genes. Heritability statistics range in value from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating a larger effect of genetics than environment in producing a given trait. The heritability estimate for height is 0.80, signifying that the vast majority of variation in height within a population owes to genetic factors. Estimates of heritability for trait dimensions in the Big 5 taxonomy generally are accepted as being at least 0.50, and, with corrections for measurement error,<sup>1</sup> range as high as from 0.66 to 0.79. Further, once psychological traits solidify in an individual in late adolescent or early adulthood, they remain with the individual for life. With delays of six years between observations, stability levels as high as 0.95 have been reported for Big 5 trait dimensions (McCrae and Costa 2003).

All this should give us pause. Because psychological traits constitute a fundamental part of who we are, the premise that human behavior can be entirely, or even primarily, explained by social and environmental factors is unsound. Similarly, it would seem imprudent to presume that all human individuals experience social and environmental factors in basically the same way. Instead, a variation in perception and response seems more plausible, and to date, such an understanding also seems more consistent with the available evidence. In the work place, in the educational system, and even in politics, there is growing evidence that psychological traits influence how individuals perceive what happens around them and how they respond to it.

However, as other scholars have argued, the remedy for “environmental determinism” is not “biological determinism” or even “trait psychological determinism.” The basic position of trait psychology scholars could hardly be clearer. To understand the function of personality, we must understand the interactive relationships between the social environment and the traits-

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<sup>1</sup> In estimating heritability, typically based on data from twin studies, variation in a phenomenon is partitioned into three categories: the heritable component, the component that traces to the shared environment, and the component that traces to the unshared environment. The latter is actually a residual category, and it thus tends to be overestimated when the phenomenon in question is measured with error. Consequently, use of improved measures tends to increase estimates of the heritable and/or shared environmental components. With personality, exercises of precisely this sort have resulted in the revised heritability estimates noted above.

related tendencies of the individual (see for example Mondak 2010; McCrae and Costa 2008; John, Naumann and Soto 2008). Still, studies that attempt to theorize and model these interactive relationships remain few in number. To date, most research focusing on personality has examined the direct effects of various traits while acknowledging that these effects emerge in some form of situational context. Such research often concludes with an argument for seeking trait-environment interactions in future work.

Scholarship on personality and political participation has contributed to this body of research. In this context, two direct personality effects have frequently emerged. Citizens who are highly open to experience often appear more likely to take political action than their counterparts who are relatively closed to experience (Gerber et al. 2011; Mondak et al. 2010; Vecchione and Caprara 2009; Bekkers 2005). Highly extraverted citizens often prove especially likely to participate in actions that involve a great degree of social interaction relative to the population in general, and introverts especially (Mondak et al. 2011; Mondak 2010; Vecchione and Caprara 2009; Bekkers 2005). The explanations for these patterns have an intuitive quality. People generally inclined toward creating new experiences or toward social interaction are likely to pursue specific activities that satisfy these inclinations. Yet as personality scholars have recognized, this type of explanation implicitly presumes the relevance of the social environment. Political activities always occur in some type of social environment. If opportunities for participation did not exist somewhere in the social environment, personality could not influence whether the citizen takes action. In the absence of stimuli, personality traits would be inconsequential.

Beyond this initial insight, scholarship on personality and political participation has not moved further. Consequently, our understanding of how and when psychological traits influence citizen motivation remains limited. Our understanding of what motivates individual citizens to participate in collective, public actions also remains limited. Without question, social and environmental factors contribute to citizen motivation, and practitioners of mobilization must attempt to create environments that promote participation. The growing abundance of research in trait psychology provides reason to believe that not all individuals will react to social and environmental factors in the same way. Yet our understanding of what will trigger trait-related tendencies remains crude and imprecise.

To advance our understanding, we must identify the specific features of social environments and social interactions that stimulate or suppress different psychological tendencies (Funder 2008; McCrae and Costa 2008; Mischel and Shoda 1995). We must begin exploring how differences in psychological traits matter as practitioners of mobilization use different strategies and as citizens face different types of incentives and disincentives in their environments. The question is *how*, and to answer this question, we need a theoretical framework to guide us.

### **The Nature of Public Action: Social Environments, Psychological Traits & Mobilization**

The need for a theoretical framework to guide studies of trait psychology has become a matter of consensus among scholars. To date, however, efforts to examine how social and environmental factors interact with psychological traits have exhibited a distinctly ad hoc character. In the search to identify what stimulates or suppresses the expression of traits, there has been little discussion and arguably less agreement about how to identify the most relevant aspects of social and environmental circumstances (Buss 2009; Funder 2008).

Some scholars have argued that we might make headway by considering what a particular action requires of an individual, then asking whether certain trait-based tendencies may make an individual more or less likely to undertake the action (Mondak et al. 2011; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; McCrae and Costa 2008; John, Naumann and Soto 2008). Others have argued that we might add precision to this approach by identifying types, or classes, of social and environmental circumstances that might stimulate trait-related tendencies. More specifically, we might identify common problems or scenarios that pervade the human experience, and then consider what features of these scenarios become psychologically salient for individuals with different characteristics (Buss 2009). However, as the general contours of a theoretical framework have emerged, efforts to develop and apply this framework to politics have lagged behind.

This project enters the fray by developing a framework to guide the study of participation in public actions. Chapter 2 introduces this framework, emphasizing how public actions involve common human dilemmas and suggesting how psychological traits can play a role in the resolution of these dilemmas. To explain the dynamics of mobilizing publics into action, this framework considers how trait-related tendencies matter given the actions used to attain various political

goals, the tactics used to motivate participation, the incentives and disincentives already present in the lives of citizens.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus upon different forms of public action and the dynamics that produce participation in each. Chapter 3 examines the dynamics of electoral mobilization by focusing upon how parties and the citizens that support them attempt to build a public capable of winning elections. Chapter 4 turns to the dynamics juridical mobilization, or the process of fielding juries. In doing so, this chapter explores explanations for why summons compliance is often very low and advocates moving beyond traditional solutions to this problem. Chapter 5 takes up the dynamics of mobilizing publics for direct action with an eye toward the exceptionally intensive social interactions of protests and community problem-solving efforts. Chapter 6 brings the project to a conclusion by asking what the nature of public action can tell us about ourselves and the kind of political challenges we face as human beings. As means of addressing this question, this final chapter considers what might be missing from our politics and what we might gain by being more conscious of our psychological traits, our social environments, and the interplay between them.

## CHAPTER 2: PUBLICS-IN-ACTION

This project defines a *public* as created through collective, goal-directed action, by citizens who recognize a set of common interests. Publics, in this sense, are ephemeral. They exist only when citizens are *in action*, because only action can advance and defend political resources, be they tangible (like money) or intangible (like values). Although in principle, a public is open to all citizens, in practice, they must be both willing and able to participate in actions taken to reach a given political goal.

The choice to define publics as created through citizen action is not an arbitrary one. It stems from the premise that citizens, as human beings, fundamentally depend upon one another to survive and thrive. Few other animals, in fact, appear to exhibit such fundamental dependencies on other members of their species throughout the lifecycle as do humans. From birth to death, we rely upon others to help us meet our basic needs—food, shelter, physical security. We also rely upon others to help us move beyond these basic needs by achieving material prosperity along with the intellectual and emotional stimulation that, for so many of us, makes life worth living.

Our foremost political problem is therefore our foremost human problem: recognizing our dependence on one another and living in accordance with it. We must often depend upon one another to advance and protect our interests. We depend upon one another in these ways not only because some goals require the efforts of many but also because, as individuals, we are endowed with different qualities. We perceive and respond to the circumstances of our environments in different ways. To a significant extent, these differences are the products of our social experiences—the values we adopt, the identities we acquire, and the relationships we form. Because none of us can have every possible social experience, we find ourselves reliant on others for perspectives and abilities that we may not have acquired.

Yet social experience alone is not the sole source of our differences, nor the only reason for our dependent condition. Even before we have our first social experiences, biology endows us with psychological traits that shape how we not only respond to social experiences, but also what kinds of social experiences we pursue. Consequently, in pursuing collective goals, our effectiveness may well depend upon our own fundamental human qualities, and those of others.

## **The Nature of Public Action: From Social Environments to Psychological Traits**

As Elinor Ostrom (1998) so provocatively put it, “You would not be reading this...if it were not for some of our ancestors learning how to undertake collective action to solve social dilemmas.” Even before we had a word for politics, we had a need for strategies and norms that encouraged productive, collaborative behavior. Not by coincidence, we can find such strategies and norms at work whenever political goals require the efforts of many to achieve. The foremost problem faced by citizens attempting to build a public, therefore, centers on adopting strategies and norms that maximize the likelihood of success.

Where achieving a goal requires the actions of many and individuals can benefit from positive outcomes without contributing, some may choose to free-ride. Where achieving results of a collective effort are uncertain, some individuals may choose not to take action in effort to prevent expending resources without a return. Where victory can be secured only by the largest number or the most intense display of preferences, inaction by some can mean failure for all. This is the problem mobilization seeks to address. In turn, understanding how mobilization efforts succeed and why they fail therefore turns on the questions of what motivates citizens to take action and what suppresses this motivation.

Although any citizen can undertake public action in principle, in practice citizens encounter very different social and environmental circumstances which can influence their propensity to direct their energy in this way. Some individuals enjoy greater material prosperity than others, and this has several well-known consequences. Those who must devote large amounts of time to fulfilling basic needs often have less time to get involved in public actions. They also tend to have fewer participatory skills and less practice plying the skills they do have in the context of public action. Those who enjoy greater material prosperity often have a much greater ability to create the discretionary time needed to participate in public actions. In addition, they have often received the types of social opportunities, such as formal education and organizational responsibilities, that can foster participatory skills and political efficacy (Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995). Other socialization experiences can also influence propensities to take public action. Most notably, individuals who come to adopt political identities also tend to display a greater tendency to participate, owing to their psychological attachment to values,

ideas, and people with whom they identify (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004; Dawson 1995). They have a willingness to act when they perceive opportunities to advance or defend common interests.

During efforts to mobilize publics for political goals, these social and environmental factors have obvious relevance. They help explain why, in the absence of formal exclusions, some individuals are much less likely than others to contribute to collective actions that advance or defend their interests. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that even in the context of democratic politics, citizens who have greater material assets, greater degrees of participatory skill, and stronger political identities are also more likely to be prioritized during mobilization efforts (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992). This in turn creates a dynamic that reinforces the participatory motivations of some, while precluding those less likely to take action from experiences that might motivate them. In essence, some citizens become valued more than others in the context of mobilization, given their propensity to take action. This dynamic makes sense when considering the tendency humans demonstrate toward developing strategies and norms to achieve goals.

However, as a practical matter, public actions require more than simply having available time, participatory skills, or psychological attachment to the value, ideas, or people involved. They often require social interaction, a willingness to cooperate, and a willingness to commit to action and follow through. This means that citizens who possess these qualities may become valuable in the context of mobilization as well. It is at this juncture that we may find value in updating our notion of who the citizen is as a person. Citizens, as human beings, are more than products of external social and environmental forces. Citizens, as human beings, possess biologically-linked psychological tendencies that can systematically affect how they perceive and respond to the world around them. Moreover, some of these psychological tendencies may prove useful for solving some common types of social dilemmas.<sup>2</sup>

Over two decades of research has demonstrated that five trait dimensions, in particular, provide a comprehensive and reliable summary of the majority of personality trait structure. Known as “the Big Five” or Five Factor Model (FFM) in trait psychology, these are *openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability*. Each

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<sup>2</sup> Some scholars, in fact, have argued that psychological traits have evolved and endured for exactly this reason (Buss 2010; Buss 2009; Alford and Hibbing 2006). However, regardless of why psychological traits have persisted, the functions may be valuable in the context of collective action efforts.

corresponds to a distinctive set of basic psychological tendencies across which individuals vary. As durable psychological structures, these traits gain their significance by making some responses more likely than others as individuals encounter environmental stimuli and accumulate social experiences (Mondak 2010; McCrae et al. 2001; Mischel and Shoda 1995). Consequently, identifying whether trait-related tendencies become stimulated during a mobilization attempt can help clarify the processes by which citizens can be motivated to take action. The challenge, theoretically and analytically, becomes identifying which features of a mobilization effort stimulate, or fail to stimulate, individuals with different trait-based tendencies.

### **The Dynamics of Mobilization:**

#### **A Framework for Analysis**

As a form of political communication, mobilization is about exerting social influence. It is about creating stimuli that motivate citizens to contribute toward a political goal. For such efforts to succeed, a lot must go right. Those attempting to build a public must decide who to contact and how to contact them. Citizens must receive the communication intended for them and accept what this communication asks of them (Zaller 1992; McGuire 1989). Ultimately, they must take action. With interests and outcomes at stake, much can depend upon whether this process unfolds to completion or systematically breaks down at any point along the way.

Of course, even when mobilization does succeed, it seldom if ever does so among all citizens. When opportunities for political action arise, some citizens take action, while others do not. Again, although these divergent responses no doubt reflect differences in personal resources, participatory skills, and socialization, no person, and thus no citizen, is a simple product of accumulated social experiences. All people, and thus all citizens, develop personal, psychological tendencies that affect how they experience life, political life included.

As Figure 2.1 illustrates, these tendencies may influence the social dynamics inherent to mobilization in multiple ways. In the first place, differences in psychological tendencies may influence whether citizens actually *receive* appeals to action. Receiving contact requires that citizens be both attentive and accessible as mobilization efforts unfold. Some citizens may be inclined toward such attentiveness and accessibility, and even welcome the political experiences these qualities may invite. Other citizens may preoccupy themselves with other matters or display a reticence to engage in the social interactions mobilization sometimes requires. To the

extent that mobilization efforts rely on interpersonal communication to succeed, this implies that some individuals may be easier to reach.

Even prior to the start of mobilization efforts, the personal tendencies of citizens may influence who political actors *attempt to contact*. This becomes relevant in all cases when those who initiate an effort to build a public have discretion over who they choose to contact. Since no effort to contact citizens is costless, those undertaking a mobilization effort have reason to “strategically target” their most likely supporters (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992). This may be particularly true as the cost of reaching citizens during a mobilization effort increases. The more it costs, in either money or manpower, to initiate contact with citizens, the stronger the incentive becomes to target those most likely to support the political goal at stake. Such individuals provide the highest return on the resources expended on outreach, and often distinguish themselves on the basis of their past participation. They tend to have strong political identities, but perhaps even more importantly, they not only support political goals in principle, they also support them in practice by contributing toward their achievement. They are willing to publically express their beliefs and values and are dependable when they commit to action (Chong 1991). Thus, if personal tendencies lead some citizens to reliably accept calls to action, these citizens may build a reputation that attracts contact during mobilization.

Finally, when confronted with appeals to action, personal, psychological tendencies may influence who *accepts* requests to participate. When prompted to take action, some may find greater appeal in expressing their beliefs and values. Some may be energized by the prospect of engaging with others (Chong 1991). Some may embrace collaborative efforts, while others may avoid them when given the choice (Orbell and Dawes 1993; Orbell and Dawes 1991). Once committed to taking action, some may even have a psychological need to follow through (Chong 1991).

### Receiving Appeals to Action

For a mobilization effort to have any chance at success, citizens must receive the communication intended to reach them. As Figure 2.1 depicts, this requires that two events transpire. Those attempting to build personal contact must attempt to contact a citizen. The citizen must then be accessible and attentive when the call to action arrives.

With respect to receiving appeals to action, two traits in the FFM—extraversion and openness to experience—take on significance given the social quality that often characterizes political mobilization. These trait-related tendencies may affect a citizen’s likelihood of receiving appeals to action for two sets of reasons. In the first place, individuals predisposed toward participation and social interaction may make themselves more accessible for receiving appeals to action during mobilization efforts. Just as importantly, individuals who are highly extraverted and highly open to experience display a predisposition toward social engagement and even toward higher degrees of efficacy (Mak and Tran 2001; see also Bekkers 2005; Lounsbury, Loveland and Gibson 2003), tendencies that extend to the realm of politics. Individuals who are relatively open to experience have exhibited a general tendency toward participation, while extraverts appear drawn to forms of participation that entail social interaction (Mondak et al. 2011; Mondak et al. 2010). Owing to these qualities, these individuals may be among the most likely to have participated in political action in the past, making them potentially more visible to political actors who engage in strategic targeting.

#### *Accepting Appeals to Action*

Once citizens receive appeals to action, they must decide whether and how they will contribute toward whatever political goal is at stake. They must determine whether they will accept what taking action will require of them.

To this end, different types of action place different types of commitments on the citizen. One important way in which political actions differ is with respect to the degree of social interaction involved. Another is the degree of personal commitment required to perform the action. Some political actions, such as voting, require only nominal social interactions. They are also relatively fleeting experiences. Other forms of action, such as attending political gatherings or trying to convince others to take action, inherently involve greater social interaction. They also require a greater investment of personal time and sustained attention.

Returning to Figure 2.1, whether citizens accept calls to action may also reflect psychological tendencies, and by extension, personality traits. Individuals highly open to experience and highly extraverted have a tendency toward efficacious behavior. Extraverts display a particular tendency toward actions that involve social activity, political actions included (Mondak et al 2011; Mondak 2010).

Two other traits in the FFM—conscientiousness and emotional stability—may also influence the likelihood that citizens take action and draw their significance from a different dimension of mobilization. When political organizers contact citizens, they seek a commitment to action. Upon conceiving of a task as a responsibility or obligation, individuals who are highly conscientious and highly emotionally stable have a predisposition toward following through on commitments (Mondak 2010; Caspi et al. 2006; Lounsbury, Loveland and Gibson 2003). The final trait in the FFM—agreeableness—may influence propensities for action in two different ways. Relatively agreeable individuals tend to have a predisposition toward cooperation and communal, reciprocal relationships. Such individuals may find the prospect of contributing to political goals appealing, and thus prove more likely to take action during a mobilization effort. There is also evidence to suggest that relatively disagreeable individuals may exhibit similar patterns, owing to a different psychological motivation. Across a variety of situations, relatively disagreeable individuals have displayed a predisposition toward competitive behavior (Park and Antonioni 2007; Suls, Martin and David 1998; Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, and Hair 1996, Van Hiel et al 2007). This, however, may not hinder, but rather promote contributions toward political goals. Even individuals inclined toward competition in relation to others may still experience an intuitive need for cooperation to attain their goals.

### **The Framework Applied:**

#### **Electoral, Juridical, and Direct Action Publics**

To apply this general framework, this project examines three different contexts in which publics mobilize for action—elections, jury service, and direct action (protests and community problem-solving efforts). Each represents a form of goal-oriented behavior that involves collaboration among citizens, and yet the requirements and dynamics of each have distinct characteristics.

During elections, we face the task of selecting who will govern. Since no citizen can enter office without the support of fellow citizens, and since no one citizen's vote would be effectual by itself, electoral publics must mobilize in support of political parties and candidates as they compete for office. The most direct form of support publics can provide, of course, takes place in the voting booth. Electoral publics can also provide indirect forms of support when citizens signal the viability of parties and candidates at rallies and attempt to influence the voting behavior of fellow citizens.


The administration of legal justice also brings about the creation of publics. We call these publics juries. When legal disputes arise, juries are convened to make judgments about the actions of citizens and to apply the laws of the state. Courts issue a summons and every citizen has an equal chance of being called for jury service. Those who comply with the summons then have a chance of being seated on a jury. Finally, as a matter of institutional design, the decisions of juries are reached collectively; one citizen cannot make such decisions alone. In this way, the right to a trial by one's peers—a right that all citizens maintain—is sustained by public action.

Outside of elections and jury service, citizens face the tasks of identifying problems that require attention and participating in efforts to solve these problems. This often happens in local or relatively small-scale political communities. Here again, any one citizen can voice concerns about a problem or roll up her or his sleeves to work on a problem. Even so, strength in numbers can serve as a crucial resource. When citizens participate directly in the decisions of a community or attempt to influence government officials, the efforts of many are needed. Publics emerge when citizens mobilize themselves for action.

In each of these contexts, the capacity of publics to achieve goals comes down to the decisions of individual citizens. Taking into account both social dynamics of mobilization and biologically-linked psychological traits can help us understand how these decisions are made. It can tell us something about how various mobilization efforts succeed and why they break down. Lastly, it can tell us something about whether citizens experience the requirements of public action in different ways, owing to their inherent personal qualities.

## Chapter 2 Figures

Figure 2.1 Mobilizing for Public Action: The Potential Functions of Psychological Traits



### **CHAPTER 3:**

#### **MOBILIZING ELECTORAL PUBLICS**

Every election cycle brings with it a competition that not only involves political parties but also the publics that support them. In any given election, there can be only one winner and ultimately, this winner does not result from debate or discussion, but the imposition of one public's will over all others. On Election Day, one public—and only one public—proves itself the strongest when the ballots are counted.

As this day nears, political parties face the challenge of mobilizing a public that will achieve this goal. It is a challenge shared by citizens who prefer one party over all other competitors. Just as political parties attempt to contact citizens and mobilize them into action, citizens often attempt to mobilize each other. They attend meetings to help advance their party's efforts. They attend rallies to help signal their party's viability to others. They attempt to persuade others to vote for their party, or at very least, vote *against* the opposing parties. It is through these actions that citizens with different interests and values build competing electoral publics. It is on the success of these actions that every party's fortunes depend.

Given this reality, a fundamental question continually arises. Why do some citizens take action while others do not? As scholars have pursued this question, the dominant approach has emphasized how social and environmental factors can influence motivation. This tradition of scholarship has illuminated environmental conditions that facilitate and hinder participation (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Krassa 1988). It has directed attention toward promising mobilization tactics (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Nickerson, Friedrichs and King 2006; Gerber and Green 2005, Ramirez 2005; Gerber and Green 2001; Gerber and Green 2000). These insights into the dynamics of electoral mobilization have proven tremendously valuable, but the studies that produced these insights have advanced a questionable assumption about what moves citizens to public action. Implicit to studies that focus on social and environmental factors is the assumption that these factors influence all individuals in the same way irrespective of variation in the individuals' basic attributes and distributions.

Landmark studies in trait psychology have challenged this assumption. Such studies have demonstrated that human beings have highly stable trait structures and psychological tendencies

that appear to coalesce in late adolescence or early adulthood (McCrae and Costa 2008, McCrae and Costa 2003,). Owing to this, individuals tend display characteristic perceptions of, and responses to, what happens in the world around them. In the realm of politics, the influence of psychological traits is becoming increasingly well-chronicled. The preponderance of evidence indicates that psychological traits influence ideology, partisan affiliation, and propensities for participation (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al 2010; Gerber et al 2010; Caprara et al. 2006). Such evidence weighs in favor of a revised image of the citizen. The citizen is not simply shaped by external forces as life experiences accumulate. Rather, who the citizen is and what the citizen does reflects an interaction of stable psychological tendencies and worldly experiences. The assumption that social and environmental factors influence all citizens in roughly the same way has come to seem untenable.

The revised image of the citizen brought by trait psychology has its own limitations, however. Even as trait psychologists have argued for the importance of traits in combination with environmental situations, the emphasis of most work to date has centered upon the direct effects of traits. Taken too literally, this work also gives rise to an overly-simplistic image: citizens with some psychological tendencies actively participate in elections, while citizens with the opposite tendencies stay home. Absent from this image are the social dynamics that operate as electoral campaigns unfold. Citizens do not simply take action spontaneously, nor do they necessarily encounter situations randomly. Just as psychological tendencies can influence how the citizen engages with the others, these same tendencies can influence how others interact—and *whether* they interact—with the citizen.

To gain a fuller understanding of how citizens experience democracy, several questions warrant attention. Is it the case that some psychological tendencies make people harder to reach during mobilization campaigns? Do some tendencies make people less likely to be mobilized into action once they are contacted? Conversely, do some people become more likely to participate because their psychological tendencies attract mobilizing contact?

### **From Social Processes to Psychological Traits: The Dynamics of Strategic Targeting and Successful Contact**

In the lead up to Election Day, competing political parties attempt to contact citizens who will reliably take action in their favor. To do this, competing parties design mobilization

campaigns. They send out written materials. They use automated calling systems to reach citizens by phone. They invest in phone banks staffed by volunteers and send out canvassing teams to connect with people at home, face-to-face. As Figure 3.1 depicts, for these mobilization attempts to have any chance at success, citizens must receive the calls to action intended for them. This means that two events must transpire. A political party must attempt to contact a citizen. The citizen must then be available to receive this contact. The citizen's engagement is crucial, and competing political parties plan carefully to achieve it.

As political organizers well know, no effort to contact citizens is costless. Resources for mobilization are always finite. For these reasons, the parties "strategically target" citizens who seem most likely to support them. This is particularly true as the cost of reaching citizens during a mobilization effort increases. Sending written materials to citizens is relatively inexpensive, as is setting up an automated calling system. Devoting staff and volunteers to *personally* call citizens requires a greater investment of resources. Sending volunteers and staff to knock on doors and appeal to citizens face-to-face requires an even greater investment of resources. The more it costs, in either money or manpower, to initiate contact with citizens, the stronger the incentive for targeting likely supporters becomes.

Aside from having finite resources for mobilization, parties have another incentive for strategic targeting. Parties have a limited time to seek out potential supporters, and also have a limited reach. The conventional wisdom among campaigns is that the strongest appeals to action come not from volunteers, but instead from close family and friends. To tap into these more intimate social networks, parties often start by identifying reliable, active supporters (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p 175).

To execute strategic targeting, parties simply look for the signals that citizens provide through their past participation in electoral activities. When a citizen's name appears on donor lists from past campaigns and on voter rolls from primary elections, it provides an indicator of reliable, active support. Sending this signal comes at a cost. Citizens must expend time and energy to participate in electoral politics. Not surprisingly, signals of active, reliable support tend to come from citizens who have developed a strong partisan identity.

Such individuals have developed an attachment to specific political values and goals that help define who they are and what they do. They typically participate in primary elections. They tend to make donations to the party and attend party events. These patterns of behavior make the strong

partisan a strategic target for high-cost interpersonal contact. Likewise, when mobilization efforts unfold, they often make themselves available to receive appeals to action. In turn, strong partisans are among the most likely to report receiving interpersonal contact from the party they support (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992).

### *Beyond Partisanship: Psychological Traits and the Dynamics of Strategic Targeting*

As a practical matter, strategic targeting and successful contact may involve qualities other than partisanship as well. When competing parties target their most likely supporters, they aim to reach citizens who are energetic and reliable. They aim to reach those who will get involved, get others involved, and follow through on commitments. Strong partisans certainly fit this description, but it is unlikely that a strong partisan identity, by itself, is the sole source of these qualities. The activities that signal likely support to a party require more than a strong identification with values or goals. They also require a willingness to participate in the types of actions necessary to advance the party's electoral fortunes.

To this end, differences in stable, psychological tendencies may help explain why some citizens—and even some strong partisans—are more likely to become the strategic targets of electoral mobilization. Citizens, as human-beings, are not reducible to their social identities. Some may have psychological tendencies that make them more reliable and more amenable to taking public action. Moreover, these tendencies may make some citizens—and even some strong partisans—more likely than others to avail themselves to mobilizing contact.

Two traits in the Big Five—extraversion and openness to experience—may prove especially relevant.<sup>3</sup> These traits take on significance given the social quality that often characterizes political mobilization, and indeed, much of political life. Individuals who are highly extraverted and highly open to experience display a predisposition toward social engagement and even toward higher degrees of efficacy (Mak and Tran 2001; see also Bekkers 2005; Lounsbury, Loveland and Gibson 2003).

These tendencies extend to the realm of politics. Individuals who are relatively open to experience have exhibited a general tendency toward participation, while extraverts appear drawn

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<sup>3</sup> This is not to suggest that remaining three Big Five traits will not matter. Traits such as conscientiousness and emotional stability, for instance, may increase the likelihood that a citizen is reliable. Individuals high on agreeableness may be more inclined to cooperate owing to cooperative predisposition, while individuals low on agreeableness may be inclined to cooperate because their competitive nature motivates them to coordinate with others. The strongest basis for generating expectations, however, exist for openness and extraversion.

to forms of participation that entail social interaction (Mondak et al 2011; Mondak et al 2010). In the context of electoral mobilization, these tendencies motivate two expectations. The first pertains to partisans. Even among partisans, the relatively open and relatively extraverted may be the most willing to “pay the costs” that subsidize strategic targeting. They may be among the most likely to have participated in political action in the past, making them potentially more visible to political actors who engage in strategic targeting. Just as importantly, individuals predisposed toward participation and social interaction may be more accessible for receiving interpersonal appeals to action during mobilization efforts. They may pick up their phones and answer their doors.

The second implication pertains to non-partisans. Although strong partisans may be the most likely to be targeted with person-to-person contact, this pattern represents a generality, not an absolute. Sometimes parties do have the capacity to apply person-to-person contact more broadly, and when even person-to-person contact is strategically targeted toward partisans, citizens who are not the primary targets can receive it. Even so, citizens may not be equally likely to have this experience. Citizens must be available and willing to engage in social interaction with a political organizer. It seems plausible that even non-partisan citizens who are relatively open to experience and relatively extraverted might demonstrate these qualities.

Evidence of this sort would suggest that dominant dynamics of electoral mobilization reinforce the influence of psychological tendencies. It may be very unlikely for citizens who are closed to experience and introverted to meet a campaign organizer face-to-face. Consequently, these citizens may be systematically precluded from a potentially motivating mobilization experience. Meanwhile, for citizens who are open and extraverted, the experience of receiving mobilizing contact face-to-face may be much more likely. Those who seek social interactions may also attract social interactions. Of course, electoral publics do not form merely because citizens receive appeals to action. Electoral publics form and display their strength only when citizens take action, and there is reason to believe that traits influence the dynamics of mobilization at this juncture as well.

### **From Citizens to Publics:**

#### **Direct and Indirect Forms of Support**

For each party, the goal of electoral mobilization is to generate a stronger display of public support than the opposition. Parties rely upon citizens to make this happen. Citizens also

rely upon one another. Acting alone, no one citizen can exert much influence over an election. Just as parties benefit when citizens become motivated to support them, individual citizens benefit when others actively support the same party they do. To this end, two types of action call out for attention.

Victory in an election requires direct public support, delivered by means of the vote. This of course is the most consequential way that a public can show its strength. Yet building this strength requires indirect public support, which citizens provide by attempting to influence the actions of other citizens (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Because the focus of this study is on psychological traits and tendencies, and because the ability to provide some forms of electoral support—such as financial contributions—reflect systemic material inequalities (Verba, Scholzman, Brady 1995), attention in this chapter will be constrained to two forms of indirect support which most, if not all citizens, can perform if they are so inclined.

The first, participation in meetings and rallies, is important because it can help signal a candidate or party is viable. As scholarship on mobilization dynamics has argued, individuals appear to have different “tipping points” when it comes to contributing toward political goals. Some people appear more likely to commit their support early on; others want to see whether a goal will garner sufficient support so that their personal contribution will not be squandered (Chong 1991; Schelling 1978). Accordingly, campaigns have an incentive to develop a core of strong, visible supporters, so as to influence the perceptions and actions of others. Citizens who support a specific party also share that incentive. A second type of indirect support that virtually anyone can offer is persuading others to vote for or against a particular candidate or party. Campaigns stand to benefit from these because attempts at persuasion can help reinforce existing motivations and potentially sway citizens who have not yet decided which party to support (Mutz 2006; Zaller 1992). Again, citizens who support a specific party also benefit when fellow citizens openly share their preferences, as this can create an atmosphere conducive to victory.

### *Social Processes, Psychological Traits and the Creation of Electoral Publics*

The critical question then, is what motivates citizens to take direct and indirect electoral actions? To date, most explanations have focused primarily or entirely on social and environmental factors. Returning to Figure 3.1, several factors can influence whether citizens take action in the wake of mobilization campaigns. These include the familiar influences of partisan

identity. As previous studies have reported, citizens with stronger partisan identities tend to get more involved in a variety of electoral actions (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992). Mobilizing contact also appears to influence the actions of citizens, at least with respect to generating higher voter turnout. The effect of mobilizing contact appears especially great when appeals to action are delivered with a personal phone call or through face-to-face interaction (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Gerber and Green 2005; Gerber, Green and Nickerson 2003; Gerber and Green 2000).

Yet there is reason to believe that the results of mobilization are not reducible to partisan identities and the type of contact citizens receive. There is reason to believe that psychological traits influence the likelihood that citizens will take both direct and indirect electoral actions. Here again, the trait dimensions of openness to experience and extraversion are especially relevant. Consistently, citizens high in openness to experience have exhibited a greater probability of voting (Gerber et al 2011; Blais 2011; Mondak et al 2010; Vecchione and Caprara 2009). There is also evidence that highly extraverted citizens stand among the most likely to attend political meetings and rallies (Mondak et al. 2011; Mondak et al. 2010). Highly open and highly extraverted individuals also display a tendency for discussing politics with others (Mondak 2010). This scholarship has raised the possibility that some citizens may have psychological tendencies that facilitate public action, while others have tendencies that discourage participation. It has also left the social processes that may stimulate these traits unexplained.

Regardless of psychological tendencies, citizens do not spontaneously spring to action. They are mobilized by circumstances and by people. Because public participation in elections is an inherently social phenomenon, the interplay between social processes and psychological traits warrants examination. The existing literature on electoral mobilization suggests three possibilities.

The first possibility is that some psychological traits make participation more likely once citizens have received mobilization contact, and especially when mobilization contact is delivered person-to-person. Person-to-person contact appears distinctively effective at motivating participation *when citizens receive it*. This result has special significance for the highly open and highly extraverted citizens. Left to their own devices, citizens with such tendencies may prove no more likely to take action than anyone else. Participation in past electoral actions, may not, in itself, make present participation more likely. However, past participation may make being targeted for person-to-person solicitations about future participation more likely. Subsequently, citizens who are open to

experience and extraverted may be especially likely to be available for person-to-person contact and also prove especially stimulated by it. If so, they may become much more likely to take action than most other citizens. In this scenario, once one accounts for the influence of contact, one would expect the effect attributed to a particular trait dimension to “disappear” (or at least become greatly reduced).

A second possibility is that openness and extraversion exert a strong, positive effect on participation even when the influence of mobilizing contact is taken into account. The expectation of strategic targeting is that individuals who have been selected to receive costly, person-to-person appeals will prove among the most likely to get involved. This is because such individuals have signaled their reliable, active support as a consequence of past actions. In this scenario, citizens who are open and extraverted are more likely to receive person-to-person contact because they also demonstrate a greater tendency toward action. Put another way, elections constitute mobilizing events in-and-of themselves. When an election occurs, citizens with traits linked to participation may prove especially likely to devote their energy to electoral actions, no matter how they are contacted.

Finally, participation may be influenced by both a citizen’s psychological traits and the experience of receiving mobilizing contact. In such a case, the causal mechanism at work would be difficult to discern. It could be the case that the citizens most likely to receive person-to-person contact are already reliable, active supporters of a party. The contact may just be well-targeted. It could also be that citizens who receive this contact have an amenable psychological tendency and is especially stimulated by person-to-person appeals.

### **The 2006 Congressional Election Survey**

For the purpose of examining the potential influence of personality traits during mobilization, this study uses data from the 2006 Congressional Election Survey (CES), which provides a representative national sample, and a number of analytical benefits. First, the survey distinguishes between several different modes of mobilization—face-to-face contact, phone calls made in person, automated phone calls, and direct mailings. It also includes respondent self-reports about which parties contacted them and the degree of personal contact used by the parties. It is therefore possible to construct a scale of personal contact and to gain insight into who each party targeted with different degrees of personal contact. Second, the survey contains indicators of different forms of electoral participation which include voting, attending political gatherings, and

persuading others to take action. This affords insight into which types of participation appear subject to mobilization. Third, the survey contains several indicators of respondents' personality traits, a novel feature among surveys in political science. This allows for an examination of the influence of psychological differences on the reception and acceptance of mobilization attempts. Finally, the survey ascertains whether citizens received contact from the Democratic and Republican Parties during an historical election, when the parties faced very different electoral circumstances. Thus, it is possible to examine the extent to which the different electoral fortunes of the parties may have been influenced by differences in mobilization practices.

The analysis proceeds in two phases. The first phase focuses on who receives face-to-face contact from the parties, with an emphasis on psychological traits. This provides a strict test of the expectations regarding strategic targeting, given that face-to-face places the greatest demand on mobilization resources. The second phase focuses on the electoral participation that occurs following mobilization efforts. All results come from binomial logistic regression models.

### **The Qualities that Lead to Contact:**

#### **Strategic Targeting in the 2006 Congressional Elections**

When the 2006 congressional elections arrived, the Republican Party found itself waging an uphill battle. An unpopular Republican president was in the White House. Scandals had rocked some of the most prominent members of the party in both the House and Senate. The nation faced a sagging economy, in part due to the mounting costs of two increasingly unpopular wars heavily associated with Republican leadership. The Democratic Party was poised for a surge. Congressional seats that would normally be safe were now in play. Yet despite these very different circumstances, the nation's two major parties faced some common challenges. Both had a limited amount of time and finite amount of resources available to mobilize the strongest possible electoral public.

The mobilization efforts of each party reflect this. As expected, the more costly forms of contact, which also involve person-to-person contact, are received by the fewest citizens. Table 3.1 contains a breakdown of the most personal form of contact citizens received from the Democratic and Republican Parties. The forms of contact listed in the table range from face-to-face contact (which involves the most direct personal contact) to written materials (which involve the least personal contact) to no contact at all. With respect to each party, the percentages in each cell

represent the percentage of citizens reporting a given form of contact as the most personal form of contact they received. As Table 3.1 shows, most citizens did receive some type of contact from each party. Among citizens who were contacted, however, the largest proportion received the more impersonal forms of contact that come via written materials or automated phone calls. Just under a quarter of citizens report receiving some form of personal contact from either party. Roughly one in ten received face-to-face contact.

Consistent with the logic of strategic targeting, each party succeeded in reaching some of its most reliable, active supporters with the resource-intensive person-to-person contact. Table 3.2 presents a series of models containing covariates of face-to-face contact in Democratic mobilization efforts. Table 3.2 also presents a series of models addressing face-to-face contact in Republican mobilization efforts. With respect to each party's efforts, the baseline model contains covariates standard to research on electoral mobilization along with indicators of each trait dimension in the Big 5 taxonomy. For each party, citizens with the strongest partisan identities have a significantly higher chance of receiving contact. The predicted probability for strong Democrats is 0.16; the predicted probability for Republicans is 0.15.

Partisanship, however, is not the only quality that distinguishes citizens contacted face-to-face. Looking to the direct effects of traits in Democratic mobilization efforts, the effect of extraversion clearly stands out. For citizens with the highest levels of extraversion, the predicted probability of receiving face-to-face contact approaches 0.20—nearly twice the predicted probability for citizens at the mean on the extraversion continuum. Republican mobilization efforts, meanwhile, are slightly more likely to reach individuals who are relatively open to experience. The predicted probability that a highly open citizen receives face-to-face contact from the Republican Party is 0.14. For citizens at the mean on openness, the predicted probability is 0.11. Taken together, these findings comport with expectations. They also suggest a reason for the difference in the parties' electoral fortunes. For in-person contact to be effective, the individuals targeted for such contact must receive it. On that front, the Democrats met with more success.

Yet when it comes to targeting personal contact, parties have an incentive to do more than merely reach their most likely identifiers or those who are simply most accessible to receive personal contact. If parties focus mobilization resources on efforts to reinforce existing motivations, and if the parties are successful in this, one would expect the probability of personal

contact would be higher for strong partisans especially inclined to *enact* their partisanship. To the extent that psychological tendencies exert significant influence, this would include strong partisans predisposed toward social engagement. This implies a possible explanatory role for the traits of openness to experience and extraversion. To test the proposition that strong partisans with these tendencies will prove most likely to receive personal contact, the last two models include the appropriate interaction terms.

Very clearly, the Democratic Party not only hones in on its strongest partisans, but also those strong partisans with psychological tendencies linked to action. The efforts of the Republican Party in 2006 do not meet with the same success. As Figure 3.2A illustrates, Strong Democrats who are highly open to experience have a one in four chance of receiving face-to-face contact. Given that most citizens have slightly better than a one in ten chance at receiving face-to-face contact, this pattern is noteworthy. The pattern with respect to extraversion is even starker. Looking to Figure 3.2B, roughly one in three of the most highly extraverted of strong Democrats receive mobilizing contact face-to-face. For the most introverted strong Democrats, the predicted probability is closer to 0.05—a 30 point swing. There is also a notable difference—nearly 16 points—between highly extraverted strong Democrats and non-partisans. In essence, both the social identity and the trait matter and, in combination, provide a fuller explanation of why some individuals are more likely to receive personal contact than does either factor taken separately.

On the Republican side, neither the highly open nor the highly extraverted receive face-to-face contact to any distinctive degree. This may, in part, reflect the resource constraints on Republican mobilization efforts in 2006. Amidst difficult political circumstances, funds for executing face-to-face contact may have been more scarce than usual. This may have precluded reaching citizens who would have otherwise made time for a face-to-face appeal. A second possibility may be even more likely. Although mobilization resources may have been constrained, one would expect citizens predisposed toward social interaction to remain among the most likely recipients of face-to-face contact. The fact that this does not happen in Republican mobilization could mean that these citizens simply did not engage. In the face of dismal electoral prospects, their normally distinctive tendencies may have been dampened.

**Electoral Publics-in-Action:  
Voting, Rallies and Attempts at Persuasion**

At the reception stage of mobilization, both the Democratic and Republican Parties connect with individuals predisposed toward actively supporting them. Both parties succeed in targeting their strong partisans. On this front, Democratic efforts reach citizens who are both strong partisans and predisposed toward social interaction. These are the characteristics one would expect to find in past supporters who will likely prove supportive again.

Still, questions remain about the process by which psychological traits influence propensities for public action. It is one thing to know that highly open and extraverted citizens are more likely to take electoral actions. It is another thing to determine how citizens with these tendencies become motivated to participate. It may be the case the citizens with these tendencies become more likely to take action because they are simply more likely to experience effective mobilization appeals. Person-to-person contact may be enough to motivate most people to action, but because some are more out-going than others, they become more likely to receive contact. Alternatively, highly open and extraverted citizens may generally have a greater inclination to participate, no matter how they are contacted. The occurrence of an election may be enough to stimulate them into action. Finally, the psychological tendencies of openness and extraversion may operate in combination with mobilizing contact to make participation more likely.

*Direct Electoral Support*

Table 3.3 contains models of vote choice in the 2006 congressional elections. The first set of models in the table addresses the choice of voting for a Democratic candidate. The second set of models addresses the choice of voting for a Republican. In each set, the first model contains indicators of Big 5 traits and partisan identification, along with demographic controls. The second model in each set adds the indicator of mobilizing contact. This measure incorporates the insight that “personal contact” generally makes citizens more likely to participate. Accordingly, the measure captures the degree of personal contact a citizen receives, and ranges from “no contact” to “face-to-face contact.” The last model in each set adds two interaction terms. The first explores the possibility of interactive relationship between mobilizing contact and openness, while the second explores the possibility of such a relationship between mobilizing contact and extraversion.

Of the traits of theoretical interest, only openness exerts a direct effect on vote choice and does so only among citizens who vote for the Democratic Party. The more important finding, however, is the magnitude of this effect remains almost the same when the measure of mobilizing contact is added to the model. Mobilizing contact exhibits the positive relationship with vote choice that one would expect. Yet it does not mediate the relationship between openness and vote choice. Over and above the effect of contact, highly open citizens cast their ballots for the Democrats. Further, there is no evidence of a significant interactive relationship involving mobilizing contact and openness. Across different levels of mobilizing contact, the predicted probability that highly open citizens vote for the Democrats consistently increases across all levels of personal contact.

The story for extraversion is a bit different. Citizens with higher levels of extraversion do not demonstrate a strong tendency toward voting for either party, left to their own devices. Displayed in Figure 3.3A and 3.3B, extraverts who receive person-to-person mobilizing contact, however, exhibit a different pattern. On the Democratic side of the mobilization slate, extraverts who receive face-to-face contact vote Democrat with a predicted probability of slightly greater than 0.40. This is 20 points higher than extraverts who are not contacted at all by the party. Equally striking is that introverts—who are among the least likely to receive mobilizing contact face-to-face—vote Democrat with a predicted probability of 0.80 when they do. On the Republican side of things, only about one in five introverts who receive face-to-face contact vote for the Republican Party, as compared to nearly four out of five extraverts. Recall, however, that like most other citizens, only about one in ten highly extraverted citizens received contact from the Republican Party face-to-face. Hence, even though extraverts displayed a lower probability of voting for the Democratic Party when they received face-to-face contact, the Democrats still appear to have done better at turning out this subset of citizens because they reached them more often.

### *Indirect Electoral Support*

The task of voting may be the most vital function of an electoral public, but it is not the only task citizens undertake during an election. Citizens also attempt to build the strength of the electoral public to which they belong. As compared to the act of voting, however, acts of indirect support tend to require much greater investments of time and energy. They also tend to involve much greater social interaction.

Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 each contain models for a different type of indirect electoral action. Table 3.4 addresses participation in meetings and rallies. Table 3.5 addresses whether citizens attempted to persuade others to *vote for* a Republican or Democratic candidate. Finally, Table 3.6 turns to whether citizens attempted to persuade others *to vote against* a Republican or Democratic Candidate. Each table contains models for participation in acts that support the Democratic and Republican Party, respectively. For all three acts of support for each party, the first column in each table presents a baseline model containing indicators of the Big 5, partisanship, and demographic controls. The second model adds a measure of mobilizing contact. The final models include an interaction term for the relationship between contact and openness and a second interaction term for the relationship between contact and extraversion.

Across all three forms of indirect action, some clear patterns emerge. One pattern pertains to openness. Citizens highly open to experience demonstrate a tendency toward trying to persuade other citizens. This finding emerges for supporters of both parties, who attempt to both bolster the party they favor *and* disparage their opponent. Further, the magnitude of this relationship remains the same, even when taking contact into account. Once again, a significant relationship between contact and the likelihood of taking action also emerges, suggesting that at very least, mobilizing contact has been well placed. However, the effects of traits do not appear to be mediated through the experience of receiving mobilizing contact.

A similar pattern emerges with respect to extraversion, although only for supporters of the Democratic Party. The highly extraverted demonstrate a tendency to persuade others to cast their support for the Democrats and against the Republicans. In the case of persuading others to support the party, however, mobilizing contact does partially account for the relationship between extraversion and action. Extraversion also plays a prominent role in the dynamics that lead to participation in meetings and rallies. Here again, a significant relationship only emerges among supporters of the Democratic Party, and again, the magnitude of the relationship remains virtually the same, even when accounting for the effect of mobilizing contact.

One final set of patterns also warrants attention. The models including terms for contact-trait interactions call further attention to the political significance of extraversion. Yet again, the patterns of interest emerge only among Democratic supporters. As shown in Figure 3.4, the predicted probability of rally and meeting attendance approaches 0.40 for individuals with the highest values on extraversion who report face-to-face contact. Individuals reporting less

personal forms of contact participate in meetings and rallies with a predicted probability just above zero. Impressively, one in five highly extraverted citizens contacted in-person by the Democrats respond by giving their vote and attending party events.

Looking across these three forms of indirect action, two conclusions become apparent. First, the occurrence of an election appears to be enough to stimulate citizens with tendencies toward openness and extraversion. Although some highly open citizens, namely strong Democrats, are among the most likely to receive face-to-face contact during mobilization campaigns, citizens who possess this tendency demonstrate propensity for action across different levels of personal contact. Although highly extraverted citizens also have a tendency to receive person-to-person contact, at least from the Democrats, they too appear ready and willing to go even after accounting for the effect of contact.

The second conclusion concerns the differences in results across parties. In 2006, highly extraverted citizens demonstrate a greater tendency to put their support behind the Democrats. The Democrats also received indirect support from highly open citizens, and while the Republicans did too, the cumulative effect of highly open and highly extraverted weighs in favor the Democratic Party. It is therefore plausible that these individuals helped create and sustain the perception that the Democratic Party would win during what became an historic midterm election.

### **The Electoral Significance of Psychological Traits and What It Means for Citizens**

In the ritual conflict of elections, victory comes just one way. Competing political parties know it and so do the electoral publics that support them. Given the need to build strength in numbers, political parties seek to motivate their most active and reliable supporters. They attempt to target them during mobilization campaigns, expending resources to connect with them in-person. These citizens, in turn, extend their influence by attempting to mobilize others. It is a process that requires time, energy, and a willingness to engage in social interactions. For this reason, citizens who are open to experience and extraverted become valuable. They are more likely to pay the costs of electoral participation, owing in part to their psychological tendencies.

This description, of course, will be familiar to the student of trait psychology. Yet the political significance of this pattern lies beyond the observation of direct relationship between traits and participation. In the context of electoral politics, highly open and extraverted citizens

were also more likely to experience the type mobilizing contact that is both the costliest and the most likely to generate participation. This dynamic may potentially reinforce participatory tendencies in those who are already among the most likely to participate. Conversely, because this form of mobilizing contact is concentrated in this way, citizens who may need a stronger inducement to participate may be precluded from getting it. In the first place, they may be less likely to be targeted for face-to-face contact. Secondly, when such contact is attempted, they may be more reticent to engage it. Just as citizens who are highly open and extraverted may have psychological asset when it comes to participation, many citizens who are closed to experience and introverted may live with an invisible barrier. Owing to differences in biologically-linked and temporally stable traits, citizens may have very different experiences of democratic life.

Although nothing about this situation should be taken as *inevitable*, it seems *unlikely* that practitioners of electoral mobilization will do much alter this dynamic. When resources are tight and time is of the essence, the most practical option for campaigns is to hone in the most accessible and willing of citizens. Helping citizens break out of this pattern may simply require looking inward first for a deeper understanding of how the psychological shapes the social.

## Chapter 3 Tables and Figures

**Table 3.1 Calls to Action: Distribution of Contact by Party**

| <i>Type of Contact</i> | <u>Democratic Party</u> | <u>Republican Party</u> |
|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Face-to-Face           | 12%                     | 11%                     |
| Personal Phone Calls   | 12%                     | 12%                     |
| Automated Phone Calls  | 20%                     | 24%                     |
| Written Materials      | 26%                     | 26%                     |
| No Contact             | 31%                     | 28%                     |
| Obs.                   | 1157                    | 1160                    |

*Source:* Congressional Election Study, 2006

*Notes.* Entries are the percentage of respondents reporting each form of contact as the most personal form contact they received.

**Table 3.2 Mobilizing Contact: Face to Face Contact from the Democratic and Republican Parties**

|                                    | Contact from Democratic Party |                    |                    | Contact from Republican Party |                    |                    |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                                    | Model 1a:<br>Baseline         | Model 2a           | Model 3a           | Model 1b:<br>Baseline         | Model 2b           | Model 3b           |
| <i><u>Personality</u></i>          |                               |                    |                    |                               |                    |                    |
| Openness to Experience             | 0.62<br>(0.49)                | 1.68**<br>(0.65)   | 0.62<br>(0.50)     | 0.87#<br>(0.51)               | 1.73<br>(0.79)     | 0.86#<br>(0.51)    |
| Conscientiousness                  | -0.50<br>(0.44)               | -0.50<br>(0.45)    | -0.48<br>(0.45)    | 0.16<br>(0.46)                | -0.15<br>(0.46)    | -0.15<br>(0.46)    |
| Extraversion                       | 0.96*<br>(0.40)               | 1.00*<br>(0.40)    | 1.93***<br>(0.55)  | 0.49<br>(0.41)                | 0.49<br>(0.41)     | 1.11#<br>(0.68)    |
| Agreeableness                      | -0.45<br>(0.48)               | -0.49<br>(0.48)    | -0.46<br>(0.48)    | -0.27<br>(0.48)               | -0.30<br>(0.49)    | 0.27<br>(0.48)     |
| Emotional Stability                | -0.32<br>(0.49)               | -0.36<br>(0.50)    | -0.41<br>(0.50)    | -0.53<br>(0.51)               | -0.56<br>(0.51)    | -0.55<br>(0.51)    |
| <i><u>Social/Environmental</u></i> |                               |                    |                    |                               |                    |                    |
| Partisan Identification (PID)      | -0.14**<br>(0.05)             | 0.12<br>(0.12)     | 0.05<br>(0.09)     | 0.14**<br>(0.05)              | 0.29<br>(0.12)     | 0.23**<br>(0.09)   |
| Age                                | 0.02*<br>(0.01)               | 0.02*<br>(0.01)    | 0.02*<br>(0.01)    | 0.00<br>(0.01)                | 0.00<br>(0.01)     | 0.00<br>(0.01)     |
| Sex                                | 0.13<br>(0.21)                | 0.13<br>(0.21)     | 0.16<br>(0.21)     | 0.31<br>(0.22)                | 0.30<br>(0.21)     | 0.28<br>(0.22)     |
| Race                               | 1.04<br>(0.68)                | 1.05<br>(0.69)     | 1.09<br>(0.69)     | 0.68<br>(0.74)                | 0.68<br>(0.74)     | 0.72<br>(0.74)     |
| Competitive District               | 0.07<br>(0.25)                | 0.10<br>(0.25)     | 0.04<br>(0.25)     | -0.05<br>(0.25)               | -0.04<br>(0.25)    | -0.06<br>(0.26)    |
| PID x Openness                     | --                            | -0.56*<br>(0.23)   | --                 | --                            | -0.28<br>(0.20)    | --                 |
| PID x Extraversion                 | --                            | --                 | -0.42*<br>(0.17)   | --                            | --                 | -0.18<br>(0.16)    |
| Intercept                          | -2.52***<br>(0.53)            | -3.11***<br>(0.59) | -2.96***<br>(0.57) | -3.06***<br>(0.55)            | -3.53***<br>(0.66) | -3.33***<br>(0.61) |
| Pseudo. R-Squared                  | 0.05                          | 0.06               | 0.06               | 0.03                          | 0.04               | 0.04               |
| Obs.                               | 1060                          | 1060               | 1060               | 1062                          | 1062               | 1062               |

Source: Congressional Election Study, 2006

Notes. Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10

**Table 3.3 Electoral Publics-in-Action: Vote Choice in the 2006 Congressional Elections**

|                             | <u>Voted Democrat</u> |                      |                    |                    | <u>Voted Republican</u> |                      |                    |                    |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                             | Model 1a:<br>Baseline | Model 2a:<br>Contact | Model 3a           | Model 4a           | Model 1b:<br>Baseline   | Model 2b:<br>Contact | Model 3b           | Model 4b           |
| <u>Personality</u>          |                       |                      |                    |                    |                         |                      |                    |                    |
| Openness to Experience      | 1.08*<br>(0.44)       | 1.05*<br>(0.46)      | 0.78<br>(0.63)     | 1.07*<br>(0.48)    | -0.02<br>(0.51)         | -0.18<br>(0.52)      | -0.40<br>(0.77)    | -0.21<br>(0.53)    |
| Conscientiousness           | -0.24<br>(0.39)       | -0.10<br>(0.40)      | -0.11<br>(0.40)    | -0.06<br>(0.41)    | -0.43<br>(0.44)         | -0.49<br>(0.44)      | -0.47<br>(0.44)    | -0.56<br>(0.44)    |
| Extraversion                | -0.37<br>(0.37)       | -0.49<br>(0.39)      | -0.50<br>(0.39)    | 0.29<br>(0.54)     | 0.58<br>(0.41)          | 0.57<br>(0.41)       | 0.59<br>(0.42)     | -0.43<br>(0.66)    |
| Agreeableness               | -0.15<br>(0.42)       | -0.43<br>(0.49)      | -0.41<br>(0.44)    | -0.44<br>(0.44)    | 0.39<br>(0.47)          | 0.54<br>(0.48)       | 0.52<br>(0.48)     | 0.58<br>(0.48)     |
| Emotional Stability         | -0.92*<br>(0.42)      | -0.77#<br>(0.44)     | -0.78#<br>(0.44)   | -0.72<br>(0.44)    | -0.91#<br>(0.06)        | -0.85#<br>(0.49)     | -0.83#<br>(0.49)   | -0.93*<br>(0.49)   |
| <u>Social/Environmental</u> |                       |                      |                    |                    |                         |                      |                    |                    |
| Partisan Identification     | -0.67***<br>(0.05)    | -0.65***<br>(0.05)   | -0.64***<br>(0.05) | -0.65***<br>(0.05) | 0.82***<br>(0.06)       | 0.80***<br>(0.06)    | 0.80***<br>(0.05)  | 0.81***<br>(0.05)  |
| Contact                     | --                    | 0.46**<br>(0.05)     | 0.36*<br>(0.17)    | 0.69***<br>(0.13)  | --                      | 0.34***<br>(0.08)    | 0.51***<br>(0.18)  | 0.10<br>(0.14)     |
| Contact x Openness          | --                    | --                   | 0.21<br>(0.34)     | --                 | --                      | --                   | -0.37<br>(0.36)    | --                 |
| Contact x Extraversion      | --                    | --                   | --                 | 0.52*<br>(0.25)    | --                      | --                   | --                 | 0.58<br>(0.29)     |
| Intercept                   | -0.74***<br>(0.47)    | -0.44<br>(0.49)      | 0.57<br>(0.53)     | 0.10<br>(0.50)     | -4.56***<br>(0.58)      | -4.38***<br>(0.69)   | -5.15***<br>(0.66) | -4.36***<br>(0.65) |
| Pseudo. R-Squared           | 0.47                  | 0.51                 | 0.51               | 0.52               | 0.53                    | 0.55                 | 0.55               | 0.55               |
| Obs.                        | 907                   | 903                  | 903                | 903                | 908                     | 905                  | 905                | 905                |

Source: Congressional Election Study, 2006

Notes. Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10. Models include Age, Sex, Race, and District Competitiveness as Controls.

**Table 3.4 Electoral Publics-in-Action: Participating in a Rally/Meeting**

|                             | <u>Democrat Party Event</u> |                     |                   |                   | <u>Republican Party Event</u> |                     |                   |                    |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
|                             | Model1a:<br>Baseline        | Model2a:<br>Contact | Model3a           | Model4a           | Model1b:<br>Baseline          | Model2b:<br>Contact | Model3b           | Model4b            |
| <u>Personality</u>          |                             |                     |                   |                   |                               |                     |                   |                    |
| Openness to Experience      | 0.40<br>(1.20)              | -2.04<br>(1.58)     | -11.33<br>(10.55) | -2.56<br>(1.71)   | 1.18<br>(2.13)                | -1.47<br>(2.36)     | -20.67<br>(10.32) | -1.19<br>(2.46)    |
| Conscientiousness           | 0.05<br>(1.11)              | 0.58<br>(1.28)      | 0.53<br>(1.29)    | 0.46<br>(1.31)    | 0.93<br>(1.97)                | 0.98<br>(2.48)      | -0.01<br>(2.69)   | -1.82<br>(2.56)    |
| Extraversion                | 3.20**<br>(0.99)            | 2.96**<br>(1.20)    | 2.90<br>(1.21)    | -9.89<br>(7.57)   | 0.93<br>(1.66)                | 0.32<br>(1.97)      | -0.03<br>(2.15)   | 12.97<br>(8.41)    |
| Agreeableness               | -2.36#<br>(1.28)            | -2.68<br>(1.72)     | -2.67<br>(1.73)   | -2.34<br>(1.75)   | -2.26<br>(2.11)               | -2.95<br>(2.59)     | -3.78<br>(3.16)   | -3.34<br>(2.66)    |
| Emotional Stability         | 1.27<br>(1.14)              | 1.91<br>(1.55)      | 1.85<br>(1.58)    | 2.09<br>(1.59)    | -0.26<br>(2.02)               | 0.76<br>(2.23)      | 1.90<br>(2.60)    | 0.79<br>(2.30)     |
| <u>Social/Environmental</u> |                             |                     |                   |                   |                               |                     |                   |                    |
| Partisan Identification     | -0.76***<br>(0.19)          | -0.70***<br>(0.22)  | -0.69**<br>(0.22) | -0.74**<br>(0.23) | 1.34#<br>(0.75)               | 1.32#<br>(0.77)     | 1.52#<br>(0.87)   | 1.39#<br>(0.79)    |
| Contact                     | --                          | 2.08**<br>(0.52)    | 1.09<br>(1.07)    | 0.65<br>(0.74)    | --                            | 1.47*<br>(0.58)     | 5.40*<br>(2.45)   | 3.93*<br>(1.95)    |
| Contact x Openness          | --                          | --                  | 2.45<br>(2.71)    |                   | --                            | --                  | 5.90*<br>(2.93)   | --                 |
| Contact x Extraversion      | --                          | --                  | --                | 3.49*<br>(1.79)   | --                            | --                  | --                | -3.78<br>(2.37)    |
| Intercept                   | -3.79***<br>(1.30)          | -8.20<br>(2.50)     | -4.51<br>(4.24)   | -2.92<br>(3.11)   | -12.81***<br>(4.63)           | -15.90**<br>(5.42)  | -3.05*<br>(1.13)  | -24.71**<br>(9.12) |
| Pseudo. R-Squared           | 0.28                        | 0.54                | 0.54              | 0.56              | 0.33                          | 0.48                | 0.56              | 0.52               |
| Obs.                        | 1065                        | 1060                | 1060              | 1060              | 1066                          | 1062                | 1062              | 1062               |

Source: Congressional Election Study, 2006

Notes. Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10. Models include Age, Sex, Race, and District Competitiveness as Controls.

**Table 3.5 Electoral Publics-in-Action: Persuading Others to Support Candidate**

|                             | <u>Support Democrat</u> |                     |                    |                   | <u>Support Republican</u> |                     |                    |                    |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                             | Model1a:<br>Baseline    | Model2a:<br>Contact | Model3a            | Model4a           | Model1b:<br>Baseline      | Model2b:<br>Contact | Model3b            | Model4b            |
| <u>Personality</u>          |                         |                     |                    |                   |                           |                     |                    |                    |
| Openness to Experience      | 2.21***<br>(0.60)       | -2.22***<br>(0.62)  | 1.61#<br>(0.98)    | 2.17***<br>(0.62) | 1.49#<br>(0.74)           | 1.43#<br>(0.75)     | 3.10*<br>(1.21)    | 1.44#<br>(0.75)    |
| Conscientiousness           | -0.69<br>(0.57)         | -0.48<br>(0.58)     | -0.44<br>(0.59)    | -0.51<br>(0.58)   | 0.60<br>(0.67)            | 0.68<br>(0.68)      | 0.71<br>(0.68)     | 0.66<br>(0.68)     |
| Extraversion                | 0.99*<br>(0.49)         | 0.75<br>(0.51)      | 0.69<br>(0.51)     | 0.01<br>(0.89)    | 0.23<br>(0.58)            | 0.23<br>(0.59)      | 0.23<br>(0.59)     | -0.08<br>(1.07)    |
| Agreeableness               | -0.11<br>(0.63)         | -0.31<br>(0.66)     | -0.32<br>(0.66)    | -0.26<br>(0.66)   | -0.21<br>(0.69)           | -0.08<br>(0.70)     | -0.11<br>(0.70)    | -0.05<br>(0.70)    |
| Emotional Stability         | -0.48<br>(0.59)         | -0.48<br>(0.60)     | -0.52<br>(0.61)    | -0.54<br>(0.60)   | -0.90<br>(0.70)           | 0.93<br>(0.71)      | -0.89<br>(0.71)    | -0.94<br>(0.72)    |
| <u>Social/Environmental</u> |                         |                     |                    |                   |                           |                     |                    |                    |
| Partisan Identification     | -0.45***<br>(0.07)      | -0.40***<br>(0.07)  | -0.40***<br>(0.07) | -0.39**<br>(0.07) | 0.92***<br>(0.14)         | 0.89***<br>(0.13)   | 0.91***<br>(0.14)  | 0.89***<br>(0.14)  |
| Contact                     | --                      | 0.36***<br>(0.10)   | 0.18<br>(0.24)     | 0.19<br>(0.18)    | --                        | 0.26*<br>(0.11)     | 0.66*<br>(0.27)    | 3.93*<br>(1.95)    |
| Contact x Openness          | --                      | --                  | 0.32<br>(0.41)     | --                | --                        | --                  | 0.86*<br>(0.50)    | --                 |
| Contact x Extraversion      | --                      | --                  | --                 | 0.35<br>(0.34)    | --                        | --                  | --                 | 0.18<br>(0.22)     |
| Intercept                   | -1.67**<br>(0.64)       | -1.94**<br>(0.67)   | -1.62*<br>(0.79)   | -1.63*<br>(0.73)  | -7.03***<br>(1.03)        | -7.30***<br>(1.24)  | -8.30***<br>(1.13) | -7.17***<br>(1.12) |
| Pseudo. R-Squared           | 0.21                    | 0.25                | 0.25               | 0.25              | 0.32                      | 0.34                | 0.34               | 0.34               |
| Obs.                        | 873                     | 870                 | 870                | 870               | 873                       | 871                 | 871                | 871                |

Source: Congressional Election Study, 2006

Notes. Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10. Models include Age, Sex, Race, and District Competitiveness as Controls.


**Table 3.6 Electoral Publics-in-Action: Persuading Others to Oppose Candidate**

|                             | <u>Oppose Democrat</u> |                     |                    |                    | <u>Oppose Republican</u> |                     |                    |                    |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                             | Model1a:<br>Baseline   | Model2a:<br>Contact | Model3a            | Model4a            | Model1a:<br>Baseline     | Model2b:<br>Contact | Model3b            | Model4b            |
| <u>Personality</u>          |                        |                     |                    |                    |                          |                     |                    |                    |
| Openness to Experience      | 1.89**<br>(0.63)       | 1.88**<br>(0.63)    | 1.06<br>(1.01)     | 1.85**<br>(0.63)   | 1.82*<br>(0.73)          | 1.75*<br>(0.75)     | 4.12***<br>(1.20)  | 1.78*<br>(0.74)    |
| Conscientiousness           | -0.64<br>(0.59)        | -0.64<br>(0.59)     | -0.60<br>(0.59)    | -0.68<br>(0.59)    | 1.23#<br>(0.67)          | 1.37*<br>(0.69)     | 1.40*<br>(0.70)    | 1.32#<br>(0.70)    |
| Extraversion                | 0.91*<br>(0.51)        | 0.91#<br>(0.51)     | 0.85<br>(0.51)     | 0.11<br>(0.89)     | -0.04<br>(0.59)          | 0.08<br>(0.60)      | -0.09<br>(0.61)    | -0.89<br>(1.14)    |
| Agreeableness               | 0.22<br>(0.67)         | 0.22<br>(0.67)      | -0.21<br>(0.67)    | -0.28<br>(0.67)    | -0.90<br>(0.70)          | -0.76<br>(0.71)     | -0.81<br>(0.72)    | -0.72<br>(0.71)    |
| Emotional Stability         | -0.59<br>(0.61)        | -0.59<br>(0.61)     | -0.65<br>(0.62)    | -0.67<br>(0.62)    | -0.85<br>(0.70)          | 0.87<br>(0.72)      | -0.78<br>(0.72)    | -0.90<br>(0.73)    |
| <u>Social/Environmental</u> |                        |                     |                    |                    |                          |                     |                    |                    |
| Partisan Identification     | -0.30***<br>(0.07)     | -0.29***<br>(0.07)  | -0.29***<br>(0.07) | -0.29**<br>(0.07)  | 0.70***<br>(0.11)        | 0.66***<br>(0.11)   | 0.69***<br>(0.12)  | 0.67***<br>(0.12)  |
| Contact                     | --                     | 0.35***<br>(0.10)   | 0.12<br>(0.24)     | 0.17<br>(0.18)     | --                       | 0.33***<br>(0.11)   | 0.93***<br>(0.27)  | 0.17<br>(0.22)     |
| Contact x Openness          | --                     | --                  | 0.44<br>(0.22)     | --                 | --                       | --                  | 1.23*<br>(0.49)    | --                 |
| Contact x Extraversion      | --                     | --                  | --                 | 0.38<br>(0.34)     | --                       | --                  | --                 | 0.37<br>(0.44)     |
| Intercept                   | -2.88**<br>(0.70)      | -2.88**<br>(0.69)   | -2.44**<br>(0.79)  | -2.53***<br>(0.73) | -5.58***<br>(0.91)       | -5.88***<br>(0.94)  | -7.35***<br>(1.16) | -7.17***<br>(1.12) |
| Pseudo. R-Squared           | 0.20                   | 0.20                | 0.20               | 0.25               | 0.28                     | 0.34                | 0.32               | 0.30               |
| Obs.                        | 873                    | 873                 | 873                | 873                | 876                      | 874                 | 874                | 874                |


Source: Congressional Election Study, 2006

Notes. Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10. Models include Age, Sex, Race, and District Competitiveness as Controls.


**Figure 3.1 The Potential Function of Personality in Mobilizing Electoral Publics**




**Figure 3.2 Face-to-Face Contact from the Democratic Party**



**Figure 3.3 Vote Choice in the 2006 Congressional Election**



**Figure 3.4 Participation in Meetings and Rallies**



## **CHAPTER 4:**

### **MOBILIZING JURIDICAL PUBLICS**

In every courthouse there is a room where a select group of citizens convene. They interpret evidence. They make decisions about the application of laws. Ultimately, they render judgments that will affect the lives of others. When the door to the jury room closes, the citizens who have convened there undertake some of the most important tasks of democratic life. By undertaking these tasks these citizens become a unique form of public—a juridical public—and in doing so, they act as select members of the political community, representing the political community as whole. These publics form, through mobilization, in two phases. First, citizens must comply with a summons to duty. Then, citizens must be selected to participate on a jury, entrusted to render judgments.

In principle, all individuals recognized as citizens have the opportunity to represent the political community in this way. All recognized citizens have an equal chance to receive a summons to jury duty. All citizens who accept this civic duty face the same process of juror selection; everyone has the same opportunity to demonstrate their competence as a potential juror. Some are then selected to serve on juries, on the basis of the qualities they demonstrate. In practice, however, concerns have arisen about the representativeness of those selected as jurors, particularly with respect to race, ethnicity, gender and class (Walters, Marin and Curriden 2005; Fukarai, Butler and Krooth 1993). Such concerns, historically and contemporarily, have raised questions about both the quality of jury deliberations (Sommers 2006) and the very legitimacy of judicial decisions (Ellis and Diamond 2003; Sheridan 2003). The practical concern, of course, is not with skin color, anatomy, or bank accounts, but rather the experiences that accompany them. If certain experiences and perspectives are under-represented or not represented at all during deliberations, trial outcomes may be biased or perceived as less legitimate. It is for this reason that we cannot overlook who is in the jury room.

For this same reason, we cannot ignore how citizens get to the jury room. Without question, the process of juror selection is critical to this matter, as disparities in the social and economic backgrounds of jurors can and do emerge at this juncture. Yet the summons phase of juridical mobilization is equally critical. In many localities across the United States, low compliance rates have become a significant problem (Boatright 1998). When compliance rates fall low enough, the very right of citizens to an expedient trial by one's peers can be compromised. Trials get delayed.

Citizens who may have potentially useful experiences and qualities of judgment become functionally inaccessible to the judicial process.

Conventionally, scholars have approached these issues by focusing primarily or entirely on social and environmental factors that can shape and constrain the lives of citizens. Attention to the implications of race, gender, educational attainment, and occupational status has become increasingly common, and for good reason. These personal qualities are laden with social meaning and can influence the juror selection process in ways that the participants may not consciously recognize (Sommers and Norton 2007). Attention to social and environmental explanations has become equally commonplace in the study of summons non-compliance. Three such explanations have achieved great prominence. Some have argued that the meager compensation provided to jurors by most local courts creates a financial disincentive for compliance. By extension, while this disincentive may operate in a general manner upon all citizens (Boatright 1998), the greatest disincentive may be experienced by those with lower incomes (Seamone 2002; Fukarai and Butler 1991), who are already under-represented on juries. Individuals with lower incomes can least afford to experience a net loss in wages in order to comply with a summons. Thus, if individuals with lower incomes have employers that will not compensate them if they miss work for jury service, or if they perceive that this will be the case, they may be even less likely to comply than their more affluent counterparts.

Others have directed attention to the existence of more entrenched social and cultural obstacles—such as familial commitments and language barriers—that can disproportionately deter women and ethnic minorities from jury service (Eades 2003; Ellis and Diamond 2003; Fukarai, Butler, and Krooth 1993). Finally, some observers have argued that pervasive summons non-compliance derives from an erosion of civic responsibility in our political culture (Behrens and Underhill 2003, p145-147; Lilly 2001).

Thorough consideration of each of these possibilities is indispensable for court systems attempting to diagnose the sources of non-compliance and for scholars concerned with inequalities in the civic environment. Even so, social and environmental factors may not provide a sufficient account for the juridical problems many communities currently face. By focusing solely on social and environmental factors, the conventional approach to studying juror participation has often assumed that these factors operate the same way on all individuals. Consequently, a potentially important set of explanatory factors has remained in the shadows.

As citizens we are people first, and as people, we possess durable psychological traits that shape how we see the world and how we act in it. Some of us are drawn to new experiences; others are not. Some of us possess a deep sense of commitment to our responsibilities; others are less fervent about such matters. Some of us find stimulation in social interactions; others shy from such activities (Mondak 2010; McCrae and Costa 2003). This chapter argues that by recognizing this aspect of the human condition, a new means of understanding juridical mobilization becomes available to us. To understand why some citizens get to the jury room while others do not, we must look beyond the social and environmental factors citizens encounter to also examine the personal—in this case psychological—qualities of citizens themselves.

Doing so brings several questions about citizen motivations into view. At the summons phase of mobilization, is it the case that some psychological tendencies make citizens more amenable to the requirements of jury service and especially motivated to overcome environmental barriers to service? Conversely, do some psychological tendencies lead citizens to turn away from jury service or make environmental obstacles more difficult to handle? Likewise, attention to systematic differences in psychological tendencies raises an important question about the juror selection process. Do some citizens display qualities that increase their probability of being seated on a jury? At each phase of mobilization then, the psychological traits of citizens may affect who comes to represent the political community on juries, and in turn, how matters of legal justice are decided. Yet to date, this possibility has gone almost completely ignored (but see Clark et al. 2007).

Accordingly, because the mobilization of juridical publics occurs in two phases, this chapter unfolds in two parts. We first turn to the challenge of non-compliance with the summons, then to the matter of juror selection.

### **Summons Non-Compliance:**

#### **The First Challenge of Juridical Mobilization:**

The mobilization of juridical publics begins with the issuing of a summons. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, when citizens receive the summons, they face a choice. They can either accept jury service as a civic responsibility or reject it as a commitment that need not be fulfilled.<sup>4</sup> For those who

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<sup>4</sup> “Acceptance” of one’s civic duty in this context carries a specific and practical meaning. For citizens to meaningfully accept jury service as a civic duty, they must do more than recognize that jury service is important or that citizens like themselves *should* perform this duty when called upon. Rather, to meaningfully accept jury service as a civic duty, citizens must be psychologically willing to perform this service in the absence of impediments in

accept jury service as a civic responsibility, there is a second decision, namely whether to take action by complying with the summons. Some citizens, after all, may want to comply with their civic duty but conclude they are unable to do so. Others may experience obstacles to compliance but fulfill their duty anyway.<sup>5</sup>

As citizens make these choices, the first and perhaps most critical challenge in the formation of juridical publics comes into full view. In many communities, many citizens—even most citizens—do not fulfill their civic obligation to jury service, prioritizing other activities and commitments. When this happens, courts lose access to an array of potentially useful experiences and perspectives in the jury room, even before the process of juror selection begins. To understand what might be done about this, we must first understand the environmental and psychological factors that lead some citizens to fulfill their civic duty and others to ignore it. More precisely, we must attempt to determine whether mobilization generally breaks down because willing citizens face tangible obstacles to summons compliance or because citizens have become generally unwilling to accept jury service as a civic responsibility.

### *Environmental Factors in the Lives of Citizens*

With respect to who represents a political community on juries, the importance of social and environmental influences looms large. Even in the absence of formal exclusions on the basis of race, sex, and class, some citizens can systemically encounter practical obstacles to jury service with greater probability. As Figure 4.1 shows, citizens can encounter environmental obstacles that may dampen motivation to comply with a summons. These obstacles can come in many forms. These include: *juror compensation* (if pay is too low), *occupational commitments*, *discretionary time*, and *barriers to cultural integration*. With respect to summons non-compliance, the relative weight given to each of the explanatory factors comes with notable assumptions about the motivations of citizens.

Explanations stressing low juror pay assume that citizens would likely prioritize jury service over other activities if only courts compensated more adequately. A second critical assumption, of course, is that citizens will generally respond the same way to an increase in juror compensation—they will develop a motivation for compliance that had either been suppressed because of financial hardship or

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their environments. In other words, citizens have not accepted jury service as a civic duty if they merely express a recognition that jury service is such a duty. Acceptance requires a willingness to personally perform the service. The empirical analysis reported in this study addresses this point in greater detail.

<sup>5</sup> Readers may recognize the McGuire persuasion model (1989) as the inspiration for this formulation.

undeveloped due to a lack of incentive. This understanding of the problem yields a clear hypothesis. Juror yields will increase in the aggregate when courts selectively offer greater amounts of compensation to individuals that comply with the summons relative to what past compliers have received.

A parallel hypothesis exists at the individual level of analysis. One would expect individuals offered more money for jury service to have a higher probability of accepting their civic duty when they receive a summons than individuals offered less. One might also anticipate larger effects among workers in the private sector. Although private sector employers must grant workers time off for jury service, in many places, employers are *not* required to compensate workers during this time off. Jobs in the private sector sometimes offer compensation for missed work time, though there is more variance among private sector employers on this matter as compared to public sector employers, which guarantee paid leave for jury service. One plausible implication of this is that public sector workers will prove more likely to answer a summons, whereas private sector workers—who are more likely to be uncertain about compensation from their employers—will prove less likely to comply with the summons.

Circumstances affecting compensation, of course, are not the only the way in which environmental factors may shape the mobilization of juridical publics. Other environmental factors, in fact, may even reveal the limits of the pay increase approach to mobilization. Once a citizen receives a summons, the choice about whether to accept the call to jury service may not hinge only, or even primarily, on how much money a court will pay. To answer a jury summons, an individual must have the discretionary time with which to do so. Available evidence suggests that most individuals perceive that no significant penalty exists for non-compliance, and that individuals commonly cite personal commitments that will make it difficult or impossible for them serve (Losh, Wasserman and Wasserman 2000; Boatright 1998)—commitments that presumably limit a person's stock of discretionary time. As citizens devote more time to occupational, social and familial commitments, they have less time available for other activities. To the extent that individuals are unwilling or unable to free themselves from the time commitments that come with various types of relationships, answering a jury summons becomes less likely (Fukarai and Butler 1991; but see also Losh, Wasserman and Wasserman 2000).

Other barriers to participation may also exist among individuals who live in enclaved ethnic communities and who may have less of a connection to the larger community, and may be less

comfortable with jury service. Other cultural barriers—such as language use—are also of specific relevance to jury service. If individuals are not proficient in the language in which the summons is written, or anticipate difficulty communicating with others upon answering the summons, they may prove less likely to comply with the summons (Eades 2003; Saunders 1997). Generally speaking, such barriers are not likely to be overcome by increasing juror compensation, and may only be exacerbated by other constraints, such as social or occupational commitments. Just as importantly, barriers to social and cultural integration can also reduce the likelihood that individuals from historically marginalized populations will become members of juridical publics by sitting on juries.

Not all social and environmental factors in the lives of citizens serve as barriers to compliance, however. Citizens can accumulate social resources over the course of their lives that make civic tasks less intimidating and even more rewarding. *Political aptitude* provides one noteworthy example. As an accumulated social resource, the development of political aptitude reflects the accumulation of social experiences in the home, schools, and secondary associations that facilitate civic learning. Citizens who are generally informed about politics and are efficacious enough to participate in conventional political acts like elections, for instance, are likely to have an interest in politics and a knowledge of how to participate in civic life. A high level of political aptitude may therefore serve as an accumulated resource that propels individuals past environmental barriers that may deter others from jury duty. Conversely, low political aptitude can serve as an additional barrier to compliance (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Low political aptitude, in fact, may constitute a very different type of obstacle to compliance as compared to various occupational, social, and cultural barriers that may exist in the lives of citizens. With respect to these other environmental barriers, the assumption is that citizens would fulfill jury service if only these obstacles did not exist. The “political aptitude thesis” challenges this assumption. In essence, the thesis holds that it is not the *absence of something*, but instead the *presence of something* in citizens’ lives that matters most. More explicitly, even in the absence of environmental obstacles, citizens are most likely to comply with jury service when they possess basic citizenship skills, and by implication, when they care enough about civic life to develop those skills.

### *Trait Psychology and Orientations to Civic Duty*

Although citizens always exist in some sort of social environment that shapes and constrains behavior, citizens are not merely blank slates upon which social environments inscribe values, beliefs

and preferences. Citizens, as human beings, have durable psychological characteristics that influence how they see the world and respond to what happens in it. Few would dispute this point, yet the implications of durable psychological characteristics for civic involvement have only recently received attention.

It may not be the case, for instance, that all citizens would become equally likely to accept their civic duty when a jury summons arrives if only they experienced the “right type” of incentives or if only disincentives in their social environments were removed. Even political aptitude, by itself, may prove insufficient to motivate citizens into participating in jury service. An alternative possibility holds that differences in psychological characteristics may give rise to different orientations to civic duty, jury duty included. Jury duty as a civic exercise requires a principled commitment to the welfare of the political community and a willingness to participate in a specific type of activity, namely a willingness to interact with others. Additionally, complying with a summons and accepting jury duty as a civic duty arguably requires some deference to authority. Owing to psychological tendencies, then, some citizens may be easier to mobilize for jury service, others more difficult. Evidence of this sort would indicate the need to consider how a consequential public act is shaped by some of the most basic human characteristics of citizens.

Returning to Figure 4.1, psychological traits may influence citizens in two ways as they decide whether to comply with a summons. First, psychological traits may influence the probability with which an individual accepts jury duty as a civic duty that must be honored. Second, traits may condition the effects of social and environmental factors that may influence the likelihood of summons compliance. Put differently, where barriers to compliance are absent, attention to traits may reveal distinctive motivations for compliance or non-compliance. Where barriers are present, attention to traits may reveal distinctive motivations to overcome obstacles or psychological barriers that exacerbate these obstacles. Whereas past research has focused on social and environmental factors, this study posits that a richer understanding of political behavior—in this case, compliance with a jury summons—can emerge with a focus on psychological traits, environmental factors and trait-environment interactions.

To this end, three traits in the standard “Big Five” taxonomy warrant particular attention—*openness to experience, extraversion, and conscientiousness*.<sup>6</sup> Of the five traits in the “Big Five,”

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<sup>6</sup> This is not to suggest that the traits of agreeableness and emotional stability are irrelevant in terms of explaining political behavior generally or jury compliance specifically. However, I lack a basis to advance unequivocal

these three traits seem most plausibly implicated in juror compliance on theoretical grounds, given what is presently believed about the nature of compliance as a political task, and about the implications of traits for political behavior. Further, as most individuals tend to score relatively high or low on at least one of the “Big Five” traits (Mondak 2010, Ch. 2), a focus on these three traits also stands to highlight patterns that pertain to a large portion of the citizenry.

### *Openness to Experience*

As the very words suggest, individuals high in “openness to experience” exhibit a tendency toward trying new things. They derive satisfaction from experiences that depart from the usual, and they are especially drawn to intellectual stimulation and creative ventures.<sup>7</sup> People high in openness to experience also exhibit self-confidence, and tend to be relatively well-informed. Given these characteristics, our baseline expectation for answering a summons is straightforward. Upon receiving a jury summons, individuals who score relatively high on “openness to experience” measures are expected to have a predisposition toward compliance. Self-confidence, knowledge and willingness to experience new things all should incline the person high in openness toward jury service. By contrast, an individual averse to new experience may prove among the most difficult to mobilize at the summons compliance phase. The only caveat concerning openness is that individuals high in this trait may not prove equally open to all forms of novel experience. Jury service may not prove sufficiently enticing, particularly as individuals high in openness tend not to be judgmental; to the extent that they recognize this about themselves, disinclination toward jury service is possible.

As to conditional effects, two possibilities warrant highlighting. The first concerns a possible relationship involving openness and political aptitude. Again, a general tendency toward openness cannot manifest itself in all possible circumstances, as a positive response to every novel opportunity would be paralyzing. People must pick and choose. Hence, it seems plausible that the effects of openness on summons compliance will be especially pronounced among those with greater interest in the political world. That is, a positive interaction between civic engagement and openness to experience is projected. A second expectation concerns cultural barriers. Although cultural factors

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hypotheses pertaining to these traits. For instance, although it is plausible that individuals who score high on agreeableness may prove more likely to comply with a summons for the sake of honoring a request (and a request from a state authority no less), it seems equally plausible highly agreeable individuals would prove very unlikely to comply with a summons in anticipation of contentious interactions with others once jury service began.

<sup>7</sup> Good summaries of the content and properties of the Big Five trait dimensions are provided by Goldberg (1992) and McCrae and Costa (2003). For a discussion of the Big Five content as it relates to aspects of political behavior, see Mondak (2010), especially ch. 2.

might make it more difficult to receive and accept a summons to duty, openness to experience might motivate individuals to overcome these barriers.

### Conscientiousness

The hallmark of conscientiousness as a psychological trait is a diligence towards one's duties. Logically, this should include diligence toward jury duty, and thus a positive effect of conscientiousness on complying with a summons is expected. On closer inspection, however, the strongest effects of conscientiousness on summons response might emerge in conditional specifications. Just as people cannot be open to all experiences, they also cannot be conscientious in every circumstance. Again, people must pick and choose. People who are high in conscientiousness behave responsibly *when and where they perceive a sense of duty*. This has three implications regarding the social and environmental factors we have considered. First, among individuals with familial duties (e.g., caring for children), conscientiousness might prompt a reluctance to neglect those responsibilities, and thus provide a rationale for avoidance of jury service. Second, and similarly, conscientious employees likely prioritize work over jury service. Third, civic engagement again might prove consequential. To the extent that the conscientious are conscientious toward politics—operationalized below via a measure of political aptitude—a positive propensity toward jury service is foreseen.<sup>8</sup>

### Extraversion

Extraversion by definition entails a predisposition toward social activities, broadly construed. Individuals who score high on extraversion measures want to engage with others; individuals who score low on extraversion measures, better known as introverts, exhibit the opposite tendency. As this applies to matters of jury service, the baseline expectation regarding extraverts is that, unless otherwise impeded, they will prove more likely to answer a summons than will introverts. A summons presents an opportunity to engage in a social act, and as such, is more likely to appeal to the extraverted. If this understanding is correct, one would expect extraversion to serve as a counterweight for potential barriers to compliance in the social environment. Extraverts may prove more likely to comply than others who face similar social and environmental constraints.

As with openness and conscientiousness, however, the question of how individuals orient themselves toward the specific task of jury service warrants consideration. Extraverts may not view

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<sup>8</sup> A similar result, with respect to voting in elections, has been identified by Mondak et al. (2010).

all social opportunities as appealing. If the political world is seen as rife with conflict, political engagement may be unattractive. Politically engaged individuals have demonstrated an interest in politics on some level, and thus politically engaged extraverts, rather than extraverts in general, may be the ones who are distinctive in their probability to respond positively to jury summons.

### **From the Civic Environment to the Traits of Citizens:**

#### **The Washington State Juror Survey**

To examine how environmental and psychological factors influence the mobilization of juridical publics, this study draws its data from a survey conducted from late 2006 to early 2008 by the Washington State Center for Court Research.<sup>9</sup> In doing so, the analysis of this chapter also responds to several practical problems.<sup>10</sup> One is a notably low rate of juror compliance (less than 50 percent) in three counties located in Washington State. Another is the low juror yield among racial and ethnic groups historically under-represented on juries. Of equal importance, this chapter also addresses how environmental and psychological factors operate not only at the summons phase of mobilization, but also at the juror selection phase when compliant citizens get seated on juries.

By design, the survey conducted by the Center for Court Research allows for an examination of multiple influences on the motivations of citizens. This is especially relevant at the summons phase of mobilization, wherein citizens have the greatest degree of control over their participation. In response to low rates of juror compliance, the county courts initiated a pay experiment, also conducted by the Washington State Center for Court Research, in tandem with the survey of potential jurors used in this analysis.<sup>11</sup> Like most localities in Washington, the jurisdictions in this study paid jurors US\$10 per day.<sup>12</sup> To determine if higher pay might elevate summons compliance rates, the state legislature appropriated nearly US\$900,000 so that juror compensation could be increased from US\$10 to US\$60 per day for 12 months, starting in November 2006. The local court systems then attempted to publicize the increase through local news media.

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<sup>9</sup> See Moore and Miller (2008) and Washington State Center for Court Research (2008).

<sup>10</sup> The analyses reported in this section build on those reported previously in Bloeser, McCurley and Mondak (2012).

<sup>11</sup> The survey used a mixed-mode (telephone, supplemented by internet) design. The overall response rate (AAPOR #4) was 29%.

<sup>12</sup> In Washington, most counties pay only US\$10 per day, and state law prohibits pay of greater than US\$25 per day. A caveat in this law was created to allow for the juror pay experiment described in this study.

The quasi-experimental design executed by the Center for Court Research divides survey respondents into two groups. The first group is composed of citizens summonsed to jury service in 2006, before the temporary pay increase. These respondents were interviewed starting in late 2006 (Clark County) or July of 2007 (Franklin County and Des Moines). The second group is composed of respondents summonsed when juror compensation was US\$60 per day. This group was interviewed starting in December 2007 (Clark), February 2008 (Franklin) or March 2008 (Des Moines).<sup>13</sup> This allows us to examine whether and to what extent financial hardship acts as a deterrent to the motivations of citizens.<sup>14</sup>

The survey also includes measures of other social and environmental factors present in citizens' lives: occupational situation, discretionary time, cultural barriers, and political aptitude. Demographic indicators frequently found to correspond with patterns in political participation are also included when modeling citizen behavior. Finally, the survey also contains measures of each trait in the "Big Five" taxonomy.

The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of compliance with the jury summons, coded 1 (*respondent complied with the summons*) or 0 (*respondent did not comply with the summons*); 46% of respondents complied.<sup>15</sup> Factors thought to influence jury summons compliance will be examined in a series of logistic regression models. A full description of all variables employed in these analyses is reported in Appendix A.

### **When (Jury) Duty Calls, Who Answers?**

When a citizen finds a jury summons in his or her mailbox, the response that follows falls into one of two categories. The citizen can either proceed with the jury selection processes by answering the summons or opt out of the process by seeking to defer jury service through institutional channels.

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<sup>13</sup> All respondents—compliers and non-compliers—completed the survey after the period covered by their summons had expired. Thus, compliers completed the survey after reporting to court for service, and in some cases, after having served on a jury.

<sup>14</sup> A 29% response rate was recorded for the survey in both pay periods. The samples differed to modest, but statistically significant, degrees on several variables. Compared with the US\$10 phase, respondents in the US\$60 period scored lower on cultural barriers ( $t = 2.82$ ) and agreeableness ( $t = 2.72$ ), and more respondents were male ( $t = 2.23$ ). The differences for cultural barriers, education, and income all could correspond with higher summons compliance. Thus, a bivariate contrast of compliance in the two study phases would be misleading because higher compliance could be seen in the US\$60 period because of the pay gap, but also because of differences in the samples. The multivariate models reported in this chapter will control for all of these factors.

<sup>15</sup> Compliance means that the person appeared at the required date and time, phoned to request a deferment or filled out a juror information form; non-compliance means that the summons recipient failed to respond in any of these manners. As is typical of jury service, many compliers ultimately were excused without being placed on a jury.

The alternative is simply ignoring the summons altogether. In a place where so many citizens do the latter, two possibilities warrant investigation. It may be the case that the environment contains disincentives to compliance in the form of financial hardship, alternative commitments, and cultural barriers. It may also be the case that many citizens have simply come to neglect a civic responsibility. Though these possibilities are not mutually exclusive, some clear patterns begin to emerge when looking at how citizens experience their social environments.

### *A First Look at the Social Environment*

Like many courts trying to mobilize juridical publics, the courts in Washington State adopted a familiar logic—the logic of selective benefits. In this view, increasing juror compensation provides an incentive to comply that otherwise would not be present. At very least, it reduces a disincentive caused by financial hardship. With this logic comes an assumption: citizens would accept their civic duty when their summons arrives if only a financial barrier were lifted. To determine whether and to what extent this assumption rests on firm ground, it is useful to first examine the social and environmental factors that may limit a citizen’s likelihood of accepting a summons to duty.

Three models are reported in Table 4.1. In the first model, only demographic and environmental predictors are included, and the indicator representing the experimental increase in juror pay is excluded. The second model builds on the first by adding the pay variable. Lastly, the third model adds the variables representing the Big Five. Across all three models, strong effects emerge for three of the demographic and environmental measures.

First, not surprisingly, individuals with the highest income levels were the most likely to comply with the jury summons. Any financial burden associated with jury service should be least severe as income rises, and thus the positive effect in this instance comports with earlier work that has placed such environmental constraints in the foreground. Curiously, though, neither education nor employment status yielded corresponding effects. For the latter, preliminary analyses indicated that respondents who were employed full or part-time in non-salaried private sector workplaces envisioned that it would be difficult for them to report to the courthouse for jury duty. Nonetheless, the negative effect of employment status on actual compliance with the jury summons is negligible, and statistically insignificant.

The second variable to produce strong effects across all three of the models in Table 4.1 is the measure of cultural barriers, a variable that incorporates information on Hispanic ethnicity,

immigration status, and English-language proficiency. Between eight and nine percent of respondents indicated that they are Hispanic, and the same portion answered that they were not born in the United States. Twelve percent of respondents speak a language other than English at home, and the vast majority of these respondents speak Spanish.<sup>16</sup> Individuals with some or all of these attributes are often among the most likely to face barriers to social integration, given the difficulties they encounter building networks to individuals beyond co-ethnic, shared language communities. Consistent with previous studies of civic engagement generally and jury duty specifically, present results reveal that individuals facing these barriers are markedly less likely to participate. Individuals facing the greatest number of cultural barriers exhibit a 0.24 probability of compliance. In the case of the localities in this study, this means that individuals belonging to ethnic minorities are among the least likely to answer a summons, and only about half as likely as citizens who experience no cultural barriers. Clearly, a barrier to more diverse representation on juries occurs before juror selection ever takes place. Just as clearly, however, citizens facing no cultural barriers have a tendency to ignore the summons; their predicted probability of compliance falls below 0.50.

The third variable to produce a noteworthy effect in each of the models in Table 4.1 is political aptitude, a measure that incorporates data on frequency of voter turnout and political knowledge. Individuals with higher levels of political aptitude show a higher likelihood of compliance. From a resource perspective, the effect of political aptitude, though not surprising, must be interpreted with context in mind. It is not the case that individuals who have developed an awareness of political affairs or tendency toward civic engagement have a particularly high probability of compliance with jury service. Individuals who report a strong tendency to vote in elections and who also achieve the highest political knowledge scores, taken as a group, demonstrate only a 0.50 probability of compliance.<sup>17</sup> This mark contrasts with probabilities of jury service of 0.41 and below for respondents scoring in the bottom 20 percent on the political engagement scale. Political engagement matters for jury service, but even well-informed habitual voters are hardly rushing to

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<sup>16</sup> In Franklin County, slightly more than 20% of respondents on the survey identified as Latino, versus less than 3% in the other two jurisdictions. A Spanish-language version of the survey was available, and half of Latino respondents in Franklin County opted to answer that version. The cultural barriers scale also accounts for Asian ethnicity, but only 2% of respondents answered “Asian” on the survey’s measure of race and ethnicity.

<sup>17</sup> The positive effect of political engagement also holds for each of the two constituent variables used to construct this measure—a respondent’s reported habituation of voting (never, rarely, sometimes, always) and a respondent’s political knowledge (the summation of correct responses on three knowledge items). The positive effect of each constituent variable was of roughly the same magnitude.

the courthouse clamoring to be seated on juries. Further, in a place where compliance rates are a problem, low levels of political aptitude only serve as an additional barrier to judicial mobilization.

This evidence regarding social and environmental factors suggests the systemic presence of conditions that increased juror pay may be ill-equipped to offset. If individuals face cultural barriers or lack political interest, the promise of more money for jury service may not provide an effective incentive to comply with a summons. This, of course, is a testable hypothesis.

All models beginning with Model 2 in Table 4.1 include an indicator variable for pay period (coded 1 for respondents summonsed during the \$60 per day period, and 0 for the standard \$10 pay period). If higher juror pay is the key to fostering greater compliance with jury summonses, the new variable should produce a positive coefficient. Curiously, we see in both Model 4.2 and Model 4.3 that the effect is negative, and that it attains a minimal level of statistical significance in both models. The available evidence, therefore, does not support the conclusion that raising juror pay produced the desired effect. Analyses of aggregate juror yield data by the Washington State Center for Court Research (2008) show similar results. Specifically, juror yield figures rose slightly with higher pay in one of the study's three jurisdictions, declined slightly in another, and remained unchanged in the third. Across the three jurisdictions, the aggregate outcome was null; paying jurors more produced no effect on summons compliance.<sup>18</sup>

One may wonder, however, whether the overall effect of the pay increase proves slightly negative while still increasing compliance among specific sub-groups.<sup>19</sup> For instance, an increase in juror pay may logically produce the greatest positive effect among a) citizens for whom jury service would impose the greatest financial burden, and b) citizens that would get to keep the money paid to them for jury service (some employers pay jurors for missed work, but deduct juror pay). Likewise, it is possible that a pay increase may entice individuals to overcome cultural barriers or lack of political interest. Alternatively, an increase in juror pay may provide an incentive that mobilizes individuals

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<sup>18</sup> It is possible that the pay hike did increase compliance rates relative to what they would have been absent the raise, and that other contemporaneous factors offset this increase. However, other available evidence suggests that this is not the case. As reported in the Washington State Center for Court Research (2008), juror yield data were collected in two other Washington counties, Kitsap and Spokane. These two counties were not included as part of the pay experiment, and in both of these counties, juror yields remained constant over the full study period. This suggests that there were not factors in Washington at the time of the study that operated to lower summons compliance.

<sup>19</sup> This possibility is tested below, but the report issued by the Washington State Center for Court Research (2008) provides grounds for pessimism as to likely results. There it was observed that the pay experiment produced no change in the demographic characteristics of citizens who complied with the jury summons.

who are not encumbered by cultural barriers and who are politically interested. Such individuals may simply need the additional motivation that cash can provide.

As plausible as these conjectures may seem, none of them is borne out by the available evidence. The search for such conditional relationships yielded no significant findings.<sup>20</sup> It is not the case that increasing juror pay increases the likelihood of compliance for subgroups facing specific types of environmental obstacles. The pay increase also proves ineffective at mobilizing citizens who experience few if any environmental barriers and who have relatively high levels of political aptitude. As a practical matter, a solution to the problem of summons noncompliance remains to be identified, but “pay them and they will come” apparently should not be carved beneath “equal justice under law” on the façades of the nation’s state and local courts.<sup>21</sup>

Taken all together, this analysis of social and environmental factors reveals three clear patterns. First, evidence for environmental barriers to compliance does exist, particularly with respect to income and social integration. Hence, it is likely that some citizens facing such barriers have accepted jury service as a civic responsibility and would comply if their barriers were mitigated. This has a clear implication for the issue of juridical representation. Barriers to compliance that deter already under-represented groups threaten to constrain the range of experiences and perspectives from which a juridical public can draw, even before the juror selection process begins. Second, financial hardship does not appear to be a leading factor deterring mobilization at the summons phase. When juror pay is increased, no change in patterns of compliance occurs in the general population or within any sub-group of the population, including those sub-groups that might experience a financial burden most profoundly.

Even so, a skeptic might wonder about whether the absence of a “treatment effect” in this pay experiment may have resulted from citizens “failing to receive the treatment.” The leading possibility

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<sup>20</sup> Conditional relationships involving juror pay (pay period) and each other variable in Model 1 were modeled to affirm this.

<sup>21</sup> A skeptic might argue that amount of money paid to compliant citizens in this instance was still insufficient and that an amount greater than US\$60 is needed to alter citizen behavior. This could well be the case, however, it is important to recall that the Washington legislature requisitioned US\$900,000 in order to increase pay to the amount of US\$60 per person in just three counties. If a higher amount of compensation is generally needed to increase compliance, it is not clear that states and localities would be willing or able to allocate the amount needed to produce the intended effect. As a practical matter, we must look for other sources of citizen motivation apart from money, even if it seems prudent or just to pay jurors more than a mere US\$10 per day for their time. It is also important to note that citizens in the public sector—who are guaranteed compensation by their employer when they take time off of work for jury service—did not demonstrate a higher rate of compliance than their private sector counterparts. Hence, there is reason to believe that a net loss of income is *not* the primary reason that citizens do not comply with the summons. Further, if there is an upper limit on a court’s capacity to create a net gain income for compliant citizens, it stands to reason that we must consider other sources of motivation to increase compliance.

is that citizens failed to receive the news about the increase in juror pay, and thus could not be motivated by the pay increase. Pursuing this matter sheds greater light on how the environment contributes to the motivations of citizens. Survey respondents were asked how much jurors are paid. For respondents who complied when summonsed, most *should* have known the answer, because the bulk of them actually received compensation (the exceptions being persons who sought deferrals). To this end, a number of patterns warrant highlighting. In the first place, roughly equal numbers of citizens knew how much they would receive for jury service under each condition of the pay experiment, although such citizens were in the minority.<sup>22</sup> It is therefore not the case that citizens were generally less informed about compensation after the pay raise. If anything, the evidence suggests that citizens, on the whole, may have been better informed about compensation after the pay increase. Among citizens who complied with their summonses and who answered the compensation item, responses averaged over US\$22 higher in the US\$60 phase than in the US\$10 phase. Thus, although many individuals could not recall the precise compensation figures, the pay experiment led to variation in perceived compensation levels. The more stringent test concerns individuals who did not comply when summonsed, because this group had no recent experiential basis for their answers. Non-compliers also appear vaguely aware of a pay increase, but, relative to compliant citizens, they also appear more difficult to reach with information.<sup>23</sup> As general matter, citizens were fuzzy on the details, but many—including those who ignored the jury summons—knew that pay rates had gone up. Dissemination of information about the pay hike was far from universal, but, as a whole, respondents summonsed during the US\$60 period expected higher pay than those summonsed during the US\$10 period. Thus, if compensation prompts compliance, higher summons compliance rates should be observed for the US\$60 group, but this did not occur.

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<sup>22</sup> For the US\$10 phase, 39.3% of those respondents who complied when summonsed correctly indicated that jurors are paid US\$10, 29.1% answered that they did not know, and 31.6% listed different amounts. For the US\$60 phase, the corresponding data are 32.1% knew that daily compensation was US\$60, 17.3% did not offer answers, and 50.6% named other amounts (including 21.1% who said US\$10).

<sup>23</sup> Of respondents in the US\$10 phase, 22.8% of those who did not comply with the summons said that jurors are paid US\$10 daily, 20.8% answered with a different sum, and 56.4% said they did not know. In the US\$60 phase, only 7.7% answered US\$60, 42.9% mentioned another amount, and 49.4% said they did not know. Among those who provided substantive answers to the pay question, answers averaged US\$9.51 more during the test phase than for those called when the standard US\$10 rate was in place. Excluding those few respondents who answered US\$60 during the test phase, responses among those who ignored the jury summons differed by an average of US\$5.44 ( $p < 0.02$ ) as a function of treatment condition on the pay experiment.

This is consistent with a third, particularly vexing environmental pattern. Even where environmental barriers are absent, many citizens appear to simply ignore the summons. Many citizens, it seems, have not accepted jury service as a civic commitment. This lack of attention to a civic duty is apparent even among individuals with high levels of political aptitude, among whom the predicted probability of compliance is a “relatively high” 0.50. This same lack of attention seems the most likely explanation for the vague recognition of the pay increase in the general population and the large proportion of non-compliers who admit having no idea how much jurors get paid. Jury service simply is not a priority for many, if not most, citizens.

This interpretation meshes well with the observations of one Washington prosecutor, Stew Menefee of Grays Harbor. Prior to the juror pay experiment, Menefee was quoted as saying “the lack of money is not why people don’t show up,” and “somewhere along the way, civic responsibility lessons have been forgotten. People always talk about their rights, but never talk about their responsibilities that are just as important.”<sup>24</sup> Something is lacking in the civic culture, and the consequence is that citizens from many walks of life, with many different experiences, perspectives and skills, have opted out of their role in the judicial process.

### *Psychological Traits and Summons Compliance*

The findings presented up to this point warrant pause. The pay increase does not motivate citizens to overcome potential occupational, social, and cultural barriers. In general and in virtually all sub-groups of the population, non-compliance is pervasive. When material benefits come up short and non-compliance is frequent even among those with high levels of political aptitude, where else might one look to understand the motivations of citizens?

One source of motivation may stem from the psychological traits of citizens. As psychological traits are fundamental human qualities that help define who citizens are as people, it is distinctly possible that traits will influence how citizens perceive and respond to environmental stimuli. This includes the stimuli jury service itself presents when the citizen receives a summons. The novel quality of jury service and opportunity to exercise the intellect may appeal to citizens relatively more open to experience. The task of deliberating with fellow citizens may appeal to relatively extraverted citizens. The implicit responsibility of fulfilling one’s civic duty may resonate with citizens who are highly conscientious. Yet the function of traits may cut two ways. Some psychological tendencies may also

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<sup>24</sup> Quoted in Lisa Patterson, “Jury Duty: Lousy Pay or Just an Inconvenience?” *The Daily World* 16 January 2006.

offer additional barriers to compliance. The citizen relatively closed to experience, the introverted citizen, and the citizen lacking in conscientiousness may prove especially unlikely to mobilize when the summons comes.

To examine these possibilities, the third model reported in Table 4.1 adds measures of psychological traits to the basic model of juror behavior at the summons response phase of mobilization. Four out of the five trait dimensions have no direct influence on summons compliance, including conscientiousness and extraversion, for which positive and significant relationships were expected. Only openness to experience produces a significant effect, and unexpectedly, the coefficient on this variable is negative.<sup>25</sup>

Individuals who score high on openness to experiences measures tend to find satisfaction in undertaking novel actions or experiences. Seemingly, for most individuals, jury service would constitute just such an experience. Yet the evidence from Washington State indicates what may hold true generally does not hold true for jury service. Quite the opposite, those most open to experience prove most likely to refrain from action during efforts to mobilize juridical publics, perhaps because they would rather be open to other types of experiences. It is not the case, however, that individuals who are relatively closed to experience prove particularly inclined to comply with the summons. As with most citizens in the three Washington counties examined here, such individuals exhibited a tendency toward non-compliance, just not to the same degree as citizens relatively open to experience. In a civic culture where citizens frequently ignore jury service, individuals who are relatively open to experience display a distinctive sensitivity to the attractions of other activities. Owing to this fact, juridical publics have less access to a potentially valuable resource—citizens who possess a psychological tendency associated with intellectual curiosity.

### *Putting Psychological Traits in Context: Political Aptitude and Civic Commitment*

Given that psychological traits influence how citizens perceive and respond to the world around them, the direct relationships between traits and summons compliance tell us something important about how citizens view jury service. As a civic task, jury service constitutes an obligation that involves intensive social interaction. For most citizens, it would also constitute a novel experience.

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<sup>25</sup> Recognizing that individuals highly open to experience have also demonstrated a greater tendency toward indecisiveness, I identified individuals who demonstrated indecision on the Center for Court Research's study (as measured by the percentage of items respondents did not answer or answered with a "don't know" response). I then ran Model 3 again, including an interaction term involving the openness and indecisiveness variables. A significant conditional relationship did not emerge.

However, citizens inclined toward honoring obligations and partaking in social interactions are not particularly drawn toward participating in jury service. Citizens inclined toward new and out-of-the-ordinary experiences actually display a pronounced tendency toward avoiding jury service.

It is important to note that these results emerge when holding indicators of environmental barriers and the indicator of political aptitude constant at their respective means. Most environmental barriers appear not to deter compliance in a direct, significant way. Only barriers to social and cultural integration appear to act as major deterrents, and most citizens do not experience such obstacles. For this reason, it seems unlikely that various psychological tendencies have led citizens to accept jury service as a commitment, only to be dissuaded by environmental conditions.

Further, the citizens examined here, on average, possess some political aptitude, but not high levels of it. This is noteworthy because citizens with lower political aptitude displayed a tendency toward non-compliance. Understood in this light, psychological tendencies that could plausibly motivate compliance may largely fail to do so absent high political aptitude.

It remains possible, however, that the situation is different for those citizens who *do* have relatively high levels of political aptitude. Again, these citizens emerged among the most likely to accept jury service as a civic commitment, proving just as likely to comply as not comply with the summons. In an environment where non-compliance is the norm, political aptitude, and the basic interest and understanding of politics it implies, does appear to motivate some degree of commitment to jury service. Among citizens who possess this motivation, it seems plausible that psychological tendencies such as openness, conscientiousness, and extraversion may lead to even greater likelihood of compliance. In each case, the expectation is that citizens who score high in both the psychological trait and political aptitude will prove most likely to show up to the courthouse.

Table 4.2 introduces interactions between civic engagement and each of the Big Five variables. Notably, neither higher levels of openness nor extraversion lead to higher probabilities of compliance, even for the civically engaged. Citizens with this combination of qualities do not prove significantly more likely to comply with the summons than citizens in general, a noteworthy pattern given the relatively low level of compliance that characterizes the citizens in this study.

One interaction, however, does emerge as significant, that involving conscientiousness. For individuals scoring high on conscientiousness, a pronounced difference among individuals of high and low political engagement is evident. Highly conscientious, highly politically engaged individuals exhibit a predicted probability of summons compliance in the neighborhood of 0.60—a

likelihood notably higher than that of the population in general. Highly conscientious individuals who are not very politically engaged exhibit a predicted probability that resembles that of the potential jurors more generally—0.40. These results are summarized in Figure 4.2.<sup>26</sup> There, we see that for respondents who are one standard deviation below the mean on conscientiousness, political engagement is irrelevant for compliance with the jury summons. However, as conscientiousness increases in value, the predicted probabilities of compliance diverge for respondents high and low in political engagement. It appears that people who are conscientious but apolitical steer clear of jury service, whereas those who are conscientious and politically engaged welcome this duty.

This pattern comports well with expectations. One would expect citizens who score high in conscientiousness will be diligent about actions they perceive as duties, but that they will neglect actions they view as being outside the realm of their responsibilities.<sup>27</sup> In the models reported here, the measure of civic engagement therefore functions as a surrogate for perceived political duty. More direct measures are available on the Juror Pay Study, allowing further investigation of this matter.<sup>28</sup> Three items ask respondents whether they agree that serving as a juror “is your civic duty” and “is important for a working democracy,” and whether “juries are the voice of the public.” Data from these items form a reliable scale ( $\alpha = 0.77$ ). The scale ranges in value from 0 (low perceptions of civic duty) to 9; not surprisingly, those who did and did not comply with the jury summons differ significantly on this scale (mean difference = 0.49,  $p < .001$ ).

At question is the relationship between this civic duty measure and conscientiousness. Among all respondents, there is no correlation ( $r = -0.01$ , n.s.). That is, being conscientious has no general bearing on whether one perceives jury service as a duty. However, among respondents who complied with the jury summons, there is a positive correlation between the

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<sup>26</sup> In Figure 2 and Figure 3, all other independent variables are held constant at their means (modes for indicator variables), whereas the values of the predictors represented in the figures are varied.

<sup>27</sup> A similar finding is reported in Mondak (2010, p. 98) regarding the conditional impact of conscientiousness on campaigning activity.

<sup>28</sup> Although the Juror Pay Study includes numerous items measuring respondents’ attitudes regarding jury service, these items are not included in this analysis. The reason for excluding these measures stems from the fact that the survey was fielded after respondents did or did not comply with their jury summons. The problem is that the reported attitudes may have been formed, in part, by some respondents’ recent courthouse experiences, or, for those respondents who did not comply with the jury summons, the answers on these items may simply be rationalizations of their noncompliance. The implication is that any correspondence between attitudinal measures and compliance with the jury summons could reflect the impact of compliance on subsequent attitudes, meaning that it would be perilous to infer a causal influence of attitudes on compliance. These limitations justify exclusion of the attitudinal data from the multivariate models, but I still can look to these data for corroboration of my interpretation of the conscientious  $\times$  political aptitude interaction.

civic duty measure and conscientiousness ( $r = 0.10$ ,  $p < .01$ ), and there is a corresponding negative correlation ( $r = -0.08$ ,  $p < .01$ ) among those who did not comply. In short, conscientious individuals who complied with their jury summonses tend to view jury service as a duty, whereas those respondents scoring high in conscientiousness who failed to comply with their jury summonses are prone to reject the interpretation that they are duty-bound to serve on juries. Conscientiousness motivates compliance only once citizens develop an interest in and engagement with political life; political aptitude matters most for those predisposed toward fulfilling perceived responsibilities.

At a time when “somewhere along the way, civic responsibility lessons have been forgotten,” this result illustrates the need for a more nuanced understanding of citizen motivations. Consider the following. In virtually all survey-based studies of juridical participation, the citizen encounters questions about whether he or she believes jury service is a “civic duty;” that is to say, an “obligation.” Most citizens, on most surveys (including this one), indicate that they believe it is a duty, even as they do not comply. What can we make of this?

In the face of this evidence, one might question whether citizens “really” believe jury service is a duty. Without getting into a semantic quagmire, it appears that most citizens recognize that jury service is a consequential act that involves an obligation on their part. The mere existence of this obligation simply does not motivate most citizens to action. Only highly conscientious citizens display a tendency to fulfill obligation of jury service, and even then, only when they also have developed an interest and engagement in politics. Clearly, in the face of perceived obligation, not all citizens respond the same way, and just as clearly, a psychological tendency illuminates a major reason why. Not all citizens have a strong psychological tendency toward fulfilling perceived responsibilities.

It may therefore be the case that to mobilize citizens with tendencies toward novel experiences, interpreting information, and social interactions, we must begin to raise the salience of these features of jury service. Under current conditions, citizens who have psychological tendencies associated with these features—those who are open to experience or extraverted—may not recognize them in the context of jury service. That may even be the case among citizens who have relatively high levels of political aptitude. This would not be surprising. Most scholarship and journalism on the issue of summons compliance has overlooked these features of

jury service as sources of motivation. If citizens who make their living doing research and covering the news have not recognized these factors, other citizens surely have not either.

It may well be true that civic responsibility lessons have been forgotten. Yet it may be equally true that citizens learn to accept and find satisfaction in their responsibilities in different ways, owing to different psychological experiences of the world.

### *Can Traits Help Citizens Overcome Environmental Barriers?*

When looking to the environment for factors that influence summons compliance, evidence for tangible barriers to service was in short supply. Social and occupational commitments did not emerge as a major deterrent. The failure of the pay increase to boost compliance rates suggests that financial hardship is also not a primary deterrent, either because low pay is not itself a major disincentive to service or because a lack of civic commitment is a larger problem. The only environmental factors that emerge as particularly strong deterrents are cultural barriers, a finding that speaks to the difficulty of mobilizing a diverse juridical public.

These findings, however, reflect general patterns of behavior that do not take into account variation in the psychological tendencies of citizens. With respect to the increase in jury pay, one may wonder whether some trait-related predispositions may prove more sensitive to an increase in compensation. If so, this would indicate the pay increase did not have a broader effect on compliance because it resonated only with citizens who have specific psychological tendencies. One may also wonder whether individuals with specific trait-related predispositions prove more likely to comply when unencumbered by social and environmental constraints or whether some traits make it more likely that citizens will overcome these constraints. Evidence to this effect would signal the need for considering how citizens psychologically interact with their environments in different ways, since barriers for some citizens may not be barriers for others.

The relevant tests are reported in Table 4.2, which reports interactions between traits and family constraints (Model 2), traits and occupational constraints (Model 3), traits and juror pay (Model 4) and traits and cultural barriers (Model 5). Nearly all of the interactions produce coefficients that are modest or weak in magnitude, and either statistically insignificant or marginally significant. In terms of incentives then, it appears that the pay increase does not stimulate trait-related psychological motivations. Likewise, for the most part, psychological traits neither strengthen nor weaken possible barriers to jury service. Nor do trait-related tendencies increase the likelihood of compliance when

constraints are absent. As findings reported earlier revealed, most environmental obstacles considered here did not correspond with decreased compliance. Evidence that trait-related tendencies did not propel citizens past these sorts of barriers therefore suggests that the environmental factors were not the chief detriment to citizen motivations. This once again speaks to the general disinterest in jury service that exists in many localities.

The one clear exception to the pattern of null results concerns extraversion and cultural barriers, as seen in Table 4.2, Model 5. Of all the potential barriers to compliance considered in this chapter, cultural barriers consistently have emerged as the most pronounced.<sup>29</sup> It warrants underscoring that, when holding all other factors constant at mean or modal values, individuals facing the greatest cultural barriers have probabilities of summons compliance below 0.30. This stands to reason. Issues such as language proficiency and limited integration into the larger community can reduce the probability that a summons is both received and accepted. Yet, consistent with expectations, extraverts are psychologically positioned to overcome these cultural barriers. Overcoming cultural barriers such as these becomes easier for those who have a propensity to seek out social interaction, as they may find greater incentives to develop language skills and move beyond culturally enclaved social networks. Similarly, extraverts who face cultural barriers may also have greater experience moving beyond their immediate, enclaved communities. This experience may help facilitate compliance when the summons to jury service arrives.

The estimates displayed in Figure 4.3 demonstrate the importance of the interplay of psychological traits and environmental factors in this instance. For individuals with low cultural barrier scores (values of 1, meaning they were born outside of the United States or they are Hispanic or they speak a language other than English at home), extraversion is irrelevant for the propensity to comply with a jury summons. If anything, relatively extraverted citizens who do not face cultural barriers prove slightly less likely to comply with the summons than do others. Conversely, where cultural barriers are high (values of 3), there is more than a 40-point swing in the predicted probability of summons compliance as extraversion rises from its lowest to its highest observed values. Cultural barriers are virtually insurmountable for extreme introverts, whereas the sociability of extraverts facilitates their rising above the constraining influence of cultural obstacles.

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<sup>29</sup> The severity of cultural barriers also was highlighted in the Washington State Center for Court Research report (2008).

These findings offer another lesson with regard to compliance-promoting efforts, particularly with respect to improving the diversity and representativeness of juries. Cultural barriers apparently are not actual tangible barriers to jury service, in that some respondents facing these barriers—extraverts—nonetheless tended to comply with the jury summons. In fact, extraverts facing cultural barriers prove at least as likely to comply with the summons as citizens who do not face cultural barriers. Of equal significance, however, cultural barriers seem to magnify the introvert’s reticence toward social interaction. Whereas introverts who face no cultural barriers prove among the most likely to comply with the summons, introverts who do face cultural barriers stand among the least likely. Introverts may not find themselves as tempted to ignore a summons in favor of various other social activities. They may, however, find the process of navigating the steps to compliance and the prospect of engaging with others to be more vexing.

It therefore seems unlikely, on psychological grounds, that a “one-size-fits-all” approach will prove effective for mobilizing citizens from marginalized groups. Instead, efforts to increase the diversity of jury pools might need to identify and address the reservations felt by individuals whose cultural positions *and* psychological predispositions presently combine to make jury service seem uninviting.

### **Juror Selection:**

#### **The Second Challenge of Mobilizing Juridical Publics:**

For present purposes, attention to psychological traits raises another issue. If psychological tendencies influence who complies with the summons, it may also mean that individuals with certain traits may be over- or under-represented on juries. The next question, then, is whether psychological traits influence the juror selection phase of mobilization. It is to this question I now turn.

The issue of summons compliance, after all, takes on importance because of its implications for the decisions juries reach. Judgments on virtually any matter depend in part upon *who* participates in decision-making, and with respect to judgments made by juridical publics, only those who answer the summons have a chance to participate and to represent the larger political community.

Just as with summons compliance, where juror selection is concerned, discussions of representativeness typically focus on race, sex, and class (Ellis and Diamond 2003; Fukarai and Butler 1993; Fukarai, Butler and Krooth 1993; Saunders 1997; Sommers 2006; Walters and

Curriden 2005). Life experiences are invariably informed by one's color, sex, and economic circumstances. Perhaps equally invariably, life experiences inform interpretations of evidence, applications of legal standards, and deliberations with others. Bearing that in mind, the results presented earlier and the larger body of work on trait psychology suggests that a broader view might be warranted. If psychological traits influence how individuals see and respond to the world around them, these traits may also influence the perspectives citizens bring with them to jury service.

This possibility motivated previous work to examine whether citizens with specific trait profiles proved more likely to get seated on juries once they had answered a summons. A pioneering study by Clark et al. (2007) found that, among citizens who complied with the summons, relatively extraverted individuals had a particularly high likelihood of becoming foreperson on a jury. The study also found that, among citizens who complied with the summons, those lacking in conscientiousness proved distinctively likely to be excused for cause. This demonstrates that relative differences in psychological traits among compliant citizens do play a role in the juror selection process. However, because Clark and his colleagues only examined compliant citizens, their study cannot determine whether psychological traits also exert influence on the selection process by shaping the population of available jurors.

The results from the first part of this chapter suggest that traits very likely influence the dynamics of juror selection in precisely this way. Citizens who are relatively open to experience and relatively extraverted generally display low rates of compliance. Highly conscientious citizens, when politically engaged, display a relatively high rate of compliance. Accordingly, at the juror selection phase of mobilization, the population of available citizens tilts toward the conscientious while relatively open and extraverted citizens are in shorter supply. One question that arises, therefore, is whether this distribution of psychological tendencies is exacerbated or offset as citizens get selected to sit on juries. When paired with the findings reported by Clark et al. (2007), the findings reported above suggest that both types of outcome are possible.

Extraverts, for instance, stand among the least likely to comply with a summons. This raises the possibility that juries may lack access to citizens who possess a useful psychological tendency for tasks involving deliberation. Yet Clark et al. find that relatively extraverted compliers are distinctively likely to ascend to the position of foreperson, when selected to serve on a jury. It is therefore possible that relatively extraverted citizens who comply with the

summons, rather than ignore it, find themselves on juries with some regularity. In other words, even if extraverts are relatively less likely to comply with a summons, once they do, they may be just as likely as anyone else, or perhaps even more likely than others, to get selected to sit on a jury.

The possibilities regarding the traits of openness and conscientiousness are perhaps even more intriguing. Highly conscientious citizens emerged among the most reliable compliers, at least when they also demonstrated a high degree of political aptitude. Additionally, there is evidence indicating that individuals lacking in conscientiousness are often excused from duty once they comply. This leaves open the possibility that highly conscientious individuals will demonstrate a relatively high likelihood of getting seated on a jury. Citizens who are relatively open to experience, by contrast, are among the least likely to comply with a summons and there is no existing evidence to indicate that relatively open citizens are particularly likely to get seated on juries after they comply.

The implications of this warrant a moment of attention. The preponderance of evidence indicates that individuals low in openness to experience tend to be “absolutists” when interpreting the world; that is, seeing things as “black and white,” “right or wrong” and largely under and individual’s control. Individuals high in openness have a tendency to be “contextualists,”<sup>30</sup> seeing the world as a place where circumstances often affect the choices individuals make (Sibley and Duckitt 2008; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2004). This has potential implications for how juries may interpret evidence.

Similarly, previous work has documented that highly conscientious individuals tend to have more conservative political ideologies, and by consequence a tendency for prioritizing law and order and a tendency to be deferential to rules and authority (Mondak 2010; Sibley and Duckitt 2009). This opens the possibility that citizens that have a higher probability for jury selection may also be citizens who are predisposed toward the prosecution and predisposed toward stricter sentencing. Hence, if individuals highly open to experience are precluding themselves from jury selection and individuals high in conscientiousness prove likely to be selected as jurors, psychological traits may influence the outcomes juries reach.

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<sup>30</sup> The language of “absolutism” and “contextualism” appears in Alford, Funk, and Hibbing’s (2005) discussion of biologically influenced differences in psychological perceptions.

### Do Traits Matter for Juror Selection?

The question at hand is whether some citizens are more likely to be mobilized into juridical publics by first answering the summons, then standing out for selection to a jury. To examine this matter, this study draws upon two dependent variables.

The first variable, *jury service*, is derived from a survey item asking respondents whether they had “ever served on a jury,” with data coded 1 (yes, respondent has served on a jury; 49 percent) and 0 (no, respondent has never served on a jury; 51 percent). A limitation of this measure is that it offers no means to differentiate between the respondent who has never served on a jury because the person has ignored any and all jury summons and the respondent who has never served on a jury because, despite being available for service, the person was not selected. Thus, further insight may be obtained with a second dependent measure.

The second dependent variable, *juror outcomes*, incorporates data on both past jury service and on whether the respondent answered the most recent jury summons. The classification of respondents is as follows: 1) *past service, present noncompliance* (20 percent of respondents) means that the person has been on a jury at some time, but failed to respond to the most recent jury summons; 2) *no service, present noncompliance* (34 percent) means that the individual has never served on a jury and ignored the most recent summons; 3) *no service, present compliance* (17 percent) means that the respondent has never served on a jury, but complied with the most recent jury summons; and 4) *jury service, present compliance* (29 percent) means that the respondent has served on one or more juries, and complied with the most recent jury summons.

The juror outcomes variable is advantageous in that with it we can more definitively pinpoint the impact of the prospective juror’s own actions on jury placement. For example, respondents in the second and third categories are similar in that they have not served on juries, but they differ in that only respondents in the third group complied with the present jury summons, and thus could have been placed on juries. Likewise, the third and fourth groups are similar in that members of both complied with the jury summons, but only respondents in the fourth group actually served on juries.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Although useful, even the second dependent variable is less than ideal. First, summons compliance includes formal efforts to postpone or be exempted from jury service. Second, prospective jurors who undergo voir dire sometimes deliberately seek to be kept off of juries by providing what they believe will be unacceptable answers to

To determine whether citizens with specific characteristics are more or less likely to serve on a jury, in addition to psychological traits, independent variables in this analysis include cultural barriers, age, and education. Taking this approach allows this second section of analysis to build on the results reported earlier. Although the approach cannot provide definitive insight into the mechanisms by which citizens with various trait profiles come to be selected for juries, it *can* provide evidence about whether the influence of traits at the summons phase of mobilization carries over into the juror selection phase.

### *Who Gets to the Jury Room?*

If the influence of traits observed during the summons phase of mobilization does carry over into the juror selection phase, one would anticipate citizens who are relatively open to experience to be among the least likely to have served on a jury, as they often seem to preclude themselves by ignoring the summons. In contrast, the expectation for extraversion is less clear. Relatively extraverted citizens demonstrated a tendency to ignore the summons, yet earlier work finds that among those extraverts who do comply, a significant number ascend to the position of foreperson. A trait that suppresses compliance is also known for making selection to a jury, or at least selection to a leadership post once on a jury, more likely. Finally, one would expect highly conscientious citizens to prove among the most likely to serve on juries, given their propensity to comply with summons and their possession of a psychological attribute that may appeal to those selecting jurors.

Logistic regression estimates are reported in Table 4.3. This model focuses on whether the respondent has ever served on a jury. Coefficient estimates indicates that older respondents—who presumably have been summonsed for jury duty more times, on average, than younger respondents—are more likely to have served on a jury. Likewise, respondents who may experience cultural obstacles to jury service are less likely to have served on a jury than respondents who do not face such barriers.

As to the Big Five variables, three produce coefficients that reach statistical significance. First, consistent with expectations, an inverse relationship is found between openness to experience and the likelihood of jury service. Second, consistent with earlier findings (Clark et

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the attorneys' questions. Thus, I have no concrete means to differentiate prospective jurors in the category of "I wanted to be on a jury, but they didn't pick me" from those in the category "I went down to the courthouse, but I made sure they wouldn't pick me."

al. 2007), extraverts are more likely to have served on juries than are introverts. Lastly, conscientiousness is positively related to jury service, although the effect falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance ( $p < .08$ ).

The substantive impact of personality is similar for the three traits that produced significant effects. With other variables held constant at mean or modal values, the predicted probability that a respondent has served on a jury varies by 13 (conscientiousness) to 16 (openness) points across the observed range of the trait scales. The combined effects of multiple personality traits also are noteworthy. For example, a person with a high level of openness and a low level of conscientiousness is projected to have only a 0.34 likelihood of having served on a jury, versus a 0.62 likelihood for a respondent with the opposite personality profile.

These initial results establish a correspondence between personality and jury service, but it is difficult from these findings alone to derive inferences regarding whether the effects represent volitional behavior on the part of respondents, a preference for certain types of jurors among attorneys, or both. It is possible that additional insight will emerge with attention to a second dependent variable, juror outcomes. With this variable, it is possible to differentiate respondents simultaneously on the basis of both prior jury service and compliance versus noncompliance with the recent jury summons.

Multinomial logistic regression results are depicted in Table 4.4. In the multinomial model, one choice option on the dependent variable—here, *jury service, present compliance*—serves as the contrast category; the first three columns of results indicate whether predictors exert statistically significant influences on each choice option relative to the contrast category. The final column reports the  $\chi^2$  statistic for each independent variable; these statistics indicate whether a variable's overall contribution to the model is significant. Among the Big Five variables, openness to experience, conscientiousness and extraversion all produce statistically significant variable  $\chi^2$  values (for each,  $p < .02$ ).

Given the results in Table 4.3, the emergence of significant findings for these three in the multinomial specification is unsurprising. At question is whether the personality variables exert particularly strong influences for specific choice options. Insight on this point emerges in Figure 4.4, which depicts the predicted probabilities associated with each of the four outcomes on the dependent variable.

Estimates for extraversion in panel A show that the key difference between introverts and extraverts is how they came to ignore the present jury summons. If an introvert ignored the present summons, it is highly probable that this person has never served on a jury. Some people just want to avoid social interactions. Conversely, if an extravert ignored the present summons, it is more likely than not that this individual served on a jury at some point in the past. This sheds new light on the analysis of juror compliance presented earlier. At least for some extraverts, it appears that prior jury service was sufficiently off-putting to compel them to ignore a subsequent jury summons. The problem with mobilizing extraverts, it appears, is not getting them to comply with a summons, but getting them to comply more than once. Yet, among citizens who complied with the present summons, introverts and extraverts display the same predicted probability of having served on a jury. The available data cannot determine whether these individuals served on a jury as the result of the most recent summons or at some earlier point in time. Even so, this result indicates that at the jury selection phase of mobilization, neither introverts nor extraverts are over-represented on juries, even if extraverts are more likely to lead the deliberations (Clark et al. 2007).

In panel B, openness is inconsequential for the first and third categories, but important for the second and fourth. For respondents high in openness to experience, the strong modal prediction is *no service, present noncompliance*. That is, these individuals have never served on juries, and they ignored the present jury summons. For respondents low in openness, the modal prediction is *jury service, present compliance*, meaning that these respondents answered the summons and have served on juries.

For conscientiousness, the sharpest effect in Figure 4.4 is for the fourth category, *jury service, present compliance*. Respondents high in conscientiousness have nearly twice the likelihood of being in this category as compared to their unconscientious counterparts. This finding is particularly noteworthy when viewed in conjunction with the estimates in panel B. Together, what these probabilities reveal is that individuals who are low in openness to experience and high in conscientiousness are the most likely to respond positively to a jury summons and ultimately to be seated on juries. Consequently, there is a notable difference in the probability of jury service based on psychological tendencies that could matter for interpreting evidence and deciding sentences. Those most likely to serve have traits associated with an

ideological predisposition for supporting authority and an absolutist understanding of morality. Citizens with the opposite tendencies are among the least likely to find themselves on juries.

If traits influence the decisions citizens make as jurors, this set of results becomes especially consequential. If the citizens most likely to mobilize for service bring a specific pattern of thinking with them, it would mean that current mobilization practices fail to stimulate potentially valuable psychological tendencies—in this case, tendencies that might facilitate a more thorough consideration of possibilities. The question of whether traits influence the decisions of jurors therefore arrives as perhaps the most significant question for future research suggested by this chapter. Of course, even if psychological traits *do not* influence the decisions of jurors *directly*, the evidence presented here indicates that, at minimum, traits exert an *indirect* influence on judicial outcomes. When citizens do not comply with a summons or when they fail to get seated on juries, the judicial process loses out on a potentially valuable set of experiences and skills. Because psychological traits shape motivations for compliance and the probability of selection to a jury, traits thus influence the process by which juridical publics form at two consequential stages. The question that remains is not whether psychological traits influence judicial outcomes, but how.

### **From Summons to Service:**

#### **The Significance of Psychological Traits for Juridical Publics**

When we rely upon juries to make authoritative decisions, we do so because we believe many citizens can make better decisions than any one citizen acting alone. We believe that citizens will bring different experiences, skills, and perspectives with them to the decision-making process. And we believe that this diversity will help us consider possibilities that may otherwise remain unconsidered, to the detriment of justice. So long as we hold these beliefs, the issues of summons compliance and juridical representation will perpetually require our attention. To effectively mobilize juridical publics, after all, we must understand why problems with compliance and representation arise.

This chapter offers two sets of lessons. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, the analyses presented here find that social and environmental factors influence both the probability that a citizen complies with a summons and the probability that a citizen will serve as a juror. At each phase of mobilization, indicators of class status and cultural barriers correspond with a

lower probability that a citizen will become a juror. To the extent that different experiences and perspectives result from differences in race, ethnicity, and class, these patterns work against the goal of creating juries that better represent the political community.

Further, the evidence from this chapter is consistent with the view that increasing juror pay will not effectively address such issues, or the issue of low juror compliance in the larger population. Regardless of whether citizens faced various barriers to compliance, increased juror pay did virtually nothing to incentivize answering the summons. This finding indicates that some social and environmental disincentives cannot be overcome with money, or at least not with money alone. Among these social problems appears to be a fundamental disregard for a civic responsibility. If we want more citizens to take part in jury service, and if we want to increase the diversity of citizens who take part, we must both recognize how the environment shapes the choices citizens make and modify the environment appropriately. If citizens face cultural barriers, we must work to eliminate these barriers. If citizens lack commitment to the judicial process, we must work to improve the civic culture. That is the first lesson.

We must also move beyond the notion that citizens are shaped by their environments alone. As this chapter has demonstrated, basic psychological traits influence the probability with which a citizen becomes a juror. Although selection to a jury is ultimately outside a citizen's direct control, the available evidence indicates that psychological traits matter at two distinct junctures. Clearly, certain trait profiles appeal to the legal representatives involved in the selection of juries. If they did not, it would be unlikely that the patterns reported here would have emerged. Just as importantly, however, the choices made by citizens when they received their summonses matter, and here too, traits exert an important influence. Some citizens—the highly conscientious—prove psychologically predisposed to honor a civic duty, once they perceive it as such. Others—namely, those highly open to experience—demonstrate a tendency to prioritize other pursuits. Still others—like those facing cultural barriers—prove unlikely to mobilize unless they are relatively extraverted. If we ignore these patterns as we design mobilization strategies, we overlook an important aspect of the human condition. We risk overlooking strategies that could increase juror yields and increase the diversity of juror pool because they resonate with basic human motivations. This is the second lesson.

At a time when low compliance rates and concerns about representation compromise the judicial process, it may also be the most significant lesson. Careful attention to the environment

tells us that social barriers and a lack of civic responsibility—not paltry juror pay—have produced high levels of non-compliance and relatively low juror diversity. Yet, to more effectively mobilize juridical publics in terms of both numbers and diversity, we must part ways with the notion that citizens will respond to stimuli in the same ways. The psychological tendencies we possess are a fundamental part of who we are as citizens. They guide how we perceive and respond to the world around us. Consequently, if mobilizing juridical publics hinges on outreach and civic education, we would do well to understand the psychological basis for why some messages resonate and others do not. We also must do well to understand the implications of psychological traits possessed by citizens who come to serve as jurors, as this matter remains unexplored.

These matters, of course, raise some vexing normative questions. To what extent do decisions about legal justice depend upon the psychological tendencies of jurors? Should we purposefully aim to mobilize juridical publics by taking psychological traits into account? If we do not take traits into account when mobilizing juridical publics, do we fail in our responsibility to seek out a diverse and representative pool of potential jurors? Vexing as they may be, these are our questions to answer, and with eyes wide open.

## Chapter 4 Tables and Figures

**Table 4.1 Effects of Resources, Barriers, and Traits on Jury Compliance**

|                                                            | Model 1:<br>Baseline | Model 2:<br>Pay<br>Experiment | Model 3:<br>Psychological<br>Traits |
|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <i>Social/Environmental</i>                                |                      |                               |                                     |
| Limits on discretionary time:<br>Children under 18 at home | -0.18<br>(0.13)      | -0.19<br>(0.13)               | -0.22<br>(0.13)                     |
| Limits on discretionary time:<br>Co-dependent relationship | 0.04<br>(0.17)       | 0.02<br>(0.18)                | 0.07<br>(0.18)                      |
| Limits on discretionary time:<br>Work constraints          | 0.17<br>(0.13)       | 0.17<br>(0.13)                | 0.14<br>(0.13)                      |
| Selective benefits:<br>Pay experiment                      | --                   | -0.20#<br>(0.10)              | -0.19#<br>(0.11)                    |
| Social integration and<br>Cultural barriers                | -1.10***<br>(0.31)   | -1.13***<br>(0.30)            | 1.07***<br>(0.31)                   |
| Political aptitude                                         | 0.59*<br>(0.23)      | 0.59*<br>(0.23)               | 0.61**<br>(0.23)                    |
| Age                                                        | 0.05<br>(0.05)       | 0.05<br>(0.05)                | 0.04<br>(0.05)                      |
| Education                                                  | -0.03<br>(0.04)      | -0.03<br>(0.03)               | -0.01<br>(0.04)                     |
| Income                                                     | 0.10**<br>(0.04)     | 0.11**<br>(0.04)              | 0.11**<br>(0.04)                    |
| Income non-response                                        | 0.03<br>(0.17)       | 0.01<br>(0.18)                | 0.08<br>(0.18)                      |
| Male                                                       | -0.09<br>(0.10)      | -0.08<br>(0.10)               | -0.01<br>(0.11)                     |
| White                                                      | 0.15<br>(0.22)       | 0.13<br>(0.22)                | 0.14<br>(0.22)                      |

**Table 4.1 (cont)**

|                        | Model 1:<br>Baseline | Model 2:<br>Pay<br>Experiment | Model 3:<br>Psychological<br>Traits |
|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <i>Personality</i>     |                      |                               |                                     |
| Openness to Experience | --                   | --                            | -0.73*<br>(0.31)                    |
| Conscientiousness      | --                   | --                            | 0.36<br>(0.29)                      |
| Extraversion           | --                   | --                            | -0.36<br>(0.27)                     |
| Agreeableness          | --                   | --                            | 0.32<br>(0.30)                      |
| Emotional Stability    | --                   | --                            | -0.23<br>(0.31)                     |
| Constant               | -1.18**<br>(0.39)    | -1.07**<br>(0.40)             | -1.02*<br>(0.43)                    |
| Pseudo. R-Squared      | 0.07                 | 0.08                          | 0.09                                |
| Obs.                   | 1718                 | 1718                          | 1693                                |

*Source:* Juror Pay Study

*Note:* Cell entries are binomial logistic regression coefficients. The dependent variable is juror summons compliance (1 = survey respondent answered the jury summons, 0 = survey respondent ignored the jury summons)

\*\*\* p < .001 \*\* p < .01 \* p < .05 # p < .10

**Table 4.2 Conditional Effects of Personality on Jury Summons Compliance**

|                                                            | Model 1:<br>Political<br>Aptitude | Model 2:<br>Children/<br>Co-dependence | Model 3:<br>Work<br>Constraints | Model 4:<br>Selective<br>Benefits | Model 5:<br>Cultural<br>Barriers |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Social/Environmental</i>                                |                                   |                                        |                                 |                                   |                                  |
| Limits on discretionary time:<br>children under 18 at home | -0.21<br>(0.13)                   | 0.37<br>(0.22)                         | -0.23#<br>(0.13)                | -0.39#<br>(0.22)                  | -0.23#<br>(0.13)                 |
| Limits on discretionary time:<br>Co-dependent relationship | 0.08<br>(0.18)                    | 0.72<br>(0.74)                         | 0.05<br>(0.17)                  | 0.20<br>(0.23)                    | 0.07<br>(0.18)                   |
| Limits on discretionary time:<br>Work constraints          | 0.14<br>(0.13)                    | 0.09<br>(0.25)                         | -0.04<br>(0.40)                 | 0.10<br>(0.25)                    | 0.14<br>(0.13)                   |
| Selective benefits:<br>Pay experiment                      | -0.19#<br>(0.10)                  | -0.21*<br>(0.10)                       | -0.18#<br>(0.10)                | -0.62<br>(0.39)                   | -0.56*<br>(0.23)                 |
| Social integration and<br>Cultural Barriers                | -0.99**<br>(0.32)                 | -1.21***<br>(0.32)                     | -1.08***<br>(0.32)              | -1.21***<br>(0.32)                | -1.56#<br>(0.94)                 |
| Political Aptitude                                         | -0.62<br>(0.71)                   | 0.52*<br>(0.23)                        | 0.60**<br>(0.23)                | 0.54*<br>(0.23)                   | 0.51*<br>(0.23)                  |
| Age                                                        | 0.04<br>(0.05)                    | 0.01<br>(0.06)                         | 0.04<br>(0.05)                  | 0.01<br>(0.06)                    | 0.04<br>(0.05)                   |
| Education                                                  | -0.01<br>(0.04)                   | -0.03<br>(0.03)                        | -0.01<br>(0.04)                 | -0.03<br>(0.03)                   | -0.02<br>(0.04)                  |
| Income                                                     | 0.11**<br>(0.04)                  | 0.11**<br>(0.04)                       | 0.11**<br>(0.04)                | 0.11**<br>(0.04)                  | 0.11**<br>(0.04)                 |
| Income non-response                                        | 0.08<br>(0.19)                    | 0.08<br>(0.18)                         | 0.05<br>(0.19)                  | 0.09<br>(0.19)                    | 0.07<br>(0.18)                   |
| Male                                                       | -0.01<br>(0.11)                   | -0.02<br>(0.11)                        | -0.00<br>(0.11)                 | -0.03<br>(0.11)                   | -0.00<br>(0.10)                  |
| White                                                      | 0.15<br>(0.22)                    | 0.10<br>(0.22)                         | 0.15<br>(0.22)                  | 0.09<br>(0.22)                    | 0.13<br>(0.22)                   |

**Table 4.2(cont)**

|                                           | Model 1:<br>Political<br>Aptitude | Model 2:<br>Children/<br>Co-dependence | Model 3:<br>Work<br>Constraints | Model 4:<br>Selective<br>Benefits | Model 5:<br>Cultural<br>Barriers |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Personality</i>                        |                                   |                                        |                                 |                                   |                                  |
| Openness to Experience                    | 0.47<br>(0.80)                    | -0.78*<br>(0.40)                       | -1.27*<br>(0.51)                | -0.65*<br>(0.43)                  | -0.53<br>(0.33)                  |
| Conscientiousness                         | -1.68*<br>(0.78)                  | 0.56*<br>(0.37)                        | 0.68<br>(0.51)                  | 0.63*<br>(0.41)                   | 0.49<br>(0.30)                   |
| Extraversion                              | -0.09<br>(0.75)                   | -0.45<br>(0.35)                        | -0.28<br>(0.46)                 | -0.86*<br>(0.39)                  | -0.73**<br>(0.29)                |
| Agreeableness                             | 0.15<br>(0.78)                    | 0.27<br>(0.39)                         | -0.37<br>(0.50)                 | -0.03<br>(0.42)                   | 0.15<br>(0.32)                   |
| Emotional Stability                       | -0.83<br>(0.82)                   | 0.06<br>(0.39)                         | 0.49<br>(0.49)                  | -0.25<br>(0.43)                   | -0.04<br>(0.32)                  |
| <i>Conditional Relationships</i>          |                                   |                                        |                                 |                                   |                                  |
| Openness x resource/barrier               | -1.73<br>(1.07)                   | 0.96<br>(1.04)                         | 0.86<br>(0.62)                  | 0.17<br>(0.61)                    | -1.43<br>(1.23)                  |
| Conscientiousness x<br>Resource/barrier   | 2.94**<br>(1.04)                  | -0.67<br>(1.04)                        | -0.48<br>(0.61)                 | -0.38<br>(0.59)                   | -1.29<br>(1.31)                  |
| Extraversion x<br>Resource/barrier        | -0.72<br>(0.99)                   | -0.42<br>(0.99)                        | -0.13<br>(0.56)                 | 0.72<br>(0.55)                    | 3.36**<br>(1.14)                 |
| Agreeableness x<br>Resource/barrier       | 0.30<br>(1.04)                    | -0.30<br>(1.06)                        | 1.80<br>(0.61)                  | 0.48<br>(0.59)                    | 2.14<br>(1.37)                   |
| Emotional Stability x<br>Resource/barrier | 0.86<br>(1.10)                    | -1.53<br>(1.11)                        | -1.19#<br>(0.63)                | 0.03<br>(0.62)                    | -1.45<br>(1.22)                  |
| Openness to Experience x<br>Co-dependence |                                   | -0.81<br>(0.90)                        |                                 |                                   |                                  |
| Conscientiousness x<br>Co-dependence      |                                   | -1.18<br>(0.86)                        |                                 |                                   |                                  |

**Table 4.2(cont)**

|                                        | Model 1:<br>Political<br>Aptitude | Model 2:<br>Children/<br>Co-dependence | Model 3:<br>Work<br>Constraints | Model 4:<br>Selective<br>Benefits | Model 5:<br>Cultural<br>Barriers |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Extraversion x<br>Co-dependence        |                                   | 0.06<br>(0.80)                         |                                 |                                   |                                  |
| Agreeableness x<br>Co-Dependence       |                                   | 0.05<br>(0.90)                         |                                 |                                   |                                  |
| Emotional Stability x<br>Co-dependence |                                   | 0.14<br>(0.90)                         |                                 |                                   |                                  |
| Constant                               | -0.19<br>(0.65)                   | -0.85*<br>(0.47)                       | -0.91#<br>(0.49)                | -0.51<br>(0.47)                   | -0.94*<br>(0.44)                 |
| Adj. R-Squared                         | 0.10                              | 0.10                                   | 0.10                            | 0.09                              | 0.09                             |
| Obs.                                   | 1693                              | 1693                                   | 1693                            | 1693                              | 1693                             |

*Source:* Juror Pay Study

*Note:* Cell entries are binomial logistic regression coefficients. The dependent variable is juror summons compliance (1 = survey respondent answered the jury summons, 0 = survey respondent ignored the jury summons)

\*\*\* p < .001 \*\* p < .01 \* p < .05 # p < .10

**Table 4.3 Determinants of Jury Service: Binomial Logistic Regression Estimates**

---

*Social Environmental*

|                   |                   |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| Cultural Barriers | -0.72**<br>(0.24) |
|-------------------|-------------------|

|           |                |
|-----------|----------------|
| Education | 0.04<br>(0.03) |
|-----------|----------------|

|     |                  |
|-----|------------------|
| Age | 0.36**<br>(0.04) |
|-----|------------------|

*Personality*

|                        |                  |
|------------------------|------------------|
| Openness to Experience | -0.66*<br>(0.30) |
|------------------------|------------------|

|                   |                 |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| Conscientiousness | 0.51#<br>(0.28) |
|-------------------|-----------------|

|              |                 |
|--------------|-----------------|
| Extraversion | 0.62*<br>(0.27) |
|--------------|-----------------|

|               |                |
|---------------|----------------|
| Agreeableness | 0.08<br>(0.27) |
|---------------|----------------|

|                     |                |
|---------------------|----------------|
| Emotional Stability | 0.04<br>(0.31) |
|---------------------|----------------|

|          |                    |
|----------|--------------------|
| Constant | -1.90***<br>(0.29) |
|----------|--------------------|

|                |      |
|----------------|------|
| Adj. R-squared | 0.06 |
|----------------|------|

|      |      |
|------|------|
| Obs. | 1736 |
|------|------|

---

*Source:* Juror Pay Study

*Note:* Cell entries are binomial logistic regression coefficients. The dependent variable is juror summons compliance (1 = survey respondent answered the jury summons, 0 = survey respondent ignored the jury summons)

\*\*\* p < .001 \*\* p < .01 \* p < .05 # p < .10

**Table 4.4 Determinants of Juror Outcomes: Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates**

|                             | Past service,<br>Present<br>non-compliance | Non service,<br>Present<br>non-compliance | No service,<br>Present<br>compliance | Variable $\chi^2$ |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Social/Environmental</i> |                                            |                                           |                                      |                   |
| Cultural Barriers           | 0.28<br>(0.38)                             | 1.18***<br>(0.29)                         | -0.42<br>(0.43)                      | 31.87             |
| Education                   | 0.02<br>(0.05)                             | -0.07<br>(0.04)                           | 0.05<br>(0.05)                       | 7.62              |
| Age                         | 0.17**<br>(0.06)                           | -0.34***<br>(0.05)                        | -0.21***<br>(0.05)                   | 104.17***         |
| <i>Personality</i>          |                                            |                                           |                                      |                   |
| Openness to Experience      | 0.51<br>(0.43)                             | 1.15**<br>(0.38)                          | 0.27<br>(0.46)                       | 10.08*            |
| Conscientiousness           | -1.07**<br>(0.40)                          | -0.83*<br>(0.36)                          | -1.11**<br>(0.42)                    | 10.99*            |
| Extraversion                | 0.82*<br>(0.37)                            | -0.22*<br>(0.34)                          | -0.37<br>(0.41)                      | 10.04*            |
| Agreeableness               | -0.26<br>(0.37)                            | -0.32<br>(0.33)                           | 0.11<br>(0.39)                       | 1.77              |
| Emotional Stability         | 0.23<br>(0.42)                             | 0.15<br>(0.38)                            | -0.22<br>(0.46)                      | 1.01              |
| Constant                    | -1.13**<br>(0.42)                          | 1.85<br>(0.36)                            | 0.81#<br>(0.43)                      | 59.29***          |
| Model $\chi^2$              | 232.17                                     |                                           |                                      |                   |
| Obs.                        | 1736                                       |                                           |                                      |                   |

*Source:* American Citizen Participation Study, 1990

*Notes.* Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10.

**Figure 4.1 Mobilizing Juridical Publics: The Summons Phase**




Figure 4.2. Conscientiousness and Political Engagement






Figure 4.3 Extraversion and Cultural Barriers



**Figure 4.4**



## **CHAPTER 5:**

### **MOBILIZING DIRECT ACTION PUBLICS**

The great promise of democracy is that we, as citizens, have the opportunity to direct our destinies. We have the opportunity to advance our individual interests and our notions of the common interest. Of course, despite this opportunity, we never have a guarantee that things will work out the way we desire. Our interests can be challenged and threatened by others. We can find ourselves ignored or rejected by those entrusted with decision-making power. Immediate problems in our political communities can go unnoticed and unaddressed if citizens do not step forward. As a practical matter then, we must be prepared to take direct action. When our interests are challenged, threatened, or ignored, we have protest as an option. When we see issues that need attention in our local communities, we have the option of coming together to work on them. This requires mobilizing ourselves as publics, and doing so requires finding citizens willing to meet the demands that come with participating in direct action.

The challenge becomes finding citizens that have the time, skills, and mentality necessary to participate in these various forms of action. Who will participate? Who will we contact? These are the questions that direct action organizers face every day. Scholars are no strangers to these questions either. Previous work has highlighted how the resources citizens have, or do not have, at their disposal shape the dynamics of direct public action. Those who have the opportunity to build participatory skills and have the time to ply those skills are more likely to participate. Those deprived of skill-building opportunities and those devoting greater time to family and work are less likely to participate (McCarthy and Zald 2001; Brady et al 1995). In short, the social and environmental factors implicit to mobilization constitute well-traversed territory. Even so, this line of research has often neglected a crucial feature of the process.

Direct action inevitably involves social interaction. Protest, by design, involves confrontation. It involves coming together with those who share a common political vision. It involves taking a visible stand against those who disagree with that vision. This cannot be done without social interaction, and this social interaction can prove quite intense. Participating in efforts to solve community problems also requires intense social interactions, but often of a different kind. Community problem-solving often requires a willingness to sit around a table and strategize. It requires a willingness to move from talk to action once strategy sessions have

concluded. In addition to having time available and participatory skills, these sorts of actions require a certain mentality. A citizen must be willing to engage other citizens, face-to-face.

Here, greater attention to psychological traits promises deeper insight into what leads citizens into direct public action. Of the traits encompassed in the “Big Five,” extraversion is of particular interest. Participating in protest actions and working on local issues constitute activities involving social interaction. Extraverts, by definition tend to be socially out-going. Recent applications of trait psychology to political behavior have found that relatively high levels of extraversion give rise to a distinctively participatory predisposition (Gerber et al. 2011; Mondak et al 2010). One such study reports a strong relationship between extraversion and protest activity (Mondak et al 2011).

Questions about the process by which an extraverted tendency is stimulated remain. Extraversion would have no effect absent circumstances that stimulate it. Yet our understanding of these circumstances is limited. Does extraversion, as a psychological tendency, make some citizens more visible to organizers? Does mobilizing contact even matter that much for extraverts, or are they outgoing enough to participate even when they do not receive contact? Under what circumstances, if any, might introverts become targets of mobilizing contact and participants in direct action publics? The answers to these questions will tell us something about the dynamics of mobilizing direct action publics, as they exist under current conditions. Just as importantly, this insight can help us evaluate whether some citizens are implicitly valued more than others as a function of an inherent psychological characteristic.

### **Invitations to Action:**

#### **Social Environments, Extraversion and Mobilizing Contact**

During attempts to mobilize publics for direct action, organizers face the fundamental challenge of the public goods dilemma. When actions succeed in attaining their goals, the benefits of success are experienced collectively, even by individuals who did not contribute. Yet if no one accepts the costs of participation, public action would never get off the ground. This is true for both protest actions and for community problem-solving efforts. Citizens must prove willing to put in the time and engage in the types of participation necessary to move public action forward.

Likewise, success in the case of each type of action is often facilitated by building strength in numbers. Protests send a stronger signal about preferences, at minimum, and can exert greater coercive influence on decision-makers when the number of participants is large (Chong 1991). When citizens collaborate on problems in their local communities, strength in numbers serves a different purpose. It is not the number of people in a room, per se, that makes a public stronger, but the concentration of a diversity of perspectives and skills in the same place (Page 2007; McCarthy and Zald 2001; Morris 1981).

The challenge for political organizers centers on finding and contacting citizens who will prove most likely to take action. Organizers have limited resources for finding and contacting citizens and therefore have every incentive to focus upon citizens who are most accessible, most motivated, and most equipped to take action (McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). As Figure 5.1 illustrates, social and environmental factors remain a familiar and necessary consideration. Citizens must be available for contact. To the extent that citizens must contend with work or school commitments, and to the extent that their discretionary time is focused on familial obligations, they may become less available to receive mobilizing contact. When political organizers attempt to mobilize citizens, individuals with such time constraints may be indisposed. Alternatively, the activities they have prioritized may not place them in social situations where they are likely to experience mobilization attempts. Barriers to social and cultural integration can have the same effect. Especially in predominantly Anglophone localities, citizens who do not speak English or do not speak English as their primary language may be less comfortable receiving contact and try to avoid it, or they may be isolated from social situations where contact would become more likely (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).

Whereas some citizens may be less likely to receive contact, others may make themselves more accessible and may be more likely to be targeted for contact in the first place. When citizens have great interest in political life and prioritize it, they may place themselves in social situations where contact becomes more likely. They may also develop reputations that lead organizers to prioritize contacting them. Likewise, citizens who have developed high levels of civic skills may place themselves in situations where they become more likely to encounter calls to action. They may even be more likely to draw the attention of political organizers who find their skills attractive or view their skills as an indicator of a willingness to get involved (Ostrom 1998; Chong 1991; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; McAdam 1988; McAdam 1986).

In addition to social and environmental factors, psychological traits—and extraversion in particular—can also influence the probability that a citizen receives contact. In the context of direct action, most citizens who receive appeals to action receive them from people they know personally or from people with whom they have some pre-existing social connection (Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McAdam 1988; McAdam 1986). Extraverted citizens tend to have larger social networks and tend to be more out-going and sociable (Mondak 2010). Owing to this tendency, extraverts may be more likely to encounter appeals to action as they engage in a wide array of social interactions. A tendency toward extraversion may also signal a willingness to participate in intensive social interactions, which may in turn attract the attention of organizers mobilizing for protests and community problem-solving efforts.

Besides these direct effects of extraversion, an indirect effect also seems plausible. Extraverted individuals may prove more likely to develop a greater interest in politics (Mondak 2010) and also more likely to develop useful participatory skills as a function of their out-going, sociable tendencies. Evidence to this effect would shed new light on the pathway by which extraversion influences the experiences individuals have with citizenship and democracy. Extraversion may contribute to a “participatory personality” (Mondak et al 2011), but just as importantly, it may influence how an individual’s environment responds to the individual, by making invitations to participate more likely.

### **From Mobilizing Contact to the Creation of Direct Action Publics**

Direct action publics are not created simply by making people aware of a problem or by attempting to mobilize people into action. They are created when citizens accept the importance of taking action and follow through on their conviction. Here again, the function of social and environmental factors cannot be ignored. As Figure 5.1 depicts, after citizens have received contact from political organizers, occupational, social, and familial commitments can influence what citizens do. If a citizen is beholden to other responsibilities, these may take precedence over participating in protests or participating in community problem-solving efforts. These other responsibilities may seem more important to the citizen, or may even prevent the citizen from taking action even if he or she would prefer to participate. Social and cultural barriers, such as language use, can also reduce the likelihood that a citizen will accept participation as a priority

or take action (Cain and Doherty 2006; Ramakrishnan 2005; Barreto and Munoz 2003). If individuals feel isolated from the community, they may not accept taking action as a priority. Even if they do accept it as a priority, they may not feel comfortable participating. Accumulated social resources like political interest and civic skills also have a history of influencing citizen decisions when opportunities for action arise. Just as individuals with high levels of interest and high levels of skills may be more likely to get contacted by political organizers, they also tend to be among those most likely to take action (Brady et al 1995).

Yet the decision to participate in a protest or community problem-solving effort may not be solely reducible to the absence of competing priorities, the presence of political interest, and the development of relevant participatory skills. Two recent studies indicate that psychological traits, and extraversion in particular, also influence participatory tendencies with respect to protest participation and community involvement. In a study reporting data from Uruguay and Venezuela, higher levels of extraversion increase the likelihood that an individual has participated in a protest action (Mondak et al 2011) and also increases the likelihood that an individual becomes active in civic organizations (Miller 2010; see also Bekkers 2005). Although the relationship between extraversion and protest participation has not yet received attention in the U.S. context, it seems reasonable to expect that extraversion exerts a positive direct effect. With respect to participation in community problem-solving, an even stronger basis exists for predicting a direct, positive effect of extraversion. Individuals with relatively high levels of extraversion have a tendency to display higher levels of efficacy and a strong sense of community, qualities amenable to community problem-solving efforts (Lounsbury, Loveland, and Gibson 2003).

Direct effects of extraversion have an intuitive quality in the context of both protest actions and community problem-solving efforts. Both are the sorts of actions that seem likely to stimulate an extraverted psychological tendency. Even so, the search for direct effects leaves us with little insight into the social processes that lead to this effect. Protests and community problem-solving efforts do not occur spontaneously. Even the most extraverted citizens do not suddenly show up to a rally or meeting of concerned citizens. Mobilization efforts generally precede public actions. Accordingly, if extraverted citizens seem distinctively likely to participate, it may well be because they are more likely to receive contact from political organizers in the first place. If this is the case, one would expect the effect of extraversion to be

moderated by whether a citizen has received contact during a mobilization effort. Extraverts who are not contacted may prove no more likely to participate than anyone else. Extraverts whose participation is solicited, by contrast, may display a distinctive likelihood of taking action.

One additional possibility warrants noting, and it is a seemingly counter-intuitive one. The prediction that extraverts will prove distinctively active in protests and community problem-solving stems from the fact that each of these activities involves intensive social interaction. This of course is accurate, but it is not the only important feature of these activities. While protests and community problem-solving efforts do offer “expressive benefits” to those want them, such activities also provide “solidarity benefits” to participants as well. Where “expressive benefits” might appeal mainly to the extravert,<sup>32</sup> “solidarity benefits” may appeal even to the relatively introverted, who may wish to support a cause, even if they are not the most vocal or focal participants. Just as importantly, the social dynamics of protest and community problem-solving are not reducible to extraverts engaging in intensive social interactions. Extraverts may be inclined to initiate efforts or take the lead as action unfolds, but they also need individuals to follow that lead. Introverts may have a disposition that suits this role, and by extension, a disposition that facilitates the social dynamics that allow a public to grow in size.<sup>33</sup> Some introverted individuals may even develop reputations for reliable participation, even if they do fit the brash stereotype we often associate with “the protester” or “the community activist.” Of course, introverts may not be the most likely to be contacted, or even the most likely to take action in a general sense. However, it is plausible that introverts who are contacted for participation may be at least as likely to take action as their more extraverted peers.

### **The Dynamics of Mobilizing Direct Action Publics:**

#### **The Citizen Participation Study**

To examine how environmental and psychological factors influence the mobilization of direct action publics, this chapter uses the 1990 Citizen Participation Study (CPS). This data source is particularly useful for several reasons. It includes several measures of social and

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<sup>32</sup> Scitovsky (1976) foreshadows this prediction when discussing the appeal of “stimulating activity” that some political activists appear to experience.

<sup>33</sup> Such a dynamic would be consistent with the classic “tipping points” argument elaborated by Schelling (1978), and applied by Chong (1991) to political participation. In essence, citizens may have a preference to participate, but only once they receive a signal that a sufficient number of others will join them. This “sufficient number” of others may vary greatly. Some may prefer action even if no one else has yet committed to participate. These individuals may even initiate public actions. Others may require the company of many, many fellow citizens.

environmental factors, including a nuanced measure of civic skills gained from experiences at work and in secondary associations.<sup>34</sup> It also includes survey items that locate individuals who participate in direct action and receive contact during mobilization efforts. Additionally, the CPS contains several items that tap into the extraversion trait dimension of the Five Factor Model. Though the 1990 CPS was fielded long before the “Big Five” entered the vernacular of political science, extraversion itself long precedes development of the Big Five framework, and a precedent exists in the political behavior literature for using these items to represent extraversion (Miller 2010).

Despite this precedent, however, this chapter takes additional steps to establish construct validity. To demonstrate that items on the CPS do in fact tap into the underlying construct of extraversion, I fielded a survey of undergraduate students containing the eight CPS items for extraversion used by Miller (2010) and more standard items for measuring each of “Big Five” trait dimensions. To ensure that these items represent extraversion, I performed two sets of tests.<sup>35</sup>

First, to get a more precise sense of which items on the CPS *primarily* represent extraversion and not one of the other four trait dimensions in the Five Factor Model, I regressed each of the eight items from the CPS scale used by Miller (2010) on the standard measures of all five trait dimensions. For five of the eight items from the CPS, the standard, Big 5 measure of extraversion emerges as the strongest predictor. The extraversion scale used in this chapter therefore uses only these five items ( $\alpha = 0.67$ ). Upon establishing this scale, I then assessed whether the scale primarily corresponds with the standard, Big 5 measure of extraversion. Using the survey of undergraduates, I examined correlations between standard measures of each of the trait dimensions in the Five Factor Model and the five item extraversion scale created from the CPS items. As anticipated, the highest correlation involved the standard measure of extraversion. Although this approach does not allow one to determine whether trait dimensions besides extraversion influence the dynamics of mobilization, it does provide evidence that the measure of extraversion created from the 1990 CPS is a valid one.

The analysis in this chapter proceeds in two stages. First, we turn to the question of “who gets contacted for direct action?” Mobilization efforts for protest actions and community

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<sup>34</sup> Details on the construction of all variables included in this chapter appear in Appendix B.

<sup>35</sup> The results of these tests appear in Appendix C.

problem-solving efforts serve as the focus. The dependent variables for this portion of the analysis are dichotomous indicators of whether a citizen has received contact about participating in a protest or community problem-solving effort. The measures of contact for each form of action are coded 1 (*citizen has received contact*) or 0 (*citizen as not received contact*). Next, the chapter turns to the question “who participates in direct action,” and again protest participation and community problem-solving serve as the focus. The dependent variables in this second phase of analysis are dichotomous indicators of participation, coded 1 (*citizen participated in a protest/community problem-solving effort in the past year*) or 0 (*citizen did not participate*). Factors thought to influence the reception of contact and participation, respectively, are examined in a series of logistic regression models.

### **The Call to (Direct) Action**

Direct action publics come into existence when political problems go unnoticed or unaddressed by official decision-makers. They come into existence as citizens organize themselves to express dissatisfaction, attempt to disrupt practices they see as harmful, or otherwise take problem-solving responsibilities into their own hands.

For citizens who attempt to initiate such efforts, the first challenge, as always, centers on finding and persuading others to join the fray. A successful attempt to contact a citizen therefore implies that two events have taken place. First, a direct action organizer has attempted to contact a citizen, seeking his or her participation. Second, the citizen targeted for contact has received the intended contact. In the context of mobilizing for protest, 17 percent of citizens surveyed for the CPS receive a call to action. In the context of mobilizing for community problem-solving, 24 percent of citizens receive contact. For both types of direct action citizen who receive contact are clearly in the minority of the population. So, who are these citizens?

The results in Table 5.1 take aim at this question. Table 5.1 contains two models. The first takes mobilizing contact for protest actions as the outcome to explain. The second turns to mobilizing contact for community problem-solving efforts. Each model includes indicators of resources and barriers present in a citizen’s social environment, along with a measure of extraversion. For both types of mobilizing contact, education emerges as an important accumulated social resource. Citizens who have garnered more years of education have higher probabilities of reporting contact by organizers mobilizing for protest actions and community

problem-solving efforts. This is consistent with scholarship that finds that organizers more frequently target groups with higher education (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and the classic finding that individuals with greater amounts of formal education can more easily satisfy basic material needs and thus have more time for political involvement (Welzel and Inglehart 2010; Inglehart 1997). With respect to mobilizing contact for protests, this is the only social factor that exerts a significant influence.

Looking to mobilization for community problem-solving, several other factors warrant comment. In addition to having relatively higher levels of education, those most likely to receive contact in advance of community problem-solving efforts tend to have at least one child, have higher family incomes, and do not need to worry about language barriers. Once again, this is consistent with the findings of past research. Greater income, like a greater amount of formal education, signals that basic material needs are more easily satisfied and more time is available for political involvement. They are more available to be targeted for contact and to receive that contact. Having children also appears to place citizens in situations where mobilizing contact is more likely to happen, at least with respect to community-level issues. When people have children, they commonly have committed to living in a place. Accordingly, as people become more imbedded in a neighborhood or locality and more familiar with the organizations and institutions that structure community life, they become more likely to participate (Anderson 2009; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Sampson 1988). Lastly, language barriers emerge as a notable barrier to receiving contact about community problem-solving efforts. This does not come as a surprise. Non-Anglophone citizens in primarily Anglophone localities may find themselves especially likely to be isolated from problem-solving efforts if the dominant means of outreach are communicated in English only.

This first look at patterns of contact reflects the presence of entrenched disparities in how citizens experience democratic life. With respect to direct actions like protest and community problem-solving, those with higher levels of material prosperity prove more likely to receive mobilizing contact. Those who face language barriers—typically Latino and Asian citizens—prove less likely to receive contact. Put bluntly, while some have a relatively high probability of getting contacted for public action, others are much more likely to get ignored.

Such social and economic disparities have been well chronicled, yet they may not be the only source of disparity that affects the experiences of citizens. Perhaps the most striking result

reported in Table 5.1 pertains to extraversion. During efforts to mobilize for protest and community problem-solving, the most extraverted of citizens are at least twice as likely to receive contact than the extremely introverted. In the case of protest, the predicted probability of contact ranges from 0.09 for citizens on the low end of extraversion scale to 0.18 for citizens on the high end of the scale. In the case of community problem-solving, the predicted probability of contact for citizens at the lowest end of the extraversion scale is 0.10. The predicted probability of contact rises to 0.23 for citizens at the high end of the scale.

These results point to an important reality of citizenship. Invitations to action not only become more likely as a function of social and economic position, but also as a function of a person's psychological tendencies. Citizens with a predisposition toward out-going, sociable behavior have a much greater likelihood of encountering personal invitations to public action. In an implicit way, their psychological tendency makes them more politically valuable to direct action organizers, given the participatory demands of democracy.

### **Participation in Direct Public Action**

By itself, it may be interesting that some citizens are more likely to personally receive mobilizing contact as a function of social and economic position or because of their psychological tendencies. Still, publics do not come into existence simply on the basis of citizens receiving contact. Publics come into existence when citizens take action. The question of what happens after citizens receive or do not receive personal contact still remains. Some people who are not personally contacted may still become aware of direct public actions and decide to participate. Some people who are personally contacted may decide not to get involved.

In theory, it is possible that disparities in who gets contacted are offset at the turnout stage of mobilization. In practice, however, past research has found the opposite to be true. If anything, disparities in terms of who gets contacted contribute to disparities in terms of participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

The results presented in Table 5.2 do nothing to challenge the conventional wisdom. About one in ten citizens participates in direct action through protest. The proportion of participants is dramatically higher—one in three—among those who receive mobilizing contact. A similar pattern emerges for participation in community problem-solving. Nearly one in four citizens reports participating in a community problem-solving effort. Among those contacted,

however, 54 percent report participation. One final set of patterns also warrants attention, and it speaks to the influence of extraversion. Consistent with past studies, extraverts do appear more likely to participate in direct action than do their introverted counterparts. In the context of community problem-solving, the proportion of participants steadily increases as extraversion increases. In the context of protest, the pattern is non-monotonic. The proportion of participants gets slightly smaller as we move from the second highest observed value on extraversion to the highest observed value. As a general matter, however, protests are not the purview of the introverted.

Table 5.3 contains models that begin to examine these patterns more thoroughly. The baseline model for both protest participation and participation in community problem-solving contains standard social and environmental variables, along with a measure of extraversion. Models for protest participation also include a squared term for extraversion, in accordance with non-monotonic pattern reported above. The second model, for each form of participation, adds an indicator of whether a citizen personally received mobilizing contact. Looking first to the social and environmental factors in the baseline model, some familiar patterns emerge. For protest participation and participation in community problem-solving, citizens with higher levels of formal education prove more likely to take action. Citizens with higher incomes are also more likely to participate in both forms of direct action. Lastly, in the case of community-problem-solving, citizens with children prove more likely to get involved and citizens who do not speak English as their primary language prove much less likely to get involved. In sum, social and economic disparities that emerged with respect to contact carry over into participation.

When the indicator of personal contact is added to the models for each form of participation, two notable patterns become evident. In the first place, receiving mobilizing contact is a strong predictor of participation in direct action. Secondly, the effect size associated with each of the social environmental factors highlighted above is reduced. The effect size associated with educational attainment, in particular is reduced by 21 percent in the case of protest participation and by nearly 30 percent in the case of community problem-solving. This suggests that a substantial portion of the effect attributed to educational attainment appears because individuals with higher levels of formal education are more likely to get personally contacted during mobilization efforts. Of course, the effect of education remains a significant predictor of participation in both protest and community problem-solving even after adding the

indicator of personal contact. The same is true for the other significant social and environmental factors from the baseline model. This signals that while personal contact is partly responsible for the disparities in participation, disparities in social and economic position matter apart from contact. In other words, individuals who have accumulated resources like formal education and higher incomes and who are not isolated by language barriers are more likely to get involved with public action even when they are not personally invited.

To this point, extraversion—one of the most notable predictors of contact during mobilization efforts—has remained conspicuously absent from this discussion. Yet, as with the question of “who gets contacted,” the answer to the question of “who participates” is also one that involves this psychological tendency. Evidence for this is strongest in the case of community problem-solving efforts. Results from baseline model support the conclusion that relatively extraverted citizens display a greater likelihood of taking action. For the most introverted of citizens, the baseline model of participation yields a predicted probability of 0.24. The predicted probability of participation for the most extraverted reaches 0.41, a swing of 17 points. These results are consistent with expectations. When the indicator of mobilizing contact is added, extraversion continues to exert a significant effect, but its magnitude is reduced by 30 percent. This is also consistent with expectations. As noted earlier, an extraverted psychological tendency makes it more likely for a citizen to receive mobilizing contact in the first place.

Similar patterns emerge in the context of protest participation, albeit in a slightly more complex manner. In the baseline model of protest participation, the variable denoting extraversion and the squared form of the extraversion variable each reach statistical significance at the 0.10 level. As Figure 5.2 illustrates, with respect to protests, a certain degree of extraversion does facilitate participation. This “certain degree of extraversion,” however, is lower than one might expect—0.40, or one standard deviation below the mean value. Below this value, the likelihood of participation drops from 0.10 to 0.03. As one might expect, extreme introverts seldom take to the streets. Further, the role of mobilizing contact again calls out for attention. Here again, the direct effect of extraversion reduces in magnitude when taking contact into account.

Across both forms of direct action then, some consistent patterns are apparent. When it comes to direct action, citizens with different levels of extraversion experience democratic life in different ways. Extraverted citizens are both more likely to receive personal invitations to action,

and more likely to participate once contacted. Even when they do not receive contact, some extraverts still find their way to the action. Introverted citizens appear both less likely to take action and less likely to receive personal invitations.

### **A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Direct Action Mobilization**

The influence of extraversion in the context of direct action tells us something important about the human realities of democratic life. As the old saying goes, “democracy is not a spectator sport.” Advancing and defending one’s interests requires taking action, and where public action requires intense social interactions, the relatively extraverted have a psychological tendency that converges with this requirement. The introverted, however, may frequently experience a psychological barrier that leads them to decline participation and even be precluded from mobilization in the first place.

This evidence supports the general thesis that democratic actions involving social interactions will attract individuals who find such interactions stimulating. It also supports the general thesis that mobilization efforts, when they involve social interaction, will more frequently reach those who (consciously or unconsciously) seek out social interaction in their daily lives. Still, we need not take this as a stopping point in the quest to understand the political significance of psychological traits. We can ask whether the influence of extraversion is limited to an affinity for social contact, or whether extraversion facilitates other qualities that influence the dynamics of mobilization. We can also ask whether personal contact during mobilization exacerbates or attenuates disparities in participation. In other words, do extraverts have a higher likelihood of participation because mobilizing contact provides a source of social stimulation? Or do introverts close the participation gap once political organizers solicit their involvement?

#### **How Does Extraversion Increase the Probability of Contact and Participation?**

To understand the political significance of psychological traits more clearly, we must begin to think more carefully about the features of social environments and public actions that can stimulate trait-related tendencies. In the context of direct action, the presence of social interaction is clearly one important feature of the social environment, but it is not the only one. Protests and community problem-solving efforts often require, and always benefit from, an interest and awareness about what is happening in political life. Just as importantly, these forms

of public action often require participants to possess civic skills that facilitate cooperation and collaboration. One obvious implication is that citizens who have greater levels of political interest and who have developed greater levels of civic skills will have a greater likelihood of participating in these forms of direct public action.

A second implication, and one that directs attention to psychological traits, has received less attention. Not all citizens demonstrate an interest and awareness in political affairs and not all citizens display the same degree of civic skill. Disparate opportunities in citizens' social environments provide one partial explanation for this. Differences in psychological tendencies may contribute to a fuller explanation. An extraverted predisposition may facilitate the development of greater political interest (Mondak 2010) and a greater degree of civic skills.<sup>36</sup> Citizens with a socially out-going tendency may select into situations that help promote these qualities to a distinctive degree and may even exhibit a tendency to overcome barriers to developing these qualities that would hinder others. If so, extraversion may exert an indirect effect on the probability of receiving mobilizing contact, and may also exert an indirect effect on the probability of taking action. In each case, the effect of extraversion may operate through the development of political interest and civic skills.

These possibilities are examined in two sets of tests. Table 5.4 reports models of political interest and civic skills, respectively, regressed on extraversion and a host of social and environmental factors conventionally used to predict the development of these two qualities. For both political interest and civic skills, two results warrant highlighting. Among social and environmental factors, education is the strongest correlate of greater political interest and civic skills. Extraversion, however, also exerts a significant influence on the development of both political interest and civic skills, signaling that the development of these qualities is not a simple matter of social and economic opportunities.

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<sup>36</sup> Erdheim, Wang, Zickar (2006) report that higher levels of extraversion are associated with greater levels of organizational commitment and. Burke, Mathiesen and Pallesen (2006) find that an extraverted psychological tendency often translates into industrious workplace behavior. Forrett and Dougherty (2001) report that high levels of extraversion in the workplace often translate into career-advancing networking behaviors. This suggests that relatively extraverted citizens may have a greater likelihood of building the kind of skills that can be useful to public action, and might even become recognized by others for doing so. Further, Pulford and Sohal (2006) find that being highly extraverted corresponds with students' levels of confidence in their scholastic abilities, resulting in an indirect, positive effect on academic performance. This also suggests that relatively extraverted citizens may prove more likely to seek out and develop skills useful for public action.

Table 5.5 reports a series of models that examines the possibility that the influence of extraversion on receiving mobilizing contact is mediated by the development of political interest and civic skills. Table 5.5A contains the results with respect to contact for protest. Table 5.4B turns to contact for community problem-solving. For protest contact, the magnitude of the effect attributed to extraversion decreases by 31 percent when political interest is added to the model, by 53 percent when civic skills are added, and by 71 percent when political interest and civic skills are both added. Likewise, for contact related to community problem-solving, the magnitude of the effect attributed to extraversion drops by 34 percent when political interest is added to the model, by 54 percent when civic skills is added, and by 80 percent when both variables are added.

The results presented in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 come as strong evidence that extraversion, as a psychological tendency, influences how citizens experience democracy by facilitating the development of both political interest and civic skills. Citizens who developed these qualities have a much higher likelihood of receiving personal contact during mobilization efforts for protests and community problem-solving efforts, most likely because they have developed a reputation for their willingness and ability to participate. Still, extraversion appears to enable this development in a profound way.

Taken all together, the results of this chapter signal the value of considering both the direct and indirect effects of extraversion on the dynamics of mobilization. Figure 5.3 offers a visual representation of these effects. The dashed lines represent the direct effects of extraversion. Consistent with previous findings, extraversion has a direct effect on participation. As expected, high levels of extraversion also make the receipt of mobilizing contact more likely. Yet the story does not end there. Represented by the solid lines, two indirect effects warrant highlighting. The influence of extraversion on likelihood of receiving contact appears to be mediated by the development of political interest and civic skills. Finally, the indirect influence of extraversion is also reflected in the positive relationship between mobilizing contact and the likelihood of participation, as extraverts are more likely to receive contact and more likely to participate.

Consequently, these results indicate the usefulness of thinking beyond the presence or absence of social interactions when considering the functions of extraversion. The situation one encounters when participating in a protest or community-solving effort involves social

interactions that inherently require an interest in politics and also require, or at least benefit from, the possession of civic skills. Focusing only and coarsely on the social quality of these actions would lead us to overlook this interplay between a psychological tendency and relevant circumstances of a social situation. In the same way, focusing only on the action that occurs at the moment of participation would lead us to overlook the more complex dynamics of public action. Public action is not spontaneous, but mobilized, and some citizens are more likely to get invited into the fray than others. Just as psychological tendencies can influence how citizens respond to what happens around them in their environments, these tendencies can also influence how others in the social environment respond to citizens. Some citizens appear to have a psychological tendency that motivates the development of important participatory qualities, and others respond by seeking out these individuals.

#### *Does Contact Exacerbate or Attenuate the Effect of Extraversion on Participation?*

This chapter has argued that citizens with relatively high levels of extraversion are both more likely to get contacted during attempts to mobilize publics for direct action and also more likely to participate in direct action. One of the most important questions about the dynamics of direct action mobilization still remains, however. Does mobilizing contact exacerbate or attenuate the disparity in participation among relatively extraverted and relatively introverted citizens?

On one hand, it seems quite plausible that mobilizing contact would further stimulate the relatively extraverted citizen while having little or no influence on the motivation of the relative introvert. Mobilizing contact involves social interaction, and in the context of direct action, the type of participation being solicited involves intensive social interaction. This may stimulate the relative extravert, while the relative introvert is either not interested or repelled from participation. Evidence to this effect would signal that extraverts do not simply demonstrate a participatory tendency because they are just more out-going. Rather, they may display a participatory tendency because they are also more likely to be recruited for action.

On the other hand, it also seems plausible that relatively introverted citizens might become much more likely to take action if political organizers managed to contact them. The analysis reported earlier in this chapter found that introverts are, as expected, less likely to receive contact than their extraverted counterparts. Still, introverts who are contacted may

demonstrate a likelihood of participation that is more similar to that of extraverted citizens. If so, this could be because there is something distinctive about introverts who receive contact—perhaps they experienced circumstances that help them overcome a reticence for social interactions. It may also be the case that introverts would become more likely to participate if only organizers could reach them during mobilization efforts. In either case, evidence that introverts become more likely to participate once contacted would shed new light on the interplay between psychological traits and social factors.

To examine these possibilities, Table 5.6 reports models of protest participation and participation in community problem-solving that account for the potential interaction of personal mobilizing contact and the citizen's level of extraversion. For protest participation, a substantively and statistically significant pattern emerges. For participation in community problem-solving effort, a substantively interesting pattern emerges, even though the results fall short of conventional levels of statistical significance. These patterns are illustrated in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.

With respect to protest participation, Figure 5.4 depicts the interaction between the citizen's level of extraversion and their receipt of mobilizing contact. For relatively introverted citizens who did not receive mobilizing contact, the predicted probability of participating in a protest is virtually zero. For very extraverted citizens, the predicted probability of participation is only slightly higher, barely exceeds 0.05 for citizens in the two highest deciles of extraversion. The message from Figure 5.4 therefore, is that extraverts who have not received mobilizing contact are not much more likely to participate than anyone else.

Among citizens who do receive mobilizing contact, we see a much different pattern. The most likely protest participants are highly extraverted citizens who have received mobilizing contact. For the most extraverted of citizens who receive contact, the predicted probability of participating in a protest is nearly 0.50. This is notable given that protest is a form of public action that relatively few citizens pursue. Just as notably, this is nearly 0.45 points higher than extraverts who did not receive contact. An equally striking finding emerges with respect to highly introverted citizens who receive contact. Among these citizens, the predicted probability of participation is 0.27, a stark difference from the predicted probability of virtually zero for introverts who did not receive contact. This suggests that—*under the right circumstances*—

introverted citizens can be mobilized into action, even for public actions like protest, which involve intensive and confrontational forms of action.

Even so, among those contacted, introverted citizens lag behind their extraverted peers with respect to participation. Among those contacted, there is a 0.23 point swing from the most introverted to the most extraverted. Another point also warrants bearing in mind. Extraverted citizens are far more likely to be contacted for protest actions. They are more likely to be contacted *and* more likely to take action once contacted. In this sense, the current dynamics of mobilization exacerbate the disparity in protest participation between citizens with high and low levels of extraversion. Direct action organizers appear to reach socially out-going citizens more often, and in doing so, reach the sort of citizen who ultimately has the highest likelihood of taking action.

This pattern may in part reflect the mobilizing influence of personal contact (Gerber and Green 2005; Gerber, Green and Nickerson 2003; Gerber and Green 2000). Such contact may prove especially motivating for citizens to the extent they find social interaction stimulating. Yet, consistent with earlier studies (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; McAdam 1986), the results presented earlier in this chapter also suggest that the receipt of contact is not a randomly distributed experience. The finding that extraverts have a greater likelihood of receiving contact is consistent with the expectation that selection processes are at work during protest mobilization. Extraverts may prove more likely to select into circumstances where receiving such contact is more likely and direct action organizers may rely on the participatory histories of citizens to target their contact. Introverted citizens who receive contact may also be targeted on the basis on their participatory histories, and thus there may be something distinctive about those extraverts who receive contact and participate once receiving it. This is not to deny that personal contact can exert potent influence on motivation, as field studies that randomly assign personal contact to citizens have argued. It is only to argue that, because mobilizing efforts do not conventionally involve such randomization procedures, selection processes are a fundamental part of what moves citizens to action.

Turning now to participation in community problem-solving, a different (and provocative) pattern emerges. Figure 5.5 depicts the interaction between level of extraversion and their receipt of mobilizing contact for participation in community problem-solving. Two stark patterns emerge. Across the range of values on extraversion, there is a clear difference in

the likelihood of participation between those who do receive contact and those who do not. Citizens who do not receive contact—be they introverted or extraverted—generally do not participate. Just as clearly, among those who do receive contact, the most introverted of citizens are just as likely to take action as the most extraverted.

Here again, this could partially reflect the influence of receiving mobilizing contact in and of itself. Receiving contact designed to stimulate participation might have a strong influence on most citizens who receive it. Yet, as with the dynamics of mobilizing protest publics, the evidence of selection processes in mobilization should not go unnoticed. Relatively extraverted citizens appear much more likely to receive mobilizing contact in the context of community problem-solving. Again, these extraverted citizens might be selecting into situations where contact becomes more likely, and again, political organizers might have targeted these same citizens during mobilization efforts given their past histories of participation. Introverts who received contact may also have drawn the attention of organizers as a function of past participation.

Whatever the case, interpreting the pattern illustrated in Figure 5.5 requires careful attention to nuance. In one sense, mobilizing contact does appear to “equalize” the probability with which citizens participate in community problem-solving. However, because extraverts have a greater likelihood of receiving mobilizing contact, an important disparity in public participation still remains. Even if introverts do become more likely to participate under right circumstances—circumstances when they receive contact—the dynamics of mobilization are such that extraverts are more numerous as mobilization gives way to public action.

### **Lessons about Mobilization, Questions about Who We Value:**

#### **The Significance of Psychological Traits for Direct Action Publics**

As citizens, we can never be free from the possibility from threats to our interests, from decision-makers that ignore us, or from situations where nothing will get done unless we do it ourselves. This reality of democracy is the reason we must sometimes mobilize for direct public action. Sometimes we must take to the streets or the public square in protest. Sometimes we must gather around the table with others to collectively resolve an immediate problem. These types of direct actions inherently require citizens to engage in social interactions. More than this, they require citizens to engage in social interactions which often involve a need for political

awareness and civic skills. Citizens need to know what is at stake, what actions to take, and perhaps most importantly, how to coordinate and collaborate.

The first challenge of mobilizing publics for direct action therefore rests on the shoulders of citizens who attempt to organize others. These organizers must attempt to find citizens who are willing to do what participation requires. The citizens they target for contact must then receive it. As the results of this chapter show, when it comes to direct actions like protest and community problem-solving, not all citizens have an equal likelihood of receiving mobilizing contact. Consistent with past research, this chapter finds that social and economic disparities exist. However, in addition to these well-chronicled structural inequalities, this chapter also draws attention to a disparity linked to the inherent psychological tendency of extraversion. Relatively extraverted citizens appear much more likely to receive mobilizing contact for protest and community problem-solving efforts than their more introverted peers.

To this end, political organizers and extraverted citizens appear to create a mutually symbiotic relationship. Organizers seek participants to maximize the chances that public action will achieve its goals. Extraverted citizens who share these goals find satisfaction in taking action. In the case of protest participation and participation in community problem-solving, highly extraverted citizens are likely to take action once contacted. In effect, extraverted citizens have a quality that makes them more amenable to participation and this arguably more valuable in the context of direct action. Moreover, organizers appear to successfully contact these extraverted, psychologically amenable citizens.

At this juncture, we do well to ask ourselves—what lessons can we take from these findings? It is a question that all citizens have reason to consider. After all, in a democracy, those who participate and participate effectively have the greatest potential to determine political outcomes. Those who do not participate must take what others give them. That may be little or nothing at all. Direct action provides such an important recourse for citizens because it is a means of exercising some control over one's fate. Citizens who do not take action forfeit this. Further, because no one citizen can influence political outcomes alone, the ability to exert control over one's own fate depends on what others do. The capacity of the individual citizen to exert control over his or her own fate can be comprised if others do not take action.

That is why barriers to participation are so important to understand. For years, tangible social and economic disparities during mobilization have received abundant attention. The

finding that introverts are less likely to receive contact suggests that, for some citizens, an invisible, psychological barrier exists as well. Further, it is not simply the case that introverts shy away from the social interactions that direct actions involve. Introverts also appear less likely to develop the levels of political interest and civic skills that facilitate participation and make mobilizing contact more likely. Of course, introverts can find satisfaction in taking action as well. As the results presented in this chapter show, introverts who receive mobilizing contact do participate in protests and community problem-solving efforts. When contacted to participate in protests, even the most introverted of citizens display a greater likelihood of taking action than do citizens who do not receive contact. Among those contacted to participate in community problem-solving, the most introverted of citizens participate with the same likelihood as the most extraverted citizens.

The fact remains introverts are far less likely to receive mobilizing contact than do extraverts. With respect to direct action then, introverts are at greater risk of being devalued as citizens, owing to their social reticence. Addressing this source of participatory inequality will require something more. It will likely require a very different approach to mobilization and to citizenship itself. And it is not clear that we yet have a politics suited to these tasks. Yet until we do, some citizens will remain less likely to be mobilized into public life and less likely to exert control over their own political fate. As a consequence, we may find ourselves losing out on contributions and people that could benefit our lives.

## Chapter 5 Tables and Figures

**Table 5.1 Patterns of Participation in Direct Action**

|                                                                                                                     |     |               |                                  |      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------------|----------------------------------|------|
| <i>A. Participation and Contact<sup>a</sup></i>                                                                     |     |               |                                  |      |
|                                                                                                                     | Yes | Protest<br>No | Community Problem-Solving<br>Yes | No   |
| All Citizens                                                                                                        | 10  | 90            | 25                               | 75   |
| Contacted                                                                                                           | 34  | 66            | 54                               | 46   |
| Not Contacted                                                                                                       | 5   | 95            | 15                               | 85   |
| Obs.                                                                                                                |     | 2035          |                                  | 2039 |
| <i>B. Participation and Extraversion<sup>b</sup></i>                                                                |     |               |                                  |      |
|                                                                                                                     | Yes | Protest<br>No | Community Problem-Solving<br>Yes | No   |
| Extraversion                                                                                                        |     |               |                                  |      |
| 0                                                                                                                   | 1   | 99            | 10                               | 90   |
| 0.2                                                                                                                 | 4   | 96            | 14                               | 86   |
| 0.4                                                                                                                 | 9   | 91            | 22                               | 23   |
| 0.6                                                                                                                 | 10  | 90            | 23                               | 77   |
| 0.8                                                                                                                 | 12  | 88            | 28                               | 82   |
| 1.0                                                                                                                 | 10  | 90            | 35                               | 65   |
| Obs.                                                                                                                |     | 2035          |                                  | 2039 |
| <i>Source:</i> American Citizen Participation Study, 1990                                                           |     |               |                                  |      |
| <i>a.</i> Cell entries represent the percentages of respondents in each response category                           |     |               |                                  |      |
| <i>b.</i> Cell entries represent percentage of respondents on each value of extraversion in each response category. |     |               |                                  |      |

**Table 5.2 Mobilizing Contact for Protest and Community Problem-Solving**

|                                    | Contact<br>(Protest) | Contact<br>(Community) |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| <i><u>Personality</u></i>          |                      |                        |
| Extraversion                       | 0.78***<br>(0.23)    | 1.01***<br>(0.20)      |
| <i><u>Social/Environmental</u></i> |                      |                        |
| Language (English)                 | -0.22<br>(0.16)      | -0.36*<br>(0.16)       |
| Kids                               | 0.04<br>(0.06)       | 0.12*<br>(0.05)        |
| Co-dependent<br>Relationship       | -0.23<br>(0.15)      | -0.23#<br>(0.14)       |
| Work (outside home)                | -0.04<br>(0.10)      | 0.03<br>(0.09)         |
| Work (in home)                     | -0.07<br>(0.27)      | 0.17<br>(0.24)         |
| Attending School                   | 0.32<br>(0.36)       | -0.66<br>(0.42)        |
| Race (white)                       | 0.10<br>(0.14)       | 0.21<br>(0.13)         |
| Sex (Male)                         | -0.18<br>(0.13)      | 0.18<br>(0.12)         |
| Age                                | -0.01<br>(0.01)      | 0.01*<br>(0.00)        |
| Education                          | 0.21***<br>(0.03)    | 0.24***<br>(0.03)      |
| Family Income                      | 0.02<br>(0.02)       | 0.08***<br>(0.01)      |
| Intercept                          | -4.78***<br>(0.48)   | -6.19***<br>(0.46)     |
| Pseudo. R-Squared                  | 0.10                 | 0.20                   |
| Obs.                               | 2043                 | 2039                   |

*Source:* American Citizen Participation Study, 1990

*Notes.* Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10.

**Table 5.3 Participation in Protest and Community Problem-Solving**

|                             | <i>Protest</i>     |                    | <i>Community Problem-Solving</i> |                   |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|
|                             | Baseline           | Including Contact  | Baseline                         | Including Contact |
| <i>Personality</i>          |                    |                    |                                  |                   |
| Extraversion                | 3.44*<br>(1.47)    | 2.72*<br>(1.62)    | 0.80***<br>(0.19)                | 0.56**<br>(0.20)  |
| Extraversion^2              | -2.29*<br>(1.13)   | -1.92<br>(1.24)    | --                               | --                |
| <i>Social/Environmental</i> |                    |                    |                                  |                   |
| Contact                     | --                 | 2.20 ***<br>(0.18) | --                               | 1.53***<br>(0.12) |
| Language Barriers           | -0.09<br>(0.20)    | -0.06<br>(0.23)    | -0.57***<br>(0.16)               | -0.53**<br>(0.17) |
| Kids                        | -0.08<br>(0.08)    | -0.12<br>(0.08)    | 0.17 ***<br>(0.05)               | 0.15**<br>(0.05)  |
| Co-dependent Relationship   | -0.23<br>(0.20)    | -0.15<br>(0.21)    | -0.00<br>(0.13)                  | 0.09<br>(0.14)    |
| Work (outside home)         | 0.12<br>(0.15)     | 0.17<br>(0.16)     | 0.01<br>(0.09)                   | 0.02<br>(0.09)    |
| Work (in home)              | 0.55<br>(0.38)     | 0.70#<br>(0.41)    | 0.08<br>(0.22)                   | 0.03<br>(0.23)    |
| Attending School            | 0.83#<br>(0.44)    | 0.80#<br>(0.48)    | -0.33<br>(0.40)                  | -0.14<br>(0.41)   |
| Race (white)                | 0.19<br>(0.19)     | 0.14<br>(0.20)     | -0.01<br>(0.12)                  | -0.08<br>(0.13)   |
| Sex (Male)                  | -0.02<br>(0.17)    | 0.10<br>(0.18)     | 0.02<br>(0.11)                   | -0.08<br>(0.12)   |
| Age                         | -0.03***<br>(0.01) | -0.03***<br>(0.01) | 0.02***<br>(0.00)                | 0.01**<br>(0.00)  |
| Education                   | 0.19***<br>(0.04)  | 0.10*<br>(0.04)    | 0.14***<br>(0.03)                | 0.08**<br>(0.03)  |
| Family Income               | 0.05#<br>(0.03)    | 0.05#<br>(0.03)    | 0.05*<br>(0.02)                  | 0.02<br>(0.02)    |

**Table 5.3(cont)**

|                   | <i>Protest</i>     |                    | <i>Community Problem-Solving</i> |                    |
|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|
|                   | Baseline           | Including Contact  | Baseline                         | Including Contact  |
| Intercept         | -5.57***<br>(0.77) | -4.89***<br>(0.82) | -4.55***<br>(0.42)               | -3.82***<br>(0.44) |
| Pseudo. R-Squared | 0.10               | 0.26               | 0.12                             | 0.22               |
| Obs.              | 2043               | 2035               | 2039                             | 2039               |

*Source:* American Citizen Participation Study, 1990

*Notes.* Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10.

**Table 5.4 Political Interest and Civic Skills—The Influence of Extraversion**

|                           | Political Interest | Civic Skills       |
|---------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Extraversion              | 0.44 ***<br>(0.06) | 0.65***<br>(0.07)  |
| Language (English)        | -0.07*<br>(0.04)   | -0.07*<br>(0.04)   |
| Kids                      | 0.04**<br>(0.02)   | 0.06***<br>(0.02)  |
| Co-dependent Relationship | -0.04<br>(0.04)    | -0.07<br>(0.05)    |
| Work (outside home)       | -0.03<br>(0.03)    | 0.29***<br>(0.03)  |
| Work (in home)            | 0.02<br>(0.07)     | -0.01<br>(0.08)    |
| Attending School          | -0.18#<br>(0.11)   | -0.11<br>(0.13)    |
| Race (white)              | 0.07#<br>(0.04)    | 0.06<br>(0.04)     |
| Sex (Male)                | 0.11**<br>(0.04)   | -0.01<br>(0.04)    |
| Age                       | 0.01***<br>(0.00)  | 0.01***<br>(0.00)  |
| Education                 | 0.08***<br>(0.01)  | 0.10***<br>(0.01)  |
| Family Income             | 0.03***<br>(0.01)  | 0.06***<br>(0.01)  |
| Intercept                 | 0.81***<br>(0.12)  | -1.90***<br>(0.13) |
| Adj. R-Squared            | 0.23               | 0.39               |
| Obs.                      | 2040               | 1833               |

*Source:* American Citizen Participation Study, 1990

*Notes.* Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10. The dependent variable *political interest* ranges from 0="not at all interested" to 4="very interested." The dependent variable *civic skills* is the average of skilled activities reported by the respondent at work and in secondary associations. These activities include writing a letter, giving a speech, leading a group, and a fourth activity. This variable ranges from 0 to 4, continuous.

**Table 5.5 Political Interest and Civic Skills as Mediators of Extraversion**

| <i>A. Mobilizing Contact for Protest</i>                   |                   |                    |                   |                                     |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
|                                                            | Baseline          | Political Interest | Civic Skills      | Political Interest and Civic Skills |
| Extraversion                                               | 0.78***<br>(0.23) | 0.52**<br>(0.23)   | 0.37<br>(0.25)    | 0.22<br>(0.25)                      |
| Political Interest                                         | --                | 0.73 ***<br>(0.10) | --                | 0.54***<br>(0.11)                   |
| Civic Skills                                               | --                | --                 | 0.49***<br>(0.08) | 0.40***<br>(0.08)                   |
| Adj. R-Squared                                             | 0.10              | 0.15               | 0.15              | 0.17                                |
| Obs.                                                       | 2043              | 2040               | 1833              | 1830                                |
| <i>B. Mobilizing Contact for Community Problem-Solving</i> |                   |                    |                   |                                     |
|                                                            | Baseline          | Political Interest | Civic Skills      | Political Interest and Civic Skills |
| Extraversion                                               | 1.01***<br>(0.20) | 0.69**<br>(0.21)   | 0.46*<br>(0.23)   | 0.22<br>(0.24)                      |
| Political Interest                                         | --                | 1.00 ***<br>(0.10) | --                | 0.88***<br>(0.11)                   |
| Civic Skills                                               | --                | --                 | 0.85***<br>(0.07) | 0.74***<br>(0.08)                   |
| Adj. R-Squared                                             | 0.20              | 0.27               | 0.30              | 0.35                                |
| Obs.                                                       | 2039              | 2036               | 1829              | 1826                                |

*Source:* American Citizen Participation Study, 1990

*Notes.* Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10. Models include as controls measure of language barriers, the number of children for whom the respondent is responsible, relationship status, work status (outside the home), work status (works at home), whether the respondent currently attends school; race, sex, education, and family income.

**Table 5.6 Extraversion and the Moderating Effect of Contact**

|                              | <i>Protest</i>     | <i>Informal Community<br/>Problem-Solving</i> |
|------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| <i>Personality</i>           |                    |                                               |
| Extraversion                 | 2.78<br>(1.85)     | 0.51*<br>(0.31)                               |
| Extraversion^2               | -1.68<br>(1.39)    | --                                            |
| <i>Social/Environmental</i>  |                    |                                               |
| Contact                      | 2.93***<br>(0.56)  | 1.49***<br>(0.34)                             |
| Political Interest           | 0.48**<br>(0.15)   | 0.39***<br>(0.10)                             |
| Civic Skills                 | 0.22*<br>(0.11)    | 0.26**<br>(0.08)                              |
| Language (English)           | -0.04<br>(0.25)    | -0.48**<br>(0.19)                             |
| Kids                         | -0.13#<br>(0.09)   | 0.13*<br>(0.05)                               |
| Co-dependent<br>Relationship | -0.11<br>(0.21)    | 0.18<br>(0.15)                                |
| Work (outside home)          | 0.13<br>(0.18)     | -0.06<br>(0.10)                               |
| Work (in home)               | 0.78<br>(0.44)     | 0.06<br>(0.25)                                |
| Attending School             | 0.85<br>(0.54)     | -0.61<br>(0.54)                               |
| Race (white)                 | 0.00<br>(0.22)     | -0.14<br>(0.14)                               |
| Sex (Male)                   | 0.07<br>(0.19)     | -0.13<br>(0.13)                               |
| Age                          | -0.03***<br>(0.01) | 0.01<br>(0.01)                                |
| Education                    | 0.05<br>(0.05)     | 0.04<br>(0.03)                                |


**Table 5.6(cont)**

|                           | <i>Protest</i>     | <i>Informal Community<br/>Problem-Solving</i> |
|---------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Family Income             | 0.02<br>(0.03)     | 0.00<br>(0.02)                                |
| Extraversion<br>X Contact | -1.22*<br>(0.78)   | -0.38<br>(0.44)                               |
| Intercept                 | -5.68***<br>(0.98) | -4.08***<br>(0.52)                            |
| Pseudo. R-Squared         | 0.28               | 0.25                                          |
| Obs.                      | 1822               | 1817                                          |


*Source:* American Citizen Participation Study, 1990

*Notes.* Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10.


**Figure 5.1 The Dynamics of Mobilizing Direct Action Publics**



**Figure 5.2 The Direct and Indirect Influence of Extraversion**




**Figure 5.3 The Influence of Extraversion on Protest Participation**




*Note:* Figure 5.2 is derived from the Baseline model presented in Table 5.3.

**Figure 5.4 Extraversion, Mobilizing Contact and Protest Participation**



**Figure 5.5 Extraversion, Mobilizing Contact and Participation in Community Problem-Solving**



## **CHAPTER 6:**

### **WHAT POLITICAL CHALLENGES DO WE FACE?**

Pursuing political goals in a democracy requires us to depend upon others. It requires mobilizing for collective action to get things done. It requires facing the challenge of motivating citizens to participate in the actions of goal-oriented publics. For years now, our efforts to face this challenge have found us looking outward toward our social environments. From this vantage point, we could see only the external factors that shape our motivations—the mobilization tactics we encounter, the social and economic resources we possess, the barriers to participation we face. Consequently, our ability to understand the dynamics of mobilization and design effective mobilization strategies has been limited to these factors.

Only more recently have we begun to look inward, toward the stable, biologically-linked, psychological characteristics that can also shape our motivations. This has given us a new view of ourselves as citizens. We all respond to the conditions of our social environments, to be sure. We just do not all respond in the same ways, owing to inherent psychological differences. Some of us have psychological tendencies that facilitate public action. Others of us have tendencies that make us less likely to engage in public action and, in some circumstances, more likely to be ignored during mobilization efforts. The result is a form of participatory inequality that has long gone unnoticed. Owing to psychological traits that we did not choose for ourselves and may not be able to change, some of us have tendencies that can make public action more accessible. Others of us, meanwhile, have tendencies that can act as invisible barriers to public action.

The preceding chapters have helped bring this overlooked participatory inequality into focus. Two of the most significant questions, however, have thus far lingered in the background. What does this participatory inequality reveal about the kind of political challenges we face? On this question, insights about the dynamics of electoral, juridical, and direct action publics can guide us.

#### **What Kind of Challenges Do We Face?**

It may be true that democracy allows all recognized citizens to participate. However, it is also true that citizens can experience opportunities for participation and the actions required by participation very differently, as a function of inherent psychological traits. To this end, the studies presented in this project call particular attention to the trait dimensions of openness to

experience and extraversion. Highly open and highly extraverted citizens have a tendency toward taking action in a variety of ways. Just as importantly, where political organizers and institutions can exert some control over the mobilizing process, highly open and extraverted citizens also have a greater likelihood of receiving appeals to action. This is no small matter. When political goals require the efforts of many to achieve, gaining the support of individuals who are willing to take action is among our most important political challenges. By extension, gaining the support of individuals who are highly open and extraverted may be one of the keys to successful mobilization.

### *The Challenge of Mobilizing Citizens Predisposed Toward Action*

Efforts to understand the process of political mobilization have often focused on the types of benefits that attract participants. Of particular interest in the case of public actions, participation can sometimes be its own reward. Citizens can gain expressive benefits by making their voices heard. They can receive solidarity benefits by working to advance common interests. They can earn reputational benefits from contributing to a common effort. Benefits of these types can actually help citizens overcome collective action problems and achieve commonly desired outcomes (Chong 1993). Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that all citizens have an equal propensity to pursue these types of incentives. Successful public actions, in fact, may require—or at least benefit from—the presence of individuals who have psychological tendencies toward the various forms of stimulation that public action can provide. Overlooking this reality may even hinder our ability to successfully mobilize and reach political goals.

Some of the strongest evidence for this conclusion comes from the context of electoral mobilization. In this context, success depends on building strength in numbers and demonstrating that strength at the polls. During the congressional elections of 2006, the Democratic Party enjoyed great success, winning a majority of contested seats and regaining control of the House of Representatives for the first time in twelve years. In doing so, the Democratic Party also enjoyed greater support from citizens who were highly open and highly extraverted. Put another way, in the contest for elected office, the Democrats appear to have more successfully met the challenge of gaining the support of citizens predisposed to take action.

Citizens with higher levels of openness proved more likely to vote for the Democratic Party, and also demonstrated a tendency to persuade others to vote the same way. Citizens with

higher levels of extraversion displayed a tendency to provide indirect support for Democrats. They took action by attending rallies and meetings in support of the Democratic Party and its candidates. They attempted to persuade others to vote *for* the Democrats and *against* the Republicans. In a year where the Democratic Party was poised to win many contested seats, these efforts may have helped generate support in the electorate.

The Republican Party, meanwhile, found much more limited support from highly open and extraverted citizens. The Republicans also appeared less successful in reaching citizens with these psychological tendencies during pre-Election Day mobilization efforts. On the Democratic side of things, highly open and highly extraverted citizens were among the most likely to make themselves available during mobilization efforts, and may have also been among the most likely to be strategically targeted by the Democratic Party. Where the Republicans failed to reach citizens predisposed toward action, the Democrats succeeded. In doing so, they connected with citizens who helped them build a strong, and ultimately successful, electoral public.

Similarly, in the context of direct action, highly extraverted citizens also appear to figure prominently in successful mobilization. Like in elections, during protests and community problem-solving efforts, strength in numbers is an important political asset. Protests require strength in numbers to send a strong signal about the preferences of a public. Community problem-solving efforts benefit from strength in numbers when it creates a diversity of perspectives and larger core of active citizens who are willing to roll up their sleeves to address issues of immediate concern. In mobilization efforts for protests and community problem-solving efforts, highly extraverted citizens are among the most likely to participate and among the most likely to receive appeals to action. Although the available data does not reveal whether these actions were successful in reaching their goals, one fact remains clear. No success is possible if action is not taken. To that end, highly extraverted citizens appear to be instrumental in the process that makes action itself possible. Without them, it seems far less likely that any kind of direct action would get off the ground.

The significance of highly open and highly extraverted citizens also emerges in a context where they are not especially inclined to participate—jury service. In Washington State, one goal of juridical mobilization involved increasing juror yields. Summons compliance had fallen so low that it had begun to complicate the scheduling of trials. The state tried increasing juror pay to incentivize compliance, but failed. The citizens of Washington State did not make jury service a

priority, and citizens highly open to experience were among the most egregious in this regard. Highly open citizens were among the least likely to show up when they received a summons. Extraverts were no more likely than the rest of the population to comply, and given that only about 40 percent of citizens called for jury duty complied, that was not particularly likely.<sup>37</sup> Further, most extraverted citizens who reported serving on a jury in the past ignored the summons the next time around. The lesson in this may be that when mobilization efforts *cannot* motivate citizens with an inherent predisposition toward taking action, those efforts are likely to fail at mobilizing citizens more broadly.

### *The Challenge of Adapting Mobilization to Different Psychological Tendencies*

Mobilizing citizens who are psychologically predisposed toward action constitutes one important challenge, but it is not the only one. In fact, focusing too narrowly on citizens who are predisposed toward action would be imprudent. Whether the goal is winning an election, influencing a decision through direct action, or improving juror yields, success requires building strength in numbers. Mobilizing citizens who are psychologically predisposed toward out-going, sociable behavior may make for a good start. Building sufficient support to achieve political goals, however, may depend on doing more than this. It may often be necessary to mobilize citizens whose motivations are more strongly shaped by other psychological tendencies.

Evidence from this project suggests that this is possible, but also far from easy. In the contexts of elections and direct action, citizens who are relatively closed to experience and introverted are among the least likely to participate. Yet at least among the introverted, there is some evidence that these individuals will participate once contacted. Upon being contacted face-to-face by the Democrats, the very introverted tended to cast their ballots for Democratic candidates in 2006. Very introverted citizens contacted to participate in community problem-solving efforts proved as likely to take action as their very extraverted counterparts.

Even so, introverted citizens are among the least likely to report receiving this type of contact. Face-to-face contact during elections requires a willingness to engage in social interactions. Mobilizing contact for community problem-solving also tends to take place face-to-face (Verba, Schlozman Brady 1995). Introverts, by nature, often display an aversion to this type

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<sup>37</sup> Only among citizens facing the greatest degree of cultural barriers do the highly extraverted prove distinctively likely to report for jury service undaunted.

of situation; they are inherently more difficult to contact. Further, because so many forms of public action involve out-going, sociable behavior, introverts may also be less likely to develop the type of participatory history that makes them visible to political organizers. Where political organizers have some control over the mobilizing process, they have a strong incentive to focus their efforts on likely participants who are accessible for contact. If organizers use micro-targeting techniques to identify individuals who have participated in past public actions, introverted citizens may be precluded from contact. The dynamics of strategic targeting may reinforce the tendency to remain inactive. Thus, while there is some evidence that citizens who are psychologically reticent to participate can be mobilized into action, we currently lack a reliable means of reaching them. To improve the effectiveness of our mobilization efforts, this is a challenge we would do well to address—if we can.

Of course, even when contact successfully reaches citizens who are introverted, it is far from certain that these citizens will take action. The same pattern emerges with respect to individuals who are closed to experience. This is especially true when public actions involve a great deal of social interaction—attempting to influence the actions of others, attending rallies, joining protests, and even participating in jury service. With respect to attending rallies and joining protests, the probability of an introvert participating is very nearly zero. The probability of participation in these actions for citizens closed to experience is only slightly higher. In the case of complying with a summons for jury service, the probability of an introvert participating is still less than 0.50. The same is true for citizens closed to experience. Further, in the case of jury service, it is not the case that strategic targeting has precluded citizens who are not especially sociable. By design, all citizens have an equal chance of being summoned for duty, yet even here, those who are socially reticent display a tendency toward inactivity. These findings signal the existence of an additional challenge when mobilizing for public actions. Even when explicitly invited to take action, some citizens are not willing to be out-going and sociable because they are psychologically predisposed not to be.

Where political goals require strength in numbers, the challenge of motivating these individuals may even be the most difficult to address successfully. Because psychological traits are typically highly stable over the course of a lifetime, efforts to alter the traits of citizens seems impractical. Some citizens may always be averse to social interactions or pursuing novel experiences. Further, unlike many social and environmental barriers to participation, the primary

obstacle is not a tangible one, but rather a perceptual one. Where psychological traits create a barrier to participation, the obstacle is not only what may be happening in a citizen's social environment, but how the citizen perceives what is happening, or what needs to happen.

*Can We Meet the Challenges We Face?*

At this juncture, one might ask whether we must accept this state of affairs as inevitable. Must we simply accept that some individuals are inherently better suited to the practical requirements of participatory democracy? Can we alter our political conduct to mobilize citizens who have very different psychological tendencies? The answers to these questions are far from certain, and will ultimately depend upon what we are willing to do as citizens. We can evaluate our personal qualities as well as those of others. We can use this knowledge to shape who we engage with and how we engage with them politically. This, however, will require looking inward and recognizing the qualities in ourselves and in others that we can change, and also the qualities that we may not be able to change.

## APPENDIX A:

### VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION FOR CHAPTER 4

#### Description of Variables

*Juror Pay. Pay period* is coded 1 for *citizens summonsed during the US\$60 study phase*, and 0 for *those called during the US\$10 phase*.

*Discretionary time*. The possible constraints on discretionary time pertain to respondents' family and social circumstances and to their employment status. *Children below 18 at home* is an indicator coded 1 if the individual receiving the jury summons has children below the age of 18 at home, and 0 if otherwise. *Codependent relationship* is coded 1 if the *respondent is married or living with someone considered to be a partner*, and 0 if *otherwise*. *Work constraints* incorporates data from three employment measures, dichotomous indicators of whether the respondent is employed, works in the private sector, and works in a non-salaried position. Data from these items are summed, with the resulting scale recoded to range from 0 (*no work constraints*) to 1 (*maximum work constraints*; i.e., respondent is employed in a non-salaried private-sector job).

*Social integration and cultural barriers*. In Washington, and especially in Franklin County, court officials have voiced particular interest in heightening summons compliance among Latinos. Thus, our measure of *cultural barriers* focuses on matters related to ethnicity. The scale used here draws on information from dichotomous measures of whether the respondent speaks a language other than English at home, whether the respondent was born outside of the United States, and whether the respondent's self-identified ethnicity is Latino or Asian. Responses to these three items were summed, and then recoded to form a 0 (*no cultural barriers*) to 1 (*maximum cultural barriers*) scale.

*Political skill and experience*. To measure political skill and experience, we form a *political aptitude* scale using data on the respondent's political knowledge and voting history. Voting history is represented with data from an item asking whether the respondent votes in elections *never* (0), *rarely* (1), *sometimes* (2) or *always* (3). Knowledge is represented with data from questions regarding the length of a U.S. Senate term, and the name and party of Washington's

governor. Summing correct answers produces a 0 to 3 knowledge scale; it and the voting measure are correlated at a level of  $r = .48$ . The final measure of political engagement sums the voting and knowledge measures, and then recodes the scale to range from 0 to 1.

*Psychological traits.* Respondents were asked 15 semantic differential items, three for each of the Big Five trait dimensions. Items were drawn or adapted from those in Goldberg (1992). The word pairs used and scale alpha levels are as follows: (openness;  $\alpha = .64$ ) imaginative-unimaginative, not an intellectual-an intellectual, creative-uncreative; (conscientiousness;  $.63$ ) careful-careless, hardworking-lazy, responsible-irresponsible; (extraversion;  $.73$ ) timid-bold, outgoing-shy, introverted-extraverted; (agreeableness;  $.71$ ) unkind-kind, polite-rude, sympathetic-unsympathetic; (emotional stability;  $.64$ ) relaxed-tense, moody-steady, nervous-at ease. All scales are recoded to range from 0 (*lowest observed value on the trait*) to 1 (*highest observed value*).

*Demographic control variables.* All models include the following control variables: *age* (coded 1 for respondents ages 18 to 24, to 6 for respondents 65 and older); *education* (1 for 8th grade or less, to 7 for graduate degree), *income* (1 for less than US\$15,000, to 7 for US\$100,000 or more; missing values were set at the modal category, 4, which is for incomes of US\$35,000 to US\$49,999; the original 1 to 7 income scale was re-coded to range from 0 to 1); *income non-response* (1 if the respondent did not report an income level, 0 if otherwise); *male* (1 if the respondent is male, 0 if female) and *White* (1 if the respondent is White, 0 if otherwise).

## **APPENDIX B:**

### **VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION FOR CHAPTER 5**

#### **Description of Variables**

##### *Direct Action Participation—Protest and Community Problem-Solving*

The CPS asks respondents whether they have participated in two forms of direct action in the past year—protest and community problem-solving. The analysis reported in this chapter uses dichotomous measure this measure of participation in each type of direct action. Data are coded 1 (participated) and 0 (did not participate).

##### *Mobilizing Contact—Protest and Community Problem-Solving*

The CPS asks respondents whether they have received mobilizing contact designed to encourage their participation in protest and community problem-solving, respectively. The analysis reported in this chapter uses dichotomous measure of whether a respondent received such contact for each type of direct action. Data are coded 1 (received contact) and 0 (did not receive contact).

##### *Personality (Extraversion)*

The CPS does not contain a standard, Big 5 measure of the extraversion trait dimension. However, it does contain eight items that ask about personal qualities. Respondents are asked whether they “usually count on being successful at everything [they] do”; “like to assume responsibility”; “like to take the lead when a group does things together”; “enjoy convincing others of my opinions”; “serve as a model for others”; “[are] good at getting what [they] want”; “[are] often a step ahead of others”; “often give others advice and suggestions.” For each item, respondents can answer yes (coded 1) or no (coded 0). Miller (2010) uses a scale built from all eight items, which she calls a scale of extraversion.

This chapter uses a version of this scale that contains five items. The item pertaining to “responsibility” is dropped for several reasons. First, “responsibility” is a quality that typically serves as one measure of the conscientiousness trait dimension (Mondak 2010; McCrae and Costa

2008). Second, as reported in the first table in Appendix B, in a sample of undergraduates at the University of Illinois, a standard, Big 5 measure of conscientiousness is the strongest predictor of a “yes” response to the CPS item about responsibility. Third, of the five items included in the scale used in this chapter, extraversion is a stronger predictor, and the only consistently strong predictor across each of these items. When used as predictors, each of the other four Big 5 trait dimensions fails as a predictor on at least one item in the scale. Fifth, as reported in the second table of Appendix B, using the data drawn from undergraduates, the five item scale of extraversion is most strongly correlated with the standard Big 5 measure of extraversion. Sixth, past research using standard measures of the Big 5 trait dimensions has reported positive relationships between extraversion and outcomes resembling each of the five items contained in this chapter’s measure of extraversion. Extraversion is associated with confidence in one’s ability to succeed (Pulford and Sohal 2006), taking the lead in groups (Bloeser et al 2012; Clark et al 2007); status seeking (Barrick, Parks and Mount 2005) and status attainment (Anderson et al 2001); and discursiveness (Mondak 2010).

The standard measures of the Big 5 trait dimensions used on the undergraduate survey each contain three constituent items. Items were drawn or adapted from those in Goldberg (1992). The word pairs used and scale alpha levels are as follows: (openness;  $\alpha = 0.57$ ) imaginative-unimaginative, not an intellectual-an intellectual, creative-uncreative; (conscientiousness; 0.75) careful-careless, hardworking-lazy, responsible-irresponsible; (extraversion; 0.82) timid-bold, outgoing-shy, introverted-extraverted; (agreeableness; 0.71) unkind-kind, polite-rude, sympathetic-unsympathetic; (emotional stability; 0.73) relaxed-tense, moody-steady, nervous-at ease. All scales are recoded to range from 0 (lowest observed value on the trait) to 1 (highest observed value).

### *Social and Environmental Factors*

All models contain items measuring education, family income, age, race, sex, relationship status, number of children, and occupational status. Models examining the possibility of mediating and moderating relationships involving extraversion also contain items measure political interest and civic skills.

*Education.* The measure education denotes the number of years a respondent has attended school, coded from least (1) to greatest (20) amount of educational attainment (mean = 13.27; SD = 2.87).

*Family Income.* The measure of family income denotes the income of the respondent's household, coded from least (1 for less than \$5000/yr) to greatest (16 for \$200,000/yr and over) amount of income (mean = 7.18; SD = 3.65).

*Age.* The age item, coded from youngest to oldest, ranges from 18 to 92, (mean = 42.43, SD = 15.87).

*Race.* The race item is a dummy variable coded to indicate whether the respondents indicated their race as white (1) or any race other than white (0).

*Sex.* The item denoting sex is coded to indicate whether respondents indicated their sex as male (1) or female (0).

*Co-dependence.* The item measuring relationship status is coded to indicate whether the respondent is in a long-term relationship (1) or not (0).

*Kids.* This item indicates the number of children for whom the respondent is responsible and is coded from lowest (0) to highest (10); (mean = 0.98, SD = 1.24).

*Occupational Constraints.* Models contain three measures of occupational constraints—whether an individual is employed in a job outside the home (0 if not, 1 if part-time, 2 if full time), whether the individual works at home (1 if yes, 0 if no), and whether the individual currently attends school (1 if yes, 0 if no).

*Civic Skills.* The measure of civic skills is a scale derived from a total of 12 items. The CPS asks respondents whether they have performed a variety of skill based tasks as part of their job, part or as part of secondary associations, such as churches and other secular organizations. These skills include

letter writing, meeting attendance, meeting planning, and giving presentations. Respondents could indicate a maximum of 12 skills and a minimum of 0 across the domains of work, church, and other secondary organizations. An average for each respondent was then calculated, resulting in values for each respondent that range from 0 to 4; (mean = 1.04, SD = 1).

*Political Interest.* The CPS asks respondents about their interest in local and national politics. For both domains of politics, respondents can indicate “not very interested,” slightly interested,” “somewhat interested,” or “very interested.” The scale of political interest used in this chapter takes the average of responses about interest in local and national politics and ranges from low (0) to high (4); (mean = 2.96, SD = 0.84).

## APPENDIX C: THE CPS EXTRAVERSION SCALE

*Big 5 Traits and Individual Items of CPS Extraversion Measure*

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|                        | Count on<br>Success | Assume<br>Responsibility | Take Lead<br>in Groups+ | Persuades<br>Others+ | Model<br>for Others+ | Gets What<br>One Wants+ | Ahead of<br>of Others | Gives Advice+     |
|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Open.                  | 0.83<br>(0.71)      | 0.35<br>(0.84)           | -1.02<br>(0.69)         | 2.73<br>(0.79)       | 0.57<br>(0.61)       | 0.33<br>(0.63)          | 0.65<br>(0.58)        | 0.94<br>(0.86)    |
| Conscientious          | 2.10***<br>(0.69)   | 4.32 ***<br>(0.94)       | 1.89**<br>(0.66)        | -0.08<br>(0.62)      | 1.63***<br>(0.56)    | 0.12<br>(0.57)          | 1.36***<br>(0.53)     | 1.49**<br>(0.76)  |
| Extraversion           | 1.70***<br>(0.70)   | 2.62***<br>(0.86)        | 4.36 **<br>(0.00)       | 2.25***<br>(0.73)    | 2.14***<br>(0.00)    | 3.27***<br>(0.67)       | 0.92*<br>(0.53)       | 2.15***<br>(0.85) |
| Agreeableness          | -0.045<br>(0.70)    | -0.38<br>(0.84)          | 0.25<br>(0.69)          | -0.66<br>(0.67)      | 0.53<br>(0.59)       | -1.24**<br>(0.62)       | -1.15**<br>(0.57)     | 1.21<br>(0.82)    |
| Emotional<br>Stability | 2.37***<br>(0.78)   | 1.50#<br>(0.90)          | 0.66<br>(0.70)          | 0.65<br>(0.67)       | 0.25<br>(0.60)       | 0.62<br>(0.62)          | 1.21**<br>(0.58)      | -1.17<br>(0.78)   |
| Constant               | -1.44               | 1.50                     | -1.53                   | -0.78                | -1.90                | -0.28                   | -0.90                 | -0.38             |
| Adj.<br>R-Squared      | 0.14                | 0.22                     | 0.20                    | 0.13                 | 0.13                 | 0.12                    | 0.06                  | 0.11              |
| Obs.                   | 392                 | 392                      | 392                     | 392                  | 392                  | 392                     | 392                   | 392               |

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*Source:* Political Science Department Undergraduate Subject Pool, University of Illinois, 2012

*Notes.* Entries are binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05, #p<.10. Items included on the measure of extraversion used in the analysis presented in this chapter are marked with a “+.”

**Correlations—Standard “Big Five” Measures and the CPS Measure of Extraversion**

|                     |                     | Openness | Conscientiousness | Extraversion | Agreeableness | Emotional Stability | CPS Extraversion |
|---------------------|---------------------|----------|-------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Openness            | Pearson Correlation | 1.00     | 0.02              | 0.39**       | 0.28**        | 0.09                | 0.22**           |
|                     | Sig. (2-tailed)     |          | 0.71              | 0.00         | 0.00          | 0.08                | 0.00             |
|                     | N                   | 392      | 392               | 392          | 392           | 392                 | 392              |
| Conscientiousness   | Pearson Correlation | 0.02     | 1.00              | 0.05         | 0.38**        | 0.29**              | 0.16**           |
|                     | Sig. (2-tailed)     | 0.71     |                   | 0.34         | 0.00          | 0.00                | 0.00             |
|                     | N                   | 392      | 392               | 392          | 392           | 392                 | 392              |
| Extraversion        | Pearson Correlation | .39**    | 0.05              | 1.00         | 0.29**        | 0.11*               | 0.41**           |
|                     | Sig. (2-tailed)     | 0.00     | 0.34              |              | 0.00          | 0.03                | 0.00             |
|                     | N                   | 392      | 392               | 392          | 392           | 392                 | 392              |
| Agreeableness       | Pearson Correlation | 0.28**   | 0.38**            | 0.29**       | 1.00          | 0.39**              | 0.18**           |
|                     | Sig. (2-tailed)     | 0.00     | 0.00              | 0.00         |               | 0.00                | 0.00             |
|                     | N                   | 392      | 392               | 392          | 392           | 392                 | 392              |
| Emotional Stability | Pearson Correlation | 0.09     | 0.29**            | 0.11*        | 0.39**        | 1.00                | 0.09             |
|                     | Sig. (2-tailed)     | 0.08     | 0.00              | 0.03         | 0.00          |                     | 0.09             |
|                     | N                   | 392      | 392               | 392          | 392           | 392                 | 392              |
| CPS Extraversion    | Pearson Correlation | 0.22**   | 0.16**            | 0.41**       | 0.18**        | 0.09                | 1.00             |
|                     | Sig. (2-tailed)     | 0.00     | 0.00              | 0.00         | 0.00          | 0.09                |                  |
|                     | N                   | 392      | 392               | 392          | 392           | 392                 | 392              |

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

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