

POLISH POLITICAL ELITE OPINION ON TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION

BY

URSZULA MARIA BIEGAJ

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Adviser:

Associate Professor Carol Leff

Abstract

Recent European history has been defined by the growth and development of the European Union. At first the focus was on the western European countries that helped to create the supranational structure, but in recent years the question of continued expansion has become more and more important. Countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic waited a long time to finally be accepted into the EU, following the rules and regulations set out for them. It may be surprising (or not) to know that Turkey has been waiting to become a full member of the EU since 1959, when the country first applied for associate membership. While the Central and East European countries have already been accepted into the EU, the Turks still wait for their turn. In general, Eastern Europe, including Poland, has been supportive of the idea of further enlargement. The Polish political elites—like the foreign minister, the president and prime minister—are also supportive of Turkey’s EU accession. But the support ends at words, some of which are full contradictions when looking at the literature on the topic. Unsure of why these contradictions exist, I was curious about the discourse occurring within the Polish political elite circles about Turkey’s EU accession and how this discourse is represented in the media. This study includes a descriptive history of Polish-Turkish relations, and the historical evolution of elites in Poland. Turkey’s journey through the accession process thus far and all the problems it has encountered is also discussed. I concluded that although the Polish political elite show rhetorical support for the Turkish cause, they do not act on it. Some of my recommendations for the Polish elite include driving EU agenda towards the Turkish issue and concluding accession negotiations as well as posing a challenge to Turkey’s biggest opponents, such as France and Germany.

Dla mamy, taty i Devona

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Chapter One

Introduction

Recent European history has been defined by the growth and development of the European Union. At first the focus was on the western European countries that helped to create the supranational structure, but in recent years the question of continued expansion has become more important. In 2004, the European Union expanded to twenty-five members after accepting many East European countries that had been working towards that goal since the end of the communist era. Enlargement was an important event whose success was doubted by many on the international stage. Countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic waited a long time to finally be accepted into this club, following the rules and regulations set out for them. It may be surprising (or not) to know that Turkey has been waiting to become a full member of the EU since 1959, when the country first applied for associate membership. While the Central and East European countries have already been accepted into the EU, the Turks still wait for their turn. European indecision about Turkey has made the Turkish government restless and seemingly less interested in the prospects of membership. This disinterest itself has caused problems as well. Many of the EU elite are worried that the Turks are turning away from Europe in foreign policy and for international cooperation.

While the issue of what western European countries think about Turkey's possible accession into the EU is addressed often and in detail, the question remains about what the "rest of Europe" thinks. It is true that, despite the purpose of the unification of Europe within the European Union, there is still a divide between the east and west in terms of importance and power. But Eastern Europe is doing pretty well for having joined the EU so recently, even amidst the global economic downturn. Poland has been one of the most successful countries in the

group. As a region within the European Union, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is growing in importance and power, even in international relations. The CEE countries too have opinions about the future of the EU and the role of Turkey in it. It is important to listen to what they have to say as their influence over the region continues to grow. Although Poland and Turkey do not seem to even belong in the same sentence, there is an interesting history between the two countries that ties them today. These connections inspired the current project, which aims to make them more well-known. Not much is written about the relations between Poland and Turkey, but the facts of history and the opportunities for the future make it important to gather the information together and present them coherently.

As a part of the EU, the Central and East European countries have a stake in its future, including when it comes to enlargement. In general, Eastern Europe has been supportive of the idea of further enlargement and the Poles are most excited about it among all the countries. Public opinion polls show that Poles want Turkey to become a member; the motivation behind the support has been about being “fair” to all the EU candidate countries—they should be allowed to follow through with accession. In 2010, 54% of Poles supported Turkish membership.¹ More recent data shows that support has dropped slightly to 48.9% but it is still well over the EU-27 average of 34.4%.² In the political circles, the opinion is quite similar: the Polish political elites—like the foreign minister, the president and prime minister—are also supportive of Turkey’s EU accession. But the support ends at words, some of which are full contradictions when looking at the literature on the topic. Unsure of why these contradictions

¹ Pavel Šaradín, “The Support of East Central European Countries for Turkey’s Accession to the European Union” in *The Politics of EU Accession: Turkish Challenges and Central European Experiences* eds. Lucie Tunkrová and Pavel Šaradín (London: Routledge, 2010), 129.

² Jürgen Gerhards and Silke Hans, “Why not Turkey? Attitudes towards Turkish membership in the EU among citizens in 27 European countries,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 4 (July 2011): 746.

exist, I was curious about the discourse occurring within the Polish political elite circles about Turkey's EU accession and how this discourse is represented in the media.

Some of the scholars who have researched this topic are convinced that Poland, along with the other Central and East European countries, does not hold any sway over EU decision-making and is waiting on an official position to come from above. If the latter were true, however, it is probable that the political elites would not hold any position on the matter. In other instances the Polish elites have shown strength and determination in following through with their foreign policy plans. For example, the Polish elites worked hard within the European Parliament to help orchestrate an EU response to Ukraine's Orange Revolution.³ And the fact remains that Poland already has an official position on the Turkish issue. Others argue that the Polish media does not represent Turkey well, using western sources in their own newspapers, which provides the reading public, elites included, with a skewed vantage point towards Turkey. Many western European countries, like Germany and Austria have very strong opinions about Turks and Turkey which are influenced by large Turkish immigrant population in their countries. If the Polish news media is using sources from there, the reading public might not be getting the whole picture. In the end, it does not make much sense that the Polish political elite would present a positive opinion of the Turkish bid to the EU and then not do anything about it.

Several factors could help explain this inconsistency. First, Turkey may not be important for the Polish political elite or for Polish international relations and that the Polish political elite are only expressing support to keep up appearances. This is an extreme theory, however, because there are several reasons why Turkey actually is important for Polish foreign policy that many of the political elites have already realized. It might also be that it is not the political elite who are

³ Olga Barburska, "The Role of Poland in Shaping the EU Policy towards Ukraine," *Yearbook of Polish European Studies* 10 (2006): 32.

most interested in this topic, but another set of elite altogether. Second, Turkey is important for the political elite, but because of the economic crisis, the Turkish issue cannot take center stage. It is possible that this is true—the problems with the economy, with Greece and with the Euro are a threat to the EU's structure. If the elite do not focus on these issues, there will be no EU for Turkey to accede into.

Nevertheless, Poland's rhetorical support of Turkey's EU accession has not been enough. Speeches are never enough to change anything, let alone the EU's current attitudes towards Turkey. There are a few things the Polish elites could do differently to help Turkey in its bid. They can take the leading role in the European Parliament and try to drive the agenda, much like they did in the case of Ukraine. By taking charge in this manner, Poland will show how serious is in its support for Turkey. Polish elites should also try to challenge the cultural and religious excuses many of the other member states have been using to prevent Turkey from becoming a member. Catholic Poland's support of Muslim Turkey will help to chip away at the idea that the EU is a Christian-only club and perhaps open Europeans to this idea as well. By doing this, Polish elites might also help internal prejudices against the Turks, which are usually based on misinformed historical stories.

The current research will try to find out exactly what the present attitudes of the Polish political elite are towards Turkey's EU accession and how these attitudes are represented by the political elite's institutions, including in the media. There are three broad reasons for the importance of this kind of study. Because of its size and recent economic success, Poland has the potential to become a regional leader. It is true that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe do not have an extensive history of working together, but they are often grouped as if they do. These countries share a history and a future; by working together they can succeed economically

and politically. Poland's leadership in the issue of Turkey's EU accession could be the start of a regional movement towards greater power within the EU. Some scholars blatantly claim that Eastern Europe is not important. Suffice it to say here that it actually is and that these countries, as part of the European Union, are equals to the rest of the group. By taking a stand on the Turkish accession issue, Poland can help lead the region to more power and influence. The second point to make is that Turkey can be a powerful ally to Poland. When thinking about the Ottoman legacy and its reach into Europe, Poland does not usually come to mind. Nevertheless, a handful of scholars have studied the two countries together, comparing them in terms of politics, religion and history. There are many similarities despite the glaring differences in history and religion. By studying the extent of their relationship now, recommendations can be made for further cooperation between Turkey and Poland. If Poland becomes a vocal ally in the accession process, Turkey would make it a very good friend. Finally, the role of the elites cannot be ignored in Poland's history. It is interesting to see how the Polish elite function within the EU structure, whether they are able to grow in confidence and power, or if they have been pushed aside by the elites of the EU and other member states. Before delving into the structure of the present study, a history of the elites in Poland follows below.

The Historical Evolution of Polish Elites

The bulk of this research focuses on the political elites of Poland. To understand who the elites in Poland are now, the history of Polish elites, who they were and how they came to be the "elites", benefits the reader greatly. In terms of analysis, this thesis focuses on the present attitude towards Turkey among Polish elites. However, in order to understand how the elites function today, their evolution through history is essential. Today's elite is a product of many

changes over the last couple centuries. The recent transition to democracy and the post-Solidarity restructuring of the elites is most important in this context but there are interesting connections between Poland and the east earlier on in history. Furthermore, the general history of Polish elites is an interesting one and, honestly, at times a bit strange.

Although today Poland is known to be ethnically and religiously homogenous, it was not always that way. With the marriage of young Jadwiga to the Lithuanian, newly Christianized, Władysław Jagiełło, came the union of the two countries. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was created for the protection and development of all groups contained in the united land. This union created the notion of a noble democracy, or a democracy of the gentry: “It was a democracy because it was based upon the principle of the sovereignty of the people; it saw itself as a republican state, setting against the dynastic principle the ‘will of the nation’, hence a form of civic nationalism.”⁴ Only those who were a part of the noble class were allowed to participate in this democracy, but the status of nobility was not limited to one group of people. Nobility ranged across different ethnicities in this society.

That is not to say, however, that this society was genuinely multicultural in the sense that the various cultures were equal, even at the level of the elites. There was an understanding that although the nobility represented different cultures, they conformed to one, Polish model. To help facilitate this, the elite came up with the Sarmatian nation; all of the nobles were descendants of the famous ancient and powerful Sarmatians.⁵ As the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth grew in size and power, it came into contact more often with the East and with

⁴ Andrzej Walicki, “Intellectual Elites and the Vicissitudes of ‘Imagined Nations’ in Poland,” in *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 263.

⁵ Adam Zamoyski, *The Polish Way: A Thousand Year History of the Poles and their Culture* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1987), 107-108. Writers in Poland developed the theory that the *szlachta*, or nobility, in Poland was not like the Slav peasantry but were descendants of the Sarmatians. This was a group of warrior people from the Black Sea Steppe who had reached southeastern Europe in the 6th century. This theory quickly became popular among the multi-ethnic *szlachta*.

Muslim cultures. As a result, the Sarmatian ideal demonstrated eastern elements in behavior, and even in clothing. Moustaches became popular as men carried sabers, wore fur stoles and learned to ride horses. The *szlachta* put their personal wealth on display in various possessions, such as jewel-encrusted clothing, and would lavish guests with hospitality to show off their means.⁶

Within this framework, Polish culture became the model as it was considered the most developed culture within that realm.⁷ Although six languages received official recognition in the Commonwealth, with the Sarmatian ideology came a quick Polonization of the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Jewish, Ruthenian, etc. populations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Sarmatism in Poland may seem to be a strange and superficial notion but it was a genuine attempt to unite the elite class in the Commonwealth. Over time, this ideology created an interesting synthesis of West and East within Poland, so much, however, that other countries began to consider Poland as un-European. During the Enlightenment, the main concern for reformers was to turn from a nation of the gentry to a nation based on property ownership. By embracing this French concept of the nation, the multiethnic character of the Commonwealth became problematic. This notion of the nation was suspicious of regional and cultural differences; in Poland “this meant the unification of the law, the liquidation of the autonomous status of Lithuania, and programmatic Polonization of the entire population.”⁸ No longer would there be a union of Poland and Lithuania but a union strictly under the government of Poland.

Before the final partition of Poland in 1795, westernizing reforms continued in Poland ending with the May 3rd Constitution of 1791. It seemed revolutionary, but it did not improve the situation of the peasants and it stripped the landless gentry of its noble status; nobility was now

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Andrzej Walicki, “Poland between East and West: The Controversies over Self-Definition and Modernization in Partitioned Poland” (August Zaleski Lectures, Harvard University, April 18-22, 1994), 11.

⁸ Ibid., 12.

the privilege of the landowning class. The notion of equality within the nobility had also gone out of fashion. The partitions of Poland are a unique event in history, one that helped to shape and define Poland even today. There were some Poles who considered themselves to be pro-Russian but, for the most part, the Poles did not like the Russians. “Polish patriots felt themselves to be citizens of an invisible *res publica*, ruled by an informal ‘moral government,’ composed of the most authoritative representatives of the national elite in the three parts of the partitioned country.”⁹ As the Insurrection of 1830-1831 failed and the elite community decided to emigrate from the territory formerly known as Poland, political thought flourished. In light of the situation, the intellectuals and elites were unsure if and how Poland fit into Europe. They speculated whether their conceptualization of Poland needed to change. The Westernizers, portrayed best by Prince Adam Czartoryski, wanted to continue the reforms begun by the May 3rd constitution; they wanted to connect with a Western identity. The other side believed in a Slavic communal identity which saw Slavs as distinct from the West.

When the January Uprising occurred in 1863, a different notion of what Poland should look like prevailed. For those who participated, a ‘federal nation’ was the driving ideal; their manifest called to arms three nations of the old commonwealth: Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians.¹⁰ Each was recognized as a separate nation. Those who participated in this uprising came from the former noble and elite classes. They were desperate to get their country and their status back and assumed the general population would be supportive. While in some places only the nobility was involved, in general the Uprising included the participation of all the social classes. Once the January Uprising was defeated, romantic notions of unity such as these fell to the wayside. National identity began to be centered on the Catholic Church.

⁹ Ibid., 16.

¹⁰ Walicki, “Intellectual Elites,” 273.

Although Poland had been partitioned among three different states, Poles did not give up on the fight for independence. The divide between ideologies, however, still remained. Having been born right after the last insurrection among the Poles, Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski did not hold onto many Romantic notions about the fight for Polish independence. But they had different ideas for the resurgent Poland. The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was led by Piłsudski. “The intellectual elite of the ‘resurgent Poland’ ...were used to think[ing] of nations in political, not ethnic terms.”¹¹ They could not imagine the Lithuanian and Ukrainian peasants constituting themselves as separate ethnic nations. The PPS ignored the budding Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalist sentiments, and had a problem appealing to the Jews. For the PPS the biggest foreign concern was the Russians. On the other side were Dmowski and the National Democratic Party (the “Endecja”). “Its membership included the bourgeoisie, the déclassé szlachta and large sections of the peasantry. It was less aristocratic than the PPS and less Romantic in its outlook.”¹² For this group, Poland could not be resurrected as an ethnically mixed country—Poles would be the only ethnic group. They were also much more concerned with the Germans as enemies of Poland.

At the end of the First World War, Poland was finally free. Piłsudski’s group was able to gain control of the new Poland, but Piłsudski himself refused to be president or prime minister. He ended up being Marshal, a potentially very powerful political position. The interwar period was hard around the world, with high unemployment rates and growing discontent. In Poland, there was mounting resentment against “foreign” elements, including the Jews, who did not really assimilate into Polish society. The Jews lived in urban areas but were not concentrated in one city or town. This animosity did not lessen with the start of World War II.

¹¹ Ibid., 280.

¹² Zamoyski, *The Polish Way*, 329.

As a result of the Second World War and the havoc wreaked on Poland and its people, three social classes disappeared. The bourgeoisie and big landowners fled the country, because of both the Nazis and the Bolsheviks. Both groups would have been targeted and they had the means to go elsewhere. Since much of the Jewish population of Poland was exterminated during the war, a large portion of the petty bourgeoisie also disappeared. The intelligentsia was decimated by both the Nazis and the Soviets. The Communist takeover in Poland can be attributed to the weakening of the Polish social structure and the general disillusionment with already established political parties. Communism within Poland had an interesting journey, never really entrenching itself as much as in other Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, the system was in place and whoever aspired to join the elite had to work within that system. “The means employed by Communists to attain power were effective: the political system was under total control of the party, society appeared to be pacified and social peace was secured. In return, the new authorities guaranteed full employment, some social benefits, and upward-mobility opportunities for the representative of the lower classes.”¹³

The structure for creating a new elite class was in place. In other East Central European countries under Stalin’s control, the Communist elite and their lives were also at risk; this was, of course, according to the whims of Stalin. In Poland, Communism had a dubious hold over the country and virtually none over the Catholic Church. Show trials were not a common occurrence in Poland, but the upper ranks were reshuffled just as well. The lower ranks had many advantages all across the region. Political elite recruitment went through several phases during communism in Poland. Immediately after WWII, loyalty to the party through membership and faithfulness to communist principles was rewarded with placement within the communist

¹³ Jacek Wasilewski and Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński, “Poland: Winding road from the Communist to the post-Solidarity elite,” *Theory and Society* 24 (1995): 671.

political and bureaucratic structure. During the Stalinist period, the added label of proletarian worker, both in the rural and urban setting, allowed for access to these privileges. After Stalin died and especially after 1956, “party specialists” were appointed to office. This new category was to help reconcile the political and qualificational requirements of the political elite; the candidate for office was to be a party member and a diploma holder.¹⁴ Of course, the order of the words was most telling; first party member, then a specialist. The government needed employees, apartments needed tenants and schools had open spaces for the children of the non-“bourgeoisie.” Competence did not really matter as witnessed by the case in Poland: “as late as 1966, four-fifths of Polish state employees had only a primary school education. The country was run by a strikingly under-educated administrative caste.”¹⁵ These three categories had their foundations in the system of *nomenklatura*. During and after the Solidarity movement in the early 1980s, a new category of candidate for the elite was created: loyal expert. Under this system, the selection process was to be based solely on the qualifications necessary for the job and met by the candidate. Studies have shown, however, that this did not happen and that the system of *nomenklatura* was still very powerful.¹⁶

There is no doubt that elites played a huge role in the negotiated transition to democracy in Poland. However, the definition of ‘elite’ was quite broad. From 1989-1995, “practically all elites (the intellectuals, artists, leaders of voluntary associations and socio-cultural movements, the Catholic hierarchy, trade union leaders, etc.) played the role of political elites.”¹⁷ It is true that over time, the politicization of people who were not directly involved with the government

¹⁴ Jacek Wasilewski, “The Patterns of Bureaucratic Elite Recruitment in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s” *Soviet Studies* 42 (1990): 744.

¹⁵ Tony Judt, *Postwar: History of Europe since 1945* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), note on 176.

¹⁶ Wasilewski, “The Patterns of Bureaucratic Elite Recruitment,” 753.

¹⁷ Jacek Wasilewski, “Elite Research in Poland: 1989-1995” in *Elites in Transition: Elite Research in Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Heinrich Best and Ulrike Becker (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1997), 16.

decreased, but it took quite a bit of time. After the 1993 elections, it seemed as though communism had returned to Poland. The elections had resulted in a predominantly left-leaning coalition, controlled by many of the former communist leaders. In reality, Poland did not return to communism, but it was no longer the era of Solidarity, either; Poland was both post-communist and post-Solidarity. As a result, the elite could not fall back on old habits. In order to succeed fully in democratization, the political elites could not fight about who had been a party member or Solidarity member, but on social safety nets, privatization, subsidizing of agriculture, inflow of foreign capital, etc.¹⁸ It is true that Polish political elites spent a lot of time and energy in *lustration* campaigns, trying to identify and condemn those who were on the wrong side of the communist divide.

For many years the Polish political system seemed unstable because of the back and forth struggle between post-Communist and post-Solidarity political parties. Each election would bring new faces into the political world. The concern that Poland was turning away from Europe because of the political elites in power at the time was a constant discussion. The Kaczynski brothers of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) held both the President and Prime Minister positions. They were quite conservative and skeptical of outside influence. Although Poland was well underway to membership, the Kaczynski brothers would cause a stir when they refused to adapt to the norms or when they criticized the EU, embarrassing much of the Polish elite (the public too). Having joined the European Union in 2004, Poland seemed on the right path to democratic and international success. For years, however the political system in Poland seemed volatile, especially when political seats had high turnover rates. It was not until 2011 that an incumbent party was returned to office; the Civic Platform (PO) party continues to rule and integrate into

¹⁸ Wasilewski, "Poland: Winding Road," 694.

the European structure. The present structure of the political elite and their relationship to the Turkish bid to the EU is the focus of the following study.

Methodology and Outline

Although Poland, as a member of the EU-27, supports further enlargement to include Turkey, the country's leaders and the general public have not demonstrated active support. This is a shame for both countries because of a shared history, and the economic possibilities that lie in forming a solid relationship between them. Poland and Turkey have both been successful despite the recent economic crisis that hit the world. Furthermore, the accession of Turkey might forward Poland's national interest in Ukraine's inclusion into the EU. Turkey's transformation to a European democracy could act as a model and catalyst for Ukraine's own positive changes and acceptance into the EU. If Turkey is accepted into the EU, after all of the problems and delays, Ukraine's accession to the organization might not appear as daunting or impossible in comparison. As the biggest country in the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, Poland serves as an example and a leader in the region. Poland's leaders and the general public should take a more active interest and role when it comes to Turkey's accession into the European Union because of historical, cultural and economic bonds. It would benefit Poland immensely.

In order to study the topic of political elite opinion, the appropriate methodology is content analysis of materials representing the political elite in Poland. In this case this means the websites of the Foreign Minister, the President and the Prime Minister of Poland. This information is freely available on the Internet in the form of governmental websites, including documents released by the various offices. The latter half of 2011 also provided an opportunity

for the Polish political elites to lead on the supranational scale in the form of Poland's presidency of the Council of the European Union. This office rotates every six months and allows for each of the 27 member states to be in the leadership position. The documents released by the presidency outline the plans each country has for the European Union, bringing to the forefront personally important political, economic and cultural concerns. Poland held the presidency July-December 2011; it will be interesting to see if the political elite made Turkey's EU accession a priority. As a final part of this study, a small sample of the media elite will be studied.

Newspaper readership is not as high as tabloid paper readership in Poland (unfortunately), but the highest selling and most popular newspaper, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, has the widest following. Although other studies claim that newspaper articles are skewed against Turkey in the news they give¹⁹, it would be interesting to see if this is true even today. Time and space does not allow for an extensive study of the different media outlets in Poland; furthermore, this study is meant to give a brief analysis of the media and how they have represented the elite and their opinions on Turkey's EU accession. A small sample for *Gazeta Wyborcza* will suffice in this study.

This topic does not live in a vacuum; there are elements of history and politics that help inform the research. All these elements are part of the thesis. Chapter Two contains the literature review that describes the various theories and bodies of work that explain this research. The identity issues that plague Central and Eastern Europe are discussed as well the studies already done about Polish elite opinion of Turkey's EU accession. These studies have some interesting conclusions that help to inform the body of this project. Chapter Three gives the historical background of Polish relations with Turkey. Diplomatic relations between the two countries go as far back as 1414. The Turks were great supporters of the Poles, especially during the time of

¹⁹ Sylvia Tiriyaki, "The Debate on the EU Membership Prospects of Turkey," in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States*, ed. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz (Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 2006), 183-195.

the partitions. Present political and economic relations are also discussed in this section. Chapter Four concentrates on the European Union accession process that Poland finished successfully and that Turkey is still working through. This chapter gives an overview of what has been holding the process back for Turkey, including political and cultural reasons. Chapter Five is where the content analysis of the websites, documents and newspaper articles begins. I make some interesting discoveries in the documents released by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the articles in *Gazeta Wyborcza* help to give a clearer picture of what Turkey looks like to Poland. Chapter Six is the concluding chapter where all of the information gathered in this thesis is synthesized and further recommendations are made on the topic of Polish elite opinion on Turkey's accession into the European Union.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

There are three bodies of literature that are relevant to the study of Polish political elite opinion on Turkey's EU accession. The elites and intellectuals in Poland have played a major role in state formation, from the time of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the collapse of communism to the present with Poland in the European Union. Elite studies play an important role in understanding how they function within society. As this project focuses on the behavior of the political elites in Poland towards Turkey's membership prospects, looking at the literature about the elites is quite relevant. A more thorough history of elites in Poland was discussed in the introductory chapter; the first section of this chapter will predominantly deal with contemporary issues of elite studies specifically in the post-communist context. Until 1989, communist elite functioned differently than in today's Poland. Studies of how the transition of elites occurred and who functions as the political elite in Poland today are relevant pieces of research for the topic at hand.

The second section of this chapter will deal with studies of identity in Europe, a topic that affects both countries in this study. Since Poland is a member of the European Union, and Turkey is a candidate country, discussions about the European experiment and how individual countries still are able to function under the umbrella of the supranational organization are pertinent. Whether countries have a lot of say about their national interests and how they go about fulfilling them will be discussed. The final literature that is important to study is directly related to the topic at hand. Not much has been written about Polish elite opinion of Turkey's EU accession, but what has been written should be mentioned. Names tend to repeat, as do main ideas. This project is meant to fill the gaps in available literature. This literature will help inform

my studies of the websites of the most important political elite and the newspaper articles that include their opinions.

Elite studies: an evolution

Modern elite studies in Poland and CEE in general, have developed in a short period of time. Considering the fact that within communist and socialist ideologies the ultimate goal was a classless society, talking about elites at the academic level was taboo and could get someone into trouble. According to the overview given by Jacek Wasilewski in his essay on elite research in Poland from 1989-1995, this lack of discussion is obvious when looking at university curricula. In Poland, Marxism dominated the social sciences, although for a relatively short period of time, from 1948-1955.²⁰ But with the chain of events that began in the 1970s, and continued with the success of the Solidarity movement into the 1980s, academics and scholars developed a greater interest in politics.

The elites played an integral role in the Polish transition to democracy negotiated by communist elites and Solidarity counter-elites at the Round Table. However, the definition of 'elite' was quite broad. From 1989-1995, "practically all elites (the intellectuals, artists, leaders of voluntary associations and socio-cultural movements, the Catholic hierarchy, trade union leaders, etc.) played the role of political elites."²¹ It is true that over time, the politicization of people who were not directly involved with the government decreased, but it took quite a bit of time. In his analysis, Wasilewski discusses how elite studies in Poland truly began after the end of communism. The Polish Academy of Sciences formed the Institute of Political Studies in 1990 and elite studies at the university level really began to develop within Poland. The main

²⁰ Wasilewski, "Elite research in Poland," 13.

²¹ Ibid., 16.

questions that scholars wanted to answer were ‘who are the new elites?’ and ‘what happened to the old elites?’ These questions were present not only in Poland but in academia all over the world. Traditional elite theories did not apply to the post-Soviet space and the democratic transition was not like anything the world had seen before.

One of the most important points that Wasilewski makes about elites in Poland is that the transition from “old” to “new” was not simple or swift. In another article, Wasilewski discusses data he and his colleague collected through interviews in the early 1990s, after the transition to democracy had already occurred in Poland. Wasilewski’s concern in this study was exactly in accordance with the above-mentioned questions. Specifically, he aimed to find out if the elites (political, cultural and economic) in Poland had gone through a complete transformation or just a circulation of the old elites. After analyzing their data, they found out that there was no distinctive line between the two groups—the old political elite and both economic elites had a lot in common. For example, in terms of social status, nearly two-thirds of both the old and the new elites came from peasantry, working class, and non-manual families; on the other hand, however, the new *cultural* and *political* elites were distinct in terms of their social background, education and party membership.²² It was the small differences that distinguished them.

With such a slight distinction it was no wonder that with the elections of 1993 it seemed to be a return to communism. As mentioned before, the communist successor parties’ election into office was a concern to many that Poland had returned to the political system that never quite belonged there in the first place. The truth was, however, that neither the communist party elite, nor the Solidarity party could rule successfully based on what had happened in the past. The elite could not fall back on old habits because they would not help Poland anymore. In order to succeed fully in democratization, the political elites could not fight about who had been a

²² Wasilewski, “Poland: Winding road,” 683.

party member or Solidarity member, but on social safety nets, privatization, subsidizing of agriculture, inflow of foreign capital, etc.²³ Wasilewski's conclusion is an important reminder that all of that was just a distraction from the important aspects of the transition to democracy.

Over time, however, political elites in Poland continued to be fragmented. It really had not been until recently that the political world in Poland stabilized with the second term of the Civic Platform (PO) party and its leader, Donald Tusk. Throughout the 1990s, there was turmoil among the political elites, especially about who actually constituted the political elite. As mentioned before, several groups that elsewhere are considered apolitical, like the Catholic Church or artists, were politically active in Poland. By the mid-90s this politicization subsided, but the world of politics in Poland still was unsure of the function and make-up of the political elite. Bogdan Mach and Włodzimierz Wesolowski conducted a study in 1996 of actual and aspiring parliamentarians—both people already in the Sejm and those who came pretty close in elections. These politicians were electoral winners despite their parties not getting enough votes to cross the necessary threshold to become part of the Sejm. Mach and Wesolowski studied the difference between what the political elite desired in their politicians and what they actually saw in them. In terms of the desirable politician, all parliamentary parties agreed that they were “leaders who are able to gain social support.”²⁴ What they saw on a daily basis, however, was that people actually involved in politics were just party leaders. Their conclusion was that all elite members “irrespective of party affiliation wanted politics to be a job for active and socially conscientious leaders” but that the proportion of the party elite who thought this was actually the

²³ Ibid., 694.

²⁴ Bogdan Mach and Włodzimierz Wesolowski, “The Political Elite’s Transformational Correctness” in *Elites after State Socialism: Theories and Analysis* eds. John Higley and György Lengyel (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 90.

case was small.²⁵ Ideally, the Polish political elite saw themselves as representatives of the public, reaching their position through free and fair elections. But the truth seemed to be that the political elite was comprised of party leaders who just climbed a political ladder to the top.

Currently, the political elites in Poland have a clearer understanding of how to be effective leaders. The legacy left behind by the transition to democracy made the political elites more aware of their role domestically and internationally. This has been made obvious by the economic and political presence Polish elites have shown on the international stage. For example, there have been many positive reports about the Polish presidential term of the Council of the European Union.²⁶ Poland made a great impression on the European community through its competent and ambitious leadership of the six-month position. This has also reflected the public's desire for Poland to succeed on the international level. Regarding Poland's role in the European Union there does not seem to be a great disconnect between the Polish elites, the public and the supranational entity itself.

With the establishment on the European Union and the eventual addition of the CEECs, elite studies have become more encompassing and they deal with elites within the supranational structure. The individual member states have political elites who function nationally, but also on the EU level. What scholars have found is that as the EU has grown, so has the divide between the elites and the citizens they represent. Max Haller discusses this exact topic in his book *European Integration as an Elite Process: The Failure of a Dream?* This study straddles two important topics: elites in the EU and the feasibility of the European experiment in general; the latter issue will be discussed further in the next section. Haller raises some interesting points about different types of elites in the EU; he discusses the difference between political, economic

²⁵ Ibid., 91.

²⁶ Jacek Kucharczyk and Agnieszka Łada, "Pole Position: The Polish Presidency of the EU Council," Heinrich Böll Stiftung European Union, <http://www.boell.eu/web/270-798.html> (last accessed July 2012).

and cultural elites. Furthermore, there is a growing “Eurocracy” in the EU political structure. Haller sees the rejection of the constitution of Europe by the French and Dutch in 2005 referenda as the visible division between the elites, who wholeheartedly support European integration, and the citizens, who just see the EU as an elite project, not really having anything to do with them. He concludes that the elites have to be more willing to have citizens involved in the integration process, but challenges regular people to actually be more interested.

Haller’s book does not focus specifically on Poland or the other CEECs; in fact, he seems more concerned with the western European countries. He does, however, mention that support for further integration from the public in Central and Eastern Europe is generally higher than in other member states, but many scholars mention this fact. It is interesting to see the political and sociological studies that Haller provides in his book. One of Haller’s most pertinent observations has to do with why EU integration does not necessarily mean that political elites are giving up power. Participating in integration becomes a means to preserve or restore national autonomy and independence in the time of superpowers and globalization. It turns out that heads of member state governments have the last say in all decisive political matters of integration policy.²⁷ Of course, elites have different motivations for agreeing to participate, whether collective-political or personal-individual. But there are benefits to both the member states and their national leaders for participating in the European experiment. How elites in Poland fit into this framework will be discussed next.

The European Experiment

The debate whether CEE historically belongs to a western or eastern tradition is important in understanding the region. Başak Alpan discusses this in his essay “Intellectual and

²⁷ Max Haller, *European Integration as an Elite Process: The Failure of a Dream?* (London: Routledge, 2008), 80.

Political ‘Europe’: Rupture or Continuity in Central Europe?” With the introduction of the European Union to Central Europe, the process of Europeanization and its extent comes into question. Has the region always been a part of Western Europe and is finally coming back to it after the whole nasty business of Communism? Or has it always been different from the rest of Europe and only with the process of European integration does it finally belong? The questions are intriguing and are telling of how Central Europe has been perceived. Alpan’s discussion includes an overview of these debates and how their proponents justified their stand. One of the theoreticians who argued against the western quality of Central European history and political structure thought democratic structure to be cumbersome to the region. “Despite early moments of freedom under Communism (Prague Spring, Solidarity), the prospective premise of a neo-liberal state system, of a weak state, and a strong civil society, was nonexistent in the CEEC.”²⁸ History shows that, although it took time, these aspects are present in the region. The second half of Alpan’s essay deals with how the option of the European Union was thrust upon the CEECs as the only option to increase prosperity and freedom in the newly democratized states. Over time, however, there was a growing spectrum of Euro-skepticism that made people think twice about whether union with the other countries in Europe would really be the best for them. This links to the study Haller conducted: growing skepticism among citizens correlates to the idea that integration is just an elite project.

Author and historian Tony Judt was already a skeptic about the EU in his lecture and eventual book *A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe*. Judt takes the theme of the “return to Europe” of Eastern Europe head on. He is not at all convinced that was actually going to happen. Judt discusses how the divide between East and West in Europe did not begin with the Cold War

²⁸ Başak Z. Alpan, “Intellectual and Political ‘Europe’: Rupture or Continuity in Central Europe?” in *Central European History and the European Union: The Meaning of Europe*, ed. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 147.

and the Iron Curtain, but much further back in history. Travelers from the West could not help but comment on how different and less civilized things seemed east of Vienna. Although Eastern European integration plays an important if dubious role in Judt's argument, his main concern is that "Europe"—for unification and integration—is not the answer to everything. Europe will have its own problems to deal with, whether demographic or economic and Judt did not think adding Eastern Europe would help. It is interesting to note here that Judt does not mention Turkey's EU prospects; he only mentions the country in relation to its historical and imperial impact on the region. It would have been interesting to see what Judt had to say on the topic. In any case, Judt's observations are frank and a little discouraging. As a scholar of the region, it is difficult to read Judt's claims that the region does not matter (especially to the "rest" of Europe) and that offering membership to the EU would be equivalent to charity. But there are other scholars who think otherwise. Central and Eastern Europe, as a regional power, does not have to take a back seat in terms of foreign policy and international influence.

In his book, Joshua Spero discusses how Poland, as a middle power, was able to work out a comfortable and safe security network right after the end of communism. Throughout history, Poland was at a geographical and political disadvantage against its German and Russian neighbors. Polish leaders did not want to repeat the mistakes of history and allow for any domination or coercion to happen again. Spero's main thesis is that middle powers are able to work within the framework of greater and lesser power to ensure political security. His study includes the specific time period of 1989-1993; he focuses his analysis on the first post-communist Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. While acting as Foreign Minister, Skubiszewski was able to ensure security for Poland by working together with Germany, Russia, the Central European Visegrad group—the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland—and

with others. Spero concludes that middle power countries are able to “bridge” relations among several different countries, including great powers that might have controlled or destroyed them otherwise. Spero claims that not enough research is done on the relations between Poland and its neighbors, especially in the post-Cold War world.

Adam Balcer and his colleagues would beg to differ. In a translated chapter from their book *Pionek czy rozgrywający? Nowa polska geopolityka* [Playmaker or Pawn? New Polish Geopolitics] Balcer, Krawczyk and Wóycicki argue that too much emphasis has been put on the East/West geopolitical divide. For them, the North/South axis, which includes the Scandinavian countries, the Balkans and Turkey, offers Poland opportunities, especially within the EU structure. These scholars seem very passionate and excited by these options for Poland, but they also take it a little too far by suggesting that Polish foreign policy should focus on *all* these regions at the same time. Nevertheless, they see partnerships with these various regions as essential for different reasons. For example, the Black Sea region is seen as essential in the concern over energy resources while cooperation with Turkey might relieve the aging work force problem in Poland and help Ukraine become a member of the EU, just like Poland wants. Spero’s study was focused on a specific time period and it was published before Poland acceded into the EU, but he probably would agree with Balcer and the others about the effectiveness of Poland as a power. It is hard to say what Spero would think of Turkey as an ally; the topic has been polarizing. This leads into the final section of this chapter, the body of literature that discusses what scholars have said about Poland’s involvement in Turkey’s EU accession.

Poland on EU enlargement: the case of Turkey

Scholars from Poland, Turkey and other Eastern European countries have studied the topic of Polish support of continued EU enlargement, including Turkey's bid (to some extent). Names, theories and conclusions tend to repeat themselves as really only a handful of scholars have looked at this topic directly. From the Turkish side, studies have been done to evaluate Central and East European public opinion and elite opinion on EU enlargement. Polish scholars, however, seem to be relatively more interested in this particular topic. These scholars look at Poland's foreign policy trends and actions and how they relate to Turkey's membership prospects.

Kazmierkiewicz discusses how Central European support for continued EU enlargement exists because of a genuine interest to be inclusive. The post-Cold War world is meant to be built on trust; none of the states of the region should be excluded from the EU network. One aspect Kazmierkiewicz brings up is that there is a gap of support for further enlargement between the new and old member states. Furthermore, opinion varies depending on the economic stability of the candidate country in question. That is, the wealthier the country, the more likely it will be supported as a prospective member. Ukraine, however, is by no means a wealthy country, yet receives considerable support from member states, when compared to countries with Muslim populations.²⁹ Kazmierkiewicz claims that none of the governments of the Central and Eastern European countries have an official position on the future of EU enlargement and they will not have one until the EU itself determines one. When Kazmierkiewicz talks about the EU, he probably does not mean the whole institution. If he did, then Poland and the rest of the Central European countries would have a say in establishing this stance. But as Judt frankly stated—no

²⁹ Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, "Central European Debates on Further EU Enlargement" in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States* ed. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz (Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 2006), 19.

one cares about Eastern Europe. From the context of what Kazmierkiewicz writes, the European Union's power lies elsewhere. About Poland's stance toward Turkey Kazmierkiewicz discusses that the president and government have agreed that Poland will not block further enlargement but also will not play a leading role as Turkey's advocate.³⁰ Although Polish public opinion supports continued EU expansion, Poles do not rank Turks highly in terms of a nationality they like; as many as 53% of Poles expressed negative feelings towards this group.³¹

Prejudice against Turkey and its potential membership is further discussed in Andrzej Ananicz's work. He explains that there is a gap of opinion between the public, who harbor negative feelings toward Turkey because of the few historical ties between the two countries, and the Polish political class, who have generally positive attitudes towards Turkey's accession.³² It is interesting that Ananicz mentions this divide because it brings up the question of where the political class is getting its information about Turkey, and why they are not negatively affected by it. It can be argued that there are more historical and cultural connections between Poland and Turkey, which may not be well-known but could create closer and more positive relations if they were. Ananicz also discusses some of the reasons behind the complexity of conditionality applied to the Turkish situation and speculates what the impact could be on the EU if Turkey were to become a member. Ananicz reiterates many of the positive aspects of Turkey's EU membership, including its dynamic market and its influence on the Middle East. Ananicz states that "as far as the EU is concerned, previous enlargements have always brought a positive stimulus to the EU economy. There is no reason to believe that Turkey's entry would have a

³⁰ Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, "Poland," in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States*, ed. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz (Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 2006), 118.

³¹ Ibid., 126.

³² Andrzej Ananicz, "Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations: A View from Poland" in *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations* IAI-TEPAV Report, ed. Nathalie Tocci (Rome: Quaderni IAI, 2007), 34.

different effect.”³³ Ananicz concludes his study by discussing the prejudices that exist both in Turkey against the EU and within EU member states against Turkey. Again he states that, within Central and Eastern Europe, prejudices and preconceptions are weaker among political and cultural elites. Ananicz puts a positive spin on the relationship between Poland and Turkey in regards to the latter’s EU membership. However, his study lacks a more direct recommendation for the improvement of the relations between the two countries and what the Polish political elites could possibly do about it.

Having a more skeptical and negative opinion of Polish and Turkish relations, Adam Szymański bluntly states that Turkey is just not a priority for Poland. Ukraine’s possible membership is much more important to Poland. However, Szymański does state that Polish foreign policy gives unequal weight to the eastern vectors compared to the other areas, including the south, much like Balcer, et al discuss in their own work. “Polish politicians simply do not see the direct benefits of EU membership of countries from south-eastern Europe.”³⁴ Citing other Polish scholars, Szymański claims that Poland does not think it has much clout within EU policy-making and so the political elites focus on Eastern Europe itself. Even when trying to support Ukraine’s membership prospects, Szymański explains, Poland is using “discreet” diplomatic means, especially since Ukraine’s parliamentary elections in 2006 when it became passé for the EU to pay attention to Ukraine. It seemed as though the democratization process begun with the Orange Revolution and the 2004 elections slowed down considerably in Ukraine especially since the former anti-democratic party found success in the 2006 elections. Although to some extent it may be true that Poland has little clout in the EU, it can be argued that Poland can increase its power and sway as an economically and politically successful EU member state.

³³ Ibid., 38.

³⁴ Adam Szymański, “The Position of Polish Political Elites on Future EU Enlargement,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 23 (2007): 552.

Commentary

It would seem that the present author's research question, "What is the Polish political elite opinion of Turkey's EU accession?" has been answered by the previous section. Although we have a better idea of the answer, it is not completely clear. All the literatures discussed above will help to get the complete answer, and will help in figuring out possible solutions. The body of literature on elite studies shows that the transition to democratic elite was not simple or swift. In most cases, the new political elite functioned with the old elites still in place. In Poland, it took a long time for the political world to stabilize after the transition to democracy. And although political leaders were idealistic about what the elite should do and represent in the government, reality showed that it was still the party leaders who were in charge. The legacy that the historical evolution has left on Polish political elites cannot be ignored. Presently, the Polish elites are much stronger and organized in terms of foreign policy and international relations. It is obvious that they are ambitious in Poland's potential role in foreign relations and within the EU.

Questions about the validity and projected success of the European experiment in the form of the EU have abounded. The western countries that began the EU seemed to give it a good reputation and image, but many scholars were skeptical about whether the newly democratized Central and Eastern European countries would be able to function and succeed without taking everyone else down with them. This brought out discussions of the meaning of "Europe" and how the CEECs were to return to it. Scholars of Central Europe fight to convince everyone else of the area's western roots, but there is much doubt that this is actually true. This discussion is quite similar to the debate on Turkey. Poland and Turkey are very different, but issues of identity and belonging run deep for both countries.

The Polish political elite are still trying to find its place in the “new” Europe. As one of the more successful East European countries, Polish leaders are working toward even more clout and power. One of the ways Poland can get ahead could be through Turkey. But the elite are not taking the lead on this issue in the region. This project is meant to decipher exactly what the elites are saying on the topic of Turkey and whether it is helping or hurting them politically and, in terms of real power. In the end recommendations will be made on the basis of history, culture economy and the theories discussed above. In the next chapter, I will discuss the history of Polish-Turkish relations, from their beginning to the present.

Chapter Three

Polish- Turkish relations

Considering how expansive the Ottoman Empire was, there is no doubt at the continued relations between today's Turkey with the countries in the Balkans, in the Middle East and even with Russia. A multitude of studies have discussed this particular topic. Despite the fact that it is not widely known or studied, throughout the Ottoman Empire's history it also had political and economic ties with Poland. Turkey and Poland still have friendly diplomatic ties. Although one country does not automatically remind someone of the other, the historical relations between these countries are quite fascinating, and have run long throughout history.

On the level of elites, the historical connections are fairly well-known but rarely used in the discourse between the two countries. Major events that have influenced their relations are often brought up in meetings and speeches. Knowledge of this history allows for the political elites of both Poland and Turkey to feel a sense of camaraderie which, undoubtedly, helps in political and economic relations. Although this study does not focus specifically on the Polish public, it is beneficial to mention that most Polish people do not know about the depth and length of relations between Poland and Turkey. What they seem to focus on are the negative aspects of the relations, and do not realize how generally positive they have been. The same can be said of the general public—not many people know about Turkish-Polish relations. Hopefully, this chapter will remedy that.

The first diplomatic contact between the Kingdom of Poland and the Ottoman Empire was in 1414, according to the histories of Jan Długosz, a prolific writer of Polish history and international relations. In that year, Poland's Hungarian-born king Zygmunt sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan to begin a new period of relations. An envoy including Skarbek z Góry and

Grzegorz Ormianin was sent to the Sultan's palace.³⁵ Polish-Ottoman relations were first based around Hungary, whose borders the Ottomans and Poles shared as neighbors. Since 1386, when Poland and Lithuania were united under Władysław Jagiełło, "Polish expansion directly followed the course of the international trade route connecting Europe with Central Asia and China leading from Venice and Nuremburg through Cracow and Lwów to the Moldavian ports of Akkerman and Kilia."³⁶ The Ottoman Empire extended west and north. As a result the two political powers were neighbors.

Although the diplomatic relations began in 1414, the first treaty between the two states was not signed until 1489.³⁷ In general, the relations between the two were good, although Hungarian territories and ports were the cause of a few conflicts early on in the political relationship. When Zygmunt Stary took the Polish throne in 1506, at the age of 40, and ruled until 1548, his rule happened to coincide with the 'classical era' of the Ottoman Empire under Süleyman the Magnificent. "Friendly relations between these rulers formed the basis of a political equilibrium that lasted in Central Eastern Europe throughout the 16th century."³⁸

It was the 17th century that contained the most tension between the Poles and Turks. In that time, four wars were fought between the two autocracies. In 1620, the first war began as the Ottomans viewed Polish involvement in Moldavia an encroachment into their own sphere of influence. In 1621, a Polish-Lithuanian-Cossack army was able to withhold the advances of the Ottoman army. In the treaty that followed, no border changes were made but Poland agreed to stop interfering in Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania and Hungary.³⁹ The border dispute was

³⁵ "Polonyahılar ve Türkler ilk ne zaman ve nerede karşılaştılar?" Polonya Cumhuriyeti Büyükelçiliği Ankara, <http://www.ankara.polemb.net/?document=98> (last accessed June 7, 2012).

³⁶ Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th-18th Century): An Annotated Edition of 'Adnames and Other Documents* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2000), 99.

³⁷ Ibid., 110.

³⁸ Ibid., 113.

³⁹ Ibid., 132.

never quite solved, however. In 1633, another fight began. As the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth fought with the Russians, who had broken an armistice with them, there were scuffles near the Dnieper River, the designated border between the Ottoman Empire and Poland. Tatars, Turks, Cossacks, Poles and Russians were involved as one group pillaged another. In the end, because the Sultan admitted that he knew nothing of his underlings' doings, the treaty between the Poles and Turks was extended.

The rest of the 17th century was not turning out well for the Poles. The Cossacks became an even bigger problem when they organized a huge uprising, causing the Russian Empire and Poland to fight over Ukraine. Even worse, Poland went to war with Sweden; the onslaught of war was so bad it was considered a “Potop” or a Deluge. Polish forces could not keep up with the Swedish onslaught. In light of these problems for Poland, the Turks decided to attack their weak neighbor. There were many reasons for this not-so-noble act against Poland. Strategically, it seemed like the right thing to do for the Ottoman Empire. The Cossacks continued to be a problem for the Turks; if they could control the region, they could control this unruly group of people. With the province of Podolia under their control, the Ottomans could also have a stronger hold over the Crimean Khanate, their own protectorate state. For Sultan Mehmet IV the fight also had the advantage of keeping his troops in shape.⁴⁰ After more than a week of heavy bombardment, the Poles decided to surrender. In the treaty signed between the Poles and Turks, the province of Podolia was ceded to the Ottoman Empire, but Cossack Ukraine remained autonomous under Ottoman protection. Lipka Tatars were allowed to immigrate to Ottoman lands with their families and property.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Ibid., 145-146.

⁴¹ Ibid., 148.

While the Poles nursed their wounds from the multiple blows given out by their neighbors, the Ottomans were moving deeper into Europe. In 1683, as the Ottomans tried to fight their way into Vienna, a coalition representing several different countries, including King Jan Sobieski III of Poland, tried to beat them down. They were successful and the Ottomans' advance was halted in Vienna; they were never able to expand their forces or control further than at that time. In the years that followed, several European states finally had the ability to decide the fate of the Ottomans instead of being wary of their actions. The Treaty of Karlowitz, signed in 1699, reestablished the prewar border between the Ottoman Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This treaty, concluded by Austria, Venice and Poland, is considered one of the most important peace treaties of modern European history. It was one of the first limits put onto the Ottomans, who seemed to be unstoppable before. Austria was the biggest winner in this treaty—it annexed valuable and large territories including Transylvania, parts of Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia that had been under Ottoman control.⁴² Russia signed a separate treaty with the Ottomans in 1700 but their relationship continued to be strained, since the Russian Empire was interested in the Ottoman's continued demise and its own rise. From this point on, the Ottomans would find themselves on the defensive.

Despite the ugliness of war and battles, Turkish and Polish relations were positive in the following years. This show of friendship was a comfort, no matter how small, to the Poles who were facing another kind of unpleasantness. Poles had a rough relationship with their Russian neighbors who had their own visions of expansion. Before the first partition of Poland, the Ottomans supported the unrest in Poland against the “Russian” candidate for king, and the Russians' general interference in the region. Peter the Great in Russia at first was not interested

⁴² Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries Volume I* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 65.

in the Ottoman Empire, focusing his war efforts on the Baltics. Nevertheless, he eventually became quite ambitious, launching a campaign for the Balkans, getting as far as Iasi.⁴³ The Ottomans were able to keep the Russians at bay. As the middle of the 18th century approached, the Ottoman Empire grew more and more concerned over the situation in Poland. They, along with the French, did not want to see Poland under Russian control.

While the rest of Europe was preoccupied with war and infighting the Ottomans enjoyed a time of peace. The balance of power on the continent rested at this time on three major figures: Catherine the Great in Russia, Maria Theresa of Austria and Frederick the Great of Prussia. And they were all problems for the Poles. Catherine the Great already had a strong hold on Poland. She had influenced the vote for king through force. Stanisław Poniatowski, Catherine's lover, became king in 1764.⁴⁴ Although Poniatowski had great ambitions for the reconstruction of Poland, the empress of Russia only saw him as a puppet—she would get what she wanted. In 1768, among many new arrangements forced onto Poland by Russia, "...the Poles were made to accept a Russian guarantee of their laws and constitution, and even for their territory, binding them hand and foot to their seemingly irresistible neighbor."⁴⁵ As a result of all the foreign meddling, Polish nobles formed an association at the Confederation of Bar, and led an uprising against the outside control. The initial uprising was easily crushed by the Russians, but the Confederation of Bar "opened the way to four years of civil and guerrilla warfare, with uncontrollable international repercussions."⁴⁶

Concerned about their ally in Poland, and urged by the French and Crimean Tartars, the Ottomans declared war on Russia in 1768. This war turned out to be disastrous for the Ottoman

⁴³ Ibid., 66.

⁴⁴ Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, *A Concise History of Poland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 115.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 116.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Empire, ending in the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, signed in 1774. “It was a major military and diplomatic disaster for the Ottoman Empire, since it marked a complete change in the power balance in the Black Sea region.”⁴⁷ The Turks lost control of the Crimea, along with other important areas. The Poles could sense impending disaster and hoped to talk to their Turkish allies. But, after the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca was forced on the Ottomans, the envoy on the way to Moscow was not allowed contact with the Poles.⁴⁸ The Turks were not the only ones to suffer. Although the Russians gained many naval and military victories, the struggle caused Russia a lot of strain. The Barists could not be easily taken care of, as a result.

Seeing the Russians struggle, Frederick of Prussia approached Catherine with an idea to help get rid of their Polish problem. This is the moment in history where the partitions of Poland really began. Russia, Prussia and Austria signed several bilateral agreements that divided Poland among themselves. Russia would still control what remained of Poland, at least until Poland ceased to exist. The Poles tried but could not resist the partition of their own country; they did not have the money or the troops to do anything about it. In 1795, the final partition of Poland by the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians officially ended Poland’s existence. Although the Ottoman Empire was having its own troubles, they found it disadvantageous to the balance of power for Poland to be erased from the map. They did not do anything about it, however, and diplomatic relations officially ended between the two countries.

At the time of Poland’s partitions, until the First World War, Turkish Polish relations took on an interesting character. Officially, there was no Poland to have relations with, but the Ottomans still supported their Polish friends. First, the Ottoman Empire never acknowledged the partitions. It is hard to determine whether this story is just a myth, or whether it has some truth to

⁴⁷ Jelavich, 69.

⁴⁸ Kołodziejczyk, 164.

it, but it is quoted by both Turkish and Polish sources. There are several variations but they all illustrate the same point. Whenever the Ottoman's held international meetings at the Turkish court, someone would ask, "where is the Polish ambassador?" or someone would announce that the "Polish ambassador has not yet arrived," further explained by the slowness of travel due to lack of roads.⁴⁹ However it actually happened, the story illustrates that the Turks were not interested in abandoning their Polish allies. The Turks did not like or trust the Russians anyway, but especially after they helped orchestrate the division of Poland. Friendly relations between the Turks and Poles during the time of partition helped to cement relations into the 21st century. Another interesting aspect to Turkish-Polish relations was the flow of Polish immigrants into the territories of the Ottoman Empire, including Istanbul. The Ottoman Empire became a refuge for Poles who wanted to get together with others and plan for the resurgence of Poland. A surprising number of Poles chose to stay in Turkey, some even converting to Islam.⁵⁰

Here would be the appropriate place to discuss some of these immigrants, including those who chose to live in Adampol or Polonezköy. To this day, Polonezköy exists as an example of Polish life in an Istanbul suburb. Located on the Asian side of the city, Polonezköy was created as a refuge for Poles who did not want to serve in the Russian army and those who had been sold into slavery while fighting in the Caucasus and subsequently freed by the Lazarists.⁵¹ Adam Czartoryski came up with this project after the failed Polish insurrection in 1830-31. As a result, the Polish name for the village (Adampol) is in honor of him. Czartoryski was a magnate and diplomat. He had participated in the Great Emigration to Paris, where many others of the Polish

⁴⁹ Głogowska; Kołodziejczyk; also Suat Kiniklioğlu, "Where is the Polish Ambassador?" *Today's Zaman*, January 27, 2012.

⁵⁰ See Kołodziejczyk; see also Jerzy Łatka, *Słownik Polaków w Imperium Osmańskim i Republice Turcji* (Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005) and Jerzy S. Łatka, *Carogrodzki Pojedynek* (Cracow: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1985).

⁵¹ Łatka, *Słownik Polaków*, s.v. "Adampol."

aristocracy and elites escaped to live and plot for a revolution to get Poland back. Nevertheless, he was involved in Ottoman politics and saw the Ottomans as important allies. Many of the Ottoman politicians viewed Czartoryski as a true representative of the Polish emigration and the immigrant community.⁵²

After the failure of the 1830-31 insurrection, Czartoryski was sentenced to death and so moved to Paris, where he eventually bought the Hotel Lambert, a hotel of course, but also an important political salon where revolutionaries met. There Michael Czaykowski, also exiled after the failed insurrection, met Czartoryski. Czaykowski became the man on the ground in Turkey, working with anti-Russian groups. The Russians demanded his extradition to Russia but having converted to Islam, Czaykowski was able to stay in Turkey.⁵³ Mehmet Sadık Paşa was his new name and he was given the title of Ottoman general, despite the fact he did not have military training. Although he was a great figure during his time in Turkey, Czaykowski made amends with the Russians, moved to Moscow, and ended up offending the Turks. Throughout his political career, he believed in a united, nationalist Poland, that included Ukraine. He had romantic notions about nationalism. Unfortunately, he ended up taking his own life.

Another important figure of Polish nationalism to move to Istanbul was the Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz. Sent on a diplomatic mission to the Ottoman Empire in 1855, Mickiewicz was charged with studying the science and literature of the Greco-Slavic countries of the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁴ But he also wanted to help the military efforts of the Turkish against the Russians in the Crimean War. He, along with several other Polish political figures in Constantinople, tried to convince the Cossacks who had moved out of Poland into the Ottoman

⁵² Ibid., s.v. "Czartoryski."

⁵³ Ibid., s.v. "Czaykowski."

⁵⁴ Ibid., s.v. "Mickiewicz."

Empire to help fight against the Russians.⁵⁵ Mickiewicz lived in Constantinople only three months before he died, but Poles have romanticized his life there ever since. Because Mickiewicz is such a beloved figure in Poland, it is meaningful to the Poles that Istanbul is where he died. His wooden house was rebuilt with concrete and brick and turned into a museum that still exists today.

Groups of Poles were struggling to find a way to reconstitute the country that they lost. During this time, the Ottomans were going through a transitional period of their own. The pressure was building as the European powers grew in size and strength, and the Ottomans seemed to lag behind. There is a popular quote allegedly uttered by Czar Nicholas II that the Ottoman Empire was the “sick man of Europe” and although that is not really what he said,⁵⁶ the Ottomans had to deal with problems of collapsing infrastructure and losing control of its territories. This time it was Poland that did not want to see the Ottoman Empire be dismantled. Having been torn apart by its neighbors, Poland needed a strong ally that had the same enemies.

At the time of the Balkan Wars, a group of Poles became ardent and vocal supporters of the Turks. In his treatise on the relations between Turks and Poles, S.T. Gasztowtt did not hold back. Although the Balkan Wars had awakened anti-Turkish feelings among some Poles, Gasztowtt and others were reminded of the close ties they really had. Gasztowtt mentions how the Poles had always been drawn to the East in terms of architecture and clothes (Sarmatism) and the Turkish influence on the Polish language. To Gasztowtt and those in his group, the attack and dismantling of the Ottoman Empire was reminiscent of the partitions of Poland.⁵⁷ Gasztowtt expressed the radical opinion that the Serbian plan to divide up the land in the Balkans was to

⁵⁵ S.T. Gasztowtt, *Turcya a Polska* (Paris: Drukarnia Polska A. Reiffa-Heymann, 1913), 15.

⁵⁶ For an incredibly interesting discussion of this topic, see Dimitris Livanios, “The ‘sick man’ paradox: history, rhetoric and the ‘European character’ of Turkey.” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 8 (2006): 299-311.

⁵⁷ Danuta Chmielowska, *Polsko-Tureckie Stosunki Dyplomatyczne w Okresie Międzywojennym* (Warsaw: DIALOG Wydawnictwo Akademickie, 2006), 34.

wage a war for possession, *not* for independence.⁵⁸ They were against Turks and Muslims and were going to do anything to take out their frustration on them. Gasztowtt felt passionately about the goodness of the Turks, but there were more reasons for the Poles to support the Turks than just cultural ones. Poles saw an ally in Turkey—once it was formed. They were also worried about the Russians taking control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.⁵⁹

By this point in time in the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks had taken over the Ottoman government. This group had benefitted from the education reforms in *Tanzimat*, which revived universities in Istanbul; as a result, their movement had a broad social basis.⁶⁰ They were interested in spreading European civilization in their country, but wanted to keep the Empire independent. There was a threat of losing independence if they opened themselves too much to foreign influences, as history had shown the Turks before. The Young Turks saw that their economy was suffering and was backward. Unsuccessfully the Young Turks approached the British and the French to make a deal. The British and French were not interested in working with the Turks as the threat of war loomed. In the end the Young Turks negotiated with the Germans, thinking they were protecting their state from the impending conflict but instead became a major part of it. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the Polish territories, two competing groups and ideologies caused tensions especially in problems of foreign policy. On the one side, followers of the nationalist Roman Dmowski thought that the Germans were the biggest problem for a reestablished Poland. On the other side, Józef Piłsudski and his cohort strongly believed that the Russians were their biggest enemy. Piłsudski and the socialist party took control of politics in Poland. Their goal was to get Poland back to what is once was as a commonwealth of three nations.

⁵⁸ Gasztowtt, 18-19

⁵⁹ Chmielowska, 34.

⁶⁰ Alan Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (London: John Murray, 1992), 220.

As the storm of war was brewing, the Russians made their deal with England and France, which promised them most of the Ottoman Empire. The deal stipulated that if the Entente won, Russia would get control of Istanbul, the Bosphorus, the western edge of the Marmara Sea, southern Thrace and the islands on the Marmara Sea.⁶¹ Piłsudski saw that Turkey's enemy was also the Russians and so targeted the Turks for support of Polish independence. Piłsudski came up with a plan to create a Central-Eastern European bloc to counterbalance German and Russian Imperialism; this plan included Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.⁶² With the outbreak of WWI, not much could have been done to complete this project. Piłsudski did send a journalist friend to stoke support for the Polish cause among Poles and Turks.⁶³ Some of the Poles living in Istanbul were eager to help rebuild their country, but some who lived in Adampol had no interest in politics. They led the village life and no matter how many promises were made to them, they could not leave the land they had lived and worked on for so many years.

During WWI, Poles from the German area of Poland and the Turks fought on the same side. The end of the war was a turning point for both groups. Poland finally regained its independence in 1918 after a long absence from any map. The Ottoman Empire had been defeated and it was to be included in the spoils of war for the winners. Concerned about the status of his country, Mustafa Kemal took control of the situation. Before becoming "Atatürk," Kemal served in the Ottoman armies as the Empire tried to hold itself together while the different peoples within the Empire rebelled in the name of nationalism and culture. Despite all of his successes on the frontlines, Kemal grew restless because of the ideological boundaries he faced in Istanbul, where "the Sultan and his friends were strongly opposed to all nationalist ideologies,

⁶¹ Chmielowska, 42.

⁶² Ibid., 46.

⁶³ Ibid., 45.

which they held responsible for the misfortunes that had befallen the Empire.”⁶⁴ They tried disbanding the Turkish forces and laid still as the Allies encroached on the Armistice terms; Kemal saw all of this as a selfish and cowardly ploy to keep power. The rumblings of a nationalist resistance movement echoed in Anatolia while the Allies and the Sultan began making terms for the new Turkish state. When the head of the military heard of Mustafa Kemal’s involvement in the movement in Anatolia, he demanded that Kemal return to Istanbul immediately. Kemal, instead, resigned from his commission and took off the military uniform.⁶⁵ He became the leader of the rebellion against the Ottoman status quo. Support for the Sultan turned against him when word spread that the Treaty of Sevres had been signed, which would have left Turkey a mere skeleton of its former self. As a result, Kemal and his supporters could focus on the war with the Greeks, which was another set of tough battles. On October 11, 1922, an armistice was signed between the Turks and British, who were the last of the Allies occupying the Dardanelles. “By its terms, the Allied governments agreed to a restoration of Turkish sovereignty in Istanbul, the Straits, and eastern Thrace...;”⁶⁶ the Greeks eventually acceded to the armistice. Turkey’s complete sovereignty under an undivided state was secured at the peace conference of Lausanne in 1923.

Atatürk and Piłsudski had a lot in common—both were fierce defenders of their respective countries and hated the idea of the imperialist intentions of some neighbors, including the Russians. Before the Second World War, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Poland were officially established and the two were generally supportive of each other. When WWII did begin, Turkey chose a neutral stance, not wanting to participate in the conflict. Nevertheless,

⁶⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 245.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 248.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 254.

Turkey did not break diplomatic relations with Poland, despite pressures from Hitler to do so.⁶⁷ Relations between the two countries slowed down but still existed when Poland came under the control of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence. Turkey had its own issues of democratization and modernization, experiencing several military coups intended to safeguard the secular nature of the government.

Since 1989, when Poland began its own democratization process, political relations with Turkey have strengthened. Turkey, as a member of NATO already, strongly supported Poland's aspirations to the organization in the late 1990s.⁶⁸ When Poland became a member of the EU in 2004, the two countries became economically connected via the Customs Union, which Turkey is already a part of despite not being a member. Because of this connection, trade has increased quite dynamically. The volume of trade practically tripled from 2 million USD in 2004 to 5.6 million USD in 2011.⁶⁹ There is considerable foreign investment on the part of both countries, which will more than likely continue growing in the coming years. Within the last decade, Poland has become a supporter of Turkey's bid for membership to the EU. But, as has been discussed, Poland seems to only be sharing words and not actions. The following chapter will describe the problems that Turkey has faced in its accession process and compare its experience to that of Poland's. This will give a clearer picture of the troubles Turkey has faced in its

⁶⁷ Justyna Głogowska, "Poland-Turkey Relations: Friendship at a distance," Bilgesam Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies, http://www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=442:poland-turkey-relations-friendship-at-a-distance&catid=70:ab-analizler&Itemid=131 (last accessed June 2012).

⁶⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relations between Turkey and Poland," Republic of Turkey, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-poland.en.mfa> (last accessed July 14, 2012). See also Dr. Wojciech Forsysinski and Przemysław Osiewicz "The EU-Turkey Accession Negotiations from the Polish Perspective: Allies or Competitors?" (conference paper presented at the Third Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Istanbul, Turkey, September 21-23, 2006), 2.

⁶⁹ Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, "Informator ekonomiczny o krajach świata: Turcja" <http://www.ms.gov.pl/files/Informator%20ekonomiczny%20-%20pdf/Turcja/Turcja%2004.pdf> (last accessed June 2012), 2.

accession process and contextualize their situation with Poland's. This will also give the reader a better idea of what Poland's role could be in Turkey's EU accession proceedings.

Chapter Four

The Road to the European Union

In order to understand where both Poland and Turkey stand internationally and how they relate with one another today, it is pertinent to discuss their respective experiences with the European Union. Much of their modern identity and history has been greatly influenced by this organization. Looking at these particular countries makes for an interesting comparison when it comes to their journeys towards membership in the EU. In previous such comparisons, scholars have highlighted some similarities between the two, including the role of religion and nationalism in each country, as well as their size in relation to neighbors; Poland was the biggest member to want to join in its cohort and Turkey's size has been discussed, as well. Poland is now the 6th largest EU member. Once Turkey joins it would be the second largest member—second only to Germany but growing much faster. This chapter will try to synthesize the information revolving around accession procedures for membership in the EU, and will compare Poland's and Turkey's dealings with the supranational organization.

Poland's history as a democratic state has been quite recent compared to Turkey's. Their histories diverged once the Soviet Union took over the eastern bloc of Europe. While Poland was left behind the Iron Curtain, dealing with imposed communist rule, Turkey was beginning its long relationship with the EU. For the Polish government and its people, 1989 was a pivotal year. It marked the beginning of change and the so-called "return to Europe." Although Turkey never had to deal with a communist regime, it too has dealt with political transitions which have affected its relationship with the EU. For example, several times in the course of Turkey's modern history the military conducted a coup on the government in the name of protecting the secular state. Turkey has been involved with the EU since 1959, yet has to follow many of the

rules and restrictions that had been created in light of the Central and Eastern European countries' desire to join the EU. Since Poland is now a member, it may be too easy to assume that it did not have many problems in its accession process, but it was definitely not easy at first. Turkey's experiences with the EU are a bit complicated and will be discussed first.

Turkey's history with the EU

It would be an understatement to say that Turkey's journey to EU accession has been a long one. If the 1959 date is used as the start of the process when Turkey applied for associate membership to the European Economic Community (EEC), the country has been waiting 53 years for full membership (as of 2012). Thus far, the average wait time for a candidate country to become a member of the EU has been 9 or 10 years.⁷⁰ But it looks as though Turkey will need to wait even longer, because there is no sign that 2014 or any year soon, will be the one to bring its total membership in the European Union. The accession process really has been a complicated battle for Turkey. Of course, becoming a member of the EU is supposed to be a process, and the institution warns that accession does not happen overnight for any country. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Turkey has been a special case for the EU.

As mentioned above, Turkey applied for associate membership in 1959. In 1963, the Ankara Agreement was signed between Turkey and the EEC. The Agreement aimed to bring Turkey into a Customs Union with the organization, and eventually was meant to be a step to full membership for Turkey. In 1987, Turkey made an application for full EEC membership and a decade later, at the Luxembourg European Council, it was declared eligible to become a member of the European Union. It is important to realize that there were many good consequences—such

⁷⁰ Armağan Emre Çakır, "Introduction" in *Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story*, ed. Armağan Emre Çakır (London: Routledge, 2011), 1.

as reform and progress—because Turkey was involved with the EU for such a long time. “The depth of the relationship that developed during the period 1963-1999, until the time when Turkey was formally recognized as a candidate for full membership, should not be underestimated.”⁷¹ However, according to some, the relationship between the two until that point was not sufficiently deep to make a significant impact on Turkey’s economy or path to democracy and therefore did not advance the EU accession process. The elites wanted to keep Turkey as an economic ally, but would not make any promises when it came to membership. A pivotal moment in the accession process occurred in 1999 when the EU Helsinki Council recognized Turkey as a candidate country on equal footing with all the other candidate countries. Because of this recognition, the EU’s credibility greatly improved, showing the Turkish elites the process may not end up being futile. As a result the reform process within the country was accelerated. However, no timetable had been decided on at this point. Not until the end of 2004 were the accession negotiations opened by the European Council.⁷² Within all these checkpoints of the process lay many problems in Turkey’s EU accession. The back and forth struggle between the EU and Turkey has involved many factors, from the foundations of the accession process, to identity and border issues.

A core problem lies with the basics. The current foundation of EU membership is the Copenhagen Criteria which are the conditions for enlargement. Before any negotiations are started, the candidate country must meet these conditions, which were put in place by the European Council in December 1993 in Copenhagen. The Copenhagen Criteria (CC) require a candidate country to have

⁷¹ Ziya Öniş, “Turkey’s encounters with the new Europe: multiple transformation, inherent dilemmas and the challenges ahead,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 8 (2006), 281.

⁷² European Commission, “EU- Turkey relations,” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (last updated January 7, 2011).

stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the pressure of competition and the market forces at work inside the Union; the ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union.⁷³

Since the establishment of these criteria, more conditions have been added in order to clarify and specify exactly what the EU needs from its potential members, including requiring that, with continued expansion, the EU needs to be able to cope with the integration of new members. As the elite in Turkey understands, “the Copenhagen Criteria (CC), originally drafted for the benefit of former communist countries in Eastern Europe in an effort to facilitate their transition to liberal democracy and eventual accession to the EU, have now become the principle guidelines for all potential candidates seeking accession to the EU.”⁷⁴ Some have argued that Turkey has met these criteria, and so, should be allowed to proceed and become a member of the European Union. Others are not as convinced.

In the case of Turkey, it is obvious that, although the CC is the basis for EU membership, more rests behind the debate. In fact, even after 1999 when Turkey became an official candidate country, the debate still centered on *whether* it should be a member, not *how* it was going to happen.⁷⁵ The truth is that all the political debate negatively affects the EU’s image and credibility in the eyes of the Turks. “If the Union’s right hand lectures Turkey on the Copenhagen criteria arguing that these are the *sine qua non* for EU entry, while the left hand engages in highly politicized and often populist debates over the desirability of Turkey’s entry,

⁷³ European Commission “Conditions for Enlargement,” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm (last updated January 30, 2012).

⁷⁴ Ozay Mehmet, “Turkey and the European Union: A Troubled Relationship or a Historic Partnership?” in *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics*, eds. Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydin (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), 42.

⁷⁵ Nathalie Tocci, “Elite opinion dimension. Behind the scenes of Turkey’s protracted accession process: European elite debate” in *Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean story*, ed. Armağan Emre Çakır (London: Routledge, 2011), 83.

the Union's credibility in Turkey risks being seriously undermined.”⁷⁶ There is concern over this very thing. In a 2011 poll, support for the EU among young Turks dropped to 47.2% from 74% in 2005.⁷⁷ Turkey might pull away from working with the EU and may turn to the Middle East, a thought that concerns many scholars and some of the EU elite. Nevertheless, the different levels of debate have formed and continue to shape Turkey's future in the EU.

Those in power in Europe, as well as the general public, have had much to say on the topic of Turkey's accession. Their opinions have greatly influenced Turkey's journey into the EU. Those against Turkey's membership have focused on how “un-European” Turkey is. The opposition also cites all of the ways Turkey is not ready for membership, including that Turkey's economy has not improved enough and that its accession will cause a mass migration of Anatolian peasants into Europe, which would cause problems for Europe's welfare system. Mainly, however, they argue that most of Turkey is not on the European continent and although it can make itself fit into the European mold, so could any country; they argue that “...Europe is a community of values, not only a bundle of financial clauses and legal frameworks.”⁷⁸ The people in Turkey, as well as their supporters, would not agree, however, that “values” are exclusive to the European Union. The Turkish government is prepared to implement the Copenhagen Criteria, and actually has made the changes necessary to implement them, especially in recent years, but the Turks do not see the CC as particular to the EU—they see them as universal criteria for any modern nation.⁷⁹ Although Turkey is a Muslim country, the values that have driven the country are not exclusive to religion. Throughout the 20th century, the concept of modernity has been essential for Turkey and its identity. Even the transition from the

⁷⁶ Ibid., 88.

⁷⁷ “Turkish Support for EU Membership Drops Further,” *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, May 30, 2012.

⁷⁸ Livanios, 302.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey allowed for extensive westernization and modernization while sustaining Turkish religious and cultural differences. From this perspective, it is obvious that Turkey would want to fulfill the conditions of membership, and be considered a modern nation, like the other countries of Europe.

Opposition and support for Turkey's EU accession forms a multifaceted debate among the elite. Different levels of the debate exist. In the global context, Turkey's accession is generally deemed positive by scholars and some elites across Europe and other parts of the world, especially in regards to foreign policy and the economy. In terms of the national level, individual countries have differing opinions; Germany and Austria have the lowest opinion of Turkey's EU accession while Romania has the highest.⁸⁰ On the intermediate level is the European context, which deals directly with how the supranational organization could handle Turkey's accession. In terms of the EU's institutions, the opposition thinks that EU could not handle integrating another country, especially one as big and impoverished as Turkey.⁸¹ Furthermore, the elite doubt that Turkey fits the European identity, as was mentioned above. Much of the opposition to Turkey's EU membership has focused so much on how Turkey is not European; yet, the opposition has never specified what Turkey actually *is*. For them, Turkey does not share the European "heritage" which is defined by the combination of Christianity, Roman law and ancient Greek philosophy. Of course, this definition makes it difficult *not* to include Turkey, because these elements "were not confined to the geographical limits of the continent"⁸² when they were created and developed. To put it bluntly, as many would probably agree, "the use of 'geography' to construct a 'cultural' and 'historical' point about 'Europe' is an

⁸⁰ Gerhards and Hans, 746.

⁸¹ Tocci, 86.

⁸² Livanios, 304.

unrewarding undertaking.”⁸³ Nevertheless, the issue of borders and identity, including culture, religion and history, heavily influence the arguments against Turkey’s EU accession.

Support for Turkey has been framed by the benefits to the economy and foreign policy. Turkey is cited to be a great ally in the war on terror and a leader in the Middle East, as well as a large market with a growing economy.⁸⁴ In many ways, Turkey functions as the best example of a secular Islamic state and as such, an important buffer for the EU. Before accession negotiations began in 2004, a substantial pro-Turkey coalition formed, which was comprised of different elements. First, in terms of political parties, Social Democrats have been supportive of Turkey’s EU accession—“Turkish membership appeared to make much more sense for most if not all social democrats given their vision of a multi-cultural Europe as long as an essential pre-condition was satisfied, the pre-condition being that Turkey conformed to European norms of democracy and human rights.”⁸⁵ Second, different national perspectives on the function of the EU brought out more support for Turkey. For example, some countries within the EU view the organization as a loose collection of autonomous states while others see it to be a tightly bound supranational entity; those of the former persuasion greatly support Turkey’s EU accession. Britain, the Scandinavian countries and “the Eastern European newcomers to the Union in May 2004 also subscribe to a similar vision of a comparatively loose, intergovernmental Europe”⁸⁶ and so are quite supportive of Turkey’s bid in the EU. Poland fits within this framework. Along the same lines, national perspectives about Turkey may differ because of experiences with Turkish immigration. Countries that already have Turkish immigrant populations, such as Germany and Austria, are worried about an even greater influx of people if Turkey were to

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 301.

⁸⁵ Öniş, “Turkey’s encounters,” 290.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

become an EU member. In countries where Turkish immigration is not currently a problem, like Poland and the UK, such worries are dormant, and may flare up with immigration⁸⁷ or might not at all. Another part of the support network, Britain and Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, also support a strong transatlantic relationship with the US while France and Germany were, and to some extent still are, critical of the Iraq War and the United States' unilateral decision-making. Turkey also has had a strong relationship with the US. For the reason of sheer numbers and being able to outweigh their opponents, the transatlanticists have been supportive of Turkey's bid for membership into the EU.⁸⁸

There are numerous other points of contention surrounding Turkey's membership in the EU that bear at least mentioning, although they cannot be discussed in detail in the particular study. One of them is the problem of Cyprus and Greece. Once Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974, and the country was partitioned, Turkey's prospects for full membership were adversely affected.⁸⁹ Although Cyprus has been admitted into the EU, Turkey's accession negotiations have been stalled because of the country's attitude towards Cyprus, refusing to do what the EU demands with respect to relations with Cyprus. One of the main issues was that Turkey refused to allow Cypriot boats to dock in Turkish ports and planes to land on Turkish runways. This issue has led to a serious impasse in terms of accession negotiations. The issue of the Armenian genocide has also worked against Turkey, especially as west European countries have started to demand acknowledgement of the event as a genocide, most recently France. This topic has influenced many important people in the European Union and so has caused some foreign relations problems for Turkey.

⁸⁷ Tocci, 90.

⁸⁸ Öniş, "Turkey's encounters," 291.

⁸⁹ Ziya Öniş, "Diverse but Converging Paths to European Union Membership: Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective" *East European Politics and Societies* 18 (2004): 490.

Domestically, Turkey has had problems with the military and with its Kurdish population.⁹⁰ The Kurds are an ethnic minority in Turkey, concentrated in the south eastern region of the country. The Turkish government has dealt with terrorist violence on the part of the Kurdish separatists, who want their own country and who do not feel equal to the Turks within Turkey. As the Turkish government has followed the criteria of the EU and has become more tolerant of minorities, the issue has not been totally resolved. EU elites are convinced that Turkey has not done enough to be in line with the western European standards of human and minority rights. Since the EU builds its reputation on tolerance and respect for human rights, this issue has stalled the EU process, as well.

Another domestic issue Turkey has dealt with involves the military. The political role of Turkey's military has an interesting history. Ever since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Turkish Republic in the 1920s, the military has viewed itself as the protector of secularism and "Kemalism" in the country. Four times in Turkey's history the military has intervened, overthrown the government and closed down political parties it thought to be too Islamist or not laicist enough. However, with the rise of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) or the AKP, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the military has been all but pushed out of the democratic process.

In recent years, one of the biggest changes in Turkey- EU relations has come from the Turkish side, with the election of the AKP into power. Erdoğan and his party have been the most motivated and the most successful when it comes to following EU demands in the democratization process. Although this has been a positive step for Turkey, it has not soothed all of the problems discussed above. Political leaders within and outside of Turkey fear the AKP to be too Islamist and that Erdoğan and his ilk will lead Turkey away from Westernization and the

⁹⁰ Ananicz, 33-36.

EU. This is where Turkey stands within the EU today. As mentioned before, on the Turkish side, there is a sense of incredulity that the EU and its political elites are stalling the accession process. Public support for EU accession is waning and Turkey has grown into its role of leader in the Middle East. Some progress, however, has been made as Turkey forms to the EU mold.

Poland's history with the EU

Poland's path to EU membership was much different than Turkey's has been, and officially culminated with its accession into the organization in May 2004, along with many other post-communist Eastern European states. Although it might be easy to assume that Poland's accession process was smooth since it achieved membership, it is important to remember that it really was not. It might not have been as bad as Turkey's experience but Poland too had many changes to make in order to fit into the mold that the EU created. Fighting for recognition and inclusion in Europe has been a marker of Poland's history. Several times in its history Poland was unfairly ignored and excluded by the powerful. The history of Poland has been a tumultuous one, with wars and partitions literally erasing the country from the map. Once the First World War was over and Poland was able to regain its independence in 1918, the fight for unity and recognition was thought to have been won. World War II and its aftermath dashed the hopes of many as Poland was attacked from both sides by the Nazis and the Soviets. The biggest blow came, however, when the western powers, including Britain and the United States, seemingly pushed it into the other side of the Iron Curtain. Although behind it, the Poles did not consider themselves outsiders or anything other than European; the communist regime did not fit within the Polish culture, and the Poles were quite vocal about it. It was a relief when communism did collapse in Poland, before it did in any other country. "Following the collapse of

communism, rapid and full integration into the economic, political, and security structures of the Western world such as NATO and the EU has become a priority for Poland's foreign policy."⁹¹

It can be argued whether Poland sought membership in the EU for the sole reason of being considered European but practically speaking, "the consensus was that the road to economic recovery and the institutionalization of liberal democracy lay through membership" in NATO and the EC.⁹²

Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) were changing quickly with the end of communism. The "return to Europe" is a common phrase used for this region when referring to the accession process, but there is something to be said for it, especially in terms of standards and norms that had been developed in the CEECs long absence. In previous enlargements, the supranational organization dealt with already well-established and well-functioning democracies; their economic systems were also established as capitalist and western oriented.⁹³ The newly post-communist states were only just beginning to develop all these important aspects of being a well-adjusted and highly developed European country. At first, when the CEECs expressed interest in becoming a part of the EU the organization was cautious—it offered practical technical and financial assistance to support the necessary reforms and somewhat normalized trade relations between the countries and the EU. This became known as the 'pre-accession strategy'⁹⁴ on the part of the EU—no promises were made to the CEECs but the doors were not completely closed off in terms of mutual relations. As mentioned in the case of Turkey, the Copenhagen Criteria were developed especially in the case of the CEECs because the EU never

⁹¹ Ibid., 486.

⁹² Karl Cordell, "Introduction: aims and objectives" in *Poland and the European Union* ed. Karl Cordell (London: Routledge, 2000), 3.

⁹³ Ronald Linden, "EU Accession and the Role of International Actors" in *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*, eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Ltd., 2011), 128.

⁹⁴ Jackie Gower, "EU policy to central and eastern Europe" in *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*, ed. Karen Henderson (London: UCL Press, 1999), 3.

had to deal with non-western oriented and poorly functioning democracies in previous enlargements. In this case, establishing the Copenhagen Criteria marked a turn in EU policy towards the CEECs because they were finally talking about *when* rather than *if* these countries could become members. Along with the Copenhagen Criteria, the applicants were obliged to accept and pass into legislation the code, practices and laws that were in place in the EU; these are referred to as the *acquis communautaire*. Beginning in 1998, yearly assessments were made of each individual state to judge whether it had done everything it needed to be in line with the standards. In the end, for most of the CEECs thirty-one chapters of standards were assessed and only when the chapters were ‘closed’—or deemed fulfilled—would membership be issued.⁹⁵ Most of the CEECs reached this point in 2002. On May 1, 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia acceded to the European Union. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007.

Within this overview of the 2004 enlargement of many CEE states there are many details and problems both sides encountered in the accession process. It may be easy to assume that the all of the countries had the same experience in accession but it would be a false assumption. Just like their experiences with communist rule, their experiences with the EU were not the same. In comparison to the rest of the CEECs applying for EU membership, Poland was, for the most part, favored by the supranational organization. There were differing concerns and opinions about whether Poland’s accession would benefit the EU: Poland was the biggest country out of the group and some felt that absorbing the smaller countries first would be better.⁹⁶ Despite these concerns, however, the European Community established diplomatic relations with Poland and they signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation on September 1989; Poland

⁹⁵ Linden, 129.

⁹⁶ Andrzej Podraza, “EU Eastern Enlargement and Poland” in *The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Efforts and Obstacles on the Way to Membership*, ed. Anselm Skuhra (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2005), 31.

submitted an official application in May 1990. Poland and the EU then signed the European Agreement in December 1991, which was ratified and finally came into force in 1994. This agreement provided “a legal framework for multilateral cooperation in economic, political and cultural sectors and promised to add impetus to Poland’s program of internal reform.”⁹⁷ Poland formally applied for full membership in April 1994. After the application was accepted at the Luxembourg Summit later that year, it was agreed that negotiations would formally begin in 1998. “What is important is that Poland ha[d] been provided with clear unambiguous signals at an early stage in its relations with the EU.”⁹⁸ While this may be somewhat true, as was mentioned above, the EU was not necessarily sure what to do with Poland and the rest of its cohort when it first thought about the accession process with so many candidates. The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, failed to address some of the most basic issues in adjusting the EU system, in the wake of enlargement.⁹⁹ The EU began the accession process anyway.

In a thorough assessment of Poland’s reforms in 1997, the European Commission found the economy to be Poland’s biggest problem. Economic reforms began immediately in Poland, including the Balcerowicz Plan, which was a form of ‘shock therapy’. “This plan involved ending all price controls, making the Polish zloty convertible to western currencies, eliminating trade barriers, eliminating government subsidies for state enterprises so they had to self-supporting, restricting wage increases, reducing money supply, and increasing interest rates.”¹⁰⁰ Life was pretty miserable for people after this plan was put into force. The unemployment rate rose from .3% in 1989 (which probably corresponds with communist-style statistics on the

⁹⁷ Öniş, *Diverse but Converging Paths*, 489.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 489.

⁹⁹ Podraza, 32.

¹⁰⁰ Jane L. Curry, “Poland: The Politics of ‘God’s Playground’” in *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*, eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Ltd., 2011), 177.

matter) to 16.4% in 1993.¹⁰¹ Starting in 1993 and throughout the rest of the decade, conditions improved for Poles as the economy got better; however, it still did not compare to the economies of the members of the EU. At the time, GDP per capita in Poland was 31% of the EU average.¹⁰²

There were other issues for Poland within the negotiation process. Some of the biggest issues included agriculture, the free movement of persons, environment, external border and transport and the acquisition of land by foreigners. Poland was looking forward to participating in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since much of its industry was agricultural and the country wanted to be able to compete in the Single Market. France and Germany, however, were weary of letting any of the new member states participate so soon after accession. They eventually were able to reach a compromise. For western Europeans in the European Union, the immigration concerns for after accession seem to be common. This was true in attitudes towards the Poles, as well. With accession, and the free movement of people, EU member states were worried about immigrants flooding the labor market. For Poland, this was one of the most important benefits of joining the EU. In the end, a transitional period, where labor markets were closed off for citizens of new member states, was decided on by each country but with a general expiration date of seven years after accession. Once all the negotiation chapters were closed, Poland was offered membership, a promise fulfilled in 2004.

Poland and Turkey

As has been illustrated, the arguments against Turkey's accession to the EU have been much louder and more specific than ever came up in Poland's experience. In fact, sources about the Turkish issue are common and freely available, while it is hard to find many specific

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Podraza, 34.

instances of how the political elite felt about Poland; it is not surprising that time erases negative opinions. Nevertheless, immigration issues are common to both cases. Fear of a mass of Turkish immigrants to the EU can seem dramatic when the same concerns came up, and were handled, when Poland became a member of the EU. In the case of Turkey, the fears of immigration stem from the problem of assimilation. Since so many of the western European elite are concerned with Turkey's cultural differences, they think it would be a problem if Turkish immigrants could not blend in. They see this happening in countries that already have large Turkish populations, like Germany and Austria. Immigration, however, is not the only issue that concerns opponents of Turkey's EU membership. Some are concerned about Turkey's size; with over 70 million inhabitants, it would be the second biggest country in the EU, only after Germany. Although it has been working towards democratization and increased economic prosperity, the EU would still have to spend a lot of money bringing Turkey up to the right standards. The EU spent a lot of time and effort making the accession of the CEECs work. Perhaps they are at a loss as to what to do with Turkey. With more member states, it may be more difficult to come to a consensus about rules and regulations regarding its potential accession. For the time being, the EU has used the same framework it developed for the sake of the new member states that acceded in 2004 and 2007 for Turkey's membership application and process.

Most of Turkey's supporters come from the last enlargement with a few located in Western Europe, such as the UK and Sweden. Germany and Austria are its biggest opponents, as well as France. Poland is a supporter but seemingly only a verbal one. It would be interesting to see what the Polish elite have to say on the matter. Studies have shown that both Polish elite and public opinion is supportive of further enlargement of the European Union, including of Turkey's membership, more than any of the other member states. Yet, Turkey is not any closer

to membership after the 2004 enlargement. The situation of Polish elite opinion towards Turkey's EU accession is discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter Five

Elite Opinion

Through research on the topic of Polish elite opinion on Turkey's EU accession I have become confused by what seems like a discrepancy. Mainly this is due to most of the literature stating that Polish elites have a positive opinion on EU enlargement, including Turkey's bid, but they do not seem to act in any way to help move the process along. Furthermore, scholars have shown that the media in Poland is not a help in spreading information about Turkey to the elite or to the public. They claim that newspapers in Eastern Europe use Western news sources to inform readers on the topic. The problem is that most of these Western sources provide negative opinions of the Turkish situation and so Poles do not get neutral reporting on what their elites claim to be important.

In an effort to minimize confusion and to get a better idea of the situation with Polish elites, I will be looking at the information that the elites generate themselves on the topic of Turkey's EU accession and whether they mention Polish support on the matter. In the modern age, detailed information such as this is available online on governmental websites that are run by the institutions themselves. To clarify, I am not necessarily looking at the individuals who hold the political offices presently. Although they influence policy greatly, the fact is that the Polish government has officially held the position that the EU should continue to enlarge to include Turkey. I am interested in how the governmental offices are showing this support through websites, press releases and other documentation. If available, I looked at all sources in Polish and in English in order to make sure nothing of note was missed. It is not unheard of that an organization's or institution's English language website is nowhere near as detailed and informative as the website is in the original language. Something that other scholars have not had

the opportunity to look at, because it is so recent, is the program of the Polish term serving as the president of the Council of the European Union. Here the Polish government was able to steer EU agenda in the direction it wanted to, bringing to forefront the issues that were important to it. There is also documentation on an internal review of the Polish presidency and the realization of its many plans.

Another element to my analysis includes looking at a cross-section of newspaper articles on the topic of Turkey. I chose to look at *Gazeta Wyborcza* which has the highest readership among all the newspapers in Poland, although newspaper readership is generally not very high in Poland. Nevertheless, I will give a broad overview of some of the articles that I read and discuss the significance in regards to the broader issue of Turkish membership in the EU. I found articles from 2005 to the present year that inform the issue and help to form some conclusions to be discussed in the final chapter.

Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych- Ministry of Foreign Affairs

It seems logical to start with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁰³ as they deal with international relations and external affairs. The website is meant to serve as both an informative portal about the countries with which Poland has relations and as a center for the Polish stand on all subjects international and diplomatic. In fact, the slogan for the Ministry (MSZ) is “Polsce- służyć, Europę- tworzyć, Świat- rozumieć” which when translated means “To serve Poland, to create Europe, to understand the world.” The latter part of the slogan is met in the website through the individual country dossiers accessible through a drop-down menu. These dossiers include general geographic and demographic facts, historical overviews, and breakdowns of the

¹⁰³ Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, “Strona Główna,” http://www.msz.gov.pl/Strona_glowna,1.html (last accessed June 2012).

respective economies. With Turkey there is also documentation about the bilateral relations between Poland and Turkey, a discussion of aspects of the Turkish market and a document with a list of links for more information about the government, history and the language. Some of the information provided in these documents seemed erroneous, especially when it came to religion and religious holidays. For example, the holy month of Ramadan (Ramazan in Turkish) was reported as lasting only a week. Otherwise, it shows that they were well researched and compiled. All the information provided on the website was last updated on May 10, 2012.

An interesting aspect about Turkey's presence on the MSZ's website is that it is pretty well hidden. The above-mentioned documents are available from the drop-down menu that acts as a sort of "address-book" of countries Poland has relations with but information on Turkey is hard to find otherwise. For example, Turkey is not included in the main geographical regions listed on the menu under "foreign politics;" it is not included in Asia, but there is no category for Middle East. The Eastern Partnership program has a very prominent role in Polish politics and the MSZ's website but Turkey is not included in this EU program. Searching the website did not yield good results making it obvious that the best way to find information about Turkey was through the drop-down menu.

The website includes a document entitled "Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012-2016" or "Priorities of Polish foreign affairs 2012-2016."¹⁰⁴ It was published in March 2012 in Warsaw. This document shows Poland to have very specific personal and international goals. The writers bring up the fact that Europe faces a dilemma—to continue with deeper integration or to lose power and importance on the international scale if it does not integrate further.¹⁰⁵ For

¹⁰⁴ Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, "Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012-2016," www.pl2011.eu/sites/default/files/users/user43/raport_koncowy_-_rm_17.04.2012.pdf (last accessed June 2012), 1-279.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 3

Poland, further integration within the EU is the key to its success; integration has become one of Poland's priorities on the international scale. In this document the Poles state that the EU is postponing important discussions and decisions. They need to discuss the future of the Single Market, energy security, the speed of EU expansion, demographic and migration problems, security of EU citizens and the guarantee of freedoms. The EU must redefine its role on the global stage, which include transatlantic relations and relations with strategic partners, but most of all in terms of the economy.

In its role within the framework of the EU, Poland has a plethora of foreign policy goals which are enumerated within this document. Some of the main goals the MSZ discusses include: to become a reliable ally in a stable transatlantic order, close cooperation with Ukraine and other East European countries, Russia and the South Caucasus. Furthermore, Poland is interested in enhancing cooperation among the Visegrad Group countries, developing a promotional campaign to enhance Poland's position in Europe and the world and developing greater connections with Poles living abroad. Of course, they desire continued modernization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When it comes to Poland's European policy three words succinctly explain it: competitiveness, solidarity and openness. Although integration is important, the EU should not become a super state that wipes out the individual member states.¹⁰⁶

Openness is an important element to the EU—its image has been built on this idea. Polish foreign policy is concerned with enlargement, especially as a tool for stability. Poland promises to assist in the political and economic transformation processes and to support the accession aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans states, the South Caucasus states and Turkey.¹⁰⁷ Here it is clear the further enlargement of the EU is seen by the Ministry of Foreign

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 8.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 11.

Affairs as a good thing. As an organization that considers itself open, the EU should continue to add members. It is important for stability and for reforms that will bring Europe ahead on the global level.

The offices of President and Prime Minister

As a state with a semi-presidential political system, the President and Prime Minister are both important figures at the head of the Polish political elite. When the Kaczyński brothers held both offices, the difference in power between them was slightly minimized. Now, however, with Bronisław Komorowski as president and Donald Tusk as the prime minister, there is a definite shift in power. Regarding foreign policy and the EU, this is visible even in the President's website. There was no information about Turkey's EU accession and minimal information about the EU itself; the President's website puts more emphasis on domestic politics and concerns. The reader is directed to another website¹⁰⁸ that describes how Poland functions within the EU. Here there is general information about the enlargement process and where candidate countries stand in the accession process. Any information on this website regarding enlargement or Turkey's EU accession is the same information one can find on the EU website. Furthermore, the website has not been updated since May 2011.

There is a definite difference in the matter on the part of the Prime Minister. Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów or the Chancellery of the Prime Minister¹⁰⁹ is quite positive in its assessment of Poland's role on the international scale. The Chancellery is active in international relations, having diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries. They consider Poland a leader in the region and a strong voice in the European Union. When mentioning Turkey, however, it seems like the Poles put it into a distant category, not within the label of European

¹⁰⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Polska w UE," Republic of Poland, www.PolskawUE.gov.pl (last accessed June 2012).

¹⁰⁹ Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, <http://www.premier.gov.pl/> (last accessed June 2012).

neighbor, but something physically distant, like Vietnam. Through the website the readers see that the office is quite active in various elements of politics, not only international relations but also the spread of cultural knowledge, problems in education and women and infant care.

Because the Prime Minister and his office are so active internationally, they release different press documents to keep people informed of what is going on. These documents are available on the website through Centrum Prasowa or the Press Center. A search for Turkey resulted in a couple of interesting press releases that really demonstrate the verbal support Poland shows Turkey. In May 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan visited Poland, the first state visit at such a high level of office. In the press release “Strategiczna współpraca Polski i Turcji” Tusk stressed that Poland would participate in the negotiation process and integration of Turkey into the EU.¹¹⁰ During this visit the two Prime Ministers spent a lot of time talking about energy issues and their mutual participation in the Nabucco pipeline project. This support was present again in 2010 when Tusk attended a Polish-Turkish entrepreneurs’ forum in Istanbul. At the forum Tusk spoke of the long history of diplomatic relations between Poles and Turks, their mutual participation in NATO and Poland’s support of Turkey’s bid for the EU.¹¹¹ Tusk discussed how this support is a long-standing strategy of Poland’s and mentioned that the Polish presidency in the EU will provide Poland the opportunity to move that agenda forward. It is apparent that the Prime Minister and his office are supportive of Turkey in its journey towards the EU. What drives the points even further is the fact that Tusk mentions the EU presidential term as Poland’s way of pushing this process forward for Turkey. Because of the timing of this

¹¹⁰ Chancellery of the Prime Minister Press Center, “Strategiczna współpraca Polski i Turcji,” May 19, 2009, Chancellery of the Prime Minister, http://www.premier.gov.pl/centrum_prasowe/wydarzenia/strategiczna_wspolpraca_polski,336/ (last accessed June 2012).

¹¹¹ Chancellery of the Prime Minister Press Center, “Turcja i Polska mogą stać się tygrysami globalnej gospodarki,” December 9, 2010, Chancellery of the Prime Minister, http://www.premier.gov.pl/centrum_prasowe/wydarzenia/turcja_i_polska_moga_stac_sie_5794/ (last accessed June 2012).

research, it is possible to look at what the Poles actually accomplished with regards to Turkey's accession process in their term as president of the Council of the EU.

Polish presidency in the EU

Every six months the presidency of the Council of the EU rotates among the 27 member states. When the EU expanded to its current size, the EU government realized how difficult it would be to maintain consistency and coherence when changing the President so often. In order to remedy this situation, they established an 18-month trio of member states who would hold the office by working together. The Presidency would still rotate every six months, but three member states were required to work together in the run up of their terms so as to keep coherence and make progress towards a set of goals. Poland was the first to hold the office in its trio, which includes Denmark and Cyprus. It is quite interesting that Cyprus is included in this grouping with Poland, because of the Turkey issue. If the Polish political elite are so interested in helping Turkey in its accession negotiations, they had to have discussed this plan with the Cypriot government. As mentioned before, the Turkey-Cyprus issue has halted the accession negotiations for Turkey. As long as the Turks make the required reforms to be in line with the EU's norms, which includes recognizing Cyprus as a whole nation, Cyprus would support Turkey in its bid, as well. Perhaps Poland had the idea that it could accomplish this through its presidency.

The presidency of the Council of the European Union is quite the opportunity for each member state. It is that country's chance to bring to the front of the EU's agenda what it thinks is important. In the previous section about the Prime Minister's office, they made it known that the Polish presidency of the EU would make Turkey a priority on the agenda in moving along the

accession process. Poland would support Turkey's bid to the EU by making this a part of its plan as President. Each country makes a program or plan for the following six months and makes it available to the public. Since the presidency is such a short term of office, it is not surprising if the country does not accomplish all that it planned. Regardless, the program sets the tone for the agenda and shows everyone what that country thinks is most important.

The program that the Poles developed is incredibly detailed, as most of the programs probably have been in the past. It seems a little ridiculous that the presidency would have so many plans for a term that lasts only six months. Nevertheless, they seemed quite serious about the support for Turkey and about speeding the accession negotiations along. In the document, the Polish government discusses how the EU is changing at a pace unseen before, but that it must efficiently deal with the problems that are slowing it down. In its role to help deal with these problems, the Polish presidency intends to focus on: European Integration as a source of growth, a Secure Europe and a Europe that takes advantage of Openness.¹¹² Enlargement is categorized under the section on the Openness of the EU. First, however, the document discusses the Eastern Partnership with Ukraine and Moldova. The Polish presidency will also want to include Belarus, to make sure it is democratizing and developing as it should. The document mentions that Poland will attempt to expand the Eastern Partnership regional policy to include more countries.

Enlargement is a highlighted concern in Poland's program for the presidency. There is a strange discrepancy, however, between the Polish and English versions of the text. Throughout the text, to highlight important ideas and to show emphasis, words and phrases are bolded. In the English version, the importance of signing the Accession Treaty with Croatia is stressed, shown

¹¹² Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, "Program polskiej prezydencji w Radzie Unii Europejskiej 1 lipca 2011 r. - 31 grudnia 2011 r." http://pl2011.eu/sites/default/files/users/shared/o_prezydencja/program_polskiej_prezydencji_w_radzie_ue.pdf (last accessed May 2012), 5.

by this bolding pattern. In the Polish version, continuing accession negotiations with Turkey is bolded, emphasizing that aspect. Iceland and the Western Balkans are also stressed in the Polish version.¹¹³ It may be a minor difference or just a mistake, but there could be something else to it. Of course, the English version of the text would be more widely read than the Polish version. It is hard to make any assumptions here, but the Polish MSZ might have been writing the English version for a more conservative and focused audience; an audience that is not interested in Turkey, but more in Croatia and the Western Balkan countries.

On April 17, 2012, the organizers of the Polish presidency also made available a final report assessing the six months that Poland held the office. At almost 300 pages, they had a lot to say on the topic. Since Poland's term ended in December 2011, enough time has passed that it makes sense to be making assessments. Poland was eager to make a good impression in its role as President of the Council of the European Union. In the document "Przewodnictwo Polski w Radzie Unii Europejskiej: Raport końcowy z przygotowania i sprawowania prezydencji" the presidency is explained down to the smallest details.¹¹⁴ As was seen in the program, Poland planned for an ambitious presidency—to prove to themselves and the world that they could be successful. The three countries of the trio—Poland, Denmark and Cyprus—came together to plan for their presidencies, so they would be taken seriously and would be effective together; that they would be complementary to each other. For the first half of 2011 everyone was concerned with the financial crisis and what was going on in the Arab world and the Arab Spring. Poland was most concerned with its neighbors Belarus and Ukraine, especially when it came to working towards democratization and closer relations with the EU. It seemed as though the EU was not

¹¹³ Ibid., 11.

¹¹⁴ Pełnomocnik Rządu ds. Przygotowania Organów Administracji Rządowej i Sprawowania przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską Przewodnictwa w Radzie Unii Europejskiej, "Przewodnictwo Polski w Radzie Unii Europejskiej: Raport końcowy z przygotowania i sprawowania prezydencji," Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Warszawa: April 2012, http://pl2011.eu/sites/default/files/users/user43/raport_koncowy_-_rm_17.04.2012.pdf (last accessed June 2012).

supportive of Poland's focus on its neighboring countries, but the Eastern Partnership regional policy is an important part of the EU's foreign policy so the EU could not be too concerned by this focus.

A lot went into creating the Polish presidency in the EU—websites, social media, and brochures. Meetings about the presidency had been going on since 2008. These meetings and information sessions attempted to incorporate the whole EU structure into the presidency. The process of creating an agenda and program that would be relevant in the term (July-December 2011) began in 2009, two years before it would even come into play. In his assessment of the presidency the Plenipotentiary states that forty-eight conclusions and resolutions, and fifty –four legislative acts were accepted, while sixty-four issues were taken to new levels so that they can be moved forward in the future.¹¹⁵

As mentioned before, for Poland in its presidency, further enlargement of the EU was an important aspect. They wanted to sign the accession treaty with Croatia and to continue the negotiations with Turkey. In terms of enlargement, Poland was able to realize some of its goals. It closed the final chapter in the accession negotiations with Croatia, and was able to open and close a handful of chapters with Iceland. The accession negotiations with Turkey were stalled because of the gravity of some problems-including the impasse at which the Turks and Cypriots are still stuck. The tone of the text seems a little disheartened by the fact that Turkey does not budge on the issues that are holding it back from membership, but there is a little bit of optimism: Poland was able to get Turkey to sign off on the General Affairs Council. Further regarding enlargement, Poland was able to open the accession process for some of the Western Balkan countries, mainly Macedonia.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 162.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 173.

After looking at these different political offices, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ), as an office and as the representative body of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, has a lot of power in determining and expressing policy. Although the MSZ has expressed that Poland supports Turkey's accession into the EU, the words are empty. This is similar to the Polish prime minister's office and its support. They express support and even promise some mode of action (only in a few instances) but allow other issues to take precedence. This seems to support the conclusions of the majority of the literature on this topic. Turkey just is not a priority of Poland's foreign affairs. As an interesting contrast to the above study of websites and documents released by the political elite institutions themselves, the following section describes some of the media reporting on the topic.

Gazeta Wyborcza

Previous literature on this topic studied the political elite opinion within the Polish media; it seemed that most of the articles mentioned, however, came from *Rzeczpospolita*, the more conservative newspaper in Poland. I chose to look at a small sampling of newspaper articles in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, which is not as conservative and has a greater readership than any other newspaper in Poland. The articles ranged from 2005 through 2012. I was looking for mentions of Poland's support of Turkey's EU accession, but there were not many articles that were specific to this issue, although some did mention it. The only direct reference to the Polish political elite being supportive of Turkey's EU accession was in an interview with Lech Kaczyński.¹¹⁷ Interestingly enough, throughout the years, there were several interviews with Western politicians and intellectuals, as well as from Turkey itself. Those interviews were generally quite

¹¹⁷ Jacek Pawlicki and Marcin Wojciechowski, "Przede wszystkim jestem Europejczykiem," *Gazeta Wyborcza* January 10, 2009.

positive about Turkey's potential accession into the EU, but all of them agreed that Turkey has a long way to go to be in line with all the EU laws and norms. Fears about Turkey turning away from Europe were criticized, as everyone claimed that Turkey has nowhere else to go.

Generally, the tone of articles in *Gazeta Wyborcza* about Turkey is informative and explanatory. One example of this is an article about the AKP and the history of politics in Turkey, written by Adam Balcer, an intellectual who is part of a think tank concerned with Poland's foreign policy towards the Middle East. His reporting on Turkey is balanced—he does not avoid the problems that Turkey has, but also does not demonize the country.¹¹⁸ In a more recent article, the Polish journalist explores the cult that still surrounds Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish nation.¹¹⁹ Although the behavior the journalist describes may be strange to Polish ears, it is an essential piece of Turkish culture to understand. Considering most Poles do not know much about Turkey, and if they do, have a negative opinion based on history and religious prejudices, reporting like this is important.

Some of the literature about Polish opinion of EU enlargement mentions that western sources are used within Eastern European newspapers to report on Turkey's journey to the EU. In the small sample that I collected, there were a few articles that originated in a news service, mainly Reuters, but everything else was written by Polish journalists, on assignment in Brussels and even in Istanbul, Izmir or Ankara. The news however, is definitely focused on what the Western countries have to say on the matter of Turkey. The Cyprus issue was the focus in *Gazeta Wyborcza* across the years, as the negotiations kept stalling because Turkey would not budge on the issue of allowing Cypriot airplanes and boats to land in Turkey. Journalists were also reporting on French and German reactions and opinions. Over and over they state Sarkozy's

¹¹⁸ Adam Balcer, "Demokracja po Turecku," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, December 2, 2006.

¹¹⁹ Witold Szablowski, "Nie ma Turka bez Atatürka" *Gazeta Wyborcza*, September 2, 2010.

opinion that there is no room for Turkey in the EU because it does not belong culturally. An interesting article gave a completely different perspective on the Turkish issue, and although it was in a Polish newspaper, it was not written by a Pole. Margaret Beckett, the former Foreign Secretary of Great Britain wrote an article that was translated into Polish for the newspaper. In it Beckett writes that Turkey is the solution to all of Europe's problems. By pushing Turkey away, the EU will be poorer, weaker and less secure.¹²⁰ The British definitely have been one of Turkey's defenders in its journey to the EU. Another article reports how British Prime Minister David Cameron was frustrated with the EU because of its anti-Muslim prejudices against Turkey.¹²¹ Great Britain's support of Turkey confirms the theory that countries with different notions of what the European Union constitutes, i.e. a loose confederation, are more open to Turkey becoming a member of the EU.

It seems that before 2009, the reporting on Turkey was quite positive, if not neutral. The facts were discussed, whether they were good or bad. After 2009, after problems with the global economy really started, the view on Turkey became much more negative. The issues that had been discussed before became insurmountable according to the discourse. Also, there was increased fear that Turkey was turning towards the Middle East, and away from Europe. One recent article's headline states that Turkey is "Putinizing."¹²² It is hard to say what exactly changed the discourse on Turkey within one newspaper. 2009 is the year when the economic crisis started in Europe and so priorities shifted for everyone—Greece quickly became an issue, finances were a concern across Europe and Turkey looked like it would further strain this new economic situation. More of the political elite across Europe were concerned about Turkey playing up its role in the Middle East.

¹²⁰ Margaret Beckett, "Turcja: Strategiczny Wybór Europy," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, December 14, 2006.

¹²¹ "Cameron: Turcja do Unii," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, July 28, 2010.

¹²² Dawid Warszawski, "Turcja się Putinizuje," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 13, 2012.

Commentary

Looking at the coverage of the issue of Polish elite opinion of Turkey's EU accession, something seems to be missing. Although Poland and Turkey have a friendship that goes back centuries, not much of the history is actually discussed. Mainly, the history of friendly relations is mentioned in speeches and forums. The newspaper does not go into any details of this history in its reporting. None of the official literature released by the Polish government includes the information. This is an interesting discrepancy. On the personal level, the two countries agree that their history is an important part of their diplomatic relations. In the European context, however, the Polish elites do not think it important enough to even mention it. It might be that the Polish elites do not think it is appropriate to mention the history between them in official documentation, but it might help the Turkish cause. Many of the other Central and Eastern European countries have a negative past with the Turks, because of the Ottoman Empire's legacy, but it might be refreshing to hear about the friendship and support between the two. The history bears more than just mentioning considering the support Poland has shown Turkey, especially over the last decade.

Since Poland joined the EU the Polish governments have been supportive of Turkey's EU accession. Of course, Poland had been focused on its own potential membership since communism collapsed in 1989 that it is hard to say whether they were aware of any other country's journey through the same process. Nevertheless, some of the previous political elites that ruled in Poland before accession were vocal about their rejection of Turkey as a potential EU member. At first the right wing Law and Justice (PiS) party supported a privileged partnership for Turkey instead of full membership, much like the German government still prefers. In the

end, however, PiS changed its view and officially supported full membership for Turkey proving that “the national interests became more important than party interests for members of PiS after their party had come into power.”¹²³ As long as Poland has been a member of the supranational organization it has vocalized its own support. Furthermore, “the pro-European policy of the Turkish government has also been supported by all Polish cabinets since 2001.”¹²⁴ Before the current Civic Platform-run government, however, it would have been difficult for Poland to have much influence over the EU agenda. Although the Kaczynskis and their government became supportive of Turkey’s EU accession, they were loudly Euroskeptic in terms of Poland’s membership. It would have been quite difficult for that set of political elites to have made much of a difference for Turkey’s journey to the EU, since they were hindering Poland’s own progress.

Today’s Polish government is much stronger and organized. It has specific and ambitious plans in terms of foreign policy and international cooperation. Poland’s term as president of the Council of the European Union left a great impression on the rest of Europe, commanding respect for the Polish government from their neighbors. This new-found influence will undoubtedly work to the Polish elite’s favor if and when they begin acting on their rhetorical support of Turkey. In the concluding chapter, I will synthesize my findings with the historical and political information introduced at the beginning of this thesis and will discuss some of the things the Polish elite could do to that would help Turkey’s in its bid to the EU.

¹²³ Forysinski and Osiewicz, 6.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 4.

Chapter Six

Analysis and Conclusion

Turkey's journey towards EU membership has been difficult. It is hard to deal with conflicting requirements stipulated by the EU, its member states and the elites that govern. On the one hand, once the Copenhagen Criteria are met and all chapters of the negotiation process have been closed, membership is supposed to be rewarded. On the other, there seems to be a growing prejudice against Turkey because it is predominantly Muslim, has a poor population that might immigrate en masse to the EU and because it is so big, it might overtake the supranational organization. It is a new situation for the EU because it never had such trouble agreeing over a candidate country. The East-Central European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 caused some trouble, but never to this extent. Having gone through the accession process itself, Poland, along with some other Central and East European countries, is excited for other countries to join the EU because of all the benefits that membership brings to members. Since Turkey has already gotten so far in the process, it should be made a member as soon as the negotiations are finished. As was illustrated in the previous chapter, the Polish elites have been vocal about their support of Turkey and its journey to the EU.

It is not unusual for Poland and Turkey to have friendly relations today because they have held diplomatic relations since the 15th century. Although there was some animosity between them over the centuries, their relations have generally been quite pleasant and peaceful, quite unlike the Turks' relationships with other countries. As mentioned in the chapter on the history of Polish-Turkish relations, the Turks were supportive during the partitions of Poland, and more recently in its desire to join NATO. There are strange similarities between these two countries—nationalist ideology, history and religious devotion—that connect them. It makes sense then that

Poland would show support for Turkey's future membership in the European Union. And so the Polish political elite who guide the country's international relations and agenda have stated many times that Poland supports Turkey. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its public documentation, always mentions EU enlargement and the EU's general "openness" as a continuous goal for the supranational structure. Turkey is used as an example in this discussion and the political elites express the desire for the accession negotiations to continue so that Turkey can become a member. The Prime Minister and the Chancellery office, which includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, freely volunteered that one part of Poland's agenda as the President of the Council of the European Union would be to help move the accession negotiations along.

The documentation shows that Turkey is a part of Poland's foreign policy as it has been a member of the European Union. In Poland's term as president of the Council of the EU the Polish elite scheduled the issue of Turkey into its busy agenda. When it comes to words, the Polish political elite seem to be as supportive of Turkey as it is of Ukraine in potential membership, a country that has also been connected to Poland for quite a long time. Both countries are mentioned in relevant literature, documentation and newspaper coverage. However, there is a lot more action on the part of Polish elites regarding Ukraine than it ever is in terms of Turkey. Often there is more contact between the two countries politically and economically, and Poland shows great concern over Ukraine's continued democratization and modernization. This corresponds with what many of the scholars have written—that Turkey is not seen as a priority for Polish foreign policy. There might be something more to this lack of action, however. There is only so much the Polish political elite can do to help the Turkish government in their bid to the EU. Granted, Turkey is further along with the accession process as a candidate member than Ukraine, but nevertheless, Poland is more active in their concern over Ukraine. For example, "In

the European Parliament...Polish deputies take an active part in preparing resolutions concerning Poland's eastern neighbor.”¹²⁵ Although Turkey was included in the presidential term agenda, the evaluation of this aspect seemed to be discouraged that it was not fulfilled because Turkey did not move forward in accession negotiations on its own. The Polish political elite can do more to help Turkey's EU prospects but the Turkish elite have to meet them in the middle. Some of the accusations launched against Turkey in the accession process have been harsh and unfair. But there are parts of EU norms and regulations that Turkey has to conform to in order to become a member in the EU. As long as Turkey continues on the path the European Union has set out for it, Poland can be a great help for the final push.

In the meantime, Poland can increase its support of Turkey's bid to the EU. As Adam Balcer and Piotr Zalewski so succinctly put in their essay, “speeches in favor of Turkish accession are not enough.”¹²⁶ Poland can help keep Turkey on the EU's enlargement and foreign policy agenda, as it has done for Ukraine. The Polish political elite can help create the appropriate framework for Turkey's accession by engaging other member states of the EU. The above-mentioned scholars suggest that Poland can actually challenge France and Germany who are the main opponents of Turkey's EU membership. France, for example, has put a block on full membership for Turkey into the EU, suggesting something other than full membership. Discourse like this by the elite of France, one of the founders of the EU, undermines EU solidarity and the understanding that negotiations are meant lead to accession.¹²⁷ In order to do this successfully, Poland can engage other Eastern European countries and work with them to accomplish the goal of Turkey's membership. Furthermore, the Polish elite can remind other

¹²⁵ Szymanski, 551.

¹²⁶ Adam Balcer and Piotr Zalewski, “Turkey and the ‘New Europe’: A Bridge Waiting to be Built.” *Insight Turkey* 12 (2010): 42.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

member states just how beneficial the addition of Turkey could be to all of them. For example, Poland, along with other European countries, is on the verge of a population crisis. The Turkish population and workforce are very young and vibrant. Turkish immigrants could be the solution against a stagnating population for many countries. Turkey could also open doors for new lines of energy; the Nabucco pipeline would, in part, go through Turkey. Since Russia has the reputation of cutting off gas supplies to parts of Europe, it would be nice to have another supply available. Turkey's membership in the EU would guarantee a mutual partnership in terms of energy and would never leave European countries in the cold.

When it comes to Turkey's bid for EU membership, some may think that the Polish political elite are doing the best they can to help. But it is obvious that they could be doing more, much like they have for Ukraine, Croatia and even Iceland. I do not agree that Turkey is not important or a priority for Poland. The Polish political elites are not blind to the benefits of having Turkey as an ally and a member state of the EU. However, they could try to reconfigure or concentrate their efforts to be more effective in the way they help. Redirecting the current discourse about Turkey as an outsider, non-European and too Islamist can help to heal the east-west divide that has plagued the European continent for centuries. Changing the discourse can make these cultural aspects a non-issue in terms of the EU accession process.

Having included a short study of newspaper coverage in Poland on Turkey and the issue of its accession, it is important to comment that the media in Poland could also help in the accession process, without becoming too biased and violating any journalistic integrity. Some of the articles included in this study show that unbiased, informative reporting on Turkey and Turkish culture can help to inform public and elite opinion. Although Poles are quite supportive of continued EU enlargement, including Turkey, many public opinion polls show that Turks are

not a favored nation among Polish people because of preconceived notions or old historical facts. As was shown in the historical chapter, Poland and Turkey have had friendly relations for centuries, despite some conflicts between them early on. Turks were supportive of Poland after the partitions, welcoming them to their country and even housing Poland's beloved national poet Adam Mickiewicz. *Gazeta Wyborcza* is not using many western or foreign sources in its reporting on Turkey, which is a positive thing. There is no reason to hide the truth from the reading public, but there is no need to demonize the country or its EU accession process. If more of the Polish elite are reported in newspapers to support Turkey's EU accession, more public support might be garnered which helps even on the supranational level.

In the introductory chapter I stated that there were three aspects that made this project important. The point that Turkey could make a powerful ally to Poland and the other member states if it were a member of the EU has yet to be seen but the potential lies in its membership. Poland's leadership in initiating greater political and economic contact would make it more likely for Turkey to be that important ally. The present study is meant to show that cooperation between Turkey and Poland will help to develop the alliance that could be so beneficial to all EU member states. As Margaret Beckett wrote in her essay printed in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, there is a country that could solve many of Europe's problems and it is Turkey; it would be a shame to push it away. Another aspect that this study is meant to address is the potential for Poland to become a true regional leader. It may be surprising to know that although Eastern Europe is always grouped together, the countries that comprise it do not have an extensive history of working together. Since there is still that east-west divide within Europe, the Eastern European countries have the opportunity to act together and make a difference on the supranational level. Poland, as the biggest country in the region, and as the only one (in Europe) to have had a

growing economy during the global downturn has the potential to be the leader of this region.

The European Union helped this region immensely since the end of communism and it is almost on par with the western European countries economically; the East-Central European region has the opportunity to be their political equals as well.

The final aspect this study is meant to discuss the importance of is the role of the Polish elites since Poland has become a member of the EU. Throughout Polish history there is no doubt that the elites have played important roles in change and progress. The question remained, however, whether the Polish political elites have as much power and energy under the new-to-them EU structure. Through this study it is pretty obvious that the political elites have ambitious plans for Poland as an important part of the EU. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister's Chancellery office are quite active on the European stage, moving their agenda forward while working within the system. The Polish political elite had strong and ambitious plans for Poland's term as President of the Council of the European Union and they did not want to botch the opportunity, and made a good impression on the rest of the Europe and the world. Outside of this presidential term, the Polish elite have many plans for Poland's foreign affairs. They do not seem to back down from the challenges of membership and try not to be pushed aside by other elites in the EU.

This study opens up further questions about the Polish political elite and their involvement with Turkey and the EU. It would be interesting to see how public opinion towards the EU project compares with the elite's vision for the supranational government. Other studies have shown that there is a huge discrepancy in western European countries between the elites and the rest of the population. Is there any such discrepancy in Poland; has it grown over time? Another question that comes up is what the Turkish elite have to say about the Polish elite and

their support. There was not enough time to do a comparative study of the Polish and Turkish elites, but delving further into the historical, cultural and political connections between the two countries would be an interesting future study.

In conclusion, the Polish political elite have a strong positive opinion on Turkey's EU accession and have shown it mainly through words. At this point, however, Turkey might need more than words to help it along in the accession negotiations as it faces all of the cultural and religious arguments against it. It would be safe to assume that the Turkish elite see that words are not enough to help them. Polish-Turkish relations have been strong in the past and have the potential of becoming even stronger through cooperation in this matter. Both Poland and Turkey would benefit greatly from Turkey's membership in the EU. Time will tell if Poland will put action behind its support for Turkey.

Chapter Seven

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