

PUTTING THE WINNER-LOSER EFFECT IN CONTEXT:  
PRESIDENTIALISM & DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS

BY

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DISSERTATION

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## **ABSTRACT**

This project concerns the winner-loser effect on individual citizens' political attitudes and behaviors. The process of electoral politics mandates that voters win or lose in tandem with their preferred political candidates. As such, the relationship of such voters vis-à-vis the government and the political system differ based on whether one was a political winner or political loser during the last electoral cycle. Using survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), I execute a comparative study of the winner-loser effect across 18 countries from North, Central, and South America.

In total, this study includes fifteen dependent variables at the individual level to measure political attitudes and behaviors. I include ten indicators of political attitudes: internal and external efficacy; interpersonal trust; trust in the national government, the president and the national congress; presidential and congressional job approval; satisfaction with democracy and system pride. In keeping with the literature on winning and losing, winners have a stronger, more positive relationship to government than losers and this is seen throughout the political attitudes included here (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001). Winners are more trusting, view job performance more favorably, and exhibit higher levels of system support than do losers.

In the behavioral realm, I include five indicators: contacting government and attending town or party meetings; protest participation; and frequency of political discussion and attempting to sway the votes of other citizens. In contrast to attitudes, losers tend to participate more than winners. While this is expected for protest, it is not expected for conventional participation or political discussion. Ultimately, widespread loser participation is beneficial to democratic politics because it shows losers' commitments to the polity.

In addition to these individual-level effects, however, I also find that the winner-loser effect varies greatly across the countries included in this study. Using multilevel modeling, I account for the cross-national differences by including elements of institutional and democratic context including divided government, presidential power, and the quality of democracy. These measures include an updated version of Shugart and Carey's (1992) measure of presidential powers. Context helps to account for variations in how much winning and losing matters and in what ways across the countries herein.

*With love for Gordon & my family*

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# Chapter 1:

## Introduction

People like to win and dislike losing. For some, winning is about being better than others (physically, mentally, financially); for others, the goal is to be proved right, to have found one's place or path in the world. Ultimately, however, winning and losing is about power and control of the rewards of competition. Through winning, people can gain possessions, acclaim and reputation, control over people and/or access to people and things heretofore unattainable; losers forfeit such prizes (Duina, 2011, pp. 77-94). Winners are to be admired, while losers are at best forgotten and at worst disdained. Psychologically, winning represents the attainment of a goal or the meeting of a need, the fulfillment of an expectation, and results in positive emotions (e.g. joy, interest, pride); conversely, losing is the realization that said goal, hope, or expectation is not to be, and this loss results in feelings of disappointment, anger and, even, fear (Sander & Scherer, 2009). People want the rewards of winning and dread the consequences of defeat.

Democracies are defined by political competitions, the give and take between ideas and positions, that ultimately determine who gets the prizes of government and who forfeits the chance to control those rewards. Elections, especially winner-take-all battles for powerful offices, like the presidency, turn voters who participate in them into winners and losers. Politics is the means by which we decide "who gets what, when, and how" (Lasswell, 1953), and it is the winners who control that process. Representative democracy, carried out through elections, creates winners and losers out of the voting populace despite the fact that voters, themselves, do

not take office and despite the fact that, in most cases, the material rewards associated with victory are not immediately bestowed on them. Rather, the only immediate gain to voters is the knowledge that their side has won or lost. This winner-loser status, of having one's side represented or not in the power-wielding offices of government, affects the individual's political attitudes and behaviors throughout the ensuing term of office (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Clarke & Acock, 1989). Winners are happy with the election's outcome and, thus, have a more congenial relationship with and hold more benevolent views towards the sitting government than do their loser counterparts.

On the one hand, winning and losing is an individual experience. It is rooted in one's choices and produces an individual-level effect in political attitudes and behaviors. However, the individual experience cannot be the whole story. Just as one hand complements the other, so too do environment and social context complement the individual experience. Historical and institutional factors determine the size of the political stakes, and the size of the stakes influences the intensity of the winner-loser effect. Ultimately, context affects the way the players feel about their status as winners and losers. To more fully understand the political citizen and why she thinks and behaves as she does, one must take into account the way in which context affects the magnitude of the winner-loser effect. A primary goal of this study of political winners and losers is to provide an integrated analysis of the individual and institutions to present a more coherent picture of the political person and the motivations behind his political attitudes and behaviors. Context affects relevance of winner-loser status and the magnitude of the winner-loser effect on political attitudes and behaviors.

Identification with the winners or the losers of electoral politics shapes perceptions and actions towards government and other political players. Furthermore, the structure, rules, and



reality of the political game alter the winner and loser effect in meaningful ways for politics and legitimacy. This project will show how one's place in the political order, based on winner-loser status and embedded in the political context of a country, affects one's political behaviors and opinions. To investigate these relationships between winner-loser status, context, and political attitudes and behaviors, I undertake a cross-national comparative analysis of the winner-loser effect in 18 presidential democracies across the Americas. Through this study, I show how being a winner or loser affects political attitudes and behaviors and how context alters this winner-loser effect. Additionally, I illustrate the ways in which politics can exacerbate the divisiveness between winners and losers through institutional arrangements and democratic processes, ultimately affecting stability and democracy within the state.

## **1.1: Creating Political Winners and Losers**

Modern democracy inherently creates winners and losers by virtue of its representative nature. Citizens delegate authority for their political decision-making to government officials through the process of elections. In fact, many scholars maintain that a system cannot be truly defined as democratic until more than one side experiences winning and losing via the alternation of political power (Cheibub, 2007; Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010b; Przeworski, 1991; Przeworski et al., 2000). As such, winning and losing are necessary facts of life for citizens in a democratic polity. Democracy may be "a system in which parties lose" (Przeworski, 1991). However, parties aren't the only ones impacted by electoral losses; elections mandate that citizens play the political game as well, that voters lose (and win) in tandem with their preferred candidates. Elections connect citizens to their government in a democracy; therefore, they determine political winners and losers, deciding who is in government and who is out.

Democracy is a system in which *people* win and lose, and this experience affects how these winners and losers relate to their government, government officials, and other citizens in the polity.

The conceptual distinctions between democracies and dictatorships exist along two axes: participation and contestation (Dahl, 1971a). “What is essential in order to consider a regime as democratic is that two kinds of offices be filled, directly or indirectly, through elections: the chief executive office and the seats in the effective legislative body” (Przeworski et al., 2000). Contested elections, those swellings of mass participation that, though not always overwhelming, create the backbone of the democratic system, are a significant moment in the average citizen’s political experience. Citizens gather information, decide on and then vote for a candidate; afterwards, voters must live with the consequences of that choice – one’s winner-loser status – until the next elections. The individual experience of winning and losing elections defines one’s position in relation to the current government and to control of the rewards for victory. One’s winner-loser status affects one’s political attitudes and behaviors.

Because of the singular importance of elections in the political lives of citizens, individual vote choice is most commonly used to identify political winners and losers (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Bowler & Donovan, 2007), although the concept has also been applied to self-reported economic winner and losers, those who feel they are better or worse off economically because of the current regime (Herzog & Tucker, 2009; Tucker, Pacek, & Berinsky, 2002). Electoral winners and losers are defined by their relation to those two key elections required by democracy: the executive and the legislature. Most of the winner-loser literature focuses solely on the executive (whether that be the ruling cabinet in a parliamentary system or the president in a presidential one) (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson &

Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTempio, 2002). Winners find their man (or woman or party) in control of government while losers are left to endure a period of enemy control.

Institutional arrangements matter keenly for the way in which the democratic electoral processes produce winners and losers. In parliamentary systems, the two processes of executive and legislative election are wound into one; the chief executive is selected from within the parliament by virtue of a party – or coalition of parties – gaining more than half of the seats in the legislature’s popularly elected chamber (usually the lower house of Congress). In this case, winners encompass all those who voted for parties making up the government. Additionally, parliamentary systems include a “vote of no confidence,” a mechanism by which to remove a government that no longer maintains its mandate to rule. This ensures that winners represent a majority of society.<sup>1</sup>

Conversely, presidential systems hold separate elections for the legislative and executive branches. The checks-and-balances among differing branches mandate the partitioning of legislative and executive duties; in many cases, these divisions are not mutually exclusive with, say, presidents holding some power to introduce legislation or create public policy through executive order or other types of mandates. However, these constitutionally-separated institutions invoke the potential for divided government, with the party of the executive branch differing from that (or those) in control of the legislature. Additionally, presidents (and legislators) serve fixed terms in office making their removal from office before the completion of their term nearly impossible save through complicated impeachment processes.

Because of these variations in institutional arrangements, the process of winning and losing is distinctively different in parliamentary versus presidential systems, and this difference

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<sup>1</sup> The exceptions to this majority mandate in parliamentary systems are the presence of minority governments that rule without majority control but with majority consent.

alters the stakes of winning or losing for the electorate. Certain characteristics of presidential institutions raise the specter of the winner-loser effect by increasing the stakes of the political game. In presidential systems, the elections for chief executive are distinct from those of the legislature. Presidential elections take on a winner-take-all quality with only a single victor, raising the stakes of winning or losing. Also raising the costs of losing and the benefits of winning is the fact that presidents sit for fixed terms in office. The outcome of presidential elections, then, is both more exclusive than in parliamentary systems and more permanent. Embracing the unique position of presidents, this is a study of the winner-loser effect in the presidential systems of North, Central and South America. Herein, winners are all those who voted for the sitting president; losers voted for any other candidate except the victor in the most recent presidential election.

To complete the comparison of citizens from 18 countries, I needed comparative survey data. I found the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to meet the individual-level cross-national survey needs of this study. Table 1 indicates each country's most recent presidential election date prior to data collection for LAPOP 2008 early in that year and the respective winners of each election. All countries have the key selection variable: a popularly elected president from which I derive winner-loser status; however, the countries vary across the contextual variables including institutional arrangements and democracy, which in turn alter the winner-loser effect on political attitudes and behaviors.

## **1.2: The Winner-Loser Effect**

The difference between winners and losers in the attitude or frequency of behavior reflects the winner-loser effect. The size of the gap between winners and losers, therefore,

represents the magnitude of the effect. While the winner-loser gap can be positive (winner-dominated) or negative (loser-dominated), the overriding expectation throughout the winner-loser literature is that winners have a more positive relationship and losers a more negative one with government and the governing system. There are two ways in which this effect may play out. First, winning can mean that one will experience (or can expect to experience) more of the material rewards of office. Parties or the executive in power controls legislation and the formation of public policy during their tenure – the rewards for winning the office. Furthermore, even without material rewards, the psychological reward one gets from being a winner (or the dejection that arises from losing the electoral contest) impacts the citizen. Consequently, those who voted for the eventual winner find their preferences represented; alternatively, political losers are left to endure a period of opposition reign.

The second way the winner-loser effect can exert its influence is through the psychological effects of partisanship. Winners and losers use election results as a heuristic, a shortcut to help them understand the world and their positions in it (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). In this sense, there is a ‘home team’ bias in which winners view their government through rose-tinted glasses, giving more leeway to decision makers and holding more positive evaluations of the system than their loser counterparts (Norris, 1999). Partisans remain loyal to their electoral preferences, an opinion which is beyond the influence of material progress made on relevant issues. Regardless of the mechanism by which the winner-loser effect manifests, winners feel they’re in a positive position and have a positive response to government, while losers are in a negative position and, therefore, react negatively to government.

It is reasonable to expect that those on the outside of power (i.e. losers) act and feel differently towards government than those in power (i.e. winners). Losers feel more alienated

from the political system; conversely, winners have a congenial relationship with the government. The effect of these relationships manifests in the political attitudes and actions of individuals. Specifically, previous literature has shown that one's status as a political winner or loser affects such basic political characteristics as efficacy (Clarke & Acock, 1989), and trust and satisfaction with government (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001) as well as protest activities (Anderson & Mendes, 2005). Winners have a more positive relationship to government than do losers, hold more positive opinions about government than losers, and are less likely to participate outside the bounds of governing institutions than losers. Winner-loser status defines political attitudes and alters participatory patterns, creating and reinforcing divisions in society.

At another level, winning and losing in politics relates to issues of the legitimacy of the political system. The prizes of electoral competition go to the winners and their supporters, and the decision-making processes of government are dominated by political winners at the expense of political losers. Yet, "a stable democracy requires relatively moderate tension among its contending political forces" (Lipset, 1960, p. 71); therefore, the study of the winner-loser effect raises the question of which contexts may exacerbate the sentiments of winners and losers, increasing the stress on the democratic system and democratic society. Losers are the instigators of political change, and a system will remain stable so long as losers have relatively few incentives to bring about institutional change (Riker, 1983). Therefore, for a political system to endure, the conflict between winners and losers must be reconciled so that all see benefit to continued participation in and acceptance of the political system (Przeworski, 1991).

The supreme fear is that an excessive winner-loser effect reflects the alienation of losers from their political system, a polarization of society that can lead to the unraveling of the

democratic polity. Healthy polities encourage system support while offering a forum in which to express the various positions of society, and vivacious democracies require participation from all quarters to ensure its representativeness. Differences in opinion are to be expected, and the democratic system must be flexible enough to accommodate them; however, the system must also be strong enough to not let such tensions tear it apart. The democratic system exists to serve the individual constituents. Therefore, in order for the system to persevere, winners and, especially, losers must be able to hold and express their opinions while seeing the benefit to continued support for the system. Ultimately, then, the question of winning and losing becomes a topic of real interest for political leaders, for both those who wish to maintain the status quo and those who seek change.

### **1.3: Extending the Scope of the Winner-Loser Effect**

To begin, my study will mimic many of the initial steps of a winner-loser study from a line of literature that establishes the presence and magnitude of the winner-loser gap. However, this study makes two important contributions to the existing winner-loser research. First, it includes more dependent variables on which to see the winner-loser effect in action. These additional measures are important because they indicate to researchers of mass politics an underlying motivation for attitudes and behaviors that citizens hold based on their experiences of political winning and losing. One cannot get a clear picture of the citizen without taking these dispositions into account. Second, this study illuminates the role of context – both institutional and democratic context – on the winner-loser effect. Electoral winning and losing happens within a political system and situation that defines the stakes of the political game; these varying stakes

alter the impact of being a winner or loser in the post-election reality, which can be seen through the winner-loser effect on individuals' political attitudes and behaviors.

The extant literature on the winner-loser effect focuses, primarily, on single dependent variables, and such studies find consistent winner-dominant effect. For example, Clarke and Acock (1989) are concerned about the effect of electoral participation and outcomes on internal and external political efficacy; they find that electoral winners exhibit higher levels of both forms of efficacy than losers. Anderson and Guillory (1997) are concerned about support for democracy and, similarly, find that winners' levels of support outpace those of losers. Anderson and LoTempio (2002) are interested in trust in government, and they too find winner-dominated effect. Anderson and Mendes (2005) look at the winner-loser effect on protest potential, a mixture of actual participation and stated willingness to do so; here they confirm the literature's suspicion that losers will participate outside the political system more frequently than winners.

Two studies stand out for their wider coverage of the winner-loser effect. Anderson and Tvedora (2001) consider a wider range of system support variables including support for the performance of the regime and support for non-regime political actors (in this case civil servants); they also look at individual-level factors of both internal and external efficacy. Once again, they find overwhelming support for the winner-dominant theory of the winner-loser effect. Finally, the most comprehensive work on the winner-loser effect, Anderson et al. (2005), focuses predominantly on support for government variables, including support for democracy, system performance, and legitimacy of electoral outcomes; the authors also look at efficacy but restrict themselves to only external efficacy. Unsurprisingly, they too find a winner-dominant effect.

Overall, the literature has dabbled in a variety of political attitudes and behaviors, but it has not taken a systematic, comprehensive look at the whole political individual. One of the



primary aims of this study is to fill that void. Using the Latin American Public Opinion Project's survey data, I include indicators of ten political attitudes including both internal and external efficacy; interpersonal trust; trust and job approval of the national government, the president and congress; support for democracy; and pride in the political system. Additionally, I provide analysis of the winner-loser effect on both conventional and unconventional political participation, political discussion, and attempts to influence the votes of fellow citizens. I use these indicators to show the impact of winning and losing on individuals across the 18 presidential democracies in North, Central, and South America listed in Table 1.

Because the winner-loser gap gives an indication as to the health of the political system by illuminating the tensions it creates, verifying its presence confirms its importance to cross-national analyses. Large gaps between the opinions and actions of winners and losers provide evidence of strong stresses within the system which may require attention by political leaders and citizens for the democratic system to remain stable. This study provides evidence that shows that, while support and satisfaction measures remain winner dominated, the number of loser-dominant gaps nearly equals that of winner-dominant one's in the more self-evaluative measures such as internal efficacy and interpersonal trust. When the target of the attitudes specifically references the current government and actors, winner-loser status matters a lot. However, when the evaluation is turned inward to the individual, winner-loser status does not play as prominent a role. In the realm of participation, losers tend to outpace winners suggesting that, while losers are less pleased with their system, they are more than willing to participate in it; this is a good sign for the health and stability of democracy in these countries.

## **1.4: Exploring New Contexts**

The second improvement that this study makes to the winner-loser literature is to move into central focus the role of context in moderating or exacerbating the winner-loser effect, adding to our understanding of the impact of context on citizens. I choose to examine the presidential systems of North, Central, and South America because they present some key variations on those studies already conducted in the winner-loser arena. This extension provides new insight, not just to the study of the winner-loser effect, but also to the role that democracy and institutional arrangements play in shaping individuals' attitudes and behaviors. This study uses AmericasBarometer data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project from the year 2008 (collection dates for this version of LAPOP range from January through May of 2008) ("Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)."). The comparative analyses throughout this study include 18 presidential countries from the Western Hemisphere: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and the United States.

The most comprehensive of previous studies of the winner-loser effect – Anderson et al. (2005) – utilizes several surveys to provide a robust picture of winner and loser effects in the developed countries of Western Europe, Canada, and the United States and a handful of post-communist, Eastern European countries. The authors find a significant winner and loser effect on many attitudinal orientations towards the political system including external efficacy, trust in political actors and support for the political system of a country. Results and their significance vary by outcome variable and across countries; however, this study attempts only rudimentary descriptions of these cross-national differences. In fact, what cross-national comparison does take place takes Europe, Canada, and the United States all separately from one another. Where

this limited comparison does occur, the contextual variation is limited to democratic history and neglects institutional arrangement entirely.<sup>2</sup>

My winner-loser study elucidates the bond between citizens and political institutions in two distinct ways. First, it pushes studies of the winner-loser effect to new horizons by examining the effect across the Americas, in a variety of democratic contexts and histories. The new Latin American democracies with presidential leaders have escaped the scrutiny of winner-loser scholars who tend to focus on established democracies and those with parliamentary systems such as Western European states and Canada. The exceptional presidential system is the United States, which is more similar to the aforementioned established democracies in context than to other presidential systems around the world. If a country has a poor history of democratic protections for those not allied with the government, then the stakes of the game are significantly raised, adding incentive to win and increasing the costs of defeat. The strength and stability of democratic institutions alters the stakes of the political game and, thus, affects the winner-loser experience.

Democracy – its stability and legitimacy – is based, in large part, on the promise it makes to losers, that they will have a chance to reverse their fortunes via a subsequent election. However, democratic transitions in this region have only been at work for about three decades (Domínguez & Shifter, 2008). In fact, since World War II until the study date in 2008, the countries in this study have a median number of years of consecutive democratic governance of

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<sup>2</sup> Similarly, Anderson and Tverdova (2001) include 12 countries, but all are from Europe. Anderson and Guillory (1997) also take a cross-national approach, but their 11 countries are also all from Western Europe. Other winner-loser studies are single-country samples such as the United States – Clarke and Acock (1989) and Anderson and LoTempio (2002). Only Anderson and Mendes' (2005) study on protest potential includes non-European states in their cross-national analysis including the former British colonies of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States as well as Japan; while these countries represent a geographical divergence from the traditional analyses, they are still developed economic and political systems, reducing the substantive differences in the experience of winning and losing.

only a few decades (roughly 24 years) and average at least one autocratic regression each.<sup>3</sup> These statistics indicate that democracy is not inevitable in these countries, and indeed, the process of consolidating the democratic transitions of the 1980's and 1990's continues today. Losing is a much less risky endeavor in states with a long pattern of protecting minority rights than in those where losers' promised attempt at redemption by a free-and-fair future election is less secure. Under these circumstances of questionable democratic quality and history, one would expect a larger winner-loser effect.

The second way this study pushes the contextual barrier is by examining the impact of variations in presidentialism on the winner-loser effect. The political system can alter the stakes of electoral competition by defining the roles and powers of the elected actors. Powerful political offices increase the rewards of winning that position and increase the costs of losing, and the presidency in presidential systems is absolutely the top office in the land. Especially in Latin America, "the presidency has always been the epicenter" of political activity (Smith, 2005, p. 157). With justice and party systems still relatively undeveloped, the office of the president wields tremendous influence over national policy (Domínguez & Shifter, 2008). The institutional realities of presidentialism throughout the Americas endow this office with large amounts of power; consequently, citizens' winner-loser status greatly affects the political attitudes and behaviors of supporters and opponents of such presidents.

Powerful presidents raise the stakes of winning or losing that electoral contest, altering the winner-loser experience. Building off the work of Shugart and Carey (1992) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), I will use measures of the legislative and non-legislative powers of the

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<sup>3</sup> See Chapter 2 for coding rules and country-level scores on democratic history.

president to predict the magnitude of the winner-loser effect.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, I look at other institutional arrangements that also affect the power and position of the president including years in office. Another institutional factor affecting winning and losing in presidential systems is the number of candidates included in the presidential contest. The weakly institutionalized nature of party systems in Latin America tends to create a plethora of parties and high levels of electoral volatility; especially for winner-take-all presidential elections, an abundance of parties can weaken a president's mandate and his legitimacy in the eyes of electoral losers (Smith, 2005). However, an extreme multiparty context can also reinforce the positive relationship between winners and their candidate as together they have triumphed over a large field of opponents.

Finally, I add in an institutional factor unique to presidential system: the potential for divided government with the executive and legislature being controlled by different parties. While it can divvy up the winning and losing and, thus, increase representation, divided government has long been a motive for attacks on presidentialism because of its potential to deadlock the government (see Linz, 1990; Valenzuela, 1993). This deadlock, combined with the fixed terms of elected officials, can lead to a president's removal from office via constitutional (Pérez-Liñán, 2007) or extra-constitutional means (Tsebelis, 2002).

Comparing the winner-loser effect across countries provides perspective to the individual results, allowing one to see which systems ameliorate the inherent tensions created by political winning and losing versus those that exacerbate them. This study adds breadth to the types of cases reviewed under winner-loser studies by looking specifically at presidential countries at a variety of stages of political (i.e. democratic) development, clarifying the role of these contextual elements in the winner-loser experience. Ultimately, this study will show that the powers of the

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<sup>4</sup> While some work has been done in the Lijphart tradition of majoritarian vs. consensus systems (Anderson and Guillory 1997), because of the focus on parliamentary states, this measure is less appropriate for presidential systems.

president and institutional arrangements of presidential systems, especially the presence of divided government, have meaningful impacts on the winner-loser effect. Furthermore, it shows that a history of democratic stability and protection of individual rights moderates the tensions evident in the winner-loser effect. To achieve the goals of this study – a more thorough examination of the effect of winning or losing on the political individual, an increased understanding of context’s role in altering the winner-loser effect, and the expansion of winner-loser analyses to new corners of the world – I undertake a cross-national analysis of the presidential systems of the Americas.

## **1.5: Outlining the Study**

Going forward, Chapter 2 deals with the conceptualization and operationalization of the dependent and independent variables to be included in this study; additionally, it delineates the expectations for both the winner-loser effect and context’s influence thereon. Chapter 2 ends in a collection of eighteen hypotheses that will shape the subsequent analysis. Chapter 3 deals with the most basic element of the winner-loser argument, establishing the presence of the winner-loser gap in the surveyed countries included in the study. Furthermore, Chapter 3 addresses the importance of the winner-loser effect as an influence on political attitudes and behaviors through the use of significance tests and OLS and logistic regression as well as fixed effects models.

Chapters 4 and 5 add in the second important factor in this study: the role of context in moderating or exaggerating the winner-loser effect. Chapter 4 will examine the first dimension of context: the role of political institutions, power distribution and electoral realities on the winner-loser effect. Chapter 5 covers the second dimension of context: the effect of democracy – current and historical patterns of democratic length and quality – on the winner-loser effect.

These context-driven chapters utilize multi-level modeling to account for the combination of individual-level and country-level indicators. This study will end in Chapter 6 with a discussion of the conclusions from the preceding analysis, the broader implications of the winner-loser effect and the potential research avenues generated by this study.

## **1.6: Table**

**Table 1. Presidential Winners by Country (as of Jan. 1, 2008)**

<b><u>Country</u></b>	<b><u>(Code)</u></b>	<b><u>Date</u></b>	<b><u>Presidential Winner</u></b>
Argentina	(ARG)	10/28/2007	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
Bolivia	(BOL)	12/18/2005	Evo Morales
Brazil	(BRA)	10/29/2006*	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
Chile	(CHI)	01/15/2006*	Michelle Bachellet
Colombia	(COL)	05/28/2006	Álvaro Uribe Vélez
Costa Rica	(CORI)	02/05/2006	Oscar Arias
Dominican Republic	(RDOM)	05/16/2004	Leonel Fernández
El Salvador	(ELSA)	03/21/2004	Antonio Saca
Guatemala	(GUA)	11/04/2007*	Alvaro Colom
Honduras	(HON)	11/27/2005	Manuel Zelaya
Mexico	(MEX)	07/02/2006	Felipe Calderón
Nicaragua	(NIC)	11/05/2006	José Daniel Ortega Saavedra
Panama	(PAN)	05/02/2004	Martín Torrijos Espino
Paraguay	(PAR)	03/27/2003	Nicanor Duarte Frutos
Peru	(PERU)	06/04/2006*	Ollanta Humala
Uruguay	(URU)	10/31/2004	Tabaré Vázquez
Venezuela	(VEN)	12/03/2006	Hugo Chavez
United States	(USA)	11/02/2004	George W. Bush

**Notes:** Codes will represent each country in tables and figures throughout this study. Election dates marked with an asterisk (\*) represent elections that went to a run-off; in such cases, the date listed is that of the runoff round of the election. “Presidential winners” are those who voted for the winning presidential candidate in the first round of the election. [See Chapter 2 for a description of this coding decision.]



## **Chapter 2:**

### **Winner-Loser Effect Theory & Operationalization**

The effects of winning and losing can be seen in the way citizens feel and behave towards government and governmental actors. Ideally, the citizen is supposed to be rational and participative in governance; citizens should be interested, informed, and influential in the governing process (Luttbeg, 1968). While this “rational-activist model” of democratic linkage has been widely debunked by reports of nonparticipation (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Campbell et al., 1960) and misinformation (Kuklinski et al., 2000), the citizen is still a compilation of political behaviors and opinions shaped by the personal qualities, political realities, and institutional arrangements surrounding him. Citizens may not meet the conceptual ideal; however, they are still dominant players in the political game, selecting and electing government officials. Furthermore, these players operate within the confines of the political context in which they play the game of politics. It is this mixture of personal and political that motivates this study of winning and losing across contexts.

Institutional and democratic arrangements affect the thickness and shape of the winner-loser lens. Recall from Chapter 1, presidential systems have two democratically legitimate entities – the president and the legislature – as opposed to the parliamentary systems in which the executive is selected from within the legislature. Presidential elections are winner-take-all affairs with little or no room for negotiating minority (i.e. loser) interests after the fact. The nature of the presidential system – the powers of the president and the electoral rules that seat the constitutionally differentiated legislative and executive branches – affects the winner-loser

experience by altering the importance of holding the presidency. The more powerful the office that controls the rewards of victory is, the more important it becomes to see one's candidate win that office. A winner-loser study, such as this, can help scholars to understand which institutional arrangements exacerbate (and which ameliorate) winner-loser tensions in these higher-stakes political competitions, ultimately wading into the debate on the merits of presidentialism and presidential institutions.

This chapter covers the theory behind the political attitudes and behaviors and the role winner-loser status plays in motivating these positions and activities. Included in this study are the attitudes of efficacy, interpersonal trust, and support for the political system and its actors, as well as the participatory practices of conventional and unconventional political action and political discussion. Additionally, this study argues for the inclusion of contextual elements into the model of individuals' opinion formation and political behavior.

Throughout the following explanations of individual and contextual theory, I develop a series of hypotheses on the relationship between winner-loser status, the attitudes and behaviors of citizens, and the context in which individuals are embedded, and I present the operationalization of these concepts from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).<sup>5</sup> Next, I briefly summarize a group of control variables to be included in the empirical models, as the characteristics of individuals play a role in defining their political opinions and behaviors. Finally, this chapter culminates with a summary of the hypotheses delineated herein and provides a brief blueprint of the empirical chapters to follow.

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<sup>5</sup> This study includes eighteen presidential countries from North, Central, and South America. They are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, and the United States of America.

## **2.1: Defining Winners and Losers**

Winners are those who have had their aspirations and expectations met; conversely, losers have been unsuccessful in their attempts. Within the political realm, winners and losers are most often defined in relation to electoral results. Winners were successful in getting their candidate elected; losers were not. In the literature, which focuses predominantly on parliamentary systems, winners are all those who voted for a party making up the government (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001). In this study of presidential systems in the Americas, winners and losers are defined by the success or failure of their preferred candidate's attempt to hold the most powerful office in the system: the presidency. *Electoral winners are all those who voted for the winning president; losers are everyone else.*

I determine winners and losers based on self-reported vote choice in the most recent presidential election included in LAPOP survey. This measure is dichotomous. Anyone selecting the winning candidate is coded as a "1" for winner; all other responses to the vote choice question are coded with a "0" for losers. Two factors make this choice of coding decision more difficult. The first complication is the self-reported nature of the coding. There is a proven tendency for survey respondents to lie to the survey taker in order to give the answer the respondent thinks takers want to hear (Zaller, 1992). In this case, the tendency would be for respondents to claim winner status and its ensuing psychological reward of appearing to have chosen "correctly" in the last election. What this means for the study is that some "winners" may actually be "losers," which could minimize the differences between these two groups. While acknowledging the inherence of this problem in any study using survey research, any such movement will only further reinforce the findings of this study as any significance is in spite of such noise from the data.

The second difficulty in coding winners and losers lies in the electoral system of the individual countries. Plurality electoral systems are the most prevalent electoral systems of the 18 countries in this study; in such cases, coding is straightforward with only a single-round of voting. For systems with a majority run-off, multi-round system, however, coding requires a decision; in such cases, winner-loser status is coded by the first round vote choice. The motivation for this decision lies in the fact that voters can opt for a preferred candidate in the first round before settling on a major-party candidate in the run-off round. Conceptually, voters who preferred another candidate in the earlier round cannot be considered “winners” in the same way as those who selected the ultimate winner from the start of the electoral process; therefore, first round vote choice is the coding rule for winner-loser status throughout this study.

## **2.2: The Winner-Loser Effect on Political Attitudes**

Winning and losing is a result of competition, interactions where one participant meets with success while the other encounters failure. In the animal kingdom, winning and losing takes on a physical dimension of struggle and domination (Chase, Bartolomeo, & Dugatkin, 1994; Hsu & Wolf, 1999). For psychology, winning and losing relates to motivation. Intrinsic motivation is the desire to for competence and self-determination (Deci, 1975). These are people’s actions based on their desire for self-efficacy and autonomy; to know one’s capacity to perform the task and perform it well. The prospect of reward (or punishment) [winning and losing outcomes] adds motivations outside the person (extrinsic motivations) that are said to suppress intrinsic motivations (Deci et al., 1981).

Politically, winning and losing works much the same way as it does for biology or psychology. Specifically, the electoral realm of politics necessitates confrontation between teams

composed of candidates and their supporters. These political battles result in winners and losers who hold differential positions in relation to the elected government. There are extrinsic motivations (perceived rewards and punishments) that flow from such status as well as personally-held intrinsic motivations. In the political realm, these motivations either encourage or discourage one's feelings towards and continued acceptance of and participation in the political process.

Ultimately, this portion of the study focusing on the winner-loser effect on political attitudes is about the political and civic culture of individuals within their society. It is about "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system" (Almond & Verba, 1965, 12). These orientations fuel individual participation in their political system, a necessary cornerstone of democratic politics. This civic culture includes attitudes that are not necessarily political, such as trust in other people (30). Therefore, this study includes a collection of political attitudes that tap the individual's political orientations. These indicators include political efficacy, interpersonal trust, and a variety of government-support measures.

### ***Political Efficacy***

Efficacy is related to intrinsic motivation for activity and involvement (Deci, 1975), and consequently, the basis of representative politics – of active and involved citizenry – is dependent on feelings of political efficacy. People cannot be motivated to do something if they see no payoff or feel their efforts are wasted; in politics, efficacy comes from an indication that one can influence government (officials and/or policies) in a meaningful way. High levels of inefficacy indicate a breakdown in the system of representative democracy between the

government and the people, as citizens feel that they are no longer connected to their government or that they can no longer achieve their desired ends through it.

Efficacy has its roots in psychology, where one's efficaciousness relates to the recognition of the ability to perform a task and perform it well (Deci, 1975). Political efficacy can be both internal and external, and one's status as a political winner or a political loser can affect either of one's feelings of efficacy. External efficacy, at its most basic, refers to "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process, i.e. that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties" (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187). Internal efficacy is a very self-reflective form of efficacy, the feeling that one has the skills and resources to understand and participate effectively in politics. In contrast, external efficacy deals with the perception that government is responsive and accountable to the political influence of the individual citizen (Lane, 1959).

Winner-loser status should affect an individual's feelings of political efficacy. A study of the 1984 American electorate found support for winner-loser effect on both internal and external efficacy with the greatest effect coming from one's winner-loser status based on the presidential election (Clarke & Acock, 1989). Cross-national studies of developed democracies show mixed results with a significant winner-loser effect on efficacy in some nations but not in all; however, the primary study only looks at external efficacy (Anderson et al., 2005). My study expands on this previous winner-loser work by including measures for both internal and external efficacy with cross-national comparison. The winner-loser effect is a useful tool for understanding the foundations of the political attitudes of internal and external efficacy. In keeping with the previous literature, I expect that winners will feel more efficacious than losers.

As these limited previous works suggest, winners should exhibit greater levels of efficacy than losers. In addition, I also posit a secondary hypothesis on the winner-loser effect of external *versus* internal efficacy. The president will reflect winners' positions more than losers' because winners elected him or her; therefore, winners' external efficacy should greatly outpace that of losers, leading to a large winner-loser effect. However, a personal reflection on one's own competence in the political realm (internal efficacy) will not be as largely affected, as losers may not view a loss as a personal indictment on their own capacities. In this manner, winner-loser status should matter more for external efficacy (government listening) than for internal efficacy (political capacity); therefore, the winner-loser effect on internal efficacy will be smaller than that for external efficacy.

### **Hypothesis 1: Political Efficacy**

- ⇒ **1.1: Losers are likely to feel less efficacious than winners.**
- ⇒ **1.2: Winner-loser status matters more for external efficacy than for internal efficacy.**

The LAPOP survey provides one indicator for internal and external efficacy, respectively.<sup>6</sup> On internal efficacy (i.e. one's judgment of her own knowledge and capacity), the survey asks to what extent one agrees or disagrees with the idea that "I [the respondent] feel that I understand the most important political issues of this country." This is a self-reflective question about political knowledge, one's competence and understanding of the political world around him. Conversely, the outwardly-oriented external efficacy asks how much the respondent agrees

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<sup>6</sup> Responses to the efficacy questions on the extent to which one agrees with a statement range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). I recode this scale to go from 0 to 6 for ease of visual interpretation of graphs and figures used in later chapters.

or disagrees with the statement that “[t]hose who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think.”

Beyond the general winner-loser effect, evidence of cross-national variation in levels of efficacy in both this study and the Anderson et al. (2005) study (which only looks at external efficacy) suggests that there are elements or characteristics of political systems which may moderate the winner-loser effect; however, previous studies fail to determine what those system-level characteristics may be. My dissertation posits that there are significant impacts from political context on the winner-loser effect on political attitudes and behaviors, including that of efficacy. I will consider the moderating effects of context more toward the end of this chapter.

### ***Interpersonal Trust***

A democratic political system is based, inherently, on the conflict of ideas, beliefs, and values; the electoral process decides which of these will hold sway. At the heart of lasting democracy, then, must reside the capacity for individuals to accept the legitimacy of the political “other.” A healthy democracy is one in which “tolerance and compromise” are present to “moderate the intensity” of partisan conflict (Lipset, 1960, p. 71) . While not inherently political, interpersonal trust (IPT) is an important additive to civic culture (Almond & Verba, 1965). Should winners become intolerant, there emerges the long-feared “tyranny of the majority” (Mill, 1956); should losers lose their tolerance, the legitimacy of the system may fail (Riker, 1983). Interpersonal trust reflects a potential for cooperation and a moderation of potential tensions in a polity.

Trust is viewed as a necessary condition for the workings of a good society. Trust is a cornerstone of the broader concept of social capital (Putnam, 2000), and it is fundamental to



relationships amongst individuals. Mutual trust creates strong social bonds which can be social and political currency to be translated into greater productivity and accomplishment (Coleman, 1990). Trust allows citizens to break free of the Hobbesian vision of life as “nasty, brutish and short” (Newton, 2001). It provides friends, family, and acquaintances to help one navigate life successfully, and in consequence, IPT creates a vibrant civil society with citizens ready and able to engage in it. Conversely, rampant distrust can lead to the erosion of collaboration and compromise within a democratic society, creating a more polarized and divided polity.

The nature of democratic society requires that individual voters win or lose. Winners’ place as the dominant player in society and losers’ position of subservience create tension in society. Despite its value to democratic society, the extant winner-loser literature does not incorporate measures of interpersonal trust. With the rewards of victory (be they material or psychological), winners’ rosy feelings should extend to their personal interactions as well as those with government, leading to higher levels of interpersonal trust; similarly but in an opposite direction, losers’ negative feelings of failure, anger, or fear should taint their feelings with regards to other citizens in society, leading to lower levels of interpersonal trust among losers than winners.

### **Hypothesis 2: Interpersonal Trust**

⇒ **Losers are less trusting of other people than winners.**

Three indicators in the LAPOP data delve into the realm of interpersonal trust. Their differences lie in the specificity and focus of the trust judgment. At the broadest level, one can gauge trust as a dichotomy: can people be trusted? This question has no specific target of trust; it merely asks for a judgment on people in general. LAPOP also provides indicators that ask

respondents to evaluate trustworthiness more specifically, of people in their communities and of those they meet for the first time.<sup>7</sup>

For purposes of the analysis, these three measures are indexed into a four-point scale.<sup>8</sup> Those indicating no trust at all receive zero points while the most trusting, indicating any amount of trust in each of the measures, earn three points. Any mark of trust in each indicator gains the respondent a point; therefore, respondents can receive one point for the dichotomous measure (“most people can be trusted”) plus another point for answering that community members are “very” or “somewhat trustworthy” (versus “not very” or “not at all trustworthy”). Finally, respondents can receive their last point in the IPT index for answering with any level of trust in new acquaintances (“totally,” “somewhat,” or “trust a little” versus the only negative response “do not trust at all”). By combining these three measures of general, community, and new associate trust, one gets a more thorough picture of the overall level of an individual’s interpersonal trust. Applying the winner-loser lens to this index provides insight into the formation and maintenance of interpersonal trust among citizens.

### ***Government and System Support***

Representative democracy is rooted in the continuing support of the people. Citizens must trust in the elites and institutions to whom they have relinquished political, decision-making power. Ultimately, the legitimacy of any democratic political system is dependent on the continued backing of the people, especially amongst the losers. If losers are the instigators of

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<sup>7</sup> Questions on interpersonal trust included in the LAPOP dataset: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” “Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy?” “How much do you trust people that you meet for the first time? Totally trust them, somewhat trust them, trust them a little, do not trust them at all.”

<sup>8</sup> Factor analysis confirms the validity of combining these three measures into a single, indexed indicator.

political change (Riker, 1983), then a system will remain stable only as long as losers see continued benefit to be in the system and as long as they resist the urge to call for institutional change. While the system reflects the positions of electoral winners, losers must see a benefit to their continued participation in it. The continued trust, faith, and support of a populace in their government and its actors are necessary for the continued functioning of a democratic political system.

System support is initially considered to be two-fold; a citizen can express diffuse support or specific support. The former refers to judgments directed at the political system as a whole, while the latter relates to issues closely tied to specific political actors and their outputs (Easton, 1975). How a respondent interprets support questions (as implying either diffuse or specific judgments) remains a thorny issue for scholars of system support (see Canache, Mondak, & Seligson, 2001). However, all deal with the link between voters and their government because, in the end, support is determined by how one “evaluatively orients” oneself towards an object (Easton, 1975, p. 436).

Pippa Norris (1999) extends Easton’s dual classification. Rather than the two-fold, Eastonian arrangement, Norris imagines diffuse and specific support as a continuum along which one can place questions of support based on the object of support (Norris, 1999, p. 10). Five categories of questions range from most diffuse in their evaluation to most specific, from national pride and a sense of community to trust and evaluation of individual political actors. Inevitably, any question of support or satisfaction, either diffuse or specific, addresses the relationship between citizens and their government, a relationship determined in part by one’s status as a political winner or a political loser.

Cross-national research into political trust has been hampered by a lack of consistent questioning on the subject in large, cross-national survey projects (Newton, 1999). The most work on the winner-loser effect on support for government has been done in developed polities, where authors show that winning and losing affects trust in political institutions and satisfaction with the political system (Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTempio, 2002). Data availability has played a large role in determining this narrow case selection based in established democracies. However, the implications for trust and support for government are much greater for new and developing political systems. In such systems, support for the political system is most vital – as institutions do not have stand-alone legitimacy – but, also, most uncertain as citizens may still be unconvinced as to the effectiveness and necessity of the governing institutions (Canache, 2002). Luckily, the discipline continues to expand its gaze, and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) dataset provides a series of questions about several elements of trust in and satisfaction with government and the political system.

The winner-loser literature suggests that winners should have a more positive relationship with government than losers. This is a slight twist on the literature on trust in government which suggests a strong partisan component with partisans giving their ilk more positive evaluations than their opposition (Levi & Stoker, 2000).<sup>9</sup> Additionally, the winner-loser literature suggests that the winner-dominant effect continues from the specific realm to the more diffuse evaluations (Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001). However, for the health of the democratic system, one would hope that this winner-loser effect attenuates as one moves from more specific to more diffuse measures. By using a scale of system support, I am able to directly address this area in the literature by distinguishing between the winner-loser effect on specific *versus* diffuse

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<sup>9</sup> I include a control for partisan ID in the analytical models in order to distinguish the winner-loser effect from a partisan effect. For a description of this control, see section 2.4 below.

levels of support. The winner-loser effect is based on the connection that elections create between individual voters and the sitting government. I would suggest that this connection makes winner-loser status more salient for evaluations of specific support than for those of diffuse support; thus, the winner-loser effect should be stronger for specific support than it is for diffuse support.

### **Hypothesis 3: Government and System Support**

- ⇒ **3.1: Losers are more distrustful of political institutions and actors than winners.**
- ⇒ **3.2: Losers are less satisfied with the performance of their government and its actors than winners.**
- ⇒ **3.3: Losers are less satisfied with the democratic system than are winners.**
- ⇒ **3.4: Losers are less proud of their political system than winners.**
- ⇒ **3.5: Winner-loser status matters more for specific support than it does for more diffuse measures of support.**

Within LAPOP, the issue of system support falls into four categories of questions: trust in government, satisfaction with government actors' job performance, satisfaction with the overall workings of democracy, and level of pride in the government system. Each deals with a different object of judgment providing an array of specific and diffuse questions. Two sets of indicators deal with specific support towards one end of Norris' continuum. According to Easton, specific support concerns direct outputs from the government. Along those lines, I determine specific support based on respondents' levels of trust in government and satisfaction with the job performance of governmental actors. According to Hypothesis 3.1, losers will have a lower extent of trust in their government whether you ask them about the trustworthiness of the national

government as a whole, the president or their national congress.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, as in Hypothesis 3.2, losers are less satisfied with the job performance of the key government actors in a democracy (the president<sup>11</sup> and congress<sup>12</sup>) than are their winner counterparts. Both of the measures are quite specific, relating to the current government and its actors (levels five and four of Norris' diffusion scale (1999, 11)).

As we move up Norris' continuum of support towards more diffuse objects of support, the evaluations of the political system are more general. These indicators get to the roots of citizen contentedness with the system as a whole. Here as well, one's status as a political winner or loser, based on the electoral relationship to the current president, will affect one's view of the government (see Hypotheses 3.3 and 3.4). In the middle of the scale of support (what Norris calls the third of five levels (1999, 11)), losers are less satisfied with the form of democracy in their countries than are winners.<sup>13</sup> Finally, at the most diffuse level of government support (Norris's "Level 1"), losers are less proud than winners to live under the political system of their country.<sup>14</sup> Because objects of diffuse support are broader and less susceptible to control/change by the sitting government, winner-loser status should matter less for diffuse support than for

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<sup>10</sup> Questions on trust in government included in the LAPOP survey: "To what extent do you trust the national government?" "To what extent do you trust the President?" "To what extent do you trust the National Congress?" Responses are scaled from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot). For this study, I recode the scale to run from 0 to 6.

<sup>11</sup> Question on presidential job approval included in the LAPOP survey: "Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President (name)?" Responses to presidential job satisfaction are on a 5-point scale from "very good" to "very bad." For this study I recode this satisfaction scale to run from 0 (very bad) to 4 (very good).

<sup>12</sup> Question on congressional job approval from the LAPOP survey: "Now speaking of Congress. Thinking of members of congress as a whole without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members of Congress are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly or very poorly?" For this study, I code responses from 0 ("very poorly") to 4 ("very well").

<sup>13</sup> Question on satisfaction with democracy in the LAPOP survey: and "[i]n general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the form of democracy in (country)." I code satisfaction with democracy from 0 ("very dissatisfied") to 3 ("very satisfied").

<sup>14</sup> Question on pride in the political system included in the LAPOP survey: "[t]o what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of (country)?" Responses scaled from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("a lot"). I recode the scale to run from 0 to 6.

specific support (Hypothesis 3.5). In this way, the winner-loser effect may be less dangerous for the stability of democracy than it is for the tenure of individual presidents.<sup>15</sup>

## **2.3: Winner-Loser Effect on Political Behavior**

If democracy is to be understood from the *demos*-rooted “rule by the people” cliché that we teach all middle school social studies students, then the participation of individuals in the political process seems a necessary condition for the realization of this concept. As Dahl (1971) famously claimed, democracy requires both participation and contestation.<sup>16</sup> As such, political participation is a necessary part of democratic politics and may be broadly conceived of as activities by individuals intended to influence the political system, its actors, or other citizens towards political ends. Such participation can occur in two different channels: conventionally or unconventionally.

### ***Conventional vs. Unconventional Participation***

Modern representative democracy channels the opinions and actions of the people through institutions, formalized by the process of elections and the contact and activities included therein. Within this category reside political actions such as voting, attending town meetings, and campaigning. These conventional actions are considered low-cost activism in democratic systems, taking little of an individual’s time, effort, or money and, ultimately, presenting little risk to the individual (McAdam, 1986).

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<sup>15</sup>This idea that regimes are susceptible to individual turnover without threatening democracy would support a new line of recent literature on democratization in Latin America. There is a growing sense that instability in Latin America is no longer about the changing of regime type (i.e. devolution into autocracy), but instead, change in these regimes is about removal of presidents before their term has ended (Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Pérez-Liñán 2007).

<sup>16</sup> Dahl (1971) doesn’t think that modern democracies reach the ideal of a widely participative citizenry. Instead of democracy, he claims that a more accurate characterization of modern polities would be as polyarchy.

Unconventional participation takes on a negative definition in that it includes those actions not associated with the institutional processes of representative politics (Barnes & Kaase, 1979). Positively, unconventional participation is “uninstitutionalized direct political action” (42). The driving question for unconventional participation is why would an individual step outside the bounds of conventional participation into the more costly (in terms of time, risk, etc.) realm of unconventional political participation? Winning and losing suggests a potential explanation; although representative democracy is meant to give voice to the people, some are still less “heard” than others. These are the losers in the democratic process, and as such, they may seek to move outside the institutionalized world of politics from which they receive little satisfaction (Anderson & Mendes, 2005; Riker, 1983).

Losers are more likely than winners to participate outside the institutions of government than winners; conversely, winners use the institutionalized forms of participation more frequently than losers. If the winner-loser effect on both conventional and unconventional participation is great in these expected directions, this suggests that the political system is not effectively managing citizen demands; losers feel they must operate outside of the institutional channels of government in order to be heard or to enact change. Again, a focus on context may suggest conditions under which these institutional breakdowns in channeling political behaviors occur, but one must first start with establishing the winner-loser effect on conventional and unconventional political participation.

#### **Hypothesis 4: Conventional Political Participation**

⇒ **Winners are more likely than losers to use conventional forms of participation.**

#### **Hypothesis 5: Unconventional Political Participation**

⇒ **Losers are more likely to participate unconventionally than winners.**



LAPOP provides a set of indicators that can be used to get at the issues of participation. For conventional participation, we are interested in contacts or interactions with the governing system and institutions. In this case, such conventional participation includes contacting of government officials/agencies for assistance, participation in local political gatherings, and attendance at meetings of political parties.<sup>17</sup> These actions all revolve around the current governing system. I create two different measures for conventional participation. The first involves contacting local officials, Congressional representatives, or government agencies/institutions; the second focuses on attending political gatherings.<sup>18</sup> Both measures of conventional participation I use are dichotomous; either one has or one has not contacted government or attended politically-oriented meetings. Conversely, unconventional participation concerns extra-institutional political expression; in this case, protest participation will be the measure of unconventional participation.<sup>19</sup> This is also a dichotomous measure for any participation (“sometimes” and “almost never”) versus no protest participation in the last year (“never”).

### ***Political Discussion***

Finally, political discussion can be considered an important political behavior, even if it isn't about impressing individual opinions on government and government officials. Instead,

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<sup>17</sup> Questions regarding conventional participation included in the LAPOP survey: “Have you ever requested help from... a member of Congress, a local public official or a federal or state agency or public institution?” “Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?” “Do you attend meetings of a political party or political organization once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never?”

<sup>18</sup> Factor analysis confirms that these two categories (contacting and attending) are substantively different forms of conventional participation.

<sup>19</sup> Question regarding unconventional participation included in the LAPOP survey: “[N]ow thinking about the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? Have you done it sometimes, almost never or never?”

political discussion involves the transmission of political ideas amongst individuals. A healthy democracy needs political discussion to encourage tolerance and the deliberative process (Lipset, 1960). Experiencing disagreement in political discussion pushes citizens to understand and justify their own beliefs (Huckfeldt, Ikeda, & Pappi, 2005; Mutz & Mondak, 2006); in fact, it is precisely the cross-cutting discussions amongst differing opinions that ultimately encourages knowledge and tolerance in society (Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2002; Mutz, 2002; Mutz & Mondak, 2006). Vibrant political discussion combining many and differing opinions is necessary for modern democracy to flourish. A one-sided, winners' dominance of political discussion indicates that disagreement, and inevitably democracy, is imperiled.

Although not directly addressed in the literature on winning and losing, the expectation from communication is that majority or minority status affects citizens' rates of political discussion (Mutz, 2002; Mutz & Mondak, 2006). As a consequence of their majority status in society, winners are less likely than losers to meet with dissonance – objections to or disagreements with their political positions – when discussing politics. Since dissonance is uncomfortable for humans and is, therefore, to be avoided, losers have greater incentive to avoid political conversation than winners (Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2004). According to theories of dissonance, winners will be more likely than their loser counterparts to participate in political discussions and put their political positions out for others to see.

An alternative set of loser-dominant hypotheses is also theoretically possible. Winner-loser theory suggests that losers' political attitudes will be more negative than those of winners; this disdain for the sitting government may give losers more to discuss than winners who are happy to go along with the *status quo*. Similarly, in order to mobilize the electorate to oust the incumbent government, losers must try to influence others to vote for their candidate against the

previous election's winner. To enact change, losers must get their opinions and positions out in public to convince others to join their cause. Ultimately, normatively and for the sake of deliberative democracy, the winner-loser gap in discussion and influencing should be as small as possible, indicating that both winners and losers participate in this way with similar frequencies.

### **Hypothesis 6: Political Discussion and Influence<sup>20</sup>**

- ⇒ **6.1: Winners will discuss politics more frequently than losers.**
- ⇒ **6.2: Winners will try to influence other voters more frequently than losers.**

LAPOP includes a measure for political discussion generally<sup>21</sup> and a more specific question regarding attempts to sway potential voters to your side during an election.<sup>22</sup> Winners are more frequent discussers of politics and attempt to convince others to join their political positions more often than do their loser counterparts. Once again, the context in which the discussion occurs should matter and, therefore, will affect the winner-loser relationship with political discussion.

In conclusion, the literature is clear on the winner-loser effect on political attitudes. Although no study provides the systemic diversity of attitudinal variables that this one does, there is a consistent, winner-dominant effect on individual opinions with winners scoring higher than losers across the board (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Clarke & Acock, 1989). The hypotheses

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<sup>20</sup> For the sake of conciseness, the hypotheses are presented in the winner-dominant, dissonance lens. However, as justified above, there is just a strong reasoning to suggest that losers may dominate this area of political participation.

<sup>21</sup> Question on LAPOP survey regarding political discussion: "How often do you discuss politics w/ other people? Daily, a few times a week, a few times a month, rarely, or never." For this study, responses are scaled from 0 ("never") to 4 ("daily").

<sup>22</sup> Question on LAPOP survey regarding attempts to sway other voters: "During election time, some people try to convince other to vote for a party/candidate. How often have you tried to convince others? Frequently, occasionally, rarely, or never." Herein, responses scaled from 0 ("never") to 4 ("frequently").

suggested above will attempt to confirm this pattern across the attitudes of efficacy (both internal and external), interpersonal trust, and various measures of support for government [Hypotheses 1-3]. These results provide a broader, more nuanced understanding of the winner-loser effect on political attitudes.

However, attitudes alone have little impact on the actual practice of politics if unsupported by political action. In this realm, there is a real lack of study of the winner-loser effect across different forms of political behavior. The translation of attitudes into behaviors is a vital step in understanding how politics works in a country, and this study will analyze this important linkage [Hypotheses 4-6]. If one really wants to know how the winner-loser effect affects politics in a state, then one must study political behaviors as well as political attitudes.

Yet just as one should not study attitudes without behaviors, one cannot study individual attitudes and behaviors without including context, because these characteristics are not formed or executed in a political vacuum. Instead, one must take into account the role of context in moderating the winner-loser effect on the political attitudes and behaviors discussed above.

## **2.4: Context and the Winner-Loser Effect**

Context is supremely important when studying political opinions and behaviors of individuals. An individual does not experience politics in isolation. Instead, the individual citizen is surrounded and bounded by his or her context – the rules and structures that define the political game. Beyond moving to another area, individuals have little control over their context. Context is structurally imposed and external to the individual (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987, p. 1200). All political activity and opinion formation occurs around and within this structure. Context defines an individual's political options and sets the stakes of winning and losing

electoral contests for control government. For example, presidential elections are winner-take-all affairs. They create divisive politics; as such, it is important to study the winner-loser dynamics in such countries, to explore how variations in presidentialism may alter the winner-loser effect. Without accounting for context, research into any individual phenomenon – political, social, cultural, even biological – will be set up to fail by discounting this fundamental source of influence.

While institutional and democratic context should provide an interesting realm of study, research on winner-loser effects in politics curtails the variation in context by centering on the study of the consolidated, parliamentary democracies of Western Europe.<sup>23</sup> For example, one work uses Lijphart's distinctions of majoritarian and consensus systems (Lijphart, 1999) to analyze satisfaction with democracy in 1990, with all 10 included countries coming from Western Europe (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). In another piece, Anderson and Mendes (2005) examine protest potential in new democracies, where their “new” democracies include five Eastern European countries. Even the most expansive work on winner-loser biases – Anderson et al. (2005) – includes only Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and some Central and Eastern European states. There is a sense that context has to play a role in the winner-losing experience, but cross-national studies of the developing world have been basically nonexistent.

While the existing works create a dense literature on this handful of advanced countries, the literature has necessarily lacked insight into the wide swath of world politics not falling into the European Union, the United States or the British Commonwealth. Most importantly, two key areas regarding context and its effect on winning-losing have slipped through the proverbial cracks. First with the predominance of parliamentary systems in the previous literature, scholars

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<sup>23</sup> Anderson et al. (2005) includes one presidential system, the United States. Given this limitation on cases, they do not undertake analysis of the potential effects of presidential institutions on the winner-loser patterns found therein.

have neglected the question of how variations in presidential systems affect the winner-loser effect. Do variations in the powers held by presidents alter the impact of winning and losing? Does divided government lessen or exacerbate winner-loser tensions? These are questions unique to presidential systems that the previous literature, necessarily, cannot address.

The second group of questions deals with historical and democratic context of the countries involved. Anderson et al. (2005) look at transitioning post-communist countries; however, the close relationship between these states and the European Union provides unique incentive for democratic consolidation. In contrast, the democratization process in Latin America has been much more sporadic, with most states suffering interruptions from military, autocratic takeovers. In this context, some unique questions emerge. Specifically, how does the uncertainty of the democratic political process in new democracies affect winners and losers? How does familiarity with democratic politics affect one's responses to winning and losing? And, how do current levels of democratic rights protections affect the winner-loser experience? The extant winner-loser literature has failed to address these questions about democratic and presidential context; this project will remedy this oversight.

### ***Executive Power & the Presidential Context***

The first questions address an important contextual dimension: the structure of power and the role of the executive in the state. Institutional arrangements are important for government because they determine with whom power – and thus responsibility for the rewards of victory – lies. Most of the previous winner-loser studies focus predominantly on parliamentary systems where membership in the ruling coalition defines winner status. However, large swathes of the developing and middle-income world (especially in Latin America) rely on presidential

governments, and this institutional arrangement presents particular challenges that the more negotiated parliamentary systems do not.

Since Juan Linz presented his critical analysis of presidentialism in the early 1980's, presidential systems have had a bad reputation as being disadvantageous to stable democracy because of the fixity of the system and the potential for deadlock caused by the dual legitimacy of the president and the legislature (Linz, 1990). Furthermore, concentrating power in the office of the president is thought to encourage the emergence of demagogical leaders who can abuse their positions to inhibit democratic governance (Linz, 1990; Valenzuela, 1993). Examination of the world's states in the post-WWII era seemed to confirm the idea that presidential systems made democracy less durable; on face value, the historical evidence was clear that countries that used presidential systems had more reversions to authoritarianism than did their parliamentary cousins.

In the face of this condemnation, however, others have rallied admirably to presidentialism's defense; while acknowledging the potential shortfalls of the system, they argue that institutional and electoral arrangements, as well as past legacies of authoritarian rule, are the real causes of presidential-system instability, not presidentialism in and of itself (Cheibub, 2007; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). For example, presidential system stability can be threatened by overly-strong presidents. Powers of the executive can be broken down into legislative and non-legislative powers (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Metcalf, 2000; Shugart & Carey, 1992), and the sense is that presidential systems which endow great legislative powers to the president are more prone to breakdown than those with legislatively weaker presidents (Shugart & Carey, 1992). Additionally, combining a presidential executive with proportional representation in the legislature can exacerbate the gridlock problems of presidentialism by encouraging a plethora of

political parties (Mainwaring, 1993). This study is interested in these tension-ameliorating or tension-exacerbating arrangements, in the ways in which the presidential institutions and division of power in the presidential countries of the Americas affect the political attitudes and behaviors of winners versus losers.

In presidential systems, individuals vote separately for the executive and for the legislature, who share law-making power. When examining the winner-loser effect in presidential systems, one must account for the fact that there are two decision-making bodies. A presidential loss doesn't necessarily mean one is completely shut out of government; there is still the possibility that one's views can find expression with control of congress. This potential of divided government is frowned upon by critics of presidentialism as a cause of gridlock (Linz, 1990; Valenzuela, 1993). However, other studies have found that divided government doesn't inevitably lead to a breakdown of the system (Cheibub, 1999), and winner-loser study may provide an explanation as to why this potential negative can actually increase stability. Divided government may ameliorate some winner-loser tensions by divvying up the winning and losing, while symmetry between the president and legislature may exaggerate the winner-loser effect.<sup>24</sup>

Also, when cross-nationally comparing presidential systems, it is important to account for the possibility that the importance of winning the presidency depends on the amount of power wielded by the holder of that office. As the presidency gains power, it becomes increasing important to be a presidential winner. Cheibub (2007), following the tradition of Shugart and Carey (1992) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), suggests several means of operationalizing the relationship between presidents and legislatures based on the agenda-setting and legislative powers given to the president, including respective veto powers and relative control of important

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<sup>24</sup> Divided government occurs when the president's party is NOT either the leading party in the national congress or a member of the ruling coalition therein. This is a dichotomous measure.



legislation, such as the budget. These presidential powers are countered by the ability of the legislature to override such decisions.

I use the “Comparative Constitutions Project” data to update the initial legislative and non-legislative power coding from Shugart and Carey (1992) to account for constitutional modifications since their 1992 study (Elkins, Ginsburg, & Melton, 2011).<sup>25</sup> Ultimately, the more powerful the president, the greater the consequences of winning and losing and, thus, the greater the winner-loser effect should be.

Finally, I include a country-level indicator for the number of years already served by the president as of January 2008 (as all surveys for LAPOP 2008 were conducted between January and May of that year). How long one has been a winner or a loser under a sitting president should affect how one feels and acts towards government. While it is possible for the winner-loser effect to fade as status may weaken with time, I expect the opposite: it is likely that the more time the incumbent has spent in office the clearer the winner-loser divide becomes as citizens have had more time to decide on their opinions of and react to the sitting government.

#### **Hypothesis 7: Divided Government**

- ⇒ **The winner-loser effect is less extreme in countries with divided government than in those where the legislature is dominated by the same party as the President.**

#### **Hypothesis 8: Presidential Power**

- ⇒ **The more power the President wields, the larger the winner-loser effect – based on presidential vote choice – is.**

#### **Hypothesis 9: Years in Office**

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<sup>25</sup> Additionally, I include the measure of constraints on the executive developed by POLITY IV as an alternative measure of presidential power. I ultimately decide to use the amended Shugart and Carey measure instead of POLITY because of the increased nuance of the former measure over the latter.

⇒ **The longer the sitting president has been in office, the greater the winner-loser effect will be.**

Presidential systems offer unique characteristics that can exacerbate or ameliorate the differences in the attitudes and behaviors of winners and losers. The separation of powers in presidential systems creates both the potential for divided government and requires the allocation of decision-making powers. Additionally, presidents are endowed with varying degrees of powers and freedoms. Finally, presidents sit for fixed terms and there are various rules governing their reelection; all of which result in variation in the length in which a president can and has held office. Table 2 summarizes by country the presidential system factors to be included in Chapter 4 of the study.

### ***Historical & Current Democratic Context***

A second dimension of context that as of yet has been only narrowly explored by the literature on winning and losing regards historical experience with democracy and the resultant winner/loser experiences. Once again, political winning and losing isn't just the individual experience of atomized individuals. Rather, this experience is rooted in polities with varieties of institutional rules and historical experiences. Social consensus provides norms for interpreting this world (Prislin & Wood, 2005); these widely agreed-upon ideas help one understand the world, help one relate to others, and help define one's identity (677-684). Democracy, with its supporting ideas of tolerance, trust, and participation (Almond & Verba, 1965; Lipset, 1960), creates one such reality; however, in new democracies, this norm does not hold sway, and players in the political game must accept consequences of winning and losing under fluid conditions. For such neophyte citizens, this is a process of learning to lose while maintaining

respect for the rules of the democratic system; in this manner, historical experience and practice with democracy – with its elections and the ensuing wins and losses – alters the effect of the winner-loser experience.

As previously mentioned, democratic politics inherently creates winners and losers. In established democracies, the effects of losing are tempered by the individual knowledge that there will be another chance at power via future elections. Furthermore, the equitable rule of law guarantees that the accession to power by one's opponents will not result in physical or material distress for the losers. While the nature of the presidential election may be zero-sum, in established democracies losers are assured that the consequences of the election round will be neither cataclysmic nor everlasting. However, in new democracies, these guarantees to losers are not assured to the same extent as the norm of alternation of power has not been established; thus, the perceived costs of losing may be much graver. In Latin America, the historical reality of military regimes that absolutely failed to protect, and in many cases directly persecuted, losers establishes a tenuous historical foundation for democratic politics. Only a consistent display of successful rights protections and alternation of power over time can overcome the legacy of losers' oppression in the past. The fluidity of the political system in these newer democracies and historical legacies of loser persecution increases uncertainty in the political game, exacerbating the effect of winning or losing.

Not only does democracy inherently create winners and losers, but the distinction of electoral winners and losers inherently assumes a democratic form of government. Intuitively, the effects of losing and winning are not the same if there is no election or if the election outcome is predetermined compared to electoral contests that take place in a democracy; in the absence of democracy, electoral outcomes are distorted. The payoffs of winning or losing –

access to and control of rewards or the forfeiture thereof – are warped without meaningful political and electoral competition. Minimally, democracy exists when regimes are selected through regularly contested elections (Przeworski et al., 2000). However, a great deal of variation exists around the quality of democracies beyond the elections minimum. The protection of rights and liberties is also important to the full realization of democracy (Dahl, 1971a). Consequently, both the length of democracy's existence and the quality of democracy within the state should affect how one feels about and responds to winning and losing.

Because this element of context determines the importance of elections and the stakes of the contests, the current and historical experience one has had with democracy affects the experience of winning and losing in three related ways. First, democratic experience should reduce the effects of winning and losing, closing the gap in attitudes and behaviors between winners and losers. Those with the most experience with the alternation of power via elections will be least swayed by election results in their political attitudes and actions. Finally, current levels of rights protections define the present context for attitude formation and political participation. High levels of protection of civil liberties and rights should reduce the winner-loser effect as the repercussions of elections are tempered by systematic protections. In a context of high rights protections, losers have less to fear about the erosion of their rights while their opponents control the government.

#### **Hypothesis 10: Democratic Experience**

- ⇒ **The winner-loser effect on attitudes and behaviors will be smaller the longer the democratic experience of a country.**

#### **Hypothesis 11: Democratic Quality**

- ⇒ **The winner-loser effect will be smaller in countries with high levels of democracy than in those with poor democratic quality.**

A country's democratic quality and longevity define the context in which all of this winning and losing and supporting, trusting, and participating occurs. The idea of democracy in context can be conceptualized in two ways: past democratic history and current democratic quality. In order to code these data, I use data collected by Cheibub and his colleagues (2010) in their research into the foundations of democratic versus authoritarian government.

Longevity of democracy refers to the number of consecutive years of democracy a country has experienced from the time of the most recent imposition of democratic governance up to the date of this study in 2008. I also use an alternative coding of democratic history that may be more relevant to the individual political experiences of citizen respondents to the LAPOP (2008) survey: years of democracy (not necessarily consecutive) since the end of WWII; this operationalization of contemporary democratic history gives countries credit for recent democratic experience even if it was interrupted by a period of authoritarianism.

Finally, I use POLITY IV and Freedom House to measure the current quality of democracy within the state. For both of these indicators of democratic quality, I use the results published in 2008 that reflect the quality of democracy in 2007; I do this because data collection for the LAPOP 2008 survey took place in the early months of 2008, making 2007 the last full year experienced by the populace before the survey.<sup>26</sup> Table 3 shows a country-by-country summary of the coding results for democratic context.

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<sup>26</sup> Only two countries had a change in the democratic quality coding from Freedom House from 2007 to 2008; Colombia and Nicaragua both saw one of their indicators decrease in quality (in civil rights in Colombia and political rights in Nicaragua). No country saw their POLITY IV score change between 2007 and 2008.

## **2.5: Individual-Level Controls**

A final component of the forthcoming multivariate models of individual political attitudes and behaviors necessitates a return to the individual level. In addition to winner-loser status, I include as independent variables a series of control variables to account for demographic and other characteristics which the literature suggests may play a role in determining one's attitudinal and behavioral positions. **Gender** and **age** are two particularly influential characteristics. For the most part, politics remains a male dominated field, despite the fact that Latin America has a stronger presence of women in political leadership roles than other parts of the world. The male-dominated pattern engenders greater external efficacy and government support amongst men than women (Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997). Internal efficacy should be affected less by gender as this is a more self-reflective rather than outwardly oriented attitude. Looking at respondent age in new democracies gives us a window into the development of political attitudes and behaviors. Elders have political experiences, often with autocracy, that many younger people do not; while this necessitates a re-socialization to the norms of democracy (Mishler & Rose, 2002), past autocratic memories can also mitigate expectations for current performance evaluations exerting a positive influence on one's relationships to government. In this case, the expectation is that younger citizens will be more critical than their elders, leading to a positive association between age and support especially in the measures of more specific support. Additionally, young people tend to be more active in unconventional participation due to the lack of ties and obligations that come with a more advanced age (McAdam, 1986).

Also included in the models as a control is **education**. Education is a key component of the participation literature on socio-economic status (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978). Education creates a more knowledgeable, and potentially more critical, citizenry

(Christensen & Laegreid, 2005), leading to a negative relationship, especially in specific support. However, education should increase feelings of efficacy and, perhaps, encourage more conventional participation as educated folks are more able to access institutions and to communicate their positions to government officials.

Finally, I also include a control for party identification (PID). PID is especially important to winner-loser studies because it allows for one to control for partisan bias in addition to winner-loser bias. A control for the **shared PID** of the presidential winner and the individual voter helps to eliminate the assertion that the winner-loser effect is entirely partisan-based. Combined with winner-loser status, PID variable helps to disentangle the effect of attachments to the political system and to an individual candidate from those of winner-loser status.

## **2.6: Blueprint and Summary of Hypotheses**

Going forward, Chapter 3 explores each of the general hypotheses (summarized in Table 4) within 18 presidential countries in North, Central and South America. I use a combination of difference-in-means tests and linear and logistic regression to confirm the existence and illustrate the boundaries of the winner-loser effect across this array of measures of political attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, the inclusion of fixed effects in the regression models shows the country-level differences and foreshadows the need for the multi-level analyses that follow in Chapters 4 and 5.

Chapters 4 and 5 tackle the questions raised by the hypotheses listed in Table 5 regarding the role of national-level context in moderating the winner-loser effect. Chapter 4 addresses the first set of country-level factors [Hypotheses 7-9] dealing with presidentialism and electoral factors. Chapter 5 covers the two hypotheses dealing with democracy and historical context

[Hypotheses 10 and 11]. Throughout these contextual models, I use multi-level modeling techniques in which the individual-level data from Chapter 3 can be combined with the second-level conditions of the countries' institutional and democratic characteristics. The study will culminate in Chapter 6 with a discussion of the broader implications of the winner-loser effect and establish which questions remain to be studied with regards to the winner-loser effect on citizen attitudes and behaviors.



## 2.7: Tables

**Table 2. Presidential Power and Electoral Rules by Country**

	Divided Govt.	Legislative Power	Non- Legislative Power	Presidential Power (PP)	Tenure to Date
<b>ARG</b>	NO	3	3	6	0
<b>BOL</b>	NO	1	2	3	2
<b>BRA</b>	NO	3	1	4	5
<b>CHI</b>	NO	3	2	5	2
<b>COL</b>	NO	4	2	6	5.5
<b>CORI</b>	NO	4	2	6	1.5
<b>RDOM</b>	NO	1	1	2	3.5
<b>ELSA</b>	NO	2	2	4	3.5
<b>GUA</b>	NO	2	2	4	0
<b>HON</b>	NO	1	2	3	2
<b>MEX</b>	NO	2	1	3	1
<b>NIC</b>	NO	4	2	6	1
<b>PAN</b>	YES	1	1	2	3.5
<b>PAR</b>	NO	4	1	5	4.5
<b>PERU</b>	YES	4	3	7	1.5
<b>URU</b>	NO	3	2	5	3
<b>VEN</b>	NO	4	3	7	9
<b>USA</b>	YES	1	1	2	8

**Notes:** “Divided government” based on presidential winner’s party having control (or membership in controlling coalition) in the national legislature in January 2008.

“Legislative Power” is an index with one point each for partial veto, total veto and decree powers, plus an inverse of the legislatures ability to override (i.e. no override = 2 points, strong override ( $\geq 2/3$ ) = 1 point, weak override ( $< 2/3$ ) = 0 points). Scale ranges from 0 (very weak president) to 5 (very strong president).

“Non-legislative Power” is an index of cabinet formation (one point each for appointing and approving) plus the president’s constitutional ability to dismiss both the cabinet and the legislature. Scale ranges from 0 (very weak president) to 4 (very strong president)

“Years served” is calculated by the time already spent in office as of January 2008, rounded to  $\frac{1}{2}$  years.

**Table 3. Democratic History and Quality in the Americas**

	<b>Years of Democracy (consecutive to 2008)</b>	<b>Years of Democracy (1946-2008)</b>	<b>Freedom House</b>	<b><u>POLITY</u></b>
<b>ARG</b>	25	45	4	8
<b>BOL</b>	26	27	6	8
<b>BRA</b>	23	41	4	8
<b>CHI</b>	18	45	2	10
<b>COL</b>	50	53	6	7
<b>CORI</b>	59	61	2	10
<b>RDOM</b>	42	42	4	8
<b>ELSA</b>	24	24	5	7
<b>GUA</b>	22	51	7	8
<b>HON</b>	26	33	6	7
<b>MEX</b>	8	8	5	8
<b>NIC</b>	24	24	6	9
<b>PAN</b>	19	37	3	9
<b>PAR</b>	19	19	6	8
<b>PERU</b>	7	30	5	9
<b>URU</b>	23	50	2	10
<b>VEN</b>	49	51	8	5
<b>USA</b>	233	63	2	10

**Notes:** “Years of Democracy” are the years of consecutive democracy counting back from 2008.

“Years of Democracy since 1946” represents the initial start date for the Cheibub et al. 2010 data collection project and counts all democratic years until 2008.

Freedom House scores are aggregates of the country’s Political Rights and Civil Rights scores (variable range: 2 (most free) to 14 (least free)).

POLITY IV scores range from -10 (completely autocratic) to 10 (completely democratic).

**Table 4. Attitudinal and Behavioral Hypotheses (Summary)**

**Hypothesis 1: Political Efficacy**

- ⇒ **1.1: Losers are likely to feel less efficacious than winners.**
- ⇒ **1.2: Winner-loser status matters more for external efficacy than for internal efficacy.**

**Hypothesis 2: Interpersonal Trust**

- ⇒ **Losers are less trusting of other people than winners.**

**Hypothesis 3: Government and System Support**

- ⇒ **3.1: Losers are more distrustful of political institutions and actors than winners.**
- ⇒ **3.2: Losers are less satisfied with the performance of their government and its actors than winners.**
- ⇒ **3.3: Losers are less satisfied with the democratic system than are winners.**
- ⇒ **3.4: Losers are less proud of their political system than winners.**
- ⇒ **3.5: Winner-loser status matters more for specific support than it does for more diffuse measures of support.**

**Hypothesis 4: Conventional Political Participation**

- ⇒ **Winners are more likely than losers to use conventional forms of participation.**

**Hypothesis 5: Unconventional Political Participation**

- ⇒ **Losers are more likely to participate unconventionally than winners.**

**Hypothesis 6: Political Discussion and Influence**

- ⇒ **6.1: Winners will discuss politics more frequently than losers.**
- ⇒ **6.2: Winners will try to influence other voters more frequently than losers.**

**Table 5. Context-Related Hypotheses (Summary)**

**Hypothesis 7: Divided Government**

- ⇒ The winner-loser effect is less extreme in countries with divided government than in those where the legislature is dominated by the same party as the President.

**Hypothesis 8: Presidential Power**

- ⇒ The more power the President wields, the larger the winner-loser effect – based on presidential vote choice – is.

**Hypothesis 9: Years in Office**

- ⇒ The longer the sitting president has been in office, the stronger the winner-loser effect will be.

**Hypothesis 10: Democratic Experience**

- ⇒ The winner-loser gap in attitudes and behaviors will be smaller the longer the democratic experience of a country.

**Hypothesis 11: Democratic Quality**

- ⇒ The winner-loser gap will be smaller in countries with high levels of democracy than in those with poor democratic quality.

## **Chapter 3:**

# **The Winner-Loser Effect on Political Attitudes & Behaviors**

Winning and losing are fundamental conditions required by the democratic practice of elections. Voters win or lose in tandem with their preferred candidates in elections. The winner-take-all nature of presidential elections makes having one's candidate win that office of particular importance to voters. The expectation is for winners to be happier with the government than losers because their votes contributed to choosing the new leader and, thus, their positions will be represented in government, while losers' votes were for naught and their positions will be left out. However, excessively large gaps indicate that there is a polarizing element, either in the system or in the leader that could threaten the democratic nature of society. Examination of the gap in attitudes and actions towards government shows which countries minimize the winner-loser effect on political attitudes and behaviors and which countries exacerbate the difference.

The key premise of this chapter is that one's status as a winner or loser alters one's orientation toward politics as manifested in political attitudes and actions. Examination of the difference of means between winners and losers shows a significant, yet varied, winner-loser effect amongst citizens across North, Central, and South America. First, there is an effect on individual attitudes government and other citizens. Winner-loser status helps explain citizens' efficacy, interpersonal trust, and trust in government. Winner-loser status also affects individual attitudes about government and system performance, altering one's evaluations of job

performance, democracy, and the governing system. On the whole, for attitudinal variables, winners dominate the winner-loser gap confirming the assumption of the literature. In addition to political attitudes, winning and losing also affects participatory patterns and practices, but it does so less consistently than with attitudes and beliefs. Indeed, losers outpace winners in certain types of participation in many countries. Furthermore, in addition to the general winner-loser effect on political attitudes and behaviors, there is substantial cross-national variation in both the aggregate levels of these attitudes and participatory behaviors and in the magnitude of the winner-loser effect across all the indicators. The potential causes of this contextual variation will be examined in subsequent chapters.

### **3.1 Modeling the Winner-Loser Effect**

In this initial empirical chapter, I present a three-stage process to show the presence and magnitude of the winner-loser effect on political attitudes and behaviors. First, I confirm the existence of the winner-loser effect on political attitudes and behaviors through examination of the difference in mean response levels for winners versus losers in each country. Second, I run ordinary least squares, logistic, or ordered logistic regressions (depending on the scaling of the dependent variable in question) to calculate the winner-loser effect and determine whether it persists when controlling for other factors. This is a multivariate analysis which includes controls for key demographics – gender, age and years of education – as well as a dummy variable for sharing the party identification of the president. Finally, I add fixed effects into the preceding regression models to help illustrate the importance of country-level factors in explaining political opinions and actions and the effect of the winner-loser experience.

Using data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) from 2008 for 18 presidential democracies throughout North, Central, and South America, the following figures and tables illustrate the difference between the responses of winners and losers across attitudinal and behavioral indicators.<sup>27</sup> In all, there are thirty-six observation groups, one winner group who voted for the presidential winner holding office at the beginning of 2008 and one group comprising all losers who voted for any other presidential candidate from each of the eighteen countries.

Ultimately, there is a consistent and frequently significant winner-loser effect on the political attitudes of external efficacy, satisfaction and trust in government. Winners view their government more favorably than do losers, sometimes dramatically so. For internal efficacy and interpersonal trust results are more mixed across countries as to winner/loser dominance and differences are not consistently significant. The winner-loser effect on political behaviors is, similarly, more mixed and less frequently significant than the attitudinal indicators; this implies that while winner-loser status is sufficient to elicit attitudinal variation, it does not have the same motivating influence on political behaviors. Individual-level characteristics of the respective winners and losers help to explain some of this variability; however, this initial investigation into the winner-loser gap generates several questions about the variability of the effect across contexts that will be explored in later chapters.

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<sup>27</sup> Countries included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, and the United States.

### **3.2: The Winner-loser Effect across Attitudes**

One's status as a winner or loser is a key factor in defining one's relationships with government and with fellow citizens. How much influence one feels towards government, how much one trusts others, and how much trust one has in those in office is wrapped up tightly with our political identity as a winner or loser. Those on the winning side feel more efficacious, are more trusting of others and are more trusting of government and its institutions than those who voted for a losing presidential candidate in their country's most recent elections as of 2008. Along a similar line, winning and losing affects one's judgments on the political system's effectiveness and structure; winner-loser status, based on the elected executive, slants one's take on how well the government and its branches are doing their jobs and even one's perceptions on the quality of the democratic system in a particular country.

#### ***Political Efficacy***

Hypothesis 1.1 states that the winner-loser effect should be winner-dominant for efficacy.<sup>28</sup> However, Hypothesis 1.2 conditions that this effect will be stronger and more consistent for external efficacy than internal efficacy because the former relates directly to government responsiveness while the latter concerns evaluation of one's individual capacities. Figure 1 supports the first hypothesis that winners consistently feel more efficacious than losers across in all countries, and in support of the second hypothesis, this pattern is most clear for external efficacy. Winners see "those who govern this country" as being "really interested in what people like [them] think" more than losers in every country. Winners feel they have the

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<sup>28</sup> Chapter 2 provides a full justification and listing of all six groups of hypotheses included in this chapter (efficacy, interpersonal trust, government support, conventional participation, unconventional participation, and political discussion and influence).



attention of those in government more so than losers, and in all cases but three (Honduras, Panama, and Peru), this difference is statistically significant.<sup>29</sup> The relationship to government here is clear: winners elect those in power and, therefore, the system is perceived as responsive to their wishes. Additionally, winners control the spoils of victory; thus, they are assured their interests will be represented going forward.

Conversely, and in line with the second hypothesis, internal efficacy scores are much more equivalent for winners and losers, resulting in a smaller, and largely negligible, winner-loser effect. In fact, the winner-loser gap in internal efficacy is significant in a negative, loser-dominant direction in twice as many countries as it is significant in a winner-dominant direction. Winner-loser status has a more mixed effect among countries than external efficacy, and it is less frequently significant. Winning and losing does not have as strong an effect on this internally-directed judgment of one's own capacities as it does on the externally-oriented evaluation of government responsiveness.

While Figure 1 shows larger winner-loser gaps in external efficacy than internal efficacy, it is worth noting that efficacy on the whole is very low. Only four groups would "agree" to any degree that those who govern are interested in what common people think (i.e. show even moderate levels of external efficacy), and all of these were winners from their respective countries with Uruguay leading the way with a winner-efficacy score of 3.5.<sup>30</sup> The lowest overall external efficacy scores belong to the citizens of Paraguay whose average winner-efficacy score is only 0.9 and whose loser-efficacy average is a paltry 0.6. Overall, the vast majority of citizens – winner or loser – in many of the 18 countries in this study do not feel their governing leaders

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<sup>29</sup> I use a one-way ANOVA test to determine the significance of the difference in the mean scores throughout this analysis.

<sup>30</sup> Groups that averaged at least a 3 (on a 0-6 scale) include winners from Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela. No group of losers scored to this level.

are interested in citizen opinions. However, this feeling of being without a voice in government is consistently and significantly stronger amongst losers than winners with losers only averaging 1.9 while winners average 2.6 (on a scale of 0 to 6). Even in the face of very low overall levels of external efficacy, which does not provide much room for variation, one still sees a strong winner-loser effect.

Conversely, average responses for all groups of respondents were higher for internal efficacy than for external efficacy, and the winner-loser gap, on average, is negligible on the same zero-to-six scale; only thousandths of a point separate the winner average (3.071) from the loser average (3.067).<sup>31</sup> Whereas all respondents, but especially losers, exhibit low amounts of external efficacy, all respondents display more internal efficacy (i.e. more trust in their own capacities to understand politics), an effect that is especially pronounced amongst losers. As Figure 1 shows, losers surpass winners, although not always substantially so, in roughly half of the cases.

Amongst the six cases in which the winner-loser effect is significant for internal efficacy, only two are positive (winners outpace losers significantly in Uruguay and the Dominican Republic); the other four are negative with losers feeling significantly more politically competent than winners in Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Venezuela. This implies that losers in these countries are not shaken in their own capabilities to judge political events despite their status in relation to government. In fact, it appears that losing in these fairly divisive polities may be more reason than ever to have faith in one's capacity to understand the political situation.

Overall, then, winning and losing alters how much one sees the government as being in touch with the people; however, winner-loser status does not seem to impact one's interpretation

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<sup>31</sup> The United States has the highest combined mean on internal efficacy (3.9), while Paraguay is once again at the bottom of the efficacy spectrum with a score of 1.6.

of one's own capacity to "understand the important political issues" of his country. This implies that even if democracy isn't playing out to expectations of responsiveness from government, there is still a citizen base with the self-perceived competence to keep working at democratic politics. This conclusion plays out when one looks at the regression analysis. Table 6 verifies that winner-loser status matters significantly (and in a winner-dominated direction) for external efficacy, but it matters more modestly (yet still significantly) in a loser-dominated fashion for internal efficacy. In similar fashion to winner-loser status, the control variables exert different influence depending on the type of efficacy in question.

Table 6 also shows that external efficacy is driven by the attachment to government, as seen in the effects of winner-loser status and identification with the president's party; the effects of these variables suggest that even controlling for shared PID with the president, one still sees a winner-loser effect.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, when combined, these two indicators result in excess of a one point (or nearly a 17%) increase in feelings of external efficacy. On the other hand, individual demographic characteristics matter much more-so than attachments for internal efficacy. Identifying with the president's party still, and now being male, older (age), and more educated all play significant roles in determining one's feelings of internal efficacy. Additionally, comparing across the efficacy scales, the magnitude of the winner-loser effect on external efficacy fairly equals that of male status on internal efficacy; considering the well-established expectation of male-dominated efficacy,<sup>33</sup> this winner-loser effect is truly substantively significant.

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<sup>32</sup> It is worth noting that this combined effect indicates that the set of winners and losers is different from those sharing the president's partisan identity; this is because some members of the president's party didn't vote for him or her and because many of the winners are not necessarily partisan.

<sup>33</sup> A long history of work has proven and reinforced the idea that men are more efficacious than women. From different eras, see Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954) and Verba, Burns, and Schlozman (1997).

Finally, each of the three models is increasingly explanatory. While the inclusion of winner-loser status helps to marginally improve the descriptiveness of Model 2, it is the inclusion of fixed effects (i.e. dummy variables) for each country that really helps to boost the  $R^2$  in Model 3 for both internal and external efficacy. This indicates that there may be some highly influential country-level characteristics that, in turn, help to shape feelings of efficacy. This presence of cross-national variation can be seen throughout this and the forthcoming models in this chapter, clearly indicating the need for the multilevel and contextual analyses that will propel Chapters 4 and 5.

### ***Interpersonal Trust (IPT)***

As a core component of civic culture, interpersonal trust is a fundamental part of a person's social relationships (Almond & Verba, 1965). IPT can be linked to citizens' ability to interact with the world around them and has been found to influence trust in government and governing entities (Cook & Gronke, 2005). Winner-loser theory should apply here as it does to relations with government officials because winners have a majority place in society meaning they have had their vote-choice (i.e. the presidential winner) confirmed as best; therefore, as according to Hypothesis 2, winners should have higher levels of interpersonal trust than their loser counterparts.

Using an index of interpersonal trust based on three trust measures,<sup>34</sup> the United States has the highest cumulative average of IPT, averaging just over 2 trust items per respondent; conversely, Brazil has the lowest overall average with a score of 1.2. Figure 2 shows that winners dominate the winner-loser gap in over 2/3 of the countries; only in Brazil are losers

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<sup>34</sup> Factor analysis confirms that signaling trust in any of the three measures – one referencing community members, one referring to new acquaintances and a final dichotomous question asking about IPT in general – represents a common factor.

significantly more trusting of other citizens than their winner counterparts. The idea that winners, by virtue of their majority status in society, should feel more trusting of others than do losers is borne out in the data. However, this winner-dominant pattern is significant in only five of the eighteen countries.

Table 7 shows a winner-dominated winner-loser effect; however, this effect is not statistically significant. Additionally, individual characteristics play a large role here with those who are older, more educated, and male having higher levels of IPT. Furthermore, having any attachment to the president's political party also tends to make one more trusting of others in the community. Overall, the predicted probabilities in Table 8 show that the differences between winners' and losers' probabilities of being trusting are negligible.

### ***Trust in Government***

According to Hypothesis 3.1, winners should also dominate the winner-loser effect in trust in political actors. Indeed, the perception amongst losers that government does not care about citizen concerns, even if they are fully capable of understanding the pertinent issues (external versus internal efficacy), and the tendency to trust others in society are further reflected in the winner-loser gap in trust in the national government, in the nation's president, and in one's national congress. For national governments, thirteen of the eighteen groups of winners are trusting on average (scoring at least a 3.0), while only two sets of losers (from Chile and Mexico) reach this minimal level of trust. For trust in the president, winners' levels average higher than for the national government (3.8 versus 3.5); however, again, only two groups of losers trust their president (this time from Colombia and Mexico). Figure 3 confirms that if you did not vote for the president you cannot summon even moderate levels of trust as illustrated by a winner-

loser gap of over 2 points (on the 7-point scale) in 1/3 of the cases. For congress, average levels of trust are abysmally low driven, in large part, by the low levels of trust in congress espoused by presidential winners (average winner/loser scores of 2.7/2.3 versus 3.5/2.2 for national governments and 3.8/2.0 for presidents). Only a handful of winning cases and three losing cases trust their national congress.

As Figure 3 shows, winners absolutely dominate the trust-in-government gaps with only the United States' "trust in Congress" breaking the winner-dominant pattern. In fact, the winner-loser gaps presented below are very large considering the scale, and *all* trust-in-national-government and trust-in-the-president gaps are statistically significant at at least a 99% level. The winner-loser effect on trust in Congress is significant in roughly half of the cases and, again, is negative only in the case of the United States. On a 7-point scale (coded 0-6), winners trust their national government and president, while losers consistently do not. The winner-loser effect on trust in one's national legislature is consistent, though less frequently significant, across the cases. Winner-loser status significantly affects one's level of trust in the government, but the overall size of the effect depends on the solicited object of said trust.

In addition to the large magnitude of the winner-loser effect on national and presidential trust, a second point that these trust indicators show is the relevance of winning and losing in the presidential realm to other areas of government. Recall, qualification as a winner or loser is contingent on one's presidential vote choice; as one would then expect, winners appear most clear about their commitment to trusting the president they had a hand in electing, and losers are most clear about their distrust of the executive they had hoped would lose. Correlations amongst the three variables suggest that the national government scores – without any office specified – most closely resemble those of the presidency in thirteen of the eighteen countries but suggest

that, in the other five countries, respondents' trust in their national government as a whole more closely reflects their trust in national congresses.<sup>35</sup> Gaps in trust in the national government are the second-largest ones in all countries except for one with the winner-loser gap for congress coming in a much smaller third; Guatemala is the only country in which the gap in trust in the national congress exceeds that for the national government. However, while the winner-loser gap is narrower for congress than the president or the national government, the winner-loser effect is consistently positive with winners being more trusting of their government and key institutions than losers.

Table 9 clearly bears out these patterns in trust in government. Winner status does not matter significantly for trust in congress, but plays a significant role in trust in national government and has an extremely large impact in trust in the president even with the inclusion of party identification control. In fact, trust in the president is dominated by winner-loser status and shared presidential partisanship. Those winners who share the president's PID see their trust scores rise over two points or nearly a third of the trust scale versus losers who do not share the PID affiliation of the sitting executive; this compares to a 1.25-point gain for national government support and only about a 0.35-point gain in support for congress. Clearly, this cocktail of winner status and shared partisanship is a potent mixture for determining trust in one's president.

Additionally, Table 9 shows a number of control variables are important for predicting trust in government and government offices. External efficacy is extremely important in all models of trust (for any target); if one feels that government cares what you, the voter, thinks,

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<sup>35</sup> Overall, the correlations for the three trust measures are 0.68 (national government-president), 0.61 (national government-congress) and 0.44 (president-congress). The correlation between trust in the national government and trust in congress exceed that between national government and the president in Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and the United States.

then one will be more trusting of government actors than if there is a perceived disconnect between citizens and their government. As the literature suggests, interpersonal trust holds a strong place in determining trust in government and governing officials (Cook & Gronke, 2005); the ability to trust in personal, close relationships extends to more abstract, distant relationships with elected officials and government. Additionally, age matters presidential trust, but it is insignificant as a predictor of trust in the national government and congress; conversely, gender is not significant for either national government or presidential trust but does matter in evaluations of trust in congress. Education is a significant predictor of trust across all three targets, and it is negative with the more educated being less trusting of government and governmental actors than more uneducated citizens. Finally, the  $R^2$  at the bottom of Table 9 shows that these models perform well in predicting these types of trust, especially for trust in the national government and in the president.

### ***Job Performance***

Similar to the previously reported trust-in measures, job performance evaluations are summarily higher and the winner-loser effect is larger for the president than they are for congress. On average, presidents receive job performance scores of 2.1 with a gap between winners and loser of one point on a 5-point scale; with scores ranging from zero to four, winners average a 2.6 while losers average a score of 1.6, placing winner opinions slightly better than a “good” evaluation and loser just above “bad.” Conversely, congress only receives an average score of 1.7 with a winner-loser gap of only 0.3 (winners’ score: 1.9; losers’ score: 1.6); both winners and loser score congressional job performance between “bad” and “neither good nor bad.” The stronger effect for presidential performance is intuitive because of our selection



variable for defining winners and losers. If one voted for the person, then one is more likely to support the job that said politician is doing; conversely, rather than using the winners' rose-tinted glasses, losers' views of government, and especially presidential, performance are substantially more negative. As with the trust evaluations, the lower-on-average scores for congress result from winners' scores dropping to more closely reflect those of losers.

In support of Hypothesis 3.2, Figure 4 shows a consistent, winner-dominant pattern in job performance evaluations. The winner-loser effect is especially strong for the job performance of the president, but it is more moderate for that of congress. There is still a consistent pattern of a winner-loser gap favoring the winners; however, the gap between winners and losers is less pronounced. Indeed, the gaps in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Venezuela exceed 20% on the presidential job performance scale and the United States' gap exceeds 40%. For congress, the only gap to reach the 20% threshold is in Venezuela. The United States is the only country in the study that bucks the pattern of a winner-dominated effect on performance judgments with its loser-dominated evaluation of congressional job performance; this finding mirrors that for trust in congress shown in Figure 3.

A couple of results concerning job performance evaluations deserve a closer look now and will be thoroughly examined in the forthcoming chapters. First, the year of this study (2008) marks the end of the second-term of the contentious presidency of George W. Bush in the United States. Respondents from the U.S. seem to have particularly clear loyalties with winners supporting the president but not congress, and losers abhorring the work of the president but remaining relatively pleased with Congress. This is a case of divided government (a Republican president and a Democratic Congress), a situation which may alleviate some broader tensions by spreading the winning and losing around; however, the nature of the political system in the

United States – perhaps the clearly two-party dominant electoral structure – clarifies winner-loser positions leading to dramatic winner-loser differences in performance (and the aforementioned trust) evaluations. Number of political parties as a contextual influence of political attitudes will be part of Chapter 4.

Second, and on a similar note, Venezuela sees the largest gap between winners and losers in congressional job support, and this mirrors the presidential evaluation, which comes in second in magnitude only after the aforementioned case of the United States' President Bush. In this case, President Hugo Chavez's near total control of government gives similarly clear indicators to the winners and losers of Venezuela about their corresponding levels of support for this regime. However, the dominance of Chavez over the presidency and of his political party in the congress creates a reinforced winner-domination of the political system. Clearly, the political situations surrounding these two countries affect the winner-loser effect on satisfaction with the job performance of government officials, influencing the magnitude and direction of the winner-loser effect. However, for the sake of the health of democracy, the winner-reinforcing pattern in Venezuela is more troublesome than the divided evaluations (both of trust and job performance) in the United States.

Table 10 and the accompanying predicted probabilities in Table 11 confirm this stronger winner-loser effect on presidential job approval than on congressional job performance evaluations. In fact, Table 11 shows that losers are three times more likely than winners to have a negative evaluation of the president (a 26% chance of selecting "bad" or "very bad" versus only about a 9% chance for winners), while winners are more than twice as likely as losers to have a positive evaluation of presidential job performance (a 46% chance of picking "good" or "very good" versus a 20% chance for losers to answer the same).

Conversely, although losers are more negative and winners more positive, the differences in odds of giving a positive versus a negative opinion on congressional job performance is different by no more than five percentage points either way; however, both winners and losers are more likely to provide a negative than positive evaluation of congressional job performance, bearing out the pattern in poor performance evaluations for congress mentioned above. Furthermore, Table 11 shows a higher number of respondents are likely to feel indifferent about the job performance of congress than of the president; most of these with added indifference come from the winner's side of the political aisle.

In addition to the winner-loser effect on presidential evaluations, Table 10 shows that external efficacy provides a substantial boost to one's evaluations of performance for both branches; feeling like the actors care what one thinks encourages more positive performance reviews. Similarly, holding the same PID as the president system increases positive evaluations of government performance (although the effect on evaluations of presidential performance is three times as big as that for congressional performance). Indeed, when winner status is combined with shared presidential PID, the difference equates to more than 2.5 points or one half of the presidential job performance scale. The remaining control variables are insignificant for presidential job approval but significant predictors for congressional approval. This difference, clearly seen in Table 10, suggests that the trust process may be different for congress, with its many parties and legislative procedures, than it is for the president, with its winner-takes-all dynamic.

### ***Diffuse Support: Satisfaction with Democracy and System Pride***

Finally, the winner-loser effect influences more than one's relationship to government or one's perceptions of how well government officials do their jobs. Support for government exists on a scale of specific and diffuse support depending on the object of the evaluation (Norris, 1999), and the winner-loser effect is also reflected in one's overall feelings on the nature of the democratic system. Hypotheses 3.3 and 3.4 are in keeping with the winner-loser literature in suggesting that the winner-dominant effect seen in more specific attitudes will continue in more diffuse areas of support: satisfaction with democracy and pride in the political system (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001).

While this is the expected result, it may not be the best result for democracy in normative terms. The study of winning and losing is ultimately about the health and stability of the democratic system, and such a system needs the continued faith of the players in order to survive. If some begin to feel the system is not working for them, the system loses legitimacy, and the losers may decide more dramatic change than that available through democratic politics is necessary. So the question becomes, are the winner-dominated specific evaluations reflected in, potentially more serious for the stability of the system, opinions about the political system and democracy writ large. Regarding the health of the democratic system, Hypothesis 3.5 posits the hope that the winner-loser effect in diffuse support will be insignificant, or at the very least less impactful than those for specific support. These more diffuse measures of political support broadly reflect satisfaction with the form of democracy in the respondent's country and one's pride in the system.

Overall satisfaction with the "form in which democracy works" is low for the sample with only four groups – the winners from Costa Rica and Venezuela and both winners and losers

from Panama – averaging at least a “satisfied” response (the overall average is 1.6 on the zero-to-three scale putting it almost exactly between the “dissatisfied” and “satisfied” responses). The relatively high scores of both winners and losers in Panama gave it the highest overall average at 2.1, while Peru had the lowest average at 1.3. Pride averages right in the middle of the 7-point scale (scored 0 – 6) with winners averaging 3.4 and losers averaging 2.7 (the cumulative average is a flat 3.0). Costa Rica has the highest, cumulative average of system pride (4.1) while Paraguay has the lowest level for a population scoring only a 1.0 on a scale of zero to six.

Figure 5 corroborates Hypotheses 3.3 and 3.4, the continuation of the winner-dominant pattern in political attitudes to these more diffuse measures. In opposition to Hypothesis 3.5, there is a consistent pattern of a winner-dominated effect across most countries on both indicators of opinions on the political system (Panama has the only loser-dominated gap in any measure, and it is a very small, insignificant gap in satisfaction with democracy). In fact, two thirds of the countries have significant gaps in both measures of broader system support, and all are in a winner-dominated direction. Again, on these dimensions as before, the larger the gap, the more disjointed the opinions of winners versus losers. In countries with large gaps, like Venezuela, one sees clear winner satisfaction and loser dissatisfaction with the political system as a whole.

Table 12 verifies that winner-loser status matters significantly for both measures of system support with winners having more positive evaluations of the system as a whole than losers, and the predicted probabilities in Table 13 support this winner-biased pattern in system support. Similarly, the connections one makes, both to the political system and to other citizens, also have a positively significant effect on diffuse support. Those sharing the president’s party identification are more proud of their system and more satisfied with the democracy therein. So

too do the perception of responsiveness – external efficacy – and the level of trust one has in other citizens exert this positive influence.

Two personal characteristics – age and internal efficacy – affect the most diffuse measure of system support – pride – but do not show up as significant predictors of satisfaction with democracy. This reflects, perhaps, the more personal nature of an evaluation of pride rather than satisfaction. With the latter, one concerns an external entity, passing judgment on the quality of democracy; conversely, an evaluation of pride represents an internal judgment, asking about the emotion one feels at being under a certain system. Those who feel they understand how government works in their country (i.e. those expressing higher levels of internal efficacy) are more likely to be proud of their system than those who are less confident in their ability to navigate the political landscape.

Another potential explanation of the significance of age and internal efficacy for one indicator and not the other may have to do with the respondents' interpretation of these support questions. One must exercise caution when interpreting results of system support and satisfaction with democracy questions because these are broad questions, and it is difficult to disentangle the meaning that each has to the individual respondent. This is especially true of cross-national analysis using the satisfaction with democracy indicator as some respondents think about the system in general but others may associate the system with a particular actor or institution (Canache, Mondak & Seligson, 2001). Intuiting from the results on the more specific types of support (i.e. trust and job approval) presented above, it appears that questions on pride in the system may trigger associations to the president, support for whom respondent age and internal efficacy play a more significant role than in evaluations of either the national government or congress.

Across political attitudes, then, one can see a persistent winner-loser effect. Winners consistently and significantly feel better about the relationship to government and government performance than do their loser counterparts especially in measures of connection and evaluation of specific offices (i.e. external efficacy, trust in government, and the job performance of the executive and congress). Especially in elements of presidential evaluations, the pattern is clear; voting for the president (i.e. holding winner status) matters very much and, especially when winner status is combined with holding the president's party ID, the effect on attitudes is very large, indeed. In contradiction to Hypothesis 3.5, this winner-dominant pattern carries over to the more diffuse objects of support. Clearly, the analysis above has shown that political attitudes are strongly influenced by one's winner-loser status, and this influence is consistently in a winner-dominant direction.

However, a key question for the study of political behavior remains unsolved after this analysis of political attitudes; ultimately, is this all smoke and no fire? Does one see attitude reflected in action? Does the winner-loser effect extend as strongly and frequently across behaviors as it does opinions? The next section addresses the implications of winner-loser status for political behaviors of conventional and unconventional participation as well as two elements of political communication – political discussion and convincing others to vote for your candidate during election time.

### **3.3: The Winner-Loser Effect on Political Behaviors**

Given the winners' control of government, the expectation is that they would outpace losers in their political participation, especially in conventional forms. The more congenial and trusting relationship between winners and their government should encourage them to operate

within the political system and institutions more frequently than losers. Conversely, given their outside position, losers can be expected to use unconventional participatory practices (e.g. protest) more frequently than winners, who have little need to operate outside of the government system that they support. Politics in which the participatory patterns of winners and losers differ dramatically, especially in a winner-dominated way that reinforces the attitudinal disparities examined above, risk instability and the withdrawing of “loser’s consent” to the system (Anderson et al., 2005). Whether it is instability leading to overthrow or individual withdrawal from a seemingly unresponsive system, it is unhealthy for a political system to lose the faith and support of its losers. Alternatively, loser-dominant participation patterns would indicate that losers find their position in opposition to government as a motivating factor; such a loser-dominant pattern would indicate that there is faith in the democratic idea that results may differ in the next election, that so long as one is willing to keep fighting, alternation and change in government is possible.

Overall, the winner-loser effect on political behaviors is much less pronounced and much more varied across the countries than the effect on attitudes. Whether conventional participation (contacting officials or attending meetings) or unconventional participation (determined by protest participation), the figures below generally reveal a modest effect some in positive and some in negative directions. Indeed, in some indicators, one sees both a positive and negative effect depending on the country in question. Ultimately, however, the winner-loser effect story remains generally supported. Losers tend to feel outside their government eschewing contact with officials and participating in greater numbers in protest activities than do their winner counterparts. However, in matters of political discussion, losers dominate in the majority of countries included in this study.



### ***Conventional Participation***

So, do citizens tend to participate in equal numbers or do some systems encourage a disparity in participatory behaviors? Do losers find ways to get their points across to a government they are closed out of – at least at the highest, presidential, level – or does the winner-dominated attitudinal pattern continue into participation? Hypothesis 4 suggests that if winners are in and losers out, we should see winners use the political system more frequently than losers. Winners will contact government – be it a Congressperson, local official, or government agency/institution – and attend town and party meetings with greater frequency than losers. However, as with political support, one would hope this hypothesized relationship turns out to be untrue. A healthy democratic system will encourage participation in both winners and losers as testimony to their faith in the political system; this equality of behavior should manifest in a negligible winner-loser gap and the lack of a significant winner-loser effect.

Town and party meeting attendance represents an interesting realm in which to examine the winner-loser effect because of its seeming distance from the presidential winner-loser indicator. Such meetings tend to be small and local in nature; yet, they are more public and social than contacting agencies or congressmen for assistance. Attendance at such meetings can be incredibly informative as to the health of the political system because it illustrates the continued willingness of both winners and losers to participate within the political system.

Conventional participation involves a very small portion of the survey sample, although there is some variety in participation rates across countries. On average only about 19% of respondents had contact with government officials, while attending meetings was only marginally more popular with roughly 22% indicating attendance.<sup>36</sup> Consistent with Hypothesis

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<sup>36</sup> The United States far outpaces other countries in contacting officials with nearly 36% indicating having done so; Honduras had the lowest rate of contact at only about 13%. Conversely, in attendance, Honduras dominates other

4, winners outpace losers in conventional participation although the pattern is much clearer in contacting government than attending meetings. In the case of contact one can see in Figure 6 that winners dominate two-thirds of all cases and 80% of the significant cases. Losers outpace winners in contacting government officials and offices in only six countries, and the only significant loser-dominant gap in contact is in the United States. Losers fair only slightly better in the attendance realm; in only eight of the eighteen countries do they outpace winners in the rate of attending town or party meetings, and winners dominate 71% of the significant cases. Losers are not consistently finding outlets for participation within the confines of government.

From the position of concern about the stability of the system, the winner-dominated systems are especially troubling because winners' needs are already represented by the President; clearly, in these cases, losers are truly outside of government and struggle to find outlets for their political energies. The two countries with the largest gaps in Figure 6 – Nicaragua and Venezuela – had winners significantly dominate both measures of conventional participation. These political systems are encouraging winner participation and/or discouraging loser participation more-so than any other systems in this study. Chapters 4 and 5 will suggest that the relatively strong presidencies in these countries and their democratic history and current democratic quality can help to explain this and other patterns in political behavior across the presidential countries of North, Central, and South America.

While the visual evidence seems to support the hypothesis that winners dominate conventional political participation, the regression analyses confirm only this pattern for only one of the two indicators. As seen in Table 14, winner-loser status is not a significant predictor of conventional participation through contacting government; however, winner-loser status does

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countries with 42% of respondents saying they have attended a town or party meeting in the last year; on the other hand, only about 9% of Chileans answered the same.

impact one's propensity to attend political meetings. The cross-national variation of results on the winner-loser gap helps to explain the negligible winner-loser effect on contacting officials. Table 14 also shows that participation in meetings is loser-dominant, indicating perhaps that being outside of the presidency may galvanize participation, even conventional, amongst losers.

Indeed, being male is the most influential element in attending political meetings.<sup>37</sup> Having a shared PID with the sitting president exerts a positive influence in both forms of conventional participation. Additionally, while interpersonal trust and internal efficacy make people more willing to participate conventionally, external efficacy does not matter for such activities; apparently, being trusting of others and feeling knowledgeable about politics are enough to spur participation regardless of perceived interest of government in citizen opinions. Finally, the explanatory power of the models presented below, although abysmally low, doubles with the inclusion of the country-level fixed effects, clearly illuminating the need for the context-driven models in the following chapters.

### ***Unconventional Participation: Protest Participation***

Alternatively to conventional participation, the winner-loser literature suggests that losers should use unconventional participation more than winners (Anderson & Mendes, 2005). Consequently, Hypothesis 5 states that losers will use the protest item of the political action repertoire more frequently than winners. Figure 7 clearly shows that the outside-looking-in position of political losers to government encourages their participation in politics through unconventional means. In over 2/3 of the countries, losers outpaced winners in their

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<sup>37</sup> This finding of males being more participative confirms a long line of literature suggesting the same (see Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997).

“participation in a demonstration or protest march” in the last past year.<sup>38</sup> Overall, unconventional participation ranges widely amongst the countries with a participation rate of over 70% in Guatemala but only an average participation rate of 5% in El Salvador. An ANOVA test of the significance of the differences in the mean frequency of protest participation between winners and losers in each country shows that this winner-loser gap is significant in six countries, only one of which – Uruguay – is significant in a winner-dominant direction.

The logistic regression analysis in Table 15 confirms the loser-dominated gap in unconventional political participation. Losers are more likely than winners to participate in political protests, as are those who are more educated. In fact, all other things held steady, losers are 6 percentage points more likely to participate unconventionally than winners (see Table 16). Interestingly, Table 15 also shows that respondents’ internal efficacy and their levels of interpersonal trust in other citizens is also significant (at at least a  $p < 0.1$  level) in predicting protest participation, while traditionally cited indicators of unconventional participation like being male and young are not significant in the full, fixed effects model (for more information on the demographic motivators of unconventional participation see Barnes & Kaase, 1979; McAdam, 1986). Overall, those who are more educated and feel more competent in their understanding of politics, and who trust their fellow citizens more, are more willing to undertake the potentially costly unconventional participation than others who are less educated, less internally efficacious.

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<sup>38</sup> Chile (LAPOP 2008) does not ask respondents about protest participation; thus, it is omitted from the protest participation analysis.

### ***Political Discussion and Willingness to Convince Others***

Finally, Hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2 address another area in which to see the winner-loser effect in action: political discussion and willingness to try to convince others of a political position. Here, while the dissonance literature would suggest a winner-dominant effect and a motivation-for-political-change argument would suggest a loser-dominant effect, for the sake of democracy one would like to see almost no gap in the frequency of these behaviors by winners and losers. A vibrant democracy will encourage discussion amongst all and discourage no one from expressing their political views.

Political discussion is most common in the USA with respondents averaging a frequency of discussion somewhere between a few times a week and a few times a month (with a score of 2.5 out on a zero-to-four scale); conversely, Costa Ricans average political discussion frequencies between never and rarely, only scoring 0.82. Convincing others is a more onerous element of political communication as there are elements of judgment and persuasion involved, and this is reflected in the totals with Hondurans being more convincing (1.02 on a zero-to-three scale) just into the “rarely” category and Chileans being least convincing (0.36). On average, however, losers outpace winners in both varieties of political communication. Losers marginally outpace winners 1.59 to 1.52 in political discussion and 0.74 to 0.68 in convincing others.<sup>39</sup>

This contradicts the hypotheses in this area that are based on the dissonance line of reasoning, which suggests that majority status encourages communication by winners while discouraging it among losers. Of all the measures included in this study, these political discussion variables show by far the largest and most consistent loser-dominant effects; only six countries had winners outpace losers in political discussion (and only 3 significantly), and only

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<sup>39</sup> The United States is omitted from the “convincing others” analysis as the survey question for this indicator was not solicited from USA respondents (LAPOP 2008).

three saw winners out-convince losers (and only one did so significantly) (see Figure 8, below). In only one country, Uruguay, did winners significantly outscore losers in both modes of political communication. The loser-dominant pattern even includes Venezuela, which suggests a vibrant dissent to the nearly-autocratic rule of President Hugo Chavez. Losers have a lot to talk about and much more convincing to do than winners in order to reclaim the rewards of presidential office, and it seems that in the majority of countries included in this study losers embrace the challenge with vigor.

Once again, the regression models and predicted probabilities confirm this, in this case, loser-dominated pattern in the winner-loser gap. According to the results in Table 17, the effect of winner-loser status is significant and negative for both indicators of political communication indicating that loser status encourages such political behaviors. In fact, losers are 7 percentage points more likely to discuss politics “frequently” or “daily” than winners and, also, 8 percentage points more likely to ever try to convince someone to vote for their preferred candidate or party (see predicted probabilities in Table 18).

As predicted by the literature on political behavior, being male and more educated encourages participation in political discussions and attempts at convincing others. Additionally, internal efficacy plays a significant role in determining one’s propensity for both types of political communication, indicating a certain level of self-confidence in your opinions/positions is necessary to feel the desire to spread those ideas around. Likewise, interpersonal trust is an important condition for encouraging political communication. Finally, while discussion and convincing are loser-dominant endeavors, sharing the president’s party identification works to encourage such partisans to participate in political communications.

### **3.4: The W-L Effect Conclusions (and the Need for Context)**

This chapter has shown that one's status as a political winner or loser affects how one perceives their political system and how one acts within it. As Table 19 summarizes, winners consistently feel more in touch with their government (external efficacy), exhibit more interpersonal trust and are more trusting of government actors and institutions. Similarly, winners' opinions on the job performance of government are more positive than those of losers. Of all the political attitudes tested, internal efficacy provided the most variety with nearly as many loser-dominated states as winner-dominated ones; furthermore, losers outpace winners in *significant* winner-loser gaps in this internal efficacy category. This winner-loser effect on political attitudes extends all the way to the democratic system of a country as a whole. Losers consistently feel less satisfied with the form of democracy in their countries and exhibit less pride in the system than do the winners. Finally, no country shows more than two loser-dominated gaps in political attitudes, and only seven loser-dominant gaps are significant out of a possible 180 gaps generated by the ten attitudinal variables across eighteen countries. Clearly, when it comes to opinions, evaluations and the relationships to government, winners are more positive than their loser counterparts.

However, winners and losers exhibit different patterns in political participation, and they diverge wildly from the clearly winner-dominated political attitudes seen above. Variation amongst countries is great in regards to the political participation patterns of winners and losers. Table 20 shows that while winners control the gap in political attitudes, no country has winners dominate in all areas of political participation; however, three countries – Colombia, Mexico, and Paraguay – see their losers participate at a greater rate than winners in all five categories. Winners outpace losers in the two types of conventional participation, but this is the only areas in

which winners are dominant when the sample countries are taken as a whole. Feeling the weight of the ostracization from government, losers are more likely than winners to use unconventional participation methods like protest. However, losers also dominate the winner-loser gap in political communication, suggesting that not only are the political opinions of minorities not being repressed but also that losers are more motivated to participate in political discussions than winners. This suggests a great deal of activity amongst those in the political minority throughout the Americas and hints at relatively healthy, vibrant polities despite one-sidedness of political attitudes.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, this section demonstrates that the effect of winning or losing is not consistent amongst these presidential nations of the Americas. I propose two classes of reasoning to explain these discrepancies based on varieties of context found throughout this region, and I test each respective class of country-level conditions in the following two chapters. The first suggests that differences in the power structures and electoral rules of each country may affect the salience of the winner/loser experience and, therefore, the magnitude of the winner-loser effect. Powerful presidential offices increase the stakes of winning or losing control of the office during election time and should exacerbate the winner-loser effect. The second class of reasons contends that democratic history and current rights protections explain cross-national differences in the effect of winning and losing on political attitudes and actions by similarly altering the stakes of being in (winners) or out (losers) of government. The subsequent two chapters will address each of these classes of contextual variables, respectively, as I use multilevel modeling techniques to illuminate the role of context in the winner-loser experience.


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<sup>40</sup> The idea that winner-loser differences may be *good* for democracy and stability is not widely touted in the winner-loser literature, but it may help to explain why, despite sometimes large differences between the positions of winners and losers, that we do not see widespread fulfillment of Riker's (1983) predicted collapse of polities.




### 3.5: Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Winner-Loser Gap: External & Internal Efficacy



**Notes:** Efficacy (external and internal) is scaled from 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The gap represents the difference in the average scores of winners versus losers. Gaps marked with an asterisk (\*) are significant at at least a  $p < 0.1$  level. Gap too small to graphically represent: Nicaragua (internal efficacy) – -0.0044. **Indicators:** On a scale of 1-7 [rescaled from 0-6], how much do you agree... that “those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think” (external)... that “I feel that I understand the most important political issues of this country” (internal).


**Figure 2. Winner-Loser Gap: Interpersonal Trust**



**Notes:** Interpersonal Trust based on an index of 3 trust measures resulting in a scale of 0 (no trust on any measure) to 3 (some trust in all measures). Gaps marked with an asterisk (\*) are significant at at least a  $p < 0.1$  level.


**Indicators:** IPT Index composed of three questions each worth one point for any indication of trust (point-worthy answers in **bold**). (1) “Would you say that people in this community are generally **very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy**, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy.” (2) “How much do you trust people that you meet for the first time? **Totally trust them, somewhat trust them, trust them a little**, do not trust them.” (3) “Generally speaking, would you say that **most people can be trusted** or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”

**Figure 3. Winner-Loser Gap: Trust in Government**




**Notes:** Trust in government scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot). ALL winner-loser gaps in trust in the national government and in the president are significant at at least a  $p < 0.01$  level. Gaps for trust in congress marked with an asterisk (\*) are significant at at least a  $p < 0.1$  level. **Indicators:** “To what extent do you trust...” “the national government,” “the President,” and “the National Congress.” Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].

**Figure 4. Winner-Loser Gap: Job Performance**




**Notes:** Job performance for the president and congress are scaled from 0 (very bad/poorly) to 4 (very good/well). ALL gaps for presidential job performance are significant at at least a  $p < 0.01$  level. All gaps in congressional job performance are significant at at least a  $p < 0.1$  level EXCEPT Guatemala and Honduras. **Indicators:** “How would you rate the job performance of President (insert country’s president here)? Very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad.” “Do you believe that the members of Congress are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?”

**Figure 5. Winner-Loser Gap: Satisfaction with Democracy & System Pride**




**Notes:** Satisfaction with the form of democracy is scaled from 0 (very unsatisfied) to 3 (very satisfied). Pride scaled from 0 (none) to 6 (a lot). Gaps marked with an asterisk (\*) are significant at at least a  $p < 0.01$  level. **Indicators:** “Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the form in which democracy works in (your country)?” “To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?” Place your opinion on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].

**Figure 6. Winner-Loser Gap: Conventional Participation**




**Notes:** “Contact” is dichotomous based on self-reported contact with any government office/actor/institution. “Attend” is dichotomous based on self-reported attendance at either a party or town meeting. Gaps identified with an asterisk (\*) are significant at at least a  $p < 0.1$  level. Gap too small to graphically represent: Colombia (contact) – -0.0013.

**Figure 7. Winner-Loser Gap: Protest Participation**



**Notes:** Protest participation is dichotomous, either one has or one has not participated in a protest or demonstration in the last 12 months. Chile is left out of this analysis because protest participation was not solicited from respondents there.

**Figure 8. Winner-Loser Gap: Political Discussion & Convincing Others**



**Notes:** Political discussion scaled from 0 (never) to 4 (daily). “How often do you discuss politics with other people? Daily, A few times a week, A few times a month, Rarely, or Never.” Convincing others to vote for a party or candidate is scaled from 0 (never) to 3 (frequently). “How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? Frequently, Occasionally, Rarely, or Never.” Winner-loser gaps with an asterisk (\*) are significant at at least a  $p < 0.1$  level. Gaps too small to graphically represent: Chile (convincing) – -0.0007; USA (discussion) – +0.0012. Convincing was not asked in the USA for LAPOP 2008.



**Table 6. The Winner-Loser Effect: Efficacy<sup>41</sup>**

	External Efficacy					Internal Efficacy				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3			Model 1	Model 2	Model 3		
<b>Winner Status</b>	.	0.472 *** (0.102)	0.46 *** (0.1)			.	-0.079 (0.057)	-0.084 # (0.047)		
<b>Male</b>	0.028 (0.024)	0.023 (0.033)	0.042 (0.033)			0.44 *** (0.036)	0.455 *** (0.033)	0.479 *** (0.035)		
<b>Age</b>	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)			0.01 *** (0.002)	0.01 *** (0.002)	0.008 *** (0.002)		
<b>Education</b>	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.011 * (0.005)			0.087 *** (0.008)	0.086 *** (0.01)	0.079 *** (0.006)		
<b>Pres. PID</b>	0.694 *** (0.165)	0.525 ** (0.227)	0.578 *** (0.104)			0.473 *** (0.092)	0.455 *** (0.093)	0.425 *** (0.07)		
<b>Constant</b>	2.206 (0.231)	1.95 (0.236)	1.694 (0.105)			1.44 (0.172)	1.542 (0.139)	1.429 (0.109)		
<b>Fixed Effects</b>	NO	NO	YES			NO	NO	YES		
<b>N</b>	26363	16331	16331			25994	16156	16156		
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.024	0.044	0.118			0.076	0.079	0.128		

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p \leq 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p \leq 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p \leq 0.1$

Responses scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot). Coefficients are standard OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis. Model 3 includes fixed effects for country dummy variables (Argentina is the omitted country).

<sup>41</sup> Note: all models in this study lose cases with the inclusion of the winner-loser variable because of respondent failure to answer the vote-choice question used for classification. Despite the loss of non-respondents, each country maintains at least 50% of its cases and no country drops below at least 570 cases, respectively. There are only two models – out of the 30 in this chapter that include the winner-loser status variable – in which the significance of this key independent variable changes between the non-imputed and imputed models. In the original models (the ones that lose cases for the missed responses), winner-loser status is not a significant predictor of protest participation; however, in the imputed model, it is significant. The opposite is true for political discussion where a significant finding in the original model is no longer significant in the imputed model.

**Table 7. The Winner-Loser Effect: Interpersonal Trust**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<b>Winner Status</b>	.		0.031 (0.084)		0.073 (0.045)	
<b>Male</b>	0.237 (0.037)	***	0.206 (0.041)	***	0.234 (0.036)	***
<b>Age</b>	0.008 (0.003)	**	0.01 (0.003)	**	0.007 (0.002)	***
<b>Education</b>	0.04 (0.02)	*	0.046 (0.025)	#	0.021 (0.007)	**
<b>Pres. PID</b>	0.255 (0.075)	***	0.227 (0.08)	***	0.137 (0.048)	**
<b>Fixed Effects</b>	NO		NO		YES	
<b>N</b>	26626		16464		16464	
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.008		0.009		0.038	

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p \leq 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p \leq 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p \leq 0.1$   
 IPT Index scaled from 0 (no trust) to 3 (at least some trust for each of 3 indicators) for a 4-point scale. Coefficients are ordered logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis. Model 3 includes fixed effects for country dummy variables (Argentina is the omitted country).

**Table 8. Predicted Probabilities: IPT Index**

	<u>Winners</u>		<u>Losers</u>	
<b>Pr(No Trust   x)</b>	0.13		0.138	
<b>Pr(1 Trust Item   x)</b>	0.341	0.471	0.351	0.489
<b>Pr(2 Trust Items   x)</b>	0.457		0.443	
<b>Pr(3 Trust Items   x)</b>	0.073	0.53	0.068	0.511

**Notes:** Probabilities based on fixed effects model (Model 3). All other variables held at their mean.

**Table 9. The Winner-Loser Effect: Trust in Government**

	National Government						President						National Congress					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<b>Winner Status</b>	.		0.81 ***		0.666 ***		.		1.264 ***		1.053 ***		.		0.165		0.101	
			(0.141)		(0.123)				(0.201)		(0.158)				(0.096)		(0.075)	
<b>Male</b>	-0.068		-0.04		-0.02		-0.035		0.001		0.028		-0.119 ***		-0.119 **		-0.088 *	
	(0.041)		(0.048)		(0.037)		(0.048)		(0.054)		(0.038)		(0.03)		(0.028)		(0.035)	
<b>Age</b>	0.002		0.003		0.003		0.004		0.006 *		0.005 ***		-0.001		0.000		-0.001	
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
<b>Edu.</b>	-0.048 ***		-0.038 **		-0.022 **		-0.05 ***		-0.035 **		-0.024 ***		-0.031 ***		-0.028 **		-0.02 *	
	(0.01)		(0.011)		(0.006)		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.006)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
<b>Pres. PID</b>	0.817 ***		0.439 *		0.693 ***		1.228 ***		0.644 **		0.977 ***		0.224 #		0.146		0.257 ***	
	(0.193)		(0.184)		(0.112)		(0.23)		(0.208)		(0.124)		(0.121)		(0.109)		(0.064)	
<b>External Efficacy</b>	0.349 ***		0.34 ***		0.269 ***		0.35 ***		0.323 ***		0.25 ***		0.28 ***		0.287 ***		0.231 ***	
	(0.04)		(0.043)		(0.025)		(0.042)		(0.04)		(0.018)		(0.032)		(0.032)		(0.024)	
<b>Internal Efficacy</b>	0.08 *		0.077 *		0.051 *		0.07 #		0.07 *		0.04 **		0.101 ***		0.089 **		0.06 **	
	(0.032)		(0.033)		(0.018)		(0.034)		(0.03)		(0.013)		(0.024)		(0.027)		(0.02)	
<b>IPT Index</b>	0.146 ***		0.144 **		0.176 ***		0.159 **		0.14 **		0.161 ***		0.183 ***		0.193 ***		0.192 ***	
	(0.037)		(0.042)		(0.022)		(0.044)		(0.048)		(0.024)		(0.024)		(0.028)		(0.023)	
<b>Constant</b>	1.878		1.375		1.514		1.785		1.038		1.461		1.702		1.542		1.551	
	(0.301)		(0.29)		(0.11)		(0.341)		(0.285)		(0.11)		(0.239)		(0.254)		(0.179)	
<b>FE?</b>	NO		NO		YES		NO		NO		YES		NO		NO		YES	
<b>N</b>	24445		15299		15299		24496		15313		15313		23941		15027		15027	
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.201		0.252		0.339		0.214		0.302		0.399		0.135		0.144		0.205	

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p \leq 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p \leq 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p \leq 0.1$

Responses scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot). Coefficients are standard OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis. Model 3 includes fixed effects for country dummy variables (Argentina is the omitted country).

**Table 10. The Winner-Loser Effect: Job Performance**

	Presidential Job Performance						Congressional Job Performance					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<b>Winner Status</b>	.		1.369 *** (0.188)		1.238 *** (0.164)		.		0.283 ** (0.102)		0.224 * (0.103)	
<b>Male</b>	-0.015 (0.053)		0.012 (0.06)		0.001 (0.043)		-0.189 *** (0.032)		-0.18 *** (0.038)		-0.187 *** (0.045)	
<b>Age</b>	-0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		0.002 (0.001)		-0.008 *** (0.002)		-0.006 * (0.003)		-0.005 *** (0.001)	
<b>Education</b>	-0.035 * (0.016)		-0.025 (0.016)		0.000 (0.007)		-0.037 *** (0.009)		-0.038 *** (0.01)		-0.024 *** (0.008)	
<b>Pres. PID</b>	1.452 *** (0.221)		0.888 *** (0.217)		1.291 *** (0.141)		0.568 ** (0.181)		0.426 * (0.166)		0.466 *** (0.106)	
<b>External Efficacy</b>	0.294 *** (0.037)		0.275 *** (0.037)		0.223 *** (0.02)		0.263 *** (0.036)		0.261 *** (0.04)		0.217 *** (0.029)	
<b>Internal Efficacy</b>	0.013 (0.037)		0.017 (0.034)		0.004 (0.016)		0.022 (0.03)		0.014 (0.034)		0.009 (0.023)	
<b>IPT Index</b>	0.09 (0.066)		0.075 (0.077)		0.15 *** (0.024)		0.143 *** (0.039)		0.137 ** (0.051)		0.18 *** (0.024)	
<b>FE?</b>	NO		NO		YES		NO		NO		YES	
<b>N</b>	24344		15252		15252		23769		14946		14946	
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.072		0.116		0.164		0.04		0.046		0.063	

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p \leq 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p \leq 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p \leq 0.1$

Responses scaled from 0 (very bad/poorly) to 4 (very good/well). Coefficients are ordered logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis. Model 3 includes fixed effects for country dummy variables (Argentina is the omitted country).

**Table 11. Predicted Probabilities: Job Performance**

	President				Congress			
	Winners		Losers		Winners		Losers	
<b>Pr(Very Poor   x)</b>	0.028		0.091		0.075		0.093	
<b>Pr(Poor   x)</b>	0.066	0.094	0.173	0.264	0.226	0.301	0.258	0.351
<b>Pr(Neither Poor, Nor Good   x)</b>	0.443		0.536		0.541		0.519	
<b>Pr(Good   x)</b>	0.392		0.179		0.141		0.117	
<b>Pr(Very Good   x)</b>	0.071	0.463	0.022	0.201	0.016	0.157	0.013	0.13

**Notes:** Probabilities based on fixed effects model (Model 3). All other variables held at their mean. Marginal columns represent the combined sums of those winners and losers, respectively, that had negative (choosing very poor or poor performance) and positive (choosing good or very good) job performance evaluations.

**Table 12. The Winner-Loser Effect: Satisfaction with Democracy and System Pride**

	Satisfaction with Democracy					Pride in the System				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3			Model 1	Model 2	Model 3		
<b>Winner Status</b>	.	0.519 *** (0.092)	0.469 *** (0.086)			.	0.361 ** (0.119)	0.324 ** (0.094)		
<b>Male</b>	0.004 (0.025)	0.002 (0.029)	0.02 (0.039)			-0.112 *** (0.028)	-0.113 * (0.044)	-0.05 (0.039)		
<b>Age</b>	0.002 (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)			0.005 * (0.003)	0.008 ** (0.003)	0.004 (0.002)	#	
<b>Education</b>	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.008)	#		-0.02 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.021 (0.007)	**	
<b>Pres. PID</b>	0.706 *** (0.105)	0.476 *** (0.094)	0.375 *** (0.109)			0.459 ** (0.136)	0.315 * (0.119)	0.413 *** (0.063)		
<b>External Efficacy</b>	0.123 ** (0.04)	0.127 *** (0.044)	0.159 *** (0.024)			0.251 *** (0.034)	0.241 *** (0.033)	0.193 *** (0.018)		
<b>Internal Efficacy</b>	-0.009 (0.029)	-0.001 (0.027)	0.009 (0.014)			0.118 *** (0.025)	0.124 *** (0.025)	0.071 (0.019)	**	
<b>IPT Index</b>	0.245 *** (0.041)	0.27 *** (0.047)	0.228 *** (0.032)			0.273 *** (0.035)	0.291 *** (0.042)	0.231 *** (0.026)		
<b>Constant</b>	.	.	.			1.672 (0.302)	1.327 (0.286)	1.706 (0.161)		
<b>FE?</b>	NO	NO	YES			NO	NO	YES		
<b>N</b>	24069	15097	15097			24321	15208	15208		
<b>(Pseudo) R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.024	0.038	0.081			0.131	0.149	0.232		

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p \leq 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p \leq 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p \leq 0.1$

Responses for “Satisfaction with Democracy” range from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 3 (very satisfied). Coefficients are from ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The  $R^2$  value for ordered logit is a pseudo- $R^2$ .

Responses for “Pride in the System” range from 0 (none) to 6 (a lot). Coefficients are standard OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis. Model 3 for both variables includes fixed effects for country dummy variables (Argentina is the omitted country).

**Table 13. Predicted Probabilities: Satisfaction with Democracy**

	Winners		Losers	
<b>Pr(Very Dissatisfied   x)</b>	0.043	0.339	0.067	0.45
<b>Pr(Dissatisfied   x)</b>	0.296		0.383	
<b>Pr(Satisfied   x)</b>	0.563	0.662	0.486	0.55
<b>Pr(Very Satisfied   x)</b>	0.099		0.064	

**Notes:** Probabilities based on fixed effects model (Model 3). All other variables held at their mean.

**Table 14. The Winner-Loser Effect: Conventional Participation**

	Contact Government						Attend Meeting					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<b>Winner</b>	.		0.057		-0.001		.		-0.23		-0.201	**
<b>Status</b>			(0.072)		(0.047)				(0.092)		(0.074)	
<b>Male</b>	-0.111	#	-0.101		-0.079		0.238	***	0.298	***	0.293	***
	(0.059)		(0.069)		(0.067)		(0.055)		(0.057)		(0.054)	
<b>Age</b>	0.009	***	0.005	**	0.003	*	0.001		-0.003	*	0.000	
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
<b>Edu.</b>	0.012		0.012		-0.000		-0.000		-0.008		0.004	
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.006)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.007)	
<b>Pres.</b>	0.236	**	0.129		0.202	#	0.711	***	0.717	*	0.601	***
<b>PID</b>	(0.082)		(0.084)		(0.106)		(0.106)		(0.136)		(0.094)	
<b>External</b>	-0.013		-0.005		0.012		0.001		-0.001		0.011	
<b>Efficacy</b>	(0.019)		(0.016)		(0.012)		(0.02)		(0.018)		(0.012)	
<b>Internal</b>	0.086	***	0.068	**	0.057	***	0.147	***	0.146	***	0.144	***
<b>Efficacy</b>	(0.021)		(0.023)		(0.017)		(0.021)		(0.018)		(0.017)	
<b>IPT</b>	0.114	*	0.151	**	0.1	**	0.1	**	0.109	**	0.11	**
	(0.045)		(0.048)		(0.033)		(0.037)		(0.035)		(0.035)	
<b>Constant</b>	-2.269		-2.022		-1.653		-2.184		-1.732		-2.299	
	(0.224)		(0.225)		(0.189)		(0.188)		(0.228)		(0.175)	
<b>Fixed</b>	NO		NO		YES		NO		NO		YES	
<b>Effects</b>												
<b>N</b>	24586		15340		15340		24289		15163		15163	
<b>Pseudo</b>	0.012		0.009		0.022		0.034		0.034		0.059	
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>												

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p \leq 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p \leq 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p \leq 0.1$

“Contact government” is dichotomous based on reported contact with any government official/office. “Attend meeting” is dichotomous based on any attendance at a party or town meeting. Coefficients are logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis. Model 3 includes fixed effects for country dummy variables (Argentina is the omitted country).

**Table 15. The Winner-Loser Effect: Protest Participation**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<b>Winner Status</b>	.		-0.32 *		-0.377 **	
			(0.146)		(0.135)	
<b>Male</b>	0.225 ***		0.262 ***		0.165	
	(0.052)		(0.064)		(0.068)	
<b>Age</b>	-0.004		-0.01 *		-0.01	
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
<b>Education</b>	0.061 ***		0.054 **		0.048 ***	
	(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.011)	
<b>Pres. PID</b>	-0.096 #		0.056		0.35	
	(0.154)		(0.164)		(0.14)	
<b>External Efficacy</b>	-0.009		0.018		-0.018	
	(0.023)		(0.026)		(0.019)	
<b>Internal Efficacy</b>	0.093 *		0.069 **		0.112 **	
	(0.027)		(0.026)		(0.031)	
<b>IPT Index</b>	0.039		0.031		0.118 #	
	(0.059)		(0.071)		(0.04)	
<b>Constant</b>	-2.345		-1.78		-1.587	
	(0.367)		(0.444)		(0.297)	
<b>Fixed Effects</b>	NO		NO		YES	
<b>N</b>	16950		10605		10605	
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.025		0.029		0.128	

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p \leq 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p \leq 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p \leq 0.1$

Protest participation is dichotomous. Coefficients are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Model 3 includes fixed effects for country dummy variables (Argentina is the omitted country). Protest participation was not solicited from Chile (LAPOP 2008).

**Table 16. Predicted Probabilities: Protest Participation**

	Winners	Losers
<b>Pr(No Protest Participation   x)</b>	0.85	0.79
<b>Pr(Participation   x)</b>	0.15	0.21

**Notes:** Probabilities based on fixed effects model (Model3). All other variables held at their mean.

**Table 17. The Winner-Loser Effect: Political Communication**

	Discuss Politics						Convince Others					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<b>Winner Status</b>	.		-0.392 *** (0.074)		-0.422 *** (0.058)		.		-0.324 *** (0.068)		-0.345 *** (0.046)	
<b>Male</b>	0.478 *** (0.047)		0.496 *** (0.06)		0.537 *** (0.055)		0.276 *** (0.037)		0.298 *** (0.041)		0.304 *** (0.046)	
<b>Age</b>	0.007 ** (0.002)		0.005 * (0.002)		0.004 ** (0.002)		0.003 * (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		0.002 (0.002)	
<b>Education</b>	0.108 *** (0.01)		0.102 *** (0.01)		0.092 *** (0.007)		0.033 *** (0.008)		0.031 *** (0.007)		0.042 *** (0.007)	
<b>Pres. PID</b>	0.973 *** (0.095)		1.023 *** (0.094)		0.933 *** (0.105)		0.508 *** (0.063)		0.567 *** (0.073)		0.49 *** (0.086)	
<b>External Efficacy</b>	-0.063 * (0.027)		-0.043 # (0.024)		-0.026 # (0.013)		0.006 (0.017)		0.015 (0.017)		0.031 # (0.018)	
<b>Internal Efficacy</b>	0.246 *** (0.036)		0.244 *** (0.037)		0.254 *** (0.028)		0.1 *** (0.018)		0.092 *** (0.02)		0.084 *** (0.038)	
<b>IPT Index</b>	0.193 *** (0.033)		0.21 *** (0.028)		0.152 *** (0.023)		0.075 ** (0.029)		0.087 *** (0.027)		0.084 * (0.038)	
<b>FE?</b>	NO		NO		YES		NO		NO		YES	
<b>N</b>	24687		15407		15407		23148		14346		14346	
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.075		0.078		0.1		0.017		0.019		0.037	

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p \leq 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p \leq 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p \leq 0.1$

Responses for “Discuss Politics” range from 0 (never) to 4 (daily). Responses for “Convince Others” range from 0 (never) to 3 (frequently). Coefficients are ordered logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis. Model 3 includes fixed effects for country dummy variables (Argentina is the omitted country). The USA is left out of the “convince others” models because the question was not solicited from respondents there.

**Table 18. Predicted Probabilities: Political Communication**

	Discuss		Convince	
	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers
<b>Pr(Never x)</b>	0.171	0.119	0.632	0.549
<b>Pr(Rarely x)</b>	0.455	0.404	0.177	0.201
<b>Pr(Few Times a Month /Occasionally x)</b>	0.188	0.218	0.132	0.168
<b>Pr(Few Times a Week/Frequently x)</b>	0.133	0.179	0.059	0.082
<b>Pr(Daily x)</b>	0.053	0.079	.	.

**Notes:** Probabilities based on fixed effects model (Model 3). Discussion based on 5-point scale. All other variables held at their mean.



**Table 19. Summary of Winner-Loser Gaps in Political Attitudes (by Country and Dependent Variable)**

	External Efficacy	Internal Efficacy	IPT	Trust in National Gov.	Trust in President	Trust in Congress	Job Approval: President	Job Approval: Congress	Satisfaction with Democracy	System Pride	Significant— Winner
<b>ARG</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>l</b>	<b>l</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	8/10—8/10
<b>BOL</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>l</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	7/10—7/10
<b>BRA</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>l</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	8/10—7/10
<b>CHI</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	9/10—9/10
<b>COL</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	9/10—8/10
<b>CORI</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	8/10—8/10
<b>RDOM</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	9/10—9/10
<b>ELSA</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	9/10—8/10
<b>GUA</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>l</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	6/10—6/10
<b>HON</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	5/10—5/10
<b>MEX</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	8/10—8/10
<b>NIC</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>l</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	9/10—9/10
<b>PAN</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>l</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>l</b>	<b>w</b>	4/10—4/10
<b>PAR</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>l</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	7/10—6/10
<b>PERU</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	7/10—7/10
<b>URU</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	9/10—9/10
<b>VEN</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	9/10—8/10
<b>USA</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>w</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	9/10—7/10
<b>Significant</b>	15/18	6/18	5/18	18/18	18/18	14/18	18/18	16/18	15/18	15/18	140/180
<b>Winner</b>	15/18	2/18	4/18	18/18	18/18	13/18	18/18	15/18	15/18	15/18	133/180

**Notes:** “W” indicates winner-dominated gap; “L” indicates a loser-dominated gap. All gaps significant at a 90% level in **UPPERCASE and BOLD** (insignificant gaps are lowercase). Marginals show the proportion of results that were (1) significant and (2) significant in a winner-dominant direction both within country (vertical marginals) and for each political attitude (horizontal marginals).

**Table 20. Summary of Winner-Loser Gaps in Political Behaviors (by Country and Dependent Variable)**

	Contacting Officials	Attending Meetings	Protest Participation	Political Discussion	Convincing Others	Significant— Winner
<b>ARG</b>	w	<b>W</b>	l	l	l	1/5—1/5
<b>BOL</b>	l	w	<b>L</b>	l	l	1/5—0/5
<b>BRA</b>	<b>W</b>	l	w	<b>L</b>	l	2/5—1/5
<b>CHI</b>	<b>W</b>	l	.	<b>L</b>	l	2/4—1/4
<b>COL</b>	l	<b>L</b>	l	<b>L</b>	<b>L</b>	3/5—0/5
<b>CORI</b>	w	w	l	w	l	0/5—0/5
<b>RDOM</b>	w	l	<b>L</b>	l	l	1/5—0/5
<b>ELSA</b>	w	<b>L</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>L</b>	4/5—0/5
<b>GUA</b>	w	w	w	<b>L</b>	<b>L</b>	2/5—0/5
<b>HON</b>	w	<b>W</b>	w	w	<b>L</b>	2/5—1/5
<b>MEX</b>	l	l	l	l	<b>L</b>	1/5—0/5
<b>NIC</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	w	w	l	2/5—2/5
<b>PAN</b>	w	<b>W</b>	l	<b>W</b>	w	2/5—2/5
<b>PAR</b>	l	l	l	<b>L</b>	<b>L</b>	2/5—0/5
<b>PERU</b>	l	w	l	<b>W</b>	w	1/5—1/5
<b>URU</b>	l	w	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	3/5—3/5
<b>VEN</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>L</b>	5/5—2/5
<b>USA</b>	<b>L</b>	l	<b>L</b>	w	.	2/4—0/4
<b>Significant</b>	5/18	7/18	6/17	10/18	8/17	36/58
<b>Winner</b>	4/18	5/18	1/17	3/18	1/17	14/58

**Notes:** “W” indicates winner-dominated gap; “L” indicates a loser-dominated gap. All gaps significant at a 90% level in **UPPERCASE and BOLD** (insignificant gaps are lowercase). Marginals show the proportion of results that were (1) significant and (2) significant in a winner-dominant direction both within country (vertical marginals) and for each political attitude (horizontal marginals).

## Chapter 4:

### Presidential Context & the Winner-Loser Effect

One's status as a political winner or loser – defined by whether or not one voted for the victorious (i.e. sitting) president – shapes one's political attitudes and behaviors. This winner-loser effect is strongest for political attitudes, especially those relating to the president or government responsiveness to citizens. In the eighteen countries from North, Central and South America included in this study, winners most significantly and consistently outpace losers in feelings of trust in the president and national government, presidential job approval, and external efficacy. Based on survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project from 2008, in over 90% of the 180 potential cases of political attitudes – 10 attitudinal variables over 18 countries<sup>42</sup> – winners' levels exceeded those of losers. Conversely, in the realm of political behavior, losers out-participated winners in 59% of the 88 cases – five measures over 18 countries.<sup>43</sup> Winner-loser status alters one's political attitudes and behaviors with winners having more positive relations with government than losers.

However, as the previous chapter also shows that this winner-loser effect varies in direction, magnitude, and significance across the 18 countries. I posit two classes of explanations for this variance. First, as explored in this chapter, institutional arrangements and political realities specific to presidentialism in these countries may be contributing to the variations in the

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<sup>42</sup> Recall, the countries included in this study are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, the United States, and Venezuela.

<sup>43</sup> There were only 88 country-measure cases for behavior because the LAPOP survey did not solicit attempts to "convince others" from the United States or "protest participation" from Chile in 2008.

winner-loser effect; I call this group of indicators “presidential context.” The second class of contextual explanations for winner-loser variance lies in democratic and historical context; this latter group of explanatory variables will be considered in the final empirical chapter of this study. Citizens’ experience of winning or losing and the consequences of this process are shaped by the context in which they occur. These two classes of contextual variables address this other source of influence on the attitudes and behaviors of citizens.

#### **4.1: Presidentialism: Powers and Institutional Effects**

Presidential systems have been stigmatized by the lack of political stability. While the longest-standing democracy in the world is presidential (i.e. the United States of America), the historical trajectory of more recent presidential states – most of them in Latin America and Africa – led scholars to decry presidential institutional arrangements as too volatile and susceptible to collapse (Linz, 1990; Valenzuela, 1993). Such scholars cite the concentration of power in a single executive, the potential for divided government leading to gridlock, and the seeming incompatibility of multiparty electoral structures as the roots of this instability. Furthermore, Linz suggests that presidentialism takes on a winner-take-all character that can radicalize politics in these systems (1990).

However, more recent work has shown that this volatility is not inherent to presidentialism per se. Rather, the characteristics of particular presidential systems may make them more vulnerable to upheaval, while other countries lacking in these characteristics may see very stable government under presidential institutions. Such defenders of presidentialism point to the number of political parties and the powers wielded by the president as potential catalysts of instability (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Mainwaring, 1993). Additionally, divided government

as a cause of deadlock in the political system and reelection eligibility of presidents can affect government stability in presidential systems (Cheibub, 1999, 2007). These authors recognize the problems suggested by their predecessors; however, they point to the need for a more systemic, comparative study of the variations in presidential systems.

Regardless of the position one takes in this dominant debate concerning presidential institutions, it is clear that particular characteristics of these systems routinely come to the fore. These are the traits for which this comparative chapter on presidential institutions aims to account. By showing which types of institutional characteristics predict a larger or smaller winner-loser effect, I can provide insight into the scenarios in which presidential politics become more or less contentious, more or less zero-sum. Primarily, presidents occupy a unique position as a solitary executive, unattached to the legislature. The winner-take-all nature of this position leaves supporters of the victorious president with their positions represented while opponents' views are not. The key variable of this study – the winner-loser status of individual voters – addresses this absolutely unique characteristic of the experience of politics in presidential systems.

In addition to this individual-level winner-loser component, however, there are several national-level factors which dominate the presidentialism literature and for which a study of the winner-loser effect on individuals' attitudes and behaviors must account. These characteristics determine the three hypotheses around which this chapter unfolds. First, because the president is unattached to the legislature, this provides the opportunity for divided government where the legislature does not reflect the partisan position of the president. Whereas unified government strengthens the position of winners, in cases of divided government, the views of losers, who did not vote for the president, find expression in the legislature. On the one hand, divided

government may make the production of policy more difficult and, thus lead citizens to take more extreme means to affect policy. However, on the other hand, divided government may make people feel like they are still involved in the game of politics even though their candidate for the top office was defeated; consequently, divided government may reduce the threat of extralegal activities. Accordingly, and contrary to the literature on presidentialism where divided government is seen as anathema to democratic governance, divided government should lessen the winner-loser effect, narrowing the gap between winners' and losers' attitudinal positions and participatory patterns (Hypothesis 7).

Second, the powers of the president are routinely cited as a potential catalyst of instability. Presidents can be endowed constitutionally with any of an array of powers that shape and constrain the roles and activities the president may undertake; this creates variation in the power of presidents ranging from weak, highly constrained ones to strong, unfettered ones. Specifically, strong presidents have a maximum capability to influence the workings of government and the proposing and implementation of government policies. For winners and losers, this means that the positions of winners are enhanced under strong presidents in ways that are not possible to the same extent under weak presidents. Conversely, losers are at a greater disadvantage under strong presidents who can greatly sway the workings of government than they are under weak presidents who cannot exercise such unilateral control. Consequently, the winner-loser effect should be more extreme in countries with strong presidents than in those where presidents wield comparatively few powers (Hypothesis 8).

The final characteristic which this chapter will examine is the length of the tenure of the sitting president. Reelection rules play a role here. Some countries in this study allow for the reelection of the sitting president. Other systems mandate a president step down after one term in

office while some systems allow for two terms before the president must wait out a term. With the inherent advantages of incumbency, allowing immediate reelection can reinforce the dominant position of winners and emphasize the ineffectual position of losers by extending a president's potential term in office. Longer terms in office tend enhance the position of winners and deteriorate that of losers. In essence, years in office captures the duration of dominance of winners' views over those of losers. The longer the president has held his or her position, the more severe the effect of winner-loser status should be (Hypothesis 9).

## **4.2: Measurement and Modeling of Presidential Context**

In summary, the hypotheses for presidential context include three key themes: divided government, presidential power, and tenure in office. Table 21 presents the coding for all of these measures by country. All measures reflect reality at the time of the survey in the first four months of 2008. The first measure – divided government – is strictly dichotomous; either the president's party matches that of the majority party in the lower house of the legislature or they are not. Divided systems are coded as a "1", while undivided ones are "0."

Presidential power is a scalar measure. Generally, presidential power is considered a combination of legislative and non-legislative powers (Schugart & Carey, 1992; Metcalf, 2000); the former includes measures of veto, decree, and control over specific legislation, while the latter includes powers of cabinet formation and dismissal as well as the ability to dismiss the legislature. For this study, I update the framework introduced by Shugart and Carey (1992) and modified by Metcalf (2000) using data from the *Comparative Constitutions Project* (Elkins et al., 2011). Legislative powers are an index ranging from zero to five (least powerful to most powerful) based on total and partial veto powers and decree power as well as a legislative

override component. Non-legislative powers range from zero to four based on the constitutional capacity of the president to appoint and approve the cabinet as well as to dismiss both the cabinet and the legislature. In the analytical section to follow, these measures are additively combined into a composite measure of overall presidential power scaled from zero (very weak president) to 9 (very powerful president).<sup>44</sup> Table 21 includes the component as well as the combined measures of presidential power.<sup>45</sup> Finally, “tenure to date” shows the years a president has already sat in office as of January 2008 (rounded to the nearest ½ year).

As for the modeling of the relationships proposed in the aforementioned hypotheses, the real item of interest concerns the interaction between winner-loser status and the respective contextual variables (i.e. divided government (Hypothesis 7), presidential power (Hypothesis 8), and tenure in office (Hypothesis 9)). By suggesting that context can exaggerate or mitigate the winner-loser effect, I imply that context will change the winner-loser experience thus altering the relation between the attitudes and behaviors of these two groups of citizens.

All data presented herein were developed using multi-level modeling through the HLM6 software. The results represent ordinary least squares, logistic, or ordered logistic regressions depending on the response scaling of the attitude or behavior under analysis.<sup>46</sup> The interaction of winner-loser status and presidential context is applied to ten political attitudes – efficacy (internal and external), interpersonal trust (IPT), trust in government (national government, president, congress), job approval (president and congress), and system support (satisfaction with

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<sup>44</sup> Factor analysis verifies the validity of a combined measure.

<sup>45</sup> As a potential alternative measure of presidential power, the POLITY IV measure for executive constraints was also considered for this project. This represents the independence of the executive’s decision-making power (with higher values indicating less power). This measure lacks the variation and nuance of the presidential power measure I have developed; therefore, in the analysis to follow, I use the presidential power measure in lieu of the more narrow, POLITY measure.

<sup>46</sup> The various measures for efficacy, trust in government, and system pride are 7-point scalar variables. The figures below that include these variables show ordinary least squares results. OLS results are presented for ease of interpretation. In *all* instances, ordered logistic regression confirms the significance of the interactions between context and winner-loser status for these political attitudes.



democracy and pride) – and five behaviors – conventional participation (contacting official and attending meetings), unconventional participation (protest), and political communication (discussion and convincing others). The figures presented below show the way in which the political attitudes and behaviors of winners and losers change as context changes.

### **4.3: Hypothesis 7: Divided Government**

According to Hypothesis 7, divided government should moderate the winner-loser effect by providing an outlet for more opinions in government, effectively breaking the monopoly of winners on government policy and activity. Consequently, one should see a smaller winner-loser gap in divided systems than in undivided ones. This hypothesis also implies that the lessening should come from losers improving their positions, winners losing ground, or both. What Figure 9 presents evidence in favor of Hypothesis 7 for five indicators of political attitudes and behaviors.<sup>47</sup>

External efficacy is greatly affected by divided government. Figure 9.A shows that the overall level of efficacy for both winners and losers is lower in divided government than in undivided government. In support of the hypothesis, the gap in external efficacy between winners and losers is significantly smaller in divided than in undivided polities. That the decrease in external efficacy is more substantial for winners than losers makes sense in that loser control of congress breaks the monopoly power of winners over government; therefore, government does not care as much what winners think. However, the explanation for losers' diminished levels of external efficacy is not as clear, as gaining control of one of the branches of

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<sup>47</sup> For three indicators of citizen attitudes and behaviors, the winner-loser status divided government interaction is significant, but in a way that disconfirms the ameliorating direction of Hypothesis 7; these include presidential job approval, contacting government, and protest participation. For seven indicators – internal efficacy, interpersonal trust, trust in the president, satisfaction with democracy, system pride, attending meetings, and political discussion – the interaction coefficient for winner-loser status and divided government was not significant.

government should increase the external efficaciousness of losers. In this case, the presence of divided government may muddle the political system, making all voters – winner or loser – feel that government is less likely to take the positions of voters under advisement.

For trust in the national government, the hypothesis that divided government should lessen the winner-loser effect is, again, borne out. Figure 9.B shows that, while once again we see lower scores in divided government, this effect is much greater on winners than losers, thus lessening the winner-loser gap. Indeed, loss of unified control of the legislative and executive branches results in an 11% drop in winner trust in the national government. Conversely, losers' scores diminish by only 5%.

Divided government provides a unique situation in winner-loser studies because winners (as defined from the presidential election) may be losers in the legislature. As a result, attitudes towards congress should diminish significantly amongst winners between undivided and divided governments. As Figure 9.C demonstrates, while trust in Congress is never high, the drop between divided and undivided government is 10% for winners but only 6% for losers. In a different manner but to the same conclusion, Figure 9.D shows that one's propensity to hold a poor view Congress's performance is higher in divided than undivided states. However, winners are 20 percentage points more likely to disapprove of the job Congress is doing; conversely, losers' propensity for disapproval rises by only 6 percentage points. This difference is most clear in the United States where divided government is combined with a winner-loser gap in trust in congress that is significant and loser-dominated.

The final political behavior whose interaction with divided government supports Hypothesis 7 (i.e. divided government sees a smaller winner-loser gap than undivided government) is in the participatory realm of convincing others to vote for your preferred

candidate. In this case, divided government modestly increases the propensity to try to convince others amongst political winners and decreases it amongst political losers. Figure 9.E illustrates this pattern by presenting the probability one's avoidance of convincing others. While winners are always less likely to try to convince others, losers become similarly less likely to convince when government is divided. When taken in tandem with the findings of Hypothesis 6.1 (presented in Chapter 3), losers' increasing lack of participation here has interesting implications. It seems that access to government decreases the urgency of the political situation (in this case the negative consequences of one's loser status), thus lessening one's urgency to try to convince others in the electoral arena. When losers get a share of government power through control of the legislature, they have less need to try to convince others.

#### **4.4: Hypothesis 8: Presidential Power**

Presidential power captures the capabilities and strength of the executive office in any given country. The expectation with presidential power is that the stronger the president is the more dominant are the positions of winners over those of losers and, thus, the more blatant the winner-loser effect will be because strong presidents can press the advantage, so to speak, of winners over losers. Therefore, in addition to seeing the winner-loser gap expand as presidential power increases, it is also likely that this growth will be due to winners improving their relations to government as seen in their increasingly favorable attitudes and behaviors towards government, losers' attitudes and behaviors becoming increasingly negative, or a combination of the two. Indeed, Figure 10 generally shows this exacerbating pattern; furthermore, the growing

winner-loser gap is the result of both improvement in winners' scores and a diminishing of losers'. Seven indicators provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 8.<sup>48</sup>

Firstly, at a very basic level, presidential power exacerbates the winner-loser effect in external efficacy. The feeling that government listens to what the individual voter thinks increases much more for winners than it does for losers as the powers of the president rise. Figure 10.A shows that, while losers see a rise in efficaciousness of less than a quarter of a point (0.235) on a 7-point scale, winners' levels of efficaciousness rise by more than twice that (0.505). Therefore, in a country like the United States with a very constitutionally weak president, the winner-loser effect on external efficacy is minimal. However, in countries with the most constitutionally endowed presidents, like Venezuela or Peru, the winner-loser effect on external efficacy is much greater. The more powerful the president, the more winners feel government listens to their opinions.

Trust in the national government shows an even clearer corroboration of Hypothesis 8 and the exacerbating factor of increasing presidential power on the winner-loser effect. As can be seen in Figure 10.B, winners' trust in the national government rises with increasing presidential powers; conversely, losers see a moderate decline in trust as presidential powers increase. As the political system becomes increasingly dominated by the executive, winners become more satisfied with the situation while losers become less assured of the government's path. For example, the winner-loser effect in a country scoring a 2 on the presidential power scale (like the Dominican Republic or Panama) is smaller by over a third than the same gap in a country with a presidential power score of 6 (such as Colombia or Argentina).

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<sup>48</sup> For presidential power, four indicators go against the exacerbating prediction of Hypothesis 8 at a significant level – presidential job approval, attending meetings, political discussion and convincing others. Four other indicators do not show a significant effect: internal efficacy, interpersonal trust, trust in the president, and protest participation.

This extension of presidential powers over government is also reflected in evaluations of other branches of government. Figures 10.C and 10.D clearly show that winners feel better about the trustworthiness and performance of congress as presidential powers increase; in contrast, losers reflect an opposite outlook manifested in diminishing trust and increasing disapproval of congress as the president becomes more powerful. In fact, losers hold more positive opinions of congress at the lowest levels of presidential power than do winners; however, as powers increase, the two groups move in opposing directions leading to increasingly larger winner-loser gaps in support for congress. As presidential powers rise, all politics including legislative politics are increasingly controlled by the president. Winners view this situation positively and, thus, reward congress with increasingly favorable opinions. Losers, conversely, lose faith in congress as presidential powers expand.

Indicators of system support also substantiate Hypothesis 8. Figure 10.E shows a growing winner-loser effect on the probability of being dissatisfied (or very dissatisfied) with democracy in one's country. Similarly, Figure 10.F illustrates the exacerbating effect of presidential power on the differences between winners and losers for pride in the system. In both cases, presidential power affects losers more dramatically than winners. While winners show marginal gain in support as powers increase, losers exhibit rather stark decreases. This divergent effect is especially true for satisfaction with democracy where winners see a statistically insignificant decline in probability of being dissatisfied; however, losers see their probability of dissatisfaction rise by nearly 10% to a point where a loser is more likely to be dissatisfied than satisfied at the highest levels of presidential power.

Also in support of the exacerbation hypothesis is the conventional activity of contacting government officials and offices. As presidential powers increase, losers become less likely to

participate through contacting government officials, office, or agencies (see Figure 10.G). An increase in presidential powers diminishes the conventional participation of political losers but marginally encourages such participation in political winners. Winners view systems in which their preferred president dominates as conducive to their needs, while losers see such increasing power of a president they had hoped to defeat as making the system less and less supportive.

Overall, presidential powers have an increasingly exacerbating effect on the differences between winners' and losers' political attitudes and behaviors. As such powers increase, losers feel more and more alienated from the political system while winners tend to find themselves in increasingly comfortable situations. These findings are generally in keeping with the literature on presidentialism that cautions against increasing powerful presidents (Cheibub, 2007; Linz, 1990; Mainwaring, 1993). The more powerful the presidential office, the stronger the winner-loser effect becomes. Consequently, powerful presidents can increase the perils of presidentialism by exacerbating the differences between winners and losers.

#### **4.5: Hypothesis 9: Years in Office**

Hypothesis 9 suggests that a president's tenure in office – the number of years that he or she has held the position as the top executive in the country – should have an exacerbating effect on the winner-loser effect. A long tenure suggests that losers have been out of government for a lengthy period of time, reinforcing their animosity towards the government. Conversely, winners have had their position represented throughout this tenure, encouraging increased support for government. Allowing immediate reelection of sitting presidents exacerbates this difference between winners' and losers' experiences by lengthening the potential time a president may hold office. Therefore, the increasing winner-loser effect can occur from winners increasingly

supporting government or participating, from losers' diminishing support and participation, or both. For the eight indicators in which the interaction between tenure and winner-loser status is significant, seven of these significant findings support Hypothesis 9 that tenure in office magnified the winner-loser effect.<sup>49</sup>

External efficacy is, once again, significantly influenced by presidential context. In this case, presidential tenure augments the winner-loser gap in external political efficacy. As Figure 11.A shows, the longer a president sits in office, the lower everyone's external efficacy becomes; the longer government has been in power, unchanged, the less citizens feel that government listens to their opinions and voices. However, this lowering of external efficacy is more substantial for losers than for winners. The longer a president's tenure, the longer losers have been kept out of control of the executive. While winners have had their executive holding office, losers have necessarily been locked out of this most powerful of political offices, and therefore, losers' policy preferences have found no outlet during an opponent's tenure in office. Consequently, the winner-loser effect becomes greater the longer a president has held office.

In contrast, while external efficacy falls and does so most severely for losers, internal efficacy actually grows throughout a president's tenure in office and does so most dramatically for losers. Figure 11.B shows that, while the winner-loser effect remains small, the gap between winners and losers more than doubles (from 4% to 9%) as a sitting president goes from no time to nine years in office.

Four measures of specific government support all reflect Hypothesis 9's prediction that presidential tenure will exacerbate the winner-loser gap. While this is true for trust in the national government (Figure 11.C) and trust in congress (Figure 11.E), this pattern is most clear for

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<sup>49</sup> Presidential tenure in office has a significant, but ameliorating effect on the winner-loser effect on interpersonal trust. Tenure in office does not have a significant interactive effect with winner-loser status for congressional job approval or conventional participation (neither contacting government nor attending meetings).

evaluations of the president. The longer the president has held office the more the opinions of winner and losers diverge; indeed, at the longest reaches of tenure, the winner-loser effect is very stark. Figure 11.D shows a difference between winners and losers in trust in the president of over 1/3 of the scale (2.178 points on a 7-point scale) at the longest length of tenure. For trust in the president, winners' scores grow over tenure by nearly half of a point; contrastingly, losers' scores fall by nearly a point and a half. Even more dramatically, the difference in the probability of winners and losers evaluating the president's job performance as bad or very bad exceeds 60 percentage points for the longest-sitting presidents (see Figure 11.F). In this case, losers display a fair amount of optimism at the beginning of a president's term, their propensity for disapproval nearly equaling that of winners. However, as time progresses, losers' propensity for disapproval quickly mounts, while winners' propensity for disapproval modestly declines throughout a president's term (or two terms or three terms) in office. Clearly, remaining under opposition reign for extended periods of time negatively affects losers' evaluations of government and the president; conversely, winners' approval of the president grows with tenure. Additionally, two of the most contentious presidents in this study, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and George W. Bush of the United States, have also held office the longest, exacerbating the winner-loser effect as presidential tenure increases.

More diffuse measures of political support also provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 9, showing an increasing winner-loser effect as presidential tenure progresses. Figure 11.G shows that, while dissatisfaction with democracy decreases for both winners and losers with presidential tenure, winners' probability of being dissatisfied decreases at a much faster rate than that of losers. For systems with newly elected presidents, winners' and losers' probability of satisfaction are nearly identical; however, for systems with long-tenured



presidents, losers are twice as likely as winners to be dissatisfied with democracy (46% chance for losers versus only 23% for winners). Having had considerable control of the political system longer greatly increases winners' probability of being satisfied with democracy in their country.

For pride in the system, the exacerbation in the winner-loser gap caused by presidential tenure is even clearer than for satisfaction with democracy. Figure 11.H shows that winners' levels of pride increase with presidential tenure while losers' decline. The end result is that the winner-loser effect, which was minimal at the start of a president's term, is nearly one point on the 7-point scale by the time a president is in his or her ninth year in office. Diffuse support reflects broad levels of support for the political system, and clearly, presidential tenure magnifies the differences between winners' and losers' levels of support as time wears on. Losers do not feel the positive effects of a president's lengthy tenure that winners do.

The length of a president's tenure in office also has influence on the winner-loser effect on political behaviors. In corroboration of Hypothesis 9, presidential tenure also exacerbates the winner-loser effect on protest participation. While the overall effect of tenure is to diminish unconventional participation in both winners and losers, the effect is strongest for winners whose probability of participation decreases from a 25% chance in a president's first year to only a 5% chance by the president's ninth year; losers' see a drop of only 11 percentage points from a roughly 26% chance of protest participation to only 15% (Figure 11.I). It seems likely that the particularly high participation numbers in the earliest years of presidential tenure may be attributed to attending elections-related rallies over the 12 months preceding the survey. As tenure increases, the mobilizing pressure of elections fades, and protest participation, especially among winners, dwindles.

Finally, lengthy tenure also exacerbates the winner-loser effect on participatory patterns uniquely in the realm of interpersonal political communication. Figures 11.J and 11.K clearly show that citizens – both winners and losers – participate at greater frequency as tenure increases in both political discussion and convincing others respectively. While winners see a moderate decline in their propensity to avoid political discussion and convincing others, losers see a more dramatic difference, especially in political discussion. In further confirmation of the political competition theory of political discussion, one sees losers having greater incentive to use political discussion and communication than winners. This chapter shows that the longer this situation is perpetuated, the more substantial this inclination becomes.

#### **4.6: Conclusions on Presidential Context**

This chapter has shown that context plays an important role in shaping the winner-loser effect. Herein, I tested three major hypotheses based on characteristics of presidential systems to see whether or not they had disparate effects on winners versus losers, thus altering the relationship between these two groups. Hypotheses 7 and 8 looked at the role that divided government and presidential power play in the winner-loser experience. Finally, Hypothesis 9 looked at the contextual characteristic of actual presidential tenure, the years a sitting president (i.e. the winners' candidate) has held the executive office.

Contexts that increase the supremacy of the executive exacerbate the differences between winners and loser, while those that lessen executive control tend to lessen these differences. As Table 22 summarizes, the contextual impact on the winner-loser effect on political attitudes was significant in two-thirds of the models (21 of 30) and was significant in a manner that upheld the hypotheses in over half of the total cases (18 of 30). External efficacy, trust in the national

government, and trust in congress were the most consistent attitudinal measures, being significant and in the expected manners in all three of the hypotheses. Three further measures – congressional job performance, satisfaction with democracy, and system pride – supported the exacerbating hypothesis for two of the three contextual models. Presidential context affects winners and loser differently, and this is exhibited clearly throughout the political attitudes under scrutiny.

Tenure significantly affected nearly all political attitudes. Furthermore, it had the predicted exacerbating influence on the winner-loser effect for eight of the ten attitudinal indicators. The winner-loser effect differs depending on the presidential context in which citizens experience winning and losing, and powerful presidents who hold office for extended periods of time result in the largest intensification of the winner-loser effect.

The effects of presidential context on the winner-loser effect are similarly evident for political behaviors. Table 23 shows that presidential context was most influential for unconventional participation via convincing others, being significant for all three of the hypotheses (although only corroborating two). Winners' and losers' propensities to convince others are differentially affected by presidential context, leading to significant variation in the winner-loser effect as presidential context changes.

Overall, no more than two hypotheses were supported for any of the political behaviors included in this study. As with the political attitudes, the presidential power indicator was among the most predictive for political behaviors; presidential power generated significant results in three of the four behaviors. However, presidential power had an ameliorating, rather than exacerbating effect on political behaviors. This largely results from the tendency of presidential power to suppress political communication and encourage protest participation at equal rates for


both winners and losers. Presidential tenure was the most relevant attribute of the hypothesized relationships between context and citizen behavior, producing all three of the significant relationships found therein.

This chapter has clearly demonstrated that the political context in which one experiences winning and losing can matter greatly for one's relationship to government. In this case, presidential and institutional characteristics shape the winner-loser context. Their influence is particularly pronounced for political attitudes, specifically measures of external efficacy, trust in government, and trust in congress. Presidential context also affects political behaviors, especially one's propensity to convince others.


The next chapter applies democratic context to the winner-loser model in a multi-level format similar to the one employed herein. The expectation is that established democracies lessen the stakes involved in the democratic process; consequently, a higher the quality of democracy or the longer-established a democratic system the more improved citizens' feelings about and actions towards government should be. Furthermore, losers should see the greatest increase as their position out of government is not as vulnerable as democracy increases.

## 4.7: Figures and Tables


Figure 9. The Effect of Divided vs. Undivided Government on Winners and Losers




**Notes:** External Efficacy is scaled 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). **Indicator:** On a scale of 1-7 [rescaled 0-6], how much do you agree that “those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think”?



**Notes:** Trust in the national government is scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot). **Indicator:** “To what extent do you trust the national government?” Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].




**Notes:** Trust in the national congress is scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot). **Indicator:** “To what extent do you trust the National Congress?” Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].




**Notes:** Congressional job approval scaled 0 (very bad/poorly) to 4 (very good/ well). **Indicator:** “Do you believe the members of Congress are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?”

**Figure 9. (Continued)**




**Notes:** Convincing others to vote for a party or candidate is scaled from 0 (never) to 3 (frequently). **Indicator:** “How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? Frequently, Occasionally, Rarely, or Never.”

**Figure 10. The Effect of Presidential Power on Winners and Losers**




**Notes:** External Efficacy scaled 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

**Indicator:** On a scale of 1-7, how much do you agree that “those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think”?




**Notes:** Trust in the national government is scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot).

**Indicator:** “To what extent do you trust the national government?” Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].



**Notes:** Trust in the national congress is scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot).


**Indicator:** “To what extent do you trust the National Congress?” Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].




**Notes:** Congressional job approval scaled 0 (very bad/poorly) to 4 (very good/well).

**Indicator:** “Do you believe the members of Congress are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?”


**Figure 10. (Continued)**



**Notes:** Satisfaction with the form of democracy is scaled from 0 (very unsatisfied) to 3 (very satisfied). **Indicator:** “Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the form in which democracy works in (your country)?”




**Notes:** Pride scaled from 0 (none) to 6 (a lot). **Indicator:** “To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?” Place your opinion on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].



**Notes:** “Contact” is dichotomous based on self-reported contact with any government office/actor/institution.




**Figure 11. The Effect of Presidential Tenure on Winners and Losers**




**Notes:** External Efficacy scaled 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

**Indicator:** On a scale of 1-7, how much do you agree that “those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think”?




**Notes:** Internal Efficacy scaled 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

**Indicator:** On a scale of 1-7, how much do you agree that “I feel that I understand the most important political issues of this country”?



**Notes:** Trust in the national government is scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot).


**Indicator:** “To what extent do you trust the national government?” Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].



**Notes:** Trust in the president scaled 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot).


**Indicator:** “To what extent do you trust the President?” Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot).

Figure 11. (Continued 1)




**Notes:** Trust in the national congress is scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot).

**Indicator:** “To what extent do you trust the National Congress?” Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].




**Notes:** Job performance for the president is scaled from 0 (very bad) to 4 (very good).

**Indicator:** “How would you rate the job performance of President (insert country’s president here)? Very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad.”




**Notes:** Satisfaction with the form of democracy is scaled from 0 (very unsatisfied) to 3 (very satisfied). **Indicator:** “Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the form in which democracy works in (your country)?”




**Notes:** Pride scaled from 0 (none) to 6 (a lot). **Indicator:** “To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?” Place your opinion on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].

Figure 11. (Continued 2)




**Notes:** Protest participation is dichotomous, either one has or one has not participated in a protest or demonstration in the last 12 months. Chile is omitted because protest participation was not solicited from respondents there.



**Notes:** Political discussion responses are from 0 (never) to 4 (daily).

**Indicator:** “How often do you discuss politics with other people? Daily, A few times a week, A few times a month, Rarely, or Never.”



**Notes:** Convincing others to vote for a party or candidate is scaled from 0 (never) to 3 (frequently). **Indicator:** “How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? Frequently, Occasionally, Rarely, or Never.”

**Table 21. Presidential Context Indicators**

	<b>Divided Govt.</b>	<b>Legislative Power</b>	<b>Non- Legislative Power</b>	<b>Presidential Power (PP)</b>	<b>Tenure to Date</b>
<b>ARG</b>	NO	3	3	6	0
<b>BOL</b>	NO	1	2	3	2
<b>BRA</b>	NO	3	1	4	5
<b>CHI</b>	NO	3	2	5	2
<b>COL</b>	NO	4	2	6	5.5
<b>CORI</b>	NO	4	2	6	1.5
<b>RDOM</b>	NO	1	1	2	3.5
<b>ELSA</b>	NO	2	2	4	3.5
<b>GUA</b>	NO	2	2	4	0
<b>HON</b>	NO	1	2	3	2
<b>MEX</b>	NO	2	1	3	1
<b>NIC</b>	NO	4	2	6	1
<b>PAN</b>	YES	1	1	2	3.5
<b>PAR</b>	NO	4	1	5	4.5
<b>PERU</b>	YES	4	3	7	1.5
<b>URU</b>	NO	3	2	5	3
<b>VEN</b>	NO	4	3	7	9
<b>USA</b>	YES	1	1	2	8

**Notes:** “Divided government” based on presidential winner’s party having control (or membership in controlling coalition) in the national legislature in January 2008.

“Legislative Power” is an index with one point each for partial veto, total veto and decree powers, plus an inverse of the legislatures ability to override (i.e. no override = 2 points, strong override ( $\geq 2/3$ ) = 1 point, weak override ( $< 2/3$ ) = 0 points). Scale ranges from 0 (very weak president) to 5 (very strong president).

“Non-legislative Power” is an index of cabinet formation (one point each for appointing and approving) plus the president’s constitutional ability to dismiss both the cabinet and the legislature. Scale ranges from 0 (very weak president) to 4 (very strong president)

“Years served” is calculated by the time already spent in office as of January 2008, rounded to ½ years.

**Table 22. Summary of Chapter 4 Results:  
Presidential Context & the Winner-Loser Effect on Political Attitudes**

	<b>Divided Government</b>	<b>Pres. Power</b>	<b>Tenure</b>	<b>Significant Supported</b>
<b>External Efficacy</b>	Supported	Supported	Supported	<b>3/3</b> <b>3/3</b>
<b>Internal Efficacy</b>	.	.	Supported	<b>1/3</b> <b>1/3</b>
<b>IPT</b>	.	.	Not	<b>1/3</b> <b>0/3</b>
<b>Trust in National Gov.</b>	Supported	Supported	Supported	<b>3/3</b> <b>3/3</b>
<b>Trust in President</b>	.	.	Supported	<b>1/3</b> <b>1/3</b>
<b>Trust in Congress</b>	Supported	Supported	Supported	<b>3/3</b> <b>3/3</b>
<b>President's Job Performance</b>	Not	Not	Supported	<b>3/3</b> <b>1/3</b>
<b>Congress' Job Performance</b>	Supported	Supported	.	<b>2/3</b> <b>2/3</b>
<b>Satisfaction with Democracy</b>	.	Supported	Supported	<b>2/3</b> <b>2/3</b>
<b>System Pride</b>	.	Supported	Supported	<b>2/3</b> <b>2/3</b>
<b>Significant Supported</b>	<b>5/10 4/10</b>	<b>7/10 6/10</b>	<b>9/10 8/10</b>	<b>21/30 18/30</b>

**Notes:** Table 22 shows whether or not the respective context variables (columns) had a significant interaction with winner-loser status for the key political attitudes (rows) in the multilevel models presented throughout this chapter. Any significant interaction is then marked as having “Supported” or “Not” supported the contextual hypotheses. The marginals represent the proportion of situations in which indicators or interactions were significant and those in which the significance was in a confirmatory direction.

**Table 23. Summary of Chapter 4 Results:  
Presidential Context & the Winner-Loser Effect on Political Behaviors**

	<b>Divided Government</b>	<b>Pres. Power</b>	<b>Tenure</b>	<b>Significant Supported</b>
<b>Contacting Government</b>	Not	Supported	.	<b>2/3</b> <b>1/3</b>
<b>Attending Meetings</b>	.	Not	.	<b>1/3</b> <b>0/3</b>
<b>Protest Participation</b>	Not	.	Supported	<b>2/3</b> <b>1/3</b>
<b>Political Discussion</b>	.	Not	Supported	<b>2/3</b> <b>1/3</b>
<b>Convincing Others</b>	Supported	Not	Supported	<b>3/3</b> <b>2/3</b>
<b>Significant</b>	<b>3/5</b>	<b>4/5</b>	<b>3/5</b>	<b>10/15</b>
<b>Supported</b>	<b>1/5</b>	<b>1/5</b>	<b>3/5</b>	<b>5/15</b>

**Notes:** Table 23 shows whether or not the respective context variables (columns) had a significant interaction with winner-loser status for the key political behaviors (rows) in the multilevel models presented throughout this chapter. Any significant interaction is then marked as having “Supported” or “Not” supported the contextual hypotheses. The marginals represent the proportion of situations in which indicators or interactions were significant and those in which the significance was in a confirmatory direction.

## **Chapter 5:**

### **Democratic Context & the Winner-Loser Effect**

The winner-loser gap occurs consistently and is frequently significant across the fifteen dependent variables used in this study from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for 2008. This winner-loser effect is especially identifiable in those attitudes that directly relate to the relationship between individuals and their government, such as external efficacy, trust in the national government and satisfaction with democracy. The basic expectation of winner-loser studies in politics, that winners will relate and act more positively towards their governments than losers, bears out when we look at 18 presidential countries from across North, Central and South America. However, as the previous chapters have suggested and begun to explore, overall levels of efficacy, satisfaction, support and participation vary greatly amongst the countries. To truly understand the winner-loser effect on citizens, one must account for the role of context in defining the winning-losing experience. Respective countries' histories, current practices and political institutions all shape their citizens' political worlds. While the previous chapter took into account countries' political institutions, this chapter focuses on the role of democratic context and history in shaping the winner-loser effect on citizens' political attitudes and behaviors.

## **5.1: Democratic History and the Quality of Democracy**

Democracy shapes the stakes of the political game, establishing the risks and rewards associated with one's winner-loser status. In established democracies, the democratic nature of their government is taken for granted and dissatisfaction with current policies or governments does not suggest a resistance to democratic rule. In less democratic countries, democracy may not yet be widely accepted as the only way to play the political game, and in consequence, democratic procedures and protections may be vulnerable. The citizen's experience of winning or losing and its subsequent effect on attitudes and behaviors is shaped by the democratic context in which the political game is played.

The definition and operationalization of democracy is a hotly debated topic in political science. The conceptual ideal of "rule by the people" is insufficient when trying to designate polities as democratic or nondemocratic. Much of this debate revolves around the distinction of procedural versus substantive democracy. In the former, democracy is determined by the process, method and procedure of democracy. Measures of procedural democracy, then, tend to focus on the key element of peoples' power: elections. Competitive, multiparty elections for the nations' top offices (i.e. the executive and legislature) determine democracy (Przeworski, 1991; Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999). This is a dichotomous measure, and it is meant to determine the presence or absence of democracy in a country. Either a country has free, fair elections and has experienced peaceful alternation of power among political parties and is thus a democracy, or it does not meet these minimal standards and, therefore, is not a democracy (Cheibub, 2007) .

Conversely, substantive conceptualization of democracy measures the level of democracy in a country, focusing on the rights, freedoms, accountability, and responsiveness of the



governing system to the will of the citizenry. Conceptualizing democracy in this manner allows one to get a more nuanced understanding of the inner-workings of democratic society.

Substantive democracy is generally not a dichotomous, yes or no, concept but, instead, is a scalar quantification of the grade or quality of democratic governance within the political system. Dahl (1971b) proposed the clearest conceptualization of substantive democracy with “polyarchy” – an idea that encompasses not just electoral freedom but also civil liberties such as assembly, speech, and access to information. Using the idea of polyarchy as a start point, democratic quality, then, is the degree to which a polity has reached the democratic ideal (Diamond, 1999).

Each conceptualization of democracy suggests similar consequences for the winner-loser effect on citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors. The historical experience of democracy in a country should alter the game because it indicates how long, well established and accepted the democratic system is within the country. In such countries, this guarantee of democracy should minimize the winner-loser effect. However, in new democracies, the supremacy of democracy is still being established, and these new governments face myriad citizen demands without experience upon which to draw (Mishler & Rose, 1999). It takes time for democracy to become the accepted rule of the political game and for losers to be willing to accept their losses in a democratic system (Przeworski, 1991). The stakes of the political game in such countries are much higher as the position of losers’ rights and privileges under democracy are less tenable. Everything gets better with practice, and citizens and government in democracy are no different. The longer a country has been a democracy, the smaller the winner-loser effect on attitudes and behaviors should be (Hypothesis 10).

While the measures may differ, the mechanism for democratic quality’s influence on winners and losers is similar to that for democratic experience. Specifically, democratic quality

represents a scale in which the highest ideal of democracy is a system where all citizens can participate with equal resources and with a government that is equally responsive to all citizens (Diamond, 1999, p. 18). The political game in a low-quality democracy has high stakes as there are a limited number of decision makers and, therefore, government may be responsive to fewer citizens. Ultimately, winning is more valuable in lower-quality systems because there is a greater chance to influence policy and the direction of government. Conversely, losing can be more costly in low-quality democracies as the ability to influence government, or even protect one's own civil liberties, may be greatly diminished. The higher the democratic quality of a particular country, the less impactful becomes the costs of political losses or the benefits of political victories. Consequently, the higher the quality of democracy in a country, the lesser the winner-loser effect should be (Hypothesis 11).

## **5.2: Measurement and Modeling of Democratic Context**

Because the hypotheses proposed above cover both the procedural (democratic history) and substantive (democratic quality) aspects of democracy, I will use two well-established measures from the literature on democracy. Each pulls from a different conceptualization and operationalization of democracy. Both are summarized in Table 24. First, for democratic experience, I am interested in the extent to which democracy is a well-established tradition in the countries. To this end, democracy is measured as the amount of time a country has experienced democratic governance since World War II. As this period covers the lifetimes of most survey respondents (the average age of respondents was 39), this gives a reflection of how much experience the country and its citizens have had as a democracy during the modern era. This is a count variable of the years of democracy from 1946 to 2008 (inclusive) giving the highest

possible number of years at 63 (reached only by the United States). This count includes all years during this time that a country was deemed a democracy by the procedural calculation of Cheibub and colleagues (2010a).

For the substantive conceptualization of democracy, I opt to use the POLITY IV scale of democracy. While this 21-point scale runs from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy), because I've selected cases based on the quality of being an electoral democracy at the time of the LAPOP 2008 survey, the cases selected for this study use only a 6-point range from 5 (Venezuela) to 10 (four countries). This measure incorporates component measures that analyze the recruitment of executives, constraints on executive authority, and political competition within a given country for a given year (POLITY, 2007). This indicator of democratic quality measures the level of equality and responsiveness in the political system. POLITY does this by judging the extent to which citizens can participate in government and the extent of protections on the necessary liberties for participation – especially assembly and speech. In this case, I use data from 2007, the last full year before the 2008 LAPOP survey was taken over the first four months of 2008.

As for the modeling of the relationships proposed in the aforementioned hypotheses, the real item of interest concerns the interaction between winner-loser status and the respective contextual variables (i.e. democratic experience (Hypothesis 10) and democratic quality (Hypothesis 11)). By suggesting that context can accentuate or ameliorate the winner-loser effect, I imply that context will change the winner-loser experience thus altering the relation between the attitudes and behaviors of these two groups of citizens. Better, more established democratic governance should make the attitudes and behaviors of winners and losers more

similar, while poorer quality, more recently established democracies should see a more dramatic winner-loser effect.

All data presented herein were developed using multi-level modeling through the HLM6 software. The results represent ordinary least squares, logistic, or ordered logistic regressions depending on the response scaling of the attitude or behavior under analysis.<sup>50</sup> The interaction of winner-loser status and presidential context is applied to ten political attitudes – efficacy (internal and external), interpersonal trust (IPT), trust in government (national government, president, congress), job approval (president and congress), and system support (satisfaction with democracy and pride) – and five behaviors – conventional participation (contacting official and attending meetings), unconventional participation (protest), and political communication (discussion and convincing others). The figures presented below show the way in which changes in democratic context alters the winner-loser effect on political attitudes and behaviors.

### **5.3: Hypothesis 10: Democratic History (Years)**

Hypothesis 10 states that the more experience a country has with democracy, the smaller the winner-loser effect should be. This is because the stakes of the political game are less catastrophic to the citizen in more experienced democracies. Politics is the fight over who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1953); consequently, all politics is fraught with contestation over the spoils of political victory. However, in newer democracies, these spoils are not just policy oriented, but may also include political rights and freedoms and even the ability to fairly contest future elections. Because the stakes in such new democracies are so high, the winner-loser effect

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<sup>50</sup> The various measures for efficacy, trust in government, and system pride are 7-point scalar variables. The figures below that include these variables show ordinary least squares results. OLS results are presented for ease of interpretation. In for all dependent variables, ordered logistic regression confirms the significance of the interactions between context and winner-loser status for these political attitudes.

should be more extreme in more fledgling democratic states than in fully established ones. Furthermore, whereas winners stay at the top of the heap, losers are the most vulnerable to the withdrawal or removal of rights; therefore, most of the closing of the winner-loser gap as democracy increases should be seen in the movement of losers' positions. As the figure below shows, one political attitude and two political behaviors see a significant lessening of the winner-loser effect as democratic experience increases.<sup>51</sup>

The political attitude pertaining to congressional job approval sees a narrowing of the winner-loser gap, which occurs as a result of improving evaluations from losers combined with deteriorating opinions for winners. One can see from Figure 12.A that winners' probability of a negative job approval rating for congress increases by a marginal 4 percentage points with increasing democratic experience; however, losers' probability falls by over five percentage points over the same scale of democratic experience. Congress, the forum of democratic politics, is held in higher esteem as democratic experience increases, especially amongst losers.

Democratic experience also ameliorates the winner-loser effect on interpersonal political communication for both indicators included herein. Specifically, losers see a moderate increase in their propensity to avoid political discussion as democratic longevity increases, while winners' propensity remains statistically unchanged throughout the sixty-year democracy measure (Figure 12.B). While declining participation is not a democratic ideal, this pattern does support the idea that as the stakes of the political game diminish, so too does citizens' (and especially losers') propensity to participate.

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<sup>51</sup> Democratic experience does not significantly alter the winner-loser effect on external efficacy, internal efficacy, interpersonal trust, trust in the national government, trust in congress, or satisfaction with democracy. Nor does it significantly affect the winner-loser effect on conventional participation (either contacting or attending meetings) or unconventional participation. Democratic experience has a significant, exacerbating effect on the winner-loser effect in trust in the president, presidential job approval, and system pride.

In contrast, both winners and losers see a decrease in their propensity to avoid trying to convince others to vote for a particular candidate. Figure 12.C shows, however, that winners' propensity falls at a faster rate than that of losers, resulting in the ameliorating influence predicted by Hypothesis 10.

## **5.4: Hypothesis 11: Democratic Quality**

The quality of democracy within a country, the rights and protections afforded to its citizens, shapes the winner-loser effect by altering the stakes of the political game. Democratic quality represents the equality of the political process and responsiveness of government to all citizens. Because low-quality democracies have few mechanisms of responsiveness or accountability between citizens and government, winner-loser status takes on particular importance in low-quality democracies. In polities with high levels of protections, winning does not come with excessive rewards and neither does losing come with catastrophic penalties. Conversely, the rewards and costs of winning or losing in lesser quality democracies can be much greater. In this way, the expectation of Hypothesis 11 is that increasing the quality of democracy will attenuate the winner-loser effect. As the consequences of electoral outcomes lessen, so too does the difference between the attitudinal positions and behavioral practices of winners and losers.

Overall, there is clear evidence that democratic quality is a significant predictor of the winner-loser gap across most of the 15 variables in this study. In total, democratic quality ameliorates the winner-loser effect in nearly all of the political attitudes and behaviors under investigation here – 9 significant attitudes and 4 significant behaviors. Clearly, democratic

quality sets the stakes of the political game and alters the opinions and behaviors of political winners and losers.

For external efficacy, Figure 13.A shows this narrowing of the winner-loser effect that will be reflected throughout this section. In the highest quality democracies, winners and losers have very similar levels of external efficacy. However, in the lowest quality democracies, winners' scores exceed those of losers by nearly one point (on the seven-point scale). This means that the winner-loser effect on external efficacy in Venezuela is over twice as large as that of Uruguay or Costa Rica. One can see a similar, though less extreme, narrowing of the winner-loser effect on internal efficacy as well (Figure 13.B). As democracy improves, not only do winners and losers think government is listening to them with equal surety, but they also view their own capacities to understand politics as levels nearly equal to one another.

For measures of specific support, an improved quality of democracy results in the ameliorating pattern suggested by Hypothesis 11 by diminishing winners' attitudes and buoying those of losers. For example, Figure 13.C shows that trust in the national government shows a diminishing winner-loser effect as democratic quality increases. In this case, the scores for winners and losers converge at the highest levels of democratic quality. However, in lesser-quality democracies, the winner-loser effect is quite large, exceeding 20% of the scale of political trust. In a top-quality democracy, such as Chile, the winner-loser effect results in a difference of only 0.26 points. In contrast, Honduras, which falls in the middle of the cases with a POLITY score of 7, sees a winner-loser effect that amounts to over one point on the seven-point scale, more than three times that of the highest quality democracies. Clearly, increasing the quality of democracy results in a smaller winner-loser effect on trust in the national government.

Attitudes towards the specific targets of the presidency and congress show similar outcomes, though the decline in the winner-loser effect is more stark for congress than the president. Figure 13.D shows winners' trust in the president fractionally declines as democratic quality improves, while losers' scores fractionally increase. This pattern is mirrored by the evaluations of presidential job performance (Figure 13.F), which sees a small decline in winners' propensity to positively evaluate the president and virtually no change in losers' evaluations. Citizen attitudes towards congress show a stronger ameliorating effect of democratic quality. For both trust in congress and congressional job approval, the differences between winners' and losers' evaluations converge towards the higher end of the quality scale. Both indicators on congress see no winner-loser gap in countries with POLITY scores of 9, though support for congress becomes loser-dominated at the highest measure of democratic quality. As Figures 13.E and 13.G show, winners are quite positive about congress when democratic quality is poorer, suggesting that perhaps the executive dominance of such polities which would accentuate the supremacy of the winners' position even in the legislative branch. On the other hand, losers in such systems have real reservations about the integrity and effectiveness of congress. In contrast, as democratic quality increases, losers gain faith in congress as it gains more autonomy in the political system, while winners' declining attitudes reflect the lessening of their advantaged position in control over congress.

At the most diffuse ranges of political support, increasing democratic quality also significantly lessens the winner-loser effect on satisfaction with democracy and system pride. As Figures 13.I and, especially, 13.H illustrate, winners feel fairly consistent about their levels of system support across the scale of democratic quality; however, losers evince a great deal more diffuse support as democratic quality increases. This finding provides significant corroboration



of the mechanism behind the ameliorating pressure of democratic quality predicted in Hypothesis 11. Winners may not be affected by changing the stakes of the political game, as they remain in the superior position. However, the stakes matter greatly to political losers who feel the burden of lower democratic protections and rights guarantees. Consequently, while winners' probability of being satisfied with democracy rises only three percentage points as one moves from a polity like Venezuela to one like the United States, losers' probability of being satisfied with democracy shows an increase of over 50% from the lowest-quality and highest-quality democracies (from 35% to nearly 60%). Clearly, when it comes to support for the political system, lessening the risks of electoral competition, especially those of electoral defeat, matters greatly for the winner-loser effect.

Improving the quality of democracy also has an attenuating effect on the winner-loser effect on political behaviors. Losers tend to be demobilized while winners see little effect of changing democratic quality on their political participation. The exception lies in the conventional participation act of contacting government. Winners are demobilized in contacting officials (Figure 13.J). Conversely, losers become more likely to participate conventionally, especially in contacting officials, as democratic quality increases. As the quality of democracy increases, the political system can be seen as acting more equally for all citizens, especially for loser who were otherwise excluded from the decision-making processes of government. Government seems more amenable to the needs of losers as the quality of democracy improves; therefore, losers are more likely to participate within the bounds of government in high quality democracies than in low quality ones.

Unconventionally, losers remain more likely to participate in protests than do winners, as previous literature and the preceding chapters have established. However, as democratic quality

increases, one can see in Figure 13.K that losers' propensity to participate outside the established government channels falls by eight percentage points. As government does a better job protecting the rights and freedoms of political losers and as government is viewed as more accessible to losers, losers' drive to participate outside the halls of government are reduced. As a consequence, while a loser Venezuela may be 11 percent more likely than a winner to participate in a protest or demonstration, in Chile or Uruguay, the winner-loser effect is reduced to less than one percent.

Interestingly, increasing democratic quality reduces the probability of political discussion and the likelihood of trying to influence others' votes for both winners and losers. Furthermore, it is losers who see a larger drop in their propensity for politically-oriented talk with other citizens. This suggests that, in keeping with the findings of Chapter 3, political conversation is motivated, in part, by high stakes competition. As the political system becomes less risky, in this case through increased democratic quality, the drive to discuss politics and influence others diminishes. Figures 13.L and 13.M show this decline in losers' propensity being reflected, though to a lesser magnitude, by the declining conversational propensity of winners. By the highest level of democratic quality, both winners and losers are prone to not participate in interpersonal political communication at similar rates.

## **5.5: Conclusions on Democratic Context**

Democratic context shapes the experience of political winning and losing by altering the stakes of the political game. This difference in winner-loser experience is reflected in the decline in the winner-loser effect as democratic context improves. Democratic experience and, especially, quality of democracy alter the winner-loser effect across both political attitudes and

political behaviors. The longer a country's experience with democracy (Hypothesis 10) and the higher its current democratic quality (Hypothesis 11), the lesser the winner-loser effect on political attitudes and behaviors becomes.

On the whole, democratic quality was much more impactful on the winner-loser effect than democratic experience. A country's historical experience with democracy does not seem to inform the current political attitudes and behaviors of its political winners and losers in any systematic fashion. However, the current democratic climate as defined by its democratic quality has widespread implications for the winner-loser effect on citizens.

Both winners and losers seem to focus on the here and now without much impact from historical political legacies. This what-have-you-done-for-me-lately response to politics should act as both a promise and a warning to current democracies of all types. New democracies or those with legacies of authoritarianism and oppression should be optimistic that attention to democratic quality in the present can largely ameliorate the winner-loser effect despite their less-than-democratic historical record. Conversely, the results also show that no amount of historical legacy of democracy can guarantee moderate tensions between winners and losers; consequently, even long-established democracies must guard their democratic quality in the present in order to maintain a minimal winner-loser effect.

Furthermore, the predictive power of democratic quality helps to validate the idea that POLITY is really measuring the "quality of democracy." Insofar as it produced an abundance of confirmatory findings, one can have faith that POLITY does, indeed, offer a meaningful measure of variation in democratic quality at least across the 18 countries included in this study.

As hypothesized in this chapter, democratic context had the ameliorating effect on political attitudes ranging across the spectrum of specific to diffuse. Among losers, increasing

democracy led to higher levels of trust and more positive job performance evaluations. Winners, however, saw diminishing support as democratic context improved, perhaps reflecting an increased competition for control of congress and, consequently, a diminishing of winner control over the legislature. The stronger and more established a country's democratic status, the more effective and representative it is seen to be by losers and the more ineffective and untrustworthy it seems to winners.


Overall, Table 25 shows that democratic context significantly affects the winner-loser effect on political attitudes for roughly two thirds of the indicators. Democratic quality has a much stronger effect than democratic experience, significantly affecting the winner-loser effect in 90% of the attitudes and supporting the ameliorating influence of democratic context for all significant interactions. In contrast, democratic experience only significantly alters the winner-loser effect on three political attitudes and supports the ameliorating hypothesis for only one of those significant cases.

Given the importance of citizen participation in democratic governance, contexts that exacerbate the winner-loser effect essentially create a situation that privileges winners over losers. The result is unequal participation which can, if it persists in the same manner over long periods of time, become anathema to the health of a democracy. What this chapter has shown (and Table 26 summarizes) is that democratic context can shape these participatory patterns with more democracy leading to more equal participatory patterns in all realms of political participation – conventional, unconventional, and in interpersonal communication. Most affected by democratic context is political discussion and convincing others, in which both operationalizations of democracy significantly ameliorate the winner-loser effect. Furthermore, current democratic quality affects all aspects of political participation, indicating that citizens are


influenced by the extant political climate within their country. As the stakes of the democratic game are raised through deteriorating democratic quality, the participatory patterns of winners and losers diverge.

## 5.6: Figures and Tables

**Figure 12. The Effect of Democratic Experience (in Years) on Winners and Losers**




**Notes:** Job performance of congress is scaled from 0 (very bad/poorly) to 4 (very good/well). **Indicator:** “Do you believe that the members of Congress are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?”



**Notes:** Political discussion responses are from 0 (never) to 4 (daily).


**Indicator:** “How often do you discuss politics with other people? Daily, A few times a week, A few times a month, Rarely, or Never.”



**Notes:** Convincing Others ranges from 0 (never) to 3 (frequently).


**Indicator:** “How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? Frequently, Occasionally, Rarely, or Never.”

**Figure 13. The Effect of Democratic Quality on Winners and Losers**




**Notes:** External Efficacy scaled 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

**Indicator:** On a scale of 1-7, how much do you agree that “those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think”?



**Notes:** Internal Efficacy scaled 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).


**Indicator:** On a scale of 1-7, how much do you agree that “I feel that I understand the most important political issues of this country”?



**Notes:** Trust in the national government is scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot).

**Indicator:** “To what extent do you trust the national government?”


Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].



**Notes:** Trust in the president scaled 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot).


**Indicator:** “To what extent do you trust the President?” Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot).

Figure 13. Continued (1)...




**Notes:** Trust in the national congress is scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot).


**Indicator:** “To what extent do you trust the National Congress?” Select a number from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].



**Notes:** Job performance for the president is scaled from 0 (very bad) to 4 (very good). **Indicator:** “How would you rate the job performance of President (insert country’s president here)? Very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad.”




**Notes:** Congressional job approval scaled 0 (very bad/poorly) to 4 (very good/ well). **Indicator:** “Do you believe the members of Congress are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?”




**Notes:** Satisfaction with the form of democracy is scaled from 0 (very unsatisfied) to 3 (very satisfied). **Indicator:** “Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the form in which democracy works in (your country)?”




Figure 13. Continued (2)




**Notes:** Pride scaled from 0 (none) to 6 (a lot). **Indicator:** “To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?” Place your opinion on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot) [rescaled 0-6].



**Notes:** “Contact” is dichotomous based on self-reported contact with any government office/actor/institution.




**Notes:** Protest participation is dichotomous, either one has or one has not participated in a protest or demonstration in the last 12 months.



**Notes:** Political discussion responses are from 0 (never) to 4 (daily).

**Indicator:** “How often do you discuss politics with other people? Daily, A few times a week, A few times a month, Rarely, or Never.”

Figure 13. Continued (3)



**Notes:** Convincing others to vote for a party or candidate is scaled from 0 (never) to 3 (frequently). **Indicator:** “How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? Frequently, Occasionally, Rarely, or Never.”

**Table 24. Democratic History and Quality in the Americas**

	<b>Years of Democracy (1946-2008)</b>	<b><u>POLITY</u></b>
<b>ARG</b>	45	8
<b>BOL</b>	27	8
<b>BRA</b>	41	8
<b>CHI</b>	45	10
<b>COL</b>	53	7
<b>CORI</b>	61	10
<b>RDOM</b>	42	8
<b>ELSA</b>	24	7
<b>GUA</b>	51	8
<b>HON</b>	33	7
<b>MEX</b>	8	8
<b>NIC</b>	24	9
<b>PAN</b>	37	9
<b>PAR</b>	19	8
<b>PERU</b>	30	9
<b>URU</b>	50	10
<b>VEN</b>	51	5
<b>USA</b>	63	10

**Notes:** “Years of Democracy since 1946” represents the initial start date for the Cheibub et al. 2010 data collection project and counts all democratic years until 2008.

POLITY IV scores range from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (completely democratic).

**Table 25. Summary of Chapter 5 Results:  
Democratic Context and the Winner-Loser Effect on Political Attitudes**

	<b>Democratic Experience</b>	<b>Democratic Quality</b>	<b>Significant Supported</b>
<b>External Efficacy</b>	.	Supported	1/2 1/2
<b>Internal Efficacy</b>	.	Supported	1/2 1/2
<b>IPT</b>	.	.	0/2 0/2
<b>Trust in National Gov.</b>	.	Supported	1/2 1/2
<b>Trust in President</b>	Not	Supported	2/2 0/2
<b>Trust in Congress</b>	.	Supported	2/2 2/2
<b>President's Job Performance</b>	Not	Supported	2/2 0/2
<b>Congress' Job Performance</b>	Supported	Supported	2/2 2/2
<b>Satisfaction with Democracy</b>	.	Supported	2/2 1/2
<b>System Pride</b>	Not	Supported	1/2 1/2
	<b>Significant</b>	<b>4/10</b>	<b>9/10</b>
	<b>Supported</b>	<b>1/10</b>	<b>9/10</b>
		<b>9/10</b>	<b>9/20</b>

**Notes:** Table 25 shows whether or not the respective context variables (columns) had a significant interaction with winner-loser status for the key political attitudes (rows) in the multilevel models presented throughout this chapter. Any significant interaction is then marked as having “Supported” or “Not” supported the contextual hypotheses. The marginals represent the proportion of situations in which indicators or interactions were significant and those in which the significance was in a confirmatory direction.

**Table 26. Summary of Chapter 5 Results:  
Democratic Context and the Winner-Loser Effect on Political Behaviors**

	<b>Democratic Experience</b>	<b>Democratic Quality</b>	<b>Significant Supported</b>
<b>Contacting Government</b>	.	Supported	<b>1/2</b> <b>1/2</b>
<b>Attending Meetings</b>	.	Not	<b>1/2</b> <b>0/2</b>
<b>Protest Participation</b>	.	Supported	<b>1/2</b> <b>1/2</b>
<b>Political Discussion</b>	Supported	Supported	<b>2/2</b> <b>2/2</b>
<b>Convincing Others</b>	Supported	Supported	<b>2/2</b> <b>2/2</b>
<b>Significant</b>	<b>2/5</b>	<b>5/5</b>	<b>7/10</b>
<b>Supported</b>	<b>2/5</b>	<b>4/5</b>	<b>6/10</b>

**Notes:** Table 26 shows whether or not the respective context variables (columns) had a significant interaction with winner-loser status for the key political behaviors (rows) in the multilevel models presented throughout this chapter. Any significant interaction is then marked as having “Supported” or “Not” supported the contextual hypotheses. The marginals represent the proportion of situations in which indicators or interactions were significant and those in which the significance was in a confirmatory direction.

## Chapter 6:

### Conclusion

A fundamental part of democratic politics in countries today, elections mandate that citizens win and lose in political competition. Winners are backers of the victorious candidate; losers' chosen candidate suffered defeat. There are psychological and material consequences for both victory and defeat. Elections for the executive in presidential systems represent some of the most contentious electoral battles as they are winner-take-all contests and presidents sit for fixed terms making post hoc changes nearly impossible. As a consequence of the electoral process, one's relationship to government is in part determined by one's winner-loser status. In turn, this status affects how citizens – be they winners or losers – think and act in the political arena.

Herein, I have proven that one's status as a winner or loser, based on vote choice in presidential elections, has a significant impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of individual citizens. However, this study also goes beyond what the literature has so far done by expanding the range of attitudinal and behavioral indicators under examination. In total, I examine way and extent to which winner-loser status affects ten political attitudes and five political behaviors.<sup>52</sup> The breadth of this study enforces the importance of winner-loser status for studies of political behavior among citizens. Through a cross-national comparison of 18 presidential countries from North, Central, and South America and analysis of survey data from

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<sup>52</sup> The ten political attitudes are internal and external efficacy; interpersonal trust; congressional and presidential job approval; trust in the national government, president and congress; satisfaction with democracy and system pride. The five political behaviors are contacting government officials/agencies; attending town or party meetings; protest/demonstration participation; political discussion and convincing others.

the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), I show that winners have a more congenial, positive relationship with government than do losers.

Furthermore, the winner-loser effect on citizens' attitudes and behaviors varies by country. The institutions and conditions within a country affect the stakes of the political game, altering the rewards and consequences of victory and defeat. To truly understand the winner-loser effect, one must acknowledge how and in what ways the context in which political winners and losers play the political game shapes the winner-loser effect.

Ultimately, the winner-loser effect is a concern for those interested in the quality and stability of democratic political life within national polities. The game of democratic politics only works when all players know, accept, and compete under the rules of the game. All citizens must see value in the systems to continue playing the game and, thus, maintain a democratic polity. The attitudes and behaviors of citizens towards their government can give an indication as to how differently winners and losers view the political system. While there should be some winner-loser effect as each group has a different relationship to government, an effect that is severe may indicate a system vulnerable to withdrawal of citizen support.

## **6.1: Review of Findings**

The initial analysis, done in Chapter 3, confirms and extends upon the previous literature on the effects of winner-loser status on individual citizens (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Mendes, 2005). However, it also shows the wide-ranging impact of the winner-loser effect. As compared to losers, winners exhibit higher degrees of external political efficacy, are more trusting of government and its officials, are more likely to hold positive evaluations of the job performance of the president and congress, and are more satisfied

with democracy and prouder of their political systems. Furthermore, this winner-loser effect exists in addition to a more traditionally acknowledged partisan effect. Attitudinally, the winner-loser effect is consistent and clear.

Behaviors have the potential to be much more devastating for polities than attitudes. By putting thought into action, political behavior is the manifestation of attitudes, and highly divided societies – one's with a large winner-loser effect – are more susceptible to instability than more cohesive ones. Given winner-dominance of the effect on political attitudes, the question then arises do we see the same effect in political participation? This study finds that the winner-loser effect on political behaviors is more varied than the winner-dominance of political attitudes. Winners participate conventionally more frequently than losers, but losers participate unconventionally more so than winners. Finally, losers tend to discuss politics and try to influence others with greater frequency than their winner counterparts. This final finding is particularly heartening for democratic politics as it seems to indicate that losers, recognizing they have ground to make up to improve their winner-loser status, are active citizens within the political system and see democratic politics as the vehicle through which to achieve political change.

In addition to confirming the impact of winner-loser status on citizens, Chapter 3 also bore out the variability of the winner-loser effect across countries. Even selecting upon certain characteristics – democratic nations, with presidential systems, from the Western Hemisphere – every dependent variable showed considerable cross-national variation in the magnitude of the winner-loser effect.<sup>53</sup> Chapters 4 and 5, then, explain some ways in which the political context of a country matters for the winner-loser effect.

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<sup>53</sup> In keeping with the literature on winner-loser studies, there was very little variability in the direction of the winner-loser effect. Almost uniformly, winners had more positive attitudes towards government and participated



What it means for voters to be winners in control of government or losers outside of it is different for citizens from different polities. Ultimately, winning and losing is about who controls the rewards of victory; in the case of electoral contest, this is control over government and policy. Consequently, context works to shape these outcomes. Context can increase the rewards and, thus, heighten the appeal of winning and the consequences of defeat; on the other hand, context can minimize the impact of winner or loser outcomes, thus diminishing the winner-loser effect. Therefore, the costs and benefits of electoral victory or defeat can be different for Venezuelans, for Mexicans, or for Chileans.

Chapter 4 showed that the power-sharing feature of divided government ameliorates the winner-loser effect by increasing the number of citizens who get some control of the rewards of victory. In contrast, increasing presidential power, tenure in office, and political competition (through the inclusion of a greater number of candidates) reinforces one's status as a winner or loser and, thus, exacerbates the winner-loser effect. These findings suggest that presidentialism is not wholly animosity between winners and losers because it creates an access for losers into government through control of congress. Similarly, having a balanced distribution of power (i.e. avoiding overly powerful executives) can ameliorate the attitudinal and behavioral differences between winners and losers. In countries with several of these factors, such as Venezuela with its long-sitting, powerful president whose party controls both the executive and the legislature, the winner-loser effect across attitudes and behaviors is tremendous, reflecting the acrimonious nature of politics in the country.

Chapter 5 proved that features of the democratic system like years of democratic history and, especially, current democratic quality lessen the winner-loser effect. Democratic politics

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more conventionally than losers. The only dependent variable in which losers consistently dominated the winner-loser effect was for protest participation, which is theoretically expected.

works, in large part, because all political actors agree to follow the rules of the political game. As those rules become less secure, as fewer people have effective access to government, in other words as democratic quality decreases, the rewards of victory and the costs of defeat are exaggerated, resulting in a larger winner-loser effect. States must acknowledge that current democratic quality is extremely vital to minimizing the winner-loser effect on citizens. Even in countries with recent history with violent military regimes, those with high levels of democratic protections such as Chile or Argentina see a very modest winner-loser effect; however, countries with a similar history but with poorer current democratic protections such as El Salvador and Honduras show more extreme differences between winners and losers. In order to maintain a cohesive political society, polities must work to ensure the democratic protections that keep both winners and losers playing the political game remain firmly in place.

## **6.2: The Future of Winner-Loser Studies**

Through this study, I push winner-loser studies in two key ways. First, I broaden the scope of the winner-loser effect on individual citizens by extending the number and types of attitudes and behaviors under analysis. Second, I bring to the forefront the discussion of context as a moderating factor that alters the magnitude of the winner-loser effect. However, despite these expansions, and in some cases because of the new findings generated herein, much remains to be explored regarding the winner-loser effect on citizens. Two areas of future exploration are particularly natural and informative.

First, further geographical expansion is in order. As mass surveys continue to improve and cover more of the world's countries, so too should research projects expand to take advantage of the new questions and cases now available. A geographical expansion would help

winner-loser studies in a couple of ways. By adding new countries, one can examine a wider range of contextual variation. Even within the realm of presidential systems, politics throughout Africa and Asia would add richness to the contextual analysis. Contextual characteristics such as ethnic or religious fractionalization, stability and corruption in government, and economic factors such as growth or development could all add to our understanding of how much and in what ways the winner-loser effect matters for citizens.

Additionally, having a large cross-national comparison would allow one to interact elements of context that a limited sample does not. Due to the statistical restraints of multilevel modeling, this study was unable to examine how contextual elements interact. For instance, there is a theoretical basis to think that democratic quality may mitigate the effect of presidential power by reinforcing the political institutions outside of the individual office holders. Yet, due to the country-level sample size (18 countries) and the use of interaction terms, the degrees of freedom here were quickly exhausted, leaving some areas unexplored. In a very technical manner, a geographical expansion would benefit future winner-loser studies by opening the door to the statistical analysis of theorized contextual interactions.

A second area into which winner-loser studies should expand is the debate surrounding the comparative merits of presidentialism and parliamentarism. While the previous literature covered predominantly parliamentary systems and this study focuses on presidential ones, an empirical puzzle remains for a focused comparison of the two primary means of arranging representative democracies. Presidentialism gets a bad reputation for a couple of features that parliamentary systems avoid. Having a winner-takes-all election for the executive, along with fixed terms in office and the potential for divided government, has a reputation for making presidential systems less stable and democratic than their parliamentary counterparts. However,

this study showed that divided government may play a positive role in decreasing the winner-loser effect. Winner-loser studies, stemming directly on the electoral process, can give us insight into this debate between these two, dominant forms of democratic governance. By comparing across these systems, one may be able to determine in what areas of mass publics particular institutional arrangements act to ameliorate or exacerbate the winner-loser effect.

### **6.3: Concluding Words**

The electoral process of democracy has a lingering affect through the winner-loser status it bequeaths to the citizens of a polity. Winning and losing comes with rewards and costs in terms of control of government, policy, and processes. Those whose preferred candidate won have their position represented. Those who lost are left on the outside of government looking in. Additionally, context – the arena in which the game of politics is played – alters consequences of being in or out of government.

One of the great questions of political science revolves around the determination of why people think and behave the way they do. If we are to truly get to the bottom of citizens' political attitudes and behaviors, this study has shown that winner-loser status and the winner-loser effect must be included in such analyses.

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# Appendix A:

## Chapter 4 Regressions

The following tables show the regression results from the hierarchical linear models represented in the figures above. Divided Government and Presidential Power each have one table, respectively. The results for Tenure are split between two tables; one represents tenure's effect on political attitudes (Table A.3), and one covers political behaviors (Table A.4).

**Table A.1: Divided Government and the Winner-Loser Effect**

	External Efficacy		Trust in the National Government		Trust in Congress		Job Approval: Congress		Convincing Others	
<b>Winner</b>	0.482	***	0.792	***	0.159	***	-0.35	***	0.38	***
<b>Status</b>	(0.036)		(0.034)		(0.034)		(0.04)		(0.043)	
<b>Divided</b>	-0.326		-0.524		-0.427		0.294		0.24	
<b>Govt.</b>	(0.349)		(0.392)		(0.305)		(0.246)		(0.333)	
<b>Winner*</b>	-0.471	***	-0.608	***	-0.273	***	0.568	***	-0.23	*
<b>Divided</b>	(0.074)		(0.067)		(0.068)		(0.079)		(0.101)	
<b>Constant/</b>	1.93		1.469		1.768		-1.938		1.327	
<b>Threshold 1</b>	(0.156)		(0.172)		(0.14)					
<b>Threshold 2</b>	.		.		.		1.669		0.901	
<b>Threshold 3</b>	.		.		.		4.192		2.22	
<b>Threshold 4</b>	.		.		.		6.635		.	

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p = 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p = 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p = 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p = 0.1$

**Method:** All models run using HLM6 software with responses clustered by country. External Efficacy, Trust in the National Government, and Trust in Congress use OLS; Job Approval: Congress and Convincing Others are determined using ordinal logistic regression.

**Controls:** Education, Gender, Age, and sharing the President's Party are included as covariates in all models. Internal and External Efficacy as well as Interpersonal Trust are also included for all models *except* External Efficacy.

**Indicators:** External Efficacy, Trust in the National Government, and Trust in Congress responses scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot). Job Approval ranges from 0 (very poorly) to 4 (very well). Responses for Convincing Others range from 0 (never) to 3 (Frequently).

**Table A.2: Presidential Power and the Winner-Loser Effect**

	External Efficacy	Trust in National Govt.	Trust in Congress	Job Approval: Congress	Satisfaction with Democracy	System Pride	Contacting Govt.
<b>Winner Status</b>	0.155 # (0.084)	0.305 *** (0.077)	-0.36 *** (0.078)	0.355 *** (0.091)	-0.117 (0.094)	0.06 (0.082)	-0.352 ** (0.118)
<b>Pres. Power (PP)</b>	0.047 (0.084)	-0.007 (0.1)	-0.064 (0.076)	0.053 (0.065)	0.076 (0.104)	-0.016 (0.096)	-0.062 (0.045)
<b>Winner* PP</b>	0.054 ** (0.018)	0.083 *** (0.016)	0.106 *** (0.016)	-0.133 *** (0.019)	-0.08 *** (0.02)	0.06 *** (0.017)	0.082 *** (0.025)
<b>Constant/ Threshold 1</b>	1.698 (0.403)	1.45 (0.48)	1.994 (0.364)	-2.164	-1.034	1.881 (0.46)	-1.527
<b>Threshold 2</b>	.	.	.	1.671	2.219	.	.
<b>Threshold 3</b>	.	.	.	4.191	5.095	.	.
<b>Threshold 4</b>	.	.	.	6.631	.	.	.

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p = 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p = 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p = 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p = 0.1$

**Method:** All models run using HLM6 software with responses clustered by country. External Efficacy, Trust in the National Government, Trust in Congress, and System Pride use OLS; Satisfaction with Democracy and Congressional Job Approval are determined using ordinal logistic regression. Contacting Government is dichotomous and determined in HLM6 using a Bernoulli trial.

**Controls:** Education, Gender, Age, and sharing the President's Party are included as covariates in all models. Internal and External Efficacy as well as Interpersonal Trust are also included all models *except* External Efficacy.

**Indicators:** External Efficacy, Trust in the National Government, Trust in Congress, and System Pride responses scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot). Responses for Job Approval: Congress is scaled from 0 (very bad/poorly) to 4 (very good/well). Responses for Satisfaction with Democracy range from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 3 (very satisfied). Contact Government is dichotomous based on reported contact with any government official/office.

**Table A.3: Tenure in Office and the Winner-Loser Effect on Political Attitudes**

	External Efficacy		Internal Efficacy		Trust in the National Government		Trust in the President		Trust in Congress		Job Approval: President		Satisfaction with Democracy		System Pride	
<b>Winner Status</b>	0.274	**	0.002		0.453	***	0.502	***	0.027		-0.329	***	-0.188	***	0.037	
	(0.049)	*	(0.046)		(0.046)		(0.047)		(0.046)		(0.054)		(0.055)		(0.048)	
<b>Tenure</b>	-0.061		0.044		-0.104		-0.145	#	-0.028		0.262	**	-0.032		-0.049	
	(0.057)		(0.044)		(0.066)		(0.077)		(0.051)		(0.079)		(0.068)		(0.066)	
<b>Winner* Tenure</b>	0.04	**	-0.029	*	0.072	*	0.186	***	0.025	*	-0.323	***	-0.098	***	0.097	***
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.012)	
<b>Constant/ Threshold 1</b>	2.094		1.537		1.735		1.626		1.833		-1.953		-1.719		1.948	
	(0.234)		(0.183)		(0.268)		(0.31)		(0.212)						(0.268)	
<b>Threshold 2</b>	.		.		.		.		.		1.349		2.431		.	
<b>Threshold 3</b>	.		.		.		.		.		3.799		5.319		.	
<b>Threshold 4</b>	.		.		.		.		.		6.232		.		.	

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p = 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p = 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p = 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p = 0.1$

**Method:** All models run using HLM6 software with responses clustered by country. External Efficacy, Trust in the National Government, Trust in the President, Trust in Congress, and System Pride use OLS; Presidential Job Approval and Satisfaction with Democracy are determined using ordinal logistic regression.

**Controls:** Education, Gender, Age, and sharing the President's Party included as covariates in all models. Internal and External Efficacy as well as Interpersonal Trust also included at their average for all models *except* Internal and External Efficacy.

**Indicators:** External Efficacy, Trust in the National Government, Trust in the President, Trust in Congress, and System Pride responses scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot). Responses for Presidential Job Approval are scaled from 0 (very bad) to 4 (very good). Responses for Satisfaction with Democracy range from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 3 (very satisfied).

**Table A.4: Tenure in Office and the Winner-Loser Effect on Political Behaviors**

	Protest	Political Discussion	Convincing Others
<b>Winner Status</b>	0.029 (0.089)	0.289 ** (0.052) *	0.242 *** (0.061)
<b>Tenure</b>	-0.089 (0.099)	-0.142 ** (0.046)	-0.071 (0.048)
<b>Winner*Tenure</b>	-0.126 * (0.02) *	0.046 ** (0.013) *	0.038 *** (0.017)
<b>Constant/Threshold 1</b>	-1.413	0.935	1.558
<b>Threshold 2</b>	.	2.091	0.902
<b>Threshold 3</b>	.	3.051	2.22
<b>Threshold 4</b>	.	4.45	.

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p = 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p = 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p = 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p = 0.1$

**Method:** All models run using HLM6 software with responses clustered by country. Political Discussion and Convincing Others are determined using ordinal logistic regression. Protest is dichotomous and figured in HLM6 using a Bernoulli trial.

**Controls:** Education, Gender, Age, and sharing the President's Party included as covariates in all models. Internal and External Efficacy as well as Interpersonal Trust also included for all three models.

**Indicators:** Protest is dichotomous based on self-reported attendance at a demonstration in the last 12 months. Responses for Discuss Politics range from 0 (never) to 4 (daily). Convincing Others responses range from 0 (never) to 3 (frequently).

## Appendix B:

### Chapter 5 Regressions

The following tables show the regression results from the hierarchical linear models represented in the figures above. I include the results only for those attitudes and behaviors where I found a significant interaction between democratic context and the winner-loser effect. I include four tables to cover the models from Chapter 5; the first covers the significant results from the democratic experience context. Because of the large number of significant findings for democratic quality, I divide those findings into three tables, two for political attitudes (Table A.6 (parts 1 and 2)) and one for political behaviors (Table A.7).

**Table A.5. Democratic Experience and the Winner-Loser Effect**

	<b>Job Approval: Congress</b>	<b>Political Discussion</b>	<b>Convincing Others</b>
<b>Winner Status</b>	-0.403 *** (0.091)	0.586 ** (0.088)	0.553 *** (0.107)
<b>Democratic Experience</b>	-0.004 (0.007)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.008)
<b>Winner*Democratic Experience</b>	0.005 * (0.002)	-0.004 * (0.002)	-0.006 * (0.003)
<b>Threshold 1</b>	-1.801	0.39	1.626
<b>Threshold 2</b>	1.668	2.09	0.901
<b>Threshold 3</b>	4.183	3.05	2.22
<b>Threshold 4</b>	6.622	4.448	.

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p = 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p = 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p = 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p = 0.1$

**Method:** All models run using HLM6 software with responses clustered by country. All models use ordinal logistic regression.

**Controls:** Education, Gender, Age, and sharing the President's Party are included as covariates in all models. Internal and External Efficacy as well as Interpersonal Trust are also included.

**Indicators:** Congressional Job Approval ranges from 0 (very bad) to 4 (very good). Responses for Political Discussion range from 0 (never) to 4 (daily). Convincing Others responses range from 0 (never) to 3 (frequently).



**Table A.6. Democratic Quality and the Winner-Loser Effect on Political Attitudes (Part 1 of 2)**

	External Efficacy		Internal Efficacy		Trust in National Govt.		Trust in President		Trust in Congress	
<b>Winner Status</b>	1.246	***	-0.672	***	2.765	***	1.609	***	2.062	***
	(0.204)		(0.19)		(0.186)		(0.193)		(0.189)	
<b>POLITY</b>	0.055		-0.017		0.138		0.018		0.134	
	(0.111)		(0.085)		(0.131)		(0.15)		(0.099)	
<b>Winner* POLITY</b>	-0.102	***	0.07	**	-0.25	***	-0.066	**	-0.234	***
	(0.024)		(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.023)		(0.022)	
<b>Threshold 1</b>	1.43		1.828		0.23		1.045		0.561	
	(0.93)		(0.715)		(1.096)		(1.254)		(0.832)	
<b>Threshold 2</b>	.		.		.		.		.	
<b>Threshold 3</b>	.		.		.		.		.	
<b>Threshold 4</b>	.		.		.		.		.	

**Notes:** \*\*\* p = 0.001; \*\* 0.001 < p = 0.01; \* 0.01 < p = 0.05; # 0.05 < p = 0.1

**Method:** All models run using HLM6 software with responses clustered by country. All models use OLS.

**Controls:** Education, Gender, Age, and sharing the President's Party are included as covariates in all models. Internal and External Efficacy as well as Interpersonal Trust also included as covariates in all models *except* Internal and External Efficacy.

**Indicators:** All variables scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot).

**Table A.6. Democratic Quality and the Winner-Loser Effect on Political Attitudes (Part 2 of 2)**

	Job Approval: President	Job Approval: Congress	Satisfaction with Democracy	System Pride
<b>Winner Status</b>	-1.708 *** (0.218)	-2.617 *** (0.222)	-2.163 *** (0.226)	1.566 *** (0.197)
<b>POLITY</b>	0.035 (0.16)	-0.105 (0.085)	-0.24 (0.131)	0.195 (0.12)
<b>Winner* POLITY</b>	0.056 * (0.026)	0.284 *** (0.026)	0.202 *** (0.027)	-0.148 *** (0.023)
<b>Constant/ Threshold 1</b>	-1.432	-1.003	0.18	0.167 (1.014)
<b>Threshold 2</b>	1.274	1.675	2.441	.
<b>Threshold 3</b>	3.686	4.205	5.318	.
<b>Threshold 4</b>	6.106	6.648	.	.

**Notes:** \*\*\*  $p = 0.001$ ; \*\*  $0.001 < p = 0.01$ ; \*  $0.01 < p = 0.05$ ; #  $0.05 < p = 0.1$

**Method:** All models run using HLM6 software with responses clustered by country. Job Approval and Satisfaction with Democracy are determined using ordinal logistic regression. System Pride uses OLS.

**Controls:** Education, Gender, Age, and sharing the President's Party are included as covariates in all models. Internal and External Efficacy as well as Interpersonal Trust also are included as covariates in all models.

**Indicators:** Job Approval ranges from 0 (very bad/poorly) to 4 (very good/well). Satisfaction with Democracy ranges from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 3 (very satisfied). System Pride responses scaled from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a lot).

**Table A.7. Democratic Quality and the Winner-Loser Effect on Political Behaviors**

	<b>Contact</b>		<b>Protest</b>		<b>Political Discussion</b>		<b>Convincing Others</b>	
<b>Winner Status</b>	0.791	**	-1.325	***	1.202	***	1.486	***
	(0.283)		(0.337)		(0.212)		(0.238)	
<b>POLITY</b>	0.072		-0.093		0.197		0.189	
	(0.059)		(0.211)		(0.099)		(0.083)	
<b>Winner* POLITY</b>	-0.094	***	0.116	**	-0.093	**	-0.139	***
	(0.033)		(0.041)		(0.025)		(0.029)	
<b>Threshold 1</b>	-2.409		-0.924		-1.148		-0.195	
<b>Threshold 2</b>	.		.		2.091		0.902	
<b>Threshold 3</b>	.		.		3.051		2.222	
<b>Threshold 4</b>	.		.		4.45		.	

**Notes:** \*\*\* p = 0.001; \*\* 0.001 < p = 0.01; \* 0.01 < p = 0.05; # 0.05 < p = 0.1

**Method:** All models run using HLM6 software with responses clustered by country. Contact, Meet, and Protest use binomial logistic regression; Political Discussion and Convincing Others determined using ordinal logistic regression.

**Controls:** Education, Gender, Age, and sharing the President's Party are included as covariates in all models. Internal and External Efficacy as well as Interpersonal Trust also are included as covariates.

**Indicators:** Contact, Meet, and Protest are dichotomous measures. Political Discussion ranges from 0 (never) to 4 (daily). Convincing Others ranges from 0 (never) to 3 (frequently).