

An Extensive Study on Data Anonymization Algorithms Based on K-Anonymity

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Abstract:For business and research oriented works engaging Data Analysis and Cloud services needing qualitative data, many organizations release huge microdata. It excludes an individual's explicit identity marks like name, address and comprises of specific information like DOB, Pin-code, sex, marital status, which can be combined with other public data to recognize a person. This implication attack can be manipulated to acquire any sensitive information from social network platform, thereby putting the privacy of a person in grave danger. To prevent such attacks by modifying microdata, K-anonymization is used. With potentially increasing data, the effective method to anonymize it stands challenging. After series of trails and systematic comparison, in this paper, we propose three best algorithms along with its efficiency and effectiveness. Studies help researchers to identify the relationship between the values of k, degree of anonymization, choosing a quasi-identifier and focus on execution time.

Keywords: Generalization, Incognito Algorithm, K-anonymity, Microdata, Quasi-Identifier, Samarati's Algorithm, Suppression, Sweeney's Algorithm.

1. INTRODUCTION

Microdata is being published by numerous organizations for many different purposes such as business, demographic research, public health research and so on. This published data can risk the privacy of an individual [1]. To protect the anonymity of the entities, the data holders encrypt or remove the explicit identifiers such as name, phone numbers, aadhar number and addresses. However, other attributes like sex, date of birth, zip code, race etc, when joined together with publicly released information, can be utilized to identify the anonymous individuals. The large amount of information that is easily accessible today, together with the increased computational power available to the attackers, make such attacks a serious problem [2].



Data about us is gathered on an everyday premise, as we join organizations, gatherings or are admitted in a hospital, search for basic supplies, or execute our normal day-to-day exercises. The measure of exclusive records portraying every native's finance, interests, and demographics is expanding each day. Numerous districts offer populace registers that incorporate the identities of people alongside fundamental demographics. This information, which is often publicly disseminated on the other hand, sold, can be utilized for connecting personalities with re-identified data [3]. This kind of circumstance has brought particular concerns in the medical [4] and financial fields, where microdata, which is progressively discharged for circulation or research, can be or have been liable to be manhandled, prone to abuses, thereby, threatening the privacy of individuals [2].

The problem we investigate in this paper is how to protect microdata from implication attack, and compare three Anonymization algorithms in terms of its relationship between the value of 'k' and the execution time. Removing the unique identifiers, for example, Name, Id from a table can't ensure privacy. Re-identification is conceivable by utilizing a set of attributes and another database containing a similar set of attributes [5]. At times, this approach can additionally release delicate data about a person. An illustration portraying the attack is demonstrated as follows:

Table I- Implication attack

DOB	Sex	Pin code	Disease	Name	DOB	Sex	Pin code
27/03/1980	Female	684578	Hepatitis	Aida	27/03/1980	Female	684578
12/04/1988	Female	684674	Cancer	Camilla	12/04/1988	Female	684674
03/08/1991	Male	689643	Heart Disease	Smith	03/08/1991	Male	689643
18/05/1985	Female	684987	Interstitial cystitis	Carissa	18/05/1985	Female	684987

Hospital Patient Data (a) Vote Enrollment Data (b)

An attacker can simply join the data from hospital patient data and vote enrollment information. In Table I, by coordinating the attributes like DOB, Sex and Pin-code the attacker can derive that Camilla is suffering from Cancer, which is an extremely sensitive data related to a person. As it is quite apparent that concealing the name, phonenumber or other explicit identifiers does not ensure the security of sensitive data of an individual, in this way, we require more effective procedures to accomplish our objective. Thus by using an appropriate algorithm for anonymizing data one can release maximum amount of data and can ensure that privacy of no individual is being put in danger due to the released data.

2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

Recently, manhas proposed several algorithms for anonymizing Microdata [20]. The principle objective of these algorithms is to satisfy specific privacy requirements, while guaranteeing that the anonymized information stays valuable for analysis.

2.1 Privacy Models

Normally there are three types of attributes structured in the data(i) key-attributes (explicit attributes) (ii) quasi-identifiers and (iii) sensitive attributes. Key attributes remarkably identify people, example of these properties are names and aadhar numbers. Data like pin code, sex, marital status, date of birth, does not uniquely identify a record owner, but their combination, called the quasi-identifier (QID) [6], does. Sensitive attributes are those that people are not willing to be connected with; examples are disability status, psychiatric problems and so on.

The privacy requirements are done with certain privacy models and its implementation is performed by data transformation to preserve information utility. The larger part of privacy models focus on blocking three critical threats to individual privacy: (a) identity revelation, which happens when a person is connected to their record in the publicly available data, (b) feature disclosure (or vulnerable data revelation) which happens when a patient is connected with sensitive data (e.g., HIV-positive), and (c) table linkage, in this the attacker looks at the released table to decides the presence or absence of the victim’s record[7],[9]. In all three types of threats, we assume that the adversary knows the QID of the victim. Besides, data transformation is applied by means of two techniques: Generalization and Suppression [8]. In Generalization the values are replaced with more general values, whereas in Suppression, it omits certain data values. Multiple privacy models have been proposed to offer individual privacy concerns. All these are developed by considering the various attacking scenarios of the data. Table II summarizes the privacy models against various threats, among these we focus on *k*-Anonymity because it is more vulnerable to attacks. [27]

(i) *k*-Anonymity- Model against identity Revelation

Table II-privacy models

Privacy Model	Identity revelation	Feature disclosure	Table linkage
k-Anonymity[9]	✓		
MultiR k-Anonymity[10]	✓		
<i>l</i> -Diversity[11]	✓		
(<i>k, e</i>)-Anonymity [12]		✓	
(α, k)-Anonymity [13]	✓	✓	
<i>t</i> -Closeness[14]		✓	
(<i>X, Y</i>)-Privacy [15]	✓	✓	
ϵ -Differential Privacy[16]			✓
(<i>d, y</i>)-Privacy[17]			✓
Distributional Privacy[18]			✓

k-anonymity is the well established model for identity revelation. It was the primary model proposed for microdata anonymization and it is the base from which further expansion have been developed. The definition of *k*-anonymity is as follows [19]: Let $RT(A_1, \dots, A_n)$ be a table and $Q_{I_{RT}}$ be the quasi-identifier associated with it. RT is said to satisfy *k*-anonymity if and only if each sequence of values in $RT[Q_{I_{RT}}]$ appears with at least *k*


occurrences in $RT[Q_{I_{RT}}]$.

Table III-anonymous Hospital patient data (k=3)

DOB	Sex	Pin-code	Disease
1980-89	Female	684***	Hepatitis
1980-89	Female	684***	Cancer
1990-99	Male	689***	Heart Disease

To avert record linkage through QID, Samarati and Sweeney propose the thought of *k*- anonymity [8]: If one record in the table has some value QID, at least *k* -1 different records likewise have the value QID. In other words, the base

equivalence group size on QID is in any event, k . A table fulfilling this necessity is called k -anonymous. In a k -anonymous table, every record is indistinguishable from at least $k - 1$ different records with respect to QID. Thus the likelihood of connecting an individual to a particular record through QID is at most $1/k$ [20].



records, the table is 3-anonymous, value of $k=3$. Fig. 1 Taxonomy trees

If we link the records in vote enrollment database to the records in Table III through QID, each record is linked to either no record or at least 3 records in Table III.

2.2 Anonymization Procedures

An anonymization algorithm can utilize distinctive operations to accomplish the desired level of security. Among these, deterministic mechanisms represent a more appropriate choice when the point is to protect the honesty of the information [2]. One of these techniques is generalization and suppression [8],[9],[19],[20]. Since the algorithms assessed in our study utilize generalization and suppression, we give more insights about these operations.

Table III shows a 3-anonymous table by generalizing QID = DOB, Sex, Pin-code from Table II using the taxonomy trees in Fig. 1. It has two distinct groups on QID, namely "1980-89, Female, 684****" and "1990-99, Male, 649****". Since each group contains at least 3




Fig. 2 Domain Generalization Hierarchy

(i) Generalization




Fig. 3 Generalization lattice

Generalization consists of substituting the values of a given attribute with more general values [8], [19]. To this purpose, the notion of domain (i.e., the set of values that an attribute can assume) is replaced with a set of generalized domains. In other words, Conversion of any value to a more general form is the process of generalization. E.g. "Male" and "Female" can be generalized to "Person". Generalization can be applied on the attribute level (column) and also in cell level.

Generalization Hierarchy [8], [9]-: Generalization Hierarchy can be defined as a graph or a grid structure. The nodes of this graph are achieved by generalizing various combinations of attributes together at different levels.

Consider two aspects "Gender" and "ZIP Code" of a relation T. Value of attribute Gender at level-0 of generalization can be "Male" and "Female". To achieve level 1 of Generalization with respect to attribute Gender we must generalize the values. We can generalize these two values "Male" and "Female" to another value, say, "Person" or adding asterisk up to a level defined by us. By generalizing the values of attribute Sex to "Person" we achieve level 2 generalization with respect to Gender. Similar is for ZIP code but the level can be increased. By combining different levels of generalization of different attributes we can form the Domain Generalization Hierarchy:

(ii) *Suppression*

Suppression means, removing any value totally from an information table [9],[19],[20]. Suppression prompts more information loss when compared to generalization, because suppression takes away all the attribute value in the cell. Since it takes off all the details, suppression is applied just for key characteristics. If we apply Suppression of the data we can guarantee that no dangerous implication attack will be carried out. It can be applied to the row level column level and in the complete cell.




Fig. 4 Suppression of Race

3 ANONYMIZATION ALGORITHMS

There are a number of algorithms based on different models of k-anonymity to accomplish k-anonymity. In our relative study, we have chosen three k-anonymization algorithms utilizing generalization and suppression [8], [9], [19]. We have picked these in view of the accompanying reasons: (1) these algorithms have been broadly referred to in the literature (2) these algorithms use different strategies of anonymization permitting a more complete assessment, (3) a public implementation of these algorithms is accessible and (4) these can be assessed inside a similar framework, taking into consideration all the more reasonable correlation [28]. In the following section, we describe the algorithms applicable to the scope of this work we likewise show a schematic representation also, a case for each of the algorithms, with the target of making them effortlessly conceivable for specialists. (a) Incognito Algorithm (b) Samarati's Algorithm (c) Sweeney's Algorithm.

3.1 *Incognito Algorithm*

Incognito algorithm [23] produces the set of all conceivable k-anonymous full-domain generalizations of relation T, with an optional tuple suppression threshold. In the algorithm each iteration consists of two parts. It starts by checking single-attribute subsets of the quasi-identifier, and afterward repeats, checking k-anonymity with respect to larger subsets of quasi-identifiers.

3.2 *Samarati's Algorithm*

This algorithm scans for the conceivable k-anonymous solutions by seizing various levels in Domain Generalization Hierarchy (DGH). It utilizes the binary search to acquire the solution in less time. [24] Samarati makes the assumption that great solutions are the ones where end results in a table have minimal generalizations. Therefore, her algorithm is intended to look at the cross section and distinguish the least level on which at least one solution vector is discovered (the

generalizations that fulfill k-anonymity with minimal suppression). This algorithm executes the AG_TS model, generalization is applied in the level of column and suppression is applied at the level of row. *MaxSup* is the greatest number of tuples that are permitted to be suppressed to accomplish k-anonymity.

3.3 Sweeney's Algorithm- Datafly

Datafly algorithm is an algorithm for offering anonymity of Electronic Health Records [25]. Anonymization is carried out by means of mechanically generalizing, substituting, inserting and removing statistics without losing details for Demographic research.

3.4 Analogy of Algorithms

Table IV- Analogy of Algorithms

	Algorithm	Advantages	Disadvantages
1	Incognito [23]	1.The algorithm finds all the k-anonymous full domain generalizations 2. Optimal solution can be selected according to different criteria	1.The algorithm uses breadth first search method which takes a lot of time to traverse the solution space
2	Samarati's [24]	1. Uses the binary search to obtain the solution in less time. 2. Looks for the solution with the least generalization. 3.samarati's output dependably has an opportunity to be an optimal solution 4. Great result when compared to Datafly	1.The chance to get an optimal solution dramatically varies with k, MaxSup lattice size.
3	Sweeney-Data fly [25]	1.The algorithm checks very few nodes for k-anonymity due to which it is able to give results very fast 2.It is a greedy approach that generates frequency lists and iteratively generalizes those combinations with less than k occurrences 3.Practically implementable	1. The algorithm skips many nodes, therefore, resulting data is much generalized and sometimes this released data may not be suitable for research purpose as it Provides very little information. 2.Suppressing all values within the tuple

4 RESULT AND DISCUSSION

In this section we exhibit the outcomes for the tests led utilizing the algorithms clarified in the past section. For our investigation we utilized the Adult datasets, obtained from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository [26]. The parameters changed in this trials are:-

1. *k-value*: Defines the protection level that must be fulfilled by the anonymization calculation.
2. *Dataset size*: Corresponds to the quantity of records in the dataset.

Varied k-value and Data size -: we provide various k values then observe the result, and find the Execution time of each algorithm, using a configuration of QID=5. Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 shows the result of trials. From the graph obviously, as the number of k value expands the time taken for anonymization is increments, because when k increment the time needing for anonymization is also increases for preserving the privacy of data. In the case of varied data size the anonymization time has a huge spike increment. As can be seen in figures, execution time of Incognito algorithm has minimal variation with the k value and data size. In the case of Sweeney's algorithm there is large variation of execution time. As the data size increases the curve goes to smooth because with the data size the anonymization operations are decremented.

At the point when contrasting these two algorithms and Samarati's algorithm it has exceptionally insignificant variation and also the execution time is comparatively low, and also when the data size increases it hasn't any detectable impact in the execution time. So we can conclude that among these three algorithms of anonymization Samarati's is the best one for anonymization.




Fig. 5 Dataset with 10000 data's




Fig. 6 Dataset with 20000 data's




Fig. 7 Dataset with 30000 data's

5 CONCLUSION

From the above results, we can understand that “The level of anonymization is directly proportional to the number of records”, the k value has to be chosen in such a way it bridges the gap between the privacy and the released microdata. The choice of algorithm thus plays a crucial role. Experimental results prove that Samarati algorithm is consistent even when the data size increases and would provide better anonymization. Many research extensions are possible with the obtained results, the important and challenging one is being able to find the optimal K value for the Quasi identifier(s) based on the nature of the dataset by maintaining the Anonymization-Privacy Preserving ratio.

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