

Policy brokers in policy changes of fishery resource management in maros regency

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Abstract. The policy of fishery resource management has changed from decided policy causing conflict either horizontally or vertically, this research aims to analyze and explain behaviour policy broker in mediating conflict caused by policy changes of fishery resource management with using AFC from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, this research used qualitative method with data analysis of a case study. Research results show that policy changes in local regulation No 12 in 2015 are not able to describe clearly related to shape specification of fishing technology tools and border area of fishing ground for traditional and modification technology fisher, unclear government regulations which regulate about fishing tools and border rules of fishing ground, so those become factor to create conflict between fishers in fishery resource management, this research found in conflict of fishery resource management involves policy broker in some elements which do brokerage in conflict between fishers in fishing, behaviour of policy broker in the conflict to find compromise to reduce the conflict of competed coalitions and compete to affect output of fishery policy in operational level, the behavior of policy broker is behavior oriented to material and stability in policy outputs, the behavior of policy broker does not do brokerage continuously in the case of fisher case but it is not based on personal interest of brokerage.

Keywords: Brokerage, management policy and fishery resource.

1. Introduction

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is often used to explain public policy changes. This method is focused on analyzing interaction among avocation coalitions in a policy sub system. These avocation coalitions compete to define their *policy core beliefs* into government with affecting policy [1][2][3][4].

The perspective of Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) states that policy changes happen as main consequence of competition among avocation coalitions in a policy sub system. The avocation coalitions compete one another and compete to affect government policy in operational level to affect government programs and cause high normative conflict in the policy sub system. High normative conflict happens among avocation coalitions in the policy sub system mediated by policy brokers, policy brokers offer option to be adopted and implemented by government authority resulting policy outputs in operational level [2][3].



In developing countries, policy change can be seen in area of coastal resource management. However, it has various goals but relevant elements in policy of coastal resource management in many developing countries reduce poverty, develop economy sector and assure conservation and also control city growth[5][6].

Meanwhile, the citizen wants more in order that the government concentrates to achieve the goals of coastal resource management effectively and efficiently, in fact, government in developing countries is focused on policy changes. Policy changes either major or minor level [7].

Policy change in fishery resource management is clear when constitution No. 9 in 2005 applied and then revised to be Constitution No. 45 in 2004 and then revised again to be constitution No. 31 in 2009 about fishery and it changed again by ratification of constitution No 23 in 2014 about local government as revision of constitution 32 in 2004. Before constitution 23 in 2014 issued, every area had authority to manage and used fishing resource in certain waters. When constitution No. 23 in 2014 ratified that managed widening of province authority, from 4–12 miles to 0–12 miles. So, in beginning of regency government has authority from 0 to 4 miles. Now, it has no authority anymore.

General policy goals of fishery resource policy in south Sulawesi. Especially in Maros Regency stated in local regulation No. 12 in 2015 about coastal resource management in chapter VII article 19 (1) stating that everyone or institution utilizing coastal and sea resource has to prevent pollution and destructing coastal and sea resource, and article 19 (2) stating that everyone or institution conduct their activity must use save production facility or not destruct coastal resource.

The policy of fishery resource management stated in local regulation No. 12 in 2015 has created some perceptions in coastal community related to the use of fishing technology and fishing area conflict in waters of Maros Regency, conflicted groups are traditional fisher (Klitik net and bubu) and fisher using modification fishing tool (pa'renreng, sodo)

Fisher group of modification fishing user (cantrang) or group of active technology fisher is often considered to damage traditional fishing tools (net, throwing net, rattan fish trap) put by traditional fisher while traditional fisher uses passive fishing tools that have 100 meters fishing zone. Another conflict case between traditional and modification fisher caused by fisher thinks that modification fishing tools damage fishery resource like coral, sea weed, etc. on the contrary, it is inappropriate with local regulation of Maros Regency no 12 in 2015 that traditional fisher is in 100 meters of coastal area while modification fisher thinks the tools used not prohibited by government because they are not trawl, so those tools can be operated in Indonesia waters. Detail and specific of government regulation of fishing tools allowed and prohibited by the government. As decision letter of Director General of fishery No. 340 in 1997 about technical specification and operation procedure of fishing tools mentioned if cantrang excludes kind of trawl specification.

There are two conflicts happening in Maros Regency those are specification of fishing technology and fishing ground competition between traditional and semi modern fisher, these problems happen because semi modern fisher fishes in waters (0–3 miles) claimed as traditional fisher area while semi modern fisher claims that the restriction of fishing area in that area has not been regulated clearly.

Based on those phenomena above, the writer uses AFC model 1998 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, to describe and explain about policy changes of coastal resource management causing conflict either horizontally or vertically in Maros regency, South Sulawesi. This research concentrates on *policy brokers* as a conceptual element in policy sub system which is less collaborated by Sabatier et al. Field questions asked in this research are: 1. Basic value change of fishing management 2. How policy brokers affect to policy outputs of coastal management in Maros Regency. By focusing on those questions, this research is expected to be vital contribution to AFC literature existing with reinforcing width and component depth of policy broker.

AFC presented by Sabatier et al in 1980 as response toward limitations in policy process literature. Three limitations are identified by Sabatier et al, as follows : (1) existing causal theories about policy process are not enough, (2) extending debate about power and weakness of *top-down* and *bottom-up* and need about a policy theory based on system and (3) lack of theory and research about the role knowledge and technical information in policy processes.

AFC provides an approach for all policy processes started from adoption till policy implementation and to understand policy changes in long period. AFC suggests that policy changes are competition consequences among major and minor avocation coalitions in a policy sub system. *Policy brokers* mediate conflict among those avocation coalitions with finding compromises, offering choice to be adopted and implemented by government authority resulting policy outputs in operational level[1][2][3][4].

Policy change is defined as major and minor changes in a government policy sub system [8]. Major change shows changes in aspects of *deep core beliefs* and *policy core beliefs* while minor change shows changes in aspect of *secondary beliefs* in policy or the government policy [2][9][3].

The terms of broker and policy brokers are not defined in AFC clearly. This possibility caused by Sabatier et al thinks these terms as a familiar thing in public administration and social sciences. Sabatier et al just explains policy brokers as important feature which tries to mediate and find important compromises among competed avocation coalitions. *Policy brokers* are from chosen officials politically, senior officers or regulative institutions [10][11][2]in [8].

However, broker and policy brokers explanation can be found in latest literature about policy process. [12][13] state that broker term widely in social networking literature to characterize actors who connect unrelated network. Unrelated networks are described as a structural space. Both are connected to three actors, so the third actor enjoys preferred access toward information and can use the position to get the opportunity. Broker is synonym for entrepreneurs and brokerage is synonym for entrepreneurship [12].

2. Research methodology

This research used qualitative method with data analysis of a case study to obtain understanding about policy brokers, to obtain data in this research the writer did interview, literature analysis, official document, program/local government policy, relevant constitution, article analysis based on AFC in policy changes cause conflict in fishery resource management in Maros Regency. To identify actor coalitions to facilitate the conflict from policy of fishery resource management, writer used MSA from [13] that was applied to identify advocacy coalitions in policy of coastal resource utilization, those are identifying main stakeholder, stakeholder mapping, strategic option, power and resource, interest, action scope, effect and involvement and analysis of field power. MSA results were done to dig further information to understand *policy core beliefs* of chosen advocacy coalitions and involved in fishery resource management.

3. Findings and discussions

To understand the policy changes in coastal resource management causing conflict either vertically or horizontally. So in this chapter, it will describe policy sub system changes and the role of policy brokers in mediating the conflict in fishery resource management. Based on the perspective of framework theory (ACF).

3.1. Policy brokerstoward policy outputs of management and fishery resource utilization

Based on the writer's observation in the field found that policy management and coastal resource utilization in Maros Regency consist of two competed coalitions affecting the government policy those are traditional and modification technology fisher or semi modern fisher, this coalition term found in the field by adopting some previous empirical literatures used either another theory or framework theory of ACF. Typical term of traditional fisher has type of environmental preservation while semi modern coalition or semi modification has type of resource exploitation, this type grouping of avocation coalition is adopted in some previous empirical literatures as used in [14], and also considered has similarity term "coalition pro commodity", "coalition Pro-Development [15], "Production coalition" [16].

While actors involved in policy broker or mediate the conflict in management of fishery resource utilization are found that actors are from local government have been grouped as follows : (1) Regent

(2) Fishery and Maritime department (DPKP) (3) Head of district (4) Local legislator of Maros (5) local police (Polsek)(6)Academician.

The role of each policy broker actor doesn't involve actively and continuously in the conflict of coastal resource management in Maros Regency but policy broker actors just involve a group of justification giver for action and decision of decided policy by the government. The role of policy broker mediator in ACF concept in mediating contradictive strategies among conflicted coalitions and policy preference giver and options offered by policy brokers so they result legalized decisions from the government [1]. This role is really expected to mediate the conflict of fishery technology use and fishing ground in Maros Regency.

The role of coalitions mediate of policy broker determining a policy with applying integration basic and fishery resource preservation through government regulation, policy core belief or actor policy broker has very dominant role in limiting fisher access in fishery resource utilization, policy core beliefs of broker coalition regulation considered as determination to reduce existing conflict. Based on the research result shows that the conflict happens caused by the policy issued by the government caused perception and interpretation difference between semi modern and traditional fisher, the conflict happens because existing local regulation is not able to give specification of technology types allowed and forbidden in fishing.

The actors take the role of policy brokers in fishery resource management in Maros Regency namely Maros Regent, brokerage done by the regent in fishery resource management issuing local regulation No. 12 in 2012 and notification letter of Regent about the role of fishery technology use and fishing ground border, Brokerage done by the Regent through local regulation becomes manuals for fisher, especially traditional and semi modern fisher and can reduce the conflict in fishery resource management, especially the conflict of fishery technology use and the conflict of fishing ground completion.

Local legislator member of commission IV Maros Regency did brokerage in the conflict case between traditional and semi modern fisher as example case when the ship of semi modern fisher burnt by traditional fisher. Local legislator member with head of district did brokerage to reduce the conflict by resulting agreement to be implemented by two of them, signing the ships to differentiate their ship, semi modern ship used net was suggested to leave fishing tools and given floating tools every fishing activity. Border lane of traditional fisher from 0 to 3 miles, this thing is regretted by the government and some communities about the conflict because there is an agreement between traditional and semi modern fisher and they have agreed the solution offered by the government but some violations and conflicts still happen in fishery resource management.

The next brokerage done by head of district in Maros Regency in this conflict, doing brokerage to reduce the conflict through giving fishing tools to both either traditional or semi modern fisher, this support given by head of district in order that the tools are used by semi modern fisher changed with appropriate tools based on the regulation of fishing technology that has already decided by the government, and also the government gives net and fishing tools to change the broken nets caused by semi modern ship, brokerage is also done by head of district but it is not able to reduce the conflict.

The next, policy broker in police point of view, brokerage in fishing conflict was the destruction of fishing tools that caused fighting with gathering all fishers who fought and then given some instructions about area border or fishing ground that has to be obeyed and mediated by local police but it didn't have any solution and it caused some demonstrations done by semi modern fishers, they can't fish because police supervised them in fishing area.

Policy broker in academician point of view, brokerage is done through research, seminars, mass media and scientific forum (Public discussion and seminar). They give scientific solution for the policy of fishery resource utilization that an effect of the conflict causes fishing result decreased, beside that inappropriate fishing technology causes exploitation of sea resource utilization and the academician has information and that information is exactly obtained through academic events paid by local budget of Maros. Description analysis and scientific justification toward the policies of fishery resource management is activity step done by cooperating with local and central government/ fishery and

maritime ministry in socializing the importance of management conservation and sea resource utilization

Minor coalition actors or investors / traditional fisher do brokerage toward their group by relating some networks among investors to keep the business security and security warranty to all their member with mobilizing traditional fisher to limit access toward semi modern fisher.

Minor coalition actors or investors and owner of fishery company do brokerage toward their group namely semi modern fisher by protecting toward their member to do approach to the government to clarify that technology used based on local regulation and not break the minister decision of fishery and maritime, so semi modern fisher can fish without their access limited which is done by traditional fisher.

Policy brokers in policy change of coastal resource management in Maros Regency taken from some government and government elements are right based on ACF prediction. In AFC method, *policy brokers* can be from In AFC model, Policy brokers can be from some officials that are elected politically, senior officers in government or regulative associations [10][11][2][4]. Various policy brokers' background in mediating the conflict indicate that care for prosperity, security and fishery resource conservation expected by many elements, especially coastal community.

This behavior of policy brokers is analyzed based on the importance of strategy or the orientation to stability of policy sub system of fishery resource management as predicted by AFC, *policy brokers* assume not to have the importance of strategy, in fact, they try to find out accepted compromises as solution of competed coalitions.

This behavior of policy brokers tries to affect public opinion in forum, discussion, socialization of sea resource utilization either academician or meeting done by the local government with collecting the ponggawa, sawi or investors to give understanding in preserving sea ecosystem by focusing on regulation that has been issued by the government.

The behavior of policy brokers in some brokerage cases described above is complex. Academician brokers look like [17] description as strategy actors who think about their personal interest. Their interest is material namely budget to do scientific activity either research or seminar. Because their material interest based on the regent policy, they tend to act as the member of major avocation coalition [10]. Academician brokers don't suggest solutions of cooperated program to mediate the conflict between major and minor coalitions as predicted by ACF, they just suggest the justification of major coalition policy.

The behavior of policy brokers as the investor of semi modern fisher which has policy core belief toward fishery resource governance, does brokerage function in protecting all their member activity, supplies capital, mediates and also assure business security and their member from their competitor, ponggawa/investor of traditional fisher.

While the behavior of minor coalition actors in doing brokerage in fishery resource management namely investor or fishery production owner and traditional capital owner seen that the conflict happens and focused on access problem and fishery resource governance involving actors who have personal interest toward fishing resource, so the investors have brokerage behavior in all their member activity.

In conflict case, policy brokers appreciated for programs or the rule of Maros Regent in fishery resource utilization because these things can keep sea resource conservation so they guarantee the integration of economy benefit, social and environment. In our analysis, policy brokers act as member of major avocation coalition as described by [10] Beside that, claim that programs or regulations issued by the government in fishery resource management can integrate sea ecosystem preservation so it can increase the function of economy, social and environment but the argument of minor coalitions that description of existing regulation in fishery resource management especially in technology case cannot describe specific about technology shapes modified by fisher so creating some different perceptions in fisher groups cause conflict and don't have any indication about a process of policy learning from some problems happening as predicted by ACF.

The broker behavior of politician has material interest in fishery policy management. The material interest depends on the success of major coalition policy. As academician broker, this broker do not suggest compromise program. On the contrary, they act as member of major avocation coalitions [10]. They praise regent's figure and appreciate the regent's programs in fishery management. On the other hand, broker uses moral messages to mitigate the conflict. He creates social learning but not policy learning as predicted in ACF. This broker always put their position as patron and they act as culture *translators* to minimize misunderstanding in community. This behavior is broker common type in system of klintelisme politic in developing country [18].

Broker in local police doesn't have any material interest as assumed [10][17]. But he also suggested compromise program as assumed by ACF. The broker behavior is quite based on institutional interest [10]. The police as main institution are responsible for security and domestic orderliness. These security and domestic orderliness among avocation coalitions in coastal resource management followed by mass mobilization. In fact, the government worries about demonstration involving fisher groups in some elements that tend to force, stone and fire as primitive community, the police themselves see that conflict either vertical or horizontal can be used by third party and their effort to mediate the conflict seen as their main responsibility.

Some brokerage cases described above indicate that policy brokers in fishery resource management in Maros Regency don't try to reinforce stability and look for feasibility in policy outputs as assumed by ACF. *Policy brokers* exactly seek important compromises among advocacy coalitions competing one another. But those compromises don't focus on that policy itself. In fact, policy brokers is strategy behavior based on material self interest and institutional self interest as described by [10].

Two of those types, strategy behavior based on material self interest is dominant in brokerage process in fishery resource management in Maros Regency. This analysis can be explained with differentiating the conflicts which involve government and private party. The preservation of sea environment and coastal resource consist of government interest while the fishery resource governance consists private interest. In this conflict case between traditional and semi modern fisher, major coalitions as policy brokers doing brokerage but they have not finished the conflicts directly and have not created policy outputs that can give solution toward the conflict exactly the perception of technology use and competition of fishing ground especially in technology conflict and fishing ground sharing so those things have not given major coalition outputs as policy brokers doing brokerage.

ACF states that policy broker mediating the conflicts among avocation coalitions with finding compromises, offering options to be adopted and implemented by the government authority, and result policy outputs in operational level. Our analysis, we got a little empirical evidence to state that *policy brokers* in fishery management policy in Maros Regency affect policy outputs in operational level. It is caused by *policy brokers* not try to find compromises focused on the policy, namely offering options to be adopted and implemented by the government authority.

Non Government organizations and public figures appreciate regent policy programs in sea resource management and then adopting regent policy. This broker also does not suggest compromise options to be adopted and implemented by the government authority .and also Politian broker, appreciating regent's programs but they don't suggest compromises focused on fishery resource management. However. They try to mitigate the conflict with patron approach. The last, police broker tries to mitigate the conflicts with personal approach, not compromise program options. In all brokerage cases above, policy brokers don't suggest compromise alternative programs. All programs adopted and implemented by the local government authority are from local government suggestion itself. In this case, policy brokers just try to assist to way for those adoption and program implementation.

4. Conclusions

This research investigates the concept of policy brokers using policy sub system of fishery utilization management in Maros Regency. The concept of policy brokers is suggested in ACF improved with suggesting the behavior based on interest from [11]. Our analysis results show that there are actors who are responsible for policy brokers in sub system of management policy. These policy brokers consist of academican, environmental actor, politician and official in local police. This behavior of policy brokers is strategy behavior based on material self interest and institutional self interest, this behavior is not oriented in stability and feasibility in policy outputs as assumed by ACF.

Policy brokers exactly seek important compromises among advocacy coalitions competing one another but the compromises do not focus on their own policy. Policy brokers do not affect policy outputs in operational level as assumed by ACF. However, they try to insist to adopt and implement those programs but providing evidence to the suggestion of [11] about material and institutional interest as main basis of policy broker behavior.

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