


**UNDERSTANDING THE CONTENT AND FRAMING
OF AL-QA'IDA LEADERSHIP COMMUNIQUÉS**

Baldvin Donald Holbrook

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews**



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UNDERSTANDING THE CONTENT AND FRAMING OF AL-QA'IDA LEADERSHIP COMMUNIQUE'S

By
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Submitted for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the composition, construction and framing of Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués – understood as the statements, messages, interviews, written work and other output from the movement's predominant leaders: Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The thesis argues existing research into this corpus is insufficiently rigorous, systematic and comprehensive in scope, thus failing to elucidate nuances and dynamics in the narrative of the Al-Qa'ida leadership since the movement's inception. The current study presents results from the coding of 240 communiqués produced by the two leaders from 1991 to August 2011.

The analysis was informed by the literature on Collective Action Frames, which understands this material as the communicative effort of movement leaders towards identified audiences and constituents. This approach divides each message according to diagnostic, prognostic and motivational appeals contained within the narrative and assesses the impact of this collective according to its narrative fidelity (as regards the wider socio-cultural milieu), empirical credibility (in terms of consistency and continuity) and experiential commensurability (in light of experiences and realities of designated constituents).

The dissemination of communiqués highlighting the values, aspirations, frustrations and grievances of Al-Qa'ida is a central objective of its leadership. This material provides the metrics to understand the way in which the movement has evolved since its formation. The leaders themselves recognise the importance of communicating with diverse audiences in this way. The longitudinal analysis of the leadership communiqués, however, found that bin Ladin and Zawahiri failed to present coherent justifications for the solutions presented or how they should be focused. Moreover, it found that the leadership failed to reflect the interests of the vast majority of Muslims, particularly in the West, and gradually denounced those it claims to represent – the Muslim *ummah*. This dissertation thus illustrates how Al-Qa'ida has failed as a revolutionary vanguard based on evidence garnered from a systematic and long-term analysis of the leadership's communiqués.

Embargo declaration

The undersigned hereby wish to confirm that the Pro Dean of Arts & Divinity (Postgraduate), with his letter dated 22 March 2012, has approved the embargo request on both the written and electronic copy of this dissertation for a period of five years (from the date the thesis is submitted to the University Library) as publication at this point would preclude further publication in the future.

Date: 8 June 2012

Signature of candidate:

[Baldvin Donald Holbrook]

Signature of supervisor:

[Prof. Max Taylor]

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Part I

INTRODUCTION

Establishing, designing and contextualising the enquiry

Introduction: Research Agenda

The death of Usama bin Ladin in a raid by US special forces on the Al-Qa'ida leader's compound in Abbottabad, just north of Islamabad, on 2 May 2011 dominated news coverage across the globe in the following days and weeks. Bin Ladin had been America's most wanted fugitive and his organisation was seen (and in some manifestations still is seen) as the principal enemy of the world's premier superpower. Many hoped his death would signal the demise of Al-Qa'ida. As members of the press, academia, and the security and intelligence community began to debate the impact of bin Ladin's death, *The Economist* commemorated his end on the front cover, featuring an image of the leader superimposed on a mosaic of scenes from the inappropriately-named 'war on terror' and snapshots from Al-Qa'ida's protracted campaign of violence. The title under the mosaic read: 'Now, kill his dream.'¹ Although the images reflected scenes of physical involvement in violence at group level, the caption referred to a different phenomenon: the set of ideas and beliefs communicated by the Al-Qa'ida leadership, beyond direct instigation of specific attacks.

Indeed, 'Al-Qa'ida', in the broader sense, encompasses not only a terrorist group per se but also a much wider, deeper and more comprehensive ideology that forms part of and contributes to the wider discourse of Islamist violent extremism. This set of beliefs and ideas has, arguably, spawned a host of separate threats of physical attack designed to serve a common cause. This relates to the ability of the Al-Qa'ida leadership to mobilise activists and garner support from key communities in order to strengthen and sustain the violent campaign. Rather than dissecting group dynamics or discussing past or existing threat patterns, this thesis addresses the ideational elements that have been communicated by the Al-Qa'ida leadership and the ways in which these have evolved over the past two decades. The goal is to develop understanding into the construction of these communiqués as a distinct, central and expansive facet of Al-Qa'ida, in that they constitute a corpus that is fundamental to comprehending the way in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership perceives and communicates with its wider environment as well as a method of analysis which is valuable in terms of contributing to our knowledge of political violence more generally. In addition to developing the case for analysing this aspect of terrorism in general and the Al-Qa'ida leadership in particular, the thesis tackles the following core questions:

- What is the importance of understanding the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués and how can the content conveyed through these messages be understood?
- How are the messages constructed and how have these elements evolved?
- How can we understand the effectiveness of the message and what can blunt its impact in terms of appealing to a wider audience?

These questions concern the linkage between terrorist leaders and their perceived constituents and wider communities and underscore the importance of understanding the broader socio-political, religious and cultural forces that underpin and channel involvement in violent extremism and construct the wider ideational environment. For although there is the individual terrorist as an object of analysis, as Horgan noted, 'there is also the group and the broader network to which he or she belongs, the community being represented by the terrorist, and the broader social, cultural and other issues that can impinge upon the individual terrorist at any time and at any phase of their

¹ *The Economist* (2011) (7 May).

development.² The focus here is on how the Al-Qa'ida leadership has sought to construct, present and affect this community and wider environment through its communiqués. The case is made for studying these leadership communiqués (as represented by the corpus produced and disseminated by bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri since the movement was established) as a comprehensive way of developing systematic understanding of Al-Qa'ida's stated aims and desires within an environment of competing ideas, containing (often conflicting) Islamist revolutionary and puritanical precepts, other ideological strands and diffuse actors and audiences. The case is also made for appreciating these communiqués, once systematically coded (as they are here), as detailed metrics contributing to our understanding of Al-Qa'ida's agenda, scope and development, as well as challenges and weaknesses that can be discerned once the communiqués are elaborated in this way.

The thesis is divided into four parts. Part I introduces the focus of analysis, explaining key concepts and wider context. This part is split into two chapters, the first (Chapter 1) exploring the background of Al-Qa'ida and existing attempts to conceptualise the phenomenon, whilst the second (Chapter 2) discusses the ideology of the Al-Qa'ida leadership and ways in which this aspect can be understood. Part II sets out the theoretical and methodological principles underpinning the study. This part is also split into two chapters: Chapter 3, which presents the framing aspect of the social movement approach as the organisational principle of the current study; and Chapter 4, which details data design and procedural models. These chapters, in turn, provide grounding for Part III, which presents the results from the longitudinal study of Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués, understood as the written statements, audio-visual messages and books that the two principal Al-Qa'ida leaders produced during the period under review (1991 to August 2011). Arranged according to framing aspect, this part is split into three chapters. Chapter 5 explores diagnostic framing of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués, Chapter 6 investigates prognostic frames, whilst Chapter 7 details aspects of motivational framing. The thesis concludes with Part IV which investigates the effectiveness of this discourse, according to the framing paradigm, presenting some final thoughts concerning the construction and content of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués as presented by bin Ladin and Zawahiri.

² Horgan, J. (2009) *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*, Routledge, London: page xx.

UNDERSTANDING AL-QA'IDA

1.1 Al-Qa'ida: A Conceptual Challenge

Few social and political phenomena following the end of the Cold War have attracted as much scrutiny, shaped international relations and driven public debate to the same degree as the formation of the global 'network of networks' known as Al-Qa'ida.³ As social science scholars tried to come to terms with the factors that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union – dismissing, amending and creating models designed to address the socio-economic and political factors involved – a new and completely different set of conceptual challenges was presented as Al-Qa'ida thrust its way onto the global stage.

The study of terrorism attracted ever more attention as the leaders of Al-Qa'ida – formed by veteran militants from the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan – began to see the results of their active sponsoring and instigating of terrorist strikes against the United States, its interests and allies.

The formation of the group can, of course, be partly traced to the turmoil, upheaval, vacuum of power – and resulting opportunities – presented by the decline and implosion of the Soviet Union. In August 1988, four months after the Red Army began withdrawing from Afghanistan, the principal leader of the Arab contingent of fighters in Afghanistan called a meeting in Peshawar. Abdullah Azzam, eager to recognise his aspiration – based on the perceived success of the Afghan campaign and the need to retain that momentum – for a 'pioneering vanguard' to be established⁴ resolved to consult Usama bin Ladin, his protégé, along with other major Arab figures involved in the war. Prominent among them was Ayman Al-Zawahiri, later leader of Al-Jihad in Egypt, who had fled the country after being imprisoned for involvement with militant groups in 1981. Having followed his mentor (and fellow surgeon) Sayyid Imam Al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr Fadl), another leader of Al-Jihad, to Peshawar, Zawahiri established contacts with hardened veterans of the Egyptian militant scene, including Amin al-

³ To borrow Wilkinson's conceptualisation: see e.g. (2005) 'International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU's Response' in *Chaillot Paper* (no. 84, October). Institute of Security Studies, European Union.

⁴ See Wright, L. (2006-A) *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda's Road to 9/11*. Penguin Books, London: 130; Burke (2004-A) *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, Penguin Books, London (2nd edition): 2-3.

Rashidi/Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri and Mohammed Atef/Abu Hafs who later became influential within Al-Qa'ida.⁵

United as they were in their determination to establish a group carrying forward the jihad beyond Afghanistan to break secular regimes and sever links with foreign powers, these men could not agree on its scope. A memo discussing the future direction of jihad dating from this period and summarising the position of all the major Arab veterans from Afghanistan illustrates this dilemma. Azzam, of Palestinian origin, wrote of the importance of 'spreading the spirit of jihad among the Arabs, with the long-term goal being the waging of jihad against the Jews in Palestine.'⁶

Zawahiri and other members of Al-Jihad, by contrast, argued: 'Egypt is the heart of the Islamic world and it is necessary to establish the Caliphate there first.'⁷ Azzam's affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood (Azzam led the Jordanian Brothers at one time) also angered Zawahiri, who wrote in his book *Bitter Harvest*: 'The Brothers have abandoned pursuing legitimate Muslim government in place of the current governments that rule Muslim lands. This deviation has made the Brothers idle from fulfilling their true calling, as Allah wills it.'⁸ With bin Ladin's backing, the new vanguard could become a powerful force undermining secular governance in Egypt. Bin Ladin's preoccupation, meanwhile, was the Arabian Peninsula and 'the liberation [...] of the south of Yemen from Communism.'⁹

Three months after calling the Peshawar meeting, Azzam was assassinated, leaving bin Ladin the undisputed leader of the group that later became known as Al-Qa'ida. A year before Azzam's death, though, bin Ladin's organisational prowess and financial largesse had already made the latter the pivotal figure within the organisational predecessor to Al-Qa'ida, Maktab al-Khidmat or 'services bureau (formally led by Azzam), which coordinated the activities of the Arab fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan.'¹⁰ Wright and others have argued that Bin Ladin was predominantly reliant on Zawahiri's strategic guidance during this period and the experience of his Egyptian colleagues, who retained their association with Al-Jihad. The Zawahiri-bin Ladin alliance, at this stage, appears primarily to have been a marriage of convenience: 'each man filled a need in the other', argues Wright. 'Zawahiri wanted money and contacts,

⁵ Wright, L. (2006-A): 128-129; Bergen, P. & Cruickshank, P. (2008) 'The Unravelling: The Jihadist Revolt against bin Laden' in *New Republic* (Wednesday, 11 June).

⁶ See Harmony Archives (n. d.), document number AFGP-2002- 600086; Combating Terrorism Center (2007) *Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa'ida from 1989-2006*, Harmony Project. West Point, NY: 8-9.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Zawahiri, A. Al (1991) *The Bitter Harvest: The Brotherhood in Sixty Years*, translation in Ibrahim, R. (2007) *Al Qaeda Reader*, Broadway Books, New York and Kepel, G. & Milelli, J.P. (2008) (eds.) *Al Qaeda in its Own Words* (2008). Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.

Zawahiri was, however, a great admirer of Qutb and other more hard-line elements of the brotherhood. His criticism focused on the political processes prescribed by Hasan Hudaybi, who took over as Supreme Guide shortly after Qutb's execution, and those of similar disposition within the movement. See further on internal ideological tensions within different strands of the Brotherhood in Kepel, G. (2008-A) 'The Brotherhood in the Salafist Universe', *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (vol. 6, pp. 20-29), Hudson Institute, Wash. DC. Many key figures in and around Al-Qa'ida have, however, had close engagement with the Brotherhood, including bin Ladin and Mustafa Settmariam Nasar. See Filiu, J.P (2009) 'The Brotherhood vs. Al-Qaeda: A Moment of Truth?' in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (volume 9). See on bin Ladin Brotherhood links and resulting tensions with Zawahiri: Kepel, G. (2004) *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (transl. by Pascale Ghazaleh), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA: 85.

⁹ Harmony AFGP-2002- 600086.

¹⁰ See e.g. Ibid: 49-50; Zelikow P. et al. (2004) *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* ('The 9/11 Commission Report'). US Congress, Washington: 56.

which bin Laden had in abundance. Bin Laden, an idealist given to causes, sought direction; Zawahiri, a seasoned propagandist, supplied it.¹¹ For Scheuer, however, it was Bin Laden who altered Zawahiri's agenda in the long term, much more than vice versa.¹² Nonetheless, for the time being, in terms of direction and scope, the elements that made up this nascent alliance of displaced militants remained remarkably focused on their respective native regions.

The process towards further globalisation was initiated, at this stage, by a series of local events in the Arab world. In May 1990, South Yemen – following the loss of its major sponsor in Moscow, protracted conflict with the northern Yemen Arab Republic and the discovery of oil in the disputed border territories – resolved to unite with the north, forming the Republic of Yemen.¹³ This transformed Usama bin Ladin's chief preoccupation after the Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan (February 1989) and local militant cadres fighting the Najibullah regime in Kabul fractured and lost their focus due to internal tribal disputes, mutual mistrust and a lack of direction and coordinating force. Bin Ladin had been eager to focus the post-Afghanistan momentum on toppling the socialist regime in South Yemen and had provided crucial material support to this end, as well as sponsoring assassination campaigns in the region that continued well beyond unification. He had, however, failed in securing support from the Saudi authorities, which remained suspicious of his agenda and concerned about bin Ladin's perception of his apparent ability to operate freely in the region.¹⁴ This tension marked the beginning of the Al-Qa'ida leader's isolation and the severing of ties with his Saudi homeland. Events in Yemen, however, quickly became superseded by even greater cataclysms in the region affecting Saudi Arabia in particular. A few months after Yemeni unification, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, prompting a UN-sanctioned international military response (again, made feasible by the collapse of the USSR).

Bin Ladin, almost an outcast in Saudi Arabia, was angered by the refusal of the Saudi ruling elite to form an Islamic response against the Iraqi secular regime and the threat it posed to the 'Land of the Two Holy Places' and outraged by its acceptance of US military aid (placing 'infidel' troops on hallow ground – where the Prophet himself embarked upon his *hijra*), which received backing from Grand Mufti Ibn Baz and the official Saudi religious establishment.¹⁵

Keen to invest in regions amicable towards various forms of Salafism and his own support network for puritanical Islamist militancy, bin Ladin had already started pursuing some of the opportunities presented by Hassan al-Turabi's consolidation of power in Sudan through the National Islamic Front (NIF) in June 1989.¹⁶ As events in Saudi Arabia forced bin Ladin to relocate, he found in Sudan a haven to formulate his organisation further, although the influence of al-Turabi during this process was also considerable.¹⁷ Here, he established an 'Islamic Army Shurah', which included the advisory council (*shurah*) of his own group, for all the militant Islamist fringe groups that had been courted and invited to Sudan by the NIF.¹⁸

¹¹ Wright (2006-A): 127.

¹² Scheuer, M. (2011) *Osama bin Laden*, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 12-13.

¹³ Riedel, B. (2008) (2nd ed.) *The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology and Future*. Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC: 47.

¹⁴ Wright (2006-A): 153-154.

¹⁵ Ibid: 49-50; Zelikow P. et al. (2004).

¹⁶ Zelikow et al. (2004); Randal, J. (2005) *Osama: Making of a Terrorist*, I.B Tauris, London: 115

¹⁷ See further in Taylor, M. & Elbushra, M. (2006) 'Hassan al-Turabi, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in Sudan,' in *Terrorism and Political Violence* (vol. 18, pp. 449-464).

¹⁸ Zelikow et al. (2004): section two.

Zawahiri was one of bin Ladin's closest allies during his stay in Sudan and also relied on Al-Turabi and president Bashir for protection, following his eviction from Egypt. He remained focused on his activities for Al-Jihad, however, and orchestrated a plot from there to assassinate Egyptian president Mubarak in Ethiopia where he was due to visit in June 1995.¹⁹ That same month, bin Ladin penned an open letter to the Saudi religious establishment entitled 'Saudi Arabia Supports Communists in Yemen' where he warned that 'all those who oppose the faith of the ummah' would face defeat through violent jihad.²⁰

Following a series of such open denunciations of Saudi authorities and his ever-rising profile as significant financier of Islamist terrorist groups, bin Ladin had his passport revoked, thus rendering him stateless, and was formally disowned by his family. The need for him, and those who relied on his financial support, to secure a more permanent sanctuary was thus compounded.²¹ Amidst mounting pressure to expel bin Ladin and Zawahiri from Sudan, meanwhile, Khartoum resolved to direct them to leave. Continued involvement in their affairs was no longer worth the effort.

Al-Qa'ida, as an organization, has always relied on some form of haven or base (after all, 'haven' or 'base' is one of the English translations of its name) to direct the operations of the vanguards. Following Taliban victory over Najibullah in Afghanistan, bin Ladin, Zawahiri and their followers were now free to settle again in the region that spawned the alliance in the first place.

The Afghan-Taliban period from 1996 up until the 11 September attacks, which prompted the downfall of the Afghan sanctuary in this form, became, in Sageman's words, Al-Qa'ida's 'golden age.'²² The group went from being 'the most significant financial sponsor of Islamic extremist activities in the world' according to a 1996 State Department memo²³ to being the most prominent and globally focused terrorist organisation in the world.

The isolation of the Afghan sanctuary was unprecedented. The Al-Qa'ida leadership was protected not only by the virtually impassable terrain and geographical remoteness of the Taliban-ruled territories, but also by the latter's all-encompassing regime of terror, designed to stifle alternative voices and opposition and implement their extreme and puritanical vision of Pushtun Deobandism, or what Esposito terms the 'militant neo-Deobandi movement.'²⁴ This provided the perfect platform from which to launch a public campaign against perceived treachery and corruption of local regimes, principally Saudi Arabia, the external entities that shored up these regimes, namely the US and its allies, and the perceived impact of these alliances on the Muslim world.

Whilst based in a camp near Khost called *Masada* or the 'Lion's Den' (for which he fought a decade earlier)²⁵, bin Ladin published the 'Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques' in August 1996 calling for Muslims (especially in the Arabian Peninsula) to mobilise against the 'Israeli-American alliance occupying the land of the two holy mosques and the land of the ascension of the Prophet.'²⁶ A year-and-a-half later, Zawahiri joined bin Ladin in the 'World Islamic

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ See Harmony Archive (n. d.) document AFGP-2002-003345.

²¹ Reidel (2008): chapter three; Kepel (2004): 87.

²² Sageman, M. (2008) *Leaderless Jihad*. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia: 49-50.

²³ Bergen, P. (2001) *Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*. Free Press, NY: 2.

²⁴ Esposito, J. L. (2002) *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 16. The Deobandi movement is a strand of Sunni Islam established in 19th century India, now prominent throughout the Subcontinent, the UK and elsewhere.

²⁵ Zahab, M. & Roy, O. (2002) *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection*, Hurst, London: 15.

²⁶ Bin Ladin, U. (1996) 'Message From Usama Bin-Muhammad Bin Ladin to His Muslim Brothers in the

Front against Jews and Crusaders'²⁷ with the now infamous declaration of war that announced 'the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.'²⁸ The initiative served as a prelude to the first major attacks successfully orchestrated by the leadership against US embassies in East Africa six months later.

The transition from confined militancy and localised activism to an increasingly global campaign against the West and its secular power networks and influences was neither straight forward or immediate. Mohammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj, an Egyptian electrician and great admirer of Sayyid Qutb, who later became leader of Al-Jihad (exercising considerable influence over Zawahiri) is thought to be the first contemporary militant leader to have defined a distinction between near and far enemies, which subsequently has become prominent in many analytical accounts of Al-Qa'ida.²⁹

In his attempts to rally support for militant implementation of Qutb's notions of a vanguard eliminating *jahiliyyah* – where people and societies are in ignorance of divine prescriptions – Faraj wrote a short book titled *Jihad: The Absent Obligation*, which was distributed as Soviet forces entered Afghanistan.³⁰ Here, Faraj sought to channel the limited resources of Islamist militancy in the Middle East against the perceived inhibitors to the establishment of *hakimiyyah* – society base on the sovereignty of God – namely the secular Arab rulers of Egypt and neighbouring countries. Faraj wrote:

the believer [...] is aware of what is beneficial and what is harmful and gives priority to the definite and radical solutions. This point necessitates the illustration of the following: [...] fighting the enemy that is near to us comes before that which is far. [...] Therefore to begin with destroying the Imperialists is not a useful action and is a waste of time. We have to concentrate on our Islamic issue, which is to establish the laws of Allaah in our land first and make the word of Allaah the highest. This is because there is no doubt that the prime field of Jihaad is to remove these leaderships and replace them with the complete Islamic system, and from here we start.³¹

Based on his interpretation of Ibn Taymiyyah's Mardin fatwa that classified 13th Century Mongol invaders who embraced Islam as legitimate targets outside the realm of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*), Faraj saw local secular leaders within the realm of just conflict (*Dar al-Harb*). This led to the crucial jurisprudential implication that rendered fighting these rulers not only legitimate, but an obligation for each individual Muslim (*fardh al-ayn*), invoked only when Islam is under direct attack from enemy forces and jihad has been declared by the leader of the Muslims.³² Faraj's interpretation of the Mardin fatwa, however, assumed direct political ramifications for contemporary socio-political

Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula.', published in *Al-Islah* (London: 2 September), translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004*: 20.

²⁷ Co-signatories were by Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha of the Egyptian Islamic Group, Shaykh Mir Hamzah of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan and Fazlul Rahman of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.

²⁸ Bin Ladin, U. et al. (1998) 'Text of World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders', published in *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (London, 23 February) translated in *Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004*.

²⁹ Sageman (2008): 39; Hegghammer, T. (2009-A) 'The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups' in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (vol. 9, pp. 26-46) Hudson Institute, Wash. DC.

³⁰ Kepel (1984): 47; Qutb, S. (2006) *Milestones*, Islamic Book Service.

³¹ Faraj, M. S (2000) *Jihaad: Absent Obligation*, Maktabah al-Ansaar, Birmingham: 50-51. This version is still available from Muhammad al-Maqdisi's website tawhed.net [www.tawhed.net/dl.php?i=AbsntObl] (as of 18 January 2011).

³² Ibid: 60-61; Esposito (2002): 46.

realities and ammmounted to, what Michot terms, a ‘fundamental misconstruction of it’s meaning’ that ignored the ‘juridical-religious, ethical and person-orientaded character,’ which Ibn Taymiyyah originally sought to convey.³³

Zawahiri had joined Faraj (who was executed for his role in the Sadat assassination in April 1982) down the path of local jihad against the near enemy. By 1998, however, he was frustrated with the lack of progress this strategy had brought, angered by the withdrawal from fellow Egyptian jihadists (who were increasingly isolated after the 1997 Luxor massacre), ever more reliant on bin Ladin’s patronage and resolve, and attracted by the possibilities and attention that would no doubt be garnered by targeting the distant enemy.³⁴

This transition, which kept local secular leaders within *Dar al-Harb*, initiated a re-prioritisation of target sets as a result of shifting hierarchies of enmity. Violent jihad in the name of Allah, as an *individual* obligation of all Muslims, which was used so prominently in Azzam’s works mobilising the *ummah* for jihad in Afghanistan became a ‘cosmic war’ between Al-Qa’ida and the West, alongside its local interests.³⁵

This ambitious agenda was well received by what Gerges terms ‘a new generation of freelance roaming jihadis’: displaced (mostly Arab) militants and disillusioned sympathisers from Muslim Diasporas in the West.³⁶ In Al-Qa’ida they found a relatively structured group, which could provide seed money for operations, training and more direct involvement in the planning of terrorist attacks, as well as strategic guidance.³⁷

1.2 Splintering, Regrouping, Imploding? Adding to the Conceptual Ambiguity

As well as removing the Taliban-sponsored Afghan sanctuary, the aftermath of the 11 September (9/11) attacks marked the end of anything resembling conceptual clarity and analytical consensus in approaches to Al-Qa’ida in the literature. The international response to the 9/11 attacks and the removal of Al-Qa’ida’s bases of operation seriously weakened the movement, but so did criticism from Islamist and jihadi figures, compounding the isolation of the Al-Qa’ida core leadership. At the same time, however, the vast impact of the 9/11 attacks on US society, economy, and politics, and to a lesser extent in other countries, along with the prominence the movement achieved in public, media, and political discourse, created a powerful ‘brand’ which vastly surpassed the actual operational capacity of Al-Qa’ida as a terrorist group. According to one West Point study the attacks left the ‘brand managers the only ones standing’ from a group

³³ Michot, Y. (2006) *Muslims under non-Muslim rule: Ibn Taymiyya on fleeing from sin; kinds of emigration; the status of Mardin; domain of peace/war, domain composite; the conditions for challenging power*. Interface Publications, Oxford: 46, 49. Faraj’s work, according to Michot, formed part of the ‘Mongolizing’ of Islamism, where Ibn Taymiyyah’s ‘anti-Mongol fatwas were being exploited to call to an armed rebellion against the rulers or governments of certain modern Muslim countries’ (49).

³⁴ Kepel (2004): 72; Gerges, F. (2005) *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: chapters 1-2; Reidel (2008): chapter 2; Lacroix, S. (2008) ‘Notes to Part III: Ayman Al-Zawahiri’, in Kepel & Milelli (eds.) pp. 316-341.

³⁵ To borrow Jurgensmeyer’s concept (see Jurgensmeyer, M. (2003) *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (3rd edition), University of California Press, Berkeley: 145.

³⁶ Gerges (2005): 57.

³⁷ See for instance Sageman, M. (2008) *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Phil.: 40-51. Although Gerges (2005) emphasised the importance of Al-Qaeda in developing a transnational agenda, as noted above, he also illustrated how the group was only one actor in a complex tapestry of Islamist militancy.

‘largely reduced to a media organization.’³⁸ Roy, similarly, saw Al-Qa’ida emerge from 9/11 as an ‘organization and a trademark. It can operate directly, in a joint venture, or by franchising. It embodies, but does not have the monopoly of, a new kind of violence.’³⁹

Thus, Al-Qa’ida as a movement was far from being a holistic entity. Weakened at the core, its capacity to direct operations against its far enemy was greatly diminished. At the same time, however, groups of affiliates, associates and admirers proliferated.⁴⁰ After the fact rationalisations aside, descriptive efforts to capture the essence of Al-Qa’ida as it emerged from the post-9/11 turmoil consisted primarily of studies highlighting the importance of autonomous affiliates and admirers of Al-Qa’ida on the one hand and a continued preoccupation with the central leadership on the other. Some attributed the proliferation of affiliates as well as greater focus on ‘grassroots’ militancy to a series of informed decisions as well as strategic necessities brought about by external pressures. Fragmentation, according to this view, had always been the plan.

According to Cruickshank and Hage, for instance, the decentralisation of Al-Qa’ida was, to a substantial degree, down to “intelligent design”, following doctrine from prominent jihadists, primarily Mustafa Settmariam Nasar/Abu Mus’ab al-Suri.⁴¹ Despite being a close associate of bin Ladin’s in the 1980’s and 90’s, al-Suri remained highly critical of the former’s leadership style and many of his decisions. One Libyan jihadist even claimed Al-Suri referred to bin Ladin as a ‘dictator’ and ‘Pharaoh.’⁴² Some years before 9/11 he had accused bin Ladin of alienating the Taliban after catching ‘the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause’ facilitated by access to world media.⁴³ However, the greatest strategic failure, according to this doctrine, was to initiate an attack on the scale of 9/11, the repercussions of which ‘collectively destroyed what remained of [secret jihadi] organizations.’⁴⁴ Ironically, however, the attacks brought about conditions that enabled the implementation of Al-Suri’s vision, set forth in his book *The Call for Global Islamic Resistance*, of an Islamist resistance movement with reduced hierarchy and structure, thus reducing the risk of detection and offering newcomers more freedom to develop their campaigns independently.⁴⁵ In a post-9/11 world, such a hierarchy would be a liability. According to Real, ‘the ideology has already had its effect, and it is neither necessary nor convenient for any direct central control to exist; they are safer without it.’⁴⁶

For other observers, fragmentation and decentralisation leading to greater operational autonomy of affiliates and sympathisers was simply a myth. Scheuer, for instance, insisted that Al-Qa’ida was no less a ‘functioning, hierarchical organization

³⁸ Combating Terrorism Center (2007): 1-2.

³⁹ Roy, O. (2004) *The Rise of Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, Columbia University Press, NY: 294.

⁴⁰ E.g. existing groups rebranded (Algerian GSPC), groups pledged allegiance or declared links to the Al-Qa’ida leadership and the 9/11 attacks featured prominently in Islamist militant propaganda and imagery (beyond that disseminated by the Al-Qa’ida leadership itself and its media wings).

⁴¹ Cruickshank, P. & Hage, M. A. (2007) ‘Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda’, in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (no. 30, pp. 1-14): 2.

⁴² Lia, B. (2008). ‘Dissidents in al-Qaida: Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s Critique of bin Ladin and the Salafi-Jihadi Current’. Lecture at Princeton University, 3rd December 2007, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Oslo: 4.

⁴³ Cited in Cullison, A. (2004) ‘Inside Al Qaeda’s Hard Drive,’ in *Atlantic Monthly* (294:2, September): 68.

⁴⁴ Al-Suri, A.M. in Lia, B. (2007) *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri*, Hurst, London: 352.

⁴⁵ Ibid; Cruickshank & Hage.(2007); Lia (2008).

⁴⁶ Real, M.’s Introduction to Greenberg, K. (ed.) (2005) *Al-Qaeda Now: Understanding Today’s Terrorists*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: xvii.

with clear command-and-control capabilities,' in the aftermath of 9/11 than it had been before the attacks.⁴⁷ Such polarisation is typical of analytical accounts of Al-Qa'ida, particularly those centring on organisational issues. The truth, of course, rests somewhere in the middle, between these polar opposites. The Al-Qa'ida leadership was under tremendous pressure after the 9/11 attacks and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, but managed to partially regroup in Pakistan. From here, the leadership sought to orchestrate further attacks as well as inspire grassroots to mobilise to the same end.

In September 2007, after three years of silence, bin Ladin published (via Al-Qa'ida's favourite media label As-Sahab) a video titled: 'The Solution: A message from shaykh Osama bin Laden to the American people' where he questioned the innocence of the American public and invited them to embrace Islam in redemption.⁴⁸ This was seen as a sign of the durability of the Al-Qa'ida leadership's organisational structure and its savvy media production wing.⁴⁹ Furthermore, Riedel (and others) correctly warned of the impact the Iraq war had had in opening a new front for Al-Qa'ida to exploit, as well as providing (through re-direction of allied military emphasis) a sanctuary in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, known in Pakistan as *ilaga-e-ghair* or the 'lawless land',⁵⁰ (in particular North and South Waziristan Agencies) and Balochistan on the Afghan-Pakistan border. As a result, Riedel argued: 'Al Qaeda is a more dangerous enemy today than it has ever been before.'⁵¹

Echoing these sentiments, Bergen declared in an earlier 2007 article that: 'Osama bin Laden's army is back in business [...] from Algeria to Afghanistan, from Britain to Baghdad, the organization once believed to be at the verge of impotence is again ascendant.'⁵² The deteriorating security situation in Iraq (in no small part due to the groups endorsed by Al-Qa'ida) and a truce between authorities in Islamabad and militants in Waziristan provided further breathing space for the group's central leadership to regroup and appeared to foster closer links with the Taliban.⁵³

Hoffman's February 2007 testimony submitted to the House Armed Services Subcommittee emphasised the continued resonance of two dimensions to Al-Qa'ida, depending on level of analysis and approach: 'The al Qaeda of today combines, as it always has, both a "bottom up" approach encouraging independent thought and action from low (or lower-) level operatives and a "top down" one issuing orders and still coordinating a far-flung terrorist enterprise with both highly synchronized and autonomous moving parts.'⁵⁴

⁴⁷ Scheuer (2011): 152.

⁴⁸ Distributed by As-Sahab (with subtitles), widely available on online Islamist forums. A transcript can also be located in IntelCenter (2008) *Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1*, Tempest Publishing, Alexandria VA.

⁴⁹ Whitlock, C. (2007) 'The New Al-Qaeda Central...' in *Washington Post* (9 September).

⁵⁰ Solomon, J. (2008) 'The Funding Methods of FATA's terrorists and insurgents', in *Combating Terrorism Sentinel* (vol. 1, iss. 6, May): 4.

⁵¹ Riedel, B. (2007) 'Al Qaeda Strikes Back...' in *Foreign Affairs* (86:3, May-June). Others voicing the same concerns include Scheuer (2011): 139; Wilkinson (2006) *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (2nd ed.). Routledge, Abingdon: 46.

⁵² Bergen, P. (2007-A) 'Where you Bin? The Return of al Qaeda' (January 29th) in *The New Republic* (vol. 236, no. 5).

⁵³ See e.g. Gregory, S. (2007) 'Al-Qaeda in Pakistan' in *Brief Number 5* (1 March), Pakistan Security Research Unit; Khan, I. (2005) 'Waziristan Draft Accord Approved', in *The Dawn* (2 February); Gul, P (2006) 'Waziristan Accord Signed,' *The Dawn* (6 September); Bergen, P. (2007-B), 'House Committee on Foreign Affairs', (15 February), <<http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/ber021507.htm>> (as of 19 January 2011).

⁵⁴ Hoffman, B. (2007) 'Challenges For the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global

This perception has been challenged most prominently by Sageman who presented his thesis on ‘leaderless jihad’ as an alternative analytical framework to that assuming an organisational core with a fluid and autonomous support base. For Sageman, whilst this core was in hiding and in decline, the ‘al Qaeda social movement has flourished’ – spurred on by the resentment caused by the Iraq war and new channels of communication through the Internet. This had empowered the grassroots who operated autonomously of any hierarchical leadership or structure. Indeed ‘the structure of the Internet has become the structure of global Islamist terrorism’, according to this model.⁵⁵

A similar approach was adopted in the National Intelligence Estimate of July 2007 assessing the ‘threat to the US Homeland’, which warned that the spreading of ‘radical – especially Salafi – Internet sites [...] and the growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the West’s Muslim population is expanding.’⁵⁶ The UN Security Council warned of the impact of such fluidity and that ‘the Al-Qaida and Taliban leadership continues to try to exert control over a movement that it inspires but does not direct.’⁵⁷

In the context of asymmetrical conflict, as Stepanova argued, such an emergence of a ‘multiple-cell, transnational post-al-Qaeda movement’ – as an autonomous, adaptable and de-structured actor – presented substantial analytical challenges.⁵⁸

This apparent split in analytical approaches produced ever more polarised academic debates represented by Hoffman’s view on the one hand (organised structure with operational capacity at the core is retained) versus Sageman’s approach on the other (the leaderless grassroots should be the focus of analysis).

Ironically, but unsurprisingly, it might be argued that both approaches are essentially correct and reveal relatively scant differences in terms of the perceived elements that explain the inner workings, nature and fluidity of the Al-Qa’ida network. Both concern the shifting balance between the organisational capacity of a network channelling experience, training and funds and the recipients, sympathisers and supporters, united by a broadly common agenda and prepared to instigate or assist in the planning of terrorist attacks. Swathes of the academic community have become distracted by these quarrels interrupting the more theoretical and conceptual deliberations that need to be addressed in order to develop cohesive analyses into the concept of Al-Qa’ida. Ronfeldt summarised these developments succinctly:

For a while, the pressures put on the al-Qaeda network evidently reduced its structure from a hub-and-spoke design back to a scattered-cluster design. But now it is growing again, apparently into a multihub design. Which design is it? Do the pieces consist of chain, hub (i.e. star), or all-channel subnets? And where are the bridges and holes that may connect to outside actors? The answers matter, for each design has different strengths, weaknesses, and implications.⁵⁹

Terrorist Threat: Al Qaeda on The Run or on the March?’ Written Testimony Submitted to The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Washington DC.

⁵⁵ Sageman (2008): 133, 121.

⁵⁶ ODNI (2007) *National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland* (July).

⁵⁷ Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (2008) *Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolution 1735 (2006) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities* (2008/324): 5.

⁵⁸ Stepanova, E. (2008) *SIPRI Research Report No 23 Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects*, SIPRI, Stockholm: 26

⁵⁹ Ronfeldt, D. (2007) *Al-Qa’ida and its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare*, RAND Corporation. <www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2008/RAND_RP1371.pdf> as of 20 January 2011: 35.

An underlying problem that has contributed to polarised debates and ambiguous and conflicting analytical accounts, that have proven so remarkably unhelpful in shedding light on the Al-Qa'ida phenomenon, lies in the preoccupation of these accounts with organisational structures that are based on familiar models reflecting command and control mechanisms rather than long-term, testable empirical analyses. This thesis departs from a focus on the elements that may or may not form different layers of Al-Qa'ida and their operational impact and relies instead on a systematic, empirical and longitudinal analysis of communiqués. This repository constitutes an un-tapped resource that is central to understanding Al-Qa'ida.

1.3 Conceptualisations and Typologies

Ronfeldt's own conceptual model for Al-Qa'ida was based on a 'tribal' paradigm in which the central leadership of Al-Qa'ida operated through a network of kinship and bonds, projecting 'ancient patterns of tribalism on a global scale' through 'segmental warfare.'⁶⁰ Constructing a broader spectrum, Mishal and Rosenthal argued that Al-Qa'ida had moved from a relatively hierarchical structure, through a network phase in the run up to 9/11 morphing into what the authors termed a 'Dune organization', following a process of de-territorialisation. This condition was manifest in an effective 'geopolitical vertigo' whereby clusters of variously unrelated networks of groups represented Al-Qa'ida in various regions of the world without being centred in a single location. There was no overreaching institutional presence, the activity was dynamic, command and communication chains were fluid and fragmented, and the structure and scope of the components was variable.⁶¹

Such networks operated as a 'collection of nodes connected through links', in Sageman's words⁶², differing in composition according to type of activity, reach and ability to preserve operability, according to the 'netwar' paradigm.⁶³ Again, however, the ambiguity of such operational conceptualisations contrasts the simplicity of ideational approaches. Looking beyond structures and 'nodes', for example, Burke developed his concept of 'Al-Qaedaism' to capture the essence of what the leadership and its followers stood for. Bale's 'Bin Ladenism' emphasised similar notions.⁶⁴ Some accounts have sought to reconcile these ideational approaches with the development of organisational and agency models. Soriano's study of Al-Qa'ida messages relating to Islamist militant activism focused on Spain, for instance, defined a cluster of agents (with variously local or international ambitions) in a wider 'global *jihadist* movement (GJM)'.⁶⁵ Similarly, the

⁶⁰ Ibid: 35-36.

⁶¹ Mishal, S. & Rosenthal, M. (2005) 'Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations' in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, July (28:4, pp. 275-293).

⁶² Sageman, M. (2004) *Understanding Terror Networks*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia: 137.

⁶³ Arquilla, J., Ronfeldt, D. & Zanini, M. (2002) 'Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,' in Howard, R. and Sawyer, R. (eds.), *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism – Understanding the New Security Environment* (McGraw-Hill, NY): 91.

⁶⁴ See Burke, J. (2004-B). 'Think Again: Al Qaeda' in *Foreign Policy* (May/June, no. 142, pp.18-26); Bale, J.M. (2009) 'Jihadist Ideology and Strategy and the Possible Employment of WMD' in Ackerman, G. & Tamsett, J. (eds.) *Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (pp. 3-59) CRC Press, Boca Raton.

⁶⁵ Soriano, M. (2009) 'Spain as an Object of Jihadist Propaganda' in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (32:11, pp. 933-952): 935.

‘Terrorist Perspectives Project’ developed the concept of ‘Al-Qa’ida and Associated Movements – AQAM.’ According to this model, ‘AQAM represents a large number of individuals united by a common theology, albeit with differing ethnic backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives on jihad’, where ultimately, the ‘view of AQAM as a global movement with a revolutionary vanguard at its head is the dominant perspective.’⁶⁶

A discussion of movements centred on specific belief systems with organised components espousing prompts to collective action in support of a common agenda, leads logically to the contribution of social movement theory to the current debate. The social movement approach is particularly relevant to this thesis as the literature provides a framework with which to understand the importance and meaning of message dissemination between movement leaders and broader environment of constituents, potential followers and other audiences.⁶⁷ This focus on ideational constructs is particularly central to the concept of message framing which informs the longitudinal analysis of Al-Qa’ida communiqués of the current thesis. Framing and its application to the corpus in question are explored in detail in Part II of this thesis. The relevant theoretical context, however, is introduced in the next section.

1.3.1 Social movements and complex global microstructures

Social movements can be understood in terms of the ‘organized and sustained effort of a collectivity of interrelated, groups, individuals and organizations to promote or resist social change with the use of public protest activities.’⁶⁸ A vast range of movement types and activities can of course be grouped under such a banner, but the common features – according to Wilkinson’s ‘working concept’ – include ‘conscious commitment to change’; ‘minimal organization’; and a scope for wider ‘normative commitment and participation.’⁶⁹ In terms of some of the above approaches, this can clearly be applied to Al-Qa’ida, a loosely organised movement with a central leadership that seeks to channel the frustrations of the broader community towards amending the status quo.

Some social movements, as Wilkinson observed, are fuelled by millenarian fervour of expected imminent cataclysms, espousing a ‘revolutionary promise of the advent of an age of bliss, abundance and perfect justice.’⁷⁰ In terms of understanding Al-Qa’ida, this could refer to promises of divine social justice through introduction of (their interpretation of) *shari’ah* law, or ascent to paradise for those who die seeking to introduce such a society. As a related concept, in turn, Wilkinson defined specifically

⁶⁶ Stout, M. E., Huckabey, J. M., Schindler, J. R., Lacey, W. (2008) *The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements*. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis: 55.

⁶⁷ See e.g. Benford, R. D. & Snow, D. A. (2000) ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements; An Overview and Assessment’ in *Annual Review of Sociology* (Vol. 26, pp. 611-639): 613. See also Kane A. E. (1997) ‘Theorizing Meaning Construction in Social Movements...’ in *Sociological Theory* (November, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 249-76); Williams R. H. (1995) ‘Constructing the Public Good: Social Movements and Cultural Resources’ in *Social Problems* (February, vol. 42, iss. 1, pp. 124-44). Much of the work on framing and social movement is, of course, developed on from Goffman’s thesis on Frame Analysis: (1974) *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of the Experience*, Harper Colophon, New York (especially page 247) and Gamson W.A., Fireman B., Rytina S. (1982) *Encounters with Unjust Authority*, Dorsey Press, Homewood, IL.

⁶⁸ Neidhardt, F. & Rucht, D. (1991) ‘The Analysis of Social Movements: The State of the Art and Some Perspectives for further Research’ in Rucht (ed.) *Research on Social Movements: The state of the Art in Western Europe and the USA*, Campus, Frankfurt: 450.

⁶⁹ Wilkinson, P. (1971) *Social Movement*, Pall Mall Press, London: 46.

⁷⁰ Ibid: 71.

religious social movements as those laying claim ‘to a source of doctrinal authority’; focusing on the need to ‘reorient radically individual personality and behaviour’; using religion as a source for ‘primacy and [...] authority on the basis of [a] monopoly of revelatory or rational ideological truth’; utilising ‘religion’s power of promoting social integration and solidarity.’⁷¹ According to this framework, therefore, Al-Qa’ida can be understood as a religious social movement pursuing religious socio-political goals basing activist messages on interpretation of doctrine and the need to defend core religious values.

Other scholars have explored ways in which social movements, religious or otherwise, have adopted and promoted violence as the way to address grievances and achieve stated goals. Della Porta, for instance, saw violent social movements as having adopted ‘political violence as a particular repertoire of collective action that involved physical force, considered at that time as legitimate in the [respective] dominant culture.’⁷² Again, when applied to Al-Qa’ida, this highlights the centrality of jihad – as a central concept of faith – for the leadership, interpreted as the individual duty of Muslims to fight for their religion. Gusfield, moreover, saw social movements as contributing to ‘the existence of a vocabulary and an opening of ideas and actions which in the past was either unknown or unthinkable.’⁷³ The presentation of suicide bombings against non-combatants as the noble sacrifice of martyrs furthering the cause of Sunni Islam would be illustrative of this process.

Several accounts of Al-Qa’ida have, in turn, adopted social movement theory approaches. For Riedel⁷⁴ and Brachman⁷⁵ for instance the extent to which Al-Qa’ida had become an adaptable social movement was central to its strength and continued survival. Several authors meanwhile have emphasised the ability of the Al-Qa’ida leaders to create a globalised social movement through inspiring followers to collective action.⁷⁶ Finally, the Islamist treatises themselves, have directly identified the creation and nurturing of social movements as essential features of a future uprising. Kepel, for instance, noted how Qutb’s references to the need for a vanguard to lead the *ummah* out of *jahiliyyah* (ignorance of religious duties) necessarily relied on the establishment of a ‘movement’ (*haraka*) with popular support.⁷⁷ Qutb wrote: ‘we need to initiate the

⁷¹ Ibid: 47.

⁷² Della Porta, D. (1995) *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*, Cambridge, U. P., Cambridge: 3-4.

⁷³ Gusfield, J. (1981) ‘Social Movements and Social Change: Perspectives of Linearity and Fluidity’ in Kriesberg, L. (ed.) *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* (vol. 4) JAI Press, Greenwich, CA: 325.

⁷⁴ Riedel (2008): 135-136.

⁷⁵ Brachman (2008): 11.

⁷⁶ See e.g.: Rabasa et al. (2006) [*Beyond al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement* (Part 1), Rand Corporation, Santa Monica] on ‘al-Qaeda and the universe of jihadist groups that are associated with or inspired by al-Qaeda’: 1; and Roy’s ‘Al-Qaeda: A True Global Movement’ (2008) in Coolsaet, R. (ed.) *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot: 109-115. See also Ranstorp: ‘the constantly mutating networks and cells that transformed al-Qaeda into a global “salafist-jihadist” movement thrive in this globalization-affected media milieu’: (2007) Introduction to Ranstorp, M. (ed.) *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction*, Routledge, London: 2.

⁷⁷ Kepel, G. (1984) *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*, University of California Press, Berkeley: 55. This is not to suggest, however, that Qutb’s thoughts did not evolve, or indeed that they were always radical in an Islamist sense. Shepard (1992), for instance, notes how ‘Sayyid Qutb appears to have moved from a Muslim secularist position in the 1930’s to a moderate radical Islamism (if I may use such an expression) in the late 1940’s and then to an extreme radical Islamism during the last years of his life.’ ‘The Development of the Thought of Sayyid Qutb as Reflected in Earlier and Later Editions of Social Justice in Islam’ in *Die Welt des Islams, New Series*, (vol. 32, Nr. 2 pp. 196-236).

movement of Islamic revival in some Muslim country. Only such a revivalist movement will eventually attain to the status of world leadership, whether the distance is near or far.⁷⁸ In Qutb's earlier works, moreover, when the parameters for social change were less focused on religious purity, popular movements, nonetheless, constituted the essential vehicle for change in order to put Islam into practice in wider society.⁷⁹

How can Al-Qa'ida be defined as a social movement? Within the context of Wilkinson's 'working concept', defined above, Al-Qa'ida is a conscious driving force for change in violent opposition to the status quo. Rather than relying on tiered or hierarchical structures or substantial levels of organisation exclusively, however, principal sources of strength are based on perceived common norms within a wider community and a source of identity that connects leaders with members of this wider community. This environment can be understood in terms of Cetina's conceptualisation of global microstructures, defined as 'structures of connectivity and integration that are global in scope but microsociological in character.'⁸⁰ These structures of connectivity are coordinated through norms and informal interactions rather than through complex hierarchies and by formal authority. Actors gain effectiveness not through established authority and instrumental procedures, but through exploiting 'systems of amplification', such as new forms of media – something that has been central to Al-Qa'ida's ability to reach larger audiences. According to Cetina's model, therefore, the socio-cultural environment in which Al-Qa'ida operates is not to be understood as a formal, hierarchical or institutional set of interactions but, rather, as complex and diverse networks of social structures. Global coordination efforts within this environment thus rest to a substantial degree on the use of 'scopic media' (see further Chapter 3) as formal and institutional lines of control are not feasible or appropriate.⁸¹

For the Al-Qa'ida leadership, the source of socio-cultural identity rests on Islam, the wider community of social structures consists collectively of the *ummat al-mu'minin*, the Islamic nation, and norms are reflected in a narrative communicated through public messages. These communiqués highlight grievances and aspirations of this *ummah*, alternatives to the status quo, prescribed methods for change and the adversaries that threaten the common values of the community.

1.3.2 Tiered typologies

It can be deduced from the above-mentioned approaches and in particular from the contribution of the social movement literature and the concept of global microstructures that an analysis of Al-Qa'ida needs to take into account message generators as well as message recipients. Any typology of Al-Qa'ida needs to represent the different cohorts that together form the layers of analysis that have evolved as the original components have expanded ideationally whilst transforming operationally and inspiring affiliates. Such a typology needs to capture the atomisation of the concept of Al-Qa'ida, the different actors and actor-relationships at play and the contrast between a vulnerable sanctuary-dependent 'conventional' group relying on a semblance of infrastructure and tangible networks on the one hand and a quasi de-territorialised (or globalised) corpus of message recipients on the other hand who form a latent support base and become the focus group for further mobilisation into activism and militancy.

⁷⁸ Qutb (2006): Introduction.

⁷⁹ Shepard, W. (1992): 212-213.

⁸⁰ Cetina, L. (2005) 'Complex Global Microstructures: The New Terrorist Societies,' in *Theory, Culture & Society* (vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 213-234): 215.

⁸¹ Ibid: 215-216.

Here, the widely adopted tiered typologies prove helpful. Hoffman developed his categories based on the premise that the ‘current al Qaeda [...] exists more as an ideology that has become a vast enterprise – an international franchise with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base but advancing the remaining center’s goals at once simultaneously and independently of each other.’⁸²

Correspondingly, Hoffman discerned four layers: (1) the Al-Qa’ida central, comprised of the Afghan veterans and their direct associates who founded the group in the first place (or their replacements), (2) Al-Qa’ida affiliates and associates, consisting of formal and established insurgent groups that followed the guidance of the central leadership, (3) Al-Qa’ida locals, as individuals with militancy experience and some form of linkage with the other levels above and (4) the Al-Qa’ida network, the diffuse corpus of ‘home-grown’ Islamist radicals and militants.⁸³

Brachman based his division on similar principles:

the al-Qaida high command (Bin Laden, Zawahiri); al-Qaida affiliate groups and individuals (Jemaah Islamiyyah, Lashkar-i-Taiba, al-Qaida in the [Arabian] peninsula, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb) and those individuals and groups who are supported by al-Qaida (Istanbul bombers, London 7/7 bombers); and those individuals and groups who are inspired by al-Qaida but have no direct ties to it (Toronto cell).⁸⁴

When put into this context, it emerges that Sageman’s ‘waves’ of Islamist militancy are not necessarily so dissimilar. These involved, firstly, the ‘old guard’ of Afghan veterans who established Al-Qa’ida and secondly, a corpus of younger, mostly middle class, veterans of militancy in Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya and elsewhere. Finally, Sageman defined a third wave of post-Iraq invasion mix of Diasporas and privileged youngsters from the Middle East and North Africa who constitute the mainstay of the ‘leaderless jihad.’⁸⁵ The friction between the two approaches obviously revolved around the perceived durability of different phases (for Sageman) or levels (for Hoffman) and the question of control and initiative.

Beyond academic deliberations, organisations engaged operationally in counterterrorism have also adopted tiered typologies for Al-Qa’ida. The UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, for example, introduced a three-tier model into its assessments in 2005 to ‘describe the varying degrees of connection between targets and the Al Qaida leadership: “Tier 1” describing individuals or networks considered to have direct links with core Al Qaida; “Tier 2”, individuals or networks more loosely affiliated with Al Qaida; and “Tier 3”, those without any links to Al Qaida who might be inspired by their ideology.’ Although different from Hoffman’s model in terms of focusing on stages and variations in terms of linkages with Al-Qa’ida central, the model nonetheless conveys similar notions in terms of a core leadership on the one hand and a more diffuse, autonomous base on the other. The majority of individuals of concern fell within the latter two tiers, subjects ‘who were only loosely affiliated to Al Qaida or entirely separate (albeit with shared ideological beliefs).’⁸⁶ FBI director Muller’s trichotomy for Al-Qa’ida is virtually identical:

⁸² Hoffman, B. (2006) *Inside Terrorism* (Revised Edition), Columbia University Press, New York: 282.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Brachman, J. (2008) *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice*, Routledge, London: 15.

⁸⁵ Sageman (2008).

⁸⁶ Intelligence and Security Committee (2006) ‘Report into the London Terrorist Attacks in London on 7 July 2005’: 27.

I refer to it in three levels. The first is al Qaeda itself – bin Laden, the core, [...], and the second level is individuals who are not necessarily directed from the outset and the planning is not accomplished by core al Qaeda but have some ties to al Qaeda, whether it be financial or recruiting or otherwise. And the third level is self-radicalized without any ties whatsoever to al Qaeda.⁸⁷

The *Economist* defined a journalistic ideal type with essentially the same components: ‘Al-Qaeda is a terrorist organisation, a militant network and a subculture of rebellion all at the same time.’⁸⁸

The most interesting tiered conceptualisations, however, are those developed by the militant Islamist thinkers themselves, thus adding credence to those presented above. Wali al-Haq, for instance, a prominent member of militant Islamist forums, described Al-Qa’ida as ‘not only an organization seeking to fight the Jews and Crusaders; rather it’s an ideology and a mission calling on all Muslims to uphold God’s religion and rescue the weak monotheists.’⁸⁹ The resemblance with Al-Suri’s tiered model for contemporary militant Islamist activism is more striking. The strategist found ‘three organizational circles in the units of the Global Islamic Resistance Call.’⁹⁰

The first circle consisted of a ‘militarily active [...] centralized unit’, which spread ‘the literary production of the Call [to Global Islamic Resistance], its political-juridical, educational and organizational programs, among various segments of the Islamic nation, [oversaw] the issuance of media, and programmatic communiqués.’ The second circle comprised ‘de-centralized units’, ‘elements [...] [that] can be subjected to ideological, programmatic, and educational qualification courses’ that ‘upon request’ could ‘spread throughout the world, each one according to [individual] circumstances and life situation, and operate completely freely and separately from the Centralized Unit.’ Al-Suri termed the third and final circle ‘the Da’wah circle or the General Units of the Global Islamic Resistance Call’, ‘youth, who are determined to fight a jihad [...] and form their own Units entirely independently [...] without any organizational links with the Center.’

Al-Suri thus presents perhaps the clearest illustration of the current object of analysis and the context in which it operates. The core and original leadership of Al-Qa’ida communicates with other tiers of a militant network of groups and individuals, supported and inspired by the core or operating in its name, through its public messages. Message generation, conveying the ideology, narrative and communicative strategy of Al-Qa’ida’s leaders – particularly the late bin Laden and Zawahiri, his successor as formal leader – now constitutes the primary role and the principal activity of the leadership corpus within the militant network, as well as the existence of Al-Qa’ida as a political entity. Arguably, this has always been the leadership’s focus. A Combating Terrorism Center report, for instance, posited:

In what boils down to a struggle between branding and bureaucracy, al-Qa’ida has consistently put its ability to inspire a broader movement over the development of its organizational capacities to pursue strategic military goals. While its guerrilla strategists have fought for the resources to build an effective command-and-control military

⁸⁷ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2008) *Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment* (5 February), Washington, D.C. (<www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080205_transcript.pdf> [as of 21 January 2011]: 38.

⁸⁸ *The Economist* (2008) ‘Special Report’, (17 July).


⁸⁹ Quoted in Bakier, A. H. (2008) ‘Jihadi Website Advises Recruits on How to Join al-Qaeda’, in *Jamestown Terrorism Focus* (vol. v, iss. 18, May 6th).

⁹⁰ This and subsequent references to Suri’s *Global Islamic Resistance Call* on this page are from Lia, B. (2007): 443-445.

organization, its two supreme leaders – Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri – have preferred press releases over battlefield preparedness.⁹¹

Figure 1, below illustrates the position of the core, its relationship with subsequent levels and the direction of messaging.

Figure 1: TIERED CONCEPTUALISATION OF AL-QA'IDA AND MESSAGE DISSEMINATION FROM THE CORE



The core constitutes the traditional leadership and original founders of the group alongside those who have replaced fallen leaders or become prominent within the central movement. This first layer, therefore, represents Al-Qa'ida proper.

Affiliated and associated movements form the second layer. These are militant groups which have sought direct association with the core, sometimes incorporating its name to illustrate the allegiance and operate according to Al-Qa'ida's strategic principles. The third layer hosts the support network: individuals or small groups that

⁹¹ Combating Terrorism Center (2007): 1.

seek guidance, endorsement or material support from the first two tiers, without prior or more substantial engagement with them as movements. Finally, the outer layer consists of the inspired base whereby individuals are inspired by the Al-Qa'ida message and mobilise on their own initiative, without support from the other tiers. As a fluid collection of like-minded sympathisers, these individuals are naturally exposed to other militant Islamist groups, narratives and a wider set of variables distinct from the Al-Qa'ida core.

The militant network associated with Al-Qa'ida also operates within a wider framework of Islamist militancy. This context has generated experiences, narratives, language, and alternative groups that impact upon Al-Qa'ida. Furthermore, the network engages with a host of other actors that together form the environment in which Al-Qa'ida operates, providing its wider audience and enemy targets. Ultimately, this involves the community with which Al-Qa'ida identifies and that the leaders seek to mobilise; the Islamic *ummah*. This complex structure, in Cetina's words, thus centres on the 'richness and diversity of elements and practices that layer global social forms' and the extent to which the Al-Qa'ida leadership is informed by and seeks to influence these social structures and norms.⁹² In essence, therefore, this tiered conceptualisation merely serves to deconstruct the ambiguous notion of Al-Qa'ida into descriptive layers designed to situate the core leadership within its wider environment, rather than a model describing how this leadership perceives itself or Al-Qa'ida. According to this model, the outer layers of the movement constitute divergent militant facets which, in turn, operate within a wider environment that consists both of other militant groups and radical Islamist strands as well as the perceived adversaries and potential followers that feature in the Al-Qa'ida leadership's messages.

The current study thus relies on this corpus as the point of departure to understand the way in which the Al-Qa'ida core has sought to influence others, the ideology the leadership (as represented by bin Ladin and Zawahiri) has espoused since the group's inception and the way in which its message has evolved, as well as weaknesses detectable in this narrative. The next chapter explores the way in which this ideology is constructed and how it can be approached.

⁹² Cetina (2005): 216.

THE IDEOLOGY OF AL-QA'IDA

2.1 Introduction

As analysts and observers debated the increasingly ambiguous operational relationship between the Al-Qa'ida central leadership and any peripheral cohorts, as well as the linkage between the perpetrators behind Islamist-inspired terrorist plots (both successful and unsuccessful) in the post-9/11 period and the core leadership, the role that ideology played in inspiring 'followers' to mobilise became an increasingly prominent focus of analysis. Islamist ideology became central to terrorist 'threat assessments', as observers feared the impact of this ideology on local admirers of Al-Qa'ida, who in many cases were Western nationals and therefore constituted 'homegrown' radicals. A recent Washington Institute report warned, for example, of 'how the transnational threat posed by global terrorist networks is increasingly bringing the front line of the struggle against terrorism to our shores. *Ideology*, in other words, is the common strand that binds these plots and individuals and is a driver for this global movement.'⁹³ As organisational hierarchies disperse, therefore, 'the ideological tenets of al-Qaeda thrive, and other, arguably smarter, adversaries continue to exploit its "ideological package."⁹⁴

Investigations into Al-Qa'ida needed to account for this ideational element. The threads of Islamist militancy, Ronfeldt argued, were 'held together not by command-and-control structures [...] but by a gripping sense of shared belonging, principles of fusion against an outside enemy, and a jihadist narrative so compelling that it amounts to both an ideology and a doctrine.'⁹⁵ Regardless of the Al-Qa'ida core leadership's involvement in individual plots, the success of the movement depended on wider mobilisation and support. In this sense, the focus was on the ability of the Al-Qa'ida leadership to generate a narrative, through the conveyance of communiqués, to create a wider support-base for militancy that went beyond the operational initiatives of the leadership itself. The US Director of National Intelligence, for instance, warned of the role this process played: 'homegrown extremists, inspired by militant Islamic ideology

⁹³ Carpenter, J. S., Levitt, M., Simon, S., Zarate, J. (2010) *Fighting the Ideological Battle*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington: 2. Emphasis added.

⁹⁴ Ibid: 6.

⁹⁵ Ronfeldt (2007): 44.

but without operational direction from al Qaeda, are on an evolving course for danger inside the United States.⁹⁶

In seeking to understand this ideational element of the Al-Qa'ida phenomenon, Stout et al. correctly emphasised the need for systematic and evidence-based analyses. Dissecting what Al-Qa'ida stood for and the impact this would have on potential followers required 'constant study of the enemy's thinking. The alternative is catastrophe.'⁹⁷ Cigar, moreover, argued such insights would help 'policymakers shape a more realistic profile of its leaders and of its strategy, which can be key in developing effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies.'⁹⁸ Similarly, Riedel observed, 'understanding al Qaeda's ideology is the first key to defeating the group.'⁹⁹ Or in the words of the Terrorist Perspectives Project, 'understanding the culture and ideology of global salafi jihadism is the single most important component' in comprehending the nature of the threat.¹⁰⁰ As a result, 'ideology is [...] an essential component of any strategy designed to counter al-Qaeda.'¹⁰¹ To what extent, however, is the concept of ideology clear in this respect? How can we fathom what constitutes the ideology of Al-Qa'ida and how can this be situated within its wider ideational environment? The following three sections deconstruct the ambiguous concept of 'ideology' in relation to militant Islam in general and the Al-Qa'ida core in particular. The remainder of the chapter explores how this ideational aspect can be understood through analysing communiqués in terms of dissecting messages according to ways in which the narrative is constructed and framed.

2.1.1 Definitions

The ideology of militant movements can be defined as a set of belief systems and principles guiding their political behaviour and defining the goals and rationales of individual and collective action.¹⁰² As Aldis and Herd note, ideological treatises and public messages are used to legitimise the existence of a movement and the activism prescribed, whilst appealing to a wider support base.¹⁰³

Terrorist movements frame their message by (1) identifying socio-political problems, (2) proposing solutions to these problems, and (3) seeking to mobilise their target audiences to address the issues identified.¹⁰⁴ These are the central framing tasks

⁹⁶ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2008): 9. This is not to argue, of course, that the attacks themselves are less important. For terrorists, as Hoffman and McCormick note, 'to hold their audience (and hold themselves together) they must continue to act.' Association with attacks, moreover, adds credence to those who generate the extremist narrative. See Hoffman, B. & McCormick, G. (2004) 'Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack' in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (27:4, pp. 243-281): 245.

⁹⁷ Stout et al. (2008): 130-131.

⁹⁸ Cigar, N. (2008) *Al-Qa'ida's Doctrine for Insurgency: Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin's "A Practical Course for Guerrilla War"*, Potomac Books, Dulles, VA: 4.

⁹⁹ Riedel (2008): 24.

¹⁰⁰ Stout (2008): 46.

¹⁰¹ Rabasa (2006): 7.

¹⁰² Hegghammer (2009-A); Snow, D. & Byrd, S. (2007) 'Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements' in *Mobilization* (vol. 12 no. 2 June); Hegghammer, T. (2010); Quiggin, T. (2009) 'Understanding al-Qaeda's Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work' in *Perspectives on Terrorism* (Vol. 3, Iss. 2 pp. 18-24, August): 20.

¹⁰³ Aldis, A. & Herd, G. P. (2007) Introduction in Aldis & Herd (eds.) *The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter-Terrorism*, Routledge, London.

¹⁰⁴ Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004) Introduction in Wiktorowicz (ed.) *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. Indiana University Press; Snow, D. & Benford, R. (1988) 'Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization' in *International Social Movement Research* (vol.1 pp. 197-217) JAI Press Inc, Greenwich, Conn.; Gregg, H. (2010) 'Fighting the Jihad of the Pen: Countering Revolutionary

(see next chapter), which allow us to dissect the Al-Qa'ida communiqués in terms of message content. These ideological imperatives structure the strategic goals of a terrorist movement's communication efforts. Corman and Schiefelbein identified these as: (1) legitimising the movement, (2) expanding its message, and (3) intimidating opponents. For Al-Qa'ida and other Islamist militant and revolutionary movements this entails justifications for the prescribed methodology, which – in this case – involves terrorist violence.¹⁰⁵ In terms of processes contributing to activism, moreover, Della Porta suggested how ideology offered ways of 'reducing the psychological costs of participation in terrorist organizations.'¹⁰⁶ This relates to the extent to which the ideology of a militant movement instils feelings of righteousness, legitimate violence and noble causes using language and terminology that are central to the core belief system. For the current study of Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués, these references to core beliefs and emotions are centred on notions of puritanical Islam through ideational strands known as Salafism.

2.1.2 Salafism

'Al Qaeda's ideology', Heather argues, 'is not new; it has its roots in several Muslim thinkers from the 20th century who developed the vision for an Islamic revolution.'¹⁰⁷ Indeed the framing, context and language applied in the Al-Qa'ida leadership narrative and the foundation of its faith-based strategy relies on modern Islamist revivalism and the puritanical interpretive strand of Salafism.¹⁰⁸ Although this depends on the interpretation of pure religious tradition, this tradition, as Esposito notes, was 'redefined and standardized' over the centuries.¹⁰⁹

The term 'Salafism' is developed from the Arabic concept of '*al-salaf al-salih*', the pious forefathers or the first three generations of Muslim leaders and the societies over which they presided.¹¹⁰ This 'golden age' witnessed the rise of Islam.¹¹¹ Salafism

Islam's Ideology', in *Terrorism and Political Violence* (vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 292 – 314); Tololyan, K. (2006) 'Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist' in Rapoport, D. (ed) *Critical Concepts in Political Science: Terrorism Volume IV: The Fourth or Religious Wave*, Routledge, London; Schmid, A. P. (1989) 'Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity' in *Terrorism and Political Violence* (vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 539-565); Schmid, A. P. (2005) 'Terrorism as Psychological Warfare' in *Democracy and Security* (vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 137-146); Hegghammer, T. (2010) 'The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad', in *International Security* (vol. 35, No. 3, Winter 2010/11, pp. 53–94): 64; Seliger, M. (1976) *Ideology and Politics*, Allen and Unwin, London: 11.

¹⁰⁵ Corman, S. R. & Schiefelbein, J. S. (2006) 'Communication and Media Strategy in the Jihadi War of Ideas' in *Report #0601 Consortium for Strategic Communication* (April 20), Arizona State University, Phoenix.

¹⁰⁶ Della Porta, D. (2001) 'Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy', in Crenshaw, M. (ed.) *Terrorism in Context*, Pennsylvania State University Press: 149. See also Rabasa et al. (2006): 9.

¹⁰⁷ Gregg, H. (2010): 295.

¹⁰⁸ Indeed, several analyses of the wider corpus of militant Islamists choose to apply the term 'jihadi-salafi', referring to puritanical Islamist revivalists who sanction the use of violence. See e.g. note 87 above and Fradkin, H. (2008) 'The History and Unwritten Future of Salafism', in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (vol 6, pp. 5-20).

¹⁰⁹ Esposito, J. L. (1984) *Islam and Politics*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse: 214.

¹¹⁰ This refers to the *al-Sahaabah*, or companions of the Prophet Mohammed, the second generation of followers, *al-tabi'un* and the third generation, living according to the norms and practices of the first two generations (*atba' al-tabi'in*). This period thus spans the late 7th century up to the early 9th century CE. For some, however, the *Rashidun* or rightly guided Caliphs who ruled from the Prophet's death (632 CE) up to 661 CE, with the murder of Ali ibn Abi Taalib are exclusively revered. Meijer, R. (ed.) (2009)

'Introduction' to *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, Hurst, London: 3.

¹¹¹ Meijer (ed.) (2009): 3-4

teaches a return to the core tenets of Islam, ‘stripped of local customs and cultures’,¹¹² as conveyed through the Qur’an, *Hadith* (oral reports of the Prophet’s teachings and choices) and *Sunnah* (records of the Prophet’s practices and what he forbade or permitted).¹¹³ Ostensibly, therefore, Salafism rejects any form of *taqlid* or blind following of the four juridical schools of Islam, in favour of individual interpretation along prescribed guidelines (*ijtihad*).¹¹⁴ Those who follow this path (according to their own interpretation) therefore belonged to the ‘helped group’ (*taifat al-mansura*) or ‘saved sect’ (*al-firqa al-najiya*).¹¹⁵ This is important because the theological foundations are laid for individuals who lack official religious schooling to become prominent religio-political personas (Salafism of course does not separate religion from government), espousing a far more radical message that challenges and seeks to undermine the mainstream religious establishment, especially when this is seen as corrupted by semi-secular authoritarian rulers. For the militant activist fringe, moreover, this freedom to manoeuvre elevates violent attacks to levels of religious expression whereby violence is a manifestation of religion in practice. Bin Ladin, for example, insisted the 9/11 attacks had been ‘more effective than a million books in clarifying the doctrine of allegiance to the believers and disassociation from the unbelievers’ (*al-wala’ wa-l-bara’*, see further in Chapter 6).¹¹⁶

A central concept of Salafism is *tawhid*, literally the ‘oneness of God’ or the core principle of monotheism. The importance of the concept and the extent to which it demands a response from believers depends, as Meijer notes, largely on political issues. In the interpretation of Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyyah (who informed much of Faraj’s work as mentioned above) and much later by Qutb, the activist and purist (and even militant) insistence on *tawhid* in practice and the removal of rulers who failed to live by the tenet and implement *sharia* was paramount.¹¹⁷ This version has remained central for militant Islamists (witness, for instance Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s *Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad*, before it merged with Al-Qa’ida).

This pursuit of uninterrupted *tawhid* and exclusive relationship with God, free from any cultural innovations (*bida’*) that had corrupted the Islamic creed (*aqidah*) and led to *shirik* (idolatry or polytheism) was the driving force behind Ibn ‘Ad al-Wahhab’s revivalist movement that swept the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century. Building upon the activist foundations laid by Ibn Taymiyyah, the followers of Wahhab denounced those whom they perceived to be in breach of this doctrine as *kuffar*, unbelievers outside the realm of Islam, or *murtaddun*, apostates who had infringed upon the core principles of Islam. Excommunication (*takfir*) of Muslims places them outside the realm of *dar al-Islam*, as mentioned above, thus justifying violence against them.¹¹⁸ By associating *takfir* with politics, Wahhabists unleashed ‘a monster mainstream Salafism desperately tries to keep in its cage while other currents within the movement have done their best to let it escape.’¹¹⁹ The branch of Salafism which endorses militancy as a method to achieve the above goals and punish those who stand in the way, which some have termed ‘jihadi-Salafism’ is the most modern manifestation of the doctrine (albeit with spurious links to

¹¹² Zahab & Roy (2002).

¹¹³ Brachman (2008): 23.

¹¹⁴ Meijer (ed.) (2009): 4.

¹¹⁵ Stemann (2007): 92.

¹¹⁶ Bin Ladin (2002) in As-Sahab ‘The Wills of the Martyrs of the New York and Washington Battles: The Will of the Martyr Abdulaziz Alomari,’ published 19 April, secured from Islamist web forums.

¹¹⁷ Mansfield, P. (2003) *A History of the Modern Middle East*, (2nd edition), Penguin Books, London: 40-41; Meijer (ed.) (2009): 4.

¹¹⁸ Meijer (ed.) (2009): 1-5.

¹¹⁹ Ibid: 19.

its classical arguments). ‘It concentrates,’ Meijer argues, ‘on the analysis of a political reality, devising strategies and practices for how to change it.’¹²⁰ Not all manifestations of Salafism, therefore, demand violent solutions. There are also, moreover, violent manifestations that do not rely on excessive application of *takfir*, including – as this thesis will argue and as Scheuer posits¹²¹ – the Al-Qa’ida core.

Wiktorowicz defined three major strands of Salafism: ‘purists, politicians and the jihadis:’

The purists emphasize a focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and education. They view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy. Politicians, in contrast, emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, which they view as particularly important because it dramatically impacts social justice and the right of God alone to legislate. Jihadis take a more militant position and argue that the current context calls for violence and revolution. All three factions share a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary world and its concomitant problems and thus propose different solutions. The splits are about contextual analysis, not belief.¹²²

In tracing principal facets of the contemporary jihadi Salafi current, moreover, Paz identified three major components. Firstly, the Egyptian branch from ‘among the radical sections of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’ (mainly Sayyid and Mohammed Qutb, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif/Dr. Fadl). Second, ‘neo-Wahhabism’ as developed primarily by Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz (even though he later softened his response, endorsing the placing of US troops in Saudi Arabia, prompting bin Ladin’s public rebuttals) and other Saudi religious leaders. Third, the branch led by the ‘Palestinian Trio’ of Abdullah Azzam, Umar Abu Qatada and Islam al-Burqawi/Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.¹²³

The temptation to identify anything resembling holistic or linear processes in the development of ‘jihadi-Salafi’ thought and practice, however, should be avoided. Stemann, for example, argued:

The transition from Salafism to terrorist militancy is easy given the radicalization that accompanies integration in the Salafi community. Support for or justification of terrorism, rejection of integration in host societies, and the creation of an Islamic State in Europe [in the case examined] are all ideas shared by those who adopt Salafism as their system of values and behavioral model.¹²⁴

These assumptions risk ignoring the question, ‘why is it that so many do *not* engage in terrorism?’¹²⁵ Furthermore, such assumptions also risk attaching greater theological and juridical rigor and consistency to the ideology than can justifiably be discerned. Meijer, again, offers a concise and pertinent observation: ‘living in a virtual and paranoid world, Jihadists plunder the Salafi terminological toolkit of intolerance, xenophobia,

¹²⁰ Ibid: 24.

¹²¹ Scheuer (2011): e.g. 152.

¹²² Wiktorowicz, Q. (2006) ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’ in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (29:3, pp. 207-239): 208.

¹²³ Paz, R. (2009) ‘Debates within the Family: Jihadi-Salafi Debates on Strategy, *Takfir*, Extremism, Suicide Bombings and the Sense of the Apocalypse’, in Meijer, R. (ed.): 269. Al-Suri’s assessment as to the origin of the jihadi ideology is remarkably similar, see Lia, B. (2009) ‘“Destructive Doctrinarians”: Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current’, in Meijer (2009) (ed.): 286.

¹²⁴ Stemann (2007): 88

¹²⁵ Horgan, J. (2005) *The Psychology of Terrorism*, Routledge, Abingdon: 166.

sectarianism, war against apostate governmental and unbelieving forces of global oppression with which Islam is locked in an apocalyptic clash of civilizations.¹²⁶

Central themes of this narrative include: overall victimisation of Muslims; rejection of pluralism; ‘liberation’ of the Middle East and Maghreb followed by implementation of *sharia*; the use of violence as religiously sanctioned due to actions of the West and ‘apostates’; with Muslims duty-bound to assist the vanguard in achieving victory and establishing the described order.¹²⁷

However, despite the plethora of analytical works and journalistic accounts aimed at elucidating these core aspects that are cited as drivers for Al-Qa’ida as a militant movement and for those who established or joined the movement in the pursuit of a common cause, consensus regarding these most fundamental precepts has remained elusive. Differences rest, in part, on the development of an unhelpful dichotomy separating politics and religion, even though no such distinction exists within the wider Salafist belief system.¹²⁸ Hamid Mir, for instance, who interviewed bin Ladin on three occasions, argued the latter was not following interpreted doctrine but rather ‘doing politics in the name of religion.’¹²⁹ Mohamedau too emphasised the ‘primacy of the political’ in Al-Qa’ida’s agenda.¹³⁰ Similarly, Ronfeldt questioned the significance of religion in the strategic thinking of the Al-Qa’ida leadership, arguing their perception of Jihad was based more on ‘virulent tribalism’ than religion.¹³¹

These notions informed Tibi’s understanding of Al-Qa’ida and similar organisations as fighting for ‘religionized’ political causes that rendered ostensibly conventional political concerns non-negotiable. In this sense, Al-Qa’ida was not fighting for the establishment of a Caliphate, but rather a vaguer form of ‘Islamic order.’¹³² Nascent reconceptualisations within the study of political Islam that decouple religion and politics appear to be attractive to some analysts and policy makers, particularly to those responsible for the generation of ‘counter-narratives’ and appeals aimed at any potential supporters of violent extremist groups. A recent Washington Institute report, for instance, urged the Obama administration to ‘ensure that Islamism—a radical political ideology separate from Islam as a religion—is recognized internally within the U.S. government as the key ideological drive of the violent extremist threat posed by al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups.’¹³³

¹²⁶ Meijer (ed.) (2009): 26.

¹²⁷ See e.g. Brachman (2008): 11; McCants, W., Brachman J., Felter, J. (2006). *Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report* (November). Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY: 9-10.

¹²⁸ As Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) note, however, the separation of state and religion (*din wa-dawla*) in Islamic thought is not straightforward. Although, the authors argue, ‘this view of indivisibility finds support in more than forty references in the Qur’an,’ in reality ‘politics and religion became separable not long after the death of the Prophet and the establishment of dynastic rule’ (*Muslim Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton: 46). Esposito (1984) similarly argues ‘The early extraordinary expansion and development of Islam as a state necessitated immediate decisions by caliphs and generals rather than reflective planning by scholars and policy makers’ (page 26). The indivisibility of state and religion (or what Eickelman and Piscatori prefer to call ‘sacred authority’) in Al-Qa’ida’s discourse attests to its ‘postmodern hybridity’ (see note 135, below).

¹²⁹ Mir, H. (et al.) (2005) ‘The Real Twin Towers: Al-Qaeda’s Influence on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’ in Greenberg (ed.): 138.

¹³⁰ Mohamedau, M. (2007) *Understanding Al-Qaeda: The Transformation of War*, Pluto Press: 67.

¹³¹ Ronfeldt (2007): 44-45.

¹³² Tibi, B. (2008) ‘Religious Extremism or Religionization of Politics? The Ideological Foundations of Political Islam’ in Frisch, H. & Inbar, E. (eds.) *The Ideological Foundations of Political Islam*, Routledge, London: 16. In terms of rhetoric alone, however, numerous references have been made to the loss of the Caliphate and the need for it to be re-established.

¹³³ Carpenter et al. (2010): 10.

Some analysts have voiced concerns over the validity and accuracy of this apparent distinction between religion (and religious culture) and politics in the context of Al-Qa'ida's campaign of violence and terrorism. Tololyan, for example, warns of the 'disciplinary rush to the politicization of terrorism,' whereby 'the profession of political science seems powerfully impelled to turn enormously complex events into mere, or only, or just *political* facts that can be seen as motivating other political acts, including terrorism.' He argues: 'terrorism with an authentically popular base is never a purely political phenomenon.'¹³⁴ Although the extent to which the Al-Qa'ida core, in its current form, constitutes or can rely on a popular support base is debatable, the leaders have enjoyed broader appeal within certain communities throughout the life of the movement. The ambiguity surrounding the role of and the interplay between religion (and religious concepts and interpretations) and politics (and political ambitions) in the construction of these appeals appears to result from insufficient empirical understanding of the way in which the core leadership communicates these values.

The case for empirical, systematic research is strengthened when the dynamic nature of this ideological periphery is considered. Indeed, the radical fringe upon which the ideological foundations of militant Islam and Al-Qa'ida are perched is far from a holistic entity. Differences of opinion persist, divergent strands are forged and arguments flourish in an ideational *community*, which is essentially fluid and dynamic. Selective or limited sampling is thus unlikely to be representative.

2.1.3 Ideology as a dynamic process

Apart from the core traditionalist and puritanical Islamist tenets, the content, breadth and scope of Islamist militant ideologies differ substantially. 'The ideology of jihad', as Al-Rasheed notes, 'is a postmodern hybridity, whose sources, if ever we can accurately identify them, are found in the past and present, and in both the Muslim and Western worlds.'¹³⁵ Indeed, in their analysis of the ideology of Islamist militancy, Snow and Byrd complained of the prevalence of many existing studies into the topic to underplay the complexity and multifaceted nature of the ideational forces at play:

The ideas and bundles of meaning that are supposedly constitutive of ideology are treated as given [...] and the use and application of ideology is viewed in an almost mechanistic fashion rather than as a social production that evolves during the course of interactive or dialogic processes among activists, targets, and events in the world.¹³⁶

Beliefs and values conveyed by movement leaders are, according to Snow and Byrd, not coherent in the sense of functioning in a 'programmatic and doctrinaire fashion' but rather, are to be seen as a 'variable phenomenon that ranges on a continuum from a tightly and rigidly connected set of values and beliefs at the one end to a loosely coupled set of values and beliefs at the other end.'¹³⁷ By extension, these values and beliefs associated with Islamist militancy should not be considered 'as of one cloth ideologically.' Many facets of Islamist militant ideology include conflicting strands and opposing viewpoints and areas of contention.

The antagonism between Zawahiri and Azzam over the viability and direction of the Muslim Brotherhood was mentioned in the previous chapter. The tension centred on

¹³⁴ Tololyan (2006): 33-34.

¹³⁵ Al-Rasheed, M. (2009) 'The Local and the Global in Salafism', in Meijer, R. (ed.) (2009): 305.

¹³⁶ Snow & Byrd (2007): 121.

¹³⁷ Ibid: 123.

the pragmatic approach the Brotherhood had taken to politics, with allegations from detractors that the movement's engagement in mainstream politics diluted its emphasis on religious purity. Such accusations were initially prompted, in part, by Nasir al-Din al-Albani, a 20th century reformer who criticised the Brotherhood for prioritising politics over religious knowledge.¹³⁸

Al-Albani's criticism of other Salafist strands, including the way in which Wahhabism relied on the Hanbali juridical school (in contrast with overt and apparent Wahhabite rejection of *taqlid*) reiterates the importance of recognising the conflicting elements that fall under the category of Salafism. Subsequent prominence of Wahhabism, based to no small degree on the school being propelled by the largesse of the Saudi elite, did impact upon more radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood.¹³⁹ Zahab and Roy, moreover, show how elements of Deobandism – established by Al-Wahhab's contemporary Shah Wali Allah in India – and the curriculum of Pakistani *madaaris* became 'Wahhabised' due to the influence of Saudi benefactors.¹⁴⁰ This and other developments contributed to the creation of a 'contemporary Deobandi movement [that] has been key in spreading Islamist radicalism in Pakistan'¹⁴¹ and undermined the school's traditional tolerance (and indeed incorporation) of Sufi thought.¹⁴²

This fusion of neo-Wahhabism with other forms of puritanical Islamism should not disguise frictions that remain and even differences and dynamics that are present exclusively within the militant camp. Among the actors underpinning and sustaining militant Islam, for instance, Lia identified a 'struggle between ideological purists and politico-military pragmatists.'¹⁴³ Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, according to Lia's analysis, belonged to the latter camp, warning against the disruptive impact of the exclusivist narrative he identified with the former group. According to his more inclusive and pragmatic approach, which bin Ladin also embraced, the narrow agenda of some extreme forms of Salafism could do immense damage. Describing a prominent Islamist militant thinker, Al-Suri wrote: 'Abu Qutada was extreme in his support for Salafism and the Ahl al-Sunnah school and the ideas of the Wahhabite Call. He was strongly opposed to other schools within the broader circle of Ahl al-Sunnah.' Even the Taliban were criticised for doctrinal impurity and for their short-lived pursuit for UN recognition.¹⁴⁴

Indeed Sunni militant groups in Pakistan and elsewhere on the Subcontinent include a host of divergent ideological strands and membership compositions. Intra-Sunni tensions also complicate matters, particularly in terms of tribal dynamics and ethnic cleavages.¹⁴⁵

Moving beyond the differences within Al-Qa'ida's alliance structure to the group itself, closer inspection reveals how homogenous stasis should not be assumed even at such a narrow level of analysis. The emergence of the 'Zarqawi doctrine', following the Al-Qa'ida representative's campaign of ethnic slaughter in Iraq, prompted fierce debate which again pitched the more pragmatic proponents of militant Islam against Salafi puritans and their endorsement of 'indiscriminate violence against everyone who does not support Jihadi-Salafism.'¹⁴⁶ Al-Qa'ida's record in Iraq has provoked harsh criticism

¹³⁸ Meijer (ed.) (2009): 9.

¹³⁹ Filiu (2009).

¹⁴⁰ Zahab & Roy (2002): 12.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Meijer (ed.) (2009): 5-6.

¹⁴³ Lia (2009): 283.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid: 291, 297.

¹⁴⁵ Zahab & Roy (2002)

¹⁴⁶ Paz (2009): 278.

from within the Islamist milieu from former militants and scholars.¹⁴⁷ One Saudi Imam, for instance, released a fatwa asking the leadership: ‘do they think that by exploding a building or killing a tourist, they will defeat a state and establish a new regime?’¹⁴⁸

At a discursive, structural and strategic level, too, there has been change. Hegghammer, for instance, observed how ‘the distinction between near enemy and far enemy groups seems less and less relevant.’ ‘A process of ideological hybridization has occurred, with the result that the enemy hierarchies of many jihadist groups are becoming more unclear or heterogeneous than they used to be.’¹⁴⁹ The Terrorist Perspective Project reached a similar conclusion: ‘AQAM’s strategic thought is evolving over time, this is bad news for those who would offer simplistic strategies for countering the Salafi jihadist threat.’¹⁵⁰ Along the same lines, Ranstorp and Herd argued: ‘In many ways, it is clear that al Qaeda’s ideology is a constant work in progress with many directions of influences by salafist-jihadi thinkers and clerics and that its multiple strands change character according to circumstances.’¹⁵¹

In light of such shifts and dynamics, references to Al-Qa’ida’s ‘constant message’¹⁵² or ‘single narrative’¹⁵³ appear problematic. The point is a host of different actors, ideational strands and environmental imperatives shape different facets and manifestations of salafi jihadist thought and practice. As a result, any in-depth analysis of the communiqués that construct and communicate the belief system in question needs to rely on concrete points of departure and a clear delineation of the actor sets under review. For this reason, the current thesis focuses on the two key individuals within Al-Qa’ida’s ‘core’ leadership and their recognised message output as sources of the metrics studied.

Clear identification of actor sets is underscored by what Kimmage termed ‘virtual media production and distribution entities’ (online repositories of Islamist militant media material often created by admirers rather than the terrorist groups themselves) as well as user-generated content (from those Brachman would refer to as ‘Jihobbysits’), which challenge the ability of the Al-Qa’ida leadership or other groups to exert exclusive control over the message of transnational militant Islamism.¹⁵⁴ Any emergence of a nascent ‘virtual democracy’¹⁵⁵ in this respect (ironic, given Al-Qa’ida’s denunciation of people power) underlines the importance of disaggregating sub-currents of the militant Islamist universe¹⁵⁶ in order to isolate the object of analysis (in this case, the ‘core’) as well as developing methodologies that detect dynamics and other nuances in the narrative.

¹⁴⁷ See e.g. Bergen & Cruickshank (2008); Bale (2009): 41.

¹⁴⁸ Paz (2009): 275.

¹⁴⁹ Hegghammer (2009-A): 3.

¹⁵⁰ Stout et al. (2008): 155.

¹⁵¹ Ranstorp, M. & Herd, G. (2007) ‘Approaches to Countering Terrorism and CIST’ in Aldis, A. & Herd, (eds.) 3.

¹⁵² Ciovacco, C. J. (2009) ‘The Contours of Al Qaeda’s Media Strategy’ in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, (32): 10, pp. 853-875).

¹⁵³ See Wright (2006-B) ‘The Master Plan: For the New Theorists of Jihad, Al Qaeda is Just the Beginning’, in *The New Yorker* (11 September): 48

¹⁵⁴ Kimmage, D. (2008) ‘The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message’, in *RFE/RL Special Report* (March), Radio Free Europe: 1; Brachman (2008).

¹⁵⁵ See Paz (2009): 272.

¹⁵⁶ See Hegghammer (2009-A): 2.

2.2 The Ideology of Al-Qa'ida: Theory and Methodology

The previous chapter began by introducing the emergence of Al-Qa'ida as a conceptual, methodological and theoretical challenge for an academic community still debating the end of the Cold War many had failed to predict.

Prior to that pivotal event, Schmid and Jongman warned against the lack of systematic research in academic approaches to political violence arguing that there were 'few areas in the social science literature where so much is written on the basis of so little research.'¹⁵⁷ Even earlier, Howard lamented how this literature had produced 'more incompetent and unnecessary books than any other outside [...] of sociology. It attracts phoneys and amateurs as a candle attracts moths.'¹⁵⁸

Attempts of the academic community to catch up with Al-Qa'ida's terrorist campaign and the monumental impact it had on politics and society exposed further shortfalls in the literature. Many accounts were reactive and rushed. The literature has, moreover, suffered from what Ranstorp, Crenshaw and others have identified as 'an event-driven fashion.'¹⁵⁹ 'Terrorism research has tended to focus on the here and now', in Weinberg's words.¹⁶⁰

As a result, too little emphasis has been placed on long-term analyses and sound, systematic methodologies that rely on primary sources rather than re-interpreting secondary accounts. The field still suffers from insufficiently rigorous empirical research and a dearth of individual data generation.¹⁶¹

Studies into Al-Qa'ida, in particular, need to rely on, what Hoffman termed 'sound, empirical judgement'. 'What remains missing', he argued, 'is a thorough, systematic understanding of our enemy: encompassing motivation as well as mindset, decision-making processes as well as command and control relationships; and ideological constructs as well as organizational dynamics.'¹⁶²

Indeed, there is a particular need for rigorous research into Al-Qa'ida's ideological base and the public messages of the group's leaders. Ranstorp identified the importance of investing more energy into this strand of research by 'understanding the role of ideology, the constituent parts of Al-Qaeda's narrative, and efforts to counter these ideological dimensions on the global and local levels in an age of globalization.'¹⁶³ The fact that 'the ideological front [had] been severely understudied' needed to be addressed.¹⁶⁴ Scheuer, who constructed his biography of bin Ladin using a comprehensive collection of communiqués, meanwhile, lamented how existing accounts of Al-Qa'ida and the personalities involved almost completely ignored this corpus of

¹⁵⁷ Schmid, A. & Jongman, A. (2006) *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature* (second edition). Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick: 179.

¹⁵⁸ See in Hoffman, B. (2008) 'The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters', in *Foreign Affairs* (vol. 87, pp. 133-138, May/June).

¹⁵⁹ Ranstorp, M. (2009) 'Mapping Terrorism Studies After 9/11: An Academic Field of Old Problems and New Problems', in Jackson, R., Smyth, M. B., Gunning, J. (eds.) *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*: 25; Crenshaw, M. (2000) 'The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century' in *Political Psychology* (vol. 21, no. 2): 405.

¹⁶⁰ Weinberg, L. (2008) 'Two Neglected Areas of Terrorism Research: Careers after Terrorism and How Terrorists Innovate' in *Perspectives on Terrorism* (vol. 2, no. 9, June): 13.

¹⁶¹ Silke, A. (2004) 'An Introduction to Terrorism Research' in Silke (ed.) *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, Frank Cass, London; Silke, A. (2004) 'The Road Less Travelled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research' (in same volume): 59-60; Horgan, J. (2004). 'The Case for Firsthand Research', (in same volume): 30.

¹⁶² Hoffman (2007).

¹⁶³ Ranstorp (2009): 32.

¹⁶⁴ Ranstorp & Herd (2007): 3.

primary texts and messages.¹⁶⁵ Hegghammer also made an important case for this direction of research:

More research is needed on the drivers of ideological change in general and on the blurring of enemy hierarchies in particular. The link between a lack of ideological clarity and group weakness, while yet to be firmly established, is a potentially important contribution to the nascent theoretical literature on militant group decline.¹⁶⁶

Equally, Stout found that ‘the idea that strategic thought might exist and be important within modern terrorist groups has received insufficient attention.’¹⁶⁷

For those works that do rely, in part, on Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués, many lack in systematic data collection, coding and analysis.¹⁶⁸ Riedel, for instance, claimed his book was based ‘heavily on al Qaeda’s own words and statements’ and yet only sixteen public messages from Zawahiri – one of Al-Qa’ida’s most prolific leaders – were referenced. Rabasa et al. based their commentary on the major themes of the Al-Qa’ida narrative on an equally scant number of primary documents and excerpts from the Middle East Media Research Initiative.¹⁶⁹ Scheuer assessed existing prominent works on Al-Qa’ida and found references to primary documents to be remarkably absent.¹⁷⁰ Kepel’s analysis, meanwhile, dissected a few communiqués in detail providing some immediate contextual insights, without presenting a long-term, systematic review of the development of the narrative over an extended period.¹⁷¹

The current study, therefore, relies on a standardised coding mechanism allowing for the systematic processing of Al-Qa’ida communiqués, identifying pertinent themes and variables in the great majority of the leadership’s public messages spanning the two decades from the group’s first engagement with the outside world. The methodological design will be elaborated further in Part II of this thesis, as will the theoretical underpinnings. Preliminary observations in this regard, however, should be clarified at this point.

2.2.1 Theoretical frameworks

The academic study of Al-Qa’ida has produced several different analytical approaches seeking to capture its scope and structural dynamic. Ronfeldt identified ‘five levels of theory and practice’ contributing to our understanding of such ‘networked adversaries’: (1) the organisational level (relating to aspects of networked design); (2) doctrinal level (collaborative strategies and methods); (3) technological level (especially relating to information systems); (4) social levels (focusing on personal ties between members) and (5) the narrative level (the network’s ‘story’).¹⁷²

¹⁶⁵ Scheuer (2011): 1, 18-19.

¹⁶⁶ Hegghammer (2009-A): 40.

¹⁶⁷ Stout, M. (2009) ‘In Search of Salafi Jihadist Strategic Thought: Mining the Words of the Terrorists’ *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (vol. 32, iss. 10, pp. 876-892): 877.

¹⁶⁸ Hellmich, C. (2008) ‘Creating the ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypocrites to Salafi-Jihadists’, in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (vol. 31: 2, pp. 111-124).

¹⁶⁹ Rabasa et al. (2006).

¹⁷⁰ Scheuer (2011): 18-19.

¹⁷¹ See e.g. Kepel, G. (2008-B) *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, M.A.; Kepel (2004).

¹⁷² Ronfeldt, D. (2003) ‘Foreword: Netwar Observations’, in Bunker, R. J. (ed.) *Non-State Threats and Future Wars*. Frank Cass, London: xv.

Dissecting Ronfeldt's five categories, Ranstorp and Herd developed sub-categories in terms of analytical approaches to the study of Al-Qa'ida.¹⁷³ Organisational approaches – seeking to detect and explain different elements of the nodes creating and interoperating within the network – could be divided into: the social network paradigm; the crime-terror nexus; corporate management and organisational theory; complexity theory and finally; the 'post-network' phase represented in Mishal and Rosenthal's 'dune' typology, as described above.¹⁷⁴

The doctrinal level has produced a 'plethora of different schools of thought',¹⁷⁵ including contextual analyses situating Islamist militancy within a wider framework of radical Islamism and the development of juridical arguments. Other studies, such as Lia's work on Al-Suri, adopt a narrower focus of analysis through examining individual concepts, doctrines and thinkers. In terms of thought processes relating to tactics, mobilisation and resistance, works that incorporate experiences and perceptions from other forms of uprising and militancy, including the importance of rational choice paradigms, also fall within this category.

The technological level is important, particularly as regards opportunities presented by the Internet. The creation of online forums have allowed potential sympathisers and dispersed observers to monitor and contribute to militant Islamist debates (although this 'virtual democracy' does present challenges, as discussed above). New types of online distribution networks, which offer ever-greater bandwidth, enable scores of groups and individuals to maintain and distribute media content independently of older, more established, journalistic channels.

In terms of social dimensions, Sageman's approach and other studies looking at grass root, bottom-up fluidity were mentioned above, as were perspectives looking at tribal paradigms and other social levels of an Islamist militant framework.

The narrative level has yielded particularly interesting perspectives, even more poignant as Al-Qa'ida's role as message generator and de-territorialised ideological entity supersedes other roles, dissecting message direction and propaganda content. Shortfalls in terms of methodological rigour, however, as mentioned above, still need to be addressed.

As regards theoretical underpinnings, moreover, there is a need for studies of Al-Qa'ida to move beyond the organisational model. A network analysis can be helpful when describing various nodes and links of Al-Qa'ida and understanding its tactical terrorist activities, but as Milward and Raab noted, 'while it is important to be able to visualize what the known parts of Al Qaeda look like, it tells us nothing of its strategic plan.'¹⁷⁶ The previous discussion revealed the importance of this direction for the study of Al-Qa'ida. The theoretical approaches, therefore, need to rely on accurate descriptions regarding the components that form Al-Qa'ida and the role of the leadership – or core – in particular. The Terrorist Perspectives Project made this case concisely:

Salafi jihadist leaders do not constitute a general staff that can promulgate binding strategic guidance to the movement's constituent organizations and to the masses. At best, leaders of individual organizations can exercise significant, though not total, control over their own

¹⁷³ Ranstorp & Herd (2007): 5.

¹⁷⁴ Mishal & Rosenthal (2005).

¹⁷⁵ Ranstorp & Herd, G. (2007): 5.

¹⁷⁶ Milward, H. B & Raab, J. (2005) 'Dark Networks as Problems Revisited: Adaptation and Transformation of Islamic Terror Organizations since 9/11': 31-32. Available at <www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/private/documents/.../dark_networks.pdf> (as of 30 January 2011).

people. Leaders of the movements often make their wishes known, however, through public statements and internal communications.¹⁷⁷

Theoretically, this underlines the importance of identifying, what Hegghammer terms the ‘ideal-type’ of the ‘discursive theme’ or ‘frame’ setting out the ideological rationales of an actor communicating with an audience.¹⁷⁸ The literature on collective action frames constituted by social movement leaders, which Wictorowicz and others have utilised in their analyses, provides such a framework.¹⁷⁹ Wictorowicz presented theories on social movements as a ‘unifying framework and agenda that can provide effective modes of inquiry to further the boundaries of research on Islamic activism.’ In particular, this related to ‘the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes.’¹⁸⁰ In this respect, the faith-based narratives are presented as the ‘source of a mobilizing ideology’, along the lines of the model designed by Snow and Marshall.¹⁸¹

This allows for a theoretical approach that exhibits ‘fluid boundaries, flexible leadership structures, and malleable divisions of labor’,¹⁸² emphasising the importance of narrative, ideology and audiences, as a dynamic process beyond rigid and limited interpretations presented by organisational structures.

Approaching the Al-Qa’ida leadership narrative in terms of distinct framing tasks that together form the composition of this narrative thus allows for the content and nature of the leadership communiqués to be understood as a specific feature central to Al-Qa’ida. This approach highlights the ways in which the Al-Qa’ida leadership has identified a specific set of problems that need to be addressed, formulated prescribed solutions to these problems, as well as set about communicating these messages to identified audiences with the aim of influencing message recipients. The next chapter illustrates how this theoretical model is constructed, how it applies to the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués and how this model informs and structures the longitudinal analysis, presented in Part III of this thesis, in terms of the core diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing tasks that are being pursued.

¹⁷⁷ Stout et al. (2008): 137.

¹⁷⁸ Hegghammer, T. (2009-B) ‘Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism’, in Meijer (ed.): 260.

¹⁷⁹ See e.g. Wictorowicz (ed.) (2004).

¹⁸⁰ Ibid: 2 & 4.

¹⁸¹ Snow, D. & Marshall, S. (1984) ‘Cultural Imperialism, Social Movements, and the Islamic Revival’, in Kriesberg, L. (ed.) *Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change* (vol. 7, pp. 131-152), JAI Press, Greenwich, Conn: 5.

¹⁸² Buechler, S. (1990). *Women’s Movements in the United States*, Rutgers Univ. Press, New Brunswick, N.J.: 42.

Part II
THEORETICAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

UNDERSTANDING FRAMING

3.1 Introduction

On a descriptive level, important similarities in terms of levels of analysis have emerged through representations of tiered typologies of Al-Qa'ida (even though analysts continue to argue over the significance of individual components). As illustrated in the previous part, these typologies combine the organisational remnants – the experiences and networks of personalities derived from Al-Qa'ida as it was created two decades ago – and the narrative and faith-based strategy espoused by its leaders and a wider milieu of transnational militant Islamist proponents.

Although tiered typologies inform the analytical approach of this thesis, particularly as regards the positioning of a 'core' leadership, the focus of the current analysis is not on tiered networks or the interrelationships between actors or nodes. Such organisational or 'network' approaches can be attractive in their simplicity. The danger of such approaches, however, is that objects of analysis (and by extension investigative scopes) become ill-defined with observations relying on speculation rather than testable and empirically based linkages. Raab and Milward, for instance, noted how the continued survival of Al-Qa'ida after the Afghan invasion of 2001 was illustrative (*a posteriori*) of the strength of 'covert networks' through their 'flexible structures.' These 'structures' included different 'nodes' and sub-networks, such as threads of financial support.

From the organisational perspective, these observations had implications for operational counterterrorism initiatives, based on perceived strength through adaptability whereby the more complex the web of 'hubs' within a network, 'the more redundant and resilient the network will be and the harder it will be to destroy.'¹⁸³ This resilience rested on networks being, as Powell observed, 'lighter on their feet than hierarchies.'¹⁸⁴

In this sense, a 'significant fraction of nodes can be randomly removed without much impact on its ability to function effectively.'¹⁸⁵ By extension, such approaches led to the simplistic notion (based on conceptually ambiguous interrelationships) that 'if

¹⁸³ Milward & Raab (2005): 31-32. See also Milward & Raab, J. (2003) 'Dark Networks as Problems', in *Journal of Public Administrations and Theory* (13:4, pp. 413-439).

¹⁸⁴ Powell, W. (1990) 'Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization' in *Research in Organizational Behavior* (vol. 12, pp. 295-336): 303.

¹⁸⁵ Milward & Raab (2005).

enough hubs are destroyed, the network breaks down into isolated, non-communicating islands of nodes.’¹⁸⁶

Aside from the conceptual ambiguity of such notions, the underlying assumption that designed and controlled organisational elements could be ‘targeted’ in isolation in order to destroy (in this case) Al-Qa’ida proper, appeared to overstate levels of control and undermine the complexity of relationships between individuals within the Al-Qa’ida leadership and constituents of their wider environment.

Mayntz’s ‘three distinctive features of organized terrorism [as] a functional response to the exigencies of survival confronting it’ are particularly problematic. These three ‘distinctive features’ consisted firstly of elements of central control whereby ‘notwithstanding the large scope for autonomous action that lower level units possess, their activities are effectively steered by the central leadership, not through specific orders, but by generally formulated goals and strategies.’ The second feature spoke of ‘latency of both vertical and horizontal relations’ where ‘organizational units, and especially the operative cells, are relatively isolated from each other’ in a deliberate and pre-designed structure formulated to operate as a clandestine network. This latency was, according to Mayntz, tied to the third distinctive feature of terrorist groups, namely:

The strong identification of individuals with the organization and its goals. This identification is based on ideological indoctrination and practical learning; a deeply felt religious belief may be particularly effective here. The unquestioning consensus based on shared beliefs is reinforced by close personal relationships grounded in ethnic or family ties or in a common experience, for instance in training camps.¹⁸⁷

Such a functionalist approach assumes significant levels of control and unity of thought within terrorist leaderships which fails to account for internal dissent and schisms, internal narrative inconsistencies, the importance of divergent individual *interpretation*, and a multifaceted, complex and often unpredictable relationship between leaderships and followers, perceived followers or potential supporters.

Functionalist representations of movements also risk simplifying the complexities of entry and engagement. Wiktorowicz’s criticism of resource mobilisation theory, for instance, rested on its inadequate perception of movements ‘as rational, organized manifestations of collective action. As an approach, its central contention is that while grievances are ubiquitous, movements are not.’¹⁸⁸ By extension, the autonomy of ‘constituents’ or perceived support communities and recruitment pools is undermined and dynamics in the relationship between these cohorts and the message disseminators remain unexplained.

Snow et al. echoed Wiktorowicz’s concerns whilst underlining the structured, pre-designed and systematic methodological approach applied in the current thesis:

Both the psychofunctional and resource mobilization perspectives ignore this interpretive or framing issue. The psychofunctional approaches do so by assuming an almost automatic, magnetic-like linkage between intensely felt grievances and susceptibility to movement participation. Lip service is given to subjective/interpretive considerations, but they are rarely dealt with thoughtfully or systematically. Resource mobilization perspectives also

¹⁸⁶ Sageman (2004).

¹⁸⁷ This and other quotes form Mayntz’s paper: Mayntz, R. (2004) ‘Organizational Focus of Terrorism. Hierarchy, Network, or a Type Sui Generis’ in *MPIfG Discussion Paper* (04/4), Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung: 13.

¹⁸⁸ Wiktorowicz (2004): 10.

skirt this interpretive issue by assuming the ubiquity and constancy of mobilizing grievances.¹⁸⁹

In other words, no matter how universal or deeply resonant a particular grievance may be, the response from the affected public is by no means pre-determined and uniform. In addition to the individual's own interpretation of grievances, movements filter and contextualise events, thus framing the grievance-based narrative for their intended audience. This study scrutinises this dynamic in the Al-Qa'ida leadership messages.

In approaching the matter theoretically, Cozzen's 'culturalist' alternative to functionalist approaches to Al-Qa'ida can be helpful (see further below). This built upon Fukuyama's and Uimonen's ideas of 'cultures of networking' and of networks as social capital, rather than necessarily reliant on functional structure.¹⁹⁰ As noted in the first chapter, Cetina's understanding of media as a 'scopic system' within a complex network of social microconstructions is also helpful in appreciating conveyance of media content and dissemination of communiqués as a central element worthy of independent analysis. According to this interpretation, these communiqués are often 'intentionally moral and performative in the sense of "calling" the audience to particular forms of actions,' as of course, is the objective of the Al-Qa'ida leadership. Thus, for Cetina, bin Ladin's and Zawahiri's messages are designed to have a 'coordinating force [...] [in terms of] reiterating and extending the transcendent project to which the audience is committed, that of renewing an affective community, and that of creating for this community a background world that grounds their activities and experiences.'¹⁹¹ This highlights the importance of norms and ideology. Furthermore, it underscores the significance of allowing structure to emerge from evidence rather than from preconceived assumptions. By focusing on the role of media and communiqués within a system of social microconstructions, moreover, testable metrics have been identified to explore the efforts and robustness of Al-Qa'ida as a 'coordinating force.'

3.2 Ideology and Communication

The current analysis understands communication of values, grievances and goals as an integral part in the composition and operation of Al-Qa'ida and public communiqués as central to its output over the years. Only a systematic, longitudinal study can illustrate the features and dynamics of message content, relationship with diffuse actors (as message recipients) and strategic and operational rationalisations. Such an approach needs to account for the complexity and actor heterogeneity that characterises the environment in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership operates. Ranstorp and Herd note how:

This enduring battlefield [of the West against terrorism] will have no definable frontiers, no apparent or visible enemies and these battles will be waged not only physically but also ideologically and across the virtual domain. This ideological battlefront is proving increasingly complex, elusive and multifaceted in an era of globalization where like the

¹⁸⁹ Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K. & Benford, R. D. (1986), 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation', in *American Sociological Review* (vol. 51, no. 4, August, pp. 464-481). American Sociological Association: 465.

¹⁹⁰ Cozzens, J. B. (2007) 'Approaching al-Qaeda's Warfare: Function, Culture and Grand Strategy', in Ranstorp, M. (ed.) *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction*, Routledge: Abingdon: 131-137.

¹⁹¹ Cetina (2005): 221-222.

famous ‘butterfly effect’ on small local event translates in seconds into global consciousness.¹⁹²

Rather than a vague set of ‘nodes’ or ‘hubs’, therefore, the current object of analysis is clear and consists of the Al-Qa’ida leadership as established and represented by the late Usama bin Ladin and, his successor as overall leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Furthermore, rather than attacks, plots, explicit support activity or other behaviour – a perspective which in this context relies on equally ambiguous assumptions regarding the nature of relations and affiliations between actor and ‘core’ – the ‘activity’ under review is clearly defined: the content of publicly disseminated messages. Finally, and most importantly, the evidence upon which the current observations were based was collected and processed systematically, relying on articles that are openly available.

The construction of public messaging in this context raises questions that are central to Al-Qa’ida and the Islamist extremist milieu more broadly but nonetheless move beyond the explanatory power of organisational approaches. How does the Al-Qa’ida leadership interact with its wider environment? How does it define and justify its actions? How does it build its narrative, to whom is it directed and how has it changed? These questions relate to the important relationship between the leadership as message disseminators and elements of the wider environment as message recipients. These questions become all the more important when we remember that Al-Qa’ida’s campaign of public communication preceded any direct involvement in violence and today constitutes its principal *raison d’être*.

This concerns what Cozzens termed the ‘less apparent “expressive” and “existential” quality to al-Qaeda’s character and its warfare that is not given due attention in the literature.’ This, Cozzens argued, was shaped by ‘the “identity” of combatants and the myriad of qualities resident in that term, such as group culture, religion and ideology that expresses this culture – in effect, the variables that construct a symbolic world.’¹⁹³

Indeed, ‘the grand strategic level of warfare – whether that of a state or non-state actors – cannot be fully understood apart from the protagonist’s culture, or the ideologies that express them.’¹⁹⁴

Tololyan, as another advocate of a ‘cultural’ approach to understanding terrorism, emphasised the importance of narrative nuances and ways in which events do not impact movements or individuals unidirectionally. In this sense, narratives encase, shape, interpret and contextualise events according to ideological foundations and movement agendas. To this end Tololyan developed the concept of a *projective* narrative as one that ‘not only tells a story of the past, but also maps out future actions that can imbue the time of individual lives with transcendent collective values.’ These narratives ‘tell individuals how they would ideally have to live and die in order to contribute properly to their collectivity and its future.’¹⁹⁵

Tololyan, therefore, highlighted the importance of *mediation* and the ‘possibility that the past events [...] are perpetuated, disseminated and experienced in a particular culture not as political events but as narratives that transcribe historical facts into moral or immoral acts, vehicles of social values.’¹⁹⁶

¹⁹² Ranstorp & Herd (2007): 3.

¹⁹³ Cozzens (2007): 128.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Tololyan (2006): 32.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

As this thesis demonstrates, events and catalysts do not occur in an interpretative vacuum. Although individual or public anger and outrage, elation or sympathy following watershed events do not depend on specific conduits, movements seek to translate these events (and the *emotions* they provoke) into action, support or acquiescence, in a sense – different layers of mobilisation – for their cause.

The communiqués that convey this narrative, moreover, can be understood in terms of the problems identified, the solutions presented to address these problems and the communication strategies employed to deliver this message. The framing literature, and in particular Benford and Snow's conceptualisation of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames and different aspects of frame effectiveness, provides a model with which to deconstruct the communiqués, understand their impact and organise the current analysis.

3.3 The Framing of Communiqués

In his study of Islamic activism, Wiktorowicz, defined *frames* as:

interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the “world out there.” For social movements, these schemata are important in the production and dissemination of movement interpretations and are designed to mobilize participants and support. As signifying agents engaged in the social construction of meaning, movements must articulate and disseminate frameworks of understanding that resonate with potential participants and broader publics to elicit collective action.¹⁹⁷

For the purpose of the current thesis, therefore, framing can be understood as the interpretive work undertaken by the Al-Qa'ida leadership and communicated to audiences in the wider environment with the aim of promoting the movement and elevating its causes. The focus is on ‘the way in which meaning is produced, articulated and disseminated by movement actors through interactive processes.’¹⁹⁸

According to Benford and Snow's understanding of framing and Goffman's earlier work on the concept,¹⁹⁹ social movements were not merely carriers or transmitters of mobilising beliefs and ideas (essentially, *ideology*) but could be seen as ‘actively engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers.’²⁰⁰ Al-Qa'ida is, in this sense, not to be understood merely by studying essential principles of Salafism but rather through dissecting the leaders' own production of meaning, as articulated through communiqués aimed at adversaries, potential followers and the wider community whose support Al-Qa'ida seeks to secure. The ways in which movement leaders ‘frame, or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner

¹⁹⁷ Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004): 15; see also Snow, D. A. & Benford, R. D. (1992) ‘Master Frames and Cycles of Protest’, in Momo, A. D. & Mueller, C. M. (eds.) *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT: 137.

¹⁹⁸ Wiktorowicz (2004): 15.

¹⁹⁹ The authors' application of the ‘frame’ term is based on Goffman's notions of frames as ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences within their life space and the world at large.’ See Goffman, E. (1974): 21 and Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K. & Benford, R. D. (1986).

²⁰⁰ Snow & Benford (1988): 198.

bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists²⁰¹ is thus directly relevant to Al-Qa'ida and central to the approach of the current thesis.

This understanding is also important in terms of wider processes of counterterrorism. Violent extremists, according to this approach, do not respond directly or in isolation to grievances that can be 'addressed' (minimised, contextualised or eliminated) or individual/communal frustrations that can be 'countered' (refocused, channelled). The reality is more complex. These frustrations, grievances, values, norms, aspirations and related *emotions* form part of a wider culture and narrative that justify and encourage violence and prompt activity in support of the cause. Thus:

the strategic action pursued by SMOs [social movement organisations], their resource acquisition efforts, and their temporal viability are all strongly influenced by their interpretive work. Accordingly, a thoroughgoing understanding of the participation process requires that closer attention be given to the interpretation of grievances and other ideational elements, such as values and supportive beliefs.²⁰²

Interpreting the wider environment according to the central belief system and communicating this perception thus becomes essential for leaders of movements, particularly those established in revolutionary opposition to the status quo: 'whatever else social movement actors do, they seek to affect interpretations of reality among various audiences. They engage in this framing work because they assume, rightly or wrongly, that meaning is prefatory to action.'²⁰³

For this reason, framing is necessarily a dynamic process. It is 'an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction.'²⁰⁴

[Framing] is active in the sense that something is being done, and processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process. It entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them.²⁰⁵

Benford and Snow classified the outcome of this framing process as 'collective action frames', that 'function as innovative amplifications and extension of, or antidotes to, existing ideologies or components of them.'²⁰⁶ Simply put, 'collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization.'²⁰⁷ They are frequently created to encourage mobilisation against perceived injustice.²⁰⁸ Seeking to rouse the 'Islamic nation' against perceived injustices and the identified sources behind these injustices is central to the narrative of the Al-Qa'ida leadership.

For any movement trying to mobilise support for a given set of goals, establish a presence within a wider socio-political environment with existing competitive

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Benford & Snow (2000): 613.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid

²⁰⁶ Ibid

²⁰⁷ Ibid: 614.

²⁰⁸ Benford, R. (1997), 'An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective' in *Sociological Inquiry* (vol. 67, no. 4, November, pp. 409-430). See below on 'injustice frames.'

movements, or sustain the momentum and publicity of past activities, collective action frames are fundamental.

For the Al-Qa'ida leadership, this relates not only to contextualisation and legitimisation of past attacks or violent campaigns. Messages to the wider public must also demonstrate the continued relevancy of opinions and options presented by the leadership and its ability to address concerns of those for whom the appeals are generated. Additionally, through collective action frames, the leadership must, in order to remain relevant, incorporate emerging issues within the broader framework of Al-Qa'ida's ideational positioning.

This relationship between a movement's collective action frames and the socio-cultural and political environment in which it operates thus involves a continual and interactive process. Benford and Snow observed:

Taken together, research on the core framing processes indicates that collective action frames are not static, reified entities but are continuously being constituted, contested, reproduced, transformed, and/or replaced during the course of social movement activity. Hence, framing is a dynamic, ongoing process. But this process does not occur in a structural or cultural vacuum. Rather, framing processes are affected by a number of elements of the socio-cultural context in which they are embedded.²⁰⁹

Hence, a model is presented to shed light on the continuity and change in the narrative of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués over the past two decades, based on the Salafi-jihadist context in which they are disseminated and the globalised Islamist militancy which they are intended to defend and promote. Based on this interaction, and that of movement leaders, constituents and movement adversaries, Benford, Snow and others have defined a set of frame variants whereby the ideational message is constructed and determined by the interplay of these factors.

3.3.1 Frame variants

Benford and Snow, and following on from Wilson's *Introduction to Social Movements*,²¹⁰ saw their frame categories as closely tied to the composition of an ideological framework. This produced three core framing tasks:²¹¹

1. Diagnostic. The first task concerned the need to diagnose 'an event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration.' Diagnostic appeals thus ask 'what is or went wrong?' and 'who or what is to blame?'²¹² For Salafi-jihadi activists, for instance, this would relate to religious ignorance, man-made laws and the absence of a pious Caliphate with more immediate concerns relating to the presence and influence of non-Islamist actors, forces and ideas and derived grievances. In his seminal book *Join the Caravan*, for example, Abdullah Azzam began by listing reasons Muslims had to go out and fight in jihad.²¹³
2. Prognostic. The second task, by extension, involved a 'proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done.' This framing task

²⁰⁹ Benford & Snow (2000): 628.

²¹⁰ Wilson, J. (1973) *Introduction to Social Movements*. Basic Books, New York.

²¹¹ Snow & Benford (1988): 199, 200-202.

²¹² Snow & Byrd (2007): 126.

²¹³ See: Azzam, A. (2001) *Join the Caravan* (initially published in 1988). Azzam Publications, London/online: 4.

concerned the identification of ‘strategies, tactics, and targets,’ specifying ‘what is to be done.’²¹⁴ For militant Islamists, this would involve universal support for *jihad by the sword*.

3. Motivational. Finally, a ‘rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action’ had to be produced. This concerned the ‘elaboration of a call to arms’ that went beyond diagnosis and prognosis, as agreement about causes and necessary solutions did not ‘automatically produce corrective action’ or the type of activity that the given movement was trying to encourage. ‘Participation is thus contingent upon the development of motivational frames that function as prods to action.’ As Snow and Byrd noted: ‘constituents have to be moved from the balcony to the barricades.’²¹⁵ Here, militant Islamists direct the content of the diagnostic and prognostic phases towards specific audiences in an emotive narrative in the hope of provoking a specific set of actions, detailing the consequences for those who fail to respond, and the rewards for those who do.

Accordingly, the diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks are ‘directed toward achieving consensus mobilization’, providing the rationale for action and the ‘motivational impetus for participation.’²¹⁶

The ability of movements to address these tasks can vary and be compromised in several different ways. When assessing framing capacity it is important to assess the type of movement in question and the conditions in which it operates (e.g. is the movement engaged in illegal and clandestine activity, as Al-Qa’ida is?); relevance of a given movement and its messages may also differ at specific junctures in its career; a movement may develop into different and differently focused components; and frames may also vary in terms of resonance with intended target audiences.²¹⁷ As a movement, Al-Qa’ida and its core leadership have travelled through several such phases since the movement’s inception.

As a result, an understanding of the ‘role ideational factors and meanings play in relation to the course and character of both specific genres of movements and movements in general’ depends on a rigorous analysis of these mobilising ideas and the way and extent to which the three core framing tasks have been addressed.²¹⁸

Further features of a movement’s ideational and physical environment that can affect its ability to address diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing relate to the competition of ideas. Borhek and Curtis²¹⁹ and Converse²²⁰, for example, emphasised the need to assess the relative importance of specific ideational elements that movement leaders pursued within a wider web of ideas that constituted the belief system in which they operated; the expanse and life-span of these ideational elements; and the extent to which these elements were tied to further ideational strands of the belief system. Success and efficacy of message generation would, thus, depend on the ability of movement leaders to address *principal* concerns of constituents, tie these to prescribed solutions, and ensure these emphases did not undermine or contradict other core ideational pillars

²¹⁴ Snow & Benford (1988): 199, 200-202.

²¹⁵ Snow & Byrd (2007): 126.

²¹⁶ Snow & Benford (1988): 199.

²¹⁷ Snow & Byrd (2007): 129-130.

²¹⁸ Ibid: 130.

²¹⁹ Borhek, J. T. & Curtis R. F. (1975). *A Sociology of Belief*. Wiley, New York.

²²⁰ Converse, P. E. (1964), ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’, in Apter, D. (ed.) *Ideology and Discontent* (pp. 206-61), Free Press, New York.

of the belief system in which they operated. For the Al-Qa'ida leaders, this is particularly important in relation to liberal attitudes towards violence that could infringe upon established religious guidelines and doctrine (as will be explored in further detail in the third and fourth parts of the thesis).

Fundamentally, the impact of collective action frames could be affected by, what Benford and Snow termed, the 'phenomenological life world of the targets of mobilization.'²²¹ This related to the extent to which framing struck 'a responsive chord with those individuals for whom it is intended' and was relevant to their life situations. This relevancy was dependent on three interrelated but analytically distinct constraints: 'empirical credibility; experiential commensurability; and narrative fidelity.'²²²

1. Empirical credibility concerns the fit between the framing events and real life events and the extent to which framing is testable and claims are empirically verified. According to this observation, therefore, framing must rely on events or a state of affairs that can be used as evidence substantiating the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational claims. As a result, hypothetically at least, 'the more culturally believable the claimed evidence, and the greater the number of slices of such evidence, the more credible the framing and the broader its appeal.'²²³ In this sense, empirical credibility is potentially problematic for those studying Islamist-inspired narratives, as many rely on fabrications or exaggerations of existing problems to provoke outrage.²²⁴ It is therefore important to note that empirical credibility in this context does not, according to the framing theory, necessarily imply generally believable statements – only that claims are believed by a segment of actual or potential adherents.²²⁵ This is particularly important for adherents who do not have direct access to alternative sources to verify claims.²²⁶ Credibility depends on two additional factors, however:

- a. *Frame consistency*: inherent contradictions in the narrative (as detected over time or in relation to different subject matters) can weaken overall message framing.
- b. *Claimsmaker/communicator credibility*: speakers who are regarded (by their potential adherents) as more credible are generally seen as more effective and persuasive.²²⁷ For militant Islamists, for example, 'practical' experience from the 'fields of jihad' is often thought to add credence to the words of radical speakers (and, by extension, is problematic for those lacking such experiences). Abdullah Azzam, for instance, is revered for his leadership role as a fighter, as well as his written work and speeches.

²²¹ Snow & Benford (1988): 207-208.

²²² Ibid

²²³ Benford & Snow (2000): 620.

²²⁴ Conspiracy theories are central to output from many prominent Islamist extremist figures, warning of 'global persecution of Muslims' (Azhar, M. M. (1996) *The Virtues of Jihad*, Ahle Sunnah Wal Jama'at Publications, Islamabad. and 'Western intentions of world domination' (Azzam, A, (2003) *The Lofty Mountain*. Azzam Publications (first published in 1989).

²²⁵ Benford & Snow (2000): 620.

²²⁶ Witness, for example, the extent to which the controversy surrounding the publication of Mohammed caricatures became exacerbated as false accounts of even more offensive depictions were circulated to stir up further unrest (see e.g. Danmarks Radio (2006) 'Billede fra grisefestival i imams mappe' (7 February) <<http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2006/02/07/234208.htm>> [accessed 19 April 2011].

²²⁷ Hovland, C. I. & Weiss, W. (1951) for instance, found that 'changes in opinion are significantly related to the trustworthiness of the source', rather than necessarily acquisition or retention of factual information: 'The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness' in *Public Opinion Quarterly* (vol. 50, pp. 635-650): 647.

For bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri the physical presence of an assault rifle in many of the footage and still images from public messages serves precisely this purpose.

2. Experiential commensurability relates to the need to ensure that framing matches the everyday experiences of potential participants, rather than being abstract or distant. Framing must suggest viable solutions to the identified problems. Although appealing to a sense of religious purpose and responsibility, therefore, extremist Islamist-inspired collective action frames must, according to this hypothesis, also tie the doctrinal narrative to more day-to-day concerns of normal people and feelings of injustice, socio-economic alienation, disenfranchisement as well as cultural specificity, pride, identity and related emotions in order to be effective.
3. Narrative fidelity, builds upon a concept developed by Fisher²²⁸ and concerns the degree to which framing resonates with cultural ‘myths’²²⁹, ‘domain assumptions’²³⁰ or the ‘inherent ideology’²³¹ and core narratives that constitute a given cultural heritage, thus adding depth to accounts of events and experiences in the immediate present for the potential participants in question. Myths, especially when sourced from original accounts of the Prophet Mohammed’s deeds and advice, are central to any Islamically sourced collective action frames. For discourses conveying violent and puritanical interpretations, these accounts and narrations are of central importance, as are glorifications of ‘martyrs’ who died for the cause.²³²

The linkage between individual interpretive orientations, interests, values, beliefs and priorities on the one hand and the activities, goals and ideology of a social movement leadership on the other is therefore crucial for the overall resonance of the latter’s message. Snow et al. refer to this linkage as ‘frame alignment.’²³³

As a result, according to this hypothesis, ‘if a frame is empirically credible, experientially commensurable, and narratively resonant, the stronger the consensus mobilization and the more fertile the soil for action mobilization.’²³⁴ Subsequent chapters will explore the extent to which the framing of Al-Qa’ida leadership conforms with these parameters for message impact and effectiveness.

These core assumptions, and the framing literature in general, have spawned a host of other identified collective action frame variants reflecting divergent message direction, scope and composition. Those covering a broad scope and a holistic set of issues, as many Al-Qa’ida messages do, have been termed ‘master frames’ that link to

²²⁸ Fisher, W. R. (1984) ‘Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument’ in *Communication Monographs* (vol. 51, pp. 1-23).

²²⁹ Campbell J. (1988) *The Power of Myth*, Doubleday, NY

²³⁰ Gouldner A. W. (1970) *The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology*, Basic Books: NY

²³¹ Rude, G. (1980) *Ideology and Popular Protest*, Knopf, NY

²³² Ibn Nuhaas’s seminal *Mashari al-Ashwaq ila Masari al-Ushaaq*, which Abdullah Azzam reportedly described as the ‘best book written on jihad’, is almost entirely based on myths, stories and ‘domain assumptions’ and is a good case in point. See e.g. Awlaki’s translation for Maktabah Al Ansaar.

²³³ Snow et al. (1986): 464.

²³⁴ Benford & Snow (1988): 208. Action mobilisation is defined as ‘the activation of adherents for engagement in the cause.’ See further: Klandermans, B. (1984) ‘Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory’ in *American Sociological Review* (vol. 49, pp. 583-600).

more specific sub-frames.²³⁵ Another distinct framing feature is the contrast between flexibility and inclusivity versus rigidity and exclusivity,²³⁶ although analyses should account for a degree of overlap. Most violent extremist framing exercises, for instance, would involve a set of non-negotiable values and demands, whilst relying (for practical and doctrinal reasons) on continual appeals to non-members to join the movement.

Of further relevance to the focus of the current thesis is the identification, by Gamson and others, of victim orientated ‘injustice frames’, used extensively by religio-political movements.²³⁷ In this regard, movement leaders seek to encourage participation and action by appealing to a sense of injustice and victimhood. Grievances are central to the output of Islamist extremist groups and their demand for further support and mobilisation from the wider *ummah*. Grievance framing and presentation will thus form part of the analysis of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués below.

As part of the diagnostic framing tasks, grievance or injustice frames normally include ‘attributional processes that seek to delineate the boundaries between “good” and “evil” and construct movement protagonists and antagonists.’²³⁸ This concerns, what Gamson termed, ‘adversarial framing.’²³⁹ Delineations according to this framework are an essential feature of the discourse of Islamist extremists, whereby the pious vanguard is pitched against the ‘Zionist-Crusader’ alliance and related ills. These are framed using doctrine-based distinctions between amity and enmity and related vocabulary that provide the context for re-framing and inclusion of new challenges and adversaries. As Snow and Byrd observed: ‘cultural or religious ideologies function much like established vineyards from which different varieties can be innovatively grafted together to generate a new yield.’²⁴⁰

In terms of prognostic framing tasks, moreover, religio-political movements rely on ‘accenting and highlighting some events, issues, or beliefs as being more important than others’²⁴¹ according to strategic agenda and proximity to central doctrinal issues. Snow and Byrd termed this framing emphasis ‘frame elaboration’ as opposed to more balanced ‘frame articulation.’²⁴² Islamist militant declarations of responses to hostilities as *individual* rather than *collective* obligations upon all Muslims are a case in point.

²³⁵ The extent of framing scope can be of significance, as Gerhards and Rucht noted: ‘the larger the range of problems covered by a frame, the larger the range of social groups that can be addressed within the frame and the greater the mobilization capacity of the frame.’ Gerhards, J. & Rucht, D. (1992) ‘Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in two Protest Campaigns in West Germany,’ in *American Journal of Sociology* (vol. 98, no. 3, pp. 555-595): 580.

²³⁶ Benford & Snow (2000): 619.

²³⁷ Gamson, W. A. (1992) ‘The Social Psychology of Collective Action’ in Morris, A. D. & Mueller, C. M. (eds.) *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, Yale University Press, New Haven: 68. On a related point, Egner, M. (2009) discusses differences between ‘gain framing’ versus ‘loss framing’, whereby the former frames dilemmas as prevention of further loss, whereas the latter bases the framing of the same dilemma on potential further gain. Here the mobilisation of high-risk activity is more likely to succeed when framing rests on ‘loss frames’ [‘Social-Science Foundations for Strategic Communications,’ in Davis, P. & Cragin, K. (eds.) *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together* (RAND)]. See also Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1981) ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’ in *Science* (vol. 211, no. 4481, January, pp. 453-458); Rothman, A. J. & Salovey, P. (1997) ‘Shaping perceptions to motivate healthy behaviour: the role of message framing,’ in *Psychological Bulletin* (vol. 121, no. 1, January, pp. 3-19).

²³⁸ Benford & Snow (2000): 616

²³⁹ Gamson, W. A. (1995) ‘Constructing social protest’ in Johnston, H. & Klandermans, B. (eds.) *Social Movements and Culture*, UCL Press, London.

²⁴⁰ Snow & Byrd (2007): 130.

²⁴¹ Ibid: 130.

²⁴² Ibid.

The prioritisation of issues and reactions, and associated prescriptive legitimisations, within collective action frames can provoke objections and alternative viewpoints from other movement leaders, even within the same belief system. These ‘counterframes’ can have a serious impact on the resonance of a given set of collective action frames as movement leaders are put on the defensive and forced to ‘develop and elaborate prognoses more clearly than otherwise might have been the case.’²⁴³ With respect to militant Islamist movements, the question of where the boundaries lie in terms of violent tactics and targeting, and related doctrinal arguments, is a perennial problem for the actors involved. The introductory part of this thesis, moreover, discussed some of the tensions, schisms and criticisms evident within the higher echelons of Al-Qa’ida and its environment that can be understood within this framework.

On a related point, Wiktorowicz noted the tension created by a movement’s pursuit of frame hegemony:

Frequent disagreements and framing contests over meaning encourage competitive pressures as various groups produce and disseminate interpretive schemata [...] Such competition takes place not only between a movement and its adversaries, but within the movement itself as well. Intramovement divisions (such as hardliner-softliner, conservative-liberal, young-old, ideologue-pragmatist) can create internal framing disputes as each faction attempts to assert its own frame for movement-wide adoption.²⁴⁴

The framing approach, therefore, provides a useful way in which to understand public communiqués disseminated by bin Ladin and Zawahiri on behalf of Al-Qa’ida. The success, presence and scope of the movement can, in this context, be traced partly to the fulfilment of the core framing tasks. Snow and Byrd, for instance, argue that ‘the success of al Qaeda on the global scale may be partly attributable to the ability of its leaders to adapt the diagnostic and prognostic components of its master frame to local contexts.’²⁴⁵ By extension, this focus of analysis can provide wider inferences in relation to the ‘health’ of the movement and the position of the leadership.

It should be stressed at this juncture that the framing model is not being applied in the hope of providing any inferences as regards engagement in violent extremism or the range of ‘prompters’ that might contribute to such a process of individual engagement. Suffice to say, encouraging and legitimising such engagement and facilitating greater support for violence within the wider community, as well as amplifying the impact of each violent act, is central to the overall objectives of the Al-Qa’ida leadership. The framing concept provides a point of departure from which to understand Al-Qa’ida as a movement seeking to implement its stated agenda, challenge the status quo, appeal to the wider populace and intimidate adversaries. It allows for the leadership communiqués to be dissected and their impact assessed and contrasted with the stated aims of the leadership itself.

3.3.2 Framing and the wider context of Islamist militancy

How does the framing approach correspond with the construction and dissemination of Islamist militant propaganda and discourse? Page et al. provide perhaps the best example of how the model can be applied to a corpus of Islamist militant texts through their analysis of twelve issues of *Sada al-Malahim*, a newsletter of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian

²⁴³ Benford & Snow (2000): 617.

²⁴⁴ Wiktorowicz (2004): 17.

²⁴⁵ Snow & Byrd (2007): 132.

Peninsula, according to the articulation of collective action frames.²⁴⁶ The authors detected specific examples of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing in the publication, designed to encourage collective action, in addition to testing frame consistency, empirical credibility and credibility of frame articulators, and experiential commensurability.

The authors found frame consistency to be strong across the issues analysed and assessed the credibility of frame articulators as high, based on their knowledge, religious prowess and experience. Credibility was also enhanced through the communication of relevant tactical advice as part of broader prognostic framing. Additionally, frame articulators were seen to place extensive emphasis on retaining empirical credibility, whereby *Sada al-Malahim* editors strove to be 'responsive to local, regional, and international events, highlighting themes that have temporal resonance.'²⁴⁷

By contrast, Hegghammer's analysis of the ideological 'hybridization' of militant Islamist groups suggested the increased variation in content emphases and scope in the their message output could be construed as opportunism and perceived as inconsistent by potential participants. Interrupted frame consistency, including blurred enemy hierarchies, could thus jeopardise the ability of these groups to produce a message that resonated and encouraged mobilisation of potential participants.²⁴⁸

As noted above, successful and effective collective action frames necessarily relate directly to the chief preoccupations and major anxieties of potential participants. Vergés, for instance, found, in his study of the construction of collective action frames by the *Front Islamique du Salut*, that leaders had reconceptualised socio-economic and political realities of Algerian youth within the broader religious narrative of the FIS, thus expanding its appeal.²⁴⁹

Although not relying on the framing literature specifically, numerous authors have sought to understand the narrative components of militant Islamist movements, especially Al-Qa'ida. For Bale, the interaction between these normative and ideational elements – manifested in a set of 'delusional, utopian, and non-negotiable goals that ultimately derived from a religious and fanatical "fantasy ideology" – and a 'ruthless operational efficiency capable of causing tremendous damage,' made Al-Qa'ida and affiliates such dangerous and formidable adversaries.²⁵⁰

Others have gone further, making dubious assumptions regarding the processing of messages as predictive risk assessment mechanisms. Ciovacco, for instance, concluded from his analysis of sixty-four bin Ladin and Zawahiri communiqués (post-9/11 material only) that 'in this marketing-focused war of ideas, Al Qaeda's media strategy is the linchpin to unlocking its organizational DNA and deciphering its next moves.'²⁵¹ This assumption suggests however, that calls to arms are generally heeded and fails to account for the challenges facing message framers as they seek to mobilise potential participants. This notion also fails to recognise the reflective – even reactive – nature of much of the narrative, as will be discussed in Part III.

Furthermore, as the previous discussion illustrates, many have argued Al-Qa'ida's organisational capacity has abated in the past years, putting greater pressure on

²⁴⁶ Page, M, Challita, L. & Harris, A. (2011) 'Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Framing Narratives and Prescriptions' in *Terrorism and Political Violence* (vol. 23, iss. 2, pp. 150-172).

²⁴⁷ Ibid: 163.

²⁴⁸ Hegghammer (2009-A): 39.

²⁴⁹ Vergés, M. (1997) 'Genesis of a Mobilization: The Young Activists of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front,' in Beinini, J. & Stork, J. (eds.) *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*, I. B Tauris & Co, London.

²⁵⁰ Bale (2009): 55.

²⁵¹ Ciovacco (2009): 854.

mobilising efforts through public communiqués. Several authors have sought to decipher these and to establish an organisational framework designed to capture the essence of Al-Qa'ida's public messaging. Quiggin, for instance, identified eight themes to display the contrasting interpretation between Al-Qa'ida leaders and mainstream scholars. These were: *Jihad*; *Bayat*; *Daru Islam*; *Ummah*; *Takfir*; *Shaheed*; *Al-Wala Wal Bara*; and *Hijrah*.²⁵² Although the importance of some of these concepts for the leadership are clear (such as jihad and mobilising the *ummah*) the importance of other supposed core features is less clear. *Bayat* (pledge of allegiance), for instance, does not appear particularly important outside the inner circle (primarily towards Mullah Omar and, later, through attempts to shore up the leadership of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq).²⁵³ In terms of message content and framing, the issue is not a formal bond of allegiance but rather the creation of a self-sustaining movement to bring about desired goals. Indeed, when asked of his vision for the future for Al-Qa'ida, Zawahiri noted that 'even if Usama bin Ladin doesn't become ill, he must die one day, whereas Allah's religion will remain until Allah inherits the earth and everything on it.'²⁵⁴

Corman, and Schiefelbein's study comes closer to capturing the essence of this mobilising narrative, closely tied to the definition of ideological belief systems, as discussed above:

These texts reveal three strategic goals for communication and media in jihadi operations. First they must legitimate their movement by establishing its social and religious viability while engaging in violent acts that on their face seem to violate the norms of civilized society and the tenets of Islam. This is perhaps the biggest ongoing communication challenge they face. Second they aim to propagate their movement by spreading messages to sympathetic audiences in areas where they want to expand. [...] Third they seek to intimidate their opponents. This applies not only to existing enemies but to sympathizers in the Muslim world who might think of turning against them.²⁵⁵

Looking at the example of 'Spain as an object of jihadist propaganda', Soriano sought to 'verify empirically the principal objects of interest of [jihadist] communicative activity [providing] solid quantitative information on both the degree of importance given to the themes dealt with, as well as the treatment these themes receive within the general context of this discourse.'²⁵⁶

Some have sought to develop computerised and automated ways in which to assess these features systematically.²⁵⁷ Pennebaker and Chung, for example, examined the 'linguistic style of Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri' and 'the content-related themes for their statements and interviews' relying on 'computerized text analysis' seeking to automatically determine 'the underlying meaning structures in text.'²⁵⁸

²⁵² Quiggin (2009): 21.

²⁵³ According to Sageman (2008) Khalid Shaykh Mohammed had not pledged *bayat* until just before 9/11 and two of the 1998 embassy bombers never did: 30.

²⁵⁴ Zawahiri (2008) 'The Open Meeting with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Part One,' (2 April) secured from Archive.org, transcript also available from IntelCenter (2008) *Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1*, Tempest Publishing, Alexandria, VA [105].

²⁵⁵ Corman & Schiefelbein (2006): 2.

²⁵⁶ Soriano, M. R. T. (2009) 'Spain as an Object of Jihadist Propaganda', in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (vol. 32, no. 11, pp. 933-952): 933.

²⁵⁷ See e.g. Arab, S., Reid, E. & Chen, H. (2009) 'Multimedia Content Coding and Analysis: Unravelling the Content of Jihadi Extremist Groups' Videos,' in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (vol. 31, no. 7, pp. 605-626).

²⁵⁸ Pennebaker, J. & Chung, C. (2007) 'Computerized Text Analysis of Al-Qaeda Transcripts' in Krippendorff, K. & Bock, M. (eds.), *A content Analysis Reader*. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA: 1.

Although replicable, there is a danger in relying exclusively on automated processing tools, as word-specific measurements might fail to detect nuances in the narrative, implied meaning, look beyond vague terminology or adequately appreciate the importance of context. To this end, the analytical insights of human coders are necessary. Pennebaker and Chung, for example, found (through apparent diminished usage of specific words) that an ‘increased attention to the West has replaced talk of the Middle Eastern holy lands and other Islamic conflicts, which was one of the group’s main concerns in statements before 9/11.’²⁵⁹ The current study, however, found no meaningful decline in relation to a host of issues concerning the Middle East exclusively. If anything, messages referred more to Palestinian issues, for instance, after Western troops largely left their bases in Saudi Arabia shortly after 9/11, thus removing a principal topic of the pre-9/11 communiqués (especially those disseminated by bin Ladin), as will be discussed in Part III.

The framing approach therefore allows for more nuanced and in-depth analyses of the message output under review. Communiqués, according to this interpretation, are not mere reflections of stated ambitions. They rationalise movement activities, communicate dissatisfaction with the status quo, identify causal actors and factors responsible, prescribe solutions, elucidate rewards and, crucially, define the audience of potential participants who leaders seek to mobilise. Communiqués, therefore, establish the basis for a relationship between movement leaders and potential participants beyond face-to-face contact or where physical interaction is impractical or impossible. Hence, the importance of communiqués for clandestine or illegal movements such as Al-Qa’ida is paramount.

These messages, moreover, necessarily reflect the core aspects and apply the wider vocabulary of the movement’s belief system and culture and draw upon this normative environment as a source of identity. For al-Qa’ida, this broader environment represents the doctrine of militant Salafi activism. The framing literature also highlights the need for movement leaders to address and be sensitive to – through their messages to followers, prospective supporters and adversaries – watershed events that are relevant to the movement’s goals and the concerns and experiences of potential participants. In this sense, these events and their repercussions need to be presented in a way that supports and conforms to the narrative thread, which aggregated communiqués have formed throughout the movement’s life-span.

This relates to the important framing notion of consistency. As mentioned above, the framing model provides valuable measurements with which to assess the effectiveness of specific attempts to communicate with potential participants and the wider environment. Implicitly, in a methodological sense, these theoretical deliberations highlight the importance of long-term, systematic and empirical analyses whereby the message consistency can be assessed and (by extension) observations can be made concerning the credibility of disseminators and message resonance.

Benford, for example, complained: ‘the bulk of framing studies are either synchronic or encompass a relatively brief slice of time. We need studies which examine *continuities and changes* in framing strategies, their forms, and the content of frames over the life of a movement, throughout a cycle of protest, or across an historical epoch.’²⁶⁰ This study seeks to address precisely this dynamic in the Al-Qa’ida leadership narrative. More recently, Snow and Byrd, similarly argued that the ‘homogenizing tendency,’ in terms of seeking to identify a single ‘ideology’ of terrorism, was

²⁵⁹ Ibid: 14.

²⁶⁰ Benford (1997): 417. Emphasis added.

‘counterproductive because it glosse[d] over diversity among one’s adversaries, thereby limiting understanding of them and indirectly affecting one’s strategies for effectively combating and coping with the threats they pose.’²⁶¹

Chapter 2 noted how scholars of political violence have identified a need for greater emphasis to be placed on sound, systematic and empirical research as well as independent data generation. Additionally, there is an acute need to rely on primary documents and sources. Wiktorowicz, for example, noted how ‘press reports, organizational charts, and secondary material are often insufficient for delineating and studying these [Islamic activist] networks and their relationship to contention since networks are by their nature embedded in personal interaction and social relationships.’²⁶²

In this regard, it is also important to apply holistic data collection, relying on all available articles from a particular source (or a significant majority) in order to ensure results are meaningful and that they accurately capture any continuities, as well as being able to establish in a methodologically sound fashion that a given set of principles appear constant over time. There are no guarantees that selective sampling (in this case of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués) can adequately address this dynamic or concretely identify perceived constants as genuine bedrock features. The next chapter discusses the methodological process underpinning the longitudinal study of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués, the results of which are presented in Part III.

²⁶¹ Snow & Byrd (2007): 119.

²⁶² Wiktorowicz (2004): 23.

METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

The longitudinal study discussed in Part III presents the results from the systematic reading, viewing and processing of Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués (authored by bin Ladin and Zawahiri) over the course of the past twenty years, or from Al-Qa'ida's earliest engagement through public communiqués. In total, 240 communiqués from bin Ladin and Zawahiri were identified and processed. Although it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that all communiqués for the period under review (1991-2011) from these two leaders have been captured, emphasis has been placed on identifying and securing all publically available communiqués within this timeframe. As has been argued in this thesis, these public appeals, warnings, criticisms and guidelines constitute a central element of Al-Qa'ida as a terrorist entity and are fundamental in highlighting how the movement has sought to justify its actions and elucidate its objectives and how it approaches identified constituents. Understanding these communiqués is thus central to formulating a comprehensive understanding of Al-Qa'ida and its position within the Islamist militant milieu more generally. As was argued in the previous chapter, moreover, the range of issues addressed by the two Al-Qa'ida leaders, the way in which emphases and scope have changed over time and the evolution in attitudes towards specific publics through the years, can only be comprehended when as large a corpus of Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués as possible has been dissected and processed using some form of qualitative criteria that are applied equally to each article in the dataset. Furthermore, through combining messages from both bin Ladin and Zawahiri the study has examined the output of Al-Qa'ida's most prominent leader and figurehead, as well as the material from his successor throughout the lifetime of Al-Qa'ida to date and the comprehensive set of strategic guidelines and geopolitical positioning that forms such a prominent feature in the output of the latter personality.

The way in which the data was accumulated and handled is described in detail below. In summary, this involved populating entries in the database for each communiqué with segments and summaries pertaining to each aspect of the narrative under review. This processing was applied both to written transcripts, books and other documents as well as video material produced by the Al-Qa'ida leaders. Some articles were very short, consisting only of a page or two of written material or five to ten minutes of recorded speech. Most articles, however, were more substantial, and some, especially those authored by Zawahiri could be very long indeed, from written books to

video speeches lasting up to two hours. The sections below describe the nature of the dataset that was created for the longitudinal analysis of communiqués, the sources used to accumulate data, the qualitative database derived from this corpus, the processing and methodological models applied, as well as matters relating to inter-coder reliability and research ethics.

4.2 Dataset

The 240 communiqués under review (the full list, with details for each article is presented in Appendix 2) were identified as messages disseminated by Al-Qa'ida and authored by Al-Zawahiri or bin Ladin (although few references, particularly before 9/11 were actually made to 'Al-Qa'ida' as such). Overall, emphasis was placed on collecting and coding material which was unquestionably on behalf of Al-Qa'ida, although it should be recognised that there was a degree of overlap between Zawahiri's involvement with Al-Jihad and his later merger with bin Ladin, at least as relates to the former's output during the early 1990s. The vast majority of articles were dated and coded as entire transcripts. Some of the more obscure communiqués, dating from the very early years of the movement could not be located in their entirety, either in Arabic or as translations and six communiqués could not be dated (see details in Appendix 2). For a small number of Zawahiri's more extensive written works, moreover, the study relied on translated excerpts although more important books, such as *The Knights under the Banner of the Prophet* and *The Exoneration* were read in their entirety.

Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the bin Ladin and Zawahiri communiqués was originally disseminated in Arabic. Although the author has sufficient competency to read and normally understand titles, and compare these to offered translations, Zawahiri and bin Ladin convey their messages in rapidly spoken and formal Arabic or complex written form designed to resemble the discourse of pious and ancient scholars. Full comprehension thus requires high levels of fluency.

The study therefore relies on translations from established outlets (see below on sources and verification) in order to assess message framing. Linguistic studies that focus on the more micro level of the meaning of individual words are greatly enhanced, and often depend on, transcripts and documents in their original language. This relates, for instance, to some automated studies designed to enhance understanding of specific facets of Al-Qa'ida leadership messaging through classifying and coding for individual words as indicative of more general dispositions.²⁶³


In light of the framing literature and the identified analytical and knowledge gaps, however, this thesis is based on a systematic and empirical assessment of content *themes* and *message direction* which does not rest on the meaning of individual words. It is important to understand specific Arabic wording when elucidating detailed nuances of the discourse. For example, when religious practices of individuals are being denounced, the differences between *kafir*, *murtadd*, and *mushrik*, or even the differences between *kafir I'tiqadi* ('infidel in matters of belief') and *kafir 'amali* ('infidel in matters of religious practice')²⁶⁴, need to be understood when the focus of analysis is on the theological rationales behind such groupings rather than on identifying the groups that are being denounced and the specific causal events cited. For the latter purpose, the

²⁶³ See e.g. Pennebaker & Chung (2007) as cited above.

²⁶⁴ Meijer (ed.) (2009): xi.

English differentiation between unbeliever (as someone who has never been Muslim) and apostate (as someone who committed sin as Muslim) and evidence garnered from context suffices. The focus is on the given context in the narrative and the patterns formed by communiqués over a given period.

In terms of detecting and analysing message emphases and themes, moreover, it is especially important, as noted above, to base assumptions on a substantial volume of communiqués and coded data. Additionally, in light of concerns within the literature on political violence relating to the incident-driven nature of much of the work on Al-Qa'ida in particular, this study emphasised collecting articles from the very beginning of dissemination of leadership communiqués on behalf of the group up until and beyond the seminal events of the 2011 Arab Spring and the death of bin Ladin. The distribution of communiqués analysed is given in figure 2, below.²⁶⁵ Each communiqué was given a specific identification number referring to the relevant coding log in the database. In order to facilitate crosschecking and enable further analysis of specific content details, all references in the subsequent longitudinal study of the communiqués under review (Part III) provide the unique identification number of each communiqué quoted in the analysis, thus linking to the article details annexed to this thesis (see Appendix 2).



The first articles documented are some of Zawahiri's earlier books setting out the perceived challenges facing the *ummah*. These, in turn, informed some of the content

²⁶⁵ The graph is based on 236 communiqués. The six communiqués, referred to above, that could not be dated were not included, four communiqués coded were issued by Zawahiri and bin Ladin jointly. In the interest of comparison between years, moreover, the messages from 2011 were not included as the dataset was not complete at the time of writing. Six communiqués from bin Ladin (1) and Zawahiri (5) dating from January to May 2011 were coded. Two communiqués included in the graph featured both bin Ladin and Zawahiri and were counted as one for each speaker.

and emphasis of his later output. During the 1990s, however, and beyond the 11 September attacks in 2001, Al-Qa'ida leadership output was dominated by bin Ladin's statements and interviews. Many of these featured in Arabic and English language newspapers, as a select number of curious journalists secured access to the reclusive sponsor of Islamist militant groups (as bin Ladin was recognised at the time).

Pressures following the August 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, especially resulting from disquiet within the Taliban camp concerning heightened profile of the Al-Qa'ida leadership, resulted in a dip in output for a brief period.²⁶⁶ A brief hike in disseminated communiqués followed the 9/11 attacks, by contrast, with more messages made public on average per month after the attacks than during the preceding nine months. The global campaign to oust Al-Qa'ida from Afghanistan and pursue those involved in the movement no doubt explains the sharp drop in message output, particularly from bin Ladin, from 2002 onwards. It appears, as nascent media production capacities were established and improved²⁶⁷ that, out of the two principal leaders, Zawahiri took over as chief spokesperson around the mid-2000s, although the gap between the two leaders in this respect began to narrow before bin Ladin's death in May 2011. The cut-off point of empirical collection and analysis was August 2011, allowing for the immediate impact of bin Ladin's death and the Arab Spring to be assessed.

4.2.1 Data sources and processing

In terms of the organisation of data, information and details regarding each communiqué were added into a separate entry within the database management programme 'Microsoft Access' with each thematic coding area arranged in columns (see Appendix 3). This allowed for unproblematic comparison between communiqués as well as error checking for individual details (e.g. in terms of dates entered) across the database. The majority (over 85 per cent) of the articles coded were secured in electronic format (e.g. .doc, .pdf, .wav.) The other 15 per cent were sourced from book compilations (see below).

A third of the 240 communiqués coded could be secured directly from the Islamist extremist websites and forums that now constitute the principal distribution network for propaganda material from Al-Qa'ida and other militant groups. These were unedited productions disseminated by the Al-Qa'ida affiliates themselves. Most of the more recent communiqués could be collected in this way, translated by jihadist 'media sections' (such as 'Ansar Al-Mujahideen English Forum' and the 'Global Islamic Media Front', as well as As-Sahab). Whenever possible, articles were secured from more than one source and in multiple formats in order to triangulate data sources, as discussed below.

Translated communiqués were primarily sourced from the following organisations:

²⁶⁶ Indeed, the Taliban leadership – which had forbidden bin Ladin from engaging in 'political matters' – banned media broadcasting as they were nervous about reprisal attacks and suggestions they were not fully in control in Afghanistan. Bin Ladin's cavalier attitude towards these warnings prompted Al-Suri to accuse him of catching 'the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause' and abusing the hospitality of his hosts, as mentioned in the previous chapter (quoted in Cullison, 2004: 58).

²⁶⁷ Although As-Sahab began distributing video CDs as early as 2001, production and dissemination of material posted directly online (as opposed to relying on networks such as Al-Jazeera as conduits) only began in earnest around 2005-2006 (see next chapter). This undoubtedly enabled more messages from the isolated leadership to be published than would otherwise have been possible.

- The Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC), at the US military academy in West Point [sources included the DoD Harmony database and the Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium]
- Other Department of Defense/Defense Intelligence Agency sources
- The Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation [NEFA] (a non-profit research foundation)
- The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (a service providing translations of articles for U.S. government agencies) and its successor, the Open Source Centre
- Chatham House
- Journalistic organisations (including Al-Jazeera, Pakistani newspaper *The Dawn*, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, *Esquire* magazine, *The Observer*)
- Archive.org (via links from Islamist websites)
- YouTube (via links from Islamist websites)
- ITSTIME (Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies): research centre at the Catholic University of Milan specialising in terrorism research which provided the author with unedited video speeches from bin Ladin and Zawahiri
- Written compilation works with translations of Al-Qa'ida primary documents, specifically:
 - Ibrahim, R. (ed.) (2007) *Al Qaeda Reader*
 - Kepel, G. & Milelli, J.P (2008) (eds.) *Al Qaeda in its Own Words*
 - IntelCenter (2008) *Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1*
 - IntelCenter (2008) *Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1*
- Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)
- Websites and forums representing or supporting Islamist militant groups (including: *Ansarnet*; *Al-Qimmah*; *Al-Ekhllass*; *Al-Boraq*; *Al-Hesbah*; *Jamia Hafsa* Forum)

Finally, a handful of communiqués were also sourced from the Middle East Media Research Institute, Laura Mansfield and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

The majority of articles were secured from the CTC, NEFA, IntelCenter, FBIS as well as Al-Qa'ida originals from Islamist websites. In the latter case, new videos or transcripts would be announced on the websites cited with links provided to uploading websites or commercial online repositories (such as megaupload.com) or the open-source and not-for-profit Internet Archive (archive.org) from where the article could be secured. Invariably, several different websites and web forums provided the same set of links (often a large number of links to ensure the material remained available) using the same banner to advertise the material in question. The range of websites linking this material thus provides a form of triangulation in its own right. As noted, a third of the dataset consisted of original articles translated and disseminated by Al-Qa'ida's own media networks. Where originals could not be secured, therefore, the communiqués were sourced from the organisations cited above. Emphasis was placed on accessing translations and full transcripts from official bodies such as the CTC and FBIS or academic institutions and research centres such as FFI and NEFA. Transcripts produced by these organisations have featured in a large number of research reports and academic publications, including the *Terrorist Perspectives Project*, quoted in preceding chapters. Additionally, as noted, emphasis was placed on triangulating sources whenever possible.

This consisted of securing translations and transcripts from as many sources as possible to compare the versions presented. This proved successful for 69 communiqués

in the dataset or just over 40 per cent of articles when the Al-Qa'ida originals (themselves secured via multiple links) are excluded. The majority of triangulated items included material partly sourced from NEFA and IntelCenter. A comparison of separate versions of triangulated articles revealed insignificant discrepancies in terms of content.²⁶⁸ Different translations did, of course, present variations in interpretations of individual words and concepts but this did not alter the overall direction, skew the focus or hide the themes addressed in each message. Furthermore, it should be reemphasised that the analysis did not depend on the interpretation of a single communiqué. Rather, the focus was on a selection of narrative elements detectable over time from a number of communiqués secured from multiple sources.

Prior to coding, details of each communiqué were fed into the relevant file record. These related to: (1) date of publication; (2) source origin (from where the communiqué – the version and format that was coded – was secured); (3) distributor (organisation or network that ensured the communiqué and/or translation became publicly available); (4) representative of the Al-Qa'ida leadership (Al-Zawahiri or bin Ladin); (5) type of communiqué (e.g. message statement or interview); and finally (6) title or description (when exact title was unknown). These specifics for each communiqué can be found in the data listings in Appendix 2. The most important part of the coding, of course, related to the thematic elements and categories designed to capture core aspects of message framing. Before these coding categories were applied to the communiqués under investigation, however, the reliability of the coding process had to be ensured. The next section details the way in which inter-coder reliability relates to the current study and how this was addressed. Section 4.4, below, describes the coding categories themselves, how they were arrived at and how they relate to aspects of diagnosis, prognosis and motivational message delivery. The final section of this chapter discusses aspects relating to research ethics.

4.3 Inter-Coder Reliability

In addition to capturing the essence of the Al-Qa'ida leadership narrative and adequately reflecting the composition of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing tasks, the initial research design focused on matters relating to inter-coder reliability. This concerns the need to ensure that others have checked the design of the coding categories and the coding template that was ultimately applied to the dataset in question in order to ensure that the processing tools and components are appropriate for the material under review. In a broader sense, inter-coder reliability also highlights the importance of replicability.

In terms of inter-coder reliability, this author and his supervisor worked together on the drafting of the initial coding sheet in order to reflect the composition and nature of Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués. Reliability was then addressed by selecting a representative sample of the dataset in the early stages of the process and coding the material according to the categories described in the template, as described above. Once the author had completed this work, the supervisor replicated the process and the results were compared. When both were satisfied with the way the material was handled and

²⁶⁸ The most significant discrepancy between versions was detected when NEFA's translation of As-Sahab's fourth 'interview' with Zawahiri ('A Review of Events', 16 December 2005) was compared with that of IntelCenter where some sections on Al-Qa'ida's policy towards Iran and regional developments had been omitted from the former, presumably due to an editing error.

once the coding template had been honed accordingly, the template was finalised. The coding template does involve a degree of overlap, as will become apparent in the next part of this thesis. This reflects, however, the nature of the Al-Qa'ida communiqués themselves, which often convey similar emphases, albeit in different forms of presentation, when expressing both diagnostic and prognostic elements of the message. It was important that the coding adequately represented this feature of the material under review.

Inter-coder reliability and broader concerns relating to replicability, moreover, were addressed through ensuring the processing models and methodology applied remained transparent throughout. To this end, the finalised coding template applied to all the material in question is, as noted above, annexed to this thesis. Also annexed are details of the communiqués coded and where they can be found, as well as the results of the coding process – showing how the material was categorised and coded.

Finally, it should be noted in relation to inter-coder reliability that this study is not designed as a quantitative, systematised content analysis. Rather, the purpose of the current analysis is to subject the communiqués under review to a qualitative process that is more sensitive to issues relating to context and nuances in the material delivered, as noted above. In this regard, a degree of subjectivity is unavoidable (see further in chapter 8, under 'limitations of the research'). Indeed, this is also one of the strengths of approaching this material through the eyes of a human coder, rather than through computerised or automated means, as mentioned above.

4.4 Content Coding

The coding categories necessarily needed to capture expressions forming the three core framing tasks identified above, laying the foundations of an empirical base to understand the nature of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communication strategy: the problems the two leaders identified, the solutions they presented and the way in which these were communicated to various audiences. With prognostic, diagnostic and motivational references coded for each communiqué, according to the definitions presented in the previous chapter and by applying the same variables and categories for each article, the coding was sensitive to changes in the narrative over time. In designing the coding template applied to each communiqué (see Appendix 1) emphasis was placed on structuring thematic coding categories so as to capture narrative elements that constituted the three framing tasks in a comprehensive fashion whilst retaining sufficient flexibility to capture nuances and shifting directions in terms of emphasis and scope each time.

The focus was on core cultural and normative facets of the narrative as well as more temporal grievances; the range, scope and direction of proposed solutions (short-term tactics and long-term strategic goals); as well as methods of 'delivery' in terms of audiences identified and nature of appeals. This produced six general discursive categories that thus corresponded with the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames. These were organised into a total of twenty-five subcategories (see below), grouping together the variables and observations that were attached to each narrative area. These subcategories would thus highlight references to specific details concerning a certain aspect of each communiqué that formed part of either the diagnostic, prognostic or motivational frame categories included in each article. Table 1, below, shows how the

template was organised with subsequent sections elucidating how the categories were arrived at.

Table 1: CODING OF COMMUNIQUÉS

Details of communiqué

Diagnostic elements

- Socio-cultural and normative issues
 - Undesirability of existing societies
- The grievance narrative
 - Past events
 - On-going events

Prognostic elements

- Tactics and violence
 - Importance of violence/claims of attack
 - Political tools outside violence
 - Constraints on use of violence
 - Legitimacy of targeting of non-combatants
- Direction/scope of prognostic solutions
 - Declared enemies
 - Declared friends/allies
 - Regions for support activity
 - Regions for hostile activity
- Strategic/political vision
 - Lauded past/existing societies
 - Desired way forward and end result

Motivational elements

- Message direction/audiences
 - Declared audience
 - Appeals to Muslim audiences
 - Criticism of Muslim audiences
 - Condemnation of Muslim audiences
 - Threats/warnings to non-Muslims
 - Conciliatory approaches towards non-Muslims

4.4.1 Diagnostic parameters

1. Societal, cultural and normative issues

The first challenge was to establish ways in which to collect diagnostic references in each communiqué and the range of issues cited to justify activism. At their most fundamental, these diagnostic elements concerned the perceived socio-cultural and normative ills that had allowed corruption to spread and complacency to become embedded in the populace, which in turn paved the way for certain aspects of modern day society that were seen as abhorrent and sinful. The first diagnostic subcategory was thus designed to capture these references to forms of governance that were deemed false and impious and prevailing societal and cultural principles and manifestations that were identified as contrary to core Islamic doctrines central to the belief system.

2. The grievance narrative

In terms of more tangible and immediate diagnostic references, the coding had to be sensitive to the range of grievances cited by the leadership that served to justify the establishment of Al-Qa'ida as a force for change. These related to significant events and prominent topics used to establish the rationale for action. An initial review of the communiqués suggested the grievance debate could be divided into two main subcategories: *on-going examples* of supposed oppression and other current grievances as well as *past events* used to add depth to the grievance narrative.

When grievance and opportunity constitute such important elements of mobilising efforts as presented by collective action frames, understanding the way in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership presented these events and capturing the relevant narrative elements is crucial.

The coding captured historic events presented to reflect practices that needed to be addressed, paying particular attention to any temporal patterns. On-going grievances (at the time of publication) were coded in terms of references to events, personalities and developments utilised to express emotions of victimhood, falsehood and corruption that suggested past aggression towards Islam and the *ummah* was part of a continuous policy. Events depicted as underscoring the victim status of Muslim publics would be central to wider efforts to mobilise those audiences as well as legitimising the level of violence prescribed. This category, therefore, captured important framing tasks, which played a crucial role in their own right, as well as informing those addressed through other coding categories.

4.4.2 Prognostic parameters

1. Tactics preferences and importance of violence

A description of the dire state of affairs faced by those to whom the Al-Qa'ida leadership seeks to appeal is invariably followed by a set of prognostic solutions to these identified ills. The most prominent and perhaps the most important prognostic references concerned activist responses and especially the use of violence.

The first subcategory assessing levels of activism prescribed, involved general references to the usefulness of violent attacks, encouragement in this regard and any specifics in terms of targeting (such as oil infrastructure) and tactics (such as 'martyrdom operations' or suicide bombings). This focus included any claims of responsibility and praise for past attacks when presented as events others were urged to emulate.

In order to identify the extent to which violent attack featured as one proposed option out of a range of potential initiatives, the second subcategory within this grouping sought to identify whether tools outside violent attack were prescribed for potential participants and the types of initiatives encouraged (e.g. economic boycott). This could provide valuable insights regarding any possible changes in terms of violent options elucidated over time and whether alternative forms of protest once highlighted became gradually side-lined as the campaign of violent activism progressed.

Al-Qa'ida is often seen as having embraced indiscriminate, limitless and mass-casualty violence. In order to assess the nature of violence prescribed in detail, therefore, the coding paid particular attention to any limitations (religious, moral, contextual, long- or short-term, tactical etc.) that were cited in relation to the use of violence. For this reason, the third subcategory assessed any constraints mentioned on the use of force. Again, this is important in order to establish how more indiscriminate tactics were

developed over time, whether any watershed events or catalysts were important in this regard and whether any limitations were initially identified but gradually dismissed.

By extension, the fourth subcategory focused on the perceived legitimacy of civilian targeting and the justifications presented for the killing of unarmed groups and non-combatants, including any changes in this respect over time. This relates not only to any doctrine-based legitimisations but also the list of associations, activities and roles cited in relation to justifications for more limitless targeting.

2. Direction and emphasis of prognostic solutions

In addition to the nature of violence and other forms of activism endorsed and limits cited thereof, the coding sought to capture other aspects of prognostic framing relating specifically to the direction towards which the prescribed solutions should be channelled, according to bin Ladin and Zawahiri.

Al-Qa'ida is widely and popularly recognised as the first major Islamist militant platform with a truly transnational agenda. Some of the aspects of this perceived emphasis and how the agenda was developed were discussed in the previous chapter. Partly due to this (limited) transnational focus, and the extent to which local concerns and events still resonated and were used in the narrative, it was necessary to hone the coding accordingly, to be sensitive to divergent directions in this regard. This also related to which specific groups, communities and actors were deemed hostile and legitimate targets and the identification of any regional allies.

Thus, the subcategories within this group assessed any declared enemies (especially those discussed in any detail, beyond ubiquitous rhetorical references for instance towards the United States or Israel) and declared friends or temporary allies. The latter referred to any groups, leaders, states, governments and other actors that were seen as permanent strategic allies and doctrinally sound as well as more fluid, temporary and short-term assets, whose assistance could be valued even though their religious position was questioned.

3. Strategic and political vision

In terms of prognostic parameters, however, the leaders also made some references to more profound solutions to the problems described that alluded to the pious alternative presented to replace the status quo in addition to the fundamental steps that needed to be made to secure a righteous replacement to the existing state of affairs.

Violent extremist framing exercises involve, as noted above, a set of non-negotiable values and demands that constitute the core principles for which potential participants are urged to fight. These consist of central issues affecting constituencies, their lives and identity. In short, therefore, this coding category focused on the stated goals of the Al-Qa'ida leadership. Although it could be assumed in advance that this element remains relatively constant over time for most activist movements, the inclusion of this category within the coding template allowed for assessments to be made regarding the extent to which this has been the case for the Al-Qa'ida leadership.

The elements that made up this coding category, therefore, explored: (1) references to past or present societal forms that were deemed desirable and in harmony with the Islamist extremist belief system (with special attention given to specifics of past societies that the leaders wanted to reintroduce in their own vision for the future); and (2) descriptions of desired ways forward and end results, relating to the 'end game' that potential participants were urged to embrace, the societal components this involved and

any intermediate objectives cited whereby the movement leaders could claim at least partial success once achieved. For these categories, and the last point in particular, the extent to which these elements were ignored or described superficially without any detail was identified through the coding by leaving the entries blank or noting lack of detail.

4.4.3 Motivational parameters

1. Direction of messaging and audiences

As the framing literature assumes and as noted above, descriptions of the dire state of affairs currently being experienced and elucidations of the sort of reaction movement leaders see as necessary to address the identified issues do not constitute concrete guidelines for potential followers. Something else, at the narrative level alone, is needed to move constituents ‘from the balcony to the barricades’²⁶⁹, regardless of the host of other factors involved in these processes.

The coding was thus designed to capture ways in which the message was directed at specific audiences in order to provoke specific emotions and reactions. At the most basic level, differences in message direction refer to distinctions made between Muslim, or in-group, and non-Muslim or out-group audiences. The initial coding focus concerned overall message direction and emphasis, and was normally addressed at the end of the coding for each article as this was based on assessment of overall tone and direction. Five subcategories were designed to capture attitudes towards specific audiences; three concerned message content aimed at Muslims whilst two subcategories assessed the approach towards non-Muslims.

Attitudes towards Muslims were assessed according to three levels, depending on nature of appeals and level of coercion. The first subcategory assessed positive appeals, consisting of benign guidance, elucidating the rewards for choosing the ‘right path.’ These appeals saw the Al-Qa’ida leaders fulfilling their roles as leaders of an ‘enlightened’ vanguard offering help and advice for those ‘unawakened’ or immobilised, seeking to motivate them to support the vanguard through any means possible. This constitutes the essential framing task designed to mobilise latent supporters and potential participants.

The second subcategory was designed to assess when a more critical tone was applied in appeals to fellow Muslims and the more negative features of such outreach. This included direct warnings for perceived ‘incorrect’ behaviour and descriptions of potential repercussions, be they political and region-specific or linked to doctrine-based condemnation of individuals. Finally, the coding assessed direct threats and allegations of apostasy whereby Muslims were verbally attacked and excommunicated from the Islamic realm. This category captures the *takfiri* debate discussed above, which is crucial to understand as the boundaries between this component and the two previous subcategories denote the division between Muslims as potential (albeit sometimes unwilling) supporters on the one hand and downright enemies on the other. This has obvious implications for targeting justifications too.

Direction of messaging to non-Muslims was coded according to two subcategories. The first was designed to capture threats and warnings to non-Muslims. As noted above, one of the principal objectives of public message campaigns by violent extremist groups and other activist movements is to intimidate opponents. When violence is involved, this part of the narrative is often designed to convey threats and

²⁶⁹ Snow & Byrd (2007): 126.

demands within the context of past violent attacks so as to compound their impact. The second subcategory assessed the extent of more positive appeals, conciliatory approaches and promises of truce made towards non-Muslims. For doctrinal reasons, for instance, it can be beneficial for Islamist extremist groups to encourage conversions and extend invitations to Islam for elements of non-Muslim and even enemy audiences. In this sense, 'alternative' options to continued exposure to violent attack have been offered.

4.4.4 Work processes and longitudinal study

In terms of work processes, after the coding categories had been finalised and inter-coder reliability addressed, each communiqué was carefully read or viewed, with details added to relevant categories in the template. Content areas that were not covered in a given communiqué were left empty. This process was repeated for the 240 communiqués under review. The systematic nature of the coding allowed for messages to be compared over time, revealing how focus on specific issues, such as the Palestinian question, for example, evolved over the years. This ensured the longitudinal study was based on sound and empirical processing rather than selective sampling and rudimentary coding.

All of the subcategories detailed above were designed to capture thematic details of content, with relevant quotes and summarised excerpts for each communiqué added into the specific record within the database. The results of this process are given in Appendix 3, arranged chronologically and giving the title and author of the communiqué in question as well as a unique identification number for each one of them. The most substantial element of this study, therefore, consisted of populating each entry of the database according to these criteria, as each of the communiqués was read/viewed and assessed. The process generated a rigorous and evidence-based way in which to assess and analyse the composition of Al-Qa'ida leadership messages over time. The third part of the thesis presents and discusses the results from this comprehensive review. Before presenting the results from this analysis, however, it is important to recognise significant issues relating to research ethics in the design of the current study.

4.5 Research Ethics

Al-Qa'ida is universally recognised as a terrorist organisation and its two pivotal leaders, bin Ladin and Zawahiri, have been directly involved in the planning of terrorist acts. Furthermore, the nature and dissemination of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués, under review in the current thesis, is considered illegal in many countries.

Section 1 (Part 1) of the UK Terrorism Act 2006, for instance, proscribes the issuance or dissemination of any 'statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.'²⁷⁰ Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, meanwhile, made it an offense to collect or make a 'record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.'²⁷¹ Although this relates primarily to items providing instructional guidance regarding assembly of explosives or

²⁷⁰ UK Terrorism Act 2006: Part 1, Section 1 (1).

²⁷¹ UK Terrorism Act 2000: Part VI, Section 58.

other hazardous material for use in an attack, the justificatory narrative of Al-Qa'ida is clearly relevant in this context too. Furthermore, the condemnation of populations or communities due to their race, religion, ethnicity and sexual orientation, is illegal in many countries, including the UK.²⁷² As will be discussed in the next part of this thesis, this clearly applies to much of the Al-Qa'ida leadership's narrative, relating to condemnation of Jews, homosexuals and other groups of people.

Issues concerning research ethics thus formed an important part in the initial design phase of this study and have been considered throughout this project. Although the focus of analysis is not on individuals who are approached through ethnographic or observational analyses, the nature of the material in question raises significant ethical questions. It is thus important to acknowledge the legal issues mentioned above. Additionally, it is important to view the current study as an attempt to dissect the communiqués of terrorist leaders seeking to justify and promote the activities of Al-Qa'ida and associated movements. In this regard, some thoughts on how the study can aid policy makers and practitioners tackling Al-Qa'ida are mentioned in the concluding chapter.

The nature of this material as open source communiqués that are openly available from commercially produced publications is also significant in relation to ethical considerations. The fact is, that this material is openly accessible via legal means and, indeed, often reproduced by mainstream media organisations such as the BBC, Al-Jazeera, *Time* magazine and others. Furthermore, the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués (and material from a host of other terrorist leaderships) have formed the focus of analysis in numerous research studies and published papers that can provide valuable insights into the construction of distribution of messages that add context to the wider activity of the terrorist movement in question.²⁷³ The need to contribute to such an understanding forms the premise of this thesis.

²⁷² See e.g. UK Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 and the Public Order Act 1986 in UK law.

²⁷³ See e.g. Page, M, Challita, L. & Harris, A. (2011) and note 246, above.

Part III
THE AL-QA'IDA LEADERSHIP
COMMUNIQUE'S

**A Longitudinal Assessment of Diagnostic, Prognostic
and Motivational Frames**

Introduction to Part III

This part presents results and findings of the longitudinal analysis described in the previous chapter. The coding captured the justifications put forward by the Al-Qa'ida leaders for the creation of their movement, the problems they identified, the solutions they presented, the way in which these were communicated to friend and foe, as well as changes in this respect over time. These aspects relate to all the fundamental components of the Al-Qa'ida core that can be detected and assessed through the public communiqués authored and disseminated by its two principal leaders. This study has developed a theoretically informed and empirically rigorous way of understanding these components and their significance. Furthermore, as noted above, emphasis was placed on ensuring referencing was transparent by attaching a unique identification code to each communiqué cited for direct and indirect quotes. Indeed, this constitutes a separate objective of the thesis. The range of issues covered by the Al-Qa'ida leaders could thus be traced immediately back to the evidence and the collection of communiqués supporting each claim.

Part III is divided into three chapters. The first is dedicated to diagnostic parameters of the coding whereby the leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the prevailing state of affairs and explained why the support of its fighting vanguard was necessary. Rather than an exclusive focus on a victim-orientated grievance narrative based on specific acts of aggression and treachery, however, the coding revealed the importance of value-based concerns and normative diagnosis. The chapter on Diagnostic Frames was therefore divided into two sections: the former focusing on internal and external value-based concerns with the latter exploring the composition of the grievance narrative. The normative and value-based issues featured in some of the earliest communiqués analysed and were revisited periodically by the leadership over the course of the past two decades. All 240 communiqués under review, however, identified specific events and developments seen as harmful to the interests, safety and sanctity of the *ummah* that could be traced to or were blamed on particular belligerents. The list of grievances was fairly limited to begin with but began to expand by 1997. The post-9/11 period, moreover, saw a significant increase in the list of grievances addressed, before becoming more focused again when issues such as the 2003 Iraq invasion and rendition came to the fore. In terms of identifying the geographic source of malice, however, the communiqués suffer from lack of clarity and are inconsistent over time. During a brief period, for instance, followers are urged to prioritise variously local sources of grievance over external threats or vice versa, whilst some of the latest global appeals (such as bin Ladin's focus on the environment) contradict enemy hierarchies that had been consistently publicised in earlier communiqués.

The second chapter of the longitudinal analysis sets out the prognostic facets of the material under investigation, with sections covering ultimate objectives, stages and priorities of activism, the nature of violence endorsed, strategy and tactics, as well as patterns of amity and enmity. The chapter explores both long-term, holistic, solutions and the more immediate forms of activism prescribed for followers. The former relates to the ultimate objective, as presented through the communiqués, and the creation of a pious society. These references are intended to inspire followers and highlight the noble ends that drive activism. In terms of specific responses, the coding revealed – perhaps predictably – an overwhelming emphasis on violence, which was presented as defensive and an individual obligation of all. The level of violence prescribed has escalated over time and its direction depends on the diagnostic focus each time (and as a result is not

always consistent). Justifications for this violence rely primarily on notions of revenge or reciprocity ('an eye for an eye') or the dubious adaptation and reinterpretation of medieval juristic accounts citing specific (limited) examples for the permissibility of the slaying of non-combatants. Additionally, however, and perhaps in recognition of the weakness of these justifications, the Al-Qa'ida leadership has also sought to redefine the concept of non-combatant: Western citizens for instance are intimately involved in fighting the Muslims since they pay taxes, vote for the civilian leadership of the armed forces or recognise their legitimacy. Aside from referring to more medieval rulings, the approach to Muslim deaths in Al-Qa'ida (or affiliated) attacks is similar: their status as 'Muslim' is questioned, thus – apparently – undermining their right to life. When focusing on stated constraints on the use of violence it becomes clear how problematic the deaths of Muslims and other protected people in Al-Qa'ida attacks are for the leadership. Many of the caveats voiced in the earlier messages have gradually disappeared. The response to past attacks that have resulted in Muslim deaths, moreover, ranges from outright denial of responsibility, limited apologies for 'mistakes' and collateral damage to accusing other militant networks (such as HAMAS) of inflicting even more bloodshed than Al-Qa'ida. Paradoxically, more recent communiqués have openly appealed to Al-Qa'ida affiliates to tone down their attacks and limit Muslim casualties, thus implicitly of course acknowledging that Al-Qa'ida had been linked to such atrocities all along.

The third chapter focuses on motivational frames, identified audiences and methods of delivery and is divided into sections according to focus on non-Muslim audiences on the one hand and divergent facets of the Muslim population on the other. The Al-Qa'ida leaders advocate strict separation between believers and non-believers and this, on the surface at least, is noticeable throughout the communiqués under review. The vast majority of messages appeal specifically to Muslims, with a few communiqués addressing non-Muslims and Al-Qa'ida's identified enemies. A handful of communiqués thus add discursive context to attacks against the West by addressing Western publics and leaders directly. Threats are important in this regard, although the current analysis found these are mostly issued *after* a prominent attack, rather than before, thus adding to the post-attack justificatory narrative. There appears to be another, implicit, point in addressing the West directly: these communiqués serve to present the Al-Qa'ida leaders as colossal figures, on par with the political leadership in the West, and capable of yielding formidable force in tackling these powers.

This aura of superiority is equally visible when the nature of appeals to Muslims is analysed. The leadership perceives itself as responsible for 'instigating the nation' and seeks to convince this audience of the merits of the diagnostic and prognostic parameters presented. The nature of the approach towards Muslim audiences could be divided into three categories: positive appeals, criticism and denunciation of Muslim publics, and excommunication. In terms of the latter, the communiqués revealed a hesitant approach towards the concept of *takfir*, which – although escalating in scope in terms of its application – was always qualified in some way. Excommunication was also directly linked to on-going events. The most vehement (and frequent) accusations of apostasy, for instance, were linked to local developments in Pakistan and Iraq that could threaten the position of Al-Qa'ida in these regions. The coding did not uncover a general *takfiri* approach towards Shia Muslims. By contrast, when their religious credentials were questioned, this appeared to have more to do with specific developments (particularly collaboration with identified adversaries) rather than doctrine. Unless provoked by on-going developments, therefore, the Shia issue appeared to be largely absent in the material coded. The most significant category identified in terms of communicating with

Muslim constituents concerned the increasingly irate criticism, even condemnation, of Muslim publics. The 9/11 attacks appear to have been something of a watershed in this regard. In their aftermath, the Al-Qa'ida leaders (and Zawahiri in particular) began to engage in increasingly hard-hitting criticism and denunciation of Muslims themselves, who had no affiliation with 'corruptive' elites and who, in many cases, had suffered ongoing war and hardship. After 9/11, therefore, a process began whereby the Al-Qa'ida leaders appeared to gradually alienate precisely the people they claimed to represent and defend. This process, of course, predates by many years the more overt impact of the Arab Spring and of excessive civilian targeting that have more recently been presented as signs that the Al-Qa'ida leadership is now in deep crisis.

The findings discussed in the following three chapters are developed further in the fourth, and concluding, part of this thesis, which assesses the impact of these messages and their overall effectiveness according to the framing model.

5


DIAGNOSTIC FRAMES

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses coding results that expressed diagnostic themes and emphases conveyed by the Al-Qa'ida leaders over the twenty-year period under review (these results are provided in Appendix 3.1 and 3.2, pages 244-309). The coding captured aspects of the narrative that highlight perceived sources of corruption, hardship and suffering that bin Ladin and Zawahiri want to defeat. As the account below argues, these diagnostic elements involve a multifaceted outlook and worldview that is equally informed by political as well as religious-cultural imperatives. The chapter is divided into two sections, with the first exploring these value-based diagnostic features and the second setting out Al-Qa'ida's grievance argument and how this has evolved from a localised set of ills to a far broader, more confusing and sometimes conflicting list of grievances and identified culprits.

5.2 Condemnation of Prevailing Societal Forms

Through the course of their efforts to communicate with their wider environment, the two Al-Qa'ida leaders were consistent in their condemnation of specific normative features and societal facets of contemporary cultures that prevail in Islamic countries and elsewhere. All communiqués were coded for references to the undesirability of existing societies. This included comments relating to perceptions of what made contemporary societies unpalatable and defunct in the eyes of the leadership (for instance as regards man-made legislation, the spread of capitalism and democracy). The coding results from this process are given in Appendix 3.1 (page 244). Many communiqués made brief references to such perceived societal ills. The results revealed, however, that several items, especially those authored by Al-Zawahiri, offered more detailed insights into the way in which these perceptions were formed. To illustrate how pervasive references to undesirable aspects of existing societies are in the Al-Qa'ida leaders' output, figure 3 identifies the communiqués where these positions are expressed, with each point on the graph illustrating an individual communiqué located on a timeline for the period under review.



As shown in figure 3, references to the undesirability of prevailing societal forms featured throughout the timeframe in question. These references, however, appear to have become particularly prominent in the post-9/11 discourse emanating from the Al-Qa'ida leadership.

Although Tibi is correct in tracing the uncompromising posture of the Al-Qa'ida leaders to (quasi) religious positioning, the coding established that the focus of animosity and source of anger was not exclusively based on immediate concerns over self-determination or infringement of territory by unbelievers. In 1991, for instance, Al-Zawahiri wrote a book titled *The Bitter Harvest*, condemning the corruption in the organisational and methodological thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, Zawahiri argued, was taking part in 'jahiliyya governing' through its acquiescence of democracy, elections and parliaments. Democracy, in the form of the 'rule of the people' was seen as a 'new religion' which gave 'the masses the right to legislate without being shackled down to any other [divine] authority.'²⁷⁴

Zawahiri's denunciation of democracy is therefore directly tied to his notions of *tawhid*, the oneness of God, and the fundamental impermissibility of idol worship. His reasoning was as follows: 'Democracy is a new religion. In Islam, legislation comes from God; in a democracy, this capacity is given to the people. Therefore, this is a new religion, based on making the people into gods and giving them God's rights and attributes. This is tantamount to associating idols with God and falling into unbelief.'²⁷⁵

Anyone who embraced or participated in legislative councils or any form of majority rule and obeyed authorities selected through such assemblies thus committed sin.²⁷⁶ The processing of communiqués found references where the leaders insisted that

²⁷⁴ Zawahiri (1991) *The Bitter Harvest: The Brotherhood in Sixty Years* [46]. See also See Filiu (2009): 20. See Kepel (1984) for details regarding the Qutb's delineation of different types of *jahiliyya* societies: 47.

²⁷⁵ Zawahiri (1993) 'Advice to the Community to Reject the Fatwa of Sheikh Bin Baz Authorizing Parliamentary Representation: Published Under the Supervision of Ayman al-Zawahiri,' in Kepel & Milelli (eds.) (2008) [99]. Bin Ladin also tied the concept of man-made law to alleged polytheistic practices of modern-day Jews and Christians who embraced such impious principles in: (1995) 'An Open Letter to King Fahd On the Occasion of the Recent Cabinet Reshuffle' (11 July), Harmony database [62].

²⁷⁶ Bin Ladin (2003) 'Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq,' in Kepel & Milelli (eds) (2008) [98]; see also Zawahiri's denunciation of 'accepting secularism and democracy and the spread of the majority's wishes

any form of governance or jurisprudence where decisions were embedded in the will of the majority equalled subservience to the West,²⁷⁷ was corrupted by capitalism and corporations,²⁷⁸ and one of the reasons a political culture of 'surrender and concessions' had prevailed in Palestine.²⁷⁹ In one communiqué, bin Ladin conceded it was no secret 'that the selection of emirs or presidents is the right of the nation. However, this right is governed by conditions, whose absence makes participation in the selection of an emir prohibited.'²⁸⁰ The main condition was a leadership that would implement *shari'ah*, which no existing government, after the fall of the Taliban regime, had achieved or even contemplated, according to bin Ladin. Denunciation of democracy and elections featured intermittently throughout the communiqués analysed and the coding did not reveal substantial differences in this regard over time in terms of context and terminology. Nor was there a significant difference between messages from bin Ladin or Zawahiri, aside from their respective geographic bias in a large number of communiqués (the former focusing on the Arabian Peninsula, the latter on Egypt and neighbouring regions).

When the overall trend in this regard since the 1990s was assessed, however, the period surrounding the Arab Spring emerged as the most strongly focused on issues relating to the fallacy of democratic governance or even un-Islamic forms of popular uprising. The revolutions that began in Tunisia and Egypt before spreading to other countries in the region appear to have caused anxiety within the Al-Qa'ida leadership over the apparent appeal of democratic solutions to Arab masses and the *ummah*.

Zawahiri, for example, focused extensively on the matter in his multi-part appeal to Arabs (primarily Egyptians) titled 'A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings,'²⁸¹ intended to address and explain the significance of these watershed events. Arabs were warned democracy was necessarily a *secular* form of governance²⁸² that 'worships one idol, which is the wishes of the majority, without abiding by any religion, standards or ethics.'²⁸³ Any concessions towards a democratic form of government or consultation in this regard are also directly tied to the sacrificing of Islamic cultural prescriptions and proliferation of vice and degradation. When references to democracy were considered in their immediate narrative context, this revealed that democracy was not, therefore, only tied to specific grievances concerning any perceived oppression by the democratic West. Its introduction or acquiescence involved a fundamental abrogation of the religious creed and abandonment of the *hisba*, commanding good and forbidding wrong (*al-amr bil-marouf wan-nahee an al-munkar*). 'The truth about democracy,' Zawahiri argued, is 'it

and the social state,' Zawahiri (2010) 'Al-Quds will not be converted to Judaism,' published by As-Sahab, secured from Islamist web forums (19 July) [223].

²⁷⁷ Bin Ladin (2004) audio statement (no title) published by As-Sahab (27 December), available in IntelCenter (2008) *Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1* [86].

²⁷⁸ Bin Ladin (2007) 'The Solution: A message from Shaykh Osama bin Laden to the American people' As-Sahab. (September). Secured via links from Islamist web forums [10].

²⁷⁹ Zawahiri (2007) 'Palestine is the concern of all Muslims,' published by As-Sahab (11 March), secured from Islamist web forum (also available in IntelCenter (2008) *Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1* (2008), Tempest Publishing) [18]. See further references to democracy as a source or contributing factor to the plight of Palestinians e.g. Zawahiri (2009) 'From Kabul to Mogadishu,' published by As-Sahab (22 February), secured from Islamist web forums [132].

²⁸⁰ Bin Ladin (2004) [86].

²⁸¹ Seven distinct communiqués within this series had been issued at the time of writing.

²⁸² Zawahiri (2011) 'A Message of Hope and Glad tidings to our people in Egypt (1),' published by As-Sahab (19 February), secured from Islamist web forums [232].

²⁸³ Zawahiri (2011) 'A Message of Hope.. (4),' published by As-Sahab (4 March), secured from Islamist web forums [235].

allows everything regardless of it being degrading or contradictory, as long as the majority agrees with it.²⁸⁴

5.2.1 *The impious international order and local implications*

These bedrock principles, in turn, inform much of the anger that the Al-Qa'ida leaders express towards the international community which, again, is not exclusively based on allegations of infringement of territory or other more immediate grievances. America's legislative system whereby religion is separated from policymaking is seen as 'contrary to the nature of mankind,' for example.²⁸⁵ This organisational principle, itself traceable to the secular French revolution, has produced a 'false international legitimacy'²⁸⁶ and a 'secular international order' dominated by the ideals of 'Anglo-Saxon protestant publics,' according to the Al-Qa'ida leadership.²⁸⁷

After the grading process was completed and references to the socio, cultural and normative undesirability of existing societies were aggregated and reviewed (See results in Appendix 3.1), two major manifestations of this 'corruptive order' were identified. These relate to the perceived chief pillar of this order, the United Nations; and through the impact of these ideas (and those who espouse them) on the written constitutions of Islamic countries.

Several specific reasons are cited for the perceived harmful impact of the UN. Examples include allegations the organisation prevented Muslims from defending themselves in Bosnia and elsewhere (through embargoing arms shipments) and the implementation of sanctions in Iraq and beyond. In more fundamental ways, however, the extent to which the UN is seen to represent a system that is illegitimate through its elevation of ideals that contradict the sovereignty of God remains a constant feature of the communiqués analysed. It is 'an organisation of unbelief,' according to bin Ladin.²⁸⁸ Its very charter, warned Zawahiri, 'challenges the Shari'ah'²⁸⁹ and membership to the UN renders governments illegitimate²⁹⁰ and 'forces' the recognition of Israel, Russian occupation of Chechnya, China's occupation of East Turkistan and Spain's occupation of Ceuta and Melilla.²⁹¹

The second manifestation of the corruptive power of international, secular, legal norms, according to the coding results, is the drafting of constitutions in Islamic lands. In this respect, the coding process found particular emphasis on the constitutions of Egypt, Somalia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.²⁹² The fact that *shari'ah* law is not absolute in the

²⁸⁴ Zawahiri (2011) 'A Message of Hope.. (5),' published by As-Sahab (14 April), secured from Islamist web forums [236].

²⁸⁵ Bin Ladin (2002) 'Letter from Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin to the American People,' first published in *Waaqiah* (26 October), available in *FBIS: Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements* [212].

²⁸⁶ Bin Ladin (2009) 'Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault,' published by As-Sahab (14 January) translated by Jihad Media Battalion [122]. See also bin Ladin (2008) 'A Message to the Muslim Nation,' published by As-Sahab (18 May), secured via Islamist web forums [24].

²⁸⁷ Zawahiri (2010) [223].

²⁸⁸ Bin Ladin (2006) 'Oh People of Islam,' published by As-Sahab (23 April), secured via Islamist web forums [90].

²⁸⁹ Zawahiri (2006) 'Realities of the Conflict between Islam and Unbelief,' published by As-Sahab (22 December), available from IntelCenter (2008) *Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1* [94].

²⁹⁰ Zawahiri (2007) 'A Review of Events' - As Sahab publishes fourth interview with Zawahiri,' published by As-Sahab (16 December), via Islamist web forums (also available from IntelCenter (2008)) [13].

²⁹¹ Zawahiri (2006) [94]; Zawahiri (2009) [132].

²⁹² See e.g. bin Ladin (2004) untitled audio statement (16 December), secured from Archive.org (12 January 2009) via Islamist web forums [84]; Zawahiri (2009) [132]; Zawahiri (2009) 'The Path of Doom,'

judicial and legislative assemblies described in these written constitutions is blamed primarily on the West, mostly the United Kingdom, seen as instrumental in the creation of the Egyptian, Pakistani and Saudi constitutions. Zawahiri in particular devoted substantial attention to the matter. In 2009 he even published a book dissecting the Pakistani constitution, assessing the way in which it departed from crucial tenets of Islamic law. The book admonished Pakistanis for tolerating majority rule as the benchmark for decision-making and warned that the Pakistani constitution legalised *fasiq*, disobedience from *shari'ah*, which was in itself *kufr*.²⁹³

In many of his older communiqués from the early to mid-1990s, bin Ladin too focused on the way in which the Saudi legal base failed to correspond with the Qur'an and how the *ulema* and political elite failed to rule according to the code sent down by God or the practices of His Prophet. When output from the two leaders was compared in this respect over time, subtle differences emerged. Thus, rather than dedicating extensive tracts exclusively to this aspect of contemporary societies, as Zawahiri has done, the more concise and apt bin Ladin mixed these constitutional concerns within more multifaceted criticisms of the established powers.

Thus, bin Ladin's early petitions and open letters to Saudi religio-political authorities, written on behalf of the Advice and Reform Committee, intertwined deviation from *shari'ah* governance with other socio-economic and political issues that were seen as inherently un-Islamic.²⁹⁴ The letters, written between 1994 and 1995, listed numerous 'flaws' within contemporary Saudi society. These ranged from the corruption of man-made laws and usury (*riba*) to specific grievances, such as the acquiescence of non-Islamic political forces, impious alliance structures, economic stagnation and polarisation, 'blasphemous' regional cooperation platforms and humiliating weakness of the armed forces. The culture of idleness, which saw the religious establishment ignoring and even endorsing these perceived ills was very much tied to the initial and fundamental sin of selective application of *shari'ah* and elevation of un-divine authority.²⁹⁵

Zawahiri, in his 'Message of Hope' to fellow Egyptians, similarly saw the dilution or 'alienation' of *shari'ah* within society as a tipping point leading to the spreading of vice and sin throughout the populace, including 'usury, adultery, insobriety, moral dissolution, familial schisms and forms of crimes, [of] which the man-made laws add to the increase and spread.'²⁹⁶

published by As-Sahab (26 August), secured from Islamist web forum [142]; Zawahiri (2009) 'Shaykh Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri: Eulogy for the Role Model of the Youth – The Commander and Shahid Baitullah [Mehsud],' published by As-Sahab (28 September), secured from Islamist web forum [147]; Zawahiri (2009) *The Morning and the Lamp to be Extinguished: An Analysis of the Claim that the Constitution of Pakistan is Islamic*, translated by Abu Musa Abdussalam, published by As-Sahab (16 December), secured from Archive.org via Islamist web forums [141]

²⁹³ Zawahiri (2009) [141]. Zawahiri, of course, was not alone in pointing to modern written constitutions and democracy as a major sign of corruption. In Mohammed al-Maqdisi's writings, for instance, the prevalence of these influences signalled the failure of separating truth from falsehood. Similar notions have been tabled by a host of contemporary Wahhabite scholars.

²⁹⁴ E.g. bin Ladin (1994) 'Our Invitation to Give Advice and Reform,' open letter dated 12 April, available from Harmony Archive, (AFGP-2002-003345) CTC West Point [36].

²⁹⁵ See especially: Bin Ladin (1994) 'Open Letter for Shaykh Bin Baz on the Invalidity of His Fatwa on Peace with the Jews,' open letter dated 29 December, Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345) [63]; bin Ladin (1995) 'Saudi Arabia Continues its War Against Islam and its Scholars,' open letter dated 9 March, available from Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345) [66]; bin Ladin (1995) [62].

²⁹⁶ Zawahiri (2011) [236].

5.2.2 Avoidable sins

Aside from these perceived large-scale and systemic vices, the reading and processing of communiqués also uncovered numerous references to more specific condemnation of behaviour regarded as offensive according to the puritanical norms the Al-Qa'ida leaders represent. This included 'illicit' behaviour and novelties such as sex outside wedlock and the promotion of sex, usury, alcohol, secularism/atheism, homosexuality, drugs, gambling, sexual presentation of women, adultery, disobeying parents, committing perjury, desire for wealth and status and 'a family structure which is not necessarily composed of a father, mother and children, but rather grotesque forms of depravity.'²⁹⁷

Whenever the communiqués reflected upon perceived offensive gestures of the West towards Islam, moreover, feelings of animosity were exacerbated by the fact Western values mocked the virtuous pillars of Islam whilst promoting heinous vice. How could they slander the Prophet Mohammed (through cartoons), for instance, and ban the glorification of terrorism and the *niqab* (in France), whilst tolerating homosexuality and banning any debate surrounding the Holocaust?²⁹⁸ The very presence of Westerners was thus polluting, due to the potency of their ideas. According to bin Ladin, US tourists were 'spreading filth upon whoever comes into contact with [them]' and the US, the world's greatest polluter, was also the source of AIDS in the world.'²⁹⁹ Characteristically more expansive in scope, Zawahiri similarly denounced the Western civilization of 'degeneracy, adultery, freedom from ethics, morals and religion, [...] the civilization of AIDS.'

That is why, the female veiled Muslim brings out all of these provocations, and she uncovers their [Western] usage of women as a product to attract consumers and market supplies, and [she] uncovers the degeneracy of their capitalism that adopts the trade [in] obscenity in all its kinds and colors [...] considered one of the important sources of its income, and she uncovers the fakery of their freedom as it is [acceptable] for them that a woman unveils her entire body, it is even [acceptable] for her to sell her body, but they cannot withstand a veiled Muslim woman.³⁰⁰

The spread of these ideas to the Islamic world is seen as catastrophic and no less an existential threat than that posed by the 'violent oppressors' of the West. The colonisation had ideological facets: bin Ladin warned of the 'cunning, malevolent media and cultural invasion' orchestrated by Voice of America, the BBC and other organisations at the forefront of an 'ideological invasion' spreading 'obscenity and depravity' in Muslim lands.³⁰¹

²⁹⁷ Zawahiri (2011) [235]. See for the listing of these 'vices' in: Zawahiri (1993) [99]; bin Ladin (2002) [purported], 'Al-Qaeda's Declaration in Response to the Saudi Ulema: It's Best You Prostrate Yourself in Secret' in Ibrahim (2007) [43]; bin Ladin (2002) [212]; Bin Ladin (2003) [79], bin Ladin (2004) [84]; Zawahiri (2005) 'The Freeing of Humanity and Homelands under the Banner of the Quran,' posted 11 February, available from Jihadunspun.com [as of 4 May 2009] [109]; bin Ladin (2009) 'Fight on, O' Champions of Somalia,' published by As-Sahab (19 March), secured from Islamist web forum [134]; Zawahiri (2009) 'The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy,' published by As-Sahab (4 August), secured from Islamist web forums [140]; Zawahiri (2010) 'A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade,' published by As-Sahab (15 September), secured via Islamist web forums [226].

²⁹⁸ Zawahiri (2006) 'The Alternative is Da'wa and Jihad,' published by As-Sahab (4 March), available from IntelCenter (2008) [73].

²⁹⁹ Bin Ladin (2002) [212].

³⁰⁰ Zawahiri (2009) [140].

³⁰¹ Bin Ladin (2006) [90].

5.2.3 The importance of values

When the communiqués were coded for diagnostic references, therefore, a strong normative element emerged with some of the more specific grievances that form such an integral part of communiqués (see below) enveloped in these more profound and holistic denunciations of non-Islamic culture. Reidel's assumption that Zawahiri's ideology is 'not rooted in a hatred for Western culture or values, nor the status of women there, nor the alleged decadence of the West'³⁰² does not correspond with the longitudinal coding results. Nor is there any evidence suggesting value-focused diagnosis is merely rhetorical. In Zawahiri's aforementioned book *The Morning and the Lamp*, for instance, one of the points cited supposedly exposing the infidelity of the Pakistani constitution concerned the fact women were not prohibited from becoming president.³⁰³ At the same time Western values are seen as hostile to Muslim women as sisters wearing the hijab are being 'persecuted'³⁰⁴ through a ban on face-covers being 'implemented in order to fight the values of Islam and to force our daughters to emulate the West and its immorality.'³⁰⁵

The aggregated coding results thus revealed that Al-Qa'ida's grievances are not merely 'political' or specific to the actions of the West. They are to a very substantial degree based on *values* that are informed by the interpretation of creed³⁰⁶. This is important. The anger displayed in the actions and words of the Al-Qa'ida leadership is not a mere reaction to actions of the West, local leaders or other perceived belligerents. Nor do these diagnostic message elements rely on accounts of victimisation and suffering exclusively. The anger displayed is based on a firm desire to see through specific normative criteria, opposing those that currently appear to prevail. Fundamental issues relating to religiosity and cultural norms are mixed with more specific grievances, on-going events and the prevailing sense of violation and victimhood due to actions of powers outwith the Islamic realm.

In one of the more unusual public relations initiatives undertaken by the Al-Qa'ida leadership, Ayman Al-Zawahiri invited the public to send questions via an online forum regarding the role and operations of Al-Qa'ida. Zawahiri answered many of the questions posted in this 'Open Meeting' in extensive audio addresses, issued in two batches. The latter was posted on forums in April 2008. One of Zawahiri's answers typically demonstrates the way in which immediate concerns relating to territorial integrity and other developments that arouse anger within the potential support base are mixed with more long-term normative positioning:

I reject and I am hostile to polytheism; scorn for religion; the establishment of relations based on profit, sensual delight, lies, deception, and treachery; usury, alcohol, gambling and vile deeds; seizing others' countries and inflicting justice on them based on arrogance and mischief; the plundering of their resources; double standards; and immunity to punishment for crimes for which others are punished; spreading killing, exploitation, and destruction;

³⁰² Riedel (2008): 24.

³⁰³ Zawahiri (2009) [141].

³⁰⁴ Zawahiri (2011) 'A Message of Hope.. (3)' As-Sahab (27 February), secured via Islamist web forums [234].

³⁰⁵ Zawahiri (2001) *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, initially published in *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (2 December), available in translation from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service [119], even though Zawahiri did not feel women had a choice in wearing the veil, arguing it was 'the duty of Muslim girls and women in the Islamic Maghreb is to face-off those who want to remove their Hijab' – Zawahiri (2009) [140].

³⁰⁶ Full list in Appendix 3.1.

and the destruction of environment and climate in order to be elated with mighty arrogance and for the sake of plundering and looting.³⁰⁷

The spread of vice and sin, therefore, often seen as a by-product of past acts of aggression against the Islamic realm, is here intertwined with more immediate cases of suffering that are traced back to specific Western actors and their local stooges.

In order to gauge which diagnostic elements related to the activity of a given set of actors that featured in the messages, therefore, the coding assessed references to particular events, past and present, emphasised by Zawahiri and bin Ladin. References to historic events that victimised Muslims were thus logged in each communiqué separately, as were message elements pertaining to on-going suffering and grievance. Once all the data had been collected, this latter category proved to be far more voluminous and complex. The next section discusses these coding results. Focus on events varied across the communiqués analysed and was dependent on the context of the communiqué (according to the prominence of a given set of issues within the *ummah* each time), message scope, as well as the occasional geographic bias of bin Ladin and Zawahiri as mentioned above.

5.3 Constructing a Grievance Narrative

Grievances and alleged historical crimes of the West and their treacherous 'agents' in the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere set the political and event-specific context of the message. Almost all of the communiqués coded referred to grievances and developments (long and short term) in order to vilify the West, its allies and supporters, and appeal to Muslim audiences with the aim of mobilising them to embrace militancy and justify violent methods.³⁰⁸ The leadership's take on current affairs is communicated and specific reasons for the plight and victimisation of Muslims are elucidated through an emotional narrative emphasising the individual responsibility of Muslims to react against the perceived forces of evil in order to protect the sanctity, cohesion, dignity and safety of the *ummah*.

The simplistic world vision of Al-Qa'ida is Manichean at its core, pitching the US, the West, Western culture and media, local regimes and elites in one camp against the sacrosanct world of *dar al-Islam*. Aside from the normative clashes mentioned above, the content highlights the ways in which expansionism, conspiracy, hegemony, plunder and subjugation are inherent characteristics of the former camp, thus rendering peaceful coexistence impossible.

Various examples of penetration into and mistreatment of the perceived Islamic world are presented to demonstrate this clash and the need to rise up against it. The oppression and hostility displayed by apparent forces of evil against Muslims illustrates not only their individual obligation to defend the *ummah* (by supporting Al-Qa'ida – the *ummah's* vanguard) but also the right of this vanguard to reciprocate in kind. For the Al-Qa'ida leadership, these grievances have been used to develop some of the principal justifications presented for terrorist violence, within the context of reciprocity.

³⁰⁷ Zawahiri (2008) 'The Open Meeting with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Part Two,' the second part of responses to the 'Open Meeting', published by As-Sahab (21 April), IntelCenter (2008) [107].

³⁰⁸ The coding captured references to past and on-going events that were used to construct the grievance narrative. The results from this process are given in [Appendix 3.2](#) (pages 253-309).

Part III: The Al-Qa'ida Leadership Communiqués

In order to map the grievances cited by the leadership, all entries pertaining to *on-going* (column (A) in Appendix 3.2) and *historic* (column (B) in Appendix 3.2) victimisation from the coding were processed with the aim of highlighting the most prominent issues identified. Aggregated results from this review are presented in table 2, below.

Table 2: PRINCIPAL GRIEVANCES CITED

[Issues referred to in more than two communiqués]

[See source material from coding results in Appendix 3.2 (p. 253)]

Presence of occupying forces, corruption, creation of local 'agent regimes' in Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere	2007 siege of Lal-Masjid (Red Mosque) in Pakistan	US pressure to hold Wafa'i Qustantin (An Egyptian Coptic woman who converted to Islam but was then forced to return to Christianity and moved to a Coptic monastery) in Egyptian 'torture chambers'
	2006 war in Lebanon	
	2008-2009 war in Gaza	
Creation of Israel, aggression against Palestinians. Corruption of nationalist local rulers. Local, regional and international peace initiatives (Madrid, Oslo, Camp David, Wey River, Sharm El Sheikh, Mecca accords, Annapolis etc.) as way to annex/ 'sell' Palestine	Gaza siege/blockade	Collusion between Iran and the US. Expansionist Iran
	UNSC Resolution 1701 on Lebanon ceasefire, disarming Hizbullah. Other resolutions which 'cut off parts of the lands of Islam'	Alleged mistreatment of Muslim immigrants in West
The 'oppressive' and 'hostile' campaigns by 'Crusader-Zionist aggressors' and their allies in: Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Chechnya, Kashmir, Indonesia, East Turkistan (Xinjiang Uyghur in China), Philippines, Yemen, Nigeria, Mauritania. Attempts to 'split' Muslim lands into manageable units	Battle of Al-Falujah, Iraq	Protection of Salman Rushdie and knighthood
	Support for Muqtada al-Sadr's army, Badr Brigades	Perceived offensive remarks by Pope Benedict XVI regarding Islam
	Incarceration of Muslims in Guantanamo, Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and at other undisclosed facilities	Western support for 'apostate' rulers of Muslim countries, leading to lack of development, poverty, unemployment and proliferation of distracting 'vices' in favour of Islam
Historical legacy of oppression, especially through colonialism and the Sykes-Picot agreement, Balfour Declaration and more modern equivalents—a Zionist and Christian Crusade. Usurping lands and stealing resources	Mohammed caricatures	Spread of nationalism, particularly in Palestine
	People arrested for questioning holocaust but not for 'insulting' the prophet	'Tyranny' of international law
Sabra and Shatila massacres	French ban on wearing veils in schools	'Cultural invasion' of Western media, 'permitting disengaging moral behaviour' marginalising the importance of Islam
Massacre of Srebrenica and other atrocities of Bosnia war blamed on West and UN	Hostile undemocratic regimes criticised by West but not friendly regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, despite the torture they inflict on Muslims	Global warming blamed on the West, US failure to sign Kyoto protocol
Human cost of UN sanctions against Iraq and oil-for-food programme	Muslim countries prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons but not Israel	Global capitalism and corporations causing world poverty
Separating of East Timor from Indonesia and collusion of UN	Respect in the West for human rights alternates according to political agenda. Democracy celebrated only if outcome is in the interest of the US/West, not in e.g. Algeria or Palestine	Al Yamamah arms deal between Britain and Saudi Arabia
Spanish control over Ceuta, Melilla, and Andalusia		Pakistan collapsing from within due to reduced emphasis on Islam
Darfur opened as another 'Crusader front' against Muslims, under guise of protecting human rights	Alleged desecration of Quran by US troops and prison wardens	Danger of democracy and secular rule in relation to 'Arab Spring'
Pakistani security forces have become 'hunting dogs' for the West through collusion of Pakistani government		
'Stealing Muslim wealth', especially oil		

As demonstrated, alleged subjugation and violent oppression features prominently. However, the importance of events, which the Al-Qa'ida leaders interpret as

blasphemous and contemptuous of the Islamic creed, should not be underestimated. Indeed, for effective frames to be generated, as noted in the previous chapter, the Al-Qa'ida discourse necessarily needs to address contemporary issues that have sparked arousal within the Muslim populace and been the focus of public debate and anger, media discussion and Friday sermons. Alleged military aggression, occupation and economic colonialism are obviously fundamental, but the coding revealed the prominence of cultural clashes and remarks or gestures that are seen as insulting, such as the publication of Mohammed caricatures in Danish and (later) European newspapers and Salman Rushdie's public profile.³⁰⁹ Examples were found of such issues, ostensibly relating to the dignity and pride of the *ummah*, being equated with events resulting in bloodshed and suffering. Zawahiri, for instance, noted how the 'latest decision by the French president to create a law preventing Muslim girls from covering their heads in schools is [...] consistent with the burning of villages along with their people in Afghanistan, demolishing houses over their sleeping residents in Palestine, killing the children of Iraq.'³¹⁰ Bin Ladin even suggested the publication of the Mohammed caricatures was a far worse atrocity for Muslims than bombings of innocent Muslim women and children.³¹¹

5.3.1 Localised focus

When references to harmful events were compared over time, the earliest messages were found to be more localised in scope than subsequent output. Bin Ladin was largely preoccupied with the Arabian Peninsula and the perceived illegitimacy of Saudi authorities. When other regional or global issues were addressed, these were often traced back to the inability or unwillingness of the regime in Riyadh to protect the interests of Muslims, be that through supporting Yemeni communists or acquiescing UN 'embargo' over shipment of arms to Bosnian Muslims.³¹² A letter written by bin Ladin in June 1994 and sent in the name of the London-based Advice and Reform Committee, however, is an early example of a widening diagnostic scope in the messages. The letter discussed the 'global Crusader conspiracy' and the dismal state of Muslim affairs in Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon, Kashmir, Algeria, Yemen, Bosnia, and – of course – the Arabian Peninsula and Palestine.³¹³ Just over a year later, bin Ladin penned another letter accusing the Saudi regime of seeking to deflect criticism over local issues through

³⁰⁹ Numerous references were made to the 'blasphemous' Mohammed cartoons, e.g. in Bin Ladin (2006) [90]; Zawahiri (2006) 'American Crimes in Kabul,' published by As-Sahab (21 June) available from IntelCenter (2008) [87]; Zawahiri (2006) 'Bush, the Vatican's Pope, Darfur and the Crusaders,' published by As-Sahab (29 September), IntelCenter (2008) [89]; bin Ladin (2008) 'May our Mothers be Bereaved of us if we Fail to Help our Prophet. Peace be upon Him),' published by As-Sahab (19 March), available in IntelCenter (2008) [11]; Zawahiri (2009) [140]. Rushdie's works (and the fact he received a knighthood) were discussed in: bin Ladin (1997) 'Usama Bin Ladin Urges "Befitting Reply" to Horan,' article with comments from bin Ladin, first published in *Pakistan Daily* (7 August), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [157], Zawahiri (2005) first in a series of interviews with Zawahiri, published by As-Sahab (7 December), available in Ibrahim (2007) [49]; Zawahiri (2006) [73]; Bin Ladin (2006) [90]; Zawahiri (2006) [87]; Zawahiri (2006) [89]; Zawahiri (2007) 'Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves,' published by As-Sahab (10 July), available in IntelCenter (2008) [103].

³¹⁰ Zawahiri (2004) untitled statement aired on Al-Arabiya and Al Jazeera (24 February), see Hegghammer, T. (2005) 'Al-Qaida Statements 2003-2004: A Compilation of Translated Texts by Usama bin Ladin and Ayman Al-Zawahiri,' in *FFI Rapport*, FFI, Kjeller [58].

³¹¹ Bin Ladin (2008) [11].

³¹² E.g. bin Ladin (1994) 'Saudi Arabia Supports the Communists in Yemen,' open letter dated 7 June, available from Harmony Archive [AFGP-2002-003345], CTC West Point [37].

³¹³ Ibid.

organising debates concerning the plight of Muslims in Bosnia. Although the open letter was largely addressed to Muslims in 'the land of the two holy places,' bin Ladin warned of the way in which the United Nations were being positioned to implement 'the Crusaders' plan to kill the causes of the nation of Islam and its people.'³¹⁴

Nonetheless, most of the early messages concerned domestic issues relating to areas bordering the Red Sea. This is not to suggest condemnation of the 'distant' enemy was absent. Indeed, most of these local grievances were traced back to the domination of the United States and its defence of Israel. Al-Zawahiri, for instance, wrote several articles on Abu Mohammed Al-Maqdisi's website 'Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad' criticising the state of affairs in Egypt, the secular nature of the curriculum and constitution (much in the same way as he did in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprising), citing the close ties with America and Israel as a principal corrupting influence (as well as British colonial legacy).³¹⁵

Similarly, issues of importance to Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula, from the price of wheat³¹⁶ and the inability of the regime to cater for pilgrims to Mecca³¹⁷ to economic stagnation and unemployment, were traced to the influence and presence of the US, which had coveted the region, according to bin Ladin, since Roosevelt became president.³¹⁸

This implicit prioritisation of diagnostic inferences characterised Al-Qa'ida's first public 'declaration of war' against its distant enemy and its local affiliates. A wide range of issues affecting Muslims from North Africa to the Far East were addressed, but the focus was on Saudi Arabia and the presence of US troops in the area, seen as 'one of the worst catastrophes to befall the Muslims since the death of the Prophet.'³¹⁹

Thus, even though the distant enemy had been delineated, and the consequences for his presence in the Middle East elaborated, there was some degree of prioritisation and limitation of diagnostic scope up until the mid-1990s. Gradually, however, the cluster of grievances identified in the longitudinal analysis proliferated exponentially and bin Ladin, in particular, began to place more emphasis on the regional or even global implications of the events he described.

5.3.2 Holistic, intertwined grievances

The coding thus revealed an escalation in terms of grievances addressed. By August 1997, American presence in 'all Muslim lands' was condemned, not just in the Arabian Peninsula.³²⁰ The adversary also became more multifaceted, consisting of an 'international Christian Crusade' with Zionist sympathies and agendas.³²¹ To counter

³¹⁴ Bin Ladin (1995) 'The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two Mosques,' open letter dated 11 August, from Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345), CTC West Point [69].

³¹⁵ See e.g. Zawahiri (1999) 'Muslim Egypt between the Whips of the Torturers and the Administration of Traitors' posted in 'Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad' (14 January) see McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) *Militant Ideology Atlas: Research Compendium* [116].

³¹⁶ Bin Ladin (1997) 'Pakistan Interviews Usama Bin Ladin' article/interview published in *Pakistan* daily (18 March), see *FBIS: Compilation*. [154].

³¹⁷ Bin Ladin (1997) 'The Saudi Regime and the Reputed Tragedies of the Pilgrims,' open letter dated 16 April, from Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345) [70].

³¹⁸ Bin Ladin (1998) 'One of Them Bears Witness,' statement embedded within article published in *Al-Quds al-Arabi* (23 March), available from *FBIS: Compilation*. [162].

³¹⁹ Bin Ladin (1996) 'Message from Usama Bin-Muhammad Bin Ladin to His Muslim Brothers ..', *Al-Islah* (2 September, pp. 1-12), published in *FBIS: Compilation* [5].

³²⁰ Bin Ladin (1997) [157].

³²¹ Bin Ladin (1998) 'Bin Ladin Condolences with Al-Bashir on Salih's Death,' statement embedded within article published in *Al-Quds al-Arabi* (16 February), see *FBIS: Compilation* [160].

this threat a 'World Islamic Front' was created which declared war on Zionist Crusaders and Americans in February 1998. The declaration set out three major grievances: occupation of the Arabian Peninsula; suffering of Iraqi people; and liberation of Muslims in Jerusalem and Palestine.³²² The World Islamic Front would operate as a vanguard for all Muslims in the region for all Arab land 'has either been occupied or there is a conspiracy to occupy it. For the first time since the Prophet's death atheists are occupying [the] Mecca, Medina and al-Aqsa Mosques.'³²³

The communiqués from this period illustrate the increasingly ambitious agenda of Al-Qa'ida and attempts to garner broader appeal within and beyond the Arab world. Towards the end of the decade, for instance, bin Ladin made several references to the conflict in Kashmir, religiosity in Pakistan and the perceived threat from India and highlighted the importance of supporting Chechen mujahideen as belligerents prepared for the Second Chechen War.³²⁴

This broadening of diagnostic scope that the analysis detected suggests the Al-Qa'ida leadership was seeking to mobilise a wider set of potential participants. In an interview January 1999, for example, bin Ladin congratulated himself on the 'winds of change' his messages had brought to Muslims across the globe, through highlighting their common grievances.³²⁵ The pressures following the 9/11 attacks compounded this necessity to mobilise as much support from as many regions as possible and the messages reflect this need. The US and NATO campaign in Afghanistan was presented as an attempt to destroy the only Islamic emirate in the world, rather than a mission to capture Al-Qa'ida leaders, and thus part of a larger campaign against Muslims: 'we are being attacked in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir, the Philippines and everywhere else.'³²⁶ 'This war is fundamentally religious,' bin Ladin argued. 'The people of the East are Muslims. They sympathize with Muslims against the people of the West, who are the crusaders.' Al-Qa'ida was thus presented as the vanguard for the 'victims' in Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Chechnya, Somalia, Kashmir, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere amid the corruption and infidelity of local leaders and *ulema* who had succumbed to the West.³²⁷

The Afghan invasion was thus not presented as a response to 9/11 (itself a necessary response to the described state of affairs) but rather an inevitability, a continuation of an existential struggle for Islam and a symptom of the world order created by the West and its historic thirst for ever greater territorial expanse and riches. 'It has become crystal clear that the West in general, and the US in particular, harbour an implacable, incredible Crusader hatred against Islam', bin Ladin announced shortly after

³²² Bin Ladin, Zawahiri et al. (1998) 'Text of World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,' as published in *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (23 February), see *FBIS: Compilation* [161].

³²³ Bin Ladin (1998) 'United States Admits that Keeping its Troops in the Gulf is Causing Dissatisfaction; Bin Ladin Threatens to Launch Attack Soon,' article in *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* featuring a statement from bin Ladin, see *FBIS: Compilation*.. [169].

³²⁴ See e.g. bin Ladin (1998) 'Bin Ladin Congratulates Pakistan on its Possession of Nuclear Weapons,' article in *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (1 June), see *FBIS: Compilation*... [170]; bin Ladin (1998) 'In the Way of Allah,' statement in article published in *The News* (15 June) (Islamabad), available in *FBIS: Compilation*... [171]; bin Ladin (1999) 'Usama Bin Ladin Pens Letter in Support Of Kashmir Jihad,' report giving text of letter published in *Wahdat* (Peshawar) (8 June), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [183]; bin Ladin (1999) 'UBL Orders Mujahidin to Shoot US Commandos 'on Sight', published in *Khabrain* (12 September), see *FBIS: Compilation* [186].

³²⁵ Bin Ladin (1999) 'Wrath of God: Osama Bin Laden Lashes out against the West', *Time Magazine* (11 January, vol. 153, no. 1) [178].

³²⁶ Bin Ladin (2001) [130].

³²⁷ Bin Ladin (2001) untitled statement aired on Al Jazeera (3 November), transcript available in Hegghammer, T. (2003) *FFI Rapport 1990-2002* [77].

the US and allied invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11.³²⁸ 'This war [in Afghanistan]', he argued, 'is similar to the previous crusades, led by Richard the Lion-Heart, [King Frederick] Barbarossa of Germany and Louis [IX] of France. In the present age, they rally behind [president] Bush.'³²⁹

The above examples show how holistic, intertwined grievances representing a cosmic and zero-sum clash between pious and non-pious forces replaced the more specific local and limited issues emphasised during the 1990s. The rather precarious assumption made, was that the Al-Qa'ida leaders could successfully appeal to a global sense of Muslim identity, tie together grievances and channel sympathy for ostensibly common causes towards acquiescence and support for the *mujahideen* vanguard. A proliferation of topics addressed, however, risked dilution of overall message potency and loss of frame consistency. Fortunately for the Al-Qa'ida leadership, its physical flight from Afghanistan and the pressure of coalition efforts (now with partial Pakistani support) coincided with a set of issues that proved to be invaluable rallying calls. For instance, rendition programmes and prisoner abuse cases were presented as further evidence to support the movement.³³⁰

Furthermore, as has been widely reported in analyses of the Iraq war, the decision to invade provided the Al-Qa'ida leaders with a propaganda victory and this was clearly evident from the output reviewed from this period. The invasion was presented as confirmation of wider hostility and animosity towards Islam, an argument that appeared weaker when related to Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir and other isolated conflicts alone, and aggressive determination to protect Israel. The invasion was portrayed as a 'scheme of fragmenting and ripping apart this [Muslim] nation, looting its resources and wealth, and preparing for the establishment of the greater State of Israel after expelling the Palestinians from it.'³³¹ Muslims were urged to detect a pattern, rather than a set of isolated events whereby their homelands would inevitably be next in line in US and Western-Zionist efforts to colonise the Muslim world. The aim would be to divide and plunder the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Syria, Sudan and even Iran.³³² The aim was to create and secure 'a huge Jewish super state,' bin Ladin argued at the time.³³³

5.3.3 Undermining the counter-narrative

In recognition of the damage the Iraq war and detainee abuse have done to the anti-Al-Qa'ida counterargument and to the reputation of the US and the West, efforts relating to the generation of a counter-narrative have since achieved greater prominence in recent years. The fact that counter-terrorism policy makers are searching for an attractive and effective counter-narrative to be deployed as part of a wider set of policies is in recognition of the role ideological material and arguments play in inspiring militant

³²⁸ Bin Ladin (2001) 'The facts of the conflict between us and America,' video statement aired on Al Jazeera (13 December), secured from Islamist web forums [129].

³²⁹ Bin Ladin (2002) untitled video release reported and quoted in *The Times* (Bin Ladin Film Vows Revenge on the UK,' 19 May), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [209].

³³⁰ See e.g. Zawahiri (2002) 'The Interview of Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri,' available from *IntelCenter* (2008) [22] for early references.

³³¹ Bin Ladin (2002) untitled statement distributed by Al-Qa'ida (14 October), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [211].

³³² Zawahiri (2002) *Al Walaa wa al Baraa - Loyalty and Separation: Changing an Article of Faith and Losing Sight of Reality*, available in Kepel & Milelli (eds.) (2008) [45]; bin Ladin (2003) untitled audio statement, unknown distributor (February), available from *IntelCenter* (2008) [78]; bin Ladin (2003) 'Usama Bin Ladin Urges Muslims to Launch Suicide Attacks against US,' statement embedded within article published in *Ausaf* (Islamabad) (9 April), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [217].

³³³ Bin Ladin (2003) [78].

activists, potentially fomenting support for the prescribed violent extremist agenda. The coding uncovered several examples of attempts by the Al-Qa'ida leadership to nip such initiatives in the bud. In addition to discussing specific activities, perceived examples of social, political, economic and moral corruption and alleged conspiracies, Zawahiri and bin Ladin have also sought to undermine the credibility of Western claims makers by accusing those who seek to undermine the Al-Qa'ida discourse of dualism, double standards and hypocrisy.

According to this narrative the US and its allies apply legal codes and standards selectively, according to their interests, to serve the Zionist call and in order to harm Islam. Democracy is good if the results produce regimes favourable to the United States and friendly towards Israel, but not when they are Islamic, such as in Algeria or Palestine. Pressure is applied to countries suspected of foul play during electoral campaigns, such as Zimbabwe, but not in relation to a series of shambolic Afghan elections. The Americans call for democracy, but have a record of embracing tyrants in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and elsewhere. Force, coercion and aggression should be used to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but not against Israel or India. Nor should the powers that established the United Nations give up their weapons, especially not the United States, the only country that has ever used them.

UN resolutions relating to Lebanon and elsewhere should be enforced, as Israel is threatened, but not when Israel itself is condemned. The US pretends to be a vanguard of human rights, yet takes part in such abuses against Muslims. It fights offensive wars in the name of capturing war criminals, whilst it protects and finances others. The UN and international community cry over Darfur, but do nothing when Muslims are being massacred.³³⁴ Finally, America and its allies invaded Iraq to destroy Al-Qa'ida, but 'since when has Iraq been the home of al-Qaeda? It is the land of all Muslims,' as bin Ladin reminded his audiences towards the end of 2004.³³⁵ What constitutes the necessary fluidity of realpolitik for one side, therefore, can be used to present the international order as inherently unjust, by others. In this sense, the Al-Qa'ida leadership moves beyond specific grievances relating to perceived Muslim constituencies to a wider geopolitical repertoire to display the apparent falsehood and hypocrisy of the West.

5.3.4 Conflicting diagnostic focus

According to the coding results on diagnostic message elements, the post 9/11 messages (see pages 266-309 in Appendix 3) generally offered more breadth in terms of diagnosed ailments, even though specific developments such as the Iraq war, Gaza wars and embargos and the 2006 Lebanon war also dominated. However, matters relating to Saudi Arabia and Egypt continued to feature intermittently, for example with bin Ladin's message from December 2004, which he dedicated to developments in Saudi Arabia.³³⁶ Most of Zawahiri's (admittedly more expansive) messages also addressed the situation in Egypt, as noted above, at least to some degree. Additionally, Zawahiri placed increasing emphasis on matters relating to Pakistan from around 2005 onwards, as local support from within the Al-Qa'ida leadership's new haven was crucial.³³⁷ Association

³³⁴ Bin Ladin (2002) [212]; Zawahiri (2005) [49]; Zawahiri (2007) [18].

³³⁵ Bin Ladin (2004) [86].

³³⁶ E.g. bin Ladin (2004) [84].

³³⁷ Zawahiri for instance, sought to appeal to ubiquitous anxiety in Pakistan concerning Indian aggression and anger over Kashmir, in order to shore up support: 'Musharraf's recognitions of Israel,' he argued, was 'to psychologically prepare the Pakistanis to recognize a Hindu state in Kashmir': Zawahiri (2006) 'Letter to the People of Pakistan,' published by As-Sahab (28 April), available from IntelCenter (2008) [81].

with America and the distant enemy was ever present, however. After all, according to Zawahiri, Egypt's dictatorship was 'imposed on the [Egyptian] people by America.'³³⁸

In terms of diagnosing the source of grievance, however, Zawahiri's distant and near enemy distinctions have often been ambiguous and his prioritisation in this regard is nowhere near as clear as that of the late Egyptian jihadist Mohammed Faraj, for example, who made a clear distinction between local and immediate adversaries versus more distant threats that were to be addressed only after the local enemies had been subdued. Many of Zawahiri's communiqués would, as noted above, target America and the West directly and blame them for the situation in Pakistan, Egypt and elsewhere whilst in other messages, Zawahiri would trace the causal origins to many of the grievances highlighted to domestic developments, rather than external 'oppression' or 'corruptive influence.'

Reflecting upon developments in the Middle East in his spring 2011 address, for example, Zawahiri asked: 'who helped the US implement sanctions against Iraq? Who helped them invade it? Who helped them invade Afghanistan? Who is implementing the sanctions on Gaza? Who are the ones in pursuit of the Mujahideen, arresting, torturing and killing them? Aren't they these corrupt regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan and Algeria?' Muslims had fallen behind technologically due to 'political weakness and corruption' of their elites and 'preoccupation in the errors in dialectics, Sufism, and superstitions which have made us neglect the natural sciences', Zawahiri insisted, adding almost as an afterthought that 'another cause is the West's control over us and our resources.'³³⁹ The chief catalyst, according to this message, was the local leadership in the Middle East, not the Western regimes that were the focus of so many earlier messages. This ambiguity, or what Hegghammer termed 'hybridization',³⁴⁰ has been a feature of much of Zawahiri's output since he ventured beyond an exclusive focus on violent extremism in Egypt.

Although a shifting diagnostic focus over time is not surprising and not necessarily problematic in terms of overall consistency, the impact of the diagnostic message appears more compromised when, as in the case of Zawahiri's collection of communiqués especially, the same dire state of affairs is traced back to a variety of potential causes – external and domestic – with shifting priorities in terms of the supposed primary causes. Compounding the conflicting diagnostic emphasis in the aggregate narrative, the inclusion in recent years of a host of new *global* issues unrelated or only indirectly related to the more tangible cases of Muslim suffering appears to blur and confuse the overall message even further. The most baffling of these was bin Ladin's most recent obsession with environmental issues, climate change, natural disasters (which killed more people than wars, according to bin Ladin) and relief work.³⁴¹ One of the more recent communiqués on this issue even included tacit recognition of the efforts of the hated UN to address this threat and criticism of Arab elites for failing to realise their duty in this respect.³⁴²

³³⁸ Zawahiri (2006) [73].

³³⁹ Zawahiri (2011) 'A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings [...] (2),' published by As-Sahab (24 February), secured from Islamist websites [233].

³⁴⁰ Hegghammer, (2009-A).

³⁴¹ Bin Ladin (2010) 'The Way to Save the Earth,' published by As-Sahab (19 February), secured from Islamist Website [149]; bin Ladin (2010) 'Some Points Regarding the Method of Relief Work,' published by As-Sahab (October), secured from Islamist web forums [227]; bin Ladin (2010) 'Help your Brothers in Pakistan,' published by As-Sahab (13 October), secured from Islamist web forums [228].

³⁴² Bin Ladin talked of how the UN Secretary General travelled to areas affected by vast floods in Pakistan in 2010 'as part of his job' whereas Arab leaders never ventured there despite being much closer. See bin Ladin (2010) [228].

5.4 Conclusions

The longitudinal study revealed how diagnostic iterations in the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués escalated gradually in scope from the early 1990s onwards. At the beginning the communiqués analysed focused on local grievances in the Arabian Peninsula and across the Red Sea in Egypt and the humiliation and hardship inflicted by the United States and its proxies and allies on the local population. Concurrently, significant issues relating to cultural norms and behavioural prescriptions and proscriptions based on interpreted doctrine feature consistently throughout (if more prominently of late). Through a series of internal developments and watershed events a more ambitious agenda has been constructed that also has sought to make sense of a growing range of issues of potential importance to possible movement participants and supporters.

This proliferation of issues and widening of scope has, at times, appeared confusing, even paradoxical, with potential implications for frame consistency, as will be discussed in the concluding part of this thesis. Fundamentally, this aspect of the narrative exists, as the framing concept assumes, to justify the establishment and existence of the movement by identifying present and past issues that demand a response, wrongs that need to be made right. The next chapter explores what solutions have been presented in the communiqués analysed to these identified problems.

PROGNOSTIC FRAMES

6.1 Introduction

Al-Qa'ida was established as an activist movement. Presented as a vanguard, it seeks to guide the *ummah* through a revolutionary process that removes the shackles of the status quo. Prognosis therefore constitutes a vital part of overall message framing. This concerns the delineation of alternatives, description of end goals as well as the development of a framework for action, designed to incite participants to respond to diagnosed ailments and move towards recognition of end goals. The Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués are designed to inspire and mobilise support for the solutions offered. This chapter analyses these prognostic elements in the messages of Zawahiri and bin Ladin.

As with the analysis of diagnostic framing above, this chapter compiles prognostic aspects of coding concerning both constant features of content – core issues that have not changed in terms of substance or scope since the early 1990s – and the more dynamic features of prognostic framing. The latter refer primarily to changes in terms of targeting and approaches to violence (including any stated limitations in this respect), which are crucial for understanding Al-Qa'ida as a violent extremist movement.

This chapter divides the prognostic aspect of the Al-Qa'ida leadership narrative as it emerged from the coding results into six major sections (see corresponding data in Appendices 3.3a, 3.3b, 3.4a, 3.4b, 3.5 and 3.6). The first explores the (probably deliberately) ambiguous descriptions of the desired end-results that were captured as communiqués were coded for references to the desired way forward and envisaged end-state. These references highlight and underscore the pure and noble objectives that drive and inform the prescribed activism and centre on the establishment of a pious society governed by interpretations of religious law and consultative councils. The second section assesses stages and priorities of activism and the way in which the coding revealed how Al-Qa'ida's strategic agenda has grown ever more ambitious over the course of the past two decades and more holistic in scope, even though intermittent preoccupation with domestic concerns (especially Zawahiri's obsession with Egypt) persisted throughout the period under review.

The scale, level and nature of violence that the Al-Qa'ida leaders have endorsed over time are explored in the third section. This combines coding results concerning references to the importance of violence, the nature of violent tactics endorsed and their

direction, scope and narrative context. Most importantly, this relates to the justifications put forward for the killing of civilians and the problematic issue of Muslim casualties inflicted through Al-Qa'ida-sponsored campaigns of violence. The coding showed how these justifications were primarily based on the adaptation of medieval juristic rulings concerning accidental or unavoidable deaths during combat. The fourth section focuses on the limited tactical and strategic detail presented in the communiqués, as detected by the review of the dataset, which rests primarily on core tenets of asymmetric warfare against an enemy who is seen as structurally weak and prone to overreaction. This section also discusses results from the coding that examined possible methods the Al-Qa'ida leaders have tabled as alternatives to violence. The coding revealed these involved primarily the use of economic boycott.

The fifth section analyses any limitations or caveats and regrets detected throughout the dataset, that were voiced in relation to Muslim and non-Muslim deaths, in order to identify communiqués illustrating any tension caused by the scale and nature of violence pioneered and endorsed by the Al-Qa'ida leadership. The coding of the communiqués uncovered how Zawahiri in particular sought initially to dismiss suggestions that Al-Qa'ida could be linked to Muslims deaths, whilst later seeking to rein in those forces loyal to the leadership, which he recognised had carried out attacks targeting Muslims and resulting in Muslim casualties. The final section of this chapter discusses patterns of amity and enmity, highlighting societies and actors that the al-Qa'ida leadership argues should be targeted, as well as any friends or temporary allies detected in the dataset under review.

6.2 Ultimate Objectives

At their most fundamental, the solutions the Al-Qa'ida leaders presented to their audiences and potential followers consisted of alternative societal and cultural constructions based on a shift in the balance of power from secular or impious forces to righteous communities that would operate in accordance with religious doctrine and law. Although desire for rule according to *shari'ah* as a consistent feature of the communiqués was to be expected, the coding revealed substantial shifts in geographic reach in these references. This was normally in accordance with the gradual expansion of the diagnostic emphases elaborated above. However, some variation and ambiguity in terms of strategic guidance and prioritisation can also be detected in the communiqués, particularly in Zawahiri's output.

6.2.1 A pious society

References to societal ideal types and suggested steps to achieve that goal from the material under review are captured in Appendix 3.3a and analysed below. Although the longitudinal comparison revealed these references to the ultimate objective were substantively consistent, they generally lacked detail and any meaningful deliberations concerning practical implementation. The 'solution' generally consists of: (1) ridding the Islamic world of alien, 'occupying, robbing' non-Islamic influences, separating the pious and non-pious and (2) ensuring Muslims have freedom to rule their lands according to the Shari'ah, control their own resources, and promote virtue (of '*tawheed*', morals,

chastity, fairness') and prevent vice.³⁴³ This process would ultimately culminate in the creation of a new and pious society. The answer to all administrative and judicial conundrums would be 'Islam' in its purest form. In 2004, for instance, bin Ladin issued the following statement:

The religion of Islam encompasses all the affairs of life, including the religious and the worldly, such as economic, military, and political affairs, as well as the scales by which we weigh the actions of men—rulers, ulema, and others—and how to deal with the ruler in line with the rules set by God for him and which the ruler should not violate. Therefore, it becomes clear to us that the solution lies in adhering to the religion of God, by which God granted us pride in the past centuries, and installing a strong and faithful leadership that applies the Koran among us and raises the true banner of jihad.³⁴⁴

Thus, full and unhindered implementation of doctrine in its purest form would be the organising principle of all facets of society. 'Islam is one unit that cannot be divided [...]. If someone believes in a part of it and rejects another part, then he becomes an infidel and his prayers and fasting will be to no avail.'³⁴⁵ The Islamic government would, therefore, abide by the 'heavenly' creed, relying on *shura* (consultation), whereby the *ummah* refers to the *Shari'ah* to judge the rulers, who are also selected and held to account by them.³⁴⁶ The role of the scholar would thus be central. A just scholar, according to bin Ladin, would be a 'role model' for his *ummah*, ensure *fatawa* were sound, avoid temptations, have the courage to speak out against that which is offensive, and stay away from impious rulers.³⁴⁷

Society would be inclusive (at least for men), according to the Al-Qa'ida leaders, where 'everyone judges by the Quran and Sunnah.'³⁴⁸ 'We are not calling for a dictatorship or despotism or tyranny in the name of religion,' argued Zawahiri. 'We are only calling the ummah to return to ruling by shura; justice; non-partisanship and elimination of discrimination between people except on the basis of taqwa [fear of Allah]; righteous deeds; enjoining the good and forbidding the evil; servitude [...] to the Shari'ah, without any discrimination or division; that the ummah elect its ruler and be able to hold him to account, just as was witnessed in the time of the khilafah.'³⁴⁹ Public participation in decision-making would thus not be prohibited, if conducted in the proper manner. 'We Muslims', according to bin Ladin, 'believe it is the nation's right to elect its president and we believe in Shura, however we believe that the Western democracy [is] illegitimate heresy from the Islamic point of view.'³⁵⁰ Zawahiri similarly argued elections under Islamic constitutions should be welcomed.³⁵¹ The 'proper and just' government Al-Qa'ida was seeking to install would allow 'the Ummah to participate in the selection of its rulers and holds them to account,' Zawahiri argued in 2011. The

³⁴³ Zawahiri (2005) unknown title, video statement published by As-Sahab (17 June), available from IntelCenter (2008) [72]; Zawahiri (2009) [140].

³⁴⁴ Bin Ladin (2004) 'Resist the New Rome,' audio statement aired on Al-Jazeera (4 January), transcript also published in *The Observer*, (4 January) and *FBIS: Compilation* [111].

³⁴⁵ Bin Ladin (2004) [86].

³⁴⁶ Zawahiri (2011) [232].

³⁴⁷ Bin Ladin (1995) 'Scholars are the Prophet's Successors,' open letter dated 6 May, available from Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345) [67].

³⁴⁸ As-Sahab (2002) 'The Wills of the Martyrs of the New York and Washington Battles: The Will of the Martyr Abdulaziz Alomari,' published 19 April, secured from Islamist web forums [108].

³⁴⁹ Zawahiri (2009) [141].

³⁵⁰ Bin Ladin (2009) [122].

³⁵¹ Zawahiri (2007) 'The Empire of Evil is about to End, and a New Dawn is about to break over Mankind,' published by As-Sahab (5 May), IntelCenter (2008) [23].

ummah's representatives would be inclusive and 'just in distributing the wealth of the Ummah, preventing its theft, prohibiting depravity and immorality.' These rulers would confront 'Western hegemony over our lands, and [help] to free all oppressed people from injustice.'³⁵² Under this form of governance, non-Muslims would, according to a handful of the communiqués analysed, be allowed to practice their faith under the protection of shari'ah, so long as they respected the Islamic authority (the *dhimmi* contract).³⁵³ Indeed, had the Holocaust been planned closer to Muslim lands Jews could have sought protection there, according to bin Ladin.³⁵⁴ Although strict separation according to the principle of *al Wala' wal Bara'* would be in force, a small number of references were found suggesting isolation would not be absolute. Oil could perhaps be sold abroad, as long as the price was determined by Muslims. After all: 'we are not going to drink it,' bin Ladin once remarked.³⁵⁵

Regardless of any partial pluralism of the described ideal types, all elaborations of the nature of this envisaged society, however, are exclusive, rigid and tyrannical: 'one must demand that it be the Shari'ah that rules [...] rather than it itself being ruled over by other systems. That its authority not be in need of any referendum and not open to cancellation, not have to compete with alternatives as an equal and not be subject to amendments and substitutions.'³⁵⁶ 'Muslims must be aware of the facts, and the most important is the aqeedah of tawheed, which must be the ruling authority in all systems.'³⁵⁷ The leader of the faithful will be the Imam of the caliphate state, which 'every faithful Muslim seeks to establish.'³⁵⁸ A Caliphate could be created once the 'existing' emirates in Afghanistan and Iraq had been consolidated and others established. *Hudud* (shari'ah punishment) would, Zawahiri insisted, be implemented immediately,³⁵⁹ but compliance would not be a problem as, according to bin Ladin, 'a guilty man would only be happy if he was justly punished.'³⁶⁰ As mentioned, these descriptions of the desired end-state are, perhaps deliberately, ambiguous. When the objective is to inspire and mobilise, it seems, general descriptions of a better future with vague delineations of the ultimate system that will replace the status quo, are thought to suffice. There would be holistic, legislative, political and social reforms,³⁶¹ economic and social justice, with no taxes, apart from the 2.5 per cent *Zakat*.³⁶² More detailed accounts could expose this part of the argument to criticism from more qualified Islamic scholars or prompt potential participants to doubt the attractiveness of the desired end-goal. Desperate to present an alternative to any pro-democratic voices that were greeted with so much enthusiasm in the Western media during the Arab Spring in Egypt and elsewhere, Zawahiri simply reiterated the basic features of an envisaged pious society that had been communicated before. He insisted the path forged by Al-Qa'ida promised:

³⁵² Zawahiri (2011) [235].

³⁵³ Zawahiri (unknown date) 'The Forbidden Word,' excerpts published in McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) *Militant Ideology Atlas: Research Compendium* [113].

³⁵⁴ Bin Ladin (2007) [10].

³⁵⁵ Bin Ladin (1996) interview with 'Abd al-Bari Atwan, published in *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (as 'Bin Ladin Interviewed on Jihad Against US,' 27 November), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [150].

³⁵⁶ Zawahiri (2009) [141].

³⁵⁷ Zawahiri (2010) [226].

³⁵⁸ Zawahiri (2008) [107].

³⁵⁹ Zawahiri (n.d.) [113].

³⁶⁰ Bin Ladin (1996) interview with Robert Fisk published in *The Independent* (10 June, 14), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [4].

³⁶¹ Zawahiri (2011) [236].

³⁶² Bin Ladin (2007) [10].

to fulfil the hopes of the Muslim Ummah of the establishment of a free Muslim nation in the Islamic world, which governs with the Shariah, promotes justice, implements Shura, liberates the Muslim lands, ends the blockade of Gaza, guards morality, destroys the nation of ignobility and corruption, establishes a Shura system in which the Ummah chooses its rulers without domination, forgery or rigging, holds them to account, enjoining them with good and forbidding them from evil, and guards Muslim resources from domestic thieves and their international masters who loot the treasures of our lands.³⁶³

6.2.2 *The Taliban, Iraq and a Global Islamic State*

To gauge more concrete examples of the Al-Qa'ida leadership's tolerance for oppressive and totalitarian regimes the coding examined support for contemporary or established forms of ruling (see results in Appendix 3.3b), which (predictably) highlighted its overt support and promotion of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. This was perceived as a genuine emirate, an embryonic Islamic state that signalled the desired form of governance for Muslim societies. The Islamic State of Iraq was seen as another legitimate emirate within its area of control, at least according to its representation in the communiqués analysed.³⁶⁴

Public endorsement of the Taliban regime might initially have been partially tactical. The first such recognition identified in the dataset was made by bin Ladin in November 1996,³⁶⁵ shortly after he travelled to Afghanistan with his close allies and family after being forced to leave Sudan. By that time the Taliban had only just consolidated their control over most Afghan provinces. Early public endorsements were, though, relatively cautious and infrequent, especially prior to the 1998 East Africa bombings (and US counter-attacks), after which point the Taliban-Al-Qa'ida alliance became more solidified and the support of the former more important for bin Ladin and Zawahiri. Bin Ladin claimed in March 1997 that he believed the Taliban to be 'sincere in their attempts to enforce Islamic religious law. [...] We saw the situation here before [they took over]', he continued, 'and after, we have seen an obvious improvement,'³⁶⁶ claiming reports of Taliban authorities banning girls from receiving an education were untrue.³⁶⁷ Just over a year later, any caveats or limitations had been removed. The Taliban were celebrated for having 'established the system of God on God's land' by enforcing *shari'ah*.³⁶⁸ They were unquestionably a legitimate force that had secured 'peace and restored the confidence in the public.'³⁶⁹ Zawahiri dismissed suggestions the Taliban were in any way an oppressive or tyrannical force. The people of Afghanistan 'supported and accepted the Islamic Emirate' he insisted, as it replaced the 'deterioration and damage' of the previous era. That Taliban rule was welcomed could be seen in the ways in which 'citizens in the various provinces and districts have welcomed and incited the Taliban to come to them to purge their areas of those who spread mischief;' from the

³⁶³ Zawahiri (2011) [234].

³⁶⁴ A large number of communiqués refer to the Afghan or AQI 'emirates,' see e.g. Zawahiri (2007) [13]; Zawahiri (2008) [107].

³⁶⁵ Bin Ladin (1996) [150].

³⁶⁶ Bin Ladin (1997) report of interview published in *The Independent* (as 'Interview with Usama bin Ladin,' 22 March), available from *FBIS: Compilation*, see full transcript: 'Transcript of Osama Bin Laden Interview' by Peter Arnett (CNN, 22 March). Available on <news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/binladen/binladenintvw-cnn.pdf>, accessed 3 March 2009 [155].

³⁶⁷ Bin Ladin (1997) [154].

³⁶⁸ Bin Ladin (1998) interview published in *Jang* (Rawalpindi) (18 November), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [175].

³⁶⁹ Bin Ladin (1999) interview published in Pakistani newspaper (20 February), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [182].

fact that ‘two thousand scholars at the Qandahar conference pledged allegiance to leader of the faithful, Mullah Mohammad Omar;’ that ‘the Islamic Emirate took control over large parts of Afghanistan;’ and the extent to which other jihadist groups had also stressed these factors.³⁷⁰ In any case, their implementation of divine protocol rendered questioning their authority impermissible. For this reason it was ‘compulsory upon all the Muslims all over the world to help Afghanistan and to make *hijra* to this land, because it is from this land that we will dispatch our armies all over the world to smash the *kuffar* all over the world.’³⁷¹

Taliban rule over Afghanistan (and to a far lesser extent, the Islamic State of Iraq’s ‘reign’ in several Iraqi districts) was thus endorsed as an intermediate, partial success in the establishment of a caliphate, even though some endorsements might have had as much to do with strategic expediency as they did doctrinal recognition. The ultimate goal, as an inspirational target and consistent undercurrent throughout the material under review, was, however, more ambitious and expansive. Aside from Zawahiri’s aspirational prescriptions in his messages of ‘Hope and Glad Tidings’ in response to the Arab Spring and other similar communiqués emphasising the ‘virtuous’ alternative, one of the clearer prognostic elaborations of the ultimate end goal found in the dataset was presented in an open letter, ‘Calling for a Global Islamic State,’ written by bin Ladin in early 2001. Addressing the ‘sons and daughters of Islam,’ bin Ladin concluded:

Today, every member of the Muslim world agrees that all the Muslim countries of the world having geographical boundaries on the basis of nationality, geography, religious discord, color and race, should be merged into one Muslim state, where men do not rule men. There should be one caliph for the whole state whose capital should be Mecca. There should be one currency and defense for this state and the Holy Koran should be its constitution. The name that has been proposed for this vast state is Global Muslim State. I want to congratulate you that by the grace of God, from today, we have begun the task of achieving a highly important and strong target of domination of Islam over all other religions.³⁷²

Although the coding established that desired societal, cultural and organisational components remained constant over time (pages 309-319 of Appendix 3) – irrespective of author – the scope, geographic focus and extent of application did not remain stable. A comparison between bin Ladin and Zawahiri in this respect revealed that neither was there always a comfortable match between the two leaders’ output. In the same year bin Ladin published his letter calling for a ‘Global Islamic State’ with its capital in Mecca, for instance, Zawahiri’s *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet* became available predicting an ‘earth-shattering event’ which would signal the ‘establishment of an Islamic caliphate [centred] in Egypt.’ ‘If God wills it, such a state in Egypt, with all its weight in the heart of the Islamic world, could lead the Islamic world in a jihad against the West.’³⁷³ Although essentially notional and abstract, this author argues that descriptions of the desired end goal play an important part in the communication of the Al-Qa’ida leaders’ message as they highlight the noble justifications behind mobilisation and activism. These messages remind audiences of the promised ultimate reward and the collective benefits that the *ummah* will reap if the vanguard is adequately supported.

³⁷⁰ Zawahiri (2008) [107].

³⁷¹ Bin Ladin (2000) ‘Usama Speaks on Hijrah and the Islamic State?’ statement published on ummah.net and elsewhere (22 May), made available in *FBIS: Compilation* [189].

³⁷² Bin Ladin (2001) untitled open letter published in *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Rawalpindi) (7 January), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [192].

³⁷³ Zawahiri (2001) [119].

Variation in terms of delineated stages and manifestations of the end reward, however, was detected over time, depending on geographic ambitions and emphases.

6.3 Stages and Priorities of Activism

Shortly after 9/11, bin Ladin published a set of 'Methodological Guidelines' on Maqdisi's 'Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad.' These identified six criteria for 'restoring' Islam to its true form, the ultimate goal of the *ummah* and its vanguard. These were: (1) love for God; (2) compassion for fellow believers; (3) counselling each other to goodness and obedience to God's commands; (4) hurting unbelievers; (5) jihad in the cause of God; and (6) fearlessness in the face of critics.³⁷⁴ The coding revealed how the scale of the ultimate objective these methods were intended to achieve, was relatively limited at first (See Appendix 3.3a, page 309).

Bin Ladin spoke initially of the need to 'expel' the 'unbelievers from the Arabian Peninsula,'³⁷⁵ for the US to remove its forces and end material support for Jews in Palestine.³⁷⁶ At this early stage, as the previous chapter discussed, the US presence in Saudi Arabia was seen as the 'root of all problems' preventing (alongside the Al-Saud family) the establishment of a 'pious Caliphate' on the Peninsula. The struggle would continue until Americans and their allies had been expelled from all the holy sites of Islam and *shari'ah* had been established in their wake.³⁷⁷ Prognostic elements of the communiqués from this early stage, therefore, were limited in scope and reach. Towards the end of the decade, however, additional parameters were being added. Ridding the Arabian Peninsula of American presence was merely the 'first' objective, according to bin Ladin's interview with John Miller in February 1999.³⁷⁸ In a joint statement with Zawahiri issued in September 2000, the two leaders pledged to 'do all we can to support our religion, to establish the shari'ah of Islam in the land of Islam, to expel the Jews and the Christians from the sacred places, and to endeavour to release our ulema from the United States, from Egypt, from Riyadh, and from all Muslim lands.'³⁷⁹ Post-9/11 communiqués promised to revive the Caliphate, as it was at the height of its power, throughout the Middle East and North Africa (and into Europe) 'as predicted by the Prophet,'³⁸⁰ even if it took 'several generations to achieve.'³⁸¹ 'The banner of the Caliphate' would thus 'flutter nobly after a long absence' from Al-Andalus to East Turkistan, Muslim lands would be liberated and God's way on earth implemented.³⁸²

³⁷⁴ Bin Ladin (unknown date) 'Methodological Guidelines: According to the Guidelines of Bin Ladin...' published online on 'Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad.' See McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) *Militant Ideology Atlas: Research Compendium* [112].

³⁷⁵ Bin Ladin (1994) 'The Banishment of Communism from the Arabian Peninsula: The Episode and the Proof,' open letter dated 7 July, available from Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345) [38].

³⁷⁶ Bin Ladin (1996) [150].

³⁷⁷ Bin Ladin (1998) [175].

³⁷⁸ Bin Ladin (1999) interview with John Miller and *Esquire Magazine* (February), interview conducted in 1998, later aired on ABC News (18 September), available from *Esquire Magazine* and *FBIS: Compilation* [179].

³⁷⁹ Bin Ladin & Zawahiri (2000) statement regarding Muslim prisoners aired on Al Jazeera (21 September), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [191].

³⁸⁰ E.g. Bin Ladin (2001) [130].

³⁸¹ Zawahiri (2001) [119].

³⁸² Zawahiri (2007) [102]; Zawahiri (2007) [103]; Zawahiri (2007) 'Annapolis: The Betrayal,' published by As-Sahab (14 December), available in IntelCenter (2008) [12].

Some articles even suggested a more expansionist approach, ensuring ‘the word of Allah becomes dominant and the word of the disbelievers becomes abased,’³⁸³ ‘propelling this battle toward its desired aim and intended objective of spreading Allah's religion in the world and applying His shari’ah.’³⁸⁴ Other articles, meanwhile, focused on more immediate objectives, especially progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, from where the mujahideen could spread the rule of Allah to neighbouring regions.³⁸⁵ In this sense, the emotional appeal of the Palestinian cause as a rallying cry for further support was utilised to highlight the importance of completing these more limited objectives successfully. Iraq would thus become the ‘fortress of Islam,’³⁸⁶ which could launch operations against Israel, once secured.³⁸⁷ Message elements linking on-going developments and preoccupations of Al-Qa’ida in the region, especially in Iraq, with the plight of Palestinians, became especially prominent in the dataset under review following the upheaval caused by the 2006 Lebanon war and, later, in the wake of Israel’s ‘Operation Cast Lead’ (December 2008 – January 2009) in Gaza.

6.3.1 Target prioritisation and resource mobilisation: conflicting emphases

This regional, or even global, focus appears to clash, at times, with Zawahiri’s sporadic preoccupation with Egypt, as noted above. In an article published in 1995, shortly after taking part in the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad on behalf of Al-Jihad, Zawahiri famously asserted, ‘the way to Jerusalem passes through Cairo,’ implying local activism and incremental changes preceded more ambitious gains (in addition to using the emotive Palestinian issue to shore up support of Al-Jihad in Egypt, as he did later for the Islamic State of Iraq).³⁸⁸ The way in which Zawahiri merged Al-Jihad with bin Ladin’s operations and focused on the ‘distant’ enemy was addressed in the first chapter and has been the focus of numerous papers and books.³⁸⁹ The communiqués under review for the current study, however, suggest Zawahiri never fully abandoned Egypt as the intended focal point of prognosis in terms of the range of activist solutions discussed and as ultimate objective of militancy.

In January 2008, for instance, Zawahiri emphasised the need to ‘establish a mujahidin Islamic state in Egypt that will seek to liberate Palestine and every Muslim land, eliminate corruption, establish justice and restore Egypt’s historical role of defending Islam and the Muslim people’ (adding ‘this benefit is greater than the loss represented by the shedding of some innocent blood’).³⁹⁰ The primary objective was to

³⁸³ Bin Ladin (2001) [129].

³⁸⁴ Bin Ladin (2002) [211].

³⁸⁵ Zawahiri (2006) ‘Hot Issues with Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri,’ published by As-Sahab (11 September), secured from Islamist web forums, also available from IntelCenter (2008) [21].

³⁸⁶ Zawahiri (2007) ‘Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri: On the fifth anniversary of the invasion and torture of Iraq,’ published by As-Sahab (17 April), secured from Islamist web forums, also available from IntelCenter (2008) [7].

³⁸⁷ Zawahiri (2007) ‘Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427,’ published by As-Sahab (13 February), available from IntelCenter (2008) [97].

³⁸⁸ Quoted in Burke, J. (2004-A): 154. Paradoxically, Zawahiri later insisted in his book *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, that the intention had been to target the US or European embassies in Islamabad, but they had proven too secure, suggesting, rather unconvincingly, that the target had always been the ‘distant’ enemy: Zawahiri (2001) [119].

³⁸⁹ E.g. Gerges (2005).

³⁹⁰ Zawahiri (2008) *Exoneration: A Letter Exonerating the Ummah of the Pen and the Sword from the Unjust Allegation of Feebleness and Weakness*, advertised by As-Sahab early in 2008, Open Source Center [20].

consolidate the Islamic state in Egypt prior to launching operations in support of Palestinians.

As noted above, the prioritisation conveyed through some of Zawahiri's messages also appears contradictory in terms of the 'distant' and 'near' enemy dichotomy. This relates not only to the focus of the diagnostic narrative, identifying the most pressing problems facing the *ummah* but also, and by extension, to conflicting expressions regarding the focus of activism and resources.

In December 2005, for instance, Zawahiri argued there was no way of achieving reform 'except by uprooting these corrupt and corrupting [local] regimes, and by establishing a Muslim government that will protect rights, defend sanctities, institute justice, spread consultation, raise the banner of jihad, and confront the invaders, the foes of Islam.'³⁹¹ A video statement issued a year later emphasised similar priorities: It is the duty of the Ummah's vanguard to strive for change, because getting rid of these puppets is the doorway to deliverance and *the beginning* of the serious Jihadi challenge to the Crusader invasion.'³⁹² Much as Mohammed Abd Al-Salam Faraj would argue, therefore, the emphasis of activism was on local ills, prior to attacking the distant enemy. In one of his 'interviews' with As-Sahab published three months later, however, Zawahiri appeared to swap these priorities, arguing:

The road to reform, and Allah knows best, requires, in the Arabian Peninsula and the other Islamic lands, work on two plans. The first is in the near term, and seeks to strike Crusader and Zionist interests so that the ground erupts in flames under the feet of the Zionists and Crusaders in our countries and theirs and everywhere we are able to strike their interests until they leave our countries and stop their continuous and increasing interference in our affairs. And the second plan is for the longer term, and depends on two pillars: the first is preparation for the confrontation, by going forth to arenas of battle like Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, and the second pillar is diligent work to change the corrupt and corruptive regimes through invitation, incitement, mobilization and planning, and to persevere in that however much time it takes or sacrifice it requires.³⁹³

Zawahiri's apparent inconsistency in this regard will be analysed in more detail in the section on geographic scope below. As can be seen, however, confused prioritisation of diagnostic principles has an immediate impact on the consistency of the prognostic element in the narrative, as the nature and target of suggested solutions to the problems identified become more muddled. Thus, even though his output was normally far more concise and consistent according to the current longitudinal study, bin Ladin's recent environmental agenda appears to have added some confusion to the traditional form of prognosis, as noted above.

Whereas the basic normative components and grounding of the desired alternative have remained relatively consistent in the communiqués analysed over time the coding revealed how implementation and procedural emphasis has varied in the communiqués in terms of geographic scope and topical focus with potential implications for frame effectiveness (details on how geographic scope developed are provided in Appendix 3.10, page 436).

The diagnostic (normative and grievance) frames, together with these more fundamental elements of prognosis serve to rationalise the specific course of action Al-

³⁹¹ Zawahiri (2005) [49].

³⁹² Zawahiri (2006) [94]. Emphasis added

³⁹³ Zawahiri (2007) [23].

Qa'ida pioneers and urges followers to adopt. In terms of the solutions presented to address and amend the status quo this relates primarily to the use of violence.

6.4 Approaching Violence

The Al-Qa'ida leadership has strongly advocated a strategy of increasingly indiscriminate violence in pursuit of its long- and short-term goals. Al-Qa'ida has implemented this strategy on several occasions through planning and executing dramatic mass-casualty terrorist attacks and through supporting and encouraging affiliates and followers to do the same. Approaches towards violence in the discourse under review and any limitations considered in this regard have evolved over the course of the past two decades as the Al-Qa'ida leaders have sought to convince potential participants of the forms of engagement and violent activism deemed acceptable, commendable and effective. The coding found that tactical and strategic recommendations, moreover, do not rely on violent solutions exclusively, although these have become ever more prominent in recent years.

The current analysis suggests the essence of the pro-violent narrative is a fundamental belief in the utility of violence and terrorist attacks, intertwined with evolving debates concerning the legitimacy of a given set of targets and methods in a moral and doctrinal context. The fight is invariably presented as defensive³⁹⁴ and, building upon Azzam's thesis of jihad as an individual duty (*fardh al-ayn*), it is seen as the responsibility of each true Muslim to ensure the *mujahideen* are successful, their ranks filled with new recruits and the vanguard well-funded and supplied. The alternative, collective obligation (*fardh al-kifaya*) only demands a response from a selection of the population (normally in geographical proximity) and does not apply when the *ummah* is facing an existential crisis.³⁹⁵

6.4.1 Contextual and strategic imperatives

Coding results concerning the importance of violent attack, as well as contextual and strategic imperatives, are provided in Appendix 3.4a (page 321). The processing of this material showed how in early communiqués, details relating to violent attacks were scant and preceding attacks were celebrated cautiously (mainly by bin Ladin, as Zawahiri was more explicit in his support from an early stage). Early public communiqués would only endorse attacks attributed to Al-Qa'ida and not claim responsibility. Bin Ladin stated that the principal role of the leadership was to instigate militant operations, not orchestrate attacks.³⁹⁶ This included attacks for which Al-Qa'ida would later proudly

³⁹⁴ See e.g. bin Ladin (2001) 'Letter to the Pakistani People,' aired on Al Jazeera (24 September), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [201] on defensive jihad.

³⁹⁵ Azzam, A. (2003). See references to jihad as an individual duty: (Zawahiri (unknown date) 'Response to a Grave Uncertainty from Shaykh al-Albani Regarding Silence in the Face of Apostate Rulers,' distributed online through 'Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad,' excerpts in McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) [117]) and the 'sixth undeclared element of Islam' (bin Ladin (2001) 'The US should search attackers within itself,' interview with *Ummat* (Karachi) (28 September), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [202]), a 'priority over seeking knowledge or marriage because it is an individual duty' (Zawahiri (2008) [107]).

³⁹⁶ See e.g. bin Ladin (1999) interview with bin Ladin titled 'Usama Bin Ladin, the Destruction of the Base' aired on Al Jazeera (10 June), full-length version aired on Al-Jazeera (20 September 2001), transcript available from *FBIS: Compilation* [184]; bin Ladin (1998) interview with *The News*

claim responsibility. The reason for this attempted detachment from violent operations appears linked to the conditions set by the Taliban hosts who tried to rein in their guest by asking bin Ladin to avoid engaging in 'political matters.'³⁹⁷ On-going frustration between Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban resulted in some considerable friction within the leadership of both and open criticism of the latter by bin Ladin as evident in interviews with Pakistani newspapers in the summer of 2001.³⁹⁸ Initial reluctance to claim credit for the 11 September 2001 attacks can in all likelihood be traced back to this need to protect the Afghan sanctuary and the alliance with the Taliban. Arguing in an interview with a Pakistani newspaper bin Ladin proclaimed:

I have already said that I am not involved in the 11 September attacks in the United States. As a Muslim, I try my best to avoid telling a lie. Neither [have] I had any knowledge of these attacks nor [did] I consider the killing of innocent women, children, and other humans as an appreciable act. Islam strictly forbids causing harm to innocent women, children, and other people. Such a practice is forbidden even in the course of a battle. [...] I have already said that we are against the American system, not against its people.³⁹⁹

Other interviews and announcements in the immediate aftermath of the attacks also aimed to distance Al-Qa'ida from the 9/11 attacks, variously claiming no knowledge of the attacks or blaming a US-Jewish conspiracy.⁴⁰⁰ Context would suggest these were *tactical denials*, perhaps to buy time and facilitate preparations prior to inevitable US reprisals, rather than sincere doubts regarding the merits of mass-casualty attacks. The coding revealed that bin Ladin denied involvement in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings in their immediate aftermath but began to at least endorse and welcome them when the limited impact of the lacklustre US response became clear.⁴⁰¹

By contrast, as soon as the extent of US and coalition efforts to target the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan became known, removing the former from power, the Al-Qa'ida leadership began praising the 9/11 attacks and claiming responsibility for them. By that time, it can be argued, they had nothing to lose and everything to gain by claiming credit for such spectacular attacks against the United States and its allies. The 'martyrdom' of the hijackers was celebrated, their actions presented as examples for others to follow and those who criticised the nature of the attacks were condemned as American stooges.⁴⁰² Later messages provided more detail of how the attacks were

(Islamabad/Peshawar) reported in AFP (21 August) as 'Bin Ladin Calls For "Jihad" Against Jews, Americans,' available in *FBIS: Compilation* [172]; bin Ladin (1998) [170].

³⁹⁷ See note 261, above

³⁹⁸ See e.g. Bin Ladin (2001) letter from bin Ladin published in *The Dawn* (Karachi) (3 April) titled 'Usama regrets curbs by Taliban,' available in *FBIS: Compilation* [195]; bin Ladin (2001) statement published in Pakistani newspaper (17 May) in article titled 'If Taleban allow, I can make US life miserable: Usama,' available in *FBIS: Compilation* [198].

³⁹⁹ Bin Ladin (2001) [202]

⁴⁰⁰ See e.g. bin Ladin (2001) statement reported by the Afghan Press Agency (16 September), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [200].

⁴⁰¹ Bin Ladin (1998) [172]. In a statement reported in December 1998, bin Ladin claimed not to be responsible for the bombings, even though he did welcome them. Subsequent messages followed this trend: bin Ladin (1998) statement distributed by Afghan Islamic Press, reported in AFP (24 December) titled 'Bin Ladin Denies Role in Bombings of US Missions,' available in *FBIS: Compilation* [176].

⁴⁰² Countless examples of praise for the 9/11 attacks feature in the discourse. Zawahiri and bin Ladin featured together in a sophisticated video production six months after the attacks took place titled 'The Wills of the Martyrs of the New York and Washington Battles,' which also featured excerpts from the last testimonies of the hijackers themselves: As-Sahab (2002) 'The Wills of the Martyrs of the New York and Washington Battles: The Will of the Martyr Ibn ul Jarah Al-Ghamidee Ahmed al-Haznawi,' published 18

supposedly organised and what had inspired the specific tactics displayed.⁴⁰³ The coding revealed how post-9/11 communiqués presented attacks generally attributed to sympathisers and affiliates as part of Al-Qa'ida's grand strategy. The 2002 Bali bombings were tied to warnings against Australian involvement in East Timor and presented as a reciprocal response to 'crusader aggression.'⁴⁰⁴ The Madrid bombings were discussed in a similar way⁴⁰⁵ and whilst investigators and analysts were still assessing the level of the Al-Qa'ida core's involvement in the 2005 London bombings, Zawahiri declared 'The blessed London raid is one of the raids that the Qaeda al-Jihad organization had the honour of carrying out against the British Crusader arrogance.'⁴⁰⁶ The communiqués from this period show how the Al-Qa'ida core was focused on disseminating material showing it was in direct control.

Aside from such contextual and strategic imperatives, the longitudinal study demonstrated how substantive justifications for violence have changed considerably over time. Justifications for the targeting of non-combatants (Muslim and non-Muslim) were coded separately and the findings are shown in Appendix 3.4b, page 345.

6.4.2 *Disappearing caveats*

This study found that bin Ladin rarely alluded to the importance of violent attack as a valid activist method in his early public messages. Although his open letters to Saudi leaders would declare the need for regime change in Saudi Arabia, acts of violence – especially those targeting non-combatants or Muslims – were not discussed. Towards the latter half of the 1990s, however, bin Ladin began publicly to endorse a violent uprising against US troops based in the Arabian Peninsula. Early communiqués called for the 'expulsion' of civilian contractors from the area, rather than murder.⁴⁰⁷ Nonetheless, bin Ladin celebrated the 1996 Al-Khobar bombings, noting that 'only Americans were killed,' rather than Saudi citizens,⁴⁰⁸ adding 'if liberating my land is called terrorism, this is a great honour for me.'⁴⁰⁹ The Khobar bombings, and similar attacks, constituted 'praiseworthy terrorism' against 'thieves:' a defensive response to the 'blameworthy terrorism' of America and its allies and the kind committed by 'thieves against nations.'⁴¹⁰ Terror, according to bin Ladin, could be a force for good, similar to when a

April, secured from Islamist web forums [207]. Early examples of denunciation of those criticising the attacks as 'agents of America' featured in: bin Ladin (2001) [129].

⁴⁰³ Bin Ladin discusses how he selected the hijackers, for example, in: bin Ladin (2006) 'A Testimony to the Truth,' published by As-Sahab (23 May), secured from Islamist web forum [91], noting he had decided to 'destroy towers in America' in response to the pain and suffering inflicted in Lebanon during the 1982 invasion: bin Ladin (2004) untitled statement distributed by As-Sahab (30 October), available in IntelCenter (2008) [83]. Zawahiri, meanwhile, claimed he had been present at a lecture in Kandahar a year prior to the attacks where Al-Qa'ida leaders and Mohammed Atta discussed how best to respond to aggression in Palestine, with the conclusion being they should plan the multiple hijackings displayed on 11 September 2001: Zawahiri (2006) 'The Zionist Crusader's Aggression on Gaza and Lebanon,' published by As-Sahab (27 June), available from IntelCenter (2008) [88].

⁴⁰⁴ Bin Ladin (2002) untitled statement aired on Al Jazeera (12 November), available from IntelCenter (2008) and *FBIS: Compilation* [76]; Zawahiri (2005) [49].

⁴⁰⁵ See e.g. bin Ladin (2004) untitled audio statement aired on Al Jazeera and Al-Arabiya (15 April), IntelCenter (2008) [80].

⁴⁰⁶ Zawahiri (2005) [49].

⁴⁰⁷ See e.g. bin Ladin (1997) interview with 'Dispatches' aired on Channel Four Television (20 February), transcript in *FBIS: Compilation* titled 'Correspondent Meets with Opposition Leader Bin Ladin' [151]; Bin Ladin (1997) [155].

⁴⁰⁸ Bin Ladin (1997) [154].

⁴⁰⁹ Bin Ladin (1997) [155].

⁴¹⁰ Bin Ladin (1996) [150].

police used force to contain a criminal. This was the terrorism of Al-Qa'ida: 'we practice the good terrorism which stops them [the Americans and Israelis] from killing our children in Palestine and elsewhere.'⁴¹¹ This is related to Al-Suri's notions of *irhab mahmud*, 'terrorism by the righteous who have been unjustly treated.'⁴¹²

When coding results for approaches to violence (see Appendix 3.4b) were analysed, it emerged that distinctions between soldier and civilian, however vague, began to disappear with the 1998 declaration of war from the 'World Islamic Front', where US and allied soldiers and civilians 'wherever they can be found' were equally legitimate targets.⁴¹³ Bin Ladin reiterated these calls in subsequent interviews and statements, although some variation persisted with messages issued a month after the declaration variously calling for the 'expulsion' of the American 'invaders',⁴¹⁴ or the total 'annihilation' of America.⁴¹⁵ Corresponding with an expanded geographical scope, as mentioned above, bin Ladin's messages towards the end of the decade suggested more expansive fields of jihad against India and other identified enemies,⁴¹⁶ as well as jihad in 'every street' of the US⁴¹⁷ or even a world-wide campaign in order to 'smash the kuffar all over the world.'⁴¹⁸ Bin Ladin claimed, in a 1999 interview with John Miller, that Al-Qa'ida would not 'differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets.'⁴¹⁹ 'All Americans are our enemies, not just the ones who fight us directly but also the ones who pay their taxes', bin Ladin argued in a statement issued in January 1999, practically incriminating all law-abiding American adults.⁴²⁰ 'The man is a fighter,' bin Ladin elaborated further in an interview later that year, 'whether he carries arms or helps kill us by paying taxes and by gathering information.' Furthermore, he pointed out, 'almost three quarters of the US people support [President] Clinton's strikes against Iraq [Operation Desert Fox]. They are people who increase their support for their president when he commits cardinal sins. They are a lowly people who do not at all understand the meaning of values.'⁴²¹

6.4.3 Killing civilians

This transition in terms of public endorsement for more indiscriminate violence is interesting. One possible reason is the increased influence of Zawahiri and his fellow Egyptian members of Al-Qa'ida, although Scheuer dismisses the notion as Saudi propaganda.⁴²² For the Egyptians, however, the debate surrounding the possible targeting of civilians had been on-going for some time. In the wake of the aforementioned 1995 attack on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, for instance, Zawahiri penned an article in a local newspaper insisting embassy workers had become legitimate targets since they

⁴¹¹ Bin Ladin (2001) [130]. See also on further notions of 'praiseworthy terrorism' in Bin Ladin (2001) [129].

⁴¹² In Suri's *Global Islamic Resistance Call*, Chapter 8 in Lia (2007): 383-386.

⁴¹³ Bin Ladin, Zawahiri et al. (1998) [161].

⁴¹⁴ Bin Ladin (1998) [162].

⁴¹⁵ Bin Ladin (1998) interview published in *Al-Akhbar* (Islamabad) (31 March), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [163].

⁴¹⁶ Bin Ladin (1998) [170]; bin Ladin (1998) [171].

⁴¹⁷ Bin Ladin (2000) statement published in Pakistani daily (2 May), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [188].

⁴¹⁸ Bin Ladin (2000) [189].

⁴¹⁹ Bin Ladin (1999) [179].

⁴²⁰ Bin Ladin (1999) war declaration distributed by CBS (13 January), published in *FBIS: Compilation* [180]. Other jihadi ideologues have of course voiced similar sentiments.

⁴²¹ Bin Ladin (1999) [184].

⁴²² Scheuer (2011) 8-15.

perceived government loyalty superior to divine loyalty.⁴²³ Later the Egyptian Al-Jihad *Majlis-ash-Shura* issued a lengthy treatise justifying civilian targeting. Noting how the Prophet's armies had used catapults in the 7th century (CE) siege of Ta'if, it argued indiscriminate attacks under contemporary circumstances could thus be legitimised. Although recognising that reading of the Hadith offered no concrete justification of killing 'protected people', the authors opined that killing non-combatants would be justifiable 'as long as there is a need or an obligation for Muslims to do so, or if not striking leads to a delay to jihad. As for blood money and atonement, these are to be judged individually.' The nature of asymmetric warfare, target hardening of security installations and enhanced protection of political figures, and the success of *mujahideen* operations demonstrated the need to engage in such attacks. Nonetheless, Muslims would have to be warned not to be close to potential targets of 'tyrants' and were they to be killed, apologies were in order and, funds permitting, financial compensation.⁴²⁴

In an interview with a sympathetic reporter of a Pakistani daily in October 2001, bin Ladin conceded the Prophet had banned the killing of women and children but argued this was not absolute. Citing part of a verse from the *An-Nahl* (sixteenth) Surah on the right to retaliate in kind against disbelievers, bin Ladin sought to justify the stance which has been prominent in the Al-Qa'ida rhetoric ever since: that killing of women and children is permissible since 'infidels purposely kill [Muslim] women and children.'⁴²⁵ Seeking to further strengthen his argument, bin Ladin mentioned scholars who supported these views, ignoring subsequent verses in the section of the Quran he quoted, which emphasised instead patience and endurance and encouraged those who do good. Nevertheless, the interview still fell short of full endorsement of indiscriminate targeting, justifying 9/11 as strikes against economic and military installations, rather than civilian targets. After all, the World Trade Centre was not a 'children's school.'⁴²⁶ Even so, 'if a child is above thirteen and wields a weapon against Muslims,' bin Ladin argued in another interview two months later, 'then it is permitted to kill him.'⁴²⁷ This applied to Americans in particular who were all seen as 'active members' in the 'crimes' committed against Muslims.⁴²⁸

Reciprocity featured prominently in the coding of references concerning the use of violence and was found to be central to the Al-Qa'ida leadership's justification for the killing of non-combatants. Several communiqués sought to add to these claims of counter-aggression and defensive responses an aura of fairness with the aim of convincing the Muslim audience that such claims were religiously sound given the multiple warnings made and the alternatives offered to adversaries.⁴²⁹ In his aforementioned interview with John Miller, for instance, bin Ladin warned: 'the only

⁴²³ Zawahiri (1996) 'Healing the Hearts of Believers: On Some Concepts of Jihad in the Islamabad Operation,' distributed online through 'Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad', excerpts published in McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) *Militant Ideology Atlas: Research Compendium* [118].

⁴²⁴ Zawahiri [purported] (unknown date) 'Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents', available in Ibrahim (2007). [48]

⁴²⁵ Bin Ladin (2001) [130].

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Bin Ladin (2001) Interview with Hamid Mir published in *The Dawn* (10 November), available on <<http://archives.dawn.com/2001/11/10/top1.htm>>, accessed 16 March 2012, see also Hegghammer, T. (2003) *FFI Rapport 1990-2002* [125].

⁴²⁸ Bin Ladin (2002) [212].

⁴²⁹ Scheuer (2006) notes how there are three actions that need to be undertaken before the Prophet's conditions on attacking an enemy are fulfilled: 'clear warnings of an intention to attack; offers of a truce; and public calls on the foe to convert to Islam,' arguing the Al-Qa'ida leadership has fulfilled all three. 'The Western Media's Misreading of al-Qaeda's Latest Videotape' in *Terrorism Focus* (vol. 3, iss. 34), Jamestown Foundation.

way for us to fend off these [American] assaults is to use similar means.⁴³⁰ Americans 'only understand the language of attacks and killings. Just as they're killing us, we have to kill them so that there will be a balance of terror.'⁴³¹ The 9/11 attacks were thus only a 'reaction to the continuous injustice and oppression being practiced against our sons in Palestine and Iraq and in Somalia and Southern Sudan and in other places.'⁴³² This was 'equal treatment.'⁴³³ How could 'defending oneself and punishing the aggressor in kind, [be] objectionable terrorism? If it is such, then it is unavoidable for us.'⁴³⁴ Warnings of supposedly reciprocal treatment thus featured prominently in threats communicated to the *kuffar* enemy: As you kill, you will be killed, and as you capture, you will be captured, and as you ruin our security, we will ruin your security, and the one who started it has done the greater injustice.⁴³⁵

Behind the scenes, the Al-Qa'ida leaders continued to struggle with formulating jurisprudential justifications for the level and nature of the violence displayed on 11 September. Ramzi bin al-Shibh, one of the attack's organisers, drafted an internal memo titled 'The truth about the new crusade: a ruling on the killing of women and children of the non-believers' declaring: 'The sanctity of women, children, and the elderly, is not absolute.' Four scenarios would render killing 'infidel' civilians legal according to his interpretation: (1) if the enemy had targeted Muslim civilians; (2) if Muslim regions were being invaded; (3) if non-combatants were supporting attacks on Muslims, 'whether in action, word, or any other type of assistance'; or (4) if the enemy attacked with indiscriminate weaponry which did not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants.⁴³⁶

If murdering women and children posed doctrinal challenges for the leadership, justifying the deaths of Muslims would prove even more problematic and became a source of a great deal of criticism of Al-Qa'ida from within the Islamist community. This tension was also discernable from the analysis of the coding categories on violence. Bin Ladin insisted, in an interview in 1999, that risk of inflicting Muslim deaths should not prevent attacks from being orchestrated, so long as the targets were legitimate.⁴³⁷ When asked about Muslim deaths on 9/11 in an interview in November 2001, bin Ladin largely ignored the issue of killing Muslims arguing simply that the death of Muslims could be justified if the enemy was hiding behind a 'human shield' of innocents.⁴³⁸ In this sense, legitimisations of Muslim deaths were similar to those used by conventional forces and Western coalitions when explaining the inevitability of 'collateral damage.' Any further attempts to justify the killing of Muslims were not offered at this stage and the issue has remained the most contentious and potentially damaging for Al-Qa'ida

Meanwhile, justifications for civilian non-Muslim deaths continued to be based on alleged crimes of the West and the core values and deeds of the citizenry in designated 'hostile' societies. In addition to voting and paying taxes, the public is chastised for tolerating 'immoral behaviour,' as noted in the section on diagnostic framing, acquiescing Jewish takeover of the banking system, permitting arms

⁴³⁰ Bin Ladin (1999) [179].

⁴³¹ Bin Ladin (2001) [130].

⁴³² Bin Ladin (2001) [129].

⁴³³ Bin Ladin (2002) [76].

⁴³⁴ Bin Ladin (2004) [83].

⁴³⁵ Bin Ladin (2010) 'Message from Shaykh Usama bin Ladin to the People of France,' published by As-Sahab (7 November), translated and distributed by Ansar Al Mujahideen English Forum, secured from Islamist web forums [230].

⁴³⁶ Cullison (2004): 11

⁴³⁷ Bin Ladin (1999) [178].

⁴³⁸ Bin Ladin (2001) [125].

manufacturers to operate, joining or supporting the armed forces and other alleged acts of hostility which made the general public an accomplice in the imagined conspiracy against Muslims.⁴³⁹ Further justifications and excuses were made in the wake of the 2005 London bombings, whereby ordinary civilians were classified as ‘combatants’, simply for respecting British judicial norms and the legitimacy of democratic institutions, regardless of opinion on foreign or domestic policy: in December 2005 Zawahiri claimed that the fact Britons had failed to ‘depose’ their government demonstrated they had no qualms with its policy output.⁴⁴⁰ A year later he stated: ‘even those who oppose the policies [of the West], still consider the governments legitimate. Also, all the political parties in the West supported the creation of Israel.’⁴⁴¹

6.4.4 Justifications for killing Muslims

Thus mere recognition of the legitimacy of the democratic political process suffices, according to the communiqués, to apply the combatant label to the general public and hence justify wanton killing of non-Muslims, including tourists in Muslim lands.⁴⁴² This does not constitute a radical rethink of religious protocols, nor is the debate sophisticated or original in any doctrinal sense. Rudimentary jurisprudential guidelines from religious texts on the killing of certain groups of people still broadly apply. All the leadership has tried to do is to gradually widen this category and include ever more people as legitimate targets for attack, citing increasingly vague and all-encompassing allegations of complicity. Although more problematic, the leadership has sought to justify an increase in violence against Muslim publics in much the same way. Rather than engaging in difficult doctrinal debates about the subject, for which the leadership lacks religious qualifications, this study found that Zawahiri and bin Ladin have instead sought to redefine the concept of ‘Muslim’ through their messages.

Again, much of the groundwork had already been done by the Egyptians, who needed to justify killing embassy employees and the targeting of government officials as mentioned above. Since the Qur’an strictly forbids the shedding of Muslim blood, the obvious way to do this was to try and convince followers and a wider audience of the discourse that the deceased had committed such grave sins that they were no longer Muslims. This is the essence of the *takfiri* narrative. Various sections of the Muslim population are in this way branded ‘apostates’ and legitimate enemies and targets, since they have strayed away from the true creed. Although attitude towards violence varies slightly, the communiqués consistently identify ‘treacherous’ Muslims who can be targeted. Initially, and more notably throughout, the subjects in question are leaders of Muslim countries and their closest associates in the military and intelligence services, who have allied with the West. The way in which these categories are constituted and communicated will be analysed in the next chapter when discussing the issue of designing motivational appeals. The most prominent example found in the dataset of justifications for Muslim deaths based on *takfiri* allegations – aside from the political elite – relates to Iraqis who cooperated with the coalition or the government in Baghdad or those who generally failed to embrace the sectarian chaos fomented by the violent extremists in the country.

Bin Ladin warned his ‘brothers in Iraq’ at the dawn of the conflict that those who supported the Crusaders, even just with words, were ‘apostates and outside the

⁴³⁹ Bin Ladin (2002) [212].

⁴⁴⁰ Zawahiri (2005) [49].

⁴⁴¹ Zawahiri (2007) [101].

⁴⁴² See on the killing of Western tourists in Zawahiri (2008) [20]

community of Muslims' rendering it 'permissible to spill their blood and take their property.'⁴⁴³ The killing of members of the government, army, security agencies and National Guard was sanctioned, as 'they are infidels',⁴⁴⁴ and they should be 'killed, regardless of their sect or tribe.'⁴⁴⁵ Al-Qa'ida loyalists in Iraq did not hesitate to implement this strategy going to such excesses that the central leadership became concerned over the resulting damage to its image (see further below). Zawahiri proudly announced in a 2006 video statement that 'the group Qaida al-Jihad in the Land of Two Rivers alone has carried out 800 martyrdom operations in 3 years, besides the sacrifices of the other Mujahideen, and this is what has broken the back of America in Iraq.'⁴⁴⁶ Yet, according to Riedel, more than three-fourths of Al-Qa'ida affiliated attacks in Iraq targeted Muslims, mostly (but not exclusively) the Shia.⁴⁴⁷ One of the poignant questions posed to Zawahiri for his 'Open Meeting' initiative addressed precisely this record of violence against Muslims:

Who is it who is killing with Your Excellency's blessing the innocents in Baghdad, Morocco and Algeria? Do you consider the killing of women and children to be jihad? I challenge you and your organization to do that in Tel Aviv. Why have you – to this day – not carried out any strike in Israel? Or is it easier to kill Muslims in the markets? Maybe it is necessary [for you] to take some geography lessons, because your maps only show the Muslims' states.⁴⁴⁸

Even Hamas criticised the excessive use of violence displayed by Al-Qa'ida-endorsed elements in Iraq and beyond, such as Zarqawi's Amman bombings in November 2005, arguing:

The [Muslim] people loved al-Qa'ida because it declared war on the American enemy who supports the occupation of Palestine and is the occupier of Iraq and Afghanistan; however this love was taken out of people's chest when they hit the innocent. The victims of the Amman wedding and their families, of who we see and console them even today, are proof of the blind use of weapons which tainted al-Zawahiri and his group.⁴⁴⁹

Rather feebly, the Al-Qa'ida leaders have responded arguing that those stirring up ethnic hatred and fomenting civil war are forces loyal to the regime that want America to stay in Iraq.⁴⁵⁰

The most earnest attempt at engaging with more complex theological debates in order to justify killing of civilians and Muslims that was detected in the dataset, was put forward in Zawahiri's book *The Exoneration: A Letter Exonerating the Ummah of Pen and Sword from Unjust Allegations of Feebleness and Weakness*, which he completed in early spring 2008. The book was a response to a series of allegations made by his former associate, 'Abd al-Qadir (more commonly known as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif or 'Dr Fadl') and other criticism from former extremists and radicals in Egypt and elsewhere

⁴⁴³ Bin Ladin (2003) [79].

⁴⁴⁴ Bin Ladin (2004) [86].

⁴⁴⁵ Bin Ladin (2006) 'Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr and Emir of the Martyrs, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,' published by As-Sahab (29 June), available in IntelCenter (2008) [92].

⁴⁴⁶ Zawahiri (2006) [81].

⁴⁴⁷ Reidel (2008): 101.

⁴⁴⁸ In Page et al. (2011): 162.

⁴⁴⁹ Cragin (2009) 'Al Qaeda Confronts Hamas: Divisions in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and its Implications for U.S. Policy', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, (32: 7, pp. 576-590).

⁴⁵⁰ Zawahiri (2007) [23]; Bin Ladin (2007) [10].

who were uncomfortable with the level of violence displayed by Al-Qa'ida and affiliates. Primarily based on reported deeds of the Prophet (*Ahadith*) and anecdotes and rulings of medieval jurists rather than the Qur'an, and weaved into assumptions concerning contemporary manifestations of religious protocols, *The Exoneration* set out a series of justifications for killing Muslims, children, women, the elderly, the infirm, and other people protected according to Qur'anic verses.

Three major justifications were cited for shedding Muslim blood: (1) Muslim deaths in and amongst other legitimate targets are justifiable since the Prophet allowed night raids as they were necessary to achieve victory.⁴⁵¹ This means that attacks which do not distinguish between enemies within a confined space must also be allowed; (2) the 7th century Muslim conquest used catapults, therefore indiscriminate weaponry and bombs must be justifiable even where Muslims live; (3) 'captive' Muslims being held by enemy forces may be killed since this falls under the category of 'persisting in combat' even if the enemy uses Muslims as 'human shields' (a concept referred to as *Mas'alat al-Tatarrus*). Zawahiri often cites interpretations by Ibn Taymiyyah, a 13th-14th century Sunni traditionalist jurist, implying that such deaths would not be illegal, and attempts to apply these to current events in order to justify Al-Qa'ida's tactics. These medieval jurisprudential justifications are applied, without question, to the contemporary scene and used to legitimise attacks where unarmed Muslim bystanders constitute most or all of the casualties. The only rationalisations for civilian targeting offered emphasise the extent to which regular leadership targets have become harder to strike, the specific nature of the emergency facing the *ummah*, and the need for asymmetric tactics against a conventionally stronger enemy. *The Exoneration* utilises a similar concoction of medieval *ulema* (scholarly) rulings and accounts of specific events and tactics employed centuries ago during battle to justify civilian, *non-Muslim* deaths through Al-Qa'ida attacks and those of its affiliates. Extra-contextual interpretations derived from such readings are applied to modern-day scenarios and situations for which the medieval teachings were never intended, to make the increase in indiscriminate violence seem right and religiously justified. Civilians can be killed, according to the communiqués, if they are adjacent to a legitimate target, or simply part of a hostile society. As for Jews, they can all be targeted since 'all Jews support Israel' and thus are in fact Zionists, according to Zawahiri's treatise.⁴⁵²

The development of these justifications for civilian deaths and 'collateral' damage served the purpose of legitimising, glorifying and elevating a violent strategy and set of tactical preferences that ultimately were seen as highly effective. Although, as Hegghammer notes and the current study confirms, the Al-Qa'ida leadership messages rarely provide detailed strategic or tactical advice, the overall message from the communiqués coded (see Appendix 3.4a on tactical preferences) underlines the importance of terrorist attack and especially suicide ('martyrdom') bombings as prognostic tools to achieve the desired results.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵¹ Zawahiri bases this assumption mostly on the rulings of Ibn-Qudamah and Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, influential medieval scholars.

⁴⁵² Zawahiri (2008) [20]. See further on the development of Taymiyyah's thoughts, e.g. in Esposito (2002): 45-46.

⁴⁵³ Hegghammer, T. (2006) 'Global Jihadism after the Iraq War,' in *Middle East Journal* (vol. 60: no. 1, winter): 15. Indeed the development of detailed strategic doctrine and delineation of specific objectives would generally not take place in open forums or be communicated through public messages.

6.5 Strategy and Tactics

The strategic vision set out in the communiqués can be summarised as follows: A vanguard has to be created, preferably in a region which provides the proper base to create a movement strong enough to tackle enemy forces – foreign and domestic.⁴⁵⁴ The vanguard is made up of *mujahideen* who attack the enemy but should rely on the support of the *ummah* and on the *fatawa* of righteous, independent *ulema* who have not been corrupted by government institutions or ‘agents’ of the Zionist-Crusader West. Young men from their mid-teens up to their mid-twenties provide the mainstay of the *mujahideen* vanguard⁴⁵⁵ whilst other members of the *ummah* should support them and supplement their operations through public protest, raising funds, working against ‘apostate’ local regimes or Western governments, supporting radical Islamist publications and so on. The vanguard’s success is inevitable due to its closeness to God, dedication, and willingness to embrace martyrdom. Once a small region is secured, an Islamic emirate which implements the Shari’ah will be created. This will be used as a base for further operations, which will not cease until all Muslim land has been freed of Zionist-Crusader-‘apostate’ influence and all its inhabitants start living under the strictest interpretations of Shari’ah law.

When strategic references were viewed in the wider narrative context that can be seen in Appendix 3.4a, it appears that existing experiences of violent jihad, especially from Afghanistan, and observed reactions of the enemy have informed many of Al-Qa’ida’s core strategic preferences. In *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, one of the more comprehensive communiqués discussing strategy and methods of organising violent uprising, Zawahiri emphasised how lessons from Afghanistan demonstrated to the leadership the importance of establishing a base, ‘an arena that would act like an incubator where its seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, and organizational matters.’⁴⁵⁶ Other important ingredients of a successful violent resistance movement, according to Zawahiri, included perseverance, patience and an ‘organization and leadership leading change.’⁴⁵⁷ A degree of structure and top-down guidance was thus essential, rather than the fluid, autonomous cells favoured by Al-Suri. Nothing would be achieved, however, without the ‘mobilization of popular support.’⁴⁵⁸ ‘Striving to achieve popular sympathy for the Islamic Mujahid movement for change’ was paramount, Zawahiri argued.⁴⁵⁹ As a result alienation of the general support base, due to excessive use of force, would be catastrophic, as would the failure to ensure the message resonated with identified constituents.

Some of the strategic references uncovered concerned ways in which Al-Qa’ida could utilise specific weaknesses of adversaries and learn from the historic follies of

⁴⁵⁴ Such strategic preferences strongly resemble those of 20th Century communist revolutionaries. Cf. Stout et al. (2008).

⁴⁵⁵ Over the years, however, the sense of urgency has served to enlarge the group deemed eligible for *mujahideen* operations. In 1998, for instance, bin Ladin explained that those doing most of the fighting would be between fifteen and twenty-five years of age, since younger people would not fully comprehend the nature of the battle and older men would have family obligations. Ten years later, however, Zawahiri stressed that ‘Going to jihad is a priority over seeking knowledge or marriage because it is an individual duty.’ Women do not have an operational role. See bin Ladin (1999) [184]; Zawahiri (2008) [107].

⁴⁵⁶ Zawahiri (2001) [119]. Zawahiri reiterated the importance of creating a secure base in: Zawahiri (2008) ‘The Open Meeting ... Part One,’ [105].

⁴⁵⁷ Zawahiri (2002) [22]; Zawahiri (2007) [102].

⁴⁵⁸ Zawahiri (2008) [105].

⁴⁵⁹ Zawahiri (2007) [102].

others. In addition to an unflinching belief in the ability of Al-Qa'ida to force through change, the leaders claim to understand the weak points of their principal foe, the United States. Afghanistan is, again, the source of inspiration. The withdrawal of Soviet forces and subsequent and rapid implosion of the Soviet Union itself 'cleared from Muslim minds the myth of superpowers', bin Ladin insisted,⁴⁶⁰ a point which Zawahiri reiterated in *Knights*.⁴⁶¹ This experience would inform the struggle against the US. The abrupt withdrawal of US forces from Somalia following the 'Black Hawk Down' incident convinced, at least according to public messages, that America was a 'paper tiger.'⁴⁶² It would not be able to suffer long term casualties, military or civilian, due to the resulting political pressures domestically. In addition to provoking such a reaction in their own right, therefore, attacks could lure the US into protracted wars of attrition that would cause immense political, psychological and economic damage. In the first in a series of staged 'interviews' for As-Sahab, Zawahiri noted (a year into the Afghan campaign and six months before the start of hostilities in Iraq) that: 'the continual attacks on the American system, [have] finally pulled the Biggest Satan to the arena of Jihad [...] Once in the arena of war, it will start feeling its own losses.'⁴⁶³ Bin Ladin also recognised the importance of provocation in undermining the enemy: 'all that we have to do is send two mujahideen to the furthest point East to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses.'⁴⁶⁴ Indeed, American failure in Iraq would be comparable to the debacle it suffered in Vietnam.⁴⁶⁵ In terms of strategic focus, moreover, the current study found that early messages to potential participants suggested a degree of pragmatic selectivity, whereby bin Ladin urged followers not to consider Muslim disagreements with China, but rather focus on the US, especially as animosity between the two powers could be beneficial for Al-Qa'ida.⁴⁶⁶

6.5.1 *Methods alternative to violence*

In addition to references underscoring the use of violence as a solution, the coding mined the dataset for examples and inferences regarding potential political tools for change beyond violent attack. These are collated in Appendix 3.5, page 350. This process revealed that not all of the tactics advocated by the Al-Qa'ida leadership involved violent methods, with some emphasis placed on securing collective support, through the strength of a united *ummah*, for economic sanctioning, thus striking at the very heart of the capitalist system.

Even as early as the mid-1980s, when the US-supported campaign against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was still being fought, bin Ladin used his family mosque in Jeddah to distribute leaflets and give speeches protesting against US support for Israel and calling for boycott of US goods.⁴⁶⁷ On several subsequent occasions, the Al-Qa'ida leaders have suggested economic boycott as a tool against enemy powers and urged a pan-Islamic embrace of such methods. Figure 4, below, highlights these relevant

⁴⁶⁰ Bin Ladin (1999) [179].

⁴⁶¹ See Zawahiri's fourth point on the 'Lessons from Afghanistan' Zawahiri (2001) [119].

⁴⁶² Bin Ladin (1999) [179].

⁴⁶³ Zawahiri (2002) [22].

⁴⁶⁴ Bin Ladin (2004) [83].

⁴⁶⁵ 'The claim that the Americans are depriving the mujahideen of ground shows that they are either lying or have learned nothing from the attack-and-retreat-war in Iraq or Vietnam.' Zawahiri (2007) [13].

⁴⁶⁶ Bin Ladin (1998) [171]. Such sentiments did not last long, however, as solidarity was expressed with fellow Muslims in 'East Turkistan.'

⁴⁶⁷ Bergen (2001); Riedel (2008); Wright (2006-A)

communiqués, which are arranged in chronological order along a timeline that shows when these references were made.



Although initially seen as a specific response against alleged US infringement of the sanctity of the Peninsula and Arab Islamic interests, the advocacy of such methods quickly became supportive of a wider campaign of militancy and terrorism. The first declaration of war against America in 1996 asserted that ‘if the economic boycott is coupled with the mujahidin's military strikes, then the enemy's defeat is imminent’ and added that women would be expected to take part in this as well.⁴⁶⁸ Both Zawahiri and bin Ladin have consistently reiterated such calls; stressing the need to boycott Western goods in tandem with planning and supporting acts of violence. Such calls were particularly prominent during the widespread Muslim outrage following the publication of Muhammad caricatures in Danish and Norwegian newspapers, although boycotts had already been widely planned by the time Al-Qa'ida urged its audience to embrace such measures. In a June 2007 statement distributed by As-Sahab, moreover, Zawahiri called for universal boycott of British goods in response to British colonial ‘crimes’.⁴⁶⁹

Even though all Muslims may not all be able to partake in violent operations against the external or local enemy for physical or societal reasons, they are nonetheless expected to contribute to the fight through boycotting US, Israeli, and Western goods as well as preventing ‘Muslim resources’, especially oil, from being sold to the West at a reduced price. In an interview with a Pakistani newspaper in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, bin Ladin laid out the prerequisites, stressing that ‘Western products could only be boycotted when the Muslim fraternity is fully awakened and organized’ and when ‘economic self-sufficiency is attained and substitute products are brought out.’⁴⁷⁰

6.5.2 The virtue of violent attack

Ultimately, when the dataset was reviewed for references to effective tools suggested to undermine the status quo, the tactics emphasised by Zawahiri and bin Ladin and those seen as the most likely in bringing about the desired changes, relied on forms of violent attack. The essence of this justificatory narrative and specific tactical preferences are captured in Appendix 3.4a.

⁴⁶⁸ Bin Ladin (1996) [5].

⁴⁶⁹ Zawahiri (2007) [103].

⁴⁷⁰ Bin Ladin (2001) [202].

In an extensive audio recording posted online in February 2003, bin Ladin detailed the impact of terrorist attacks against the US through the years. The 1982 Beirut truck bombing against US marines – bin Ladin reminded his audience – resulted in the prompt withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon. Then the *mujahideen* confronted America and ‘rubbed her arrogance into the dust’ in Somalia, after which ‘America and her allies fled into the darkness of the night.’ At the same time the US was targeted in Aden and again, ‘the cowardly Americans ran away and fled the country in less than 24 hours.’ US forces were struck in Riyadh and in Al-Khobar in 1995 prompting them ‘to move their bases from the cities to the desert.’ Refusing to heed the repeated warnings of the *mujahideen*, America was ‘smashed’ twice in East Africa, and again in Aden with another martyrdom operation. ‘Denying reality and proclaiming that we (the Mujahideen) were striking them because we were jealous of them (the Americans), whereas the reality is that we are striking them because of their evil and injustice in the whole of the Islamic World,’ Al-Qa’ida struck the very ‘idols of America’ on ‘the blessed Tuesday 11 September 2001,’ which destroyed the ‘Great American Dream and legend of Democracy,’ revealing the ‘true characteristics of the Crusade.’⁴⁷¹

The 9/11 attacks, according to the communiqués, were an unquestionable success and members were urged to replicate the scale of the attacks in the future. In his first interview after the attacks, with a Karachi-based newspaper, bin Ladin argued that subsequent calls that were made by the US president and British prime minister, in the wake of the attacks, for the creation of a Palestinian state, demonstrated their success.⁴⁷² The political impact of the attacks was compounded by the immense economic damage they caused, the collapse of shares in the stock exchange, the damage to the airline industry, as well as the wider ‘psychological shock.’⁴⁷³ Similarly, Zawahiri argued the British government set a date for withdrawal from Iraq a day after the London bombings in July 2005.⁴⁷⁴

Unsurprisingly, having observed the impact of suicide bombings in Lebanon and elsewhere and having embraced the tactic for its own efforts, the Al-Qa’ida leadership strongly endorses the use of ‘martyrdom operations.’ Force, according to Zawahiri, was the only language understood by the enemy, and in this regard inflicting ‘maximum casualties’ was paramount. Martyrdom operations were the ‘most successful way’ of inflicting such damage and the ‘least costly to the mujahidin in terms of casualties.’⁴⁷⁵ In this way a ‘small group in numbers and equipment’ could inflict ‘immense slaughter’ on the enemy.⁴⁷⁶ Aside from these asymmetric qualities, the coding unveiled how psychological impact and differences that separated belligerents were seen as fundamental. The *mujahideen* possess what others cannot, Zawahiri proclaimed: ‘the love of death in the path of Allah.’⁴⁷⁷ As a result, a barrage of continuous suicide attacks would force even the strongest enemy to retreat.⁴⁷⁸

This was the advice communicated to affiliates in Somalia, Iraq and elsewhere where suicide attacks could be a decisive weapon deployed by insurgents, in addition to

⁴⁷¹ Bin Ladin (2003) [78].

⁴⁷² Bin Ladin (2001) [202].

⁴⁷³ Bin Ladin (2002) statement aired on MBC Television (London) (17 April), transcript available in *FBIS: Compilation* [206]; Bin Ladin (2003) [98].

⁴⁷⁴ Zawahiri (2005), ‘Obstacles to Jihad,’ published by As-Sahab (10 December), available in IntelCenter (2008) [25].

⁴⁷⁵ Zawahiri (2001) [119].

⁴⁷⁶ Zawahiri (2002) [22].

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.


⁴⁷⁸ ‘The United States will retreat in the face of your [martyrdom] mission’: bin Ladin (2003) [217].

ambushes and clandestine operations.⁴⁷⁹ 'Out of area' suicide operations would need to be well planned. Zawahiri complained that too many initiatives within the jihad movement were haphazard.⁴⁸⁰ Well-orchestrated martyrdom operations against oil installations, supply lines, corporations and other 'economic targets' would be particularly useful in undermining the enemy, causing a ripple effect throughout the military, political and economic infrastructure.⁴⁸¹ 'Strike at the economic base that forms the foundation of the military establishment,' bin Ladin advised in a video statement posted on Al-Jazeera in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.⁴⁸²

One of the virtues of suicide bombings, as far as the Al-Qa'ida leaders are concerned, lies in the simplicity of the attacks whereby high-impact strikes can be based on relatively rudimentary planning where perpetrators use simple devices that can often be assembled by non-experts using household chemicals. By contrast, the counter-terrorism community, media and other observers have focused considerable attention on the possibility of the Al-Qa'ida leadership being involved in planning of attacks on the opposite side of the sophistication spectrum, namely through using nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons.

6.5.3 Weapons of mass destruction

Despite the attention received, this study found that only relatively few articles reviewed discussed using CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) devices and those that did were vague and often approached the matter geopolitically, rather than suggesting tactical applications (see Appendix 3.4a). To highlight the infrequency of references to possession or usage of CBRN weapons, figure 5, below, illustrates the handful of communiqués where these issues were discussed.



⁴⁷⁹ Zawahiri (2007) 'Rise and Support our Brothers in Somalia,' statement published by As-Sahab (May), available in IntelCenter (2008) [96]; Bin Ladin (2003) [79].

⁴⁸⁰ Zawahiri (2001) [119].

⁴⁸¹ Zawahiri (2006) [89]; Zawahiri (2006) [21].

⁴⁸² Bin Ladin (2001) [129].

For comparison, these references are shown together with the aggregated number of communiqués issued by bin Ladin and Zawahiri for each year. As the figure shows, therefore, references to CBRN weapons were rare and insignificant when compared to the overall output.

Generally speaking, acquiring CBRN weapons was certainly seen as a right, even a duty, of Muslims and not beyond their means. In a letter to Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban 'Islamic Emirate,' bin Ladin noted that 'It is a fact that the Islamic Republic's region is rich with significant scientific experiences in conventional and *non-conventional* military industries, which will have a great role in future Jihad against the enemies of Islam.'⁴⁸³ In an open interview, he argued Muslims 'should not be lax in possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons' and follow the example of Pakistan in this regard,⁴⁸⁴ which was urged to secure nuclear weapons of a 'better quality' than those of India.⁴⁸⁵

When discussing scenarios whereby deployment of CBRN weapons would be permissible, the coding found the terminology resembles Cold War rhetoric of deterrence through mutually assured destruction, implicitly elevating Al-Qa'ida to superpower status, rather than that of the clandestine, 'light and agile' forces that the Al-Qa'ida leaders instead embrace for operational purposes.⁴⁸⁶ 'If I seek to acquire these weapons,' bin Ladin claimed in an interview with *Time Magazine*, 'I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.'⁴⁸⁷ 'Muslim' nuclear weapons would deter against Israeli and 'Christian' nuclear weapons.⁴⁸⁸ Thus bin Ladin declared: 'that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.'⁴⁸⁹

6.5.4 Resonance and impact of strategic and tactical guidance

Although it is difficult to assess the resonance and impact of the limited strategic and tactical guidance conveyed through the communiqués under review, by analysing the communiqués alone, the contrast between the advice and prescriptions emphasised by Zawahiri in the years and months leading to the Arab Spring of 2011 and the actual course of events in Egypt and elsewhere, is revealing. Consistent throughout the prognostic framing of the messages under review is the assertion that jihad is the only force for change. Any other forms of activism would ultimately be like 'treating cancer with an aspirin.'⁴⁹⁰ As regards Egypt, in particular, Zawahiri argued in the aforementioned book *Exoneration*, published in 2008, that there was no peaceful solution to the problems of Egypt, especially after the authorities banned public protests after the Al-Azhar demonstrations in 2007.⁴⁹¹ Muslims had to focus on carefully planned

⁴⁸³ Bin Ladin (no date) Letter from bin Ladin to 'Amir al-Mu'mineen' Mullah Omar, made available by Department of Defense (translated 5 June 2002), Harmony Archive, doc. AFGP-2002-600321 [61]. Emphasis added.

⁴⁸⁴ Ladin (1998) [170].

⁴⁸⁵ Bin Ladin (1999) [182].

⁴⁸⁶ Bin Ladin (1996) [5].

⁴⁸⁷ Bin Ladin (1999) [178].

⁴⁸⁸ Bin Ladin (1999) [184].

⁴⁸⁹ Bin Ladin (2001) [125].

⁴⁹⁰ Zawahiri (2006) [94].

⁴⁹¹ Zawahiri (2008) [20]. This is not to suggest the Arab Spring represented a purely peaceful revolt, indeed the NDP headquarters were burnt down and several instances involved violent clashes, but the force of the revolution was not of the kind that Zawahiri envisaged.

attacks, seek funding and weapons in order to orchestrate coordinated strikes and prepare martyrdom operations. Mere public protests were useless.⁴⁹² 'Protests do no good in the face of bombs; Muslims must take "effective steps."⁴⁹³ Authoritarianism dictated jihad and terrorism was the only solution: 'the system in Egypt and in most of the Arabic and Islamic countries cannot be removed except by force.'⁴⁹⁴

Again, however, and as demonstrated through these series of appeals, nothing could be achieved without popular support and respect for the vanguard. As mentioned, the excessive use of violence displayed by Al-Qa'ida loyalists and affiliates (and often endorsed by the central leadership) threatened to damage the impact of the leaders' message. There are obvious tactical implications in this regard as well. For instance, US intelligence operatives recovered an Islamist manual on guerrilla warfare from 1996 following the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and flight of Al-Qa'ida elements from the country. This warned against the 'negative effects' of attacks on civilians, pointing in particular to the way in which groups in Algeria and Egypt became isolated after excessive targeting of non-combatants. The manual cautioned there was a 'lack of legal agreement' on action involving civilian deaths and that such a strategy could result in 'political splits and disputes.'⁴⁹⁵

Recognising the sensitivity of civilian, particularly Muslim, targeting or killing, the Al-Qa'ida leadership has not offered limitless or fully indiscriminate justifications for the use of violence. As discussed above, moreover, approaches towards the use of violence have evolved substantially over time. In order to identify nuances in the arguments used to justify civilian deaths the coding captured any mentioned constraints on the use of force and references to regrettable deaths or impermissible targeting. The longitudinal study thus isolated arguments limiting the scale of prescribed violence. This process allowed for a more rigorous understanding of the levels of violence that the Al-Qa'ida leaders nonetheless sanction and prescribe for their followers. The analytical results are discussed in the next section and corresponding coding details can be found in Appendix 3.6, page 354.

6.6 Constraints on the Use of Violence

The perceived moral superiority of the Al-Qa'ida leadership, as opposed to that of the adversaries, is central to the diagnostic and prognostic framing of the leaders' output. The violence prescribed relates directly to the injustices suffered and to the values that need to be promoted and protected, according to the diagnostic message frames, as well as the defensive, holistic and righteous set of solutions and methods presented to potential participants within the prognostic arguments. Through presenting itself as a pioneering vanguard of a righteous uprising against secularism and infidelity and a defensive force fighting to retain the dignity and sanctity of the *ummah*, the Al-Qa'ida leadership thus frames its violence as a noble and just form of activism. As noted above, moreover, the justifications put forward for the violent tactics employed rest to a substantial degree on notions of supposed reciprocity with attacks legitimised as just forms of retaliation. Regardless of the perceived right to 'respond' through violent means, however, references to limitations and constraints on the use of violence were

⁴⁹² Zawahiri (2007) [12].

⁴⁹³ Zawahiri (2009) 'The Massacre of Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors,' published by As-Sahab (6 January), transl. by Global Islamic Media Front, secured from Archive.org [121].

⁴⁹⁴ Zawahiri (2009) [140].

⁴⁹⁵ Stout et al. (2008): 54. See Harmony Archive (n. d.) document AFGP-2002-000026.

found in 41 of the communiqués under review (17 per cent – see full list in Appendix 3.6). Most of the details in this regard appear in messages from Zawahiri, rather than from bin Ladin which, together, offer a complex and increasingly contradictory set of conditions limiting the use and targeting of violence in the name of religion.

In a few early texts, Zawahiri stressed the need to post warnings in advance when attacking areas which Muslims frequented in order to avoid harming them.⁴⁹⁶ As regards non-Muslim deaths, Zawahiri also confirmed that women and children (boys under 13 years of age) ought to be spared. Non-Muslims in general could not be targeted if they had been awarded *dhimmi* status (pledge of protection for non-Muslims living in Shari'ah states who pay tax, *jizya*, to the state), although it was stressed that non-Muslims currently living in Egypt did not qualify.⁴⁹⁷

6.6.1 Avoiding Muslim deaths

In *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, Zawahiri remembered the shock and remorse felt when an attempted attack on the Egyptian Prime Minister's motorcade resulted in the death of Shayma Abdel Halim, an eleven-year-old schoolgirl. The death resulted in public outcry against Egyptian Al-Jihad and served as a reminder of the way in which Muslim deaths could result in rapid evaporation of public support. More than a decade later, Zawahiri would seek to remind his chief ally in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, of this danger in his letter made public by the US Director of National Intelligence. Ignoring this advice, Zarqawi went on to orchestrate coordinated attacks in Jordan resulting in sixty deaths, the majority of whom were Muslims. In the aftermath, popular support for Al-Qa'ida in Jordan, which had until then been substantial, plummeted.⁴⁹⁸

Recognising the death of Shayma as a 'mistake', Zawahiri emphasised the need to pay blood money to relatives, funds permitting, when such 'mistakes' were made. The death of Shayma and deaths of Muslims in general is revisited much later in Zawahiri's *Exoneration*. Here the author admitted that mistakes were unavoidable and that Muslims might sometimes be victims of *mujahideen* 'operations,' even though deliberate targeting of innocent Muslims remained strictly forbidden. 'As in any other human activity', Zawahiri conceded, 'mistakes have been and will be made in jihad. For every mistake, there is accountability according to Shari'ah.' Ultimately, however, 'jihad must continue.'⁴⁹⁹ The extent to which Al-Qa'ida leaders intend to take responsibility is not explained and neither is the fact that many attacks endorsed by leadership take place in crowded Muslim neighbourhoods. Indeed, in an attempt to admonish those who planned the 1993 attack that killed Shayma, Zawahiri stressed how Muslims need to avoid being in areas where attacks against leadership targets may take place, regardless of the fact that the bomb was placed next to a girls' school.

Although he largely stays away from the issue, bin Ladin similarly expressed his regret over Muslim deaths in *mujahideen* 'operations', and emphasised how those responsible must repent or face punishment.⁵⁰⁰ Although killing innocents was sometimes unavoidable, the *mujahideen* must take care to fight 'without going to

⁴⁹⁶ Zawahiri (n.d.) [113]; Zawahiri (1996) [118].

⁴⁹⁷ Zawahiri (n.d.) [113]; Zawahiri [purported] (n.d.) [48].

⁴⁹⁸ Brachman, Fishman, Felter (2008) *The Power of Truth: Questions for Ayman Al-Zawahiri*, Combating Terrorism Center (21 April), West Point.

⁴⁹⁹ Zawahiri (2008) [20].

⁵⁰⁰ Bin Ladin (2004) [84].

excess,' bin Ladin argued in a statement issued in December 2004.⁵⁰¹ In a more recent statement, bin Ladin argued that fighters 'must be very cautious during operations targeting army garrisons, which are located near Muslims,' implying Al-Qa'ida and affiliates did indeed themselves limit their attacks to such military targets.⁵⁰²

A month after publishing *Exoneration*, As-Sahab announced the release of the first batch of responses to questions sent in for Zawahiri's consideration, in the aforementioned 'Open Meeting.' As noted above, many respondents questioned operations and tactics that had resulted in large numbers of Muslim deaths. In his retort, Zawahiri insisted 'we have not killed the innocents [Muslims], not in Baghdad, nor in Morocco, not in Algeria, nor anywhere else.' As before the killing of Muslims was said to be forbidden, but sometimes unavoidable in order to ensure that the battle against the infidels and apostates continued unabated. Muslim deaths were explained either as a 'mistake', or 'out of necessity in cases of al-Tatarrus' (the 'human shield' debate). Zawahiri went on to defend the tactics of affiliates in North Africa saying they targeted only the UN and government security forces (regardless of the fact that the bombs kill mostly Muslim non-combatants or young conscripts). Finally, he tried to deflect some of the criticism on Al-Qa'ida onto the Hamas Qassam Brigades, since they employed indiscriminate rocket attacks against Israeli population centres.⁵⁰³ Such arguments appear inherently weak and fly in the face of the actual target emphasis of Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. Aside from the empirical mismatch between the rhetoric relating to the targeting of affiliates in Iraq, North Africa and elsewhere, moreover, fundamental questions remain concerning the structure and depth of the arguments put forward. How, for instance, does the citing of century-old juristic opinion pieces designed for medieval hostage and siege situations apply to Al-Qa'ida's continued desire for and endorsement of attacks in open spaces frequented by Muslim non-combatants?

The overt denial of any wrongdoing (which applies primarily to Muslim deaths) is unconvincing, as are the promises of addressing all shortcomings according to protocol. In 2007 Zawahiri talked about allegations against the Islamic State of Iraq which, he argued:

Only kills spies and traitors, and declares its innocence of any inviolable blood which one of its soldiers might spill, and not just that, but its Amir announces his readiness to appear before a judicial council in any complaint and that he is prepared to have the right taken from him personally if the legal ruling is issued against him.⁵⁰⁴

In the same statement Zawahiri argued that killing of Fatah members by Hamas militia must cause far greater jurisprudential controversy than actions of the ISI, even though numerous Al-Qa'ida communiqués make no distinction between Fatah and its leaders on the one hand and Israeli intelligence services or other 'primary targets' on the other.

Rather than engaging in a deeper debate about possible contemporary scenarios where Muslim deaths are justifiable or seeking to design a strategy, which will fall within doctrinal guidelines, the current study suggests that the leadership, unsurprisingly, prefers to deny accusations of shedding Muslim blood, given the clear doctrinal impermissibility of such actions and the danger of being labelled *khawarij*, or isolated *takfiri* extremists who ejected themselves from the true creed. Indeed, such a label was

⁵⁰¹ Bin Ladin (2004) [86].

⁵⁰² Bin Ladin (2007) 'The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies', published by As-Sahab Media (29 December), IntelCenter (2008) [27].

⁵⁰³ Zawahiri (2008) [105].

⁵⁰⁴ Zawahiri (2007) [102].

belatedly applied to the Algerian GIA.⁵⁰⁵ In one of his 'interviews' with As-Sahab, Zawahiri argued allegations of inflicting Muslim casualties in Al-Qa'ida sponsored operations were simply part of hostile 'media campaigns' against the movement.⁵⁰⁶ Such inability and unwillingness to address the issue of Muslim deaths indicates how flammable the issue is within militant Islamist circles and how damaging it is for Al-Qa'ida.

6.6.2 'The property or life of a non-believer'

The coding references examining limitations on the use of violence demonstrated far less regret expressed over the killing of non-Muslim civilians. As explained in the section above, targeting in this respect has become so broad and indiscriminate so as to justify practically any degree of violence against a non-Muslim population. Nevertheless, the communiqués do, on occasions, reveal some limitations on the use of violence in this regard too. In order to reinforce the 'grievance' argument, the leadership points intermittently to states that do not have to fear Al-Qa'ida attacks, since they have not harmed 'Muslim interests' in any way. Sweden was mentioned in this regard on a few occasions, as were Vietnam and Switzerland. It would be wrong to think, however, that foreign policy neutrality or other features of government policy would in any way guarantee freedom from Al-Qa'ida's wrath.

Chapter 5 discussed diagnostics and grievances, demonstrating how an increasingly wide range of alleged 'crimes' is used to portray a vision of global conspiracy against Muslims. Additionally, as emphasised above, diagnosed ailments relate not only to cases involving human suffering which can, in some instances, be traced to the actions of specific governments but also to alleged insults and moral depravity that are beyond the control of any governments. In this sense, for instance, the Danish Mohammed caricatures (subsequently reprinted elsewhere) added a host of targets to the list of identified enemies even though no physical harm had been inflicted and the developments were largely beyond the control of state governments. Every indication is given, therefore, that states or communities singled out as 'lesser enemies' might not remain immune from Al-Qa'ida attacks for long.

As mentioned before, the study found how Zawahiri has attempted to set out guidelines whereby non-Muslim civilians should not be killed. Invariably, this applies to their status within the desired Islamic Shari'ah empire. In *Exoneration* he wrote: 'as I said previously, the property or life of a non-believer are protected only by peace treaty [*al-sulh*], status as a protected alien [*al-dhimma*], or safe-conduct [*al-aman*]. If none of these things is confirmed, matters remain in their original state.'⁵⁰⁷ Zawahiri recognises that some Christians may be true to their religion's prophet and seek to amend relations with Muslims and claims not to desire open confrontation with Copts living in Egypt, even though their 'alliance' with the Mubarak regime was condemned. The fiercely anti-Semitic discourse is far less tolerant towards Jews, even though some indication is given that they would be allowed to reside within the Muslim state, as they are in Morocco and elsewhere, provided they comply with Islamic regulations on taxation and other

⁵⁰⁵ See e.g. Abu Hamza's (2000) book *Khawarij and Jihad*, distributed online and available e.g. from <<http://www.4shared.com/office/3GhaaPJf/khawarij-and-jihad-abu-hamza.html>> [as of 16 March 2012].

⁵⁰⁶ Zawahiri (2008) 'Al-Azhar: The Lions Den: Interview with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri,' published by As-Sahab (21 November), secured from Archive.org via link from Islamist web forum [237].

⁵⁰⁷ Zawahiri (2008) [20]

demands.⁵⁰⁸ In one of his more recent communiqués, Zawahiri reiterated these sentiments, arguing *shari'ah* law and Islamic governance, as envisaged by the Al-Qa'ida leadership, would not be opposed to living in 'coexistence with the nation's partners of Christians and non-Muslims.'⁵⁰⁹

6.6.3 *Reining in the affiliates*

These conciliatory utterances constituted interesting caveats in Zawahiri's otherwise uncompromising messages of 'glad tidings' during the Arab Spring. These presented a clear and rather desperate message to those affiliates and followers of Al-Qa'ida that had engaged in levels of violence that the leadership ultimately came to see as unproductive. 'There are some operations which are ascribed to the Mujahideen,' Zawahiri admitted, 'some by due right and others otherwise, in which transgressions occur against Muslims in their mosques, their markets, and other gathering places. About this,' Zawahiri continued, 'I say the following: Regardless of whether the ascription of these acts to the Mujahideen are correct or incorrect, my brothers and I in Al-Qaeda declare to Allah that we are innocent from these attacks, and that we object to them, whether those who carry them are the Mujahideen or others.' Al-Qa'ida followers should 'try their utmost,' Zawahiri argued, to avoid killing those 'whose blood is prohibited' when planning 'operations.' This included both Muslims and certain non-Muslims, although he insisted mistakes could still be made and that killing Muslims embedded within the ranks of the enemy would be inevitable (the *Mas'alatut at-Tatarrus* argument referred to above).⁵¹⁰ Later during this period, Zawahiri urged the *mujahideen* to 'stay away from any operation that exposes [Muslims] to danger in the markets, mosques, or crowded areas,' in his message confirming the death of bin Ladin.⁵¹¹

Put in the wider context, however, these discussions on limiting violence against non-Muslims should be seen as anomalous. Overall, the coding showed that prognostic framing is based on encouragement and praise for indiscriminate violence against non-Muslims, even if this contradicts Islamic juristic codes and places scant emphasis on regretting or justifying the murder of women, children, and the elderly. Muslim deaths are clearly more problematic, given that these can reduce sympathy within militant Islamist circles. Levels of discrimination, however, are also determined by overall message direction and the identification of enemies. This element has important prognostic implications in its own right, however, through delineating specific geographic and political sources of grievance, geographic focus of hostility or support building, as well as assets and allies that can aid the *ummah* in undermining the identified foes and adversaries. The next section, therefore, focuses on the ways in which the communiqués channel and direct the activist prescriptions, guidelines and benchmarks elaborated above.

⁵⁰⁸ Zawahiri (2007) 'The Aggression against Lal Masjid', published by As-Sahab Media (11 July), available in IntelCenter (2008) [104].

⁵⁰⁹ Zawahiri (2011) [236].

⁵¹⁰ Zawahiri (2011) [233].

⁵¹¹ Zawahiri (2011) 'The Noble Knight Dismounted,' published by As-Sahab and the Global Islamic Media Front (8 June), secured from Islamist web forums. [239]

6.7 Patterns of Amity and Enmity

In line with shifting political emphases and expressed local or global grievances, all the messages reviewed identified actors that were accused of bringing about the dismal state of affairs described. Many communiqués also specified the radical Islamist alliance tasked with combating these foes. Some actors were consistently identified as enemies, especially the United States, the UN, and Israel or Jews in general. Domestic adversaries, such as the Egyptian government, were also targeted throughout, as mentioned above.

6.7.1 Perceived sources of humiliation, vice and suffering

Prognostic framing necessarily relies on the identification of specific adversaries that provide the more tangible targets of aggression and hostility. This channels the anger derived from the diagnostic framing and propels the given set of tools prescribed by the movement leaders towards perceived sources of humiliation, vice and suffering. Unsurprisingly, the delineation of specific adversaries in the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués corresponds with an expanding and more ambitious geographic scope, as mentioned above. Whereas the primary targets were consistently charged with hostility against Muslims and immorality throughout the period under review, numerous articles from the late 1990s onwards began to introduce a list of 'secondary' targets: individuals, countries, regions and entities that had not been the focus of anger before, urging the *ummah* to be aware of and counter the threat these enemies posed. As a result, when cited references to enemies in all the 240 communiqués under review are aggregated, the breadth of animosity in these communiqués becomes clear. Table 3, below, shows the principal enemies identified by Zawahiri and bin Ladin according to the articles coded.

Table 3: PRINCIPAL ENEMIES AND TARGETS IDENTIFIED

<u>Most commonly identified enemies</u>	<u>Other prominent enemies cited</u>	
America - in general, or more specifically, e.g. US media, corporations, Hollywood, US politicians	Britain – especially for fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, closeness to US, role in establishing Israel and colonial past, detaining radical preachers, protecting Salman Rushdie, and other issues (see text). Significant rise in dedicated focus on the UK after 7/7 attacks	Australia – for taking part in operations in Afghanistan, and for its role in separation of East Timor from Indonesia
The West/ Zionist-Crusader alliance		NATO and Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, Denmark – chiefly for sending troops to Afghanistan and/or Iraq
Israel/Jews	France – especially in relation to prevention of wearing veil (and other conspicuous religious symbols in schools), presence of troops in Afghanistan, publication of Muhammad cartoons	Northern Alliance – and other militants fighting the Taliban
Christians		Pope Benedict XVI – as leader of Catholics and for alleged anti-Islamic remarks
Hindus/India	Russia – especially for fighting in Chechnya	Ethiopia – for invading Somalia
The UN	Spain – mainly for possession of Ceuta and Melilla. Fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan	Japan – for providing funds for Iraq war and other military operations
Corrupt or ‘apostate’ regimes in Muslim countries, their supporters, the government bureaucracy, army, and support mechanism – in general, but especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Pakistan (especially after beginning of campaign in Afghanistan), Iraq (especially after January 2005 elections), Afghanistan (after collapse of Taliban regime), Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Turkey	International media and news organisations – both for spreading ‘anti-Muslim propaganda’ and ‘immoral’ material	Iran – especially for supporting Shia militias in Iraq, working with coalition in Afghanistan, and for discrediting 9/11 attacks (particularly prominent from late 2007 and into 2008)
	International relief agencies	
	Multinational corporations	
	International communications companies	
Palestinian Authority, Fatah	Denmark, Norway (and to a lesser extent: Germany, France, European and America publics) – for publication of Muhammad cartoons	Serbia – (early communications from bin Ladin)
Iraqi police, military, National Guard, government supporters, ‘Awakening Councils’ – after invasion of 2003		Yemeni Socialist Party – (early communications from bin Ladin)

6.7.2 *Allies and friends*

In terms of identified Muslim allies, few surprises emerged during the coding (recognised friends, loyalties and temporary allies found in the communiqués are detailed in Appendix 3.11, page 446). Taliban leaders and other militant Islamist commanders fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, North Africa, Horn of Africa, the Levant and elsewhere were praised as fellow ‘lions of Islam’. Suicide bombers, including those who struck London in 2005, were also praised in the communiqués as martyrs. New additions to the Al-Qa’ida umbrella organisation are announced through explicit statements. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was proclaimed leader of Al-Qa’ida operations in Iraq in 2004, and both leaders paid tribute to their fallen comrade in ‘eulogies’ issued in June 2006. Following Zarqawi’s death, declarations of support for ‘allied commanders’ in Iraq subsided not least due to leadership struggles and disputes in the upper echelons of Al-Qa’ida-endorsed terrorism in Iraq. Nonetheless, in July 2006 bin Ladin declared (indirectly) that Abu-Hamzah al-Mujahid was to take over from Zarqawi and urged him to empower the consultative Mujahideen Shura Council.⁵¹² A

⁵¹² Bin Ladin (2006) [93].

few months later, however, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under leadership of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi was declared principal ally and affiliate of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, and this has remained fairly consistent ever since. Other groups, especially Ansar al-Sunnah, were urged to join the ISI to form a united front and the group continues to be praised in the communiqués, despite its reluctance to merge with ISI.

The other principal allies of Al-Qa'ida proclaimed in the communiqués are the Al-Qa'ida movement in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC) based in Algeria and the Islamic Fighting Group of Libya (IFG), although Zawahiri later had to qualify the relationship with the latter saying a 'group of the notables' from the IFG had pledged allegiance to Al-Qa'ida proper.⁵¹³ The Lebanese Fatah al-Islam was praised, but not declared part of Al-Qa'ida or indeed alluded to more than a few times. Scholars who were thought to embrace and extol the merits of militant Islam, however, were endorsed in communiqués coded, including those belonging to the 'bright side' of Cairo's Al-Azhar alumni (as opposed to the 'dark side' of the pro-regime mainstream) who have supported confrontation with the Egyptian regime.⁵¹⁴

Allusions to potential non-Muslim supporters are more haphazard and often appear paradoxical. Much appears to be down to strategic and pragmatic selectivity, as noted above. In an interview with a Pakistani newspaper in 1998 for instance, bin Ladin emphasised the extent to which China too was being manipulated and abused by the American hegemon and urged the People's Republic to 'be more careful of the US and the West', adding: 'China must use its force against the United States and Israel and should be friendly towards Muslims.'⁵¹⁵ The sincerity of such appeals is obviously questionable given the numerous pledges to 'liberate' areas in western China with substantial Muslim communities.⁵¹⁶

Several recent communiqués have sought to appeal to disenfranchised non-Muslims in order to secure their support. In his third 'interview' with As-Sahab, for instance, published in May 2007, Zawahiri expressed his dismay at the fact that black soldiers were fighting in the US Army, given their protracted civil rights struggle in America. In a wider appeal he announced:

I want blacks in America, people of color, American Indians, Hispanics, and all the weak and oppressed in North and South America, in Africa and Asia, and all over the world, to know that when we wage Jihad in Allah's path, we aren't waging Jihad to lift oppression from the Muslims only, we are waging Jihad to lift oppression from all of mankind, because Allah has ordered us never to accept oppression, whatever it may be.⁵¹⁷

A year later, in his second reply to the internet-based 'open meeting' appeal, Zawahiri sought to elaborate this point further by stressing the way in which Al-Qa'ida was providing a 'great service to the human community' in protecting 'mankind' from the oppressive West, its immoral desires, and treacherous allies.⁵¹⁸ Al-Qa'ida, according to Zawahiri, 'seeks to lift injustice from Muslims and all the victims of the system of the Western-Crusader-Zionist injustice.'⁵¹⁹ Opportunistic as this attempt to broaden the

⁵¹³ Zawahiri (2008) [107].

⁵¹⁴ Zawahiri (2008) [237].

⁵¹⁵ Bin Ladin (1999) [182].

⁵¹⁶ See e.g. Zawahiri warning of the need to alleviate the pain of Muslims in East Turkistan and elsewhere in Zawahiri (2009) 'My Muslim Brothers and Sisters in Pakistan,' published by As-Sahab (15 July), secured from Islamist web forums [139]; Zawahiri (2010) [226].

⁵¹⁷ Zawahiri (2007) [23].

⁵¹⁸ Zawahiri (2008) [107].

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

support base may be, it is nevertheless important to recognise that the Al-Qa'ida leadership is seeking to convince non-Western non-Muslims of the merits of its cause through its public statements. Bin Ladin's environmental appeals, referred to above, have a similarly broad scope. Discrediting and undermining such attempts should be straight forward, given the indiscriminate nature of Al-Qa'ida's violence and attacks, such as those that hit East Africa in August 1998 killing over two hundred mostly poor, non-white Africans and injuring thousands.

6.7.3 *Near and distant enemies*

As discussed above, when analysing the communiqués, evident discrepancies emerged in terms of the hierarchy of enemies constructed by the Al-Qa'ida leadership. Zawahiri, again, provides the best examples in this regard. This relates primarily to the 'near' and 'distant' enemy dichotomy. By joining bin Ladin in the World Islamic Front, Zawahiri signed up to a strategy that emphasised the distant enemy of the United States over impious local regimes and domestic sources of corruption. However, Zawahiri's own messages in this respect were unclear in their prioritisation.

As noted, Zawahiri never fully abandoned local causes and domestic enemies that prompted him to embrace militant Islamism in the first place. In terms of communicating enemy targets to followers, much of Zawahiri's work, therefore, focused on *both* near and distant enemies. In what is arguably his clearest strategic treatise, *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, Zawahiri 're-emphasised' and 'reiterated' that focusing on the domestic enemy *alone* will not be feasible at this stage.⁵²⁰ It was thus necessary, 'at this stage,' to target the distant enemy too.⁵²⁰ Jihad was to be waged against these 'original infidels' in addition to apostate rulers in the lands of Islam, those who failed to rule according to *shari'ah* and befriended Christians and Jews.⁵²¹ Although not dismissing the distant enemy, therefore, Zawahiri refused to differentiate between foreign invaders and their 'domestic agents' in terms of prioritisation.⁵²² This contrasts much of bin Ladin's core argument when it comes to defining enemies, although this narrative too has suffered a degree of 'hybridization' of late. By contrast (and in an apparent contradiction with the remainder of the message in question), Zawahiri's 'glad tidings' to Egyptians, Tunisians and Libyans during the Arab Spring called for the targeting of the distant enemy of the Zionist-American allies first and foremost. Only when this 'invading enemy breaks, then, by Allah's permission, their agents and others, who seek their help and emboldening, will also break. So let us focus our efforts on this Zio-American invading enemy and its agents.'⁵²³ The timing of this shift in emphasis towards the far enemy during the Arab Spring in particular, the pivotal event of resistance against local rulers in the region, seems baffling and far removed from the course of events as they transpired on the ground.

Subtle as these differences may be, shifting enemy hierarchies and competing trajectories in public messages could impact upon the overall effectiveness and clarity of these appeals. Indeed there are some tensions between different target emphases and shifting priorities of enmity. The current analysis also reveals a problematic relationship with the use of violence and a seemingly uncontrollable proliferation of grievances that

⁵²⁰ Zawahiri (2001) [119]. Emphasis added.

⁵²¹ Zawahiri (2002) [45].

⁵²² Zawahiri (2006) 'Congratulations on the Eid to the Ummah of Tawhid,' published by As-Sahab (30 December), IntelCenter (2008) [95].

⁵²³ Zawahiri (2011) [233].

fit uncomfortably with the limited and often stagnant range of solutions and alternatives presented.

This can impact upon the ability of the leadership to appeal to target audiences. Both leaders expressed through their messages; (1) their desire to guide the *ummah* to what they envisage to be the correct path and (2) their confident determination that they can both represent the *ummah* and identify workable solutions addressing the major challenges it faces. Although occasional regional imperatives channel the messages towards specific national or regional audiences the vast majority of messages coded appealed to the *ummah* as a whole and carried judgements for all Muslims, and occasionally non-Muslims too. An essential common element in the construction and dissemination of these messages concerns the way in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership communicates with its audience and shapes these 'motivational' frames. This relates to the development of what Snow and Byrd termed 'rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action,' tying together diagnosed ailments and prognostic responses with an elaborated call to arms in communicative tracts that are aimed at and designed for specific audiences.⁵²⁴ As always for the Al-Qa'ida leadership the construction of these frames also relies on a clear delineation of behaviour and positions deemed abhorrent that serves to clarify the distinction between righteousness and infidelity, in order to act as further 'prods to action.'⁵²⁵ The final chapter of Part III presents results from the coding demonstrating how these motivational appeals are generated and communicated.

⁵²⁴ Snow & Byrd (2007): 126.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

MOTIVATIONAL FRAMES

7.1 Introduction

Central to the motivational frames of the Al-Qa'ida communiqués is the distinction between in-group and out-group audiences whereby the former provide constituents and the latter constitute immoral and hostile entities that threaten the cohesion and sanctity of the *ummah*. This is related to the principle of *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* or loyalty and separation. The principle was shaped in part by Sulayman Ibn Abdallah, grandson of Abd al-Wahhab, during on-going clashes between Wahhabi forces in the Arabian Peninsula and Mohammed Ali Pasha in the early 19th Century.⁵²⁶ This interpretation of *wala' wa-l-bara'*, which Meijer sees as Wahhabism's principal contribution to Salafism, perceives open enmity towards 'idolaters', apostates and non-believers as the clearest demonstration of true faith, loyalty and dedication to Islam.⁵²⁷ The distinction between believer and non-believer (both in a physical and ideological sense) was prominent throughout the material coded.

Al-wala' wa-l-bara' for instance informed Zawahiri's criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood and the composition of semi-secular constitutions in Islamic countries. In 2002, moreover, Zawahiri published a book titled *Loyalty and Separation: Changing an Article of Faith and Losing Sight of Reality*. Here, Zawahiri warned the *ummah* that the enemy had 'launched a campaign of intellectual and doctrinal deception in tandem with their militaristic, Crusading campaign.' Their goal was to sustain corrupt leaders in Muslim lands, prevent the uptake of *shari'ah* and make Muslim lands vulnerable to conquest. In this context, deviating from the doctrine that prohibited befriending infidels was thus the greatest threat to Islam. Zawahiri, therefore, called on the *ummah*, in 'all its factions, classes and groups' to join the caravan of jihad, adding that infidels and apostates 'should not be shown affection, they should be hated and their love renounced.'⁵²⁸

As the Al-Qa'ida leadership details and communicates the prognostic and diagnostic elements of its collective action frames, several distinct actors and audiences are thus identified through this prism of loyalty and separation. The most obvious distinction to make is that of believers (Muslims) and non-believers (non-Muslims).

⁵²⁶ Kepel & Milelli (2008) (eds.): 168.

⁵²⁷ Meijer (ed.) (2009): 10.

⁵²⁸ Zawahiri (2002) [45].

Although *takfiri* elements of the communiqués effectively place allegedly ‘treacherous’ Muslims outside the realm of Islam, these were included in the coding under the category ‘approaches towards Muslims’ in order to highlight perceptions towards different groups of Muslims and isolate the *takfiri* debate. In doing so, the study found that although substantial effort was placed on excommunicating a predictable set of actors and elites, these declarations of apostasy failed to capture the variation in attitudes towards people who were born Muslim but have failed to live up to the aspirations elaborated by the Al-Qa'ida leadership. These communities and publics are admonished and criticised but not declared apostates, a far more problematic and risky allegation which the leadership used cautiously. For doctrinal, tactical and strategic purposes, moreover, the communiqués under review occasionally targeted non-Muslims in specific appeals and warnings. As the above debate concerning expressions of sympathy for supposedly disenfranchised non-Muslims demonstrates, however, these communicative initiatives also have divergent manifestations.

The first part of this chapter presents results from the coding of communiqués that collected all threats and warnings communicated towards non-Muslim audiences (these were found in 58 out of the 240 communiqués under review) as well as more conciliatory approaches. Appendix 3.7a (page 361) shows message elements concerning threats and warnings towards non-Muslims, whereas conciliatory appeals are collated in Appendix 3.7b (page 368). This data is analysed below.

The second part details the results of the coding that shows the nature of bin Ladin’s and Zawahiri’s discursive approach to Muslims. This review presents findings from the probing of the three coding categories focusing on the Al-Qa'ida leadership’s approach towards Muslims. The first category examined positive appeals aimed towards specific Muslim audiences in given geographic concentrations as well as the Muslim population globally (see results in Appendix 3.8a, page 373). The second coding category traced the leadership’s cautious, limited and strictly qualified approach to *takfiri* notions of excommunication (Appendix 3.8b, page 406). The third category focused on critical approaches towards Muslims (collated in Appendix 3.9, page 417). This element of coding uncovered evidence suggesting that the leadership has become increasingly critical of specific groups of Muslims as well as Muslim publics generally, admonishing and even denouncing and condemning those very constituents it purports to defend through the Al-Qa'ida vanguard.

7.2 Approaching Non-Muslims

By addressing the United States, the US president or British prime minister directly in public communiqués, Zawahiri and bin Ladin elevate themselves and their Al-Qa'ida vanguard to a position equal in power, authority and legitimacy to the adversaries they target. Furthermore, it could be argued that communicating with the enemy may fulfil doctrinal obligations, which prescribe warning targets prior to attack and providing them with an opportunity to mend their ways. This is in line with what Scheuer refers to as the need for ‘clear warnings of an intention to attack.’⁵²⁹ Consistent with Scheuer’s observations, the coding established that bin Ladin issued a warning in advance of the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings in a statement reported in *Nawa-i-Waqt*, a Rawalpindi-based newspaper, in November 1997. According to the report, bin Ladin


⁵²⁹ Scheuer (2006)

advised the American people to force their government to stop 'international acts of terrorism' against the Muslims or else there would not be 'any guarantee for the safety of American interests and its citizens in any part of the world.'⁵³⁰


The processing of material in Appendix 3.7a revealed, however, that most of the direct warnings towards Americans came *after* these attacks took place and in the wake of the US reprisal operation codenamed 'Infinite Reach.' In a statement published shortly after the attacks, bin Ladin warned that the 'battle' had 'not yet started' and that the 'answer' would be what the Americans could 'see, not what [they could] hear.'⁵³¹ Subsequent messages reiterated these sentiments and warnings issued in the February 1998 declaration of war, claiming that the 'war' had now just begun, that Muslim responses would be 'proportionate' to the suffering they had experienced and that all Americans everywhere would be a target.⁵³² Similarly, the current study found that the Al-Qa'ida leaders issued warnings to other identified adversaries, such as the UK and Australia, only after significant attacks against these populations had been carried out in Al-Qa'ida's name. Figure 6, below, illustrates these findings.

Figure 6: CLEAR/DIRECT THREATS OF ATTACK ISSUED IN COMMUNIQUÉS WITH DATE OF SUCCESSFUL (AQ LEADERSHIP) ATTACK

Towards US:



Towards UK and Australia:



⁵³⁰ Bin Ladin (1997) statement published in *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Rawalpindi) (27 November), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [158].

⁵³¹ Bin Ladin (1998) statement published in *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (23 August), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [173].

⁵³² Bin Ladin (1999) interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai, published in *The News* (Islamabad) (6 January), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [177]; Bin Ladin (1999) [178]; Bin Ladin (1999) [180].

The graphs in figure 6 place communiqués that presented clear and direct threats of attacks against US, UK and Australian populations or targets on a timeline, which also pinpoints significant attacks against these targets.⁵³³ As shown, most of the direct warnings (all in the case of Australia and the UK) were issued only after major attacks had taken place. This discrepancy presents a significant departure from the perceived principle of offering direct warnings of attacks prior to these being carried out.

7.2.1 Imbalance in bloodletting

With the exception of a brief reference in the spring of 2001, where bin Ladin promised to ‘make life miserable’ for America,⁵³⁴ the current study found that most specific warnings and threats surrounding the 9/11 attacks were communicated after 11 September 2001. Relying on justifications for targeting based on notions of reciprocity, as mentioned above, bin Ladin warned that ‘neither the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad.’⁵³⁵ These ‘conditions’ for safety and stability in the US and what became known as the ‘oath’ of bin Ladin⁵³⁶ were subsequently reiterated and referred to in numerous messages from both Zawahiri and bin Ladin and featured prominently in Zawahiri’s eulogy of the latter in June 2011. ‘America will not be able to dream, not even in their sleep, of living in peace and security, as long as we don’t live in real peace in Palestine, in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, and throughout the Islamic world,’ bin Ladin declared in As-Sahab’s celebration of the 9/11 attacks, ‘The Wills of the Martyrs.’⁵³⁷ Such representations of just, even restrained, *quid pro quo* in the leadership messages portray Al-Qa’ida as a heroic and righteous defender of the *ummah*: ‘just as you kill, you will be killed. And just like you bombarded, you will be bombarded. Be prepared to receive the glad tidings of what will be bad for you.’⁵³⁸ ‘The time has come for us to be equal.’⁵³⁹

By extension, therefore, there was an imbalance in bloodletting that had to be rectified. Al-Qa’ida, according to the communiqués coded, had every right to redouble efforts to harm the US and its allies on a greater scale than had been witnessed before. This was the central narrative context to threats issued to the West in the material under review. The 9/11 attacks and other past attacks constituted mere ‘skirmishes’ whereas the real battle had not yet begun.⁵⁴⁰ ‘Bush,’ Zawahiri warned, ‘fortify your targets, tighten your defence, intensify your security measures, because the fighting Islamic community – which sent you the New York and Washington battalions – has decided to

⁵³³ Only major attacks are shown, for illustrative purposes. Less significant attacks and failed plots are not shown.

⁵³⁴ Bin Ladin (2001) [198].

⁵³⁵ Bin Ladin (2001) statement aired on Al Jazeera (7 November), transcript available from *FBIS: Compilation* [203].

⁵³⁶ See e.g. Zawahiri (2009) [121].

⁵³⁷ As-Sahab (2002) [207].

⁵³⁸ Bin Ladin (2002) [76].

⁵³⁹ Bin Ladin (2002) ‘Statement from Abdallah Usama Bin Ladin to the Peoples of Countries Allied to Tyrannical US Government,’ distributed by Alneda (21 November), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [214].

⁵⁴⁰ Zawahiri (2003) untitled statement aired on Al-Arabiya (3 August), available in IntelCenter (2008) and Hegghammer, T. (2005) ‘Al-Qaida Statements 2003-2004’ [55]; bin Ladin & Zawahiri (2003) audio statement aired on Al Jazeera (10 September), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [110].

send you one battalion after the other, carrying death and seeking heaven.⁵⁴¹ The same message was directed towards the people of the UK: 'Blair has brought destruction upon you, to the center of London, and he will have more of it, Allah willing.'⁵⁴² 'We address them [the British] in the only language they understand; and if they do not understand it this time around, we will repeat it until they understand it completely.'⁵⁴³ These warnings towards the UK, which again were issued *after* the London bombings, threatened the general population rather than specific leaders or elites.

Indeed, several references identified through the coding placed particular emphasis on threatening general populations in line with allegations of complicity and collective responsibility for aggression against Muslims as detailed above (see Appendix 3.7a, pages 361-368). As long as the people of the Crusader nations failed to 'interact with the Muslim Ummah on the basis of respect and mutual understanding,' Zawahiri argued, they would 'continue to move from one disaster to the next.'⁵⁴⁴ At the same time, however, the public were warned that their leaders were fighting Muslims in order to secure their own personal financial gain, but had tricked the wider population into becoming involved in a struggle that could not possibly be won.⁵⁴⁵ The majority of threats to the West from this period, however, targeted the wider public rather than specific elites. People of the West had given the *mujahideen* 'every legal justification for attacking them,' Zawahiri argued.⁵⁴⁶ All Americans, for instance, were on the side of 'tyranny, criminality and failure' for voting for hostile regimes⁵⁴⁷ and all had to 'pay the price for their choice.'⁵⁴⁸ In an ironically twisted interpretation of Western democratic and inclusive societies, therefore, and as a crucial justification for civilian targeting, the Al-Qa'ida leaders direct their threats and warnings to 'normal' members of the public. This not only implies that they are responsible and generally at fault but also suggests the general public can immediately alter any existing policies and the current state of affairs. 'Most of you don't recognise the language of religion, morals and principles, and instead understand the language of running after pillage, and plunder,' Zawahiri claimed, whilst addressing the general population in the West, adding: 'you must honestly try to reach a mutual understanding with the Muslims for then, and only then, you might enjoy security.'⁵⁴⁹ Inclusive societies implied collective participation and thus joint responsibility, calling for a spontaneous and unified corrective response. 'Normal Americans claim to be innocent,' bin Ladin reflected, 'and yet they failed to bring the leaders responsible for the Vietnam War to justice. And elected Bush twice and gave him continued mandate to wage war [...]. This innocence of yours is like my innocence of the blood of your sons on [September] the 11th.'⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴¹ Zawahiri (2004) [58].

⁵⁴² Zawahiri (2005) interview with Al-Zawahiri aired on Al-Jazeera (4 August), see MEMRI clips no. 799 & 791 [128].

⁵⁴³ Zawahiri (2005) [49].

⁵⁴⁴ Zawahiri (2005) 'The Victory of the Islamic Religion in Iraq,' published by As-Sahab (6 December), available from IntelCenter (2008) [26].

⁵⁴⁵ Bin Ladin (2004) untitled statement published by As-Sahab (29 October), secured via link from Islamist web forums [31]; Zawahiri (2006) 'Bajawr Massacre and the Lies of the Crusaders,' published by As-Sahab (21 January), available in Ibrahim (2007) and IntelCenter (2008) [51].

⁵⁴⁶ Zawahiri (2006) [21].

⁵⁴⁷ Zawahiri (2007) [97].

⁵⁴⁸ Zawahiri (2007) [23].

⁵⁴⁹ Zawahiri (2008) 'The Correct Equation,' published by As-Sahab (22 January), available from IntelCenter (2008), also available as a collection of clips posted on YouTube [28].

⁵⁵⁰ Bin Ladin (2007) [10]. Similar tone and direction is applied to other non-Muslim audiences, addressed as holistic entities rather than multifaceted societies with a range of opinions, e.g. towards the French in some of bin Ladin's last communiqués (see: bin Ladin (2011) 'From al-Sheikh Osama bin Mohammed bin

7.2.2 *Softer appeals*

An alternative version of these messages directed towards non-Muslim publics at large present the Al-Qa'ida leadership as a fair operator. These 'softer' appeals and conciliatory approaches also place the onus for implementing change squarely on the public, thus implicitly underscoring justifications for violence when the general population 'fails' to react to appeals from the leadership. The coding found 29 communiqués containing examples of these 'softer' approaches in the dataset (see items in Appendix 3.7b). Bin Ladin, for instance, made several appeals to the 'American people,' urging them to select a 'serious' government that looked out for their interests rather than their own material gain.⁵⁵¹ After all, Americans had 'risen against their government's war in Vietnam' and were thus urged to do the same today in order to 'stop the massacre of Muslims by their government.'⁵⁵² Bin Ladin recognised that both sides had suffered during this war, arguing that the US government's 'hands are stained with the blood of all those killed from both sides, all for the sake of oil and keeping their private companies in business. The American public that voted for those in power thus held the key to ending hostilities: 'your security is in your own hands.'⁵⁵³ In order to do this, all Americans had to free themselves from the 'ideological terrorism' of the neoconservatives and the Israel lobby and were urged to 'work with' the Al-Qa'ida leadership to amend US foreign policy.⁵⁵⁴

Any collective 'failure' to recognise such initiatives thus implied common guilt. As mentioned above, moreover, both leaders extended several invitations to Islam, in order to underline the position of the leadership as a 'true' vanguard. This ensured the people of the West had been presented with options and alternatives to insecurity and potential targeting by the Al-Qa'ida leadership.⁵⁵⁵ Traditional proselytising, however, also featured, as the 'weak and oppressed' of the world and all victims of America were invited to Islam in order to benefit from the strikes of the *mujahideen*.⁵⁵⁶ Further 'options' were presented through offers of cease-fires and peace treaties, in response to 'positive reactions' in the West where members of the public displayed their opposition towards war in opinion polls and through public protests.⁵⁵⁷ Again, however, the responsibility of securing a pledge declaring that the West would not 'attack Muslims or interfere in their business' and ensuring the 'departure of its last soldier from our land' lay squarely with the ambiguously-defined 'people' to whom the messages were

laden to... The French people,' published by As-Sahab (22 January), secured via Islamist web forums [231]).

⁵⁵¹ Zawahiri (1993) [99].

⁵⁵² Bin Ladin (2001) [125].

⁵⁵³ Bin Ladin (2004) [83].

⁵⁵⁴ Bin Ladin (2009) 'A Statement to the American People,' published by As-Sahab (13 September), translated and distributed by the Global Islamic Media Front, secured via Islamist web forums [144].

⁵⁵⁵ Numerous invitations to Islam were communicated through the messages, with Islam presented as an alternative to insecurity, capitalism and immoral materialism. See: bin Ladin (2002) 'A Message Addressed to the American People,' message aired on Al Jazeera (6 October), IntelCenter (2008) [75]; Bin Ladin (2002) [212]; Zawahiri (2005); Zawahiri & Gadhafi (2006) 'An Invitation to Islam,' video message published by As-Sahab (2 September), distributed on Al-Boraq.com [33]. See further Bin Ladin (2007) [10]; As-Sahab (2002) [108].

⁵⁵⁶ Zawahiri (2006) [21]; Zawahiri (2007) [23].

⁵⁵⁷ Bin Ladin (2004) statement offering peace treaty to Europeans, audiotape distributed to media networks (14 April), transcript available in Ibrahim (2007) [52]; bin Ladin (2004) [80]; bin Ladin (2006) message to Americans, audiotape distributed to media networks (19 January), transcript available from Ibrahim (2007) [50].

directed.⁵⁵⁸ This study suggests, therefore, that the Al-Qa'ida leadership demonstrates its confidence and conviction of both the validity of its message and its ability to represent Muslims in its statements directed towards holistic non-Muslim audiences. Even more vital for the leadership, however, is the way in which Zawahiri and bin Ladin hone their messages through addressing Muslim audiences directly.

7.3 Approaching Muslims

Through directing the content of the message towards specific Muslim audiences, linkages are formed between diagnostic and prognostic message elements. This happens through explicit appeals for specific action and general mobilisation of the *ummah* and the elaboration of consequences for those who fail to heed such calls and identification of 'false prophets' and treacherous leaders. Thus, the coding measured the nature of appeals to Muslim audiences, criticism of Muslims and *takfiri* elements declaring apostasy in order to assess the construction and composition of this element of the motivational frames. The ability of the leadership to communicate the diagnostic and prognostic components that lie at the heart of the Al-Qa'ida movement depends on the quality and nature of the rapport with their 'constituents.'

For the Al-Qa'ida leadership the communiqués provide an essential vehicle allowing Zawahiri and bin Ladin to address 'constituents' and potential supporters. Thus, almost every communiqué analysed contained specific messages, advice and appeals to the 'Islamic nation' or individual Muslim communities. 'On our path to reform', bin Ladin wrote in an open letter to the people of Saudi Arabia in 1995, 'we are tasked with bringing the regime's dangers to the attention of the people.'⁵⁵⁹ The communiqués are designed to prod the wider Muslim population to act. The *ummah* must 'wake up from their sleep'⁵⁶⁰ and mobilise. 'The situation that Muslims are living in today requires the mobilization of everyone who belongs to this religion and the utilization of his resources.'⁵⁶¹ By extension, Muslims must recognise their individual obligation to respond to the situation that affects them all collectively: 'It is obligatory upon the Ummah with all its groups and sections and its men and women, young and old, to provide themselves, their wealth, their expertise, and all types of moral and material support what suffices to carry on the Jihad in the fields of Jihad.'⁵⁶²

7.3.1 Motivational appeals

Motivational appeals towards Muslims convey a sense of superiority and perceived experience and knowledge that the Al-Qa'ida leaders seek to communicate to their audiences. This element formed a very prominent part of the discursive approach towards Muslims throughout the period under review (see Appendix 3.8a). The communiqués present advice on how to be a good Muslim and how to support the jihad, enabling bin Ladin and Zawahiri to 'motivate the nation to support its mujahideen sons

⁵⁵⁸ Bin Ladin (2004) [52].

⁵⁵⁹ Bin Ladin (1995) 'Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commissions', Committee for Advice and Reform (11 July), Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345), Department of Defense [68].

⁵⁶⁰ Bin Ladin (2001) [129].

⁵⁶¹ Bin Ladin (2003) statement reported and published in *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (19 January), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [216].

⁵⁶² Bin Ladin (2006) [90].

financially and morally' with 'men, money, equipment and expertise.'⁵⁶³ Muslims are reminded of their duties, responsibilities and obligations that reflect the leadership's geographic ambition at the given moment and are based on the diagnostic elements of the communiqués and the specific prognostic elaborations provided.

The coding found that the leaders seek to incite believers and encourage them to act according to these principles, promising them that 'victory is imminent.'⁵⁶⁴ 'We seek to instigate the nation,' bin Ladin remarked, 'to get up and liberate its land, to fight for the sake of God, and to make the Islamic law the highest law, and the word of God the highest word of all [...] people must do all they can to rouse the nation with all the means in their power; with their tongues, pens, and persons.'⁵⁶⁵ In this way, emotional appeals introduce and justify the desired course of action: 'O nation of Islam,' bin Ladin implored, 'rise against injustice and tyranny, oppression and aggression, and humiliation and degradation. Bread is not more dear to us than our religion, nor is money more precious than our honor, or death more difficult than our sense of humiliation and degradation.' As a response, the *ummah* should: 'stage public demonstrations and exercise civil disobedience until the overthrow of the traitorous governments;' 'disown the leaders of disbelief and hypocrisy;' '[strike] at US interests in the world in general and on the land of our Arab and Islamic nation in particular;' '[boycott] US and Jewish goods;' '[kill] Americans and Jews with a bullet, a knife, or a stone;' and '[back] the mujahidin and [give] them every encouragement and support.'⁵⁶⁶

This message is underscored with a clear delineation of correct behaviour and consequences for collective failure: 'if we sacrifice the rule of sharia and bestow legitimacy on those who sell nations and sign the surrender agreements [...] we will lose both religion and the present life and the land will remain occupied, injustice present, and sanctities violated.'⁵⁶⁷ By extension, such divisions between righteousness and infidelity eliminate the possibility for Muslims to be passive observers. They have only two choices: 'do you belong in the party of America, Israel, France, Russia and their allies among the apostate rulers of our countries, their assistants, their soldiers, their journalists, their judges, and their clerics who spread confusion, pledge allegiance to them, and call them the care takers of the Muslims' affairs?' Zawahiri asked. 'Or, do you belong in the party of the monotheistic, Salafi Mujahideen?'⁵⁶⁸

Muslims were warned in the communiqués analysed not to be deceived by false initiatives but to follow the vanguard and the limited number of scholars and leaders who have set a good example (identified in the same communiqués). Muslims are asked to remain steadfast despite the challenges they face and recognise the power they can wield if properly guided. The *ummah* is the 'greatest human power on the face of the Earth [but] only if it establishes Islam properly.'⁵⁶⁹ The key to success, according to the material coded, is unity. 'Have full trust in the victory of Allah,' Zawahiri urged his audience, 'and know that America has no power against you, if you unite as one body in its face.'⁵⁷⁰ 'Unity is mercy and division is torture.'⁵⁷¹ This was not about allegiance to a

⁵⁶³ Zawahiri (2006) [73].

⁵⁶⁴ Bin Ladin (2004) [86].

⁵⁶⁵ Bin Ladin (1999) [184].

⁵⁶⁶ Bin Ladin (2002) statement published in *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (28 March) also distributed through www.jihad.net, available from *FBIS: Compilation* [205].

⁵⁶⁷ Zawahiri (2006) [73].

⁵⁶⁸ Zawahiri (unknown date) introduction to *Characteristics of Jihad*, a magazine of Egyptian militant Islamist activists, available in the CTC Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-600321) [35].

⁵⁶⁹ Bin Ladin (2003) [78].

⁵⁷⁰ Zawahiri (2002) [22].

⁵⁷¹ Bin Ladin (2004) [86].

particular group, but to the collective objective (as interpreted by Al-Qa'ida) of the entire *ummah*. The battle 'is not of a group or organization, but is the battle of the entire Ummah.'⁵⁷²

Aside from the inevitability of success if unity is achieved, other, softer, appeals were detected that were designed to raise the morale of the 'nation' and foment feelings of collective belonging. These include messages of condolence for communities that have suffered natural or man-made disasters and empathy for those experiencing long-term turmoil such as in Palestine. Those who suffered are assured they are not alone whilst others are urged to do what they can to help. The *ummah* was also occasionally thanked, in the material coded for its support and praised for its resilience in the face of hostilities. Increasingly, however, criticism has become a more common feature of the communiqués than gratitude, as will be discussed in detail below.

When the messages did not convey collective appeals, specific communities and regions were identified whose support and attention was perceived as particularly important. The groups identified included: scholars and other members of the (righteous) religio-political elite; members of the security forces; traders, merchants and wealthy Muslims; the men of the (jihadi) media; Muslim women (whose role is seen as passive); writers; tribes and clans; prisoners and, in particular; young Muslims.

The coding revealed the Muslim youth was especially significant in this fight since 'Mohammed's companions were young men.'⁵⁷³ The younger generation is key in toppling 'apostate' regimes and establishing a Shari'ah state as it constitutes the mainstay of the *mujahideen* forces. Convincing young men of this duty is therefore crucial: 'although Jihad in person is obligatory upon the entire Ummah, then it is even more obligatory upon the youths in the prime of their lives than upon the old.'⁵⁷⁴ Their dedication to the Shari'ah cause has to be absolute and all conventional aspirations of young people wanting to gain a skill, become educated and secure a good job must take second place. Muslims must not 'go astray' and aspire to become 'a minister, an ambassador, a director, a wealthy person, a notable, a distinguished writer, a skilful physician, a successful engineer or a prosperous businessman, [in this case] we will lose the afterlife and we will be defeated in this world.'⁵⁷⁵ The Islamic elite is also seen as having a particular role in this universal uprising:

I call upon the Muslim clerics, the writers, the thinkers, the tradesmen, the merchants, and the officers to convene and deliberate on the ways to get rid of these corrupt and corrupting regimes that burden our nation. I call upon them to start preparing for a change, however much time and effort it takes, and to spread the call for change throughout the nation. They must know that victory comes at a price, since a dark destiny awaits us unless we resist.⁵⁷⁶

In the communiqués analysed, Muslims are urged to appreciate their individual obligation in rising up against secularism and perceived occupation and recognise the need to unify the entire *ummah* under this single cause, supporting the Al-Qa'ida vanguard to ensure its victory, as well as allies such as the Taliban. Zawahiri dedicated his memoirs, *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, largely to this cause: 'This book was written in an attempt to revive the Muslim nation's awareness of its role and duty, its importance, and the duties that it needs to perform.'⁵⁷⁷ Contrasting the majority of his

⁵⁷² Zawahiri (2006) [94].

⁵⁷³ Bin Ladin (1996) [5].

⁵⁷⁴ Bin Ladin (2003) [78].

⁵⁷⁵ Zawahiri (2007) [101].

⁵⁷⁶ Zawahiri (2005) [128].

⁵⁷⁷ Zawahiri (2001) [119].

output, Zawahiri's book emphasised the obligations of Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, rather than just those of ordinary Muslims:

The jihad movement must come closer to the masses, defend their honour, fend off injustice, and lead them to the path of guidance and victory. [...] We must win the people's confidence, respect, and affection. The people will not love us unless they felt that we love them, care about them, and are ready to defend them. [...] We must not blame the nation for not responding or not living up to the task. Instead, we must blame ourselves for failing to deliver the message, show compassion, and sacrifice.⁵⁷⁸

As Al-Qa'ida was forced to flee its sanctuary in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime was toppled, this study found that appeals to Muslims for support became more desperate. In 2002, Zawahiri wrote a book imploring Muslims to realise their duty in uniting against the global front of infidelity and its secular 'agents': 'We call the Ummah - on all its factions, classes, and groups - to join the caravan of jihad', which consists of: 'staying clear of idolatrous tyrants, warfare against infidels, loyalty to the believers, and jihad in the path of Allah.'⁵⁷⁹

In order to fulfil this obligation, Muslims will have to abandon their attachment to earthly pleasures and ambitions. They must 'shun a life of play, amusement, extravagance and fun, and prepare [themselves] for the real life of killing, fighting, striking, and damaging.'⁵⁸⁰ Reflecting on the 'Obstacles to Jihad', Zawahiri argued:

The first battle Muslims need to win is with themselves - that is the key to beating the Crusaders. This battle is with weakness, hesitation, attachment to the earth, inability, fear, position, standing, family, children and wealth. The enemies are victorious against the Muslims for two reasons only: fear and hesitation of the Ummah and ignorance of warfare and fighting.⁵⁸¹

The communiqués coded demonstrated that, in the eyes of Al-Qa'ida, failure to mobilise would have drastic consequences. 'If you leave Baghdad today', bin Ladin warned in a 2006 statement to Muslims, 'then you will leave Damascus, Amman, the Gulf, and Riyadh tomorrow.' Muslims were urged to 'be cautious of the consequences of procrastination.'⁵⁸² 'It is a duty of Muslims to pledge allegiance to the "most sincere" [i.e. Al-Qaida and its affiliates] and follow them in the establishment of the Islamic state', bin Ladin argued. Having described the problem and presented the solution, the Al-Qa'ida leadership thus had to inspire the *ummah* to go forth and support the jihad: 'Stop playing around, listen, understand, wake up and pay attention [...] rush forward and do your duty [...] today Baghdad, and tomorrow Damascus, Amman, and Riyadh.'⁵⁸³

Regional emphases in the appeals are directed towards geographic concentrations deemed essential to the successful completion of specific tasks. Several messages thus impress on Kurds, Iraqis, Pakistanis, Lebanese, Somalis, Turks and others to rise up against their secular and treacherous leaders and fight those who cooperate with coalition forces and their allies. Concerned over the appeal of local groups in the West Bank and Gaza, moreover, bin Ladin and Zawahiri both address Palestinians directly,

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid

⁵⁷⁹ Zawahiri (2002) [45].

⁵⁸⁰ Bin Ladin (2003) [78].

⁵⁸¹ Zawahiri (2005) [25].

⁵⁸² Bin Ladin (2006) [93].

⁵⁸³ Bin Ladin (2007) [27].

seeking to direct them from being deceived by 'political solutions and regional deals',⁵⁸⁴ and demanding instead that Palestinians declare that 'they will take action to support the cause of establishing the Caliphate and fight until Allah's word reigns supreme.'⁵⁸⁵ The coding, therefore, established how wide ranging appeals seek to unite the Islamic world under the leadership of Al-Qa'ida and the *mujahideen*. They also appear, on occasions, to include references to Shia Muslims, or at least the followers of the first three Imams, Ali bin Abi Talib, al-Hasan and al-Husayn.⁵⁸⁶

The crucial organising principle is the implementation of God's law. Overthrow of tyrants or other more immediate goals do not suffice: the struggle must continue, according to the communiqués. Indeed, Zawahiri called on those who had successfully toppled the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes to continue fighting until *shari'ah* was established.⁵⁸⁷ The reason is that ruling classes and elites in the Arab and Islamic world, as well as the security establishment and intelligentsia, have become polluted by ideas and individuals who seek to undermine the establishment of God's law in favour of pursuing materialistic ambitions and secular principles. Were Mubarak, for instance, to be replaced with Muhammad El-Baradei, who, according to Zawahiri, 'lives in Vienna' and visits Egypt 'in his free time,' nothing would change.⁵⁸⁸ This is based on the assumption that some who claim to be Muslim have in fact committed such grave sins that they have 'nullified' their creed and left the fold of Islam. This principle of *takfir*, which Meijer described as 'a monster mainstream Salafism desperately tries to keep in its cage while other currents within the movement have done their best to let it escape,' thus has important implications for targeting, as noted above.⁵⁸⁹

7.3.2 Apostasy

This study found that *Takfirism* in the Al-Qa'ida communiqués analysed, however, is not applied limitlessly or without caution. Initially, moreover, the focus of these accusations was primarily on elites, presented as abnormal as well as immoral, and their immediate support networks. Early references also relied more on context and 'implicit excommunication' which stopped short of declaring apostasy in favour of describing behaviour and supposed consequences. A degree of escalation, therefore, or at least elaboration, was detected in the coding, for instance, in bin Ladin's criticism of Saudi authorities.

Early messages and 'open letters' thus focused on the record of the Saudi leadership and the damage these inflicted, in terms of spreading disunity, worsening the economy and strengthening the enemy.⁵⁹⁰ There was no doubt that this involved a betrayal of Islam, however, as these actions would bring the Saudi authorities 'shame in this world and torture in hell.'⁵⁹¹ Rather than being a guardian of the holiest places, the royal family was driving people away from Islam, acted out of hatred of Islam and its 'true' preachers and strove to fight against it.⁵⁹² Although bin Ladin's early

⁵⁸⁴ Zawahiri (2007) [104].

⁵⁸⁵ Zawahiri (2007) [12].

⁵⁸⁶ Zawahiri (2007) [23].

⁵⁸⁷ Zawahiri (2011) [235].

⁵⁸⁸ Zawahiri (2011) [234].

⁵⁸⁹ Meijer (ed.) (2009): 19.

⁵⁹⁰ Bin Ladin (1994) [37].

⁵⁹¹ Bin Ladin (1994) [38].

⁵⁹² Bin Ladin (1994) 'Saudi Arabia Unveils its War Against Islam and its Scholars,' open letter dated 12 September, Harmony Archive [AFGP-2002-003345], CTC West Point [40]; bin Ladin (1994) 'Higher

communiqués focused in some detail on economic plight, insecurity and lack of social justice within the Arabian Peninsula, he was quick to emphasise these were merely symptoms of far more profound crimes orchestrated by the Saudi regime. 'Our differences with the Saudi Regime surpass important incidental matters like economic collapse, administrative corruption, oppressing the people and confiscating their legal rights,' bin Ladin argued in July 1995. 'These differences become more important, greater, and deep-rooted matters [when concerning] the basic matter of the requirements of monotheism.' The Saudi regime had 'abandoned these concepts, and thus [...] completely lost its legitimacy.'⁵⁹³ Rather than being only politically or economically inept, the regime had declared 'war against Islam and those calling for an implementation of its teachings.'⁵⁹⁴ 'Whoever permits himself or others to follow a positive or man-made law is transgressing God's Law and therefore is an infidel and an apostate who no longer belongs to our religious community,' bin Ladin declared in another open letter to the Saudi regime in August 1995. It was clear that the Saudi King had 'committed the forbidden things in Islam which nullify its validity before God. The devastating failure and the dishonourable corruption which have been proven against your regime,' bin Ladin continued, 'are enough reasons to overthrow it.'⁵⁹⁵ The regime had 'deviated from Islam and [...] committed apostasy.'⁵⁹⁶ It is important to note, however, that the focus of these declarations and denunciations was on the regime as a whole and its track record. Arguing its actions went against the core tenets of Islam was crucial in order to justify any action against it. Misdeeds and corruption alone did not suffice to justify the overthrow of a regime, however unrepresentative, or question its legitimacy. This could only be done when it had been demonstrated that the regime was hostile to the interests of Islam.⁵⁹⁷

Similar labels could thus be attached to other regimes in the region. Aside from the side-lining of Islamic jurisprudence and legal codes (according to the leadership's interpretation), domestic association and cooperation with the great infidel forces of the West would provide further evidence of the apostasy and illegitimacy of such regimes. The coding of message elements given in Appendix 3.8b found references presenting political elites in the Islamic world as 'agents' of the West, traitors, 'rulers of debauchery' and 'stooges,' even as governments created by the Americans to begin with as 'treacherous puppet regimes,' such as those in power in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Palestinian territories.⁵⁹⁸ More significantly, however, the coding found condemnation of political elites frequently involved the excommunication of anyone involved in the wider decision-making process who aids or legitimises secular governance and cooperation with the West. Zawahiri spoke of the 'huge armies of traitors consisting of soldiers, writers, teachers, artists, judges, legislators, journalists and media people' that supported

Committee for Harm!!' open letter dated 15 October, Harmony Archive [AFGP-2002-003345], CTC West Point [47].

⁵⁹³ Bin Ladin (1995) [68].

⁵⁹⁴ Bin Ladin (1995) [66].

⁵⁹⁵ Bin Ladin (1995) [62].

⁵⁹⁶ Bin Ladin (1995) [69].

⁵⁹⁷ It was only much later when bin Ladin began to state more unequivocally that the Saudi leadership should suffer physically for its betrayal of Islam. In May 2003, for instance, he issued a statement promising Al-Qa'ida's next messages to Saudi authorities would be 'dripping in blood,' bin Ladin (2003) statement distributed by Movement for Islamic Reform (London) (29 May), available from *FBIS: Compilation* [219]. Over a year later bin Ladin issued a statement online expressing similar sentiments, arguing Saudis needed to 'unseat the ruler' and 'if he declines, then arms would be taken up to unseat him.' Bin Ladin (2004) [84].

⁵⁹⁸ Bin Ladin (1999) [184]; bin Ladin (2002) [205]; bin Ladin (2003) [98]; Zawahiri (2006) [73].

these regimes ‘against the Muslims and their Jihadist vanguard,’ ‘[selling] Islam in exchange for benefits and security.’⁵⁹⁹ Worst of all, however, were the *ulema*, members of the religious establishment qualified in Islamic teachings and law, who could seriously undermine and question the quality of Al-Qa'ida's, and especially Zawahiri's, anti-secular message. Scholars and the religiously ordained were thus especially chastised in the material coded for uttering support for impious systems of governance and secular leaders who were seen to rely on these ‘religious scholars of beggary, the ulema of flattery and the philosophers of defeat’ to legitimise their actions.⁶⁰⁰ These scholars ‘sold’ their *fatawa* as ‘commodities’ in exchange for power and influence in order to please the heretic ruling class.⁶⁰¹ ‘The long beards, huge turbans, majestic titles, purported lineages and popular myths,’ Zawahiri argued, ‘are no substitute for the truth and cannot conceal the crimes of cooperation with the Crusaders, loyalty to the infidel invaders and killing of the Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan.’⁶⁰²

Another crucial and powerful source of influence upon which the political elites and foreign ‘Zionist-Crusaders’ relied was the military. The embedding and popularity of the armed forces in the Middle East and beyond, however, would render it problematic to declare large swathes of its rank and file apostates. Additionally, of course the army, especially the Egyptian Army, had produced fine recruits for the jihad, including Anwar Sadat's assassins. Nevertheless, if soldiers followed corrupt rulers or military leaders they would be seen as complicit, Zawahiri warned in his first set of responses to the ‘Open meeting,’ adding, however, that he would not recommend the declaring of whole armies as apostate, as there were certain ‘particulars’ involved.⁶⁰³ Indeed, during the ‘Arab Spring,’ when the Egyptian Army became the most powerful (and popular) political organisation in the country, Zawahiri noted that although the generals were ‘in the pockets of the Americans and Israel’ there certainly were honourable people within its ranks.⁶⁰⁴ In relation to the Pakistani military the immediate stakes have been higher, however, and anxiety over on-going operations against Taliban and Al-Qa'ida loyalists by the Afghan border greater. As a result, the communiqués have declared soldiers in the Pakistani army ‘enemies of Islam’ and ‘hunting dogs’ of the Zionist-Crusader alliance whose eternal abode in the hereafter will be hellfire, unless they mend their ways and recant.⁶⁰⁵ The significance of such holistic declarations of apostasy is clear in light of the high ratio of terrorist attacks in Pakistan targeting members and recruits of the army and security apparatus. Another watershed in the widening of *takfiri* rhetoric in the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués was the Iraq insurgency and the perceived need to foment chaos and derail US- and coalition-sponsored attempts by the government in Baghdad to increase stability.

Within the context of the Iraq war, bin Ladin reminded Muslims that ‘supporting the infidels against Muslims is one of the ten things that nullify Islam, as stipulated by scholars.’⁶⁰⁶ Those who assisted the occupying forces, the government in Baghdad or embraced any institution derived from these illegitimate entities had therefore committed

⁵⁹⁹ Zawahiri (unknown date) [35].

⁶⁰⁰ Zawahiri (2006) ‘Four Years Since the Battle of Tora Bora - From Tora Bora to Iraq’, published by As-Sahab Media (12 April), IntelCenter (2008) [238].

⁶⁰¹ Zawahiri (2001) [119].

⁶⁰² Zawahiri (2007) [97].

⁶⁰³ Zawahiri (2008) [105].

⁶⁰⁴ Zawahiri (2011) [235].

⁶⁰⁵ See e.g. Zawahiri (2008) ‘A Message from Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri to Pakistan Army and the People of Pakistan,’ published by As-Sahab (10 August), NEFA; YouTube [41]; Zawahiri (2009) [140]; Zawahiri (2009) [142].

⁶⁰⁶ Bin Ladin (2006) [92].

major sin and left 'the community of Muslims.' As a result it would be permissible to 'spill their blood and take their property' and their marriages would be annulled.⁶⁰⁷ Jihad had come to Iraq and failing to support and participate in holy war against foreign invaders and their local 'agents' would not be a 'forgivable stumble'⁶⁰⁸ but a 'cardinal sin.'⁶⁰⁹ Furthermore, any Iraqis or other Muslims who expressed discomfort with the levels of violence displayed by jihadis, which often targeted normal Iraqi citizens, and acknowledged the legitimacy of the post-invasion ruling order 'by hand, tongue or pen' had 'no right to live.'⁶¹⁰

The longitudinal study found that these notions of what can be termed 'apostasy by thought,' which can apply to any member of society, appear to have evolved considerably from the earlier communiqués that focused on and traced in detail the actions of unrepresentative leaders in the Arabian Peninsula. The coding revealed that Zawahiri, however, appears to have accepted such wide-ranging *takfiri* rhetoric much earlier, during his time with Al-Jihad. A document issued on behalf of the group in 1993, for instance, which was authored or commissioned by Zawahiri, warned that 'someone who claims to be a Muslim and cites a democratic or socialist thinker becomes an unbeliever and an apostate.'⁶¹¹ This issue of nationalism, socialism and democracy or secularism as an alternative belief system to (violent extremist) Islam that, by extension, rendered anyone involved in such movements an apostate, featured prominently in Zawahiri's output later as he condemned supporters of Turkish secularism, the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian nationalist movements and similar platforms. Even Hamas was accused of taking a 'ride with the American devil and his Saudi representative,'⁶¹² although Zawahiri later pledged solidarity with the movement *if* it corrected its 'march.'⁶¹³ Fundamentally, however, the study found there would be no respite for those who claimed to be 'democratic Muslims' or support participation in democratic societies. This would be no different from saying 'I am a "Jewish Muslim", or I am a "Christian Muslim:" they are 'apostate infidel[s],' Zawahiri argued in his book on the Muslim Brothers, *The Bitter Harvest*.⁶¹⁴ Any dilution of the creed, as interpreted by Al-Qa'ida, was tantamount to abrogation of all of its tenets and the creation of a 'new religion,' a 'fairy tale' that the Americans and apostates called 'enlightened moderation.'⁶¹⁵

7.3.3 The Shia

When it comes to questioning and judging the sincerity of a Muslim's faith, conventional wisdom would suggest Shia Muslims would be particular targets of angry condemnation in the communiqués for alleged deviation from the 'true' path. Much of the diagnostic and prognostic narrative is based on puritanical interpretations of Islamist doctrine and a nostalgic aspiration to revive the spirit that prevailed during the time of

⁶⁰⁷ Bin Ladin (2003) [79]; bin Ladin (2004) 'People of Iraq,' aired on Al Jazeera (6 May), IntelCenter (2008) [82].

⁶⁰⁸ Bin Ladin (2007) [27].

⁶⁰⁹ Bin Ladin (2004) [86].

⁶¹⁰ Ibid. See also: bin Ladin (2003) [78]. Zawahiri similarly talked of those who discouraged jihad and violence in Iraq as 'traitors' in the eyes of God: Zawahiri (2006) [238].

⁶¹¹ Zawahiri (1993) [99].

⁶¹² Zawahiri (2007) [18].

⁶¹³ Zawahiri (2007) [101].

⁶¹⁴ Zawahiri (1991) [46].

⁶¹⁵ Zawahiri (2005) [49].

the Prophet Mohammed and his companions. As Fradkin notes, Salafist glorification of the *Salaf as-Salih* brings to the forefront:

The historical circumstances that eventually led to the division of Sunnis and Shiites, and the original quarrels which energized the hostility between them. Since Shiites detest and even publicly revile the first three caliphs, as well as others of the Salaf, the general orientation of modern Sunni Islamism was bound to deepen the already potent divide between it and Shiism, including Shiite Islamism.⁶¹⁶

Based on this logic and the policy of Al-Qa'ida's affiliates in Iraq, Riedel argued that 'the anti-Shia violence promoted by al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was not an aberration but a reflection of fundamental jihadist and al Qaeda thinking.' Fomenting sectarian war and violence, targeting Shia populations in particular, was part of the overall Al-Qa'ida strategy and any misgivings over the level of violence displayed by Zarqawi were not aired publically, according to Riedel.⁶¹⁷ Indeed, when asked about the Sunni-Shia hostilities in Iraq and how to stop them, Zawahiri seemed to suggest the Shia were the belligerents and that aggression was primarily aimed at Sunni districts: 'don't ask the one under attack not to defend himself,' he demanded.⁶¹⁸ Kepel and Milleli, meanwhile, take an alternative view, arguing anti-Shiism was not part of Zawahiri's 'stock in trade.'⁶¹⁹ Kepel suggests that, on the issue of Iraq especially, Zawahiri tried to find common ground between Sunni and Shia populations. He points out that Zawahiri did not deride prime minister Nuri Al-Maliki as a Shia, but rather for his collaborative stance with the Americans, and appeared to make respectful references to Imams Ali and Husayn.⁶²⁰ The current analysis supports this latter observation.

The coding process did reveal that some communiqués decried the alleged doctrinal deviation of Shiites. An early statement attributed to Zawahiri, for example, condemned the 'heresy' committed by (Twelver) Shiites in the way in which they 'distort[ed] [...] the Quran and the image of the Islamic Caliphate.'⁶²¹ Much later, the Shia were warned in the communiqués against collaborating with the government in Baghdad and accused of double standards, since they fought in Lebanon but not in Iraq.⁶²² They were seen as being led by 'unjust rulers' and 'religion traders' who strove to collaborate with the invading forces. 'We haven't heard even one Fatwa from one Shiite authority, whether in Iran or elsewhere, calling for Jihad against the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan,' Zawahiri complained in an 'interview' with As-Sahab published in December 2007.⁶²³ Indeed, the Shiite religious authorities had issued *fatawa* prohibiting fighting against the Americans in Iraq.⁶²⁴ The 'Safavids,' therefore, were 'stabbing the Ummah in the back in Afghanistan and Iraq,' just as they had done when the Ottoman empire was about to conquer Austria.⁶²⁵ In relation to Iraq, the coding

⁶¹⁶ Fradkin, H. (2009) 'The Paradoxes of Shiism,' in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (volume 8, pp. 5-26) Hudson Institute, Washington D.C.: 7.

⁶¹⁷ Riedel (2008): 13, 104.

⁶¹⁸ Zawahiri (2007) [13].

⁶¹⁹ Kepel & Milelli (eds.) (2008): 168.

⁶²⁰ Kepel (2008-B): 133-134.

⁶²¹ Zawahiri (1995) 'Our Stance Towards Iran: Response to the Accusation of Cooperation Between the Salafi Jihadi Movement and Renegade Iran', in *Nashrat al-Ansar* (1 April), excerpts published in McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) *Militant Ideology Atlas: Research Compendium* [115].

⁶²² Zawahiri (2007) [97].

⁶²³ Zawahiri (2007) [13].

⁶²⁴ Zawahiri (2010) [226].

⁶²⁵ Zawahiri (2010) 'Message to the people of Turkey,' published by As-Sahab (15 August), English version distributed by Ansarnet English Forum, secured via Islamist website [225].

revealed Shia Muslims were warned against attempting to fulfil any territorial ambitions through 'severing' southern Iraq and reminded that any collaboration with Americans or other external forces amounted to apostasy.⁶²⁶ Although he mostly avoided discussing sectarian issues in Iraq and the need to target Shiites, Zawahiri argued in the 'open meeting' that Sunnis were in fact a majority in Iraq if the Kurdish and Turkomen populations were aggregated and added to the number of Sunni Muslims in Baghdad and elsewhere.⁶²⁷

This study suggests that much of the more recent animosity towards Shia Muslims, therefore, is based on concerns over the ability of the (Shia-dominated) government in Iraq to assert its control over the country. Sectarian division and doctrine-based hatred towards Shia Muslims does not feature in the material under review in the same way it dominated much of Zarqawi's output and some contemporary militant Islamist propaganda.⁶²⁸ The necessity of focusing on the common, far and distant, enemy impressed a degree of doctrinal flexibility and pragmatism that many more avowedly sectarian and Salafist activists would not find palatable. The coding found that this was particularly the case for bin Ladin, who argued in a 1997 interview: 'The United States is the common enemy of both Iran and the Taleban. One day, relations between Iran and Afghanistan will improve [...] If Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and China get united, the United States and India will become ineffective.'⁶²⁹

The communiqués analysed clearly did not place primary emphasis on targeting Shia Muslims and they were not presented as targets for doctrinal reasons. The communiqués did encourage attacks against those who allow the state system to function, contribute to its security services, or collaborate with coalition forces. Indeed, even if those involved are Muslims, they can be targeted, as the above discussion demonstrates. Shiites may be in a majority position since the politics of Iraq work more in their favour, but in principal the culprits can be both Shia and Sunni, according to the material coded.

In a 2004 statement bin Ladin explained: 'The Iraqi who joins the renegade government to fight against the Mujahidin [...] is considered a renegade and one of the infidels, even if he were an Arab from the Rabi'ah or Mudar tribes.'⁶³⁰ Targeting justifications, according to the current study, therefore, are based on deeds and loyalties rather than strictly on creed, as they were for Zarqawi. The communiqués reveal that violence should be focused on coalition forces and on their domestic collaborators. Indeed attempts by Zarqawi and others to alter this target emphasis by focusing more on Shiites was met with cautionary advice from the Al-Qa'ida leadership, for example in Zawahiri's letter to Zarqawi as mentioned above. A statement issued by Zawahiri shortly before Zarqawi's death also appeared to contain veiled criticism: 'God knows better his [Zarqawi's] hidden intents, which I hope are better than his public ones. O Abu Musab: Be patient, stand fast, and rely only on God.'⁶³¹ Even bin Ladin's 'eulogy' message for Zarqawi reemphasised that 'whoever insisted on fighting along with the Crusaders against Muslims should be killed, *regardless of their sect or tribe*.'⁶³²

This study found that criticism of Shia Muslims, as it appeared in the communiqués, was also occasionally tied to appeals relating to notions of Islamic

⁶²⁶ Zawahiri (2005) [49].

⁶²⁷ Zawahiri (2008) [107].

⁶²⁸ See e.g. the section 'Rafidah Focus' in the fourth edition of the *Inspire* magazine (winter 2010).

⁶²⁹ Bin Ladin (1997) [154].

⁶³⁰ Bin Ladin (2004) [86].

⁶³¹ Zawahiri (2006) [238].

⁶³² Bin Ladin (2006) [92] Emphasis added.

solidarity and even the Shiite legacy itself and feelings of historical pride. Zawahiri, for example, issued the following appeal to Shia Muslims in a video message from December 2006:

And I call on [Shiites] to ask [themselves] a courageous and brave question: were Imam Ali [...] or our chief Hasan [...] or our chief Husayn [The first three Imams] present today in Iraq or Afghanistan, would they have colluded with the Crusaders in the invasion of the lands of Islam, and then cooperate with them and fight the Mujahideen in defence of them? [...] Or would they have declared Jihad against them and those who help them?⁶³³

Shiites were reminded that 'the Mujahideen are the supporters of al-Husayn [...] and are his allies and soldiers.'⁶³⁴ 'You obey al-Husayn [...] by obeying America?! And you raise the banner of al-Husayn [...] under the cross of America?!,' Zawahiri lamented in a video statement issued in July 2007.⁶³⁵ The animosity expressed thus appeared to be linked to current affairs and alleged treachery of those who cooperated with the local government and coalition forces, rather than on doctrinal differences or foundational origins. In June 2011, Zawahiri even compared the 'martyrdom' of bin Ladin to the assassination of Al-Husayn in Karbala.⁶³⁶ When asked to explain his position regarding doctrinal issues vis-à-vis the Shia, Zawahiri retorted: 'my stance towards the Shi'ite laity is [...] that they are excused through their ignorance.' To those Shia Muslims who refrained from assisting the 'Crusade,' Zawahiri commented: 'our way with them is invitation and displaying of facts, and clarifying the extent of the crimes committed by their leaders against Islam.'⁶³⁷

The results from the coding thus show that the attitude towards Shia Muslims is far from congenial, but still far less hostile than that expressed by the likes of al-Zarqawi. When Shiites are admonished in the communiqués the focus is on 'corrupt' leaders, and other actors, such as Iran, that shore up the 'treacherous' regime in Baghdad, risking to scuttle Al-Qa'ida's plans in the region. Animosity is therefore qualified in this way, and often linked to specific actors. What is perhaps most striking from the longitudinal analysis in this regard, is the extent to which the issue of Shia mobilisation, the consolidation of Iranian influence in the region and other issues relating to power balances and militant groups in the Middle East and beyond are largely absent in the material coded. At the same time other developments have forced these issues onto the agenda of other Sunni groups and individuals prominent in the region.

One potential source of tension is turmoil allegedly being generated by Sunni conversions to Shia Islam due to Iranian missionary work and region-wide admiration for Hezbollah (following the thirty-three day war between Lebanon and Israel in the summer of 2006) potentially undermining popular support for Sunni militant groups. Even Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, for example, who earlier had sought to alleviate tensions between Sunni and Shia sects, became more hostile towards the latter in his rhetoric.⁶³⁸ This lack of attention in the Al-Qa'ida communiqués largely comes down to a question of emphasis. The Shia are certainly not potential allies or, necessarily even participants,

⁶³³ Zawahiri (2006) [94].

⁶³⁴ Zawahiri (2007) [102].

⁶³⁵ Zawahiri (2007) [102].

⁶³⁶ Zawahiri (2011) [239].

⁶³⁷ Zawahiri (2008) [105].

⁶³⁸ Elad-Altman, I. (2007) 'The Sunni-Shi'a Conversion Controversy,' in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (volume 5, pp. 1-11): 1-11; Sindawi, K. (2007) 'The Shiite Turn in Syria,' in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (volume 8, pp. 82-108): 91.

but their targeting is not prioritised. Arguably, both leaders have had plenty of opportunities to launch into elaborate juristic and theological attacks on Shiism but have, as the coding established, very rarely, if ever, chosen to do so. The leaders have instead decided to focus their statements and books on the alleged shortcomings of (those who claim to be) Sunni Muslims and the danger posed by foreign infidels.

Although targeting of enemies, adversaries and members of the wider 'out-group' is an ever-present feature of the communiqués, these audiences do not constitute, what Wiktorowicz termed, 'potential participants and broader publics.'⁶³⁹ Although multifaceted, multi-layered and geographically dispersed, this base consists of those communities and individuals whom the Al-Qa'ida leadership considers 'true Muslims,' as opposed to apostates and those who have 'deviated' from the true path to such an extent that they can no longer be seen as Muslims, according to the leadership. The nature of the connection between this corpus on the one hand and the Al-Qa'ida leadership on the other is thus crucial for the overall effectiveness of the collective action frames and, ultimately, the success and survivability of Al-Qa'ida. If normal Muslim publics are alienated and their concerns ignored, the leadership will fail to present Al-Qa'ida as the pious vanguard dedicated to the physical and moral defence of the *ummah* that it purports to represent.

The coding and analysis of the communiqués under review, however, found that distinctions between apostates and 'true' Muslims failed to capture a dynamic and potentially damaging feature of the leadership's communication towards the Muslim realm which relates to the extent to which criticism, condemnation and disdain have come to dominate significant proportions of this relationship. The last section of this chapter assesses the way in which this dynamic has evolved over the years.

7.4 Criticising Muslims


In a statement published by As-Sahab in March 2008, bin Ladin defined three 'factions' of Muslims. First were the *mujahideen* and their immediate supporters. These were the most heroic and righteous of all Muslims; the fighters who were prepared to sacrifice everything in order to replicate the spirit, practices and achievements of the Prophet and his companions. The second category referred to apathetic Muslims, those who had failed to support the *mujahideen* as they fought infidelity and injustice. Finally, the third faction of Muslims consisted of advocates of 'Christian-Zionist' intervention in Islamic affairs who were seen as apostates who had sinned and left the fold of Islam.⁶⁴⁰ The members of this last category were discussed in the section above on *takfiri* elements in the communiqués. The current section explores the extent to which other Muslims are placed within the two remaining categories, of supporters or bystanders, and the consequences of this selection.

Although not without controversy, the *takfiri* label that the Al-Qa'ida leadership attached to specific groups of Muslim leaders and other members of the elite, as well as corrupted and polluting ideational strands and movements, was relatively straightforward and echoed – and in some cases was more measured than – output from other militant Islamist groups. Criticism of Muslims that stopped short of

⁶³⁹ Wiktorowicz (2004): 15. This refers to the base with which the messages are intended to resonate and the popular support that the leadership is trying to mobilise.

⁶⁴⁰ Bin Ladin (2008) 'A way for the salvation of Palestine,' published by As-Sahab (20 March), secured via link from Islamist websites, transcript also available from the NEFA foundation [6].

excommunication, however, was more complex. Broadly speaking, the analysis of coding results found that approaches towards the Muslim community in this regard can be divided into two main categories, depending on the intended audience: the elite and the wider public. The results of this aspect of coding are detailed in Appendix 3.9 and this material is analysed in the subsequent sections. Figure 7 places the aggregated communiqués described in Appendix 3.9 on a timeline covering the total period under review for the current study. Three distinct groupings are detected in the graphs presented: criticism of religio-political elites, together with the wider *ummah*; criticism of elites only and criticism that is directed primarily against the wider Islamic public. The 9/11 attacks are placed on the timeline in relation to these communiqués for illustrative purposes. As shown in the figure, criticism directed primarily against elites has been fairly consistent throughout the period under review. Denunciation of Muslim publics, however, is a more recent phenomenon. Although these sentiments were expressed prior to the 9/11 attacks, they appear to have been a particular feature of the post-9/11 discourse.



7.4.1 The religious elite

Numerous communiqués throughout the period under review criticised and admonished specific members of the religious, political and activist elite. Indeed, in early communiqués this was a chief preoccupation of the leadership and was reflected in their output. Although mainstream politicians were quickly considered outside the realm of Islam, declaring *ulema*, or Islamic scholars, and leaders of Muslim groups apostates would have been much more problematic and beyond the classification deemed appropriate at the time.

The coding revealed how early communiqués focused criticism on individual scholars or movements following their alleged drift away from the 'true' interpretation of the faith. Such allegations, however, are distinct from those levied at 'apostate' rulers or their collaborators and allies. Many of the figures in question are religiously ordained and respected and cannot be easily challenged. Even when responding to the scathing criticism of Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, Zawahiri attempted to separate the 'words' from the person for whom he still claimed to have great respect,⁶⁴¹ even though he later implied 'Dr Fadl' had always been a marginal figure within Al-Jihad.⁶⁴²

Nonetheless, those who advocate peaceful religious alternatives to the path described by Al-Qa'ida or legitimise semi-secular government systems, pose a considerable threat to militant Islamists as their ostensibly legitimate options undermine the notion that jihad is the only way to respond. This anxiety contributed to Zawahiri's publication of *Bitter Harvest* and many subsequent works⁶⁴³ and bin Ladin's letters to the Saudi grand mufti Ibn Baz. Other scholars were also warned such support for governments that failed to implement the Shari'ah would be 'viewed as a disgrace [...] on the day of judgement.'⁶⁴⁴

The current analysis revealed steadily escalating and irate denunciations of members of the *ulema* and Islamic organisations. Initial communiqués talked of 'errors' being made and expressed disbelief over some of the stances and declarations that were being disseminated, offering 'polite advice' to those who had erred.⁶⁴⁵ Later, in order to isolate those who issued *fatawa* that contradicted Al-Qa'ida's public stance, bin Ladin sought to divide the *ulema* into 'good' and 'bad' scholars,⁶⁴⁶ noting the immense gulf that separated 'scholars who act and the scholars who compromise.'⁶⁴⁷ This precluded the more problematic, potentially *khawaarij*, stance of condemning all *ulema*. Scholars belonging to the latter category were chastised for their materialistic ambitions, closeness to secular leaders, acquiescence of foreign infiltration and other perceived ills. Failure to condemn the presence of foreign troops in Muslim countries or support for local leaders, provoked outrage within the Al-Qa'ida leadership, which accused 'the scholars of evil and hired writers [of changing] their attitude to best suit the ruler.'⁶⁴⁸ These 'sellers of religion' and 'scholars of beggary' needed to be isolated and fought wherever they could be found, as noted above.⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴¹ Zawahiri (2008) [20].

⁶⁴² Zawahiri (2008) [105].

⁶⁴³ See for example extensive criticism of the Brotherhood in Zawahiri (2008) [107].

⁶⁴⁴ Bin Ladin (1994) [40].

⁶⁴⁵ E.g. Zawahiri (1993) [99]; bin Ladin (1994) [47]; bin Ladin (1994) [63].

⁶⁴⁶ Bin Ladin (1995) [67].

⁶⁴⁷ Bin Ladin (2003) [78].

⁶⁴⁸ Bin Ladin (2004) [84];

⁶⁴⁹ Zawahiri (2005) 'Wills of the Knights of the London Raid,' published by As-Sahab (15 November), transcript available in Ibrahim (2007) [53].

7.4.2 Islamist militants

The coding detected several examples of the Al-Qa'ida leadership lashing out against former colleagues and fellow militants. Former militants who have spoken out against the use of violence against unarmed civilians and Muslims in particular are potentially very problematic for the leadership, even though the extent of damage inflicted by such comments, especially considering several of the key figures involved were incarcerated when they published their criticisms, is contested. In addition to Sayyid Imam's criticism, denunciations of militancy by other Egyptians, formerly prominent on the violent extremist scene, have prompted angry responses from Zawahiri in particular. One of the more embarrassing retractions involved members of Zawahiri's own Al-Jihad, including Abu Yasir, who signed the February 1998 declaration in support of the establishment of the World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders. Less than a year later he and other members of Al-Jihad had renounced violence. In response, Zawahiri wrote a private letter warning Yasir and others that they would lose 'both in this world in the thereafter' as a result of the decision.⁶⁵⁰

In relation to the Afghan jihad, moreover, the leadership was keen to emphasise that anything that detracted from the continuation and expansion of hostilities against infidels and their allies would put any military gains in jeopardy. This was no less important in relation to on-going operations in Afghanistan against NATO and the government in Kabul. Militant leaders including Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masud (who was assassinated by Al-Qa'ida operatives) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (who since became a potent adversary of coalition forces in Afghanistan) were thus accused of fomenting discord among the *mujahideen* following Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan, failing to support the Taliban government and liaising with the United Nations.⁶⁵¹ Ironically, as already mentioned, bin Ladin also criticised his Taliban hosts for the restrictions they imposed upon him even when 'the United States is free to do whatever it feels like.'⁶⁵²

More recently, other militant groups that have become more measured than Al-Qa'ida in their approach towards violence have been the focus of criticism in the communiqués. This relates, in particular, to Hamas and Hezbollah, both likely rivals for public support, sympathy and attention in the Levant and beyond. Hamas, as mentioned, was accused of abandoning government by *shari'ah*, betraying Muslims in the Caucasus, of sacrificing 'four-fifths' of Palestine, and of other alleged shortcomings in increasingly angry outbursts from the Al-Qa'ida leadership. According to the coded material, Zawahiri was especially preoccupied with what he saw as a gradual abandonment of non-negotiable red lines that Al-Qa'ida was supposedly prepared to defend: 'I took a gradual approach with HAMAS,' Zawahiri argued, 'from support to repeated advice to warning to general criticism.'⁶⁵³ Hamas had thus been something of a last bastion of hope for indigenous Palestinian groups to respond correctly to the challenges presented as other groups in the territories had, according to Zawahiri, 'allied themselves with the devil, but lost Palestine.'⁶⁵⁴ Another reason for increased animosity towards the Hamas

⁶⁵⁰ Zawahiri (1999), letter to Abu Yasir, published in Al-Shafey, M. 'Al-Qaeda's Secret Emails' in *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (12 June 2005), letter dated 19 April 1999. Secured from the newspaper. [123].

⁶⁵¹ Bin Ladin (1997) [154]; bin Ladin (1998) statement published in Islamabad-based newspaper (17 January), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [159].

⁶⁵² Bin Ladin (2001) [195].

⁶⁵³ Zawahiri (2008) [105].

⁶⁵⁴ Zawahiri (2001) [119].

leadership of course, aside from ideological roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, was the group's success in purging Gaza of Al-Qa'ida affiliates and loyalists.⁶⁵⁵

In terms of references to Hezbollah from the coding, substantive and doctrinal reasons were also prominent in bin Ladin's and Zawahiri's critique of the group and Hassan Nasrallah, its Secretary-General, even though more immediate concerns over competition for public support no doubt played a prominent role. Indeed, the coding revealed that both bin Ladin and Zawahiri became more vocal in their criticism of Hezbollah after the 2006 war with Israel when, as mentioned above, Hezbollah managed to generate widespread support and admiration in the region. Hezbollah was presented in the communiqués as a largely secular organisation that had diluted any religious elements in its charter through cooperating and compromising with apostates and infidels and taking part in the party political process. The Al-Qa'ida leaders accused the group of failing to 'liberate Palestine' when opportunities permitted, of being reluctant to attack Israel and of ignoring the people of Gaza completely. Nasrallah was seen as a hypocrite who secretly liaised with the UN and other non-pious elements in the region in order to maximise his power and influence. Zawahiri even compared Nasrallah to his archenemy, Hosni Mubarak.⁶⁵⁶ Bin Ladin drew parallels between Hezbollah and the hated regimes of Anwar Sadat and king Hussein of Jordan.⁶⁵⁷ Interestingly, however, the coding found that Hezbollah's Shia credentials were rarely the focus of criticism.

As the perceived pinnacle of a vanguard, it is hardly surprising that the Al-Qa'ida leadership admonishes Islamic elites and activist networks that purport to provide alternative prognosis, even when problem diagnosis is often similar and even when both compete for much the same grass root support in order to retain legitimacy and relevancy. Much more significant is the way in which the leadership approaches this grass root support and any evidence suggesting the general public is seen to have failed Al-Qa'ida and, by extension, the legacy of the Prophet.

7.4.3 'The nation has failed to support us'

The processing of communiqués found that prior to the 9/11 attacks very few references were made that were critical of the general Muslim population. The *ummah* was warned in this material that 'whoever denies even a minor tenet of our religion, commits the gravest sin in Islam.' However, the coding established that most of the content from the 1990s traced responsibility squarely back to elites and decision makers.⁶⁵⁸ The authorities and members of the *ulema* were accused of seeking to 'anesthetise' the Muslim population with alternative versions of Islam that appeared to have had some impact on the youth and others who did not know better.⁶⁵⁹ The general population in this sense is seen as gullible and susceptible to such impious forces unless lead by a vanguard of righteous *mujahideen* to whom the *ummah* owes loyalty. This provides context and a sense of purpose to the diagnostic and prognostic findings presented in the communiqués.

In a statement issued together with bin Ladin and aired on Al Jazeera a year before the 9/11 attacks, the traditionally more scathing Zawahiri complained that Muslims had spoken much but done little to fight the 'tyrannical' and infidel enemies

⁶⁵⁵ Filiu, J.P. (2009): 23.

⁶⁵⁶ See e.g. bin Ladin (2008) [24]; Zawahiri (2009) [140].

⁶⁵⁷ Bin Ladin (2007) [27].

⁶⁵⁸ Bin Ladin (1999) [178].

⁶⁵⁹ Bin Ladin (1999) [184].

that were damaging the interests of Muslims.⁶⁶⁰ In his introduction to a new jihadi magazine published in Egypt during this period, Zawahiri warned that a new Islamic generation had grown up that had adopted Western-influenced norms and practices that were far removed from the traditional 'Islamic manners and behaviours.'⁶⁶¹ To address this deviation, it was essential for the Al-Qa'ida vanguard to guide the *ummah* to the correct path through the dissemination of communiqués directed towards the general public. Warnings and criticisms of Muslims, especially during the late 1990s when bin Ladin still dominated output, were still infrequent in the communiqués, however, and often qualified and limited in important ways. Thus the coding revealed references from several communiqués leading up to the 9/11 attacks where wealthy Muslims were warned especially of their obligation to support the *mujahideen* and to be aware of the distractions caused by the accumulation of wealth. In a statement published online in May 2005, bin Ladin condemned all Muslims who sought to secure worldly gains rather than live by the tenets of the faith.⁶⁶² 'We live in a world where the majority of the people constantly worry about accumulating wealth,' bin Ladin complained a year later, asking: 'how should I correct those who sell themselves for a few pennies?'⁶⁶³ For Muslims, this was a particularly important moral question, given the extent of suffering that affected so many, especially in Palestine: 'how can the wealthy hold on to their riches when the Palestinians are defending themselves without arms?'⁶⁶⁴

The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks brought unprecedented pressures on the Al-Qa'ida leadership, which was forced to flee its haven in Afghanistan and abandon the support networks that had been established in the country. The impact of this pressure and the need to secure support from the wider Muslim population to compensate for the loss of Taliban protection was reflected in the communiqués analysed. In one of his first statements after the attacks, bin Ladin warned Muslims that those who failed to support the new jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan against America, its local allies and coalition forces, would face the wrath of God on the Day of Judgement.⁶⁶⁵ Although hailed as a huge success for Al-Qa'ida and for the interests the leadership purported to represent, the current study found – based on coding of messages directed towards Muslim audiences – that the attacks mark the beginning of a shift in addresses towards normal Muslims. After the 9/11 attacks, the messages gradually became increasingly irate, and criticism – even condemnation – of the general population, the *ummah* that Al-Qa'ida claims to represent, became a prominent feature of the discourse. A central theme, according to the coding, was the perceived need for Muslims to realise that aid and support for Al-Qa'ida and the *mujahideen* fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan was the duty of all Muslims irrespective of where they lived. A month after the commencement of hostilities in Afghanistan, bin Ladin released a statement to Al Jazeera warning that 'anyone who lines up behind Bush in this campaign has committed one of the ten actions that sully one's Islam.' Strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan were merely part of a wider conspiracy against Muslims who all needed to unite under one banner.⁶⁶⁶ Muslims were lying in slumber, failing to realise their duty and living in a world of 'laziness and

⁶⁶⁰ Bin Ladin & Zawahiri (2000) [191].

⁶⁶¹ Zawahiri (unknown date) [35].

⁶⁶² Bin Ladin (2000) [189].

⁶⁶³ Bin Ladin (2001) poem published in *Ausaf* (Islamabad) (3 March), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [193].

⁶⁶⁴ Bin Ladin (2001) speech published in *The News* (Islamabad) (7 May), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [197].

⁶⁶⁵ Bin Ladin (2001) [201].

⁶⁶⁶ Bin Ladin (2001) [77].

discontent' that was causing an acute crisis for defenders of the creed.⁶⁶⁷ 'For how long will real men be in short supply?' bin Ladin asked in a poem posted online in June 2002.⁶⁶⁸ A year after the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan in response to 9/11, bin Ladin reflected upon the developments over the past twelve months and the wider implications for the current state of the Islamic nation, lamenting the absence of popular support:

My mujahidin brothers and I were grieved when we saw our nation in the east and west watching the United States, the head of unbelief, afflicting the worst of torment on the oppressed men, women, and children while the nation watched the painful scene as if it was watching an entertainment movie. [...] If every Muslim asks himself why has our nation reached this state of humiliation and defeat, then his obvious answer is because it rushed madly for the comforts of life and discarded the Book of Allah behind its back.[...] Today, the nation has failed to support us and support the loyal ones from the students of religion who established the first Islamic state in Afghanistan that applied Allah's shari'ah.⁶⁶⁹

If Muslims continued to fail to rise up against these forces of infidelity, 'then everybody will be sinful'⁶⁷⁰ and remain sinful until the *ummah* 'produces her sons, her wealth and her power to the extent of being able to wage Jihad and defend against the evil of the disbelievers.'⁶⁷¹ At a time of great volatility for the leadership, therefore, the onus was very much on the Muslim general public to come to its aid. When coding results for the two leaders were compared, it emerged that for the past decade, however, criticism of Muslims has been far more vocal, hard-hitting and general in Zawahiri's output who blames normal Muslims, rather than himself or Al-Qa'ida, for the lack of mobilisation achieved in the face of on-going hostilities in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.

This difference between the two leaders could become significant in terms of the future ability of the Al-Qa'ida leadership to reach out to normal Muslims, particularly now that Zawahiri has become leader of the core movement following the death of bin Ladin. Indeed, the latter's final communiqué illustrated his general approach to the *ummah* in the majority of his messages. The *ummah* was seen as numb and unresponsive despite the injustices it was facing primarily because the rulers had 'sabotaged the minds of the Ummah' through their control of the media and 'religious governmental institutions.'⁶⁷² The role of the Prophet Mohammed (and many other prophets before him) as a shepherd guiding and protecting his flock, provides a powerful metaphor which bin Ladin embraced. Muslims need guidance and direction in order to respond to the challenges they face in an effective and correct manner.

7.4.4 Alienating the grass roots

Zawahiri's initial warnings towards the *ummah*, as identified in the dataset, also concerned the apparent 'defeatism' that was preventing proper mobilisation in support of

⁶⁶⁷ Zawahiri (2008) [20]; Bin Ladin (2002) report of statement published in *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (26 June), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [210].

⁶⁶⁸ Bin Ladin (2002) [210].

⁶⁶⁹ Bin Ladin (2002) the 'will' of bin Ladin published in *Al-Majallah* (London) (27 October), available in *FBIS: Compilation* [213].

⁶⁷⁰ Bin Ladin (2004) [86].

⁶⁷¹ Bin Ladin (2003) [78].

⁶⁷² Bin Ladin (2011) 'The Speech by the Martyr of Islam' [As-Sahab title after bin Ladin's death], published by As-Sahab (19 May). English version distributed by Global Islamic Media Front, secured from Islamist web forums [240].

Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan and beyond.⁶⁷³ In subsequent communiqués from 2005 onwards, however, Zawahiri began to focus increasingly on the alleged failure of the general Muslim population to recognise and fulfil its religious and moral responsibility in the face of local and foreign adversaries and corrupting ideas. Local, secular regimes were thus 'winning over the *mujahideen*,' not because there was anything wrong with the tactics and ideology of Al-Qa'ida but because the *ummah* was too afraid of its individual safety and of family members. So many Muslims had contracted this 'malignant illness' leaving little hope for victory. The Muslim *ummah* had become paralysed by 'subjugation, ignorance, fear and resignation.'⁶⁷⁴ As opposed to earlier messages in the 1990s, when bin Ladin blamed lacklustre opposition against local 'tyrants' on the smothering power of these elites themselves, Zawahiri saw the general public as responsible. 'How? O Ummah, have you kept silent about this corruption in order for it to reach this degree of despotism?' – Zawahiri asked as he sought to rationalise the continued domination of Saudi politics and society by the House of Saud.⁶⁷⁵ According to the material coded, even if the *ummah* did respond in some way to the oppression it witnessed, the force of its resolve paled in comparison to the strength of the opposition and extent of the crimes committed. Protests, screams and shouts would lead nowhere, Zawahiri argued, except to defeat.⁶⁷⁶ The repercussions of this lacklustre response would be severe for the *ummah*. In his 'Open Meeting' initiative, which was intended as a public relations exercise to mobilise popular support in favour of Al-Qa'ida and to ensure that the movement did not become marginalised amid the turmoil, Zawahiri instead employed harsh rhetoric condemning the general Muslim population worldwide for its failings:

I call on the Islamic nation to fear the day when God will ask it why it failed to back its mujahideen brothers [...] The Islamic world has not only failed to support the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, but a propaganda campaign was launched against it by the rulers' scholars, Iran's agents, and groups affiliated with Islam in support of their colleagues who were in control of five per cent of Afghanistan. [...] Muslims should repent to God for failing to support [the] Taliban, and they should know that God will ask them about their failure to support [the Taliban].⁶⁷⁷

The coding of Zawahiri's communicative efforts towards Muslims shows that in his view, therefore, Muslims were essentially cowards. They lacked the fighting spirit and resolve to tackle the domestic and external enemies that they faced and their only possible salvation was to follow the example of Al-Qa'ida and accept the diagnostic and prognostic solutions its leadership presented. The Muslims' most fundamental enemy, therefore, was 'this defeatist spirit, hesitation, and attachment to safety which motivates us to backtrack whenever the tyrants attack us and to plead with them.'⁶⁷⁸ This 'shame' could ultimately be the downfall of the *ummah*. Muslims had for too long favoured safety and allowed Jews and America to become embedded in Palestine. Muslims had a 'tendency to be enslaved', which explained why they had failed for so long to liberate Palestine and repel the threat posed by their enemies, far and near.⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷³ Zawahiri (2002) [45].

⁶⁷⁴ Zawahiri (2005) [25].

⁶⁷⁵ Zawahiri (2006) 'Support for Palestinians,' published by As-Sahab (9 June), transcript available in IntelCenter (2008) [85].

⁶⁷⁶ Zawahiri (2008) 'A Call to Help Our People in Gaza,' published by As-Sahab (23 March), transcripts available from IntelCenter (2008) and the NEFA Foundation [17].

⁶⁷⁷ Zawahiri (2008) [107].

⁶⁷⁸ As-Sahab (2002) [108].

⁶⁷⁹ Zawahiri (2009) [147]; Zawahiri (2010) [223].

The coding results for motivational framing of the communiqués under review, therefore, show how this message includes significant levels of coercion and hostility towards the very people presented as Al-Qa'ida's potential participants and supporters and the pool from which the movement draws recruits. These general, often abstract and holistic references to the consequences of inaction and responsibility for failure, shift the blame for disappointing stated objectives onto the general public and circumvent any reassessment of diagnostic and prognostic positions and the benchmarks of success. The current analysis found that criticism and denunciation of Muslim publics was even more potent when stated geographic concentrations and nationalities were addressed, admonished and threatened for specific reasons.

7.4.5 Denunciation of specific constituents

The coding showed this criticism was directed primarily towards those living in areas of on-going conflict where there are opportunities for compromise, peace making and reconciliation with external forces and domestic agitators. The criticism also reflected the anger of the Al-Qa'ida leadership towards those who failed to embrace the belief system of Islamist violent extremism when they had the option of doing so. The aggregated coding results showed that this anger was directed primarily towards the people of Pakistan, Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and Egypt. Even though the publics involved often endure considerable hardships the language used was often stark and unforgiving and more direct than that of appeals towards those living in more stable and prosperous regions.

Despite decades of conflict in the Palestinian territories, for example, Zawahiri expressed his disappointment with 'people who have collapsed and are still collapsing' in Palestine and those who accepted UN resolutions and other peace initiatives. The only option available to the Palestinians was violent jihad. Indeed, as they were on the front line in the battle with infidelity this was an individual obligation. It was imperative for Palestinians to multiply their rocket attacks, martyrdom operations and ambushes against the Israelis regardless of the consequences. Anything else amounted to defeat.⁶⁸⁰

The strongest criticism emerging from the coding results, however, was reserved for Iraqis and Pakistanis; Muslims who had also suffered some of the most gruesome and sustained campaigns of violence by Al-Qa'ida affiliates and associates. As mentioned above, Iraqis of all sects and tribes were warned not to cooperate with the government in Baghdad or participate in elections. Those who embraced the party political model were condemned as 'charlatans' and blamed for the chaos the country had endured.⁶⁸¹ Perhaps the stakes were even higher in Pakistan, the adopted home of bin Ladin and Zawahiri, and numerous messages from both leaders addressed alleged hesitation, even betrayal, of the Pakistani population.

The people of Pakistan were asked how they could allow local and foreign security forces to 'hurt' their 'brothers', the Taliban, when it was an individual obligation to support them.⁶⁸² The only other option aside from jihad was idleness,

⁶⁸⁰ Zawahiri (2008) 'On the Anniversary of the Naksa... Break the Siege of Gaza,' published by As-Sahab (4 June), transcript secured from the Open Source Center [15]. This is in spite of the fact that a few months prior to Zawahiri's declaration, Al-Qa'ida had been severely criticised in the 'Open Meeting' initiative for failing to invest sufficient energy and resources in the Palestinian campaign, a charge that put the leadership on the defensive in justifying the need to focus on Iraq.

⁶⁸¹ See e.g. Bin Ladin (2004) [86]; bin Ladin (2006) [93]; Zawahiri (2006) [21].

⁶⁸² Zawahiri (2004) statement aired on Al Jazeera (25 March), transcript available from Hegghammer, T. (2005) 'Al-Qaida Statements 2003-2004' [59].

which was the way of the disobedient ones.⁶⁸³ 'Rigged elections' and politics were not the way to salvation, only jihad was. As a result, the people of Pakistan were duty-bound to 'back the Mujahideen in Afghanistan with [their] persons, wealth, opinion and expertise.'⁶⁸⁴ If Pakistanis stood by passively without offering support to the *mujahideen* they would contribute to the destruction of both Pakistan and Afghanistan and would deserve the painful punishment they would receive from Allah.⁶⁸⁵ Indeed, the chaotic state of affairs in Pakistan was largely the fault of the general population itself and the fact that people had 'abandoned the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil.'⁶⁸⁶ Their silence in the face of corruption and collusion with the enemy, moreover, had rendered the state incapable of responding to natural disasters and catastrophes that had befallen Pakistan. There were 'deviations from Islam' among 'many of the people of Pakistan,' Zawahiri warned. Many were either secularists or would take part in Islamic traditions only as a ritual which was meaningless beyond the walls of the mosques and many would accept innovation.⁶⁸⁷ 'Aren't there any honorable ones in Pakistan?' Zawahiri asked in his 'Open Meeting' appeal, 'isn't there anyone who prefers the hereafter to the life of this world?'⁶⁸⁸ The people of Pakistan had become a 'people without honor, without sanctity, without pride [and] without any worth.'⁶⁸⁹ Their only hope was to repent and re-enter Islam.⁶⁹⁰

Amid such remarkable and exasperated denunciations of normal Muslims on the front line of a bloody Islamist-inspired campaign for the operational freedom of extremist groups and against perceived sources of vice, the position of the Al-Qa'ida leadership appears increasingly isolated. This alienation of large segments of potential participants is distinct from the reputational problems incurred by excessive targeting of innocents and Muslims. In addition to the impact of actions and behaviour, therefore, this author argues that a more abstract gap appears to have formed between the Al-Qa'ida leadership and normal Muslims. This is manifested in the way in which the former addresses the latter in public communiqués, as captured by the current longitudinal study.

Isolation could be compounded by irrelevance. In terms of the latter, Zawahiri's criticism of the people of Egypt, to which he devoted the majority of his career in jihad, provides the best examples. Zawahiri traced the 'primary cause of the humiliation and disgrace we have reached in Egypt and the other countries of the Muslims' to the 'Muslims' tardiness in resisting oppression, enjoining good and forbidding evil, fear, hesitation, clinging to life's crumbs, the culture of withdrawal, the methodology of defeatism.' These were 'the most important reasons for Egypt being transformed from a fortress for the defence of Islam into a helper, aide and partner in the American-Zionist Crusade assault.' The only way out, again, was in the form of jihad, but specifically through a campaign lead by a 'believing vanguard' over which Zawahiri presided.⁶⁹¹ For Zawahiri, the people of Egypt were largely apathetic and incapable or unwilling to

⁶⁸³ Bin Ladin (2007) 'Come to Jihad: a Speech to the People of Pakistan,' statement published by As-Sahab (20 September), transcript available from NEFA Foundation and IntelCenter (2008) [14].

⁶⁸⁴ Zawahiri (2007) [104].

⁶⁸⁵ Zawahiri (2009) [139].

⁶⁸⁶ Zawahiri (2009) [142].

⁶⁸⁷ Zawahiri (2010) [226].

⁶⁸⁸ Zawahiri (2007) [104].

⁶⁸⁹ Zawahiri (2010) 'Who is going to support Aafia Sidique?' statement published by As-Sahab (4 November), translated and distributed by the Global Islamic Media Front, secured via link from Islamist web forums [229].

⁶⁹⁰ Zawahiri (2010) [226].

⁶⁹¹ Zawahiri (2007) [13].

topple the tyrannical system that prevailed in the country. They would be unable to change anything or organise any form of uprising without the stern, righteous leadership of an Islamist vanguard and unsuccessful so long as they thought protests and demonstrations would be a vehicle for change rather than violent jihad.⁶⁹² The events of the Arab Spring of course surprised many commentators and experts and the fact that Zawahiri failed to predict how they unfolded is not necessarily a major weakness in and of itself. More interesting is the way in which Zawahiri communicated, through his messages to the people of Egypt and the wider Muslim population, his lack of confidence in the strength of their resolve and bravery. It is almost as if Zawahiri in particular had dismissed the activist potential of precisely the people he was seeking to mobilise in support of his movement.

7.5 Conclusions

Ideas expressed through public communiqués do not necessarily have a limited shelf life. Even if the figure involved is deceased, his ideas can live on and often reach even more people and achieve greater prominence than before. Abdullah Azzam, for instance, still appears to be popular more than two decades after his death, at least if the republication and distribution of his works is anything to go by.⁶⁹³ As, of course, are many medieval figures and scholars, including Ibn Taymiyyah.

There is little doubt that both Zawahiri and bin Ladin wished to secure such a legacy through the messages they published on behalf of their movement. The extent to which their words will live on, however, and the degree to which the model they created and sustained over the years will resonate with the wider community of potential participants, depends on the effectiveness of the narrative frames constructed by the two leaders and the nature of the communiqués they distributed. This thesis concludes with an evaluation of these factors, according to the framing approach, and a reflection on the holistic composition and durability of Zawahiri's and bin Ladin's communiqués over the past two decades.

⁶⁹² See e.g. Zawahiri (2007) [7].

⁶⁹³ Azzam is, for example, one of the most prominent and celebrated authors of books on the English-language Islamic media repository Kalamullah.com (see <<http://kalamullah.com/azzam.html>> [as of 16 March 2012]).

Part IV
CONCLUSIONS

FRAME EFFECTIVENESS

8.1 Summary of findings

The legacy of the two Al-Qa'ida leaders and the resonance of their material will, to a substantial degree, depend on the way in which Al-Qa'ida itself develops and on the nature of its eventual demise. Ten years after the 9/11 attacks, many observers see Al-Qa'ida as a movement in crisis, even in its death throes.

Cronin, for instance, identified five principal developments contributing to the perceived demise and marginalisation of the Al-Qa'ida core leadership. First, the excessive targeting of Muslims has, as mentioned above, caused tremendous damage to the credibility of the leadership. Second, the end-goals of the Al-Qa'ida core leadership and those of its disparate affiliates have become increasingly separated. Third, and on a related point, events surrounding the Arab Spring underscore the historical irrelevance of Al-Qa'ida. Fourth, and again related to the on-going developments surrounding the Arab Spring and its aftermath, the leadership has failed to mobilise public opinion in the ways in which had initially been envisaged. Finally, the core of the Al-Qa'ida movement had been greatly weakened by the slaying of many of its principal leaders; foremost among them was bin Ladin himself.⁶⁹⁴

Although the long-term impact of the current turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa on Al-Qa'ida remains to be established – disappointment with the new order, political or cultural tension, civil wars, ethnic strife or conflict with Israel might, for instance, present new opportunities – the immediate impact has, as was discussed in the previous chapter, been very negative, especially for Zawahiri. The capacity for the Al-Qa'ida leadership – which has been famously adaptable in the past – to replace fallen leaders and regain the initiative in the upper echelons of the movement also remains to be seen. In terms of the long-term future of Al-Qa'ida however, the current analysis has unveiled a deeper and more profound weaknesses that the leadership has failed to address. These have been identified through the systematic and longitudinal coding and analysis of Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués, the results of which were presented in Part III of this thesis. This author has dissected and scrutinised output from bin Ladin and Zawahiri, produced and disseminated over the past two decades, revealing failed aspirations, alienated constituents and frustrated promises.

⁶⁹⁴ Cronin, A. (2011) '9/11: How and why do terrorist campaigns end?' British Academy and University of St Andrews symposium: '9/11: Ten Years On', held at the British Academy, London (2 September).

The case was made for approaching these two leaders as constants, a core within a wider array of actors, followers and adversaries, throughout the fluid and tumultuous life span of Al-Qa'ida from its inception until the death of bin Ladin and the emancipatory revolutions of the Arab Spring. The case was also made for looking beyond organisational models to the ideology of Al-Qa'ida, as a social production of a dynamic set of beliefs and principles guiding behaviour, dispositions and defining goals and rationales of action. In terms of developing understanding into these ideational elements, two fundamental approaches were elucidated and applied. Firstly, the analysis relied upon rigorous empirical research into primary documents in order to provide sound grounding for analytical observations and generate a comprehensive corpus of independent data. Secondly, upon exploring theoretical approaches and alternatives, the thesis applied lessons from message framing and the construction of collective action frames and structured the analysis according to the composition of these interactive framing tasks.

This approach formed the basis of the data processing and subsequent analysis. The Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués, and the ways in which they seek to fathom and impact the core's wider environment, were thus understood in terms of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames. The diagnostic frames consisted of Al-Qa'ida's disassociation with prevailing societal norms and the elucidation of an evolving set of local and global grievances. Although often tangible and with broad resonance, the current study found a core feature of these diagnostic facets based on values and normative principles, rather than exclusively focused on a sense of victimhood. In some cases, anger over corruptive values was woven together with allegations of more conventional forms of violation of rights and sovereignty. This study showed how in recent years, the grievance narrative has become more complex with a host of different sources of grievance cited that, in the case of bin Ladin's final communiqués, even began to depart from an exclusive focus on the harmful practices and influences of Israel, the US, the West and their local and regional allies.

The coding of prognostic message elements identified the solutions that the Al-Qa'ida leaders presented to potential followers. The results of the coding revealed how these were encased in promises of a society governed by religious law and limited consultation where divine justice would prevail. Any detail of how this would work was notably absent, perhaps deliberately, even though these references remained constant over time. They served as a reminder, it was argued, of the pious nature of the activism prescribed, which – by extension – would thus render a host of violent responses permissible according to the leaders' interpretation of religious doctrine and precedent. Although the coding found that violence formed, predictably, a central feature of prognosis, the study discovered substantial variation in terms of the levels of violence endorsed and the nature of desired targeting. This was partly down to tactical reasons, but also as a result of a genuine escalation that appeared to get out of hand, as the belated and rather desperate attempts in more recent communiqués to rein in sympathetic forces illustrate.

The coding established that the Al-Qa'ida leaders have resorted to three major justifications for the violent tactics they celebrate and endorse. These consist of: (1) reciprocity; (2) redefining the concept of combatant, making the general public complicit and (3) stretching and twisting medieval doctrinal justifications for specific tactics (such as night raids and catapult or siege warfare) in order to justify indiscriminate deaths and unintended casualties. The coding results established that as far as Muslim deaths are concerned, this latter approach features prominently, as does outright denial of involvement, especially in those cases where questioning the devotion of those Muslims

who died seems inadvisable. Given the indiscriminate nature of the violence endorsed and (belated and contradictory) recognition of the damage caused by the widespread slaughter perpetrated by affiliates, attempts to appeal to the ‘global oppressed’ seem rather desperate and unlikely to succeed. As will be discussed below, the longitudinal study found that the prognostic element is undermined further by inconsistent and ambiguous prioritisation of target emphasis.

Motivational frames related to the conveyance of diagnostic and prognostic message elements, effectively tying together the preceding framing categories. For the Al-Qa’ida leadership, the study found that the in-group, out-group dichotomy remained important as an element of discourse, although the coding established that some factions, especially the Shia, remained elusive and were not placed consistently within either group. Nor did the excommunication of Muslims constitute a central theme – the approach to *takfir* was shown to be cautious and qualified (even though it escalated over time) with its direction dictated to a large extent by strategic priorities and the need to legitimise the targeting of those who threatened the interests of Al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and Iraq. A far more significant finding of the longitudinal study was the gradual dismissal and disavowal of vast swathes of normal Muslim publics, to whom the two leaders attempted to appeal and whose voices they purported to elevate and represent.

Initially, the coding revealed that criticism for inaction was levied primarily against specific and identified communities – elites in particular as well as the wealthy. As late as 2001, for instance, Zawahiri clearly stated that were the *ummah* to fail to respond to Al-Qa’ida’s call the leaders ought to blame only themselves and their failure to appeal to their constituents. A few years later this rhetoric had changed completely with Zawahiri in particular denouncing the ‘nation’ that had ‘failed’ to support its vanguard. This gradual alienation of target constituents undermines the image of a just and representative vanguard that the Al-Qa’ida leaders have tried so hard to construct over the years. One component of this constructed image, uncovered in the dataset, is the notion that the leadership is in a position to table demands and conditions set on behalf of the *ummah* in messages directed towards Western leaders. Chronologically, however, the current study found that the list of demands and corresponding threats of coercive action were predominantly issued *after* attacks took place, rather than before, challenging the assumption that the Al-Qa’ida leadership is acting according to religious protocol in issuing warnings and offering alternatives to bloodshed (for instance through conversion to Islam) prior to attacks.

This gradual alienation of potential participants through the communiqués, in terms of ignoring potential assets and followers, side-lining some principal concerns and denouncing those pursuing any alternative dispositions, has served to blunt the overall message effectiveness of the leadership output, as this concluding chapter will argue. This discursive isolationism has added more pressure on the core group already reeling from event-driven marginalisation and a backlash due to excessive targeting. As this thesis has argued, however, constraints imposed by the wider environment are fundamentally different from the weaknesses exposed by the current longitudinal analysis of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués. Although elements of targeting emphases and the channelling of violence have traditionally been within the control of the Al-Qa’ida leadership, this has not always been the case and there are a number of prominent examples whereby affiliates, groups and fans operate beyond the control of the Al-Qa’ida core and contrary to its desire. Other regional, or even global, elements have also been outside the leadership’s control.

Alienation through message dissemination, however, not only represents a process over which the Al-Qa’ida has retained sole and full control, but also a process

whereby the variables at play are quantifiable. This thesis has highlighted this distinction and analysed the content in question. Furthermore, although the Al-Qa'ida leadership has in the past proven logistically adaptable and operationally flexible, the doctrinal intransigence and ideational stagnation observed through the current analysis present a new element in the equation where change and reform may not be an option. Brachman wrote that the 'Jihadist movement [...] has been able to sustain its momentum in the face of global counter-terrorism efforts [...] because it has mastered the art of the social movement: transforming consumers of its ideas to producers of them.'⁶⁹⁵ This study has demonstrated how this rapport – between Al-Qa'ida's leadership and its potential followers – can, in itself, constitute a weakness.

The Al-Qa'ida leadership did not invent, nor does it retain exclusive ownership over, the discourse of contemporary violent Islamist activism. Throughout the period under review in this thesis, however, Al-Qa'ida has exerted tremendous influence on the construction and direction of this form of activism, as well as its impact worldwide. Whatever pathways dictate the evolution of Islamist violent extremism in the future, therefore, and however groups might consolidate in the coming years, capturing the ways in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership constructed its message frames will provide important tools to understand potential future trends and how these reflect or depart from the past. The extent to which – as this thesis has shown – cracks in this discursive foundation became discernable years before the impact of external developments on the Al-Qa'ida leadership were being observed and discussed, moreover, could also inform future work on the continued evolution of the Al-Qa'ida movement and other strands of Islamist militant activism. The case has been made here for systematic and empirical research into the dynamics of ideological material. The next sections explore the significance of these weaknesses according to the framing literature and discuss how these were identified in the corpus under review.

As noted in Chapter 3, the three criteria, which the framing literature identifies as undermining message impact and effectiveness, concern narrative fidelity, experiential commensurability and empirical credibility. In terms of the first criteria, this thesis argues that the narrative fidelity of the discourse under review appears to be strong as it applies and refers to relevant cultural myths, doctrinal elements and language that are central to the belief system of constituents. The coding results established that experiential commensurability, however, is undermined in three significant ways: through the problematic approach to the question of Palestine (chiefly in Zawahiri's messages), the dismissal of Muslim Diasporas in Muslim-minority countries and through the lacklustre response to the prognostic principles suggested. Empirical credibility, moreover, is weakened mainly by inconsistencies in Zawahiri's (more comprehensive) output as regards the hierarchy of enemies and the killing of Muslims.

8.2 Message Impact

Just over a month after bin Ladin was killed at his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, now the official leader of Al-Qa'ida, issued a statement honouring the 'noble knight.' Zawahiri insisted that bin Ladin had achieved what he desired. Rather than any operational accomplishments, Zawahiri chose to focus on bin Ladin's desire to 'incite the Ummah to jihad.' Bin Ladin's message had 'reached from East to West and

⁶⁹⁵ Brachman (2008): 11.

all over the world. The Muslims answered it', Zawahiri argued, 'as did all the oppressed on the face of the earth. And today, all praise be to Allah, America does not face an individual, group, or sect. No, it faces a rising Ummah that has awoken from its slumber in a Jihadi awakening that challenges it wherever it is.'⁶⁹⁶ Aside from Zawahiri's predictable celebration of bin Ladin's supposed accomplishments, the communiqué is revealing in the extent to which the dissemination of messages and mobilisation of the *ummah* are presented as the leadership's main priority and hallmark of success, rather than any operational or activist achievements.

This thesis has thus made the case that any assessment of the role and impact of Al-Qa'ida necessarily relies on an evaluation of the messages disseminated and their effectiveness and appeal. The approach adopted in this thesis sees the Al-Qa'ida central leadership at the core of a movement seeking to mobilise, sustain and direct the attention, force and aspirations of potential participants towards prescribed channels. Zawahiri and bin Ladin thus constitute what Wiktorowicz termed 'signifying agents engaged in the social construction of meaning,' as explained in Part II of this thesis. As movement leaders they strive to 'articulate and disseminate frameworks of understanding that resonate with potential participants and broader publics to elicit collective action.'⁶⁹⁷ A central feature of these efforts involves outlining and communicating specific forms of collective action. Failure to construct, communicate and deliver these messages risks derailing the militant revolutionary momentum that is central to the movement's survival. As has been demonstrated, Zawahiri and bin Ladin do not act as passive transmitters of stagnant or predetermined beliefs and ideas. They are, as Benford and Snow's framing concept assumes 'actively engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists and observers.' They interpret relevant events and conditions in an effort to 'mobilise potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists.'⁶⁹⁸ The previous part demonstrated how the two leaders have engaged in this interpretive and communicative work through drafting diagnostic, prognostic and motivational appeals in order to inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of Al-Qa'ida.

This part concludes by considering the impact of these appeals and elaborating any factors that could blunt their effectiveness, according to the framing literature. As noted in Part II of this thesis, the mobilising potency of collective action frames can, according to Benford and Snow, be affected and undermined by what they called the 'phenomenological life world of the targets of mobilization' and the interplay between these experiences and the ideational facets and activists framework presented by the movement leaders.⁶⁹⁹ Simply put, the message needs to be relevant to the life situations of potential participants and supporters and resonate with this key audience. Prescriptions would have to be plausible and acceptable and proscriptions perceived as just. The core issues communicated would similarly need to be central to their concerns and the message disseminators need to be perceived as credible actors.

These issues all concern three interrelated constraints identified in the framing literature as: empirical credibility; experiential commensurability; and narrative fidelity. The first refers to the match between the messages and the life experience of potential participants and the extent to which the discourse is believable within this context. In order to generate empirically credible messages, the disseminators need to be consistent in their frame construction and articulation and avoid significant contradictions over

⁶⁹⁶ Zawahiri (2011) [239].

⁶⁹⁷ Wiktorowicz (2004): 15.

⁶⁹⁸ Snow & Benford (1988): 198.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid (1988): 207-208.

time or across topics addressed. This is not to suggest elements of the discourse cannot change over time. Indeed the framing process is, as discussed throughout this thesis, an inherently dynamic one. Message construction is, as Benford and Snow note, affected by a number of elements of the socio-cultural context in which movement leaders operate.⁷⁰⁰ It is when this variation becomes perceived as illogical or appears contradictory that empirical credibility is affected. This can be exacerbated if the credibility of the message disseminators themselves is also challenged.

The second constraint, experiential commensurability, relates to the centrality of the issues covered by message disseminators for potential participants and the extent to which these address and provide solutions for the day to day concerns of this wider public. A crucial question in this regard is, therefore: does the material highlight the same issues that are of main concern to the public to whom it is designed to appeal and are the solutions presented accepted?

Finally, the impact of collective action frames can be blunted by factors undermining their narrative fidelity. This constraint rests upon harmony with the cultural myths and heritage of the wider belief system, which constitutes the ideational environment in which the movement and its potential supporters exist. Questions concerning narrative fidelity would thus probe whether message disseminators paid adequate tribute to and depended upon these broader cultural ideas and myths. This chapter concludes the thesis by drawing together findings from the longitudinal study of Al-Qa'ida communiqués to determine weaknesses in terms of overall message effectiveness according to these criteria.

8.2.1 Assessing frame effectiveness

Afghan War veteran Abu'l-Walid warned in 1993 that 'a movement that is isolated from its masses, that is suspicious of its people, and whose people are suspicious of it, can achieve nothing but destroy itself.'⁷⁰¹ Marginalisation and isolation has become an increasingly acute danger for the Al-Qa'ida leadership in recent years. Physical isolation of the leadership following the flight from Afghanistan after the Taliban regime collapsed raised questions about the leadership's ability to exert control over groups and individuals operating in Al-Qa'ida's name. The sheer volume of the bloodshed inflicted by these affiliates and derivatives, moreover, presented new challenges as the Al-Qa'ida leadership risked becoming so unpopular in the Muslim world and its pool of recruits and resources so diminished that it faced a similar demise to that of the ostracised Algerian GIA. On-going developments in the Middle East and elsewhere have undermined the reach and credibility of the Al-Qa'ida leadership even further as the hated Arab tyrants so despised in Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués have been toppled by popular, predominantly secular and often relatively peaceful, revolt rather than a religiously fervent campaign of jihad, which – as the chapter on Prognostic Frames shows – is what the leadership had in mind.

Numerous observers have sought to assess the isolation of Al-Qa'ida through conducting or analysing public opinion polls and surveys. The Pew Research Centre has, for example, conducted numerous surveys measuring the appeal of Al-Qa'ida. On the surface, the results would appear to indicate the leadership is losing support from potential participants. By the time of his death, expressed confidence in bin Ladin had largely plummeted in the Muslim world from figures as high as 70 per cent in the

⁷⁰⁰ Benford & Snow (2000): 628.

⁷⁰¹ See Harmony Archive (n. d.) document AFGP-2002-600053.

Palestinian territories to less than 30 per cent, with much less confidence expressed in the other Muslim countries surveyed. Around 20 to 30 per cent of respondents claimed to view Al-Qa'ida favourably in the Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia and Pakistan between 2010 and 2011, although far fewer expressed support in Lebanon and Turkey (with greater support, in turn, measured in Nigeria).⁷⁰²

Opinion polls often give mixed, ambiguous and sometimes contradictory results, and their outcome can be dependent on the way in which the question is phrased and the size and reliability of the sample. Surveys of Muslim public opinion, for example, have shown strong support for both the role of Islam in society, as well as greater democracy.⁷⁰³ These of course are not mutually exclusive forces but, as demonstrated in this thesis, in the Al-Qa'ida communiqués they could not be further apart. Furthermore, even though polls show Al-Qa'ida's popularity is slipping, many of the points set forth in its public messages would appear to resonate, at least as far as sources of grievance are concerned. Vast majorities of Muslims for instance were angered by the Iraq invasion, despised the proposed peace process between Israel and Palestine and were concerned over the impact of Israel in the region.⁷⁰⁴ More recently, the majority of Muslim publics polled blamed US and Western policies for lack of prosperity in Muslim nations over other potential causes and vast majorities in all Muslim countries surveyed, except Indonesia, viewed US and European policies in their regions as hostile towards Muslims.⁷⁰⁵

Opinion polls therefore give a mixed picture when it comes to assessing the impact and resonance of Al-Qa'ida, its actions and discourse. This author argues that an alternative approach to measuring this impact is through studying the communiqués themselves. This extensive corpus of material provides, as this thesis has demonstrated, a sound empirical base which allows for systematic and longitudinal evaluations to be made in order to assess the position of Al-Qa'ida within its environment. This rich but untapped source can provide valuable indicators concerning the relationship between the Al-Qa'ida leadership and the wider world of potential participants, adversaries and observers.

Ciovacco argues that targeting of Muslim innocents by Al-Qa'ida affiliates has been so damaging for the leadership that their 'moral case for war [has become] problematic, and many of its key ideological assertions are considerably weakened.'⁷⁰⁶ Indeed, the preceding part showed how Zawahiri's most recent communiqués carried increasingly desperate appeals to Islamist militants to cease their targeting of mosques, markets and other indiscriminate Muslim targets. As is the case with opinion poll results, however, the reality may be more complex. Montasser Al-Zayyat, Zawahiri's former lawyer, for instance noted in his book that 'almost all Muslims agree that the prophetic traditions clearly forbid attacks against civilians under any circumstances.' However, there was, according to Al-Zayyat, broad consensus in the Muslim world with the issues Al-Qa'ida frequently mentioned, including US hegemony, lack of freedom and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories.⁷⁰⁷ Ciovacco argues that bin Ladin was adept

⁷⁰² Pew Global Attitudes Project (2011-A) 'Osama bin Laden Largely Discredited Among Muslim Publics in Recent Years' (2 May).

⁷⁰³ Pew Global Attitudes Project (2003) *Views of A Changing World* (June). Pew Research Center

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁵ Pew Global Attitudes Project (2011-B) 'Common Concerns over Islamic Extremism: Muslim-Western Tensions Persist' (July 2011). Pew Research Center

⁷⁰⁶ Ciovacco (2009): 94-95.

⁷⁰⁷ Al-Zayyat, M. (2004) *The Road to Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right-Hand Man*, Pluto Press, London: xiv.

in ‘understanding what Muslims want to hear and when they want to hear it,’⁷⁰⁸ but even in his concise and relatively coherent set of messages some inconsistencies can, over time, be detected. The three framing constraints; empirical credibility; experiential commensurability; and narrative fidelity therefore provide a sound framework through which to assess the impact of the leadership’s message, and by extension, the position of the Al-Qa’ida core within the wider environment.

8.3 Weaknesses in the Al-Qa’ida Message

In terms of narrative fidelity, this study found that, considerable and consistent emphasis throughout is placed on basing assertions, language and terminology on the religio-cultural myths that are seen to prevail within the ideational environment to which the Al-Qa’ida leaders direct their appeals. Although the categorisation of civilians as legitimate targets and the leadership’s interpretation of the Prophet’s deeds and words for Islamist activists today is of course highly contested, these assertions nonetheless refer to core Islamic principles. Although the Al-Qa’ida leadership is no conventional Salafist fundamentalist organisation the overt traditionalist and literalist approach that forms such a prominent feature of its message underscores the narrative fidelity of this output within the context of radical Islamist activism. Within this context, other revolutionary movements, much more influenced by Western ideas, such as nationalism, would face stronger opposition and accusations of innovation (*bid’ah*) than the Al-Qa’ida leadership, which – as demonstrated in Chapter 7 – was also careful not to rely too much on excommunication (*takfir*), which could lead to them being denounced as *khawaaarij*, or extremist outsiders. Within an environment where, again according to opinion polls, people place greater emphasis on the religion of Islam rather than nationality as a source of identity⁷⁰⁹ the narrative fidelity of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués would appear to be strong.

What about experiential commensurability? As mentioned, numerous elements of the diagnostic framing of the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués analysed appear to resonate with potential participants. Core grievance issues, such as the Iraq war and Palestine are common features of the communiqués, which are based on collective feelings of injustice as a source of identity. The longitudinal study revealed, however, that there are three major shortcomings in the leadership message that appear to blunt the effectiveness of the communiqués and limit experiential commensurability. These are:

- The issue of Palestine; demonstrably central to the emotions provoking anger in the Muslim populace but something the Al-Qa’ida leadership has arguable failed to address convincingly, putting Zawahiri for instance on the defensive during his ‘Open Meeting’ initiative.
- The role of Diasporas; which constitute an important and growing proportion of potential participants and an essential group of extremist activists who have carried out terrorist attacks in the name of Al-Qa’ida, but whose existence is largely ignored in the communiqués, aside from a few dismissive references;

⁷⁰⁸ Ciovacco (2009): 855.

⁷⁰⁹ Pew Global Attitudes Project (2011-B): 28.

- The prognostic solutions presented; centred on isolationism, violent uprising and a culture of martyrdom that has failed to generate the support and mobilisation demanded and envisaged by the Al-Qa'ida leadership over the past two decades.

Finally, aspects of empirical credibility appear problematic when it comes to overall message impact. This study showed that the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués contain few references to operational guidelines or tactical details that are remotely relevant to contemporary scenarios. Indeed, aside from glorifying martyrdom operations – used extensively by affiliates in Iraq and elsewhere – bin Ladin's operational advice to followers at the dawn of the Iraq war was limited to extolling the virtues of camouflage and trenches.⁷¹⁰ The practical utility of this advice is perhaps questionable but that does not necessarily undermine the credibility of bin Ladin or Zawahiri and fellow Al-Qa'ida leaders as frame articulators. They have a proven track record of involvement in militancy and use their communiqués to convey messages that are central to the movement over which they preside. Other outlets, such as the Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula publications, provide the tactical guidelines – further sharpening the core message of the Al-Qa'ida leadership – whilst the Al-Qa'ida leaders themselves frame these tactical references according to the parameters analysed in the preceding chapters. Trenches and camouflage, for example, may have less to do with practical advice and more with reminding Muslims of the Prophet's glorious victory over the *Quraish*, as he protected Medina against overwhelming force by digging a trench that rendered their cavalry useless.

Based on the longitudinal study it emerges that the empirical credibility of the Al-Qa'ida communiqués, however, is undermined by inconsistencies and contradictions in terms of message direction, emphases and scope that present a mixed and ambiguous messages to potential participants and risk diminishing the overall mobilising impact of the message. Zawahiri's messages – which invariably convey more detail and are far more extensive than bin Ladin's output – are particularly problematic in this respect. The absence of bin Ladin's presence, providing concise grievance points and a jihadi narrative in 'sound-bite' form, may therefore prove damaging for Al-Qa'ida's future mobilising potential.

8.3.1 Challenges to experiential commensurability

A. The Israeli question

It has often been argued that one of the greatest source of anger and grievance in the Middle East and among Muslims is the plight of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and the relations between the latter and other countries in the region. Alleged Israeli acts of aggression against neighbouring countries and, in particular, Palestinian enclaves and unarmed citizens have provoked outrage for decades. In his attempt to understand the 'roots of Islamic militancy,' Munson found that, according to a series of opinion polls, 'the issue that arouses the most hostility in the Middle East toward the United States is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and what Muslims perceive as US responsibility for the suffering of the Palestinians.'⁷¹¹ The way in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership approaches the issue is thus essential in terms of matching the narrative with the concerns of potential participants.

⁷¹⁰ Bin Ladin (2003) [79].

⁷¹¹ Munson, H. (2006) 'Lifting the Veil: Understanding the Roots of Islamic Militancy,' in *Harvard International Review* (6 May): 2.

Crucial as the issue may be, analysts and observers do not appear to be in agreement when it comes to assessing the approach of Al-Qa'ida leaders to the question of Israel and Palestinians. Randal, for instance, argued that 'Osama was a latecomer to the Palestinian cause [but] came to appreciate it as the single most effective unifying force not just for Arabs, but for Muslims from Morocco to the Philippines.'⁷¹² For Scheuer the Palestinian issue was central to Al-Qa'ida, which supposedly was increasingly prominent operationally in the region through an ambiguous set of apparent affiliates.⁷¹³ Riedel dismisses commentators who argue the Al-Qa'ida leadership was late in focusing on Palestine and maintains that 'the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the central all-consuming issue for al Qaeda' and the cause that 'infuses every aspect of al Qaeda's thinking and activities and has become the rallying cry used to convince the ummah of the righteousness of al Qaeda's cause.'⁷¹⁴ This assertion, however, is problematic. Firstly, Islamist militant sympathisers themselves have accused the leadership of placing insufficient attention on the Palestinian issue. As shown in the previous part, for example, the Al-Qa'ida leadership was forced to defend its position on the Israeli question in Zawahiri's 'open meeting' initiative after being accused of diverting attention away from the issue to focus on Iraq and other developments. The aforementioned 'Dr Fadl', Zawahiri's former colleague, moreover, fumed that Al-Qa'ida 'did not offer Palestine anything except words.'⁷¹⁵

Secondly, the longitudinal study of Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués, presented in the preceding chapters, reveals that matters relating to Israel and Palestinians have not always received top priority. Greater emphasis was clearly placed on other issues during the bulk of the 1990s in the public communiqués, prompting Gaza-born journalist Abdel Bari Atwan, for instance, to challenge bin Ladin to respond to criticism that he and his organisation had sidelined the Palestinian cause in favour of other 'Islamic issues.' Bin Ladin responded, rather ambiguously, that 'interest in issues is determined by their closeness to the people's life and their sequence.'⁷¹⁶ According to bin Ladin's interpretation at this time, this meant the primary emphasis would be on Afghanistan and the Arabian Peninsula for the time being, and not Palestine. This is not to suggest that the issue was ignored, or even that the Al-Qa'ida leaders, bin Ladin especially, were not themselves concerned with developments in Palestine. Bin Ladin, for example, reportedly told his childhood friend, years before he became a renowned terrorist leader, that 'unless, we, the new generation, change and become stronger and more educated and more dedicated we will never reclaim Palestine.'⁷¹⁷ Indeed the issue of alleged Israeli aggression was one of three core grievances mentioned for the establishment of the 'World Islamic Front' in February 1998, following matters relating to perceived violation of the Arabian Peninsula and the suffering of Iraqis.⁷¹⁸ The point is that the prioritisation of grievances presented in the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués at this time did not appear to match that of the majority of Muslims.

⁷¹² Randal, J. (2005): 290. See also on Israel focus in Zawahiri and bin Ladin communiqués in Blanchard, C. (2006) 'Al-Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology' in *CRS Report for Congress* (26 January), Congressional Research Service, Washington DC: 11.

⁷¹³ Scheuer (2011): 153-161.

⁷¹⁴ Riedel (2008): 11-12.

⁷¹⁵ Quoted in *The Economist* (2009) 'The Growing, and Mysterious, Irrelevance of al-Qaeda,' (24 January).

⁷¹⁶ Bin Ladin (1996) [150].

⁷¹⁷ Bergen, P. (2006) *The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al-Qaeda's Leader*, Free Press, NY: 15.

⁷¹⁸ Bin Ladin, Zawahiri et al. (1998) [161].

The mobilising potential of the Israeli question, however, was not lost on the leadership. In a remarkably frank clause in his book *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, Zawahiri explained how the conflict was of central importance to the Muslim community and key in their mobilisation: ‘the fact that must be acknowledged is that the issue of Palestine is the cause that has been firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation from Morocco to Indonesia for the past 50 years. In addition, it is a rallying point for all the Arabs, be they believers or non-believers, good or evil.’⁷¹⁹ As the geographic scope of the grievance narrative expanded towards the end of the 1990s, therefore, the role of Israel became more prominent. Bin Ladin was asked to explain this apparent shift in emphasis from the Arabian Peninsula to matters relating to Israel in a sympathetic interview conducted shortly after the 9/11 attacks. His response was that sometimes the Al-Qa’ida leaders ‘find the right elements to push for one cause more than the other,’ with the second Intifada providing the perfect opportunity to refocus on developments in the occupied territories.⁷²⁰

However, the coding unveiled how Al-Qa’ida leaders, in an attempt to re-write their own history, engaged in several attempts to convince potential participants that the Israeli question and the Palestinian population had indeed always been the main priority of the leadership and the chief inspiration behind its activities, contrary to what older messages had stated. In a communiqué issued in December 2001, bin Ladin decried the ‘deliberate murder of children’ in Palestine – for instance that of Mohammad al-Durra, whose death was caught on camera – and noted how America, the target of the 9/11 attacks a few months earlier, was the principal backer of the ‘attackers of our sons in Palestine.’⁷²¹ In October 2004, again reflecting upon the 9/11 attacks, bin Ladin insisted that the inspiration behind these strikes was US support for Israel and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, feasible only because ‘the US permitted the Israelis to invade.’ Bin Ladin reflected: ‘I still remember those moving scenes: blood, torn limbs, and dead women and children; ruined homes everywhere; and high-rises being demolished on top of their residents; bombs raining down mercilessly on our homes. [...] As I was looking at those destroyed towers in Lebanon,’ bin Ladin continued, ‘I was struck by the idea of punishing the oppressor in the same manner and destroying towers in the U.S.’⁷²²

As he commemorated the 60th anniversary of the Israeli occupation, bin Ladin emphasised how the question of Israel was a basic issue for the entire *ummah* and something that had motivated him to become an activist since childhood.⁷²³ Bin Ladin’s concern over the Palestinian issue was undoubtedly genuine, even if attempts to rearrange the hierarchy of grievances retrospectively may be due to the need to maximise mobilising appeal of the message. Zawahiri’s approach to the Israeli question, however, might have caused much greater damage to the experiential commensurability of the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués.

As noted in Chapter 6 on Prognostic Frames, in 1995 Zawahiri famously proclaimed, following the Al-Jihad bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, that ‘the way to Jerusalem passes through Cairo.’⁷²⁴ The coding revealed that this way of

⁷¹⁹ Zawahiri (2001) [119].

⁷²⁰ Bin Ladin (2001) [130].

⁷²¹ Bin Ladin (2001) [129].

⁷²² Bin Ladin (1998) [163].

⁷²³ Bin Ladin (2008) ‘Reasons of the struggle on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the occupying state of Israel,’ published by As-Sahab (16 May), secured with help from ITSTIME, Catholic University of Milan [8]. The centrality of the Palestinian cause for bin Ladin and its apparent role in inspiring the 9/11 attacks was reiterated on subsequent occasions, such as in bin Ladin’s (2009) [144] and in Zawahiri’s (2011) eulogy for bin Ladin [239].

⁷²⁴ Quoted in Burke (2004-A): 154.

highlighting the Israeli question by proxy, through emphasising the need to address other more immediate concerns first as a means towards the ultimate goal of liberating Jerusalem when conceivable, again became a prominent feature of Zawahiri's communiqués almost a decade later. The processing of communiqués showed that as Al-Qa'ida became increasingly embroiled and desperate in a bloody and indiscriminate—and progressively unpopular—insurgency in Iraq, Zawahiri began to frame its efforts in the country as essential to the successful liberation of Palestine. As he paid tribute to the disastrous Al-Qa'ida commander in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Zawahiri emphasised the need to focus on Iraq in order to establish an Islamic emirate that could subsequently launch operations against Israel, regardless of how long this would take to accomplish.⁷²⁵ Iraq would become a 'fortress of Islam' from where assaults on Israel will be conducted.⁷²⁶ In his appeals for support for the Al-Qa'ida operatives in Iraq who, despite Zawahiri's triumphant hyperbole, were engaged in an increasingly stagnant and sectarian struggle against Muslims in the country, the Al-Qa'ida leader equated a solution to the Israeli dilemma with such lofty and ambiguous aims as the 'reestablishment of the Caliphate state which the Crusaders and their helpers toppled.'⁷²⁷

Thus, ten years down the line, the way to Jerusalem now passed through Baghdad. As with the Islamabad bombings, internal objectives not only trumped potential external goals, they formed the conduits through which the latter could be achieved. This, interestingly, was precisely the argument put forward by Zawahiri's colleague, Mohammed Salam Faraj on the need to target the near enemy and establish Islamic governance on a solid footing before engaging in other more ambitious activities, an argument that Zawahiri dismissed as misguided. It is as if, therefore, Zawahiri has come full circle. Judging by the 'open meeting' venture (which has never been repeated since) and other factors, it would appear that Zawahiri's prioritisation of Iraq and utilisation of Palestinian suffering to rally support for Al-Qa'ida in Iraq through his communiqués is far removed from the concerns of the vast majority of potential participants and Muslims in the region. What about the relationship with Muslims living in the West?

B. Failure to recognise the Muslim Diaspora

The Al-Qa'ida leaders are often seen as presiding over a 'global brand' that draws supporters from all corners of the globe, including an increasingly active, enthusiastic and comparatively rich proportion of Islamist militant sympathisers living in the West. Several of the most dramatic attacks linked to or inspired by Al-Qa'ida were carried out or attempted by Islamist extremists who had lived in the West for years or had been born there. Numerous individuals living in specific Diaspora communities in Europe and North America have also sought to join and support insurgency campaigns run by Al-Qa'ida affiliates and allies in East Africa, Central Asia and elsewhere. Additionally, of course, the community identified in the Al-Qa'ida communiqués does not recognise modern borders and purportedly represents Muslims globally, regardless of geographic concentration. As this study has shown, moreover, the grievance narrative often refers to developments that: are specific to Muslims living in the West, such as the French ban on

⁷²⁵ Zawahiri (2006) 'Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr and Emir of the Martyrs Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, May Allah have Mercy on Him' published by As-Sahab (24 June), available in IntelCenter (2008) [32].

⁷²⁶ Zawahiri (2007) [7].

⁷²⁷ Zawahiri (2007) [97].

religious symbols; originate in the West, such as the cartoon controversy; or are inherently global, such as bin Ladin's more recent environmental agenda.

Paradoxically, however – according to the current study – the Al-Qa'ida leadership appears to have failed to relate to Muslims living outside predominantly Muslim regions, especially those living in the West. Remarkably, given the volume of communiqués and extent of the period involved, the current analysis found hardly any appeals directed towards Muslims living in the West. Although the French *niqab* ban was alluded to in several communiqués, as noted, the point was to collate policies that supposedly exposed the overt hostility of Western regimes towards Muslims in general and portrayed this initiative as part of a wider campaign of aggression in the Middle East and elsewhere that started with the Crusades. In the very few cases where the Al-Qa'ida leadership acknowledged the existence of Muslims in the West this was usually prompted by a question. The answer given, in turn, was dismissive. Bin Ladin, for instance, told Abdel Bari Atwan (who has lived in London since 1979) that he 'would rather die than live in any European state.'⁷²⁸ Later, in an interview with Pakistani English-language newspaper *The Dawn*, bin Ladin warned that 'the Islamic Shariat says Muslims should not live in the land of the infidel for long.'⁷²⁹ Aside from these references, the coding found that bin Ladin largely ignored the Islamic Diasporas and never addressed the issue on his own initiative.

Zawahiri also remained largely silent on the issue of Muslims living in the West throughout the material coded, making a few limited references when, again, the issue was prompted by a question. Numerous participants in the 'open meeting,' for instance, wanted to know about their position as Muslims living in the West, even as supporters of many of the causes for which Al-Qa'ida claimed to fight. Zawahiri's response was equally scornful, warning Muslims that 'permanent residence in the countries of infidelity is only allowed when necessary [...] because this means that [a Muslim] accepts their laws to be applied to him.'⁷³⁰ In several other messages, Zawahiri condemned those who 'take pride in their British citizenship, or 'beg for residency permits' outside Muslim lands.'⁷³¹ At the same time, of course, those who had carried out attacks in the name of Al-Qa'ida, such as the 2005 London bombers, were praised, regardless of the fact that they too had never left the West, despite ample opportunities to do so.

The Al-Qa'ida leadership's reluctance to recognise or even acknowledge the existence of the millions of Muslims living in the West is perhaps informed partly by, what Meijer terms, 'xenophobic Wahhabism.' This school of thought posits that a true believer 'could only express his belief and the sincerity of his faith by demonstrating open enmity towards "idolaters." This forbids the befriending of infidels and prohibits true Muslims from travelling to the land of idolaters (*bilad al-mushrikin*). Indeed, the Quranic verse that Zawahiri quotes in his communiqués more than any other is verse 51 of the fifth *Sura*: 'O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you - then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people.'⁷³²

By occasionally admonishing, but largely ignoring, the millions of Muslims who live in the West or have positive relations with non-Muslims the Al-Qa'ida leaders have

⁷²⁸ Bin Ladin (1996) [150].

⁷²⁹ Bin Ladin (2001) [125].

⁷³⁰ Zawahiri (2008) [107].

⁷³¹ See e.g. Zawahiri (2010) [53].

⁷³² Surat Al-Mā'idah (5:51).

therefore failed to relate to the experiences of a vast proportion of Muslims worldwide. The life led by the Al-Qa'ida leaders and the isolationist vision they convey is simply unthinkable for the majority of potential participants whom they seek to court. The leadership's detachment from the wider experiences of the Muslim population is perhaps best illustrated, though, by the fact the prognostic vision of bin Ladin and Zawahiri has failed to materialise. The tension this has caused is palpable in the communiqués analysed.

C. Rejection of prognostic vision

The formulation of prognostic criteria is meaningless unless this element of the message is successfully conveyed to potential participants who, at least to some extent, become convinced of the need to mobilise according to the given prescriptions. Diagnostic and prognostic assertions, as noted, thus need to be delivered effectively in ways that provoke message recipients to become activists. 'Constituents,' As Snow and Byrd noted, 'have to be moved from the balcony to the barricades.'⁷³³ A very significant challenge to the experiential commensurability of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués thus lies in the fact that constituents or potential participants largely have not, over the course of the past two decades, responded to perceived grievances and societal ills in the ways in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership demanded and envisaged.

As the current longitudinal analysis established, there are a number of problems with the ways in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership constructs and delivers its prognostic prescriptions in the communiqués. As with many other militant revolutionary movements, the leadership has offered scant details concerning the envisaged end goal or how such a society might function in practice, aside from reiterating core aspirations of Salafi jihadists. References to the desired end goal are nonetheless consistent over time and serve, to a degree, as a motivational frame to impress the need to address more immediate goals. Although the communiqués sometimes appear contradictory over time in relation to justifications set forth for violence, the coding showed that references in this regard appear to escalate in a relatively consistent manner, with communiqués, broadly speaking, becoming more indiscriminate over time. A notable exception, however, is Zawahiri's more recent attempt to distance himself from Al-Qa'ida affiliates that target Muslims in mosques and market squares in Iraq, Pakistan and elsewhere, regardless of the fact that he had earlier sought to present justifications for precisely this form of targeting. Further work on future communiqués would be needed to establish whether this tension persists.

The most profound problem for Al-Qa'ida in this respect, however, is the demonstrable failure of its leadership to convince constituents of the virtue of the form of prognosis it has presented. There is, of course, tangible evidence that the plan for action presented in the communiqués has not provoked the envisaged results. Some might argue that the threshold for action has become so high, with the leadership demanding that followers embrace martyrdom and indiscriminate violence, thus limiting participation. As this study has shown, however, bin Ladin initially limited his prognostic requirements to economic embargo and boycotting of Western and US goods. It is notable, therefore, that the vast majority of Muslim publics continue to trade with the West or purchase Western goods, regardless of the Al-Qa'ida leadership's consistent calls for the boycotting of Western products for over twenty years. When popular boycott did become widespread, in the wake of the cartoon controversy, the role of Al-

⁷³³ Snow & Byrd (2007): 126.

Qa'ida in this uprising was widely perceived as marginal, belated and ineffective.⁷³⁴ There exists an even wider gap between the leadership's notions of legitimate and necessary violent action and the form of resistance the vast majority of potential participants have been prepared to undertake.

Al-Qa'ida's calls for popular support for mass casualty terrorism and affiliated or allied groups that carry out attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, East and North Africa, as well as the West and beyond have generally not been heeded. This lack of response concerns the prognostic solutions presented rather than many of the diagnostic elements of the collective action frames, which often are shared among a greater proportion of the population. In terms of the patterns revealed in the coding of the Al-Qa'ida communiqués, however, the most significant development is the way in which the failure of the leadership to see through the envisaged behavioural changes in the *ummah* has resulted in targeted condemnation of precisely this audience and a gradual but significant alienation of those publics that would constitute potential constituents and participants. As noted above, this is distinct from *takfiri* denunciations, which – the coding showed – are more specific and limited in reach. The lack of prognostic appeal of the message and, particularly, Zawahiri's insistence that the onus for change and reflection should be on the *ummah* rather than the Al-Qa'ida leadership, has compounded the isolation that the latter began to experience with its support for mass-casualty attacks and Muslim targeting in the first place. This detachment from the experiences and desires of the vast majority of the *ummah* is best demonstrated through understanding the leadership communiqués themselves.

The differences that exist in terms of forms of prognosis between the general Muslim population and the Al-Qa'ida leadership became obvious to all during the 'Arab Spring.' Zawahiri had, as discussed in Part III, mocked and criticised those who took to the streets in protest against government oppression rather than joining the ranks of the *mujahideen*, bemoaning the 'Muslim's tardiness in resisting oppression' through any meaningful ways.⁷³⁵ The 'Arab Spring', therefore, highlighted the irrelevance of Zawahiri's prognosis even though his own frustration with the lack of mobilisation of the Muslim public according to his prescribed ways became palpable in the material coded at least six years before the 2011 uprising.

The effectiveness and mobilising potential of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués thus appears to be limited by the extent to which this narrative fails to address and match some of the chief concerns and experiences of vast swathes of the global Muslim population as well as the extent to which the presented prognosis appears to have been rejected by most message recipients. The way in which the leadership, and Zawahiri in particular, have reacted to these challenges points to its increased marginalisation in the last few years. Through a longitudinal study of Zawahiri and bin Ladin communiqués, moreover, light can be shed on the extent to which Al-Qa'ida's overall message lacks empirical credibility. The next section explores this aspect in detail.

8.3.2 Challenges to empirical credibility: frame consistency

Chapter 3 discussed how inconsistencies and contradictions that are detectable in a narrative over time could weaken message effectiveness and mobilising potential through conveying contrasting collective action frames that render the central message

⁷³⁴ See e.g. Kepel (2008-B): 180.

⁷³⁵ Zawahiri (2007) [13].

or specific activist guidelines ambiguous. As mentioned above, much of the material under review is inherently dynamic. The Al-Qa'ida leadership has confronted a wide set of challenges, reassessed the prognostic parameters deemed appropriate and reacted to watershed events which are framed within the existing dominating context of defensive jihad and collective identity based on common injustices. This variation is not necessarily problematic, so long as this fits within and enhances the overall discursive framework that the leadership has constructed over time. The preceding pages have also shown, moreover, that there are a number of obvious differences when Zawahiri's and bin Ladin's output is compared. In the early years of Al-Qa'ida, for example, Zawahiri's group and efforts were not fully in line with those of bin Ladin. Both fought to reinstate the Caliphate, but for the former its heart would be in Cairo whereas bin Ladin insisted upon the primacy of Mecca and the Land of the Two Holy Places.⁷³⁶

Following this transitional phase many argue that the scope of enmity and the focus of the communiqués became more coherent, with a clear delineation between far and near enemy for example, as discussed above, before becoming more fluid in recent years as the repertoire of issues expanded. Hegghammer, for instance, argued that traditionally rigid ranking of enemies according to prioritisation in the discourse of Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates during the 1990s to early 2000s has now morphed into a fluid hybrid whereby group leaders seek to widen their support and recruitment base by covering more issues, mixing local and external belligerents.⁷³⁷ Others, most notably Gerges, have emphasised the hypotheses that Al-Qa'ida saw an external, distant enemy in the United States and its Western allies and became convinced, and tried to convince others, of the merits of targeting this entity.⁷³⁸ This begs the question, however, to what extent was a clear dichotomy of enemy hierarchies ever tangible in the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués? For Scheuer, for example, bin Ladin always perceived and presented the US both as a near and as a far enemy – providing external assistance to local tyrants and Israel whilst being physically present in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and elsewhere. Bin Laden, according to this account, therefore, blurred the distinction between near and far enemies, but not necessarily in an incoherent way as he traced the traditional set of local adversaries and tyrannical regimes to the core threat of the United States and its allies, wherever they could be found.⁷³⁹

This study showed that early threats to frame consistency, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, were largely dispelled by the global outrage caused by the Iraq war, rendition programmes and accounts of detainee torture that proved a comfortable fit with the core elements of the Al-Qa'ida messages to date. There exists, however, an underlying tension in terms of scope and origins of grievance that could pose a challenge to empirical credibility in the long term. Part III showed how Zawahiri in particular variously traced the root cause of the grievances described, to the presence of America and the West in the Islamic world and to the overall corrupting influence of the ideas represented by these adversaries *or* to the traditional set of local tyrants and embedded elites. The result is a conflicting narrative with an ambiguous focus and set of targeting prescriptions that leaves many questions regarding the direction of activism and prioritisation of mobilisation unanswered. This apparent incongruity is no less acute in Zawahiri's more recent output. Nor does this change in scope appear to follow any logical or linear progressions with some communiqués emphasising the global, or US-

⁷³⁶ This is despite the fact that the two leaders condemned any form of nationalism and called for the, supposedly uninterrupted, application of Islamic norms regardless of geographic boundaries.

⁷³⁷ Hegghammer (2009-A).

⁷³⁸ Gerges (2005).

⁷³⁹ Scheuer (2011): 99-101.

focused, aspects of the struggle whilst others revert back to matters relating to Egypt and neighbouring regions, which are prioritised over other developments. Rather than dismissing this haphazard prioritisation as periodic nostalgia, the conflicting scope in Zawahiri's communiqués, that have always been far more expansive than those of bin Ladin, should be seen as a clear weakness in the overall empirical credibility of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués.

Empirical credibility is also undermined by inconsistencies in prognostic framing, especially in relation to justifications for violence and the reach of militant activism. Again, this is primarily a problem in Zawahiri's output. Bin Ladin's shorter and simpler communiqués generally offer far less detail than those of Zawahiri, limiting justifications for violence to notions of reciprocity and concepts, which would be familiar in the West, such as the fundamentals of 'just war.'⁷⁴⁰ Zawahiri's material is richer in content but, no doubt partly for this reason, also less consistent when it comes to deliberating the utility, prescribed form and consequences of violence. The coding showed how early accounts insisted upon the necessity of informing Muslims prior to attacks being carried out in their immediate vicinity, advice which Al-Qa'ida's affiliates appear not to have heeded. Later, the families of Muslims who were nonetheless killed were promised blood money, something which also appears to have failed to materialise. Zawahiri sometimes spoke of his profound regret for Muslim deaths in Al-Qa'ida-linked attacks, promising to make those responsible accountable before the *shari'ah* courts.

At the same time, Zawahiri developed a doctrine for Al-Qa'ida that legitimised killing Muslims, not only as collaborators (and thus as legitimate targets and traitors) but also innocent bystanders who were unlucky enough to be close to an explosive device when it went off, equating such events to medieval sieges and night rides during the time of the Prophet's immediate successors. As this study has established, Zawahiri initially claimed Al-Qa'ida's affiliates in North Africa, Iraq and elsewhere simply had not targeted innocent Muslims, contrary to accusations (but rather had targeted police or military assets only), whilst later seeking to rein in, in his most recent output, these very allies and affiliates that were targeting Muslims in markets and mosques. Zawahiri even tried to deflect some of the criticism aimed at Al-Qa'ida onto Hamas (which he derided for alleged weaknesses) through questioning their targeting of Fatah activists in comparison with the targeting of Al-Qa'ida affiliates of Iraq, regardless of the fact that numerous Zawahiri communiqués called for the killing of these very same Fatah activists and leaders.

Much has also been made of the links between targeting of non-Muslims and the grievances, or diagnostic frames, presented in the communiqués. The coding of communiqués reveals that target legitimisation in this regard, however, has moved far beyond discriminate or selective targeting of military, police, or even financial and governmental targets to include all those who pay taxes, participate in society at large and perceive the pillars of Western governance to be legitimate, regardless of whether or not the current politics and policies are supported. Although the principles of reciprocity still apply, in addition to those of asymmetry – rendering softer targets more attractive –

⁷⁴⁰ Bin Ladin's nascent environmental agenda was, of course, cut short. In the long term, perhaps, this could have challenged empirical credibility as many strands of these messages were not specific to Muslims and included as victims those who suffered the consequences of hurricane Katrina (i.e. U.S. citizens), with implicit recognition of the humanitarian role of the United Nations. This might have been part of a more elaborate strategy designed to make sense of a growing range of global issues affecting the world. Zawahiri also had a brief spell seeking to appeal to the oppressed all over the world, regardless of creed, presenting Al-Qa'ida as a fair, legitimate and pertinent actor on the global stage.

any notions of moral superiority appear undermined when the scope and reach of permitted violence has expanded so demonstrably.

8.3.3 Weaknesses in the message

Zawahiri announced, as he responded to questions posted through online forums during his 2008 ‘open meeting’ and as mentioned in Chapter 4, that ‘even if Usama bin Ladin doesn’t become ill, he must die one day, whereas Allah’s religion will remain until Allah inherits the earth and everything on it.’⁷⁴¹ Three years later, in May 2011, Al-Qa’ida announced the ‘martyrdom’ of bin Ladin and that Zawahiri would take over as leader and principal spokesperson. Of all the tasks that now become his primary responsibility, maintaining and communicating the collective action frames of the movement that are intended to attract followers and inspire and mobilise existing participants, is perhaps the most important. As this chapter illustrates, however, the impact and effectiveness of these framing tasks appear to have been undermined by the inability of the frame articulators to reflect core aspirations and experiences of perceived constituents and through generating a narrative that is, at times, incongruous and ambiguous.

It is particularly significant for the future of Al-Qa’ida that these constraints are primarily to be found in Zawahiri’s voluminous output, as the leader will, at least in the near future, be the most prominent representative of the Al-Qa’ida core. Rather than declaring vast swathes of Muslims apostates, moreover, the nature of this communication is characterised primarily by Zawahiri’s bitter denunciation of vast swathes of the Muslim population, dismissal of those living in the West and frustration with the very same people Al-Qa’ida claims to represent and protect. These findings are of clear significance for counter-terrorism practitioners in the West and elsewhere who are tasked with undermining the impact of Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. The next section thus explores some of the policy recommendations that can be derived from the current study.

8.4 Policy Recommendations

In June 2011 the British government approved an amended version of the previous government’s ‘Prevent’ strategy, designed to ‘prevent radicalisation and stop would-be terrorists from committing mass murder.’⁷⁴² At the heart of the revamped programme was a desire to ‘respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it.’⁷⁴³ These efforts would primarily target Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, viewed as the most potent terrorist threat to the UK. As explored in chapter 1 of this thesis, moreover, a similar emphasis on understanding and undermining the ideology of Al-Qa’ida has been recognised in US policy papers and by the wider counter-terrorist community.

In this context, the policy relevance of the current study is obvious. An appreciation of how terrorist groups construct and convey ideological principles to potential followers, however, necessarily relies on a comprehensive understanding of the

⁷⁴¹ Zawahiri (2008) [105].

⁷⁴² HM Government (2011) *Prevent Strategy*. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty (June). Cm 8092: 1.

⁷⁴³ Ibid.

way in which these ideas have formed and how they have developed over time. This thesis has cautioned against relying on selective sampling of Al-Qa'ida communiqués as they may not be representative for the whole and fail to capture narrative dynamics and ways in which arguments have developed over time. An initial objective for policy makers and relevant practitioners, seeking to prevent the spread and undermine the message of Al-Qa'ida's ideology, would thus be to develop a systematic and rigorous understanding of this material, as this thesis has attempted to display. On a related point, as will be discussed further below, this will also be the only way to detect potentially exploitable weaknesses and inconsistencies that emerge over time. As the framing literature assumes, and as discussed in chapter 3, such empirical inconsistencies only emerge when the material in question is subjected to a long-term and systematic analysis. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the dissemination of communiqués conveying the ideology of Al-Qa'ida is not only acknowledged as an important element of the 'threat' within policy circles, but also, as this thesis has shown, considered a fundamental benchmark of success by the Al-Qa'ida leaders themselves. Indeed, through some of this interpretive work, the Al-Qa'ida leaders have themselves sought to highlight and exploit inconsistencies in Western policies, as explored in chapter 5, above.

Three distinct policy recommendations relating to Al-Qa'ida and its ideology can therefore be derived from the current thesis: (1) the identification of metrics to provide a deeper understanding of Al-Qa'ida; (2) the identification of potentially exploitable weaknesses from the Al-Qa'ida leadership narrative; (3) an appreciation for the way in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership seeks to exploit inconsistencies in Western policy making in order to strengthen its diagnostic messaging.

1. Deeper understanding

Any policy designed to undermine the impact of Al-Qa'ida and its ability to inspire and incite potential supporters to aid or join militant activism necessarily depends on a rigorous understanding of the phenomenon in question and how it has evolved. This relates to the issues the Al-Qa'ida leadership has prioritised over the years, the nature of its problem diagnosis, its intricate and complex relationship with notions of violence as well as the leadership's multifaceted efforts to communicate and convey the core message to different audience groups. Given the ambiguity and fluidity of the Al-Qa'ida concept, as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, such a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon in question is important in order to differentiate between the core leadership and affiliates or any local promoters of Al-Qa'ida. Indeed, the ideological disposition and the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing of the latter may differ from the core leadership.

Based on observations made in this thesis, policy makers would also need to understand and be prepared for the ways in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership interprets and uses a host of issues to promote violent extremism that are not always related to grievances connected to war fighting and loss of territory. As this thesis has shown, a far greater range of issues is used in the Al-Qa'ida narrative as part of problem diagnosis to justify violence.

2. Exploitable weaknesses

Much of the policy work focused on terrorist ideologies centres on efforts to ‘counter the terrorist narrative.’⁷⁴⁴ This relates to attempts to undermine the credibility of the message or exploit other weaknesses that can blunt its impact within the relevant target communities, as well as seeking to promote and communicate alternative positions and interpretations to those expressed by extremist and terrorist groups and leaderships.

Counter-narrative work is likely to be particularly strong when it is based on inconsistencies and tensions that emerge through the processing of the terrorist communiqués themselves. In this sense, the current thesis suggests that efforts to counter and undermine the narrative of the Al-Qa’ida leadership should focus in particular on highlighting the ways in which the message has become inconsistent in terms of scope. This relates to the failure of the Al-Qa’ida leadership, argued above, to present a consistent prognostic message to potential followers in terms of hierarchies of enmity and target prioritisation.

Furthermore, the tensions identified in the current analysis, relating to the use of violence, could be exploited. This relates to the highlighting of the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s efforts to offer justifications for evermore limitless targeting of Muslims and non-Muslims and its endorsement of groups and affiliates that carry out attacks killing Muslims and non-Muslim civilians. These aggregated messages, in turn, could be compared with the leadership’s (especially Zawahiri’s) much more recent criticism of Al-Qa’ida affiliates that have been responsible for this bloodshed. In addition, as argued in this thesis, the leadership’s recognition that Al-Qa’ida affiliates and loyalists have indeed targeted Muslim publics and innocent civilians could be contrasted with the leadership’s earlier insistence that these groups had nothing to do with Al-Qa’ida.

As discussed in this chapter, moreover, the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués also reveal, according to the framing literature, shortcomings in terms of experiential commensurability. These could potentially be exploited by policy makers for counter-narrative purposes. For Western policy makers and practitioners, for example, the fact that the Al-Qa’ida leadership has made such scant efforts to address (or even recognise the validity) of problems faced by Muslims living the West would be of clear relevance in terms of efforts to undermine the reach and impact of this message.

3. Al-Qa’ida’s usage of policy inconsistencies

Section 5.3.3, above, discussed how the Al-Qa’ida leadership has sought to engage in its own counter-narrative work of sorts, seeking to emphasise inconsistencies in Western policy making in order to highlight alleged double-standards. This has primarily focused on policies towards democracy, mistreatment of detainees, selective endorsement of tyrants and unconditional support for Israel. This discourse was certainly not invented by the Al-Qa’ida leadership but it is important to recognise that bin Ladin and Zawahiri have sought to use these policy inconsistencies as part of their portrayal of the West in the diagnostic element of their communiqués.

It could be argued, therefore, that it is particularly important for Western policy makers to convey a consistent message, which corresponds with their stated core values as any diversion from these emphases are exploited by Al-Qa’ida. Whenever changes in policies are unavoidable or the universal implementation of a particular set of values is unfeasible, it is important that policy makers address these inconsistencies through

⁷⁴⁴ See e.g. Quiggin, T. (2009) ‘Understanding al-Qaeda’s Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work’ in *Perspectives on Terrorism* (vol. 3, no. 2): 24.

targeted public diplomacy that dismantles and pre-emptes Al-Qa'ida's efforts to portray the West as unfair or un-Islamic.

In exploring potential policy implications that can be derived from this thesis, however, it should not be assumed that understanding communiqués and constructing effective counter-terrorism measures through adopting this perspective offers anything akin a panacea in terms of tackling Al-Qa'ida and undermining its impact. The next section discusses important limitations of the current research and highlights issues of importance and relevance that are beyond the scope of the current thesis.

8.5 Limitations of the Research

The focus of this analysis has been on the composition and dissemination of Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués, which have been presented as the most measurable component available to study Al-Qa'ida as a movement and the way in which it has evolved. The case was made that studying these communiqués is important not only as it displays the construction of Al-Qa'ida's justificatory narrative over the years but also since the dissemination of this material is seen as an important benchmark of success by the Al-Qa'ida leadership itself, as noted above.

Communiqués, therefore, have been presented as a yardstick for success with which to assess the way in which the Al-Qa'ida leadership has portrayed the movement and responded to the challenges it has faced over the years. The way in which this material was navigated and notions of success, effectiveness and credibility were approached rested on the criteria set out in the literature on collective action frames. Different comparative studies, however, may produce alternative perspectives in terms of Al-Qa'ida's perceived success and failure. If the leadership's efforts to impact Western policymaking were to be assessed and contrasted with that of other terrorist leaderships or networks, for instance, the verdict – at least in the short term – would no doubt be that the Al-Qa'ida leadership has been quite successful. This is particularly the case when its material weakness is considered in relation to the vast wealth and power of its adversaries. Indeed, bin Ladin recognised this phenomenal impact of Al-Qa'ida, as noted in chapter 6: 'all that we have to do is send two mujahideen to the furthest point East to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses.'⁷⁴⁵

However, this thesis has not measured the Al-Qa'ida leadership's success against its stated goals and ultimate objectives as expressed through the prognostic part of its communiqués. These relate to the establishment of a global religious state and realisation of coordinated mass Islamist revolutions against foreign and domestic adversaries. Many of these long-term prognostic references, as emphasised in chapter 6, serve an inspirational purpose and are deliberately ambiguous. Rather, this thesis has assessed the effectiveness and strength of the communiqués in terms of the ability of the Al-Qa'ida leadership to convey a coherent, consistent message that addresses the concerns and realities of those to whom the leadership seeks to appeal.

In this regard concepts such as 'mobilisation', 'engagement' and 'participation' become central. With these concepts, the focus is not on the content of communiqués but on *behaviour*. It should thus be clearly stated (as was addressed in chapter 3) that this thesis does not provide any clear indicators concerning the likelihood that individuals

⁷⁴⁵ Bin Ladin (2004) [83].

might seek to implement Al-Qa'ida's message. Just as the Al-Qa'ida leadership is free to interpret events in different ways and convey that interpretation to its audiences, individuals are also capable of interpreting their wider environment – and Al-Qa'ida's message – in countless different ways. A host of external and internal factors, contextual and psychosocial issues affect this interpretation and the complex process that might lead an individual to become engaged in violent extremism. An equally complex set of circumstances may also contribute to an activist's disillusionment and eventual departure from violent extremist activity. Dissatisfaction or disappointment with Al-Qa'ida's message may play a role in some cases, but will never be an exclusive factor.

In this sense, it is important to acknowledge that the Al-Qa'ida leadership message contains several weaknesses in terms of the construction of a coherent and effective message. Any further deliberations concerning the propensity of individuals to become engaged (or disengaged) cannot be derived from this thesis. Indeed, the focus has not been on the individual in this study. Aspects potentially contributing to participation, engagement and related behaviour, moreover, have not provided the variables or metrics that have been analysed in this thesis. Furthermore, the prism of the social movement literature – through the adoption of a framework on the generation of collective action frames by movement leaders – was not applied in order to make any inferences regarding elements that are regarded as likely to attract 'potential participants' to become engaged in physical activism. The concept of motivational framing, for instance, which is designed to move people from 'balconies to the barricades', focuses on the *attempts* by movement leaders to fulfil this framing task, rather than implying that this process is inevitable or in any way straightforward.

The current study, therefore, focuses on the *intended* impact of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués, measured against the criteria set in these messages, and analyses potential issues that might blunt its impact, based on a literature defining the effective generation of messages designed to affect and mobilise wider audiences (regardless of the extent to which such mobilisation takes place or not).

Finally, it is important to consider another fundamental limitation of this study, which relates to its qualitative nature. Although this thesis adopted a longitudinal perspective, analysing 240 Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués using a coding template that was applied to the entire dataset in a systematic way, a degree of subjectivity in the processing of this material cannot be avoided. There is a difference between systematised, automated and computerised content analyses that code transcripts according to specific criteria relating to certain words and concepts and the more in-depth, nuanced perspective adopted for the current study. The shortcomings of computerised studies intended to process Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués were addressed in chapter 3. In terms of addressing the limitations of qualitative studies, inter-coder reliability was addressed by honing the coding template on a sample of the dataset and replicating these work processes together with the supervisor (see further in chapter 4). Furthermore, emphasis was placed on ensuring the processing of the communiqués was transparent and the methodologies applied accessible and replicable. To this end, the coding template itself is annexed to this thesis, together with details of the material coded and the coding results themselves.

A discussion of limitations of the current study leads logically to the identification of further potential research that can be developed from or informed by the current project.

8.6 Further Research

The findings of this thesis, the methodology applied and the data accumulated could form the basis for a number of related comparative studies that would broaden the scope of analysis and provide opportunities to understand the development of Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués in the wider context. The use of, what Cetina terms, 'scopic' systems of media⁷⁴⁶ or the issuance of communiqués is not uniquely a preoccupation of the Al-Qa'ida leadership. The leaders of numerous Islamist militant groups (often affiliated with Al-Qa'ida), from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere disseminate ideological and propaganda material presenting the relevant justificatory narrative and elucidating problem diagnosis and prognosis in a message designed to encourage a particular response from target audiences.

It would thus be particularly informative to apply similar work processes and methodologies (including a standardised template similar to that adopted here) in order to assess ways in which the discourse of these movements has evolved, how these jihadi leaders have approached different forms of prognosis (particularly violence) and how they have constructed targeted appeals through motivational framing. A comparative analysis with such an evolutionary perspective would, for example, address whether the identified shortcomings of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués feature similarly in other datasets and whether there are parallels between the Al-Qa'ida leadership's approach to the use of violence and that of other jihadi leaders. Such a comparative analysis could also view the doctrinal approach adopted by bin Ladin and Zawahiri in relation to the position adopted by other Al-Qa'ida or Islamist militant leaders. In this context, it would be especially important to establish whether bin Ladin's and Zawahiri's relatively flexible approach to some core facets of puritanical Salafi thought was reflected in the communiqués of other leaders. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, as mentioned, adopted a far more critical and hostile approach towards Shia Muslims than did bin Ladin and Zawahiri. It would be worthy of further research to establish whether these doctrinal tensions persist in relation to other prominent leaders associated with Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. A discrepancy between two approaches could help explain the fact that some Al-Qa'ida affiliates carry out attacks against Muslim populations (such as Shia and Sufi communities) even though they are not target priorities in bin Ladin's and Zawahiri's communiqués.

It would, furthermore, be equally valuable to compare the current analysis with a similar study of communiqués from groups beyond the Islamist extremist cohort specifically. A comparative study involving the Provisional Irish Republican Army leadership, for example, could offer opportunities to contrast the construction of diagnostic and prognostic frames in a completely different cultural and political context.

Moving beyond the framing approach, the current study can also be viewed in terms of its analysis of evolving leadership strategies. In this regard, a wider perspective that looks at the communication strategy of other Al-Qa'ida leaders (such as Abu Yahia al-Libi) could highlight different leadership styles and help develop hypotheses concerning the way in which the Al-Qa'ida might evolve (or, retrospectively and hypothetically, how it might have evolved) with different leaders at the helm.

The wider theological, cultural and discursive context of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués has largely been beyond the scope of the current thesis. This area of study, however, offers numerous opportunities for further research in order to assess the impact of the Al-Qa'ida communiqués more broadly. Indeed, the religio-

⁷⁴⁶ Cetina (2005): 221-222.

political positioning of the Al-Qa'ida leadership, as described in this thesis, may present further challenges beyond the shortcomings identified above and distinct from criticism levied at the leadership for excessive targeting.

In a doctrinal sense, therefore, the expression of active religio-political ambitions may encourage debate and criticism from quietists and discrete or pacifist activist strands of Salafism, which would be worthy of further analysis.⁷⁴⁷ The combination of the religious and the political in the Al-Qa'ida leadership's narrative, moreover, could be examined further in light of the controversy such an approach provokes within several schools of Islamic thought. Eickelman and Piscatori, for example, note how some Islamic movements 'believe that too great an involvement with politics may mislead or corrupt the believers. For example, the Tablighi Jama'at, a significant movement of reform that originated on South Asia but now has worldwide influence, believes that the separation of religion and politics is necessary in the short term.'⁷⁴⁸ 'As God's vicegerent (*khalifa*)', the authors argue, 'men are given the earth to govern but are not worthy to do so until they can govern themselves. In effect, therefore, they must eschew politics until they prove themselves worthy of being political.'⁷⁴⁹

On a related point, Zawahiri's anti-democratic stance and his insistence that politics and religious rule (where concepts of power, authority and religiosity are intertwined) are dictated by the monotheistic principle of *tawhid* is, of course, by no means universal. As Esposito notes, for example, advocates of Islamic democracy have used alternative interpretations of *tawhid* to reach conclusions concerning correct form of legitimate governance that are in stark contrast to Zawahiri's position. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, for instance, argued that correct implementation of *tawhid* required the implementation of some form of democratic rule. 'No Muslim questions the sovereignty of God,' El-Affendi, argued, 'or the rule of Shariah, Islamic Law. However, most Muslims do (and did) have misgivings about any claims by one person that he is sovereign. The sovereignty of one man contradicts the sovereignty of God, for all men are equal in front of God.'⁷⁵⁰

Numerous theological and religious juridical strands could, therefore, be considered as part of further research to shed light on the impact of the Al-Qa'ida leadership communiqués and the controversial nature of the leaders' religious interpretations.

Furthermore, when considering the actual impact these communiqués might have on individuals, it would be essential to conduct ethnographic research and interviews with relevant target audiences. Such an approach would add valuable detail regarding the way in which individuals might interpret the material under review, which – as noted in the previous section – has been beyond the scope of the current study.

Finally, in terms of pursuing further questions regarding the potential impact of Al-Qa'ida's message, future work could focus on elements of competition where movements and groupings have emerged that may seek to attract much of the same audience, which the Al-Qa'ida leadership targets in its message, but that offer a radically different form of prognosis. Baker, for instance, talked of the emergence, during the late 1990s, of 'prophetic minorities' in the Islamic world: social movements focused on creative, non-violent actions committed to the 'peaceful remaking of their own

⁷⁴⁷ See e.g. Meijer (2009): 16-17.

⁷⁴⁸ Eickelman & Piscatori (1996): 51.

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁰ Quoted in Esposito (2002): 145-146.

societies.’⁷⁵¹ In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, moreover, a range of Islamist groups and other movements in the Islamic world can now operate with far more freedom than before in order to design and implement a prognostic agenda that is alternative to – and undermines – the set of solutions presented by the Al-Qa’ida leadership.

8.7 Conclusion: Sustaining the Dream

This thesis began by posing three questions that informed and structured subsequent chapters. The first question concerned the importance of understanding the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués. For an organisation that has become increasingly fractioned and diffuse since its inception in the wake of the Afghan-Soviet war, the ideational elements that underpin this movement were presented as a concrete and testable measure of analysis. Indeed, communiqués – understood here as the building blocks that make up the narrative of Al-Qa’ida – thus convey metrics that can be more tangible than organisational variables. The case was therefore made to study this material in a structured manner, using standardised coding tools and a longitudinal perspective that would be sensitive to the dynamic and variable nature of this ideational discourse. This responds to calls from scholars studying Al-Qa’ida and militant Islamism for a more structured approach to understanding the ideology of the movement as well as a desire within the wider academic community focusing on political violence for more grounded, systematic, empirical and evidence-based analyses. Lastly, as became evident in the longitudinal study of Al-Qa’ida communiqués, the leadership itself has recognised the importance of generating a narrative that appeals to identified constituents, effectively conveying its desires, prescriptions and frustrations. Revealingly, bin Ladin’s impact on Al-Qa’ida’s audiences via disseminated communiqués was central to Zawahiri’s assessment of the late leader’s legacy and the benchmark he used to celebrate bin Ladin’s perceived success as a pioneer of the contemporary jihad.

The second question concerned the construction of these messages and the way in which they have evolved. This was approached by designing the coding according to the construction of collective action frames – understood as the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational message elements conveyed through each communiqué. The results of this study were analysed in Part III. This review illustrated how the messages from the two Al-Qa’ida leaders evolved from localised tracts to more expansive and ambitious media initiatives that coincided with the leadership’s campaign of violence, culminating in a narrative that appears confused, at times contradictory in terms of prioritisation, struggling with the consequences of the violence it has presented as legitimate and out of kilter with the desires and experiences of vast proportions of supposed constituents.

This relates to the third fundamental question that structured this dissertation, relating to the effectiveness of the message conveyed and elements that can blunt its impact. Chapter 3 explored how the framing literature identifies shortfalls in message dissemination and this chapter has discussed how this applies to the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués based on the results of the longitudinal analysis. The abundance of grievances, which can be utilised to present and frame activist messages and the two leaders’ sophisticated grasp of key religio-cultural concepts and terminology, constitute the ingredients of a poignant and potentially effective narrative.

⁷⁵¹ Baker, R. W. (1997) ‘Invidious Comparisons: Realism, Postmodern Globalism, and Centrist Islamic Movements in Egypt’ in Esposito, J. L. (ed.) *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?* (115-135). Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder: 115.

Aside from the impact of external developments, the impression of this narrative, however, appears to have been blunted by the leadership's own shortcomings in terms of presenting coherent or acceptable solutions and in terms of addressing the experiences and emotions of perceived constituents and potential sympathisers. The leadership has not necessarily lost sight of, what Wilkinson termed 'the revolutionary promise of the advent of an age of bliss, abundance and perfect justice' as conveyed by religious and millenarian social movements (see Chapter 1). It does, however, appear to have lost confidence in the ability of constituents to form a mass movement that will follow the example of the Al-Qa'ida vanguard in fighting for this promised 'age of bliss.' As this thesis has shown, the leadership's message over the period in question has become inconsistent and ambiguous; its frustration with the publics it purports to protect and represent too vocal and prominent; and, its dismissal of realities faced by scores of Muslims living in Diaspora communities in the West too stark. The *ummat al-mu'minin* – the Islamic nation – has rejected Al-Qa'ida's set of prognostic solutions (from ever more indiscriminate forms of violence to economic boycott and other prescribed forms of uprising) and appears to have moved out of reach of Al-Qa'ida's self-described vanguard.

This dissertation opened with a description of press reaction to the death of Usama bin Ladin. At the time, *The Economist* implied that the battle with Al-Qa'ida would not be over with the demise of its pivotal leader. It would still be necessary to 'kill his dream.'⁷⁵² The preceding chapters have illustrated that although constructing and communicating this dream was an essential preoccupation of the Al-Qa'ida leadership, this vision has been blunted and weakened by the nature, direction and scope that bin Ladin and (especially) Zawahiri chose to adopt in their own communicative efforts. This, in turn, could contribute to an undermined status of this core within the wider Islamist militant milieu and should be a point of focus for future research.

Al-Qa'ida was formed as the result of a debate on the future directions of jihad in the wake of the perceived triumph of the *mujahideen* against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Now, more than ten years after the 9/11 attacks and war in Afghanistan, after the death of bin Ladin and amid the turmoil of the Arab Spring, a new generation of Islamist militants is again faced with the challenge of shaping the future directions of jihad. The strength of their effort and size of their movement will to some degree depend on the extent to which this new generation of Islamist activists will appreciate – and learn from – the shortcomings of the Al-Qa'ida leadership.

⁷⁵² *The Economist* (2011) (7 May).

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Zawahiri (unknown date) 'The Forbidden Word,' excerpts published in McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) *Militant Ideology Atlas: Research Compendium* [113].

Zawahiri (unknown date) 'Response to a Grave Uncertainty from Shaykh al-Albani Regarding Silence in the Face of Apostate Rulers,' distributed online through 'Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad,' see excerpts in McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) [117].

Zawahiri [purported] (unknown date) 'Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents', available in Ibrahim, R. (2007) *The Al Qaeda Reader*, Broadway Books NY. [48]

Zawahiri (unknown date) introduction to *Characteristics of Jihad*, a magazine of Egyptian militant Islamist activists, available in the CTC Harmony database (document number AFGP-2002-600321) [35].

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. Coding Template

DETAILS OF COMMUNIQUE

ID number	
Filename	<i>Unique filename to locate document in database</i>
Date released	<i>Release date of document by AQ on the Internet, or date of interview, or date communiqué was received by media organization. If these dates are unavailable date of publication by media reports will be given in stead, with explanation in square brackets.</i>
Location	<i>The book, website, report, newspaper article, etc. where the communiqué can be found or database from which it was taken</i>
Distributor	<i>The carrier which distributes the communiqués, e.g. As Sahab, Al Jazeera, As-Sharq Al-Awsat</i>
AQ representative	<i>The author of statement or letter or subject of interview or other documents from the Al-Qaeda core: AAZ=Ayman al-Zawahiri; UBL=Usama bin Ladin</i>
Type	<i>I.e. letter or internal memo, external statement, interview, article/news item</i>
Description/Title	<i>Title, if one is available, in inverted commas, otherwise short description</i>

DIAGNOSTIC

Societal/cultural/normative

References to undesirability of existing societies	<i>This refers to comments explaining how features of existing societies need to be replaced, such as man-made laws, democracy and capitalism. And how these systems are defunct</i>
----------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Constructing a grievance narrative: significant events and prominent topics

References to past important events	<i>References to specific events such as the 1948 war in the Middle East and older events /more vague e.g. colonialism. Also to more recent events demonstrating victim status and/or need for action.</i>
References to ongoing political events and crises	<i>References to events demonstrating alleged victim status, e.g. Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan. Also events such as publications of Muhammed drawings in Denmark, Norway and elsewhere</i>

PROGNOSTIC

Tactics preferences and importance of violence

Importance of violent attack, claims of attack	<i>References to the importance of attacks, including desired targets (e.g. oil infrastructure), specific tactics (e.g. suicide bombings)</i>
Identified important political tools outside violent attack	<i>For instance economic boycott</i>
Mentioned constraints on the use of violence	<i>Particularly any references to groups of people who should not be targeted, e.g. women and children.</i>
Perceived legitimacy of civilian targeting	<i>This includes justifications for civilian targeting, e.g. that those who vote for Western leaders should be targeted</i>

Direction and emphasis of prognostic solutions

Declared enemies	
Declared friends and temporary allies	<i>References to groups, leaders, countries which are close allies (such as the Taliban) or more short-term assets</i>
Identified regions for support building	<i>Areas of focus for gathering support, e.g. Pakistan, Europe etc.</i>
Identified regions for hostile actions	<i>Areas where most attacks and other operations should be focused, e.g. Arabian peninsula, Iraq, Egypt, Europe, the West, globally.</i>

Strategic/political vision

References to desirable past or existing societies	<i>E.g. to Taliban Afghanistan or the 'golden age' during the reign of the Prophet Mohammed and his immediate successors. Especially attention to the specifics of those societies which should be re-introduced</i>
Descriptions of desired way forward and end result	<i>What components need to be in the new society, and descriptions of more immediate (interim) objectives</i>

MOTIVATIONAL

Direction of messaging and audiences

	Declared audience	<i>Direction of message</i>
ADDRESSING MUSLIMS	Appeal to Muslim audience	<i>Guidance to Muslims, and appeal for their support through emphasising benign factors and rewards</i>
	Criticism of Muslims and warnings	<i>Criticism of lack of support of Muslims, references to those who neglect to support the leaders' cause. Warnings against incorrect behaviour.</i>
	Threats, allegations of apostasy of Muslims	<i>Verbal attack on Muslims, declarations of apostasy, threats of action.</i>
ADDRESSING NON-MUSLIMS	Threats and warnings to non-Muslims	
	Appeals & conciliatory approaches, promises of truce	

NOTES

Free text area/notes

Free text	<i>Covering aspects not caught in items above</i>
Notes	<i>On authenticity of text and other technical aspects</i>

APPENDIX 2: Details of Articles

Six communiqués could not be dated, these were:

- Zawahiri (article) 'Response to a Grave Uncertainty from Shaykh al-Albani Regarding Silence in the Face of Apostate Rulers'⁷⁵³
- Zawahiri (article) 'The Forbidden Word'⁷⁵⁴
- Zawahiri (article) Introduction for new journal - *Characteristics of Jihad*⁷⁵⁵
- Zawahiri (purported) (treatise) 'Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents'⁷⁵⁶
- Bin Ladin (purported) (compiled lecture series) 'Methodological Guidelines According to the Guidelines of Bin Ladin: We Proceed in the Way of Manhattan in Order to Defy America and Put an End to Their Controlling Evil'⁷⁵⁷
- Bin Ladin (letter) 'Letter from Usama bin Ladin to Mullah Omar'⁷⁵⁸

Of these six communiqués, only Zawahiri's introduction to *Characteristics of Jihad* and bin Ladin's letter to Mullah Omar could be secured in their entirety. The others are excerpts

⁷⁵³ Combating Terrorism Center [CTC] (2006) *Militant Ideology Atlas: Compendium* (November). Originally published in *Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad*.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁵ CTC (Harmony Archive): Document no. AFGP-2002-600142. See <http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_docs.asp> [as of 30 April 2011].

⁷⁵⁶ Ibrahim, R. (2007)

⁷⁵⁷ Combating Terrorism Center (2006).

⁷⁵⁸ CTC (Harmony Archive): Document no. AFGP-2002-600321. As noted, the database compiled and used for this study focuses on communiqués intended for public dissemination, it is not clear, however, whether bin Ladin intended his letter to Taliban 'emir' Mullah Omar to become public, but the message does contain valuable clues for instance as relates to the perceived importance of the media.

N	[ID]	Filename	Date released	Location	Distributor	AQ rep.	Type	Description/title
1	117	Militant Ideology Atlas - Research Compendium	N/A	Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium November 2006	Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad	AAZ	Article	'Response to a Grave Uncertainty from Shaykh al-Albani Regarding Silence in the Face of Apostate Rulers'
2	112	Militant Ideology Atlas - Research Compendium	N/A	Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium November 2006	Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad	UBL	Series of articles/lectures	'Methodological Guidelines (1) According to the Guidelines of Bin Ladin: We Proceed in the Way of Manhattan in Order to Defy America and Put an End to Their Controlling Evil'; (2); (3)
3	113	Militant Ideology Atlas - Research Compendium	N/A	Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium November 2006	unknown	AAZ	Article, interview	'The Forbidden Word'
4	61	nefaublmullahomar	N/A	NEFA + DoD	N/A	UBL	Letter	Letter from UBL to Mullah Omar
5	35	Characteristics of Jihad Magazine	N/A	CTC-Harmony	Egyptian Islamic Jihad	AAZ	Article	Introduction in new journal - Characteristics of Jihad
6	48	[no filename, document from book]	N/A	Ibrahim, Raymond (2007). Al Qaeda Reader. Broadway Books.	N/A	Purported AAZ - Ibrahim claims document states it was 'overseen' by AAZ	Treatise	'Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents'
7	46	[no filename, document from book]	01-Jan-91	Ibrahim, Raymond (2007). Al Qaeda Reader. Broadway Books + Kepel & Milelli (ed.) Al Qaeda in its Own Words (2008). Harvard U. Press.	N/A	AAZ	Book	'The Bitter Harvest: The Brotherhood in Sixty Years'
8	114	Militant Ideology Atlas - Research Compendium	01-Jan-92	Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium November 2006	Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad	AAZ	Book	'The Black Book: An Account of the Torture of Muslims in the Time of Husni Mubarak'

9	99	[no filename, document from book]	01-Jan-93	Kepel & Milelli (eds) (2008).	N/A	AAZ / Islamic Jihad	Speech, or statement	'Advice to the Community to Reject the Fatwa of Sheikh Bin Baz Authorizing Parliamentary Representation: Published Under the Supervision of Ayman al-Zawahiri'
10	1	FBIS1	09-Mar-94	FBIS Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004	Al-Quds Al-Arabi	UBL	Interview	Usama Bin Ladin Denies 'Terrorism' Link London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic 9 Mar 94 p 4
11	36	Letter from Bin Laden 1	12-Apr-94	CTC-Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter/Statement	'Our Invitation to Give Advice and Reform'
12	37	Letter from Bin Laden 1	07-Jun-94	CTC-Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter/Statement	'Saudi Arabi Supports the Communists in Yemen'
13	38	Letter from Bin Laden 1	11-Jul-94	CTC-Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter/Statement	'The Banishment of Communism from the Arabian Peninsula: The Episode and the Proof'.
14	39	Letter from Bin Laden 1	19-Jul-94	CTC-Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter/Statement	'Quran Scholars in the Face of Despotism'
15	2	FBIS3	08-Aug-94	FBIS Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004	Al-Quds Al-Arabi	UBL	Article	Saudi Islamic Opposition Opens London Office London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic 8 Aug 94 p 1
16	40	Letter from Bin Laden 1	12-Sep-94	CTC-Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter/Statement	'Saudi Arabia Unveils its War Against Islam and its Scholars'
17	42	Letter from Bin Laden 1	16-Sep-94	CTC/Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	'Urgent Letter to Security Officials'
18	47	Letter from Bin Laden 2	15-Oct-94	CTC-Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	'Higher Committee for Harm!!'
19	63	Letter from Bin Laden 2	29-Dec-94	CTC/Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	'Open Letter for Shaykh Bin Baz on the Invalidity of His Fatwa on Peace with the Jews'
20	64	Letter from Bin Laden 2	29-Jan-95	CTC/Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	Second letter to Shaykh Abd Al Aziz Bin Baz from the Reform and Advice Foundation
21	65	Letter from Bin Laden 2 + Letter from Bin Laden 3	12-Feb-95	CTC/Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	'Prince Salman and Ramadan Alms'

22	66	Letter from Bin Laden 3	09-Mar-95	CTC/Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	'Saudi Arabia Continues its War Against Islam and its Scholars'
23	115	Militant Ideology Atlas - Research Compendium	01-Apr-95	Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium November 2006	Nashrat al-Ansar	AAZ	statement	'Our Stance Towards Iran: Response to the Accusation of Cooperation Between the Salafi Jihadi Movement and Renegade Iran'
24	67	Letter from Bin Laden 3	06-May-95	CTC/Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	'Scholars are the Prophet's Successors'
25	68	Letter from Bin Laden 4	11-Jul-95	CTC/Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	'Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commissions'
26	62	nefaubletterkindfahd	03-Aug-95	NEFA [+ see also other sources, e.g. FFI]	N/A	UBL	Letter	'An Open Letter to King Fahd On the Occasion of the Recent Cabinet Reshuffle'
27	69	Letter from Bin Laden 5	11-Aug-95	CTC/Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	'The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two Mosques'
28	118	Militant Ideology Atlas - Research Compendium + Al-Qaeda - terrorists-hypocrites-fundamentalists + AQ ideology 2003_Chatham house	01-Jan-96	Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium November 2006 + Hellmich, Christina (2005). 'Al-Qaeda - Terrorists, hypocrites, fundamentalists. .' in Third World Quarterly. + Al-Qaeda: the misunderstood Wahhabi connection... Feb 03.	Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad	AAZ	Article	'Healing the Hearts of Believers: On Some Concepts of Jihad in the Islamabad Operation'
29	3	FBIS4	17-Jun-96	FBIS Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004	Rose Al-Yusuf + Fayizah Sa'd	UBL	Interview	Usama Bin Ladin Reportedly Interviewed in London Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic on 17 June 1996 on pp 25-27
30	4	FBIS11	10-Jul-96	FBIS Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004	Robert Fisk, The Independent	UBL	Interview	Interview With Saudi Dissident Bin Ladin London INDEPENDENT in English, 10 Jul 96 p 14

31	5	FBIS13	02-Sep-96	FBIS Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004	Al-Islah	UBL	Statement	Bin Ladin Declares Jihad on Americans London AL- ISLAH in Arabic, 2 Sep 96. [Message From Usama Bin- Muhammad Bin Ladin to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula: Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying
32	150	FBIS Bin Laden 1994-2004.pdf	27-Nov- 96	FBIS Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004	Al-Quds al- Arabi - interview with 'Abd al-Bari 'Atwan	UBL	Article/int erview	'Bin Ladin Interviewed on Jihad Against US'
33	151	FBIS Bin Laden 1994-2004.pdf	20-Feb-97	FBIS	Channel 4/Gwyn Robert	UBL	Interview	'Correspondent Meets With Opposition Leader Bin Ladin'
34	152	FBIS Bin Laden..	03-Mar- 97	FBIS	Al-Islah (London)	UBL	Article	'Bin Ladin Cited on Prince Sultan's US Visit'
35	153	FBIS Bin Laden..	15-Mar- 97	FBIS	The Muslim (Islamabad)	UBL	Article	'Bin Ladin Charges US Involvement in China Bombings'
36	154	FBIS Bin Laden..	18-Mar- 97	FBIS	Pakistan (Islamabad) Hamid Mir	UBL	Article	'Pakistan Interviews Usama Bin Ladin'
37	155	FBIS...	22-Mar- 97	FBIS Report	The Independent	UBL	Interview/ report	'Interview with Usama bin Ladin'
38	70	Letter from Bin Laden 5	16-Apr-97	CTC/Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	'The Saudi Regime and the Reputed Tragedies of the Pilgrims'
39	156	FBIS...	06-Jun-97	FBIS Report	Daily Pakistan/Ha mid Mir	UBL	Report of interview	'Usama Bin Ladin Dares US Commandos To Come to Afghanistan'
40	157	FBIS..	07-Aug- 97	FBIS Report	Pakistan Daily	UBL	Report on press statement	'Usama Bin Ladin Urges 'Befitting Reply' to Horan'
41	158	FBIS Bin Laden..	27-Nov- 97	Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi)	FBIS	UBL	Article	'Daily Reports Usama Bin Ladin's Threat Against Americans'
42	159	FBIS Bin Laden ...	17-Jan-98	FBIS	Pakistan newspaper (Islamabad)	UBL	Article	'Bin Ladin Claims Foiling of UN's Afghan 'Conspiracy''

43	160	FBIS Bin Laden...	16-Feb-98	FBIS	Al-Quds al-Arabi	UBL	Article based on letter	'Bin Ladin Condoles With Al-Bashir on Salih's Death'
44	161	FBIS Bin Laden...	23-Feb-98	FBIS	Al-Quds Al-Arabi	UBL, AAZ [as amir of the Jihad Group, Egypt] plus Abu Yasir Taha, Mir Hamzah and Fazlul Rahman .	statement	'Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans' and 'Text of World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders'
45	162	FBIS Bin Laden ..	23-Mar-98	FBIS	Al-Quds Al-Arabi	UBL	Article based on statement	'Bin Ladin Urges Expulsion of 'Invaders" statement titled 'One of Them Bears Witness'
46	163	FBIS Bin Laden ..	31-Mar-98	Al-Akhbar (Urdu, Islamabad)	FBIS	UBL	Report of interview	'Interview With Usama Bin Ladin Reported'
47	164	FBIS Bin Laden...	15-Apr-98	FBIS	Al-Quds Al-Arabi	UBL	Report on Statement	'Bin Ladin Warns Against Richardson Mission to Afghanistan'
48	71	Letter from Bin Laden 5	07-May-98	CTC/Harmony	N/A	UBL	Letter	'Supporting the Fatwa of the Afghani Religious Scholars of Ejecting the American Forces from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques'
49	165	FBIS Bin Laden ..	14-May-98	FBIS	Al-Quds Al-Arabi	UBL	Article on statement received	'Clerics in Afghanistan Issue Fatwa on Necessity to Move US Forces Out of the Gulf; Saudi Oppositionist Usama Bin Ladin Supports It'
50	166	FBIS Bin Laden..	18-May-98	FBIS	Al-Quds Al-Arabi	UBL	Statement/Article	'Bin Ladin : Afghanistan's Inclusion on US 'Terrorism List' Is 'Certificate of Good Conduct' for Taliban"
51	167	FBIS Bin Laden...	19-May-98	FBIS	Al-Hayah (London)	UBL	Report on statement	'World Islamic Front Backs 'Intifadah of Palestine's Sons' .. Title of statement:

								'Wounds of Al-Aqsa Mosque'
52	168	FBIS Bin Laden..	28-May-98	FBIS	The Dawn (Islamabad)	UBL	report on press briefing	'Bin Ladin Creates New Front Against US, Israel'
53	169	FBIS Report...	29-May-98	FBIS	Al-Quds Al-Arabi	UBL	Article/statement	'United States Admits that Keeping Its Troops in the Gulf Is Causing Dissatisfaction; Bin Ladin Threatens To Launch Attack Soon'
54	170	FBIS Bin Laden..	01-Jun-98	FBIS	Al-Quds Al-Arabi	UBL	Report on Statement	'Bin Ladin Congratulates Pakistan on Its Possession of Nuclear Weapons'
55	171	FBIS Bin Laden..	15-Jun-98	FBIS	The News (Islamabad)	UBL	Interview/article	"In the Way of Allah" - interview with UBL
56	172	FBIS Bin Laden..	21-Aug-98	FBIS	AFP (Hong Kong Branch) & The News (Islamabad - Peshawar)	UBL	Report of statement	'Bin Ladin Calls For 'Jihad' Against Jews, Americans'
57	173	FBIS Bin Laden ..	23-Aug-98	FBIS	Al-Quds Al-Arabi/Abd-al Bari Atwan	UBL	report on statement	'The Battle Has Not Yet Started, We Will Reply to Clinton in Deeds'
58	174	FBIS Bin Laden ...	02-Sep-98	FBIS	The Nation (Islamabad)	UBL	Statement/article	'Bin Ladin Praises Pakistanis for Love of Islam'
59	126	FBIS Bin Laden 1994-2004 [Usama Bin Ladin Sends Message to Anti-US Conference] + FFI_AQ Comms 1990-2002	12-Sep-98	FFI Dokjumentasjon om Al-Qaeda... + FBIS Compilation..	Al-Akhbar, Pakistani newspaper in Urdu + Bodansky (1999)	UBL	Letter	Letter to anti-US Islamist conference in Islamabad
60	175	FBIS Bin Laden ...	18-Nov-98	FBIS	Jang (Rawalpindi)	UBL	Letter/statement	Bin Ladin: Expel Jews, Christians From Holy Places
61	176	FBIS Bin Laden ..	24-Dec-98	FBIS	Afghan Islamic Press through AFP (Hong Kong)	UBL	Article/statement	'Bin Ladin Denies Role in Bombings of US Missions'
62	177	FBIS Bin Laden ...	06-Jan-99	FBIS	The News (Islamabad)/Rahimullah Yusufzai	UBL	Interview	'Taliban let Bin Ladin Break his Silence'
63	178	FBIS Bin Laden ..	11-Jan-99	FBIS	TIME Magazine	UBL	Interview	'Wrath Of God; Usama Bin Ladin lashes out against the West'

64	180	FBIS Bin Laden ...	13-Jan-99	FBIS	CBS	UBL	Statement	'Accused Terrorist Leader Usama bin Ladin Declares War on All Americans'
65	116	Militant Ideology Atlas - Research Compendium	14-Jan-99	Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium November 2006	Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad	AAZ	Article	'Muslim Egypt Between the Whips of the Torturers and the Administration of Traitors'
66	179	FBIS Bin Laden ...	01-Feb-99	FBIS + Esquire	Esquire Magazine/John Miller + ABC News	UBL	Interview/Article	'Esquire Interview With Bin Ladin' see also 'President Bush on terrorist attacks; Interview with Usama Bin Ladin from 1998' [ABC News 18 Sept 2001]
67	182	FBIS Bin Laden...	20-Feb-99	FBIS	Pakistan newspaper (Islamabad, Urdu)	UBL	Interview	May 1998 Interview With Bin Ladin Reported
68	123	Asharq - secret AQ emails	19-Apr-99	'Al-Qaeda's Secret Emails' Al-Sharq al-Awsat articles by Mohammed Al-Shafey. Published 12/06/2005.	Al-Sharq al-Awsat	AAZ	Letter / email	Letter to Abu Yasir
69	183	FBIS Bin Laden...	08-Jun-99	FBIS	Wahdat (Peshawar)	UBL	Report of statement/letter	'Usama Bin Ladin Pens Letter in Support Of Kashmir Jihad'
70	184	FBIS Bin Laden..	10-Jun-99	FBIS	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Interview	'Usama Bin Ladin, the Destruction of the Base'
71	185	FBIS Bin Laden ...	25-Jul-99	FBIS	Jang (Rawalpindi)	UBL	Statement - Report	'Bin Ladin Calls On Muslims To Declare Jihad Against US'
72	186	FBIS Bin Laden ..	12-Sep-99	FBIS	Khabrain (Islamabad)	UBL	report on statement	'UBL Orders Mujahidin To Shoot US Commandos 'on Sight''
73	187	FBIS Bin Laden ..	09-Jan-00	FBIS	Pakistan Daily (Islamabad)	UBL	Statement	'Usama Bin Ladin Denounces US-Sponsored 'World Order''
74	188	FBIS Bin Laden ..	02-May-00	FBIS	Pakistan Daily (Islamabad)	UBL	Statement/Report	'UBL Sees Holy War in 'Every Street' of US'
75	189	FBIS Bin Laden..	22-May-00	FBIS	Ummah.net + Al-Jihaad newsletter of Supporters of Shari'ah	UBL	Statement	""Usama Speaks on Hijrah and the Islamic State?""
76	190	FBIS Bin Laden ..	26-Jun-00	FBIS	Pakistan Observer (Islamabad)	UBL	Report on statement	'Usama Bin Ladin Renews Call For Jihad'

77	191	FBIS Bin Laden ..	21-Sep-00	FBIS	Al-Jazeera	UBL & AAZ	Statement	'Bin Ladin, Others Pledge 'Jihad' To Release Prisoners in US, Saudi Jails'
78	124	FFI_AQ Comms 1990-2002	13-Nov-00	FFI Report (Hegghammer) Dokumentasjon om Al-Qaeda: Intervjuer, kommunik��er, og andre prim��rkilder, 1990-2002	al-Ra'i al-'Amm, Kuwaiti newspaper	UBL	Telephone interview	Short telephone interview with Kuwaiti newspaper
79	192	FBIS Bin Laden ...	07-Jan-01	FBIS	Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi)	UBL	statement	'Daily Prints Usama Bin Ladin 'Letter' Calling For Global Islamic State' [FBIS title]
80	193	FBIS Bin Laden ..	03-Mar-01	FBIS	Ausaf (Islamabad)	UBL	poem	Ausaf Receives Bin Ladin's Poem on Resolve To Continue Jihad'
81	194	FBIS Bin Laden ..	07-Mar-01	FBIS	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Poem/mes sage	
82	120	AFGP-2002-901188-Trans + nefaublletterpaksch olars	01-Apr-01	Harmony Database - CTC + NEFA	N/A	UBL	Letter	Letter from Usama Bin Ladin to the scholars of Deyubende in Peshawar in Pakistan
83	195	FBIS Bin Laden ..	03-Apr-01	FBIS	The Dawn (Karachi)	UBL	Reports of Letter	"Usama regrets curbs by Taliban"
84	196	FBIS Bin Laden ..	10-Apr-01	FBIS	The Nation (Lahore Edition)	UBL	Statement	'Usama urges Muslims to help Afghans, wage jihad'
85	197	FBIS Bin Laden	07-May-01	FBIS	The News (Islamabad)	UBL	Speech	'Usama urges Ummah to continue Jihad'
86	198	FBIS Bin Laden	17-May-01	FBIS	Islamabad	UBL	Statement	'If Taleban allow, I can make US life miserable: Usama"
87	199	FBIS Bin Laden	27-May-01	FBIS	Al-Arab Al-Alamiyah (London)	UBL	Statement	'Bin Ladin Sends Voice Message to Palestinian People: 'We will Not Let You Down!'"
88	200	FBIS Bin Laden ..	16-Sep-01	FBIS	Afghan Islamic Press Agency	UBL	Report of Statement	'Afghanistan: Bin Ladin Denies Involvement in Terrorist Attacks in US' [FBIS title]
89	181	FBIS Bin Laden	21-Sep-01	FBIS	Daily News - New York	UBL	Report with UBL remarks	'BIN LADIN: FROM RICH KID TO TERRORIST RINGLEADER Sheds his fancy clothes to hide in Afghani hills'
90	201	FBIS Bin Laden..	24-Sep-01	FBIS	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Statement	'Text of Bin Ladin's Letter to the Pakistani

								People 24 Sep'
91	202	FBIS Bin Laden ...	28-Sep-01	FBIS	Ummat (Karachi)	UBL	interview	"The US should search attackers within itself" - Exclusive interview with Usama bin Ladin
92	130	FFI_AQ Comms 1990-2002 + FBIS Bin Laden ...	10-Oct-01	FFI Rapport 1990-2002 + See also FBIS	Al-Jazeera & Jihad Online News Network (and others)	UBL	Interview	Tayseer Allouni interviews bin Ladin in Afghanistan
93	77	FFI_AQ Comms 1990-2002	03-Nov-01	FFI Dokumentasjon. .. 1990-2002	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Statement	Bin Laden condemns the UN
94	203	FBIS Bin Laden..	07-Nov-01	FBIS	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Statement	'Al-Jazirah Carries Bin Ladin's Address on US Strikes' [FBIS title]
95	125	FFI_AQ Comms 1990-2002 + Osama claims he has nukes_interview with Hamid Mir	10-Nov-01	The Dawn + FFI Dokumentasjon om Al-Qaeda...	The Dawn, Pakistani Newspaper	UBL	Interview	'Osama claims he has nukes: If US uses N-arms it will get same response' - Interview with Hamid Mir
96	119	Zawahiri - Knights under the Banner of the Prophet	02-Dec-01	FBIS Report	Al-Sharq al-Awsat	AAZ	Book	'Knights under the Prophet's Banner: Mediations on the Jihadist Movement'
97	129	UBL_Al Jazeera-131201	13-Dec-01	Al-Jazeera + Archive.org / Islamist website	Al Jazeera	UBL	Video Statement	Address to go into the details of what the 9/11 attacks and subsequent invasion denote. "The facts of the conflict between us and America".
98	204	FBIS Bin Laden ..	01-Feb-02	FBIS	CNN [and Al-Jazeera]	UBL	Report of statement	'Al-Jazirah TV Website Reports on 'Row' With CNN Over Bin Ladin's Tape' [FBIS title]
99	205	FBIS Bin Laden ...	28-Mar-02	FBIS	Al-Quds Al-Arabi + See also www.jihad.net	UBL	Statement	'Usama Bin Ladin: Prince Abdallah's Initiative Is High Treason'
100	206	FBIS Bin Laden ...	17-Apr-02	FBIS	MBC Television (London)	UBL [and other AQ]	Report on statement	'MBC TV Carries Video of Bin Ladin, Aides Supporting 911 Attacks' [FBIS title]
101	207	FBIS Bin Laden ... + 19M-2.DAT	18-Apr-02	FBIS + Islamist websites	Al-Jazeera + As-Sahab	UBL + AAZ	AQ 9/11 film	'Al-Jazirah Aairs 'Selected Portions' of Latest Al-Qa'ida Tape on 11 Sep Attacks' [FBIS title] + 'The Wills of the

								Martyrs of the New York and Washington Battles: The Will of the Martyr Ibn ul Jarah Al-Ghamidee Ahmed al-Haznawi'
102	108	19M-1.DAT	19-Apr-02	Islamist Websites	As-Sahab	UBL, others	Film about 9/11	'The Wills of the Martyrs of the New York and Washington Battles: The Will of the Martyr Abdulaziz Alomari' (Abu al-Abbas al-Janoobi) a.k.a. 19 Martyrs (part 1)
103	209	FBIS Bin Laden ..	19-May-02	FBIS	The Times (London) + AFP Paris	UBL	Reports on video release	'Bin Ladin Film Vows Revenge On the UK' + 'British-Based Islamic News Agency Receives Encrypted Bin Ladin Video'
104	43	[no filename: document from book]	01-Jun-02	Ibrahim, Raymond (2007). Al Qaeda Reader. Broadway Books.	N/A	UBL [purported, or close affiliation]	Letter	'Al-Qaeda's Declaration in Response to the Saudi Ulema: It's Best You Prostrate Yourselves in Secret'
105	210	FBIS Bin Laden ..	26-Jun-02	FBIS	Al-Sharq al-Awsat	UBL	Report on statement/poem	'A Site Close to Al-Qa'idah Posts a Poem by Bin Ladin in Which he Responds to his Son Hamzah, Who Inquires About the Future'
106	22	20020000 zwahr_interview	01-Sep-02	ITSTIME + IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri Vol. 1 (2008)	As-Sahab	AAZ	Interview	'The Interview of Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri'
107	75	[no filename, document from book]	06-Oct-02	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1 (2008) + FBIS	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Statement	'A Message Addressed to the American People'
108	211	FBIS Bin Laden ..	14-Oct-02	FBIS	Al-Qal'ah	UBL	Statement	""Statement From Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, May God Protect him, and Al-Qa'ida Organization"
109	212	FBIS Bin Laden ..	26-Oct-02	FBIS	Waaqiah	UBL	Statement	'Letter From Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin to the American

								People"
110	213	FBIS Bin Laden ...	27-Oct-02	FBIS	Al-Majallah (London)	UBL	Reports of statement/'will'	"Al-Majallah Obtains Bin Ladin's Will: It Bears His Signature in His Own Hand and Is Dated Ramadan 1422 Hegira, Corresponding to 14 December 2001..."
111	76	[no filename, document from book]	12-Nov-02	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1 (2008) + FBIS compilation (p 227)	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Statement	Osama bin Laden hails recent operations in Bali, Moscow, Jordan
112	214	FBIS Bin Laden ..	21-Nov-02	FBIS	Alneda (internet)	UBL	Statement	"Statement from Abdallah Usama Bin Ladin to the Peoples of Countries Allied to Tyrannical US Government"
113	215	FBIS Bin Laden ..	28-Nov-02	FBIS	Al-Quds Al-Arabi	UBL	Report on Statement	'Bin Ladin in a Special Message to the 'People of the Peninsula': Take up Arms To Defend Your Honor. Warned of 'Critical Days and All-out War'
114	45	[no filename, document from book]	30-Dec-02	Ibrahim, Raymond (2007). Al Qaeda Reader. Broadway Books + Kepel & Milelli (2008)	N/A	AAZ	Book	'Al Walaa wa al Baraa' (Loyalty and Enmity: An Inherited Doctrine and a Lost Reality' [Ibrahim's translation]), 'Loyalty and Separation: Changing an Article of Faith and Losing Sight of Reality' (Kepel & Milelli).
115	216	FBIS Bin Laden ..	19-Jan-03	FBIS	Al-Sharq al-Awsat	UBL	Report of Statement	'New Message From Bin Ladin Justifies Mistakes of Al-Qa'ida Leaders, Attacks 'Secularist Movements', and Calls for Unity of 'Islamic Factions' .. Original title: "Islamic Action Between Causes of Consensus and Advocates of Disagreement"

116	78	[no filename, document from book]	01-Feb-03	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden, Vol. 1	unknown	UBL	Audio statement	On the obligation of Jihad for everyone, the weak foundations of America, the plot to annex Saudi Arabia and establish a Jewish superstate.
117	79	[no filename, document from book]	11-Feb-03	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden Vol.1 + FBIS compilation, p. 247	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Audio Statement	'A Message to Our Brothers in Iraq'
118	217	FBIS Bin Laden ...	09-Apr-03	FBIS	usaf (Islamabad)	UBL	Reports on Statement	'Usama Bin Ladin Urges Muslims To Launch Suicide Attacks Against US'
119	218	FBIS Bin Laden ..	18-May-03	FBIS	Le Matin (Algiers) and Khilafa News (Algeria)	UBL	Report on Statement	'Riyadh, Casablanca Attacks' [FBIS title]
120	54	AQ Statements 2003-2004 Hegghammer_CST PV database	21-May-03	FFI	Al-Jazeera + BBC	AAZ	Statement	Attack on Arab support for US war in Iraq. Call for attack on Norway, et al.
121	219	FBIS Bin Laden ...	29-May-03	FBIS	Movement for Islamic Reform website (London)	UBL	Report on statement	"Very Urgent: Shaykh Bin Ladin and the Mujahidin Threaten Terrible Response to Two Shaykh's Death"
122	220	FBIS Bin Laden ..	11-Jul-03	FBIS	Ilaf news	UBL	Letter	""Ilaf' Learns From its Own Sources in Jeddah: Usama Bin Ladin to His Mother Through an Intermediary: I Did Not Carry Out Terrorist Actions Against Saudi Arabia"
123	55	AQ Statements 2003-2004 Hegghammer_CST PV database	03-Aug-03	FFI + IntelCenter Ayman Al-Zawahiri vol. 1	Al-Arabiya	AAZ	Statement	Audiotape about Guantanamo prisoners
124	110	FBIS Bin Laden 1994-2004	10-Sep-03	Foreign Broadcast Information Report: 'Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004'	Al-Jazeera	UBL & AAZ	Audio statement	Al-Jazirah Airs Bin Ladin, Al-Zawahiri Tape on Anniversary of 11 Sep Attacks

125	56	AQ Statements 2003-2004 Hegghammer_CST PV database	28-Sep-03	FFI	Al-Jazeera + Al-Arabiya + BBC	AAZ	Statement	'Message to Muslims in Pakistan and Afghanistan'
126	98	[no filename, document from book]	18-Oct-03	Kepel & Milelli: Al Qaeda in its Own Words (2005, 2008) + see also FBIS	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Statement	'Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq'
127	221	FBIS Bin Laden ...	16-Nov-03	FBIS	Al-Quds Al- Arabi + Al- Jazeera	UBL	Report on Statement	'Al-Jazirah TV: Al-Qa'ida Claims Responsibility for Istanbul Bombings'
128	57	AQ Statements 2003-2004 Hegghammer_CST PV database	19-Dec-03	FFI	Al-Jazeera + BBC	AAZ	Statement	Audiotape recognising the two year anniversary of the battle of Tora Bora
129	111	FBIS Bin Laden 1994-2004 + UBL statement Jan 2004 - Guardian	04-Jan-04	Foreign Broadcast Information Report: 'Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004' + Observer	Al-Jazeera, Observer	UBL	Audio statement	Bin Ladin Warns of 'Grand Plots' Against Arabs, Criticizes Gulf Rulers 'Resist the New Rome'
130	58	AQ Statements 2003-2004 Hegghammer_CST PV database	24-Feb-04	FFI	Al-Jazeera + Al-Arabiya	AAZ	Statement	Zawahiri on the state of the union speech and the French headscarf ban
131	59	AQ Statements 2003-2004 Hegghammer_CST PV database	25-Mar-04	FFI	Al-Jazeera	AAZ	Statement	Audiotape calling for Musharraf overthrow
132	52	[no filename, document from book]	14-Apr-04	Ibrahim, Raymond (2007). Al Qaeda Reader. Broadway Books.	Audiotape delivered to media	UBL	Statement	Offer of peace treaty to Europeans
133	80	[no filename, document from book]	15-Apr-04	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1	al-Jazeera + al-Arabiya	UBL	Audio statement	Peace offering to Europeans
134	82	[no filename, document from book]	06-May-04	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1	Al-Jazeera	UBL	audio statement	'People of Iraq'
135	31	tr.2 + tr. 1 [folder: 20041029 obl_threat to the US]	29-Oct-04	ITSTIME + MEMRI	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	Threat to the US

136	83	[no filename, document from book]	30-Oct-04	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden Vol 1 + also ITSTIME and MEMRI, see above + Al Qaeda in its Own Words (edited by Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, translated by Pascale Ghazaleh).	As-Sahab	UBL	audio statement on video	Message to Americans. On 9/11, how the idea (allegedly) was formed, and the policies of the two presidents Bush'
137	84	[no filename, document from book] + OsAmA-2002_ozooo-161204	16-Dec-04	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1 + Archive.org/Al-Hesbah	unknown	UBL	audio statement	Message concerning Saudi Arabia
138	86	[no filename, document from book]	27-Dec-04	Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1 (2008)	As-Sahab	UBL	audio statement	To the people of Iraq Muslims. On the Allawi regime, elections
139	109	The Freeing of the Humanity and Homelands Under the Banner of the Quran	11-Feb-05	Jihadunspun.com, forums.Islamica wakening.com	Jihadunspun.com	AAZ	Essay	'The Freeing of Humanity and Homelands under the Banner of the Quran'
140	222	In condolence of the two Martyred leaders of the Islamic state of Iraq_25-5-10.pdf	25-May-05	Ansarnet and other Islamist sites	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'In condolence of the two Martyred leaders of the Islamic state of Iraq'
141	72	[no filename, document from book]	17-Jun-05	IntelCenter: Words of Yaman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	Video Statement	On the need to rid the Muslim world of Crusaders and their supporters, implement Sharia. Need to unite Iraqis.
142	128	12a-AAZ + 12bAAZ	04-Aug-05	MEMRI clips no 799 & 791	Al-Jazeera	AAZ	Interview	Interview with Ayman al-Zawahiri aired on Al-Jazeera
143	53	[no filename, document from book]	15-Nov-05	Ibrahim, Raymond (2007). Al Qaeda Reader. Broadway Books.	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'Wills of the Knights of the London Raid'
144	26	20051206 zwahr_Islam in Iraq	06-Dec-05	ITSTIME + IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri Vol.1.	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'The Victory of the Islamic Religion in Iraq'

145	49	[no filename, document from book]	07-Dec-05	Ibrahim, Raymond (2007). Al Qaeda Reader. Broadway Books. + IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri Vol.1.	As-Sahab	AAZ	Interview	First interview with Ayman al-Zawahiri
146	25	20050900 zwahr_obstacles of J	10-Dec-05	ITSTIME + IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri Vol.1.	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'Obstacles to Jihad'
147	50	[no filename, document in book] + 20-OBL + OBL_toAmerican19012006_ar_vcd-190106	19-Jan-06	Ibrahim, Raymond (2007). Al Qaeda Reader. Broadway Books + IntelCenter + MEMRI + Archive.org	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Statement	Bin Laden truce offer to the Americans
148	29	gta zawahiri0106	20-Jan-06	Global Terroralert	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	Zawahiri presents a poem from Maulawi Muhibbullah al-Kandahari
149	51	[no filename, document from book]	21-Jan-06	Ibrahim, Raymond (2007). Al Qaeda Reader. Broadway Books. + IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri Vol.1.	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'Bajawr Massacre and the Lies of the Crusaders' - Response to attempted attack on Zawahiri's location in the FATA (the village of Damdula, in Bajuar) which killed 18 people
150	73	[no filename, document from book]	04-Mar-06	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri Vol.1.	As-Sahab	AAZ	vid statement	'The Alternative is Da'wa and Jihad'
151	238	[no filename, document from book]	12-Apr-06	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri Vol.1 (2008)	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'Four Years Since the Battle of Tora Bora - From Tora Bora to Iraq'
152	90	[no filename, document from book] + Ya-AhL_ozooo_256kb-230406 + 25-OBL	23-Apr-06	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden Vol.1 + Al-Jazeera + Archive.org	As-Sahab	UBL	audio statement on video	'Oh People of Islam'
153	81	[no filename, document from book]	28-Apr-06	IntelCenter Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	Vid statement	'Letter to the People of Pakistan'

154	91	[no filename, document from book] + SaHaTaT_ozooo-230506	23-May-06	IntelCenter: Words of Osama Bin Laden + Archive.org / Al-Hesbah	As Sahab	UBL	audio statement on video	'A Testimony to the Truth'
155	85	[no filename, document from book]	09-Jun-06	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	vid statement	'Support for Palestinians'
156	87	[no filename, document from book]	21-Jun-06	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	vid statement	'American Crimes in Kabul'
157	32	20060624 zwahr_lamentation for zrqw (2)	24-Jun-06	ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	Lamentation of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi - 'Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr and Emir of the Martyrs Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, May Allah Have Mercy on Him'
158	88	[no filename, document from book]	27-Jun-06	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	vid statement	'The Zionist Crusader's Aggression on Gaza and Lebanon'
159	92	[no filename, document from book]	29-Jun-06	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1]	As-Sahab	UBL	audio statement on video	'Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr and Emir of the Martyrs, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi'
160	93	[no filename, document from book]	01-Jul-06	IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1	As-Sahab	UBL	audio statement on video	'To the Ummah in General and to the Mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia in Particular'
161	33	Invitation to Islam Sept. 06 - Zawahiri and mainly Gadhan - As Sahab-Al Boraq xx	02-Sep-06	Al-Boraq.com	As-Sahab	AAZ + Gadahn/Amriki	Statement	'An Invitation to Islam'
162	21	20060911 zwahr_ second interview by As-Sahab (2)	11-Sep-06	ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	Interview/ Statement	'Hot Issues with Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri'
163	89	[no filename, document from book]	29-Sep-06	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	video statement	'Bush, the Vatican's Pope, Darfur and the Crusaders'
164	94	[no filename, document from book]	22-Dec-06	[IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1]	As-Sahab	AAZ	video statement	'Realities of the Conflict Between Islam and Unbelief'

165	95	[no filename, document from book] + 30-AAZ	30-Dec-06	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol.1 + Laura Mansfield	As-Sahab	AAZ	Audio statement on video	'Congratulations on the Eid to the Ummah of Tawhid'
166	96	[no filename, document from book]	05-Jan-07	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	video statement	'Rise and Support our Brothers in Somalia'
167	28	Zawahiri message to Bush feb 2007 1of2 XX + Zawahiri message to Bush feb 2007 2of2 XX	22-Jan-07	You Tube + Laura Mansfield + IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'The Correct Equation'
168	97	[no filename, document from book]	13-Feb-07	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	audio statement on video	'Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427'.
169	18	Zawahiri march 2007-1 + Zawahiri march 2007-2+ 20070311 zwahr_Palestine	11-Mar-07	You Tube, forums, ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'Palestine is the concern of all Muslims'
170	23	20070505 zwahr_third interview by As-Sahab tr. 1, 20070505 zwahr_third interview by As-Sahab tr. 2	05-May-07	ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	Interview	'The Empire of Evil is About to End, And a New Dawn is About to Break Over Mankind'
171	30	20070523 zwahr_Dadullah	23-May-07	ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	Announces the death of Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah Akhund
172	101	[no filename, document from book]	25-Jun-07	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	audio statement on video	'Forty Years Since the Fall of Jerusalem'
173	102	[no filename, document from book] + The-Advice-of-One-Concerned_256kb	04-Jul-07	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1 + Archive.org	As-Sahab	AAZ	Video statement	'The Advice of One Concerned'
174	103	[no filename, document from book]	10-Jul-07	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol 1.	As-Sahab	AAZ	audio statement on video	'Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves'
175	104	[no filename, document from book]	11-Jul-07	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	audio statement on video	'The Aggression Against Lal Masjid'

176	10	UBL 09 2007 + 20070907 OBL(2) [videos - ITSTIME] + nefa 8 September 2007 -UBL + Osama_bin_laden_s_message_to_the_American_people-YT 0907 1 of 3, Osama_bin_laden_s_message_to_the_American_people. YT 0907 2 of 3, Osama_bin_laden_s_message_to_the_American_pe	07-Sep-07	As-Sahab/You Tube/Al-Ekhlass/NEFA also ITSTIME + IntelCenter	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	'The Solution: A message from shaykh Osama bin Laden to the American people'
177	14	nefa 20 September 2007 - UBL	20-Sep-07	NEFA foundation + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	'Come to Jihad: a Speech to the People of Pakistan'
178	16	nefa 22 October 2007 - UBL + The-People-of-Iraq_Ozooo-221007	22-Oct-07	NEFA foundation + see also IntelCenter + Archive.org / Al-Hesbah	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	'Message to the People of Iraq'
179	9	Mansfield-UBL address to Europe November2007_Tra nscript + nefa 29 November 2007 - UBL + ToEurope-Ar-En_Ozooo-291107	30-Nov-07	Laura Mansfield/You Tube/As-Sahab (Al-Ekhlaas forum)/NEFA + see also IntelCenter + Archive.org	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	'Message to the People of Europe'
180	12	nefa 14 December 2007 Annapolis statement - Zawahiri + YT_Zawahiri message December 2007 on Annapolis meeting nr 1 - Arabic, YT_Zawahiri message December 2007 on Annapolis meeting nr 2 - Arabic	14-Dec-07	NEFA foundation + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'Annapolis - The Betrayal'

181	13	nefa 16 December 2007 Interview - Zawahiri + Zawahiri interview nr 4 with As Sahab December 2007 (YT user al masri002) [folder] + 20071217 zwahr_fourth interview with As-Sahab tr. 1	16-Dec-07	NEFA foundation, ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	'Interview'	'A Review of Events' - As Sahab publishes fourth interview with Zawahiri
182	27	nefa 29 December 2007 - UBL	29-Dec-07	NEFA + IntelCenter	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	'The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies'
183	20	zawahiri exoneration	01-Jan-08	Open Source Center	Advertised by As-Sahab	AAZ	Book	'Exoneration: A Letter Exonerating the Ummah of the Pen and the Sword from the Unjust Allegation of Feebleness and Weakness' or 'Exoneration: A treatise on the exoneration of the nation of the pen and sword of the denigrating charge of being irresolute'
184	19	nefa 27 February 2008 on Libi-Zawahiri	27-Feb-08	NEFA Foundation + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'An Elegy to the Martyred Commander Abu al-Layth al-Libi'
185	44	Letters from AQ to ISI-Translations	06-Mar-08	Foundation for Defence of Democracies - 12 http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11782255&Itemid=353	N/A	AAZ	Letter	Letter to Abu Umar al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State of Iraq
186	11	nefa 19 March 2008 - UBL + UBL message to Europe March 2008	19-Mar-08	NEFA foundation, You Tube, LiveLink + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	'May our Mothers be Bereaved of us if we Fail to Help our Prophet. Peace be upon Him')
187	6	nefa 20 March 2008 - UBL + UBL March 2008 Islamist Website	20-Mar-08	NEFA foundation, You Tube, forums + See also IntelCenter + Islamist forum	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	'A way for the salvation of Palestine'
188	17	nefa 23 March - 2008 - Zawahiri	23-Mar-08	NEFA foundation + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'A Call to Help Our People in Gaza'

189	105	[no filename, document from book] + nefa 2 April 2008 Response to questions online - Zawahiri + First-Part-of-Responses-by-Dr-Ayman_al-Zawahiri-to-Open-Meeting-Coordinated-by_al-Fajr_Center-and_as-Sahab_en	02-Apr-08	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1 + NEFA + Islamist website / Archive.org	As-Sahab	AAZ	audio interview	'The Open Meeting with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Part One'
190	7	nefa Zawahiri message transcript 17 April 2008-NEFA xx	17-Apr-08	NEFA foundation, forums + see also IntelCenter	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri – On the fifth anniversary of the invasion and torture of Iraq'
191	107	[no filename, document in book]	21-Apr-08	IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1	As-Sahab	AAZ	Questions	'The Open Meeting with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Part Two'
192	8	20080516 OBL En	16-May-08	ITSTIME	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	'Reasons of the struggle on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the occupying state of Israel'
193	24	18 may UBL + 20080518 OBL Ar	18-May-08	Open Source Center + ITSTIME	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	'A Message to the Muslim Nation'
194	15	Zawahiri 4june80	04-Jun-08	Open Source Center	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'On the Anniversary of the Naksa... Break the Siege of Gaza'
195	41	Zawahiri 10-08-08 message to Pakistan_NEFA + A_Message_to_the_Pakistan_Army_and_the_People_of_Pakistan_-__	10-Aug-08	NEFA + You Tube	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'A Message from Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri to Pakistan Army and the People of Pakistan'
196	74	nefazawahiri0808-2	24-Aug-08	NEFA	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'In Lamentation of a Group of Heroes'
197	100	Exit of Bush and Arrival of Obama	19-Nov-08	Archive.org / Islamist website	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'The Exit of Bush and Arrival of Obama'
198	237	nefazawahiri1208 + The-Fifth-As-Sahab-Interview-with-Dr-Ayman-al-Zawahiri-with-english-subtitle	21-Nov-08	NEFA + Archive.org / Islamist website	As-Sahab	AAZ	Interview	'Al-Azhar: The Lions Den: Interview with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri'

199	106	The Death of our Heroes and Betrayal of our Rulers_Zawahiri	01-Dec-08	NEFA	As-Sahab	AAZ	Audio recording	'The Death of our Heroes and Betrayal of our Rulers'
200	121	Massacre-of-Gaza-and-the-Siege-of-the-traitors_En + nefazawahiri0109	06-Jan-09	Archive.org / Islamist website + NEFA	Global Islamic Media Front - As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'The Massacre of Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors'
201	122	Osama Gaza 14 Jan 2009_EN + nefabinladen0109	14-Jan-09	Archive.org / Islamist website + NEFA	As-Sahab, Jihad Media Battalion [translation]	UBL	Audio statement	'Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault'
202	131	AAZ Gaza 13 feb 09.doc	03-Feb-09	Ansarnet.info	As-Sahab/GIM F	AAZ	Written statement	'The Sacrifices of Gaza... and Conspiracies'
203	132	AAZ from Kabul to Mogadishu	22-Feb-09	Ansarnet.info	As-Sahab	AAZ	Video message (still) w footage	'From Kabul to Mogadishu'
204	133	Practical Steps UBL March 09	14-Mar-09	Ansarnet.info	As-Sahab	UBL	Still on video	'Practical steps to Liberate Palestine'
205	134	Champions of Somalia UBL March 09	19-Mar-09	Ansarnet.info	As-Sahab	UBL	Still on video	'Fight on, O' Champions of Somalia'
206	135	AAZ on Sudan March 09.docx	24-Mar-09	Ansarnet.info	As-Sahab	AAZ		'The Crusade Sets its Sights on the Sudan'
207	136	AAZ Six Years since the Invasion of Iraq.rm	20-Apr-09	Ansarnet.info + other Islamist sites	As-Sahab + Global Islamic Media Front	AAZ	Still on Video + footage	'Six years since the invasion of Iraq and thirty years since the signing of the Israeli Peace Accords'
208	137	AAZ Obama in Egypt_June2009	02-Jun-09	Al-Qimmah Islamic forum, + other Islamist site	As-Sahab	AAZ	Written transcript	'The executioner, Egypt and the American puppets welcome Obama'
209	138	Message to the People of Pakistan_12 Jul 2009.pdf	12-Jul-09	Ansarnet.info + other Islamist sites	As-Sahab	UBL	Official transcript	'And fight with them until there is no more persecution and religion should be only for Allah: A Message to the People of Pakistan'
210	139	AAZ on Pak 15 Jul 09.divx	15-Jul-09	Ansarnet.info et al	As-Sahab	AAZ	Still on video	'My Muslim Brothers and Sisters in Pakistan'
211	140	AAZ Facts of jihad and lies of the hypocrites_NEFA Aug09 + AAZ interview with As-Sahab posted 3-8-09_AR	04-Aug-09	Ansarnet.info + NEFA	As-Sahab	AAZ	Interview	'The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy'

212	142	AAZ 260809_Road of Doom.rmvb	26-Aug-09	Ansar1.info/other jihadist sites	As-Sahab	AAZ	video message	'The Path of Doom'
213	144	UBL Statement to American People.AVI	13-Sep-09	Ansarnet and other Islamist sites	As-Sahab and Global Islamic Media Front	UBL	Audio message	'A Statement to the American People'
214	143	OBL to Europe 09-1430_en.mp4	25-Sep-09	Ansar1.info / other jihadist sites	As-Sahab	UBL	Audio message	'A Message to the European People'
215	147	Eulogy for Meshud + Eulogy for Meshud_NEFA.pdf	28-Sep-09	Ansarnet/jihadist websites/NEFA foundation	As-Sahab	AAZ	Audio message	'Shaykh Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri: Eulogy for the Role Model of the Youth – The Commander and Shahid Baitullah [Mehsud]'
216	145	Eulogy for Ibn Sheikh Al Libi by Sheikh Ayman Al Zawahiri 5-Oct-09.rmvb	04-Oct-09	Ansarnet and other jihadist sites	As-Sahab	AAZ	video message	'Eulogy for Ibn Sheikh Al Libi by Sheikh Ayman Al Zawahiri'
217	146	AAZ Arabic 14 Dec 09.rmvb + Idol of National Unity_NEFA.pdf	14-Dec-09	Ansarnet and other jihadist sites + NEFA foundation	As-Sahab	AAZ	Audio message (on video showing Al-Aqsa mosque)	'The (Palestinian) National Unity: A Worshipped Idol'
218	141	MorningAndTheLampToExtinguish_Eng_2NDDraft.pdf	16-Dec-09	Archive.org	As-Sahab - translated by Abu Musa Abdussalam	AAZ	Book	'The Morning and the Lamp to be Extinguished: An Analysis of the Claim that the Constitution of Pakistan is Islamic'
219	148	From Osama to Obama.mpg + NEFA Usama to Obama Jan 10.pdf + [Al Jazeera subtitled version on YouTube]	16-Feb-10	Ansarnet, YouTube, and other Islamist. + NEFA	Al-Jazeera	UBL	Audio message	'From Osama to Obama'
220	149	The Way To Save The Earth.pdf	19-Feb-10	Ansarnet and other Islamist sites	As-Sahab	UBL	Written message	'The Way to Save the Earth'
221	223	Al-Quds will not be converted to Judaism_en.pdf + Al-Quds will not be converted to Judaism_AAZ 19-7-10_AR.mp4	19-Jul-10	Ansarnet and other Islamist websites + Flashpoint Partners	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	'Al-Quds will not be converted to Judaism'

222	224	In Condolence of Sheikh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid_AAZ 27-7-10_AR.mp4	27-Jul-10	Ansarnet and other Islamist websites	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	"In condolence of Sheikh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid R.A'
223	225	AMEF transl of AAZ_Message to the Muslim People of Turkey"_15-8-10.avi	15-Aug-10	Ansarnet, Al-Qimmah and other Islamist websites	As-Sahab/Ansarnet English	AAZ	Statement/specific message	"Message to the people of Turkey"
224	226	AAZ_A Victorious Ummah A Broken Crusade_15-9-10.divx	15-Sep-10	Ansarnet and other Islamist websites	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	"A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade"
225	227	UBL_Stances Regarding the Method of Flood Relief_Sept10.pdf	01-Oct-10	Ansarnet and other Islamist websites	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	"Some Points regarding the method of relief work"
226	228	UBL_Help Your Brothers in Pakistan_AMEF13 Oct 10.wmv	13-Oct-10	Ansarnet and other Islamist websites	As-Sahab	UBL	Statement	"Help your Brothers in Pakistan"
227	229	Defense of the Scientist Afia Siddiqui_AAZ-6-11-10.pdf	04-Nov-10	Ansarnet and similar Islamist websites	As-Sahab/Global Islamic Media Front	AAZ	Statement	"Who is going to support Aafia Sidique?"
228	230	UBL to French Oct 2010.pdf + To... The French People_Nov 10.pdf	07-Nov-10	Ansarnet and similar Islamist websites + NEFA	As-Sahab/Ansarnet Al-Mujahideen English Forum (Ansarnet)	UBL	Message	"Message from Shaykh Usama bin Ladin to the People of France"
229	231	UBL to French Jan 2011.pdf	22-Jan-11	Ansarnet and similar Islamist websites + NEFA	As-Sahab	UBL	Message	"From al-Sheikh Osama bin Mohammed bin Laden to.. The French people"
230	232	A-Message-of-Hope.pdf	19-Feb-11	Ansarnet and other Islamist websites	As-Sahab/Global Islamic Media Front	AAZ	Statement	A Message of Hope and Glad tidings to our people in Egypt (1) "By Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahri H.A"
231	233	message of hope 2.pdf	24-Feb-11	Ansarnet and other Islamist websites	As-Sahab/Global Islamic Media Front	AAZ	Statement	A Message of Hope and Glad tidings to our people in Egypt (2) "By Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahri H.A"
232	234	A-Message-of-Hope-3.pdf	27-Feb-11	Ansarnet and other Islamist websites	As-Sahab/Global Islamic Media Front	AAZ	Statement	A Message of Hope and Glad tidings to our people in Egypt

								(3) "By Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahri H.A"
233	235	message of hope 4.pdf	04-Mar-11	Ansarnet and other Islamist websites	As-Sahab/Global Islamic Media Front	AAZ	Statement	A Message of Hope and Glad tidings to our people in Egypt (4) "By Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahri H.A"
234	236	Message of Hope 5_NEFA.pdf + MPM5	14-Apr-11	NEFA + Ansarnet and similar Islamist websites	As-Sahab/Global Islamic Media Front	AAZ	Statement	"A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings" to Our Fellow Muslims in Egypt (5) by Sheikh Ayman Al Zawahiri (H.A.)
235	240	The Speech by the Martyr of Islam	19-May-11	Ansarnet and other Islamist web forums	Global Islamic Media Front	UBL	Statement	The Speech by the Martyr of Islam (As We Consider Him) The Mujahid Sheikh Usama Bin Laden - May Allah Have Mercy on Him-To His Muslim Ummah
236	238	AAZ Glad Tidings 6	21-May-11	Ansarnet and other Islamist + NEFA Foundation	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	Message of Hope and Glad Tidings to Our People in Egypt, Episode 6
237	239	The Noble Knight Dismounted	08-Jun-11	Ansarnet and other Islamist forums	As-Sahab + GIMF	AAZ	Statement	The Noble Knight Dismounted
238	241	GEBD	28-Jul-11	Ansarnet + other Islamist extremist web forums	As-Sahab + GIMF	AAZ	Statement	Glory of the East The First Being Damascus - Sheikh Mujaahid Ayman Al-Zawahiri (Hafidhahullaah)
239	242		09-Aug-11	Ansarnet + other Islamist extremist	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	A Message of Hope and Glad tidings to our people in Egypt (7) [(The Victory of Allah Support You)] "By Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahri H.A
240	243	zawahiri_81511	15-Aug-11	Ansarnet + other Islamist extremist web forums + NEFA	As-Sahab	AAZ	Statement	"Do not become weak nor grieve" or "Be Neither Weakened or Saddened"

APPENDIX 3: Coding Results

APPENDIX 3.1 Condemnation of Prevailing Societal Forms

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to undesirability of existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [unknown date] "Introduction to Characteristics of Jihad"	35	'Secularism, its artificial laws, the American hegemony, the Israeli supremacy, the apparatus of oppression, the sexually oriented media, the hypocrite clerics, and those who confuse matters in order to serve the tyrants?'
AAZ [early 1991] "The Bitter Harvest: The Brotherhood in Sixty Years"	46	<p>Muslim brotherhood taking part in 'jahiliyya governing that is democracies, elections, and parliaments'.</p> <p>'Know that democracy, that is, "rule of the people", is a new religion that defies the masses by giving them the right to legislate without being shackled down to any other authority'. 'Democracy is a man-made infidel religion'. These leaders become masters of the world, which people 'take for lords in place of Allah'. 'Democracies grant the rights of legislation to the masses, as found in the eighty-sixth article of the Egyptian Constitution'.</p> <p>'Loyalty: we cannot reconcile loyalty with God's unbelieving enemies, affection for them, or praise for them and their impious doctrines, like consultation, positive law, and democracy'. [see how the dogma of loyalty and enmity/separation - al walaa wal baraa - subject of a separate book in 2003, was already being developed].</p> <p>Taking part in democracy questions the very foundations of monotheism: 'either we govern according to God's revelation, making our actions agree with our words ("There is no God but God"), or we govern in spite of God's revelation, which means associating other gods with God, because sovereignty is God's alone'.</p>
AAZ/Islamic Jihad [early 1993] "Advice to the Community to reject the Fatwa of Shakyh Bin Baz authorising Parliamentary Representation: Published under the Supervision of Ayman Al-Zawahiri"	99	<p>The impious positive legal system left by the invading unbelievers in the Muslim countries and embraced by the domestic rulers 'allow such illicit behaviour, as fornication, usury, wine, and gambling but forbid that which is licit, like jihad along God's path, commanding good, and forbidding evil'. 'Democracy is a new religion. In Islam, legislation comes from God; in a democracy, this capacity is given to the people. Therefore, this is a new religion, based on making the people into gods and giving them God's rights and attributes. This is tantamount to associating idols with God and falling into unbelief' [see 12:40]. This relates to the Egyptian constitution's embrace of democracy too.</p>
UBL [April 1994] "Our Invitation to Give Advice and Reform"	36	The state of affairs in Saudi Arabia (according to the petitions of the ulema and UBL himself): deviation of shariah law, economic situation and debt due to wastefulness, 'contemptible' social situation including water distribution, state of the armed forces, corruption, false media, foreign policy that works against Muslims, restriction of worship, waging of war against just people,
UBL [December 1994] "Open Letter for Shaykh Bin Baz"	63	Flaws in current (Saudi Arabian) society: 1) corruption, man-made laws, the practice of usury (or adding interest) by government supported banks. He who tolerates such practice has committed sin, but he who legitimises this - as the Saudi regime has done - is an apostate because he has made himself an equal to God, 2) The King donned a cross, and the shaykh didn't

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to undesirability of existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		object, 3) the attacking Jewish Crusader army occupied the country under the justification of protecting Kuwait, and the Shaykh justified this in a fatwa, 4) when the Saudi regime aided and supported Yemeni communists against the Muslim Yemeni people, and the Shaykh said nothing, 5) The regimes attacked members of the ulema who had been criticising its actions.
UBL [January 1995] "Second Letter to Shaykh Abdal Aziz Bin Baz.."	64	'Today the Muslims' ailment is not military weakness or financial poverty, but rather their leaders' betrayal, regimes' failures, plus scholars acceptance of current situations and befriending bad leaders'.
UBL [March 1995] "Saudi Arabia Continues its War against Islam and its Scholars"	66	The scholars have spoken out against the man-made laws, economic management, usury, called for media reform and removing immoral programmes, highlighted the deteriorating social programmes, poor state of the military, how the judicial system changed most of the religious laws into laws imposed by the regime, spoke out against the foreign policy which consisted of supporting infidels against Muslims. These scholars were put away because: 1) of the regime's personal hostility against the Muslims, 'getting rid of Islamic da'wah, whose positive outcome has started to emerge', 2) its adherence to implementing the infidels' (US, Jews, Nato) plans to destroy Islamic da'wah and preachers.
UBL [August 1995] "An Open Letter to King Fahd on the Occasion of the Recent Cabinet Reshuffle"	62	<p>The major underlying problem with the Saudi regime is that it does not govern according to the pillars of Islam, 'the foundations of monotheism which distinguish between infidelity and faith.' This lead to 1) abandoning Shariah law and 2) 'Allegiance to the Infidels and Hostility towards Muslims'.</p> <p>By obeying and revering monks and man-made laws, Christians have elevated these people to the position of lords' this is in derogation of the real Lord. Jews are also guilty of such polytheism.</p> <p>The man-made laws in Saudi Arabia: 'A quick look at the charts of commercial courts and the laws that allow and authorize bank usurious transactions and others, labour and labourers laws, the law of the Saudi Arabian army, and other godless laws which exemplify to what extent and influence have these arbitrating and blasphemous laws achieved in this country.' As blasphemous is the mechanism to settle disputes between nations within the GCC.</p> <p>Worldly failures of the Saudi authorities: 1) economic situation, Fahd's 'suicidal' policies have engulfed the state in debt impacting schools, hospitals, the labour market etc. The Luxury life of the royal family whilst it asks the population to be frugal and save energy. Fahd particularly contributed to this problem by: a) playing part in lowering oil prices, b) failing to secure alternative sources of revenue, c) paying the bill for the Gulf war and buying military hard-ware off the British, d) exhausting financial assets abroad, d) taking interest loans. 2) The military situation: the astronomical funding for the military is merely to give money to princes and the backers of the regime, notes the immense squandering of funds and corruption.</p>
UBL [November 1996] "Bin Ladin interviewed on jihad against US"	150	'I would rather die than live in any European state.' [Bear in mind when considering AQ's unclear relationship with diasporas in Europe].
AAZ [December 2001] "Knights	119	'Who is banning the hijab [veil] at schools and the niqab [face cover] at universities in order to fight the values of Islam and to force our daughters

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to undesirability of existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
under the Prophet's Banner..”		to emulate the west and its immorality?'.
UBL [purported] [June 2002] “Al-Qa’ida’s Declaration in response to the Saudi Ulema..”	43	The document utterly contradicts the shariah and 'is built on Western conceptions, which themselves rest upon the most loathsome, secular principles, whose basis is the United Nations and its satellites.' The West was key in abolishing 'legitimate Islamic education in exchange for secular education, whose influence we still suffer from to this very day'. 'The essence of our problems with the West revolves around these principles' [of Islam: 'faith in Allah alone, all the prophets, and emulation of Muhammad; upholding the doctrine of Loyalty and Enmity [loyalty to Muslims, hostility towards non-Muslims]; repudiating all enslavement save to Allah alone, and rejecting all idolatry and false worship; and jihad in the path of Allah Most High'. 'The West is hostile to us on account of Loyalty and Enmity, and Jihad'. 'The issues most prominent in the West revolve around secularism, homosexuality, and atheism.' (37).
UBL [October 2002] “Letter from Usama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the American People”	212	America: 'You are the nation who, rather than ruling by the Law of Allah, choose to implement your own inferior rules and regulations, thus following your own vain whims and desires. You run a society contrary to the nature of mankind by separating religion from your policies. So much so that people believe that even if they commit adultery, theft, and other wicked acts, as long as they go and confess, everything will be okay.' On the prominence of drugs, sex, alcohol and gambling in US society. On the sexual presentation of women, US tourists 'spreading filth upon whoever comes into contact with' them, US as the greatest pollutant which still refused to sign Kyoto. The AIDS virus and other diseases being spread from America. US reliance on offensive weapons and WMD.
UBL [February 2003] “A Message to Our Brothers in Iraq”	79	The grave sins, according to the sharia: 'polytheism, sorcery, killing, unless permitted by God, usury, taking the money of orphans, fleeing from combat, and slandering innocent faithful women' (the seven grave sins). 'Also, all grave sins, such as consuming alcohol, committing adultery, disobeying parents, and committing perjury'.
UBL [October 2003] “Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq”	98	'Islam is God's religion, and parliaments are an ignorant religion, so those who obey princes and ulema (who allow what God has forbidden, like entering legislative councils, and forbid what God has allowed, like jihad) commit the sin of making these men lords in place of God - when strength is only in him!'.
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	84	Man-made laws, usury, collaboration with the infidels. The opening of the Arabian Peninsula to Jews and Christians. Absolute supremacy is given to the King and his laws, and not those of God, this includes policies which contradict the Sharia, e.g. on permitting usury (interests) - even though this is a 'cardinal sin', and through loyalty with infidels (such as the Jordanian regime) and punishing those who criticise these links.
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	86	'People worship other people in the name of the so-called international legitimacy or the New World Order and its satellite regimes [...] whose existence is based upon the implementation of the arbitrary decisions of the Security Council and the UN resolutions against oppressed countries'. Subservience to the West. 'Man-made and pagan constitution'.
AAZ [February 2005] “The Freeing of Humanity and	109	'The freedom we want is not the lowly, filthy American freedom, it is not the freedom of the banks of usury, major corporations, and deceitful media, it is not the freedom of destruction of others for the sake of material

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to undesirability of existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Homelands under the Banner of the Quran”		interests, it is not the freedom of AIDS, spreading obscenity, and symbol marriages. It is not the freedom of gambling, alcohol and family breakups, it is not the freedom of using women as merchandise to gain customers, sign deals and attract tourists and sell products. It is not the freedom of double standards, and dividing people into robbers and robbed, it is not the freedom of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is not the freedom of selling torture machines, and supporting regimes of force, suppression and might, the friends of America, it is not the freedom of Israel massacring Muslims, destroying Masjid Al-Aqsa and turning Palestine into a Jewish state, it is not the freedom of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, it is not the freedom of carpet bombings, seven ton bombs, cluster bombs and leaf fallers, nor depleted uranium, and the destruction of villages in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is not the freedom of the government of Halliburton and its sister blood suckers. It is not the freedom of monopolization of weapons of mass destruction, developing it and then forbidding it from others. It is not the freedom of monopolizing the vote in the Security Council to the five big nations, four of whom are crusaders'.
AAZ [December 2005] “Obstacles to Jihad”	25	This material world is 'drowned in atheism, unbelief, criminality, hypocrisy, disgrace and surrender'.
UBL [April 2006] “Oh People of Islam”	90	The way of the Security Council: 'America and Britain represent the Protestant Christians, Russia represents the Orthodox Christians, and France represents the Catholic Christians, while China represents the Buddhists and pagans of the world. As for the Islamic world, it is represented by 57 countries, and comprises a 5th of the world's people, and more than a 4th of the countries in the UN [...] yet it has no seat in the Security Council. And here I am not asking for that, because that is wrong, am simply describing the facts of the matter'. The UN is an organisation of unbelief, used to implement Zio-Crusader resolutions against Muslims. [religion the real identity].
AAZ [June 2006] “Support for Palestinians”	85	'The constitution and laws clash with the Shari'ah which is absent from government in Egypt'.
UBL [July 2006] “To the Ummah in General and to the Mujahiden in Iraq and Somalia in Particular”	93	'I also tell my Islamic nation we have lost our Caliphate state, which has been fragmented and fell under the Crusader occupation almost a century ago. Ever since, the Crusaders have been trying to prevent us from reinstating the Caliphate state or even establishing any Islamic state. For this reason, they invaded Afghanistan and applied pressure on Sudan'.
AAZ + Adam Gadhan [September 2006] “An Invitation to Islam”	33	G: There can be no separation of religion and state, its laws and government. Islamic faith, and the spirit of jihad, not democracy, is needed to topple corrupt leaders domestically. Attacks on Christianity, sanctions attacks on women and blacks, is a false religion etc...
AAZ [September 2006] “Bush, the Vatican’s Pope, Darfur and the Crusade”	89	'Christianity cannot be accepted by a sound mind because it includes superstitions like the trinity, the crucifixion, redemption, the original sin, the infallibility of the pope, and the church's forgiveness of sins'.
AAZ [December 2006] “Realities of Conflict between Islam and Unbelief”	94	Membership of the UN means recognising Israel. Its charter also challenges the Shariah, and forces the recognition of Russian occupation of Chechnya, China's of East Turkistan, Spain's of Ceuta and Melilla and other cases.
AAZ [March 2007] “Palestine is the Concern of All	18	The surrender, concessions and recognitions of Israel witnessed in Palestine are the results of secular democracy.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to undesirability of existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Muslims”		
AAZ [July 2007] “Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves”	103	Nationalism, socialism, liberalism, and submissiveness.
UBL [September 2007] “The Solution..”	10	Democratic system cannot protect human beings as it is manipulated by corporations. Must rid the world of Capitalism. Man-made laws serve only those with capital. Total obedience to the orders and prohibitions of God. The rabbis altered the words of the Torah and the monks altered the words of the Evangel. Western society has partitioned state from God. In the Islamic society there will be no taxes apart from the 2.5%. Islam is the religions of all the prophets, including Jesus
UBL [September 2007] “Come to Jihad: Speech to the People of Pakistan”	14	Ulema of Pakistan refuse to rule by the religion of Islam in 'in all of life's affairs, like politics, economy, social life and other matters'.
AAZ [December 2007] “A Review of Events”	13	The Jihad media must fight those who are trying to drag the Ummah 'towards secularism, and away from the rule of Shariah, and towards nationality-based partisanship and away from the brotherhood of Islam and towards submission of the Sykes-Picot instead of the Caliphate state from ocean to ocean' ... ' and those who are abandoning their territories under the pretext of political expertise, world-wide pragmatism, national unity, saving lives and other such myths.' All governments are illegitimate since they are recognized in an international community rather than by the rule of Allah, they take part in the UN and do not fit the requirements of Dar-ul-Islam.
AAZ [April 2008] “The Open Meeting.. p.1”	105	'Egypt after 25 years [of Mubarak rule] has become more degenerate, corrupt and vassal-like'.
AAZ [April 2008] “The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman..p.2”	107	<p>'Democracy contravenes the sharia because democracy is based on the rule of the majority whereas sharia is based on the rule of the laws that are revealed by the lord of the universe'. . The Egyptian constitution & democracy; 'In Islam, no people, no matter how many they are, have the power to change sharia, which must be implemented whether the majority agrees or disagrees'.</p> <p>(Asked about modern technology): 'I like or do not like this or that value not because it is old or modern. However, I reject and I am hostile to polytheism; scorn for religion; the establishment of relations based on profit, sensual delight, lies, deception, and treachery; usury, alcohol, gambling and vile deeds; seizing others' countries and inflicting justice on them based on arrogance and mischief; the plundering of their resources; double standards; and immunity to punishment for crimes for which others are punished; spreading killing, exploitation, and destruction; and the destruction of environment and climate in order to be elated with mighty arrogance and for the sake of plundering and looting'. 'Scientific knowledge is neither Western or Eastern, but it is the property of mankind and it rotates among them in time and place. 'The West's scientific advancement has basically relied on our resources'. 'The West became superior to us because we have abandoned our values, and not because of the superiority of its values'.</p>
UBL [May 2008] “A Message to the Muslim Nation”	24	'These youths' source of talaqqi [learning] are not the laws of the United Nations or the so-called the international legitimacy, the idols of the West and east, or the ulema or leaders of groups in whose shadow they hide. Their sources of learning are also not political analyses by tendentious

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to undesirability of existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		media that do not comply with the law of God, which disdain the rituals of religion under the name of humour, spread atheism under the name of the freedom of expression, and seek to distort the image of mujahidin and weaken them.'
AAZ [August 2008] "A Message from Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri to Pakistan Army and People of Pakistan"	41	Nationalism, Western democracy, British legislative and judicial system - divided the ummah and were the reasons for great catastrophes for the ummah.
AAZ [November 2008] "Al-Azhar: The Lions Den.."	237	Government controlling selection of ulema and controlling their deeds. The 'corrupt and secular judiciary' in Egypt. 'We - and for Allah is all praise - don't have a Pope or a Wali-al-Faqih who speaks in the name of the Hidden Imam [Shia / Iran]. Rather, everyone judges by the Quran and Sunnah'.
UBL [January 2009] "Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault"	122	'False international legitimacy'. There can be no man-made laws.
AAZ [February 2009] "From Kabul to Mogadishu"	132	On the need to ensure the eradication of the Somali constitution in favour of a constitution implementing the Shariah. .. Recognising the UN means recognising Israel's control over Palestine, Russia's over the Caucasus, Spain's over Ceuta and Melilla, and China's over East Turkistan. .. References to the fallacy of democracy, specifically in Palestine.
UBL [March 2009] "Practical steps to Liberate Palestine"	133	'The fact is, all states of the Islamic world from Indonesia to Mauritania without exception fall into one of two categories: crooked states and even more crooked states; and Islam is innocent of all of their rulers'.
UBL [March 2009] "Fight on, O' Champions of Somalia"	134	'Oh, how desire for wealth, eminence and status has ruined our leaderships!'
AAZ [August 2009] "The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy"	140	'The Western civilization is the civilization of degeneracy, adultery; freedom from ethics, morals and religion...isn't the civilization of AIDS? That is why, the female veiled Muslim brings out all of these provocations, and she uncovers their usage of women as a product to attract consumers and market supplies, and it uncovers the degeneracy of their capitalism that adopts the trade obscenity in all its kinds and colors and considered one of the important sources of its income, and she uncovers the fakery of their freedom as it is OK for them that a woman unveils her entire body, it is even OK for her to sell her body, but they cannot withstand a veiled Muslim woman.'
AAZ [August 2009] "The Path of Doom"	142	Among the lies that have sustained the Pakistani state is the notion that its constitution is Islamic (refers to his book 'The Morning and the Candle').
AAZ [September 2009] "Eulogy for the Role Model of Youth.."	147	The constitution and British-based judicial system in Pakistan.
AAZ [December 2009] "The Palestinian National Unity: A Worshiped Idol"	146	Condemns 'national unity' with secular governments.
AAZ [December 2009] "The Morning and the Lamp to be"	141	['Disfiguration of Pakistan due to corrupt legal base] 'This is what has occurred in Pakistan after sixty years of its establishment. Thus, Pakistan (which ironically translates to: "the pure land") has become a foundation

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to undesirability of existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Extinguished..”		<p>for the activities of America in South Asia and the Middle East; in their Crusade against Islam.' .. When we actually study the Constitution (the “father of all law” - abul-qawānīn – as they consider it), then we find that it decisively proclaims, without doubt, that the right to amend the Constitution or to issue laws solely belongs to the majority of representatives without exception.' The text appears to recognise the appeal on consultative processes involving the 'Muslim masses', but expresses anger that this includes the provision that majority rule is absolute, above divine authority: 'Second, there would be no issues if the representatives of the Muslim masses after consultation deliberated to amend the text of their laws or their constitution, in order to realize their own interests, so long as they adhere to the religion of Allah and His Sharī'ah. But that is a matter that is not mentioned in the Pakistani Constitution.' .. Specific issues: '1. Key Principle: Legalizing fisq (disobedience to the Sharī'ah) is in itself kufr The remaining chapters discuss the following conflicts:] 2. Immunity against prosecution and questioning. 3. Right of the President of the State to pardon any crime. 4. Lack of pre-requisite of Islam in appointment of judges except in the Sharī'ah Court and of just [character] in all courts. 5. Lack of pre-requisite of masculinity for the President of the State. 6. Protection against executing a penalty retrospectively. 7. Protection against applying a punishment twice. 8. The position of the constitution on ribā [usury]', this last point pertains to frustration about the lack of emphasis put on shar'iah implementation, since the constitution only expresses the desire to nullify riba. .. On the many references to democracy in the constitution and the way in which this contradicts Islamic law and creed, including 42:21 and 10:59.</p> <p>'Amongst them [who established Pakistan] was a certain class that had received training within the English culture and were in awe of their civilization.' [UK focus].</p>
AAZ [July 2010] “Al-Quds will not be converted to Judaism”	223	<p>'Rejecting the rule of shariah, the brotherhood of Islam and the return of the Caliphate, and accepting secularism and democracy and the spread of the majority's wishes and the social state' ..</p> <p>Muslims must not become servants of the 'secular international order' dominated by the West, its secular creed and crusade bias, and primarily the 'Anglo-Saxon protestant publics.'</p>
AAZ [September 2010] “A Victorious Ummah, a Broken Crusade”	226	<p>Pakistani newspapers and media depicting 'feminine beauty' and other acts of 'disobedience' and 'decadence'. Pakistani authorities spreading vices such as 'drinking of wine, drugs, nudity, displaying of feminine beauty, gambling, usury and perversions.' [norms important too, not only grievance].</p>
UBL [October 2010] “Help Your Brothers in Pakistan”	228	<p>"Law makers are making laws away from Allah's governance' and have dismissed judges who rule according to Shari'ah, executive power and that of the media is dependent on the whims of the ruler.</p> <p>'Hateful and narrow' nationalism has prevented the ummah from uniting in responding to the crisis, using the 'Muslim wealth' of the Arabian peninsula etc.</p>
AAZ [February 2011] “Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (1)”	232	<p>'The Egyptian government, as stated in its principle documents, is a nationalistic, secular, democratic government. In reality, it is a nationalistic, secular, tyrannical and maybe a hereditary government.'</p> <p>The Egyptian government is being characterised by “Hukm al Jahiliyyah (the judgement of Jahi-liyyah). 'It being “democratic” means that sovereignty is derived from the wishes of the majority, without regards to</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to undesirability of existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>any standard, morality or creed. A democratic government must be secular, or in other words atheist, because governance and authority is not the sole right of Allah Most High, but rather subject to the desire of the majority.' Egyptian government nationalist - based on the principles of Sykes Picot. This ignores the Islamic division of people according to piety (taqwa). ..</p> <p>“(1) The Egyptian government is secular in creed, while an Islamic government is one which abides by a heavenly creed. (2) The Egyptian government claims to be democratic, i.e., that its source is the wishes of the people, without adherence to any set standard, morals or creed, while an Islamic government is one of shura (consultation), in which the Ummah refers to the Shariah and judges the rulers, who are selected and also held to account by them. (3) The Egyptian government in reality, is a suppressive government which relies upon brutality and rigged elections, while an Islamic government is one based upon shura which relies upon spreading justice, confronting oppression, and enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. (4) The Egyptian government is a nationalistic government based upon the principles of the nationalistic state, which embodies the goals of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, while an Islamic government is one based on the principle of Muslim equality and the unity of their nations, under the shade of the Caliphate. “.. 'Thus, we must stop here and clarify that secularism was introduced into our country as a result of military occupation, suppression and massacre, and it still lives off of this as we will see, and that Western secularism in its deep inside harbours enmity to Islam and sides with the Zionists.'</p>
AAZ [February 2011] “Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (3)”	234	<p>Tunisian Govt. "the beloved child of France, who waged a war against Islam, persecuted sisters who practiced Hijab, promoted prostitution, moral depravity and sinfulness, built bridges with the Jews and carried out sinister forms of repression, torture, imprisonment, hunting down every freeborn and noble person who sought to defend his religion, people, land, and sanctities.'</p>
AAZ [March 2011] “Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (4)”	235	<p>'Secularism in our Muslim World in general, and particularly in Egypt, was not a choice made by the Egyptian people.' It was forced on them by Sadat and his foreign backers. ..</p> <p>'Democracy tries to fulfil one religion and worships one idol, which is the wished of the majority, without abiding by any religion, standards or ethics.'</p> <p>'They seek a democracy which alters our principles which guide our behaviour in society. We must accept homosexuality and a family structure which is not necessarily composed of a father, mother and children, but rather grotesque forms of depravity.'</p>
AAZ [April 2011] “Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (5)”	236	<p>'People of Egypt: those who seek to alienate Sharia from governance so America can be content will spread amongst you usury, adultery, insobriety, moral dissolution, familial schisms and all kinds and forms of crimes, which the man-made laws add to the increase and spread of.' 'The man-made ordinances turn people in prison into beasts that fight over three things: homosexuality, drugs and gambling.'</p> <p>“‘This is the truth about democracy; it allows everything regardless of it being degrading or contradictory, as long as the majority agrees with it. Democracy in reality is the games of the number of votes without any moral, valuable or religious reference.” [the anti-democratic tone has been turned up in these 'Glad Tidings' messages - anxiety over the wishes of the people and the reason they protested?] .. 'In Shura, for example, it is not allowed to give licenses to the alcohol manufacturer or the heresy and</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to undesirability of existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		adultery locations or the dissolute, collapsed media, which cause corruption in the country, even if the majority of the Shura agrees.'
AAZ [May 2011] "Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (6)"	238	<p>Complains about the legal system in Egypt now that does not demand the head of state be male and a Muslim, that gives authority to others than Allah and permits alcohol production, clubs where "mortal sins" are committed etc. "Al-Azhar must gain back its stances and its scholars must choose their Shaykh from amongst themselves, and not to be enforced on them by the corrupt and corruptive governments"</p> <p>The Military council in Egypt has not released political prisoners. Talks of "social injustice" in Egypt and unfair distribution of wealth.</p>
AAZ [August 2011] "Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (7)"	242	<p>"I had mentioned earlier that the present state of Egypt is one which can be summarized as a deviation from Islam, and I had spoken of the first type of corruption in this ruling regime, which is corruption in creed (Aqeedah), explaining how the Egyptian regime is a secular, authoritarian, and nationalist regime." Reviews how this was brought about by "Zionist leaning" French campaign, secular laws in the era of Muhammad Ali, the British invasion, the English creation of a nationalistic, secular state. Talked in previous 'Glad Tidings' speeches about how the UK corrupted the Egyptian legislative system, awarded Egypt 'fake' independence and turned it into a secular state. Devotes this communiqué to discussing how Britain allowed "fake, corrupt life" to spread in Egypt. "Secularism in Egypt and the rest of the Muslim lands was never a choice for the Muslim masses, who to this day demand Islamic rule". America wishes to establish in Egypt and other Muslim lands a fake political life in which parties contest in elections and parliament, while America and its proxies watch the game from behind the curtains and intervene only when necessary."</p>

APPENDIX 3.2 Constructing a Grievance Narrative

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [unknown date] “Methodological Guidelines”	112		Violence in Chechnya, Palestine, the Philippines, Kashmir, Sudan, and Iraq. The Bush-Blair alliance is likened to the Sykes-Picot agreement: both represent crusader occupation and rule, and both aim to oppress and destroy the Islamic umma. Bush and Blair seen as trying to divide and rule Muslim world and create greater Israel.
AAZ [unknown date] “The Forbidden Word”	113		No freedom of speech in Egypt. The hardships suffered by the Afghan people are blamed on a variety of factors, among them U.S. intelligence, Saudi intelligence, the Iranian government and the Afghan Communist party
UBL [unknown date] Letter to Mullah Omar	61	References to the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, the 'calamity' of disunity after that and Mullah Omar's feat in uniting Afghanistan under Shariah law.	
AAZ [unknown date] “Introduction to Characteristics of Jihad”	35	Muslims are currently living in the worst times of their history, with the collapsed caliphate, occupation by colonialists, who installed traitor governments. The curriculum focused on demolishing the Islamic language, history and religion.	There is a worldwide conspiracy against Jihad, particularly in the Arab world - the heart of Islam. The Sharm el-Sheikh conference and the traitorous leaders who attended, trying to prevent jihad in Palestine [this presumably refers to the September 1999 conference and memorandum], including Yeltsin, Clinton, Chirac and their allies along with Shimon Peres, and of the apostates included Hosni Mubarak. [The memorandum was signed by Arafat, Barak, overseen by Albright and witnessed by King Abdullah of Jordan and Mubarak].
AAZ [early 1992] “The Black Book: An account of the Torture of Muslims in the Time of Husni Mubarak”	114		Torture and killing of activists by State Police in Egypt under Mubarak control and use of torture and intimidation throughout the judicial system.
AAZ/Islamic Jihad [early 1993] “Advice to the Community to reject the Fatwa of	99	“When the impure unbelievers came to dominate Muslims countries at the end of the nineteenth century, the revealed law of Islam was put aside in	

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Bin Baz..”		governing our countries, and they brought in impious positive law instead. When they left, the colonizers handed the reins to a group of Muslims who had reached power through these laws'.	
UBL [March 1994] ‘Usama bin Ladin Denies “Terrorism” Link’	1		Palestine, Bosnia
UBL [April 1994] “Our Invitation to Give Advice and Reform”	36	Refers to the freezing of his bank accounts, travel ban, 'defamation campaign' in the local and international press and confiscating of passports by the Saudi authorities. Refers to the petitions by members of the ulema and intelligentsia and others demanding reform, first during the Gulf War but later in subsequent petitions. All these were ignored.	References to the situation in Saudi Arabia and the state of exile. Announces the creation of the Committee for Advice and Reform.
UBL [June 1994] “Saudi Arabia supports the Communists in Yemen”	37		The Yemeni Socialist Party has enslaved its people for the past 25 years. The regime in Algeria used 'terror and violence to prevent Islamic forces from coming to power' [what about the terror and violence of the GIA?]. ... Crimes against and massacres of Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina, the global Crusader conspiracy prevented them from getting weapons. Hindu killing of Muslims in Kashmir, Jewish killing of Muslims in Lebanon ö all sanctioned by UN.
UBL [September 1994] “Saudi Arabia Unveils its War against Islam and its Scholars”	40		The Saudi Kingdom wages war against Islam and its scholars. - Government critics who call for correct implementation of the Shariah etc.
UBL [September 1994] “Urgent Letter to Security Officials”	42		The Saudi regimes 'insane campaign to strike at the Islamic awakening and its scholarly and popular symbols' in the Peninsula. The Saudi regime has committed the evil crime of throwing the best of the Ummah and Ulema into prison.
UBL [January 1995] “Second letter to Shaykh Abd Al-Aziz bin Baz from the Reform and Advice Foundation”	64		Peace agreement between the Jews and apostate secular Arab leaders recognises Jewish ownership of where the Prophet ascended to heaven and calls of jihad. It is invalid. Any agreement with Israel supports the eternal Jewish ownership of the land they

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
			took in 1948.
UBL [February 1995] “Prince Salman and Ramadan Alms”	65		Saudi assistance to Yemeni communists, the Algerian regime, cooperation with the Americans with the so-called peace plan with the Jews, and the latest was their establishment and replacement of aid organizations with their own establishments which they use to support their own policies, against the interests of the Muslims.
UBL [March 1995] “Saudi Arabia Continues its War against Islam and its Scholars”	66		The Saudi regime has detained more scholars in a recent raid on mosques and houses.
UBL [July 1995] “Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commissions”	68		The collapse of Saudi economy due to mismanagement and accumulation of interest debt, plundering of public wealth, most recently through the guise of Privatisation. The latest example is selling the national airline, this is done in order to provide ready money and in order to buy tens of US-made aircraft which will be popular in America and create jobs. The regime is trying to force the private sector to buy the airline, but this will cost them a lot of money, and people will lose their jobs.
UBL [August 1995] “An Open Letter to King Fahd on the Occasion of the Recent Cabinet Reshuffle”	62	Saudi government sending funds to the Soviets 'which has not yet cleansed its hands smeared with the blood of the Muslim people in Afghanistan', the Syrian regime as an 'award' for the massacres of Hama, the Algerian government, and Christian rebels in southern Sudan, and finally - the political and financial support for Yemeni communists.	References to 'temporal tranquillisers' against the people in the form of arbitrary changes which don't actually reform anything, such as the stillborn Shura Council. Economic collapse in Saudi. Concerning the continued presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia after the Iraq war: 'do not we have the right to question the objective for allowing them to remain on the land of the two Great Mosques with all their staggering numbers and equipment? Does Iraq still pose a real danger to your throne after the destruction of its army and the starvation of its Muslim people? All facts tend to prove otherwise and emphasize that the danger these forces are stationed here to deter is not an illusive peril from a starved and destroyed Iraq but, as the experts suggest, from the Islamic danger on the inside since the kingdom is witnessing a blessed and heightened Islamic awakening'

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
			'It is not reasonable to keep one's silence about transforming the nation to an American protectorate to be defiled by the soldiers of the Cross with their soiled feet in order to protect your crumbling throne and the preservation of the oilfields in the kingdom'.
UBL [August 1995] "The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two Mosques"	69	During the Afghan war, the Saudi authorities used money for the mujahideen in order to 'pressure the mujahidin and influence their policies in a way that would benefit the interests of the West. Sometimes these interests were used for the private interests of the princes.	<p>In order to divert people's attention from the dire economic and political state of Saudi Arabia, 'the king is trying to escape from the internal facts by drawing attention away from his problems to those going on outside the country. He is creating a diversion, tickling the nation's emotions by raising the shirt of the support for Bosnia Herzegovina and all contributions to its people'</p> <p>'We have not yet forgotten the contributions that were collected on behalf of the Palestinian cause, which at the end were given to the extortive Jews as a token of friendship and as a present of cordiality. Is the Bosnian cause going to be more important to the regime than the Palestinian cause? How are we going to believe the regime when it says it will support Islam and the Muslims in Bosnia, when the best of the scholars, the preachers of the nation, and the cream of its youth remain in prisons of the regime?'. The Saudi authorities held a conference on the situation in Bosnia threatening to intervene, giving the UN one last chance to protect the Muslims, but it did not move to protect them when 'the UN persisted on its deathly plan for the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conference was only meant for a domestic audience, and the Bosnian Muslims were left to surrender to the 'Serbian monster to be devoured in front of the eyes and ears of the entire world, forbidden from the right of legally defending themselves according to the decisions of the United Nations!!!'. The Saudi regime prevented arms and support from being sent to Muslims in Bosnia. 'The regime's propaganda of showing support for the Muslims in Bosnia was nothing more than crocodile tears and deceit'. The regime is using this event to try to 'raise the value of its declining political stock'. .. The real allies of the Bosnian Muslims</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
			<p>from the Arabian Peninsula are the youth, and those who send money directly.</p> <p>The Christian Croats managed to break the siege of Bosnia, so why not the rulers of the Muslim world, particularly the Saudi regime?</p> <p>'The Bosnian cause, with all its bitterness, contained great lessons, among which are the following: 1 - it uncovered the ruling regimes of Muslim countries and exposed them as mere tools in the hands of the great and powerful Crusaders. Those regimes do not represent their people who supported the Muslims of Bosnia. 2 - The human rights and equality slogans raised by the West are nothing but dead slogans, when it comes to Muslim matters. 3 - The United Nations is nothing but a tool to implement the Crusaders' plan to kill the causes of the nation of Islam and its people. 4 - Complying with the articles of the United Nations is a joint practical operation to conspire against Muslim causes'.</p>
UBL [July 1996] "Interview with Saudi Dissident Bin Ladin"		US entering the land of two holy places. Legacy of US aggression towards Muslims	
UBL [September 1996] "Bin Ladin Declares Jihad on Americans/Letter from Usama bin Muhammad bin Ladin to his Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula.."	5	Palestine, Iraq, Qana, Ogaden, Assam, Philippines, Burma, Tajikistan, Kashmir, Fatani, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Occupation of SA worst catastrophe since death of Mohammed. References to the Lebanon blasts in 1983 and Aden double bombings emphasizing US 'false courage'. Also Mogadishu	Saudi ruler's mistakes: 1) replacing shariia, 2) allowing in enemies, which ruined the economy. Also ignoring memoranda from religious scholars pointing to internal weaknesses and disrespect for Muslim causes and the shariia. Israel seen as trying to conquer the Arabian peninsula. Palestine.
UBL [November 1996] "Bin Ladin interviewed on Jihad against US"	150	<p>Palestine, and the US veto ensuring continued suffering. Qana massacre.</p> <p>Occupation of the Arabian peninsula by American forces and their meddling in affairs in order to bring down oil prices [which UBL implied should still be traded with the US - 'we are not going to drink it'].</p>	<p>Ignores a question concerning the possible role of the 'shiite Hezbollah' in the Khobar bombings, talking in stead of conspiracies within the Saudi state and presence of US troops [Shia]. Goes on to praise the attacks.</p> <p>The embargo against Iraq resulting in the death of more than 600 thousand children. The Sharm el-Sheikh conference.</p>
UBL [March	152		US occupation in Saudi Arabia. Struggle of

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
1997] “Bin Ladin Cited on Prince Sultan’s US Visit”			Palestinians.
UBL [March 1997] “Bin Ladin Charges US involvement in China bombings”	153		<p>Said to have accused US of seeking to harm relations between Muslims and China. Said to have 'promised action' to 'bring about an understanding' between Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China</p> <p>Article claims UBL's animosity towards US became more determined after US sought to assassinate him.</p> <p>Arrest of 'Algerian activists' in France, said to have angered UBL.</p> <p>Animosity towards UK: 'Ben Ladin also accuses the British of supporting authoritarian regimes in the Middle East in their bid to crush the Islamic movements there. He said that the British were in the forefront, some times even ahead of the United States, in advocating continued siege, collective punishment, and sanctions against the Muslim peoples of Sudan, Iran, Libya and Iraq.'</p>
UBL [March 1997] “Pakistan interviews Usama bin Ladin”	154	Argues the US has been stealing from Saudi Arabia and the Arabs through forcing down oil prices over the past years, the price of US wheat has risen three-times that of oil in the Middle East. As a result the US owes 1100 billion dollars, 11 thousand for each Muslim. Their greatest crime however, is their presence in the Arabian peninsula.	
UBL [March 1997] “Interview with Usama bin Ladin”	155		Occupation of land of two holy places - exploitation of oil exports by US.
UBL [April 1997] “The Saudi Regime and the Reputed Tragedies of the Pilgrims”	70	Saudi spending on Communists in Yemen, Christians in Southern Sudan, and the tyrants of Algeria, Egypt and elsewhere. Muslim resentment towards the occupation of the holy places, stealing of its resources, neglecting of fiscal policy.	References to the 'seasonal tragedy' whereby hundreds and sometimes thousands of pilgrims die each year due to accidents, several thousand in a fire in 1997. The reasons are lack of space in public areas leading to overcrowding, negligence of organisers and lack of safety and security precautions. The organisers have not accounted for the increased number of pilgrims. Other countries do not seem to have the same problems when they deal with mass events. The underlying reason for all this is the incapacity and

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
			despotism of the Saudi royal family. They have spent a lot more on their own palaces than on facilities for a billion Muslims. These tragedies happen every year because the family wants to rule everything, and no questions are asked, no one brought to trial. At the same time the regime is going out of its way in expressing its condolences for Christian and Jewish enemies when they lose people, and hastened to the Sharm El-Sheikh conference showing sympathy to the Zionists, after 60 of them were killed in Palestine.
UBL [June 1997] "Usama bin Ladin Dares US Commandos to Come to Afghanistan"	156		Arrest of Ramzi Yusuf Kansi.
UBL [August 1997] "Usama bin Ladin Urges 'Befitting Reply' to Horan"	157		On US Attorney Robert Horan's comments perceived as hostile and insulting towards Muslims. Compared to earlier book by Salman Rushdie and both condemned. West condemned for protecting Rushdie and welcoming him as a hero. This seen as sign of hostility towards Islam and 'moral degradation' in the West. On the 'abduction' of Aimal Kansi for killing some Americans. Says that now Muslims must insist that America withdraw not only from the Arabian Peninsula, but from all Muslim lands.
UBL [November 1997] "Daily Reports Usama bin Ladin's Threat against Americans"	158		US crimes against Muslims
UBL [January 1998] "Bin Ladin Claims Foiling of UN's Afghan 'Conspiracy'"	159	Claims to have prevented the UN from establishing a coalition government in Afghanistan between communists and mojahideen following Soviet withdrawal, says UN and its chief Butros-Ghali threatened that any other form of government would not be recognised. Claims other mohaideen leaders were prepared to sign.	
UBL [February	160		The 'International Christian crusade'

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
1998] “Bin LAdin Condoles with Al-Bashir on Salih’s Death”			against Sudan. ""its (the international Christian crusade's) fleets are ploughing the seas of Islam. They are besieging and blockading the peoples of the region as a whole with total disregard for pledges and charters, and are violating the sacred sites and draining all the wealth, while the al-Aqsa Mosque remains the prisoner of this Christian-Jewish alliance."
UBL + AAZ + others [February 1998] “Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans”	161		Three major grievances against the US/Zionist-Crusader alliance: (1) 7 years on-going occupation of the 'holiest of places', Arabian peninsula - also used as staging post for aggression in neighbouring regions including Iraq. (2) Even after the atrocities already committed against Iraqis resulting in more than a million deaths, Americans continue their campaign against the Iraqi people. (3) In addition to the religious and economic reasons for this campaign against the Muslims in the region, another strong reason is the need to weaken the enemies of Israel and divert attention away from the murdering of Muslims in Jerusalem.
UBL [March 1998] “Bin Ladin Urges Expulsion of Invaders..”	162	On the long-standing US ambitions in the Arabian Peninsula - expressed by President Roosevelt: its oil reserves, link to global communication [geographic importance], and importance for Israeli security. This has not changed. The 1973 war demonstrated to the West and US the importance of protecting Israel and securing the oil reserves more directly, and President Reagan reiterated the importance of 'seizing' strategically important hubs. Schwartzkopf insisted in 1996 that it served US interests to continue to be based in the Peninsula.	
UBL [March 1998] “Interview with Usama bin Ladin Reported”	163		Denies accusations of responsibility for recent attacks on US personnel resulting in 24 deaths in Saudi Arabia as 'totally false and baseless.'
UBL [April 1998] “Bin Ladin warns against Richardson Mission to Afghanistan”	164	Says America at the time tried to prolong dissent and infighting between mojahideen in Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal in order to weaken these forces and undermine jihad.	Reference to visit by US envoy Richardson to Afghanistan for talks with the Taliban [which they, in turn, welcomed]

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [May 1998] “Supporting the Fatwa of the Afghani Religious Scholars of Ejecting the American Forces from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques”	71	The 1990 occupation in the LTHM by the US forces, the criticism of prominent scholars, their incarceration, the declarations of scholars supportive of the regime declaring the occupation crucial for defence purposes. And then the obvious desire of the Americans to stay beyond the Iraq war after it ended.	"The nation of Islam is still faced with the case of invasion by the American forces into the land of the two holy mosques. The reaction [of the Muslim ummah] is escalating and deepening'. The latest example is the fatwa issued by the 'united religious scholars of Afghanistan, stressing the necessity of ejecting the American forces from the Arab Peninsula and the land of the two holy mosques'.
UBL [May 1998] “Clerics in Afghanistan Issue Fatwa..”	165		On the US occupation in Saudi Arabia, how they are they under the false pretence of providing security and how the Peninsula has to be cleared of their presence.
UBL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin: Afghanistan’s inclusion on US terrorism list is ‘Certificate of good conduct’ for Taliban”	166		On the US announcement Afghanistan was considered a state sponsor of terrorism. That 'US accusations of terrorism against states, groups, or individuals are no longer of any value or credibility, since everyone now knows that the United States brands as terrorist anyone -- state, group, or individual -- who is opposed to its imperialist policy and hegemony, while it continues to practice the ugliest forms of world terrorism and support the evil of the forces of terror in the world.' US killing of 'hundreds of thousands of children, women, and elderly people by sentencing them to death by starvation in Iraq' [note how this implicitly suggests views of those whose killing is forbidden] as well as US support for 'Zionist terrorism in Palestine and Lebanon.'
UBL [May 1998] “World Islamic Front Backs Intifadah of Palestine’s Sons/Wounds of Al-Aqsa”	167	'the United States, government and parliament, has always worked to spoil Israel and bolster its economic and military power.'	Palestinian intifadah
UBL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin Creates New Front Against US, Israel”	168	Claims the US tried to split up Afghanistan into fiefdoms lead by individual tribal leaders	
UBL [May 1998] “United States Admits that Keeping its Troops in the Gulf is Causing Dissatisfaction...”	169		'Arab land has either been occupied or there is a conspiracy to occupy it. For the first time since the Prophet's death atheists are occupying Mecca, Medina, and al-Aqsa Mosques.'

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UBL [June 1998] “Bin Ladin Congratulates Pakistan on Possession of Nuclear Weapons”	170		'For the first time in Muslim history' a 'Muslim nation' has acquired nuclear weapons. Indian 'occupation' of Muslim lands.
UBL [June 1998] “In the Way of Allah”	171		Criticism of Pakistani authorities for failing to invite Afghanistan-based mujahideen to fight for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir. Says emphasis should not be placed on internal Muslim-China disagreements, since the main focus needs to be on the US - and thus China could be an asset in this regard.
UBL [August 1998] “Bin Ladin Calls for ‘Jihad’ against Jews, America”	172		US bombings in Afghanistan in retaliation for East Africa attacks
UBL [August 1998] “The Battle Has Not Yet Started”	173		References to US retaliation to Africa bombings through cruise missile attacks in Afghanistan.
UBL [November 1998] “Bin Ladin: Expel Jews, Christians, from Holy Places”	175		'At this moment, Israel and United States are dominating Palestine and other holy places in such a way that Mujahidin are being killed and besieged and Muslims have been economically ruined'
UBL [December 1998] “Bin Ladin Denies Role in Bombings of US Missions”	176		'I had no hand at all in the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania [...] but I feel no sorrow over the blasts'
UBL [January 1999] “Wrath of God..”	178		US and UK bombing of Iraq which shows they are acting on behalf of Israel, seeking to divide and rule the Middle East
UBL [January 1999] “Accused Terrorist Leader Usama Bin Ladin Declares War on All Americans”	180		Occupation of Saudi Arabia, other Muslim lands, support for Israel
AAZ [January 1999] “Muslim Egypt between the Whips of the Torturers and the Administration of Traitors”	116		Talks of the corruption of the Egyptian regime and their 'crimes' against Islam, this is manifest in four main categories: (1) constitutional - sovereignty not from God. Constitution anti-Shari'a and based on British values since they created it. (2) Foreign policy - Egypt following US and Jewish policies, complains about the close ties with the two, about US military being allowed to go through and be based in

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			Egypt, says America and Israel are spying together in Egypt to help Israel, complains about the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. (3) Domestic affairs - the emergency law used to persecute Islamists and their families. Also complains about weak media, ineffective bureaucracy, election fraud, and government interference in student organisations. (4) Educational issues - complains about government control over all schooling and curricula, control over Islamic schools through Al-Azhar, and constraining of Mosque speakers who are not allowed to criticise the state or create unions.
UBL [February 1999] "Esquire interview with bin Ladin"	179	On how the Afghan war 'cleared from Muslim minds the myth of superpowers' and the US involvement in Somalia convinced the 'Muslim youth' that America was a 'paper tiger'. On Somalia: "When this took place, I was in the Sudan, but this great defeat pleased me very much, the way it pleases all Muslims." . Accuses America of double standards in its outrage at civilian deaths in Saudi Arabia - when America dropped the atomic bombs in Japan. .. US soldiers fleeing Beirut and Somalia after being confronted.	The American imposes himself on everyone. Americans accuse our children in Palestine of being terrorists--those children, who have no weapons and have not even reached maturity. At the same time, Americans defend a country, the state of the Jews, that has a policy to destroy the future of these children.' Talks of 'shameful' US stance towards Palestine and the death of a million Iraqi children through US-lead sanctions on Iraq.
UBL [February 1999] May 1998 interview reported	182		Christian and Jewish occupation of Muslim Arab lands - primarily the land of the two holy places, with the Kaaba surrounded from four directions by American forces. .. Claims the Pakistani Peoples Party prevented UBL and fellow mujahideen from travelling to Kashmir to fight India. .. Talks of how America and the UN tried to divide Afghanistan after the war with Soviets
AAZ [April 1999] "Letter to Abu Yasir"	123	"The experience of Hassan al Banna with the Egyptian government is still fresh in our minds. His end came after he chose to praise the despots and declare peace. They killed him as a present to the King! [Banna was killed on King Faruq's orders, he was informed of the successful operation on his birthday]. If	'I hesitated before writing to you, after hearing, in the media, about your announcement of end to military operations'. 'There are many frightening thoughts going through my mind at present. Did you all agree on this policy [of non violence]? What is the strategy vis-à-vis the government? Have you reached an agreement with the authorities? If so, what are the details? Why wasn't it publicised?

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		making agreements with the authorities was productive, the Brotherhood would've benefited before you. Instead, members are still being imprisoned across Egypt'.	Is the accord secret in some parts or entirely? Would the secret be known to the government but concealed from [the rest of Islamic Jihad]? If an agreement has taken place, what is the government permitting you to do?'. 'Furthermore, why was the declaration issued? Why was it frank on the withdrawal from the "International Front" but silent on other issues? What is the position of Muntasir (al Zayyat, lawyer representing Islamic Jihad members in Egypt)? If an accord has been signed with the authorities, what are the implications for other militant movements? What are the facts regarding report alleging that Salah Hashim (One of Islamic Jihad's founders and currently imprisoned in Egypt) has called for the formation of a new political party?'
UBL [June 1999] "Usama bin Ladin Pens Letter in Support of Kashmir Jihad"	183		Insists Kashmir should be independent. Offers help against Indian aggression. Condemns King Fahd, whom he says is not worthy as custodian of the holy places.
UBL [June 1999] "Usama bin Ladin, The Destruction of the Base"	184	Refutes claims that the US was allied with the mujahideen against the Soviets. Claims he has always spoken out against them. Arab support for the mujahideen was due to their own self-interest in 'protecting their thrones'. Talks about the 1987 assault on the Lion's Den camp, describes how the Afghan's fled early and praises his own efforts in standing his ground and defending the camp. Refutes claims he was behind the assassination of Abdallah Azzam as US-Israeli plot against him. Says there was no competition between them. On alleged US attempts to split up Afghanistan following the war, and collusion of the likes of Ahmad Shah Masoud. ... Condemnation of Arab leaders who 'betrayed' the 'cubs' of Palestine in their efforts against the Israelis (refers to peace treaties in Egypt). 'Massacres committed in Sabra,	Claims CIA ran plots to kill Somalis and partition Sudan in the Nairobi Embassy, thus it was a legitimate target. The Embassies was the 'greatest CIA centre in eastern Africa.' .. The latest attack on Iraq a few days ago was led by the United States and Britain.' US, however, did not react when Saddam was using weapons against the Kurds and Iran, they reacted now because Saddam has become a danger for Israel. In fact, it is America that used WMD to murderous effect against Japan. 'The Jews managed to employ the Christians -- the Americans and British -- to carry out the duty of attacking Iraq.' Similar attacks against Libya and Sudan are designed to curb the rise of Muslim states. 'Another implication of these incidents is that they emphasized clearly and explicitly that Muslims and all sensible people should not go to the United Nations.'. Taking cases to the UN is against Islamic law, but even if cases are taken, and judged in favour of the Muslims they are vetoed by the US.

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		Shatila, Dayr Yasin, Qana, Hebron, and elsewhere.'	
UBL [January 2000] "Usama bin Ladin Denounces US-Sponsored 'World Order'"	187		US is trying to rule the world, but will not be successful. It, like the Soviet Union before it, will be split into 52 countries and fail.
UBL [May 2000] "Usama Speaks on Hijra and the Islamic State"	189		Occupation of the 'holiest sites of Islam' by Christians and Jews. 'So the American troops today, Christians, Jews, crusaders, prostitutes, lesbians, homosexuals, atheists, all these people are walking in the holy land where Allah Ta'ala has chosen to reveal the Al-Qu'ran.' [note - not just grievance, also clash of values]. British: dismantled the Caliphate system, created the Palestine and Kashmir problems, embargoed Muslims in Bosnia, bombed Iraq.
UBL [June 2000] "Usama bin Ladin Renews Calls for jihad"	190		Occupation of holy lands and other Muslim places and plundering of resources
UBL [September 2000] "Bin Ladin, others pledge 'Jihad' to release Prisoners.."	191		'These heathens have spread their forces in Egypt, Yemen, and the Gulf killing our children, persecuting our scholars, soiling our holy shrines, and stealing our wealth' [AAZ]
UBL [January 2001] "Daily Prints Usama bin Ladin Letter Calling for Global Islamic State"	192		US and Israeli occupation of holy lands
Muhammad bin Ladin [January 2001] video speech addressed to his father	127		Clash of civilizations: 'Two lashkars, (The forces of West and Islam) have been pitted against one another. One lashkar is endowed with the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and is imbued with a desire to be martyrs, while the second lashkar is manned and directed by a worn-out, aged infidel leadership (kaisar). A confrontation is now bound to take place and the war clouds have truly engulfed both the lashkars'.
UBL [March 2001] "Ausaf receives Bin Ladin's Poem.."	193		Implied Americans bombed Afghanistan in order to harm Mullah Omar - 'the embodiment of Islamic respect' and the Taliban, killing children and elderly people.

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			Jews killing 'my brothers' the Palestinians
UBL [March 2001] poem/message	194		References to Al-Aqsa intifada and praise for those taking part in it. Reference to USS Cole bombings reportedly in this context.
UBL [April 2001] letter to scholars of Deyubende in Peshawar	120		Killing of children through economic boycott and war, sanctioned by the UN and fought by the Crusader west and their Jewish clientele. References to an Islamic conference in Pakistan, and how previous such gatherings in the Arab world have failed.
UBL [April 2001] "Usama regrets curbs by Taliban"	195		Refers to Taliban destruction of Buddha statues in Bamiyan and fierce reaction in West to show US/West is against Taliban, not only UBL.
UBL [April 2001] "Usama urges Muslims to help Afghans"	196		On UN sanctions against the Taliban: 'I am delivering the message to you at a time when innocent young children in Afghanistan are the victims of the so-called New World Order and the UN curbs. They are aimed at killing the Muslims,'
UBL [May 2001] "Usama urges Ummah to continue Jihad"	197		The Martyrs will liberate the Masjid-e-Aqsa. The Palestinian struggle and their lack of weaponry.
UBL [May 2001] "IF Taleban allow, I can make US life miserable"	198		US imposed sanctions harming Muslim interests and lives.
UBL [May 2001] "Bin Ladin sends voice message to Palestinian People.."	199		Plight of Palestinians
UBL [September 2001] "Bin Ladin: from rich kid to terrorist.."	181	'American history does not distinguish between civilian and military'. 'Almost three-quarters of the American people support Clinton's strikes on Iraq. They are a people whose President becomes more popular when he kills innocent people. They are lowly people who do not understand the meaning of principles.'"	
UBL [September 2001] "Text of bin Ladin letter to the	201		Talks of and mourns the death of Pakistanis in Karachi who appear to have died whilst 'defending Islam'.

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Pakistani People”			
UBL [September 2001] “The US Should search attackers within itself”	202		Not responsible for 9/11 - the attacks might have been perpetrated by someone within the 'America system', Jews, or the intelligence agencies in a bid to secure more funding, or due to some conspiracy seeking to cause war between Muslims and the West.
UBL [October 2001] “Tayseer Allouni interviews bin Ladin in Afghanistan”	130		<p>Argues America is attacking Afghanistan not because of the presence of himself or AQ in the country but because they want to prevent the establishment of the Islamic State.</p> <p>"we are being attacked in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir, the Philippines and everywhere else." When challenged on the issue of Palestine, and why he is focusing more on this now rather than the Arabian Peninsula, which was the main focus before: "Sometimes we find the right elements to push for one cause more than the other", the Intifada meant a refocus on the Palestinian issue could be made.</p> <p>On the million child deaths in Iraq, and how these are not seen as innocent as those in the West are seen as innocent. [some limited discrimination still there]. ... "We are in a decisive battle with the Jews and those who support them from the crusaders and the Zionists", sees this as a clash of civilizations.</p>
UBL [November 2001] “Bin Ladin condemns the US”	77	Partitioning of Palestine and role of the UN.	On the clash of civilizations: The way in which the West was saddened by the 9/11 attacks but happy at the invasion into Afghanistan, and how the Muslim world was happy America was struck and angry that Afghanistan was attacked. 'This war is fundamentally religious. The people of the East are Muslims. They sympathized with Muslims against the people of the West, who are the crusaders'. 'But when the victim starts to take revenge for those innocent children in Palestine, Iraq, southern Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir and the Philippines, the rulers' 'ulama' and the hypocrites come to defend the clear blasphemy. It suffices me to seek God's help against them.'. 'Take for example the Chechens. They are a Muslim people who have been attacked by the Russian bear which embraces the Christian Orthodox

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			<p>faith'. And on the Muslims killed in Bosnia in the 'UN safe havens'. 50 years of killings in Kashmir. Genocide in Chechnya, and the West and the UN do nothing to help. Indonesia suffered being split up by the UN when it was coerced into giving independence to East Timor. Somalia: 'In Somalia, on the excuse of restoring hope, 13,000 of our brothers were killed'</p> <p>The killing of a million children in Iraq and the ongoing trauma in Palestine.</p>
UBL [November 2001] "Al-Jazirah carries bin Ladin's address.."	203		The Palestinians have suffered violence and oppression, but the world does not condemn this. The same for bombing of Japan [in WWII], atrocities against the Iraqis - and yet the infidels and hypocrites all mourn the 9/11 attacks.
UBL [November 2001] Osama claims he has nukes (article title)	125		'Right now a great war of Islamic history is being fought in Afghanistan. All the big powers are united against Muslims'.
AAZ [December 2001] "Knights under the Prophet's Banner"	119	<p>'It is an irony of fate that Pakistan's secular government expelled to an unknown destination the very persons who had defended its borders'..</p> <p>The truth that everyone should learn is that the United States did not give one penny in aid to the mujahidin'. . Imprisonment and torture of Islamists in Egypt.</p> <p>Afghanistan: 'While the United States backed Pakistan and the mujahidin factions with money and equipment, the young Arab mujahidin's relationship with the United States was totally different'. But says it preposterous that bin Laden was allied to America. ' "For this reason [the successful jihad in Afghanistan] the United States was alert to this danger in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its primary condition to implement the Dayton agreement was to expel all the Arab mujahidin from Bosnia-Herzegovina." The Arabs in Afghanistan had changed it from a local conflict to a global one.</p>	<p>'An analysis of the political situation in Egypt would reveal that Egypt is struggling between two powers: An official power and a popular power that has its roots deeply established in the ground, which is the Islamic movement in general and the solid jihad nucleus in particular</p> <p>The first power is supported by the United States, the west, Israel, and most of the Arab rulers. The second power depends on God alone then on its wide popularity [importance of reaching the masses] and alliance with other jihad movements throughout the Islamic nation, from Chechnya in the north to Somalia in the south and from Eastern Turkestan in the east to Morocco in the west'.</p> <p>On the pivotal importance of Palestine in mobilising the Muslim masses: 'The fact that must be acknowledged is that the issue of Palestine is the cause that has been firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation from Morocco to Indonesia for the past 50 years. In addition, it is a rallying point for all the Arabs, be they believers or non-believers, good or evil'.</p>

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		<p>' Thus this nucleus, which the writer of this book joined, was formed in the shape of the Al-Jihad Organization. Events added another serious factor that affected the march of the jihad movement in Egypt, namely, the 1967 setback. The symbol Jamal Abd-al-Nasir--whose followers tried to depict to the people as the immortal and invincible leader--fell' . Details British incursions into Egypt in the late 19th century and its quest for increased control over the region, its support for the creation of a Jewish state, 'Britain the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement, which blew the hopes of Britain's Arab allies up in the air along with the words of honour guaranteed by the British Crown'.</p> <p>The FIS in Algeria found out the hard way that democratic initiatives are useless in dealing with apostates - the values of the west refer to them only, the only way forward is jihad.</p>	
UBL [December 2001] "The Fact of the Conflict between us and America"	129	<p>America ceased helping the Afghan fighters after they turned their attention to aiding the Palestinians in their hardship.</p> <p>Bush snr. responsible for more than a million deaths of Iraqi children.</p>	<p>"It has become crystal clear that the West in general, and the US in particular, harbour an implacable, incredible Crusader hatred against Islam" this made evident by the airstrikes in Afghanistan. This results in suffering of people in villages in Afghanistan who did nothing wrong. Seems to complain that the West would not have reacted in the same way if a European actor, e.g. the IRA had been responsible. There is no evidence to implicate the Arab mujahideen in Afghanistan.</p> <p>Palestine today sees the "deliberate murder of children". Killing of Mohammad al-Durra. America continues to aid these "attackers of our sons in Palestine" (Israel).</p> <p>"And America is participating [in] this vicious terrorism [of killing women and children] in its most abhorrent form in Palestine and in Iraq".</p> <p>"Arrogant nations who do not know the</p>

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			meaning of 'freedom' unless it applies to the white race"
UBL [March 2002] "Usama bin Ladin: Prince Abdallah's initiative is High Treason"	205	'By announcing it, he [Prince Abdullah] is following in the footsteps of his father who aborted the intifadah of 1936/1354 Hegira with a false promise made by him and the English Government. He deceived the Palestinians and they stopped the intifadah while the English occupation remained until 1948/1366 Hegira when it handed Palestine over to the Jews. He is also following in the footsteps of his ilk, the traitorous rulers who sent the seven armies under an English command, the command of the English Government's man (Glubb Pasha), and crushed the serious popular action to liberate Palestine. They completed the conspiracy and signed a truce to stop the fighting in 1949/1367 Hegira. Their biggest treason to crush the first Al-Aqsa intifadah, however, was Oslo in 1992/1412 Hegira.'" He also defamed the Two holy places by inviting the Americans to stay in the country.	Saudi initiatives to make peace with Israel 'destroy the serious popular move to liberate Palestine."
UBL [April 2002] "MBC Carries video of Bin Ladin"	206		Suffering of Palestinians, Chechens and other Muslims which called for response.
UBL [May 2002] "British-based Islamic news agency receives encrypted bin Ladin video"	209	Crusades	'This war [in Afghanistan] is similar to the previous crusades, led by Richard the Lion-Heart, [King Frederick] Barbarossa of Germany and Louis [IX] of France. In the present age, they rally behind [George] Bush.'
UBL [purported] [June 2002] "Al-Qaeda's declaration in response to the Saudi Ulema.."	43	Crusades, launched by the European church. British, French, Belgian and Italian colonization.	'Slaughter befalling Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, Indonesia, Chechnya, Eritrea, Kashmir, [...] Gujarat.'
UBL [June 2002] "A Site Close to Al-Qa'ida posts Poem..."	210	UBL's ongoing struggle and nomadic lifestyle	'Security has gone, but danger remains. It is a wor[l]d of crimes in which children are slaughtered like cows.'
AAZ [September 2002] "The Interview of Dr	22	'Here in Afghanistan, the course of history of the Soviet Union, the largest land-based military force	The Americans are losing in Afghanistan - the government is extremely weak and out of touch and relies on American air support

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Ayman Al Zawahiri”		<p>in the world, was dashed to pieces on the boulders of the Afghan jihad'.</p> <p>'The defeated Soviet Union fled from Afghanistan, turning their back only to face their own political break-up and intellectual collapse. This is the fate that awaits America in Afghanistan, by the permission of Allah</p> <p>If the mujahideen had allowed themselves to be affected by the voices of concern saying that the enemy was too strong - 'then the Soviet forces would today be in the Arabian Peninsula' and 'Israeli tanks would today be in Medina, Cairo and Damascus in realization of the goal of Greater Israel'. ... 9/11 a complete success. Shows how few people can successfully attack America. America has not achieved its goals in Afghanistan, the puppet regime does not trust its own people. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban enjoy much popular support.</p>	<p>and military, the US military also rely on 'mercenaries and bandits'. The Americans are bogged down in a guerrilla war in the mountains, where the Soviets - despite their greater numbers and Communist dictatorship, were defeated. So the same will happen to America</p> <p>'The whole world is witness to the Guantanamo Bay masquerade and the comedy of hundred's detained without any charge or court hearing in America'</p> <p>The US strategy in Iraq: the US aims to destroy any effective military in proximity to Israel, then consolidate its supremacy in the region. After Iraq, the US seeks to invade other Muslim countries including Iran and Pakistan and destroying nuclear weapons' programmes, enhancing Israeli supremacy. Then it seeks to split the Arab world into small states incapable of protecting themselves - Iraq will be divided into three. Egypt will be split into a Coptic state and Muslim state. Saudi Arabia will be split, with the US seeking full control over the oil reserves.</p> <p>Rumsfeld's announcement that troops will have to remain in Afghanistan and that victory is a long way off shows the US is failing. US admits it could face another terrorist attack any time.</p>
UBL [October 2002] “Statement from shaykh Usama bin Ladin, may God protect him, and the Al-Qa’ida Organization”	211		<p>'The US Crusade that the US President has declared and in which he led a coalition of more than 90 countries against Afghanistan began on these days one year ago.' .. Now the US is preparing to invade Iraq, 'to complete its scheme of fragmenting and ripping apart this nation, looting its resources and wealth, and preparing for the establishment of the greater State of Israel after expelling the Palestinians from it.' ..</p> <p>The US has failed in all its objectives in Afghanistan; in securing AQ and Taliban leaders and securing the country. It is now split between warlords, and US committed many war crimes against unarmed and women, children and elderly. And the opium trade is blooming like never before. The US is trying to cover up its failure in Afghanistan by invading Iraq.</p>
UBL [October	212	'Palestine is a place that has been	'You attacked us is Somalia. You have

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2002] “Letter from Usama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the American People”		suffering from military occupation for more than 80 years. The British handed over Palestine, with your help and your support, to the Jews who have occupied it for more than 50 years. The Jews attacked the Palestinians viciously, sparing no method, including killings, crimes, punishments and destruction. The creation, nurturing, and protection of Israel is a great crime and you [America] are the leaders of this crime.'	<p>been silent towards, and at times even encouraged Russian atrocities against us in Chechnya. You have clearly supported Indian butchery against us in Kashmir, and the world has been witness to your relentless assistance to several Jewish attacks, including killing us in Lebanon.' 'Under your [US] supervision and instructions, your agent countries continue to attack us and hunt us on a daily basis' preventing the establishment of Shariah, stealing Muslim wealth, oppressing the people, submitting to Israel etc. ..</p> <p>'Your forces occupy our lands spreading your ideology and thereby polluting the hearts of our people. You have laid siege on our holy places, mocking the sanctity of our mosques. You have done all of this to protect the Jews and safeguard your pillage of our treasures.'. US 'starving' people of Iraq. US helping Israel secure Jerusalem as its capital and destroying the Al-Aqsa mosque.</p> <p>On alleged US double standards: they perceive one set of legal codes for them selves and do not apply these to others - Democracy is not for Algeria, nuclear weapons are allowed for Israel, it does not respect UN resolutions even though it uses force pretending to act in their name, US searches for war criminals whilst protecting its own, US pretends to be vanguard of Human Rights - yet after 9/11 takes active part in such abuses.</p>
UBL [November 2002] “Osama bin Laden hails recent operations..”	76	Australia fighting in Afghanistan, East Timor.	Killing of children in Palestine, Iraq. People killed in mosques of Khost. People killed in a wedding reception in Afghanistan. People being killed in Chechnya.
UBL [November 2002] “Statement from Abdullah Usama bin Ladin to the Peoples of countries Allied to Tyrannical US Government”	214	Rumsfeld's legacy of killing in Vietnam.	Killings of Muslims in mosques in Afghanistan and wedding parties, in Palestine, in Iraq.
UBL [November 2002] “Bin Ladin in a special message to the people of the	215		The 'bitter reality and of the conspiracies and terrible disasters being hatched between the corridors of the crusaders and Jews in Congress and the so-called "Security Council" and with which they

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Peninsula..”			will strike, starting in the Middle East with a strike on Iraq.'
AAZ [December 2002] “Al Wala Wa al Baraa..”	45		<p>'What we see today: a state of absolute submission to the Neo-Crusaders. Palestine is torn asunder and demolished, its children slaughtered every day - yet its Arab neighbours respond with either silence or connivance. Iraq is victim to one campaign after another, in order to slay its Muslim populace, divide the land, and pillage its oil' and the Arab leaders support, 'Afghanistan is victimized by the Crusading forces', again with acquiescence from its neighbours. The Crusader forces aim to go on from Iraq and divide and plunder Saudi Arabia and Egypt and other Muslim lands].</p> <p>The Crusade, emanating from the West has sought to 'erase the lines between Truth and Falsehood, and to mix enemies and allies. 'Thus, we saw the noblest of dynasties placing itself in the service of American interests while claiming to defend monotheism; we saw impious imams imposing secular constitutions' etc.</p>
UBL [February 2003] audio statement	78	<p>Sykes-Picot agreement, which 'lead to the division of the Islamic World'.</p> <p>Americans have been trying to get control over Saudi Arabia, ever since the British lost their influence 60 years ago.</p> <p>Crown Prince Abdullah's Beirut summit, 'in which he sold the blood of our martyrs an the Palestinian cause'.</p>	<p>'This is a time when blood of the Muslims continues to flow in Palestine and Chechnya, in the Philippines, Kashmir, and Sudan and when our children are dying because of the American sanctions on Iraq'. Bush & Blair have drafted a new Sykes-Picot agreement, aiming to 'finish Islam and destroy it' under the banner of fighting terrorism. Attacking Iraq will just be a continuation of attacks against Egypt, Syria, Iran and Sudan [note Iran - Shia]. The real intention is to Conquer the land of the Two Holy Mosques. With this military build-up, America and Britain attempt to seize this 'strategic target of immense significance'.</p> <p>The Crusade also aims to establish 'a huge Jewish super state', where the suffering is going to be multiple of that suffered in Palestine today.</p>
UBL [February 2003] “A Message to our Brothers in Iraq”	79		Crusader preparations to invade Iraq, plunder its wealth, install a loyal agent government, and prepare for the establishment of greater Israel.
UBL [April 2003] “Usama bin LAdin urges Muslims to	217		After Iraq, the US will target Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan

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launch suicide attacks against US”			
UBL [May 2003] report on statement	219		Deaths of Saudi extremist clerics Shaykh Ali al-Khudayr and Shaykh Ahmad al-Khalidi at the hand of Saudi security forces
UBL [July 2003] letter	220		May 2003 Riyadh bombings
AAZ [August 2003] audio statement	55		References to the Guantanamo camp and the decision to start military tribunals which could lead to a death sentence.
AAZ [September 2003] “Message to the Muslims in Pakistan and Afghanistan”	56		"The effective Israeli-Indian co-operation in the security, military, and other fields is no secret to anyone. The visit by criminal Jew [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon - the killer of thousands of Muslims and the one who encroached on the sanctity of the al-Aqsa Mosque - to India, as well as the agreements and deals he concluded with the Indians, are only the tip of the iceberg. This US-Jewish-Indian alliance is against Muslims. This alliance, which is getting stronger, calls on the Pakistanis to recognise Israel so that the United States and Israel will be pleased with them.'
UBL [October 2003] “Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq”	98	'The "Road Map" is just another episode in the series of plots aimed at liquidating the intifada'.	'Bush thought Iraq and its oil would be easy pray, but now he is in a difficult situation'.
UBL [January 2004] “Resist the New Rome”	111	Arab governments are incapable of defending Islam, as seen with the Iraq invasion of 1991. Describes how the Spanish economy grew under Muslim rule, and is now larger than all those of the failed Arab states today	The occupation of the 'house of the Caliphate' in Iraq, the Road Map and Geneva peace initiative, seen as an attack on Jihad in Palestine and an attempt to 'destroy the al-Aqsa mosque'. Condemns American attempts to 'change the beliefs, curricula, and morals of the Muslims to become more tolerant, as they put it'. This is all part of a 'religious-economic' war against Muslims. The war in Iraq is to spread to occupation of the entire Gulf region. 'The West's occupation of our countries is old, yet new. The struggle between us and them, the confrontation, and clashing began centuries ago, and will continue because the ground rules regarding the fight between right and falsehood will remain valid until Judgment Day'. References to the Sharm al-Shaykh summit in 1996, the Arab initiative in the Beirut summit, and the road map. 'It has become clear that the rulers are not qualified to

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			apply the religion and defend the Muslims'.
AAZ [February 2004] audio statement	58		“The latest decision by the French president to create a law preventing Muslim girls from covering their heads in schools is [...] consistent with the burning of villages along with their people in Afghanistan, demolishing houses over their sleeping residents in Palestine, killing the children of Iraq, and [consistent with] the right that the United States granted itself to kill any human being or arrest anyone anywhere.”
UBL [April 2004] Peace offering to Europeans	80	Sabra and Shatilla. Shaikh Ahmed Yassin assassination.	
UBL [May 2004] “People of Iraq”	82	The role of the UN: 'handed Palestine over to the Jews', 'separated Eastern Timor', 'justified the sanctioning of Iraq and killing more than a million Children'.	Events of Iraq that need to be addressed: (1) the 'appalling and alarming event' when Bremer declared Islam would not be the source of all legislation. This shows that the Iraqi governing council is a tool in the hands of Americans. It also shows that the conflict is 'a dogmatic, religious and cultural one', their aim is to 'overcome Islam' in the region. (2) The promise of transferring power to Iraqis is only a trick to numb them. (3) In identifying Iraq as a front for fighting terrorism, Bush has identified Iraq as the focus point of his war against Islam, and Muslims need to respond. America is planning to implement its plan from Iraq of 'removing religion, plundering resources, murdering men, frightening and aggression against women in their homes in the middle of the night' in the entire Islamic world.
UBL [October 2004] Threat of the US	31	How UBL got the idea for 9/11: the American support for Israel attacking the Palestinians said to have been the main reason, especially the 1982 invasion into Lebanon. 'When the US permitted the Israelis to invade' through the presence of the sixth fleet and coastal shelling. 'I still remember those moving scenes – blood, torn limbs, and dead women and children; ruined homes everywhere, and high-rises being demolished on top of their residents; bombs raining down mercilessly on our homes'. 'As I was looking at those destroyed towers in Lebanon, I was struck by the idea of punishing the	

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		<p>oppressor in the same manner and destroying towers in the U.S'.</p> <p>On Iraqi sanctions 'causing the slaughter of children', and the 03 Iraq war. 9/11 is a response to all these things. The Americans received plenty of warnings about this intention through interviews and 'deeds' (attacks). 'it was easy for us to provoke this administration and to drag it [after us]'. </p>	
UBL [October 2004] “Message to Americans”	83	<p>'embargoing to death of millions as Bush Sr did in Iraq in the greatest mass slaughter of children mankind has ever known', 'throwing of millions of pounds of bombs and explosives at millions of children - also in Iraq - as Bush Jr did'. Describes how Bush Sr got to know dictatorship and monarchies and military regimes in the Middle East and took similar governing methods to his son, implemented in the Patriot Act. The 'election fraud' of 2000 or the placement of his other son as governor in Florida.</p>	
UBL [December 2004] “Message concerning Saudi Arabia”	84	<p>About Abd-al-Aziz's [father of the King] collaboration with the English against the Ottoman state.</p> <p>The al-Yamamah deal \$ 30 billion dollar defence contract.</p> <p>The killing of a million Children in Iraq, 'the most horrific massacre of children in history' and yet the scholars were silent and did not protest (although they did later at the killing of a single Crusader soldier). On the Saudi government's support for Arafat, the Sharm-el-Sheikh conference of 1996 supporting the Jews, offering of military bases for Iraq invasion, training of Iraqi police to fight the mujahideen, and the Beirut initiative recognising the Zionists.</p>	<p>On feuds between the rulers of Riyadh and the citizens of the homeland, much talk 'on the need for security and safety and the inadmissibility to shed blood of Muslims and those [foreign] whose security has been guaranteed [by the state]'. 'The sins committed by the regime are very huge. The regime went beyond committing mortal sins to deeds that lead to one becoming non-Muslim. It went beyond oppressing people, undermining their rights, showing disregard for their dignity, making light of their minds and feelings, and tampering with the nation's public funds'. 'The regime supported the infidel America against Muslims'. 'It is known that this is one of the 10 things that lead to one becoming non-Muslim'.</p> <p>The reason for the friction: 'Looking at the internal policies of our countries, we see the level of Crusader-Zionist control over them'. The king's 'reign has not only fallen according to the Sharia by committing acts</p>

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			<p>incompatible with Islam, but his reign has also fallen for his incompetence and losing the necessary mental ability to manage the simplest of matters'. The succession of leaders in the ME depends on the whims of America. Its power and influence is even evident in the educational curriculum's, in Egypt, Yemen and elsewhere in addition to SA in the 1980s, reducing the emphasis on religion. This will create 'educated slaves who are champions of America'. This treachery can also be seen in the leaders' approach to foreign policy, which hasn't changed for generations. The government in Riyadh has been taking part in the conspiracies with America in Afghanistan and Iraq.</p> <p>On regime change: 'True Saddam is a thief and a renegade, yet the solution can never be taking Iraq from the hands of the local thief to hand it over to the international thief'. The Saudi regime knew about the invasion plans and cooperated with the Americans, allowing to happen. Explains how repeated attempts to point these 'grand deviations' to the govt over the past decades have brought no results'.</p> <p>On the lavish life style of the Saudi regime, and the huge amount of money they spend on their palaces.</p>
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	86	References to the Badr Battle and how the conflict in Iraq is as important as Iraq.	<p>No difference between Saddam's massacre in al-Halabjah and 'Bush's massacre in al-Fallujah', this is an 'all-out war against Islam and Muslims'. References Chirac and Kissinger talking about the danger of Iraq becoming a debacle. Bush said "we transferred the war to their territory"? Since when has Iraq been the home of al-Qaeda? It is the land of all Muslims'. On how the US administration seeks to spread Christianity in the region.</p> <p>Mentions US bombing campaigns involving civilian casualties (deliberately he claims) including the wife of Zawahiri, daughter and son. On the killing of innocents by Sharon and Bush.</p>
AAZ [February 2005] "The Freeing of Humanity.."	109	Secular Europe introduced freedom and removed the church from ruling, because it had a church which gave itself infallibility, the right to speak on	Israel is only a stepping-stone for America and the West in their Crusade to take over Muslim lands. The issue of Palestine is therefore not only for the Palestinians but concerns all Muslims and the land of

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		Allah's behalf, invented a trinity, gave kings divine rule, sold people stamps for forgiveness etc.	Muslims. Arrogance and stupidity lead America to invade Afghanistan and Iraq and it is now facing the consequences with heavy losses and only defeat in sight. The Americans are trying to reduce the hostility of Muslims through changing their beliefs and feelings, hoping they will adopt freedom. But this will not allow Muslims to teach what they want to teach, rid the Muslim lands of American presence, remove Israel or have same right to weapons as it has, or price oil as they see fit. 'It means permitting disengaging moral behaviour, the permitting of everything, perverse sexual behaviour and making fun of religion, the prophets and manners'. 'Agreements to them [Americans] are nothing but a means of deceiving the enemy and lure him; there is no relation between it and honesty, loyalty and honour'. The move for Western freedom is a trick to convince Muslims to abandon shari'a and the application of God's law on earth in favour of man-made laws. This, therefore, constitutes an attack on Islam.
AAZ [June 2005] video statement	72	Mubarak torturing and kidnapping, e.g. of ladies at Shubra al-Khayma.	America is seeking to create a new 'American Islam without Jihad or resistance or the order of virtue and prevention of vice'. 'The insurmountable obstacle that prevents any reforms in our countries is simply, the Zionist and crusader control of our Muslim countries with the help of the agent rulers'. Mubarak aiming to put his son in place.
AAZ [August 2005] interview	128		Compares Iraq to Vietnam. Condoleezza Rice's visit to Egypt.
AAZ [November 2005] "Wills of the Knights of the London Raids"	53	'After long centuries of taking the battle to our soil and after his hordes and armed forces occupied our lands in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine, and after centuries of his occupying our land while enjoying security at home'.	
AAZ [December 2005] "The Victory of the Islamic Religion in Iraq"	26	Algerian elections stolen from the FIS which gained 80% of the seats.	Bush is being defeated in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan and Palestine. The use of phosphorus in Fallujah. Secret prisons for interrogating and torturing Muslims. America protested over elections in the Ukraine and Venezuela but turns a blind eye to fraudulent presidential and parliamentary polls in Egypt. America took part in rigging those elections.

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			Noted how nuclear weapons are forbidden for Muslims according to Crusader nations.
AAZ [December 2005] interview	49	British 'historic crime' in establishing Israel.	<p>The Americans are losing in their crusader campaign: Kabul and the north are in chaos, the elections were a masquerade, theatrics, talks of how the ballot boxes were carted around for 15 days and generally how the elections were botched [this emphasis is interesting given the hostility towards democracy]. The UN showed double standards in criticising the Zimbabwe elections, but not the Afghan ones. The double standards of the UN were also reviled as it 'whines' about Darfur, but was silent about the death of a million Iraqi children, partly because the siege benefited the Annan family. The UN has also stayed silent on the issue of Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and Baghram, where al-Qaeda and the Taliban are treated worse than animals. Were it not for the assistance of the Pakistani military, the Americans would already have lost. ...</p> <p>As for Iraq, elections were again ridiculous, boycotted by half the people and with US forces eradicating opposition. But the UN again sent its congratulations.</p>
AAZ [December 2005] "Obstacles to Jihad"	25	<p>When Islambouli and his men attacked Sadat - a politician who most political forces detested - he received no support in the community in Egypt. The same for mujahideen in Arabia rising up against the House of Saud.</p> <p>'The Muslim Ummah was lowly, humiliated, subjugated, plundered, divided and victimized, and then the raids on New York and Washington came to awaken in it hope, and show it its latent powers'.</p>	
UBL [January 2006] Bin Ladin truce offer to Americans	50		<p>'My message to you is about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the way to end it'</p> <p>'Our situation, by Allah's grace, is only getting better and better'. Goes on to explain how soldiers face immense dilemmas since going on patrol will be killed and maimed by mines, or see the same happen to their colleagues, whereas if they refuse to fight they will be punished</p>

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			<p>'by the "butcher of Vietnam"'. Faced by this 'extreme psychological pressure' and receiving no support from home, the soldier has no option but to commit suicide. Refers to the torture of people in Iraq and mentions human rights reports.</p> <p>Success: 'Iraq has become a point of attraction and restorer of [our] energies'.</p>
AAZ [January 2006] Zawahiri presents poem	29	Remembers Abu Hafs al-Masri, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, Isam al-Qamari, Khalid al-Islambouli, and Yahya Hashim.	
AAZ [January 2006] "Bajawr Massacre and the Lies of the Crusaders"	51		The killing of 18 civilians in the FATA
AAZ [March 2006] "The Alternative is Da'wa and Jihad"	73	<p>'Have we forgotten Salman Rushdie and his insults against the Prophet [...]?' who was welcomed everywhere in the West, even the White House.</p> <p>The 'repeated American insults against the Holy Koran'. Torture of Wafa Qustantin and her sisters at monasteries.</p>	<p>The al-Salam ferry incident shows the impact of the corruption of the 'agent government' in Egypt, imposed on the people by America. 'The Crusader grudge against Islam': seen again with the insults against the prophet, ongoing [cartoons], without apology. At the same time no one can doubt the Holocaust and insult homosexuals since they will be punished. In stead of the Prophet and Jesus, the Nazi holocaust and homosexuality have become holy. In France there is a law which bans questioning the holocaust, but still Muslim females are banned from wearing the headscarf in school and fathers are banned from preventing their adultery. In England a law was introduced banning glorification of terrorism, but insulting the Prophet is not prohibited. In Italy a minister even wore a shirt with the 'criminal cartoons printed on it'.</p> <p>The hypocrisy of the West: 'what is lawful to them is prohibited for others' - regarding bombing targets, storming religious places, fighting tyranny (they prop up the regimes of al-Saud, Musharraf, Mubarak, Abdallah Hussein, and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali), respecting human rights (whilst establishing secret prisons), democracy (but opposing it e.g. in Egypt, Palestine) - this can be seen e.g. in Bush's State of the Union address.</p>
AAZ [April 2006] "Four Years since the Battle of Tora"	238	Marking the fourth anniversary of the Tora Bora battle: where America used tons of bombs but	'America has been watching Islamic charity work, harassing it, and limiting its activities'.

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Bora”		<p>dared not enter on foot. 'They resorted to their familiar approach of assembling hypocrites and bandits, in addition to the aerial bombardment'. The Americans claimed 200 enemy kills, but in fact only 30 mujahideen died. 'The American soldiers do not fight for a faith, do not trust their leaders, and do not die for a principle'.</p> <p>The peoples of the West followed Pope Urban II who falsely claimed Muslims were pagans, and opened a Crusade against them. Now, Bush and Blair are using the same methods of deception.</p>	<p>On the people of the West: 'I had not imagined that they feared the word "why" so much [...] why they were attacked in New York and Washington, why they failed in Afghanistan, why they stumbled in Iraq, why their leaders are leading them like sheep to the slaughter house, why the oppressed of the world hate them so much, and why the Muslims bear such an animosity toward them'. Why the security services have failed, policies brought disasters etc. The WMD scandal in Iraq, and the link between the Ba'thist regime and AQ. 'Because the peoples of the West hate, detest, and run away from the word "why", they will end up in utter failure and complete defeat, God willing. By allowing themselves to be fooled by lies and illusions they will destroy themselves, ruin their countries and lead their economies to bankruptcy'. [see further - 20]. The people of the West 'acting like brainless herds'.</p> <p>Mubarak is still in his place after '25 years of crimes and corruption', 'Abdallah Bin-Abd-Al-Aziz is still in place after the death of his brother', 'oil continues to be stolen', 'Israel continues to enjoy military supremacy'. America pretending to be protector of freedoms whilst it exports prisoners to Jordan, Egypt and Saudi 'for torture by proxy'.</p> <p>'I was very surprised by the reactions in the Western press and media to our demand to the West to leave our countries and to stop stealing out wealth and supporting the corrupt rulers in our countries. They went mad and accused us of foxiness, cunning, extremism, and demanding the impossible. So what is required from us so that they would be pleased? To bless their occupation of the countries of Islam, applaud their stealing of oil and the Muslim's wealth, demand more crimes by the tyrannical agents?'</p> <p>On the farce of the 'American elections' in Afghanistan, Iraq and Egypt, with the implication given that these were false and did not represent public opinion.</p> <p>UN: the oil-for-food scandal.</p>

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UBL [April 2006] “Oh People of Islam”	90	<p>References to the feeling of superiority of the West going back to the colonial era. The UN was created to institutionalise this legacy of slavery and superiority of the West.</p> <p>On the Sykes-Picot borders, splitting Sudan from Egypt by the British and then strengthening of the South by Americans. ... Bosnians banned from defending themselves against Serbian Army, Indonesia forced to give East Timor away, Kashmirites prevented from fighting for sovereignty. Use of depleted uranium in Iraq and sanctions killing millions.</p>	<p>Cartoon publication and the need to 'punish those responsible for the heinous crime'. Those who offend Allah and the messenger is death. 'The fact is, the matter is too great and serious for it to be ended by mere regret or apology [...] Rather, the criminals must be punished along with all who sheltered them or stood by them'. This also has to be 'placed in the greater context of the aggression being perpetrated against our Ummah throughout the past years and decades'. Attacks Denmark's failure to apologise or punish the perpetrators and the solidarity expressed by America and Europe. 'These events, along with what preceded them, have confirmed that the West is incapable of acknowledging others and their rights'.</p> <p>Palestine shows the 'oppression, assault and hatred' of the Zionist-Crusaders. Their rejection of HAMAS confirms this hostility.</p> <p>America blamed for the Darfur war: 'it has exploited some differences between the tribes [in Western Sudan] and turned that into an all-out war between them which is devouring everything, to pave the way for the sending of Crusader troops to occupy the region and steal its oil' [America blamed for everything].</p> <p>Chechnya is a 'Zionist/Crusader' war as well, as is the violence and suffering in Somalia. As are continued atrocities in Iraq. 'Continuation of the cunning, malevolent media and cultural invasion' - domestic ones set up by the Crusaders and external like Voice of America and the BBC - which constitutes 'ideological invasion' and spreads 'obscenity and depravity'. On France's veil ban, oppression of Muslim immigrants and setting up of a TV station in the Maghreb. On the British and American cheering of Salman Rushdie, and subsequent defamations of the Prophet - supported by the people of the West. All this is part of the Zionist/Crusader war. Demand that the individuals responsible for the cartoons be extradited to face punishment according to the shariah. After 9/11 the Security Council called for the extradition of UBL and Bush called for his head but no</p>

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			evidence was provided and this was before they stated they had carried out the attacks. These were carried out in self-defence and to aid the brothers in Palestine, Lebanon and elsewhere - but Europeans had no business interfering in Afghanistan through Nato. This didn't concern them.
AAZ [April 2006] “Letter to the People of Pakistan”	81		<p>Third anniversary of Iraq invasion. America, Britain and their allies have achieved nothing but losses.</p> <p>America seeks to weaken Pakistan and 'fragment it into two entities under the control of India, which is allied with the Americans and Jews'. 'In this context, India appears to be the best candidate to implement the Zionist/Crusader plan to humiliate Pakistan and weaken it and tear it apart'.</p> <p>The many woes which Musharraf and his friends have brought upon the people of Pakistan: (1) 'combating of Islam', by backing the Crusaders, making war on Muslim schools, and removing jihad and sharia from Islam, (2) 'threat to Pakistani national security', through giving India an inroad through Kabul, losing strategic depth and gaining a regime hostile to the army. The army is not focusing on the external Indian threat but is focused on fermenting civil war and killing Muslims at home, and facilitating the killing of Muslims in Afghanistan. (3) 'Squandering on the issue of Kashmir', in conceding without India doing the same, (4) 'Musharraf's recognitions of Israel, to psychologically prepare the Pakistanis to recognize a Hindu state in Kashmir', (5) 'gave free range to American intelligence and investigative agencies (6) 'corruption of political life in Pakistan'. Musharraf bribes.</p>
UBL [May 2006] “A Testimony to the Truth”	91		Provides 'testimony' on behalf of the Muslim brothers in American prisoners, for Zacarias Moussaoui and the Guantanamo inmates incarcerated from 2001 and first half of 2002, they have no connection to 9/11 and many none to AQ, even oppose its war with America. This shows the 'oppression, injustice and arbitrariness of your administration in using force' and is done partly in order to justify to the American ppl the millions of

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			dollars spent by the DoD and others in this war.
AAZ [June 2006] “Support for Palestinians”	85	Consolidation of Zionist power in Palestine: 'from the ceasefire agreement of 1949 through the Oslo Accord, the conference for the protection of Israel at Sharm el-Sheikh, and the Arab surrender initiative introduced by [the Saudi king]'. Despite the vast spending of the Arab regimes and squandering of wealth they have not given any support to the Palestinians. On the vast personal wealth of the Saudi king, how its was accumulated through looting and how	Zionist/Crusader support for the regime in Egypt, which has falsified elections and attacked the impartiality of the judiciary. The 'Crusader Security Council's is sending military experts to Darfur to pave the way for its occupation and separation, the treacherous Sudanese government is collaborating in order to stay in power.
AAZ [June 2006] “American Crimes in Kabul”	87		On killing of innocents in Afghanistan and torture in prisons. On insulting the Koran in Bagram prison and Kandahar, and the Danish, French, and Italian mocking of the prophet [cartoon publication]. Clinton's and Thatcher's honouring of Salman Rushdie, 'to award him of offending the prophet'.
AAZ [June 2006] “The Zionist Crusader’s Aggression in Gaza and Lebanon”	88		The war in Lebanon and Gaza. This war is about 'jihad for the sake of God until the religion of God is established'. The weapons used in Lebanon come from and are financed by all countries of the Crusader alliance.
UBL [June 2006] “Elegizing the Ummah’s Martyr..”	92		'The enemy attacked Iraq, oppressed its people, and destroyed its villages'. The invasion of Iraq and the Guantanamo prison are clear evidence of the tyranny of Bush who sought to invade Iraq to plunder its oil.
UBL [July 2006] “To the Ummah in General and the Mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia in Particular”	93	The assassination bombing of Abu-Alial-Harithi in Yemen.	
AAZ + Gadhan [September 2006] “An Invitation to Islam”	33	G: Crusader civilization brought about holocaust, slavery, Crusade, inquisition, firebombed Tokyo and Fallujah, bombed Dresden, brought about rendition, Abu Ghraib, establishment of Israel, where anti-Semitism is a sin, etc... Jesus and his disciples were Israelites.	Gadahn: Guantanamo, desecration of Prophet.

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AAZ [September 2006] “Hot issues..”	21	Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq show the perils the Crusaders face when facing jihad.	
AAZ [September 2006] “Bush, the Vatican’s Pope, Darfur and the Crusades”	89	On the capture of Ramzi Yousef, Umar Abd al-Rahman, Wali Khan, Ibn al-Shaykh, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid al-Skaykh, Abu al-Faraj al-Libi and other Mujahideen, torture in Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan.	<p>On secret US prisons and the capture of Khalid al-Ahaykh Muhammed. Bush intentionally deceived his nation when he claimed there were WMD in Iraq and a link between Saddam an al-Qaida. Bush lies about the victory gained through capturing KSM, since America is trying to pull out of Iraq, and redeploying from Afghanistan, to be replaced by desperate Nato troops.</p> <p>Pope Benedict's insult of the prophet and claim that Islam is unreasonable. This act forms part of a series of insults of the prophet and Islam, along with Salman Rushdie's writings, the 'honoured guest of the White House', the French ban on the veil, 'US desecration of the Holy Koran', US pressure to hold Wafa'i Qustantin and sisters in 'vaults of torture in the monasteries that are protected by the US-Crusader influence', and the cartoons insulting the prophet. The Pope's speech is reminiscent of the one given by Pope Urban II declaring the Crusades.</p> <p>'Darfur 'about to become a new field for the Crusader wars'.</p>
AAZ [December 2006] “Realities of Conflict Between Islam and Unbelievers”	94	<p>British crimes: used to occupy most Islamic lands, mobilized Abd al-Aziz al Sa'ud and Husayn ibn Ali against the Ottoman empire to stab it in the back. Gave one of the holiest places in Islam to the Jews. The statement marks the 89th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration.</p> <p>Five years since the Crusaders marched into Kabul, aided by the religion-sellers..Tora Bora and Shah-i-Kot showed the weakness of America. References to how the election in Afghanistan was deeply flawed. Massacres came to light, e.g. In Dasht-i-Laili.</p>	<p>On Palestine, the UN's approach, all the protocols and resolutions and how these criminalize Jihad and recognise Jewish control over Palestine. PLOs 'disgrace and surrender'.</p> <p>Congratulates Mujahideen in Iraq on the establishment of the Islamic state of Iraq and Mujahideen in Iraq urged to join this caravan.</p>
AAZ [December 2006] “Congratulations on the Eid to the Ummah of	95		Iraq, Afghanistan, and battles elsewhere. The treacherous Palestinian secularists. The ban on the Hijab and the need for women to confront it.

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Tawhed”			
AAZ [January 2007] “Rise and Support our Brothers in Somalia”	96		Ethiopian invasion into Somalia, backed by the US. 'The strongest world power' has been defeated in Afghanistan and Iraq [success] in 'the face of mujahid groups that long for paradise'.
AAZ [January 2007] “The Correct Equation”	28	When fighting the Mongols and the Crusaders initially the Ummah united, but when the colonial crusaders attacked again and drew up the Sykes-Picot borders, the Ummah fell apart and started fighting internally.	The 'surge' - sending 20 thousand extra troops to Iraq. Guantanamo. Resolution 1701, curbing Muslims attempts at liberating Palestine.
AAZ [February 2007] “Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427”	97	'Since when are those who helped America blockade Iraq and kill a million of its children protectors of the people of the Sunnah?'. On how the Muslims have followed Turkish, Kurdish and Berber leaders historically, since they rule correctly.	<p>On events during the year 1427 (2006-2007): Bush has admitted failure in Iraq and conceded the resistance is getting stronger in Afghanistan. Bush claims to be spreading democracy but this spreading brings torture, corruption, rigging of elections, moral degeneration, theft of resources, and combating of Islam.</p> <p>'The American project in Lebanon is the same as the American project in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Gulf States, Algeria, and Somalia. There is no difference'. ... 'We must reject all of those resolutions which cut off parts of the lands of Islam [...] starting with the resolution to partition Palestine' and all subsequent updates and resolutions on Afgh, Iraq, Darfur and Somalia. And 1701 in Lebanon.</p> <p>From where did the planes set of that bombed Iraq and Afghanistan? Who was it who recognised Israel and approved its usurpation of Palestine? Who provided Americans with secret prisons?</p> <p>On the planned troop surge in Iraq, and the need to counter it.</p> <p>Ethiopoian forces on brink of flight from Somalia.</p>
AAZ [March 2007] “Palestine is the concern of all Muslims”	18	Crusader crimes in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Algeria, Chechnya, and East Turkistan.	<p>Tony Blair trying to convince his 'heedless' subjects that sending 1400 extra troops to Afghanistan will make a difference.</p> <p>Tyranny of the world represented in the fact that America can bring Darfur before international courts even if it doesn't recognise them. Also, nobody is trying the murderers in Bosnia, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Chechnya, Kashmir,</p>

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			Indonesia, the Philippines, and East Turkistan. Makes clear he is not calling for negotiations in Iraq, the media has been manipulating his words when he said that America was trying to negotiate with people in Iraq with no religious authority. UBL offered the Americans a truce, but they refused and now they must suffer the consequences. America is losing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and soon the mujahideen will be marching on Palestine. References to Egyptian authorities cracking down on a sports exhibition at Al-Azar University Cairo.
AAZ [May 2007] “The Empire of Evil is about to End”	23		AQ is not stirring up ethnic hatred in Iraq, all its efforts go to attacking the American enemy, those stirring up hatred are those who want America to stay [this goes against Zarqawi and his strategy of targeting the Shia]. The key out of such conflicts is to stop supporting the occupiers. Hypocrisy of America which calls for Democracy but embraces Mubarak and sends people to be tortured in Egypt.
AAZ [June 2007] “Forty Years since the Fall of Jerusalem”	101	The fall of Jerusalem to the Jews forty years ago. This due to weakness of own side, not strength of enemy - due to applauding of charlatans and tyrants who lead to defeat. The betrayal of the secular regimes [in Egypt] lead to the 1948 catastrophe, 1956 defeat, 1967 setback, losing the initial victory in 1973 and beginning of capitulation: colluding in blockading and occupying Iraq, with Israel in hitting Lebanon, intimidating Palestine to adopt Crusader-Zionist legal norms. ... The failed elections in Palestine and the Gaza and Ramallah incidents, failures in Egypt and Algeria show that there can be no freedom until the rule of the Crusaders has been ended and Sharia implemented.	The Mecca accords sold four-fifths of Palestine and allowed the secular sellers to stab the mujahideen in the back. The Palestinian issue is not a national liberation matter - but is part of the struggle between Islam and the West. (see quoting of Azzam in section 24). America being defeated in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia.
AAZ [July 2007] “The Advice of one Concerned”	102	Arab nationalists: 'When your role model, Abdel Nasser, took over Egypt, its borders stretched from the Mediterranean coast to the borders of Uganda, but by the time he died, Sudan had seceded,	Mecca accords - bringing together HAMAS and fatah and sacrificing 'four-fifths of Palestine'. Saudi Arabia is the richest in the region, spends more than anyone on armed forces,

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		the Sinai had been occupied and he had conceded Palestine by approving Resolution 242', 'your pivotal cause was sold out by your nationalist brothers in Oslo and what came after'	but yet they are weak, because: (1) in stead of protecting the holy places they act as police for the White House and to secure oil extraction, (2) the money is not used to build a strong army. Indeed there is no conscription. In stead it is used to build military instillations for Americans. (3) A lot of the defence budget goes to the ruling family in corruption and bribes, e.g. Through the al-Yamama deal. The government is unable to tackle the unemployment, unable to provide doctors and other important educated workforce, and skilled workers and nurses, increase production or improve the economy. Its influence on Iraq should therefore be avoided. On American and allied torture of Muslim prisoners and their parading.
AAZ [July 2007] "Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves"	103	British conquest in Asia and Africa. Handing Palestine to the Jews. Partition agreements on Palestine, starting 1947 and ending with the Mecca accords need to be renounced, as other agreements legitimising occupation of Muslim lands, such as USCR 1701.	Salman Rushdie getting a knighthood. This is a clear message to Muslims from Blair and the Queen: "if you think you will defeat us and banish us from Iraq and Afghanistan, then we curse your prophet and his family and consider whoever does so as one of our heroes".
AAZ [July 2007] "The Aggression against Lal Masjid"	104		Siege and raiding of Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad
UBL [September 2007] "The Solution.."	10	Despite the huge military and economic power of America it was infiltrated by 19 fighters, who managed to influence the policies of the US so much ('change the direction of its compass'). 'The subject of the mujahideen has become an inseparable part of the speech of your leader'. Policies changed, reputation tumbled and 'it was bled dry economically'. Holocaust. The Holocaust was carried out 'by your brethren' in Europe. Burning of live beings forbidden in Islam. Had the holocaust taken place closer to Muslim countries Jews would have received shelter there. Massacre of red Indians in America, Hiroshima & Nagasaki. Civilian deaths during Vietnam	Bush supporting opposing groups behind the scenes in Iraq in order to ferment civil war. Democratic victory in Congressional elections changed nothing, to the disappointment of Americans. This is because those with capital are those with the real power, backing their candidates in Congress and White House. Global warming and failure to sign the Kyoto protocol. Globalisation, capitalism – causing famine, global warming.

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		war. Kennedy tried to stop the war but against the will of the corporations, which benefited from his death. 'Murderous' legacy of Bush cabinet members	
UBL [September 2007] "Come to Jihad.."	14		Lal Masjid siege (Red Mosque) The most important connotations - (1) Shows Musharraf is submissive to America. According to the Koran (5:51) and the Mufti Sizamuddin Shamzai's fatwa following 9/11 amounts to betrayal. (2) Showing Maulana Abd al-Aziz Ghazi (chief cleric in Red Mosque) in women's clothes in media. (3) this shows who of the Ulema are friends of the Most Merciful, and who of Satan (those who criticise mujahideen operations, support or praise ISI, army, Musharraf). The 'ulema of vice' marching in line with the apostate rulers is not particular to Pakistan but a disaster affecting the entire Muslim Ummah.
UBL [November 2007] "Message to the People of Europe"	9		9/11 a response to US-Israeli coalition murders in Palestine and Lebanon. Afghanistan and the Taliban were not behind 9/11, bin Laden was responsible for the attacks. Grievances: (1) attack on Afghanistan unjustified, (2) attack on AQ bases, not respecting 'ethics and protocols' of war, particularly targeting women who don't fight.
AAZ [December 2007] "Annapolis – the Betrayal"	12	Treaties that 'sold out' Palestine, e.g. Madrid, Oslo, Sharm el Sheikh, Camp David, Wey River, and now Annapolis.	Annapolis meeting' last deal in a line of treacherous deals to sell Palestine'
AAZ [December 2007] "A Review of Events"	13	The Balfour Declaration and all events since giving away Palestine, with four-fifths being given away by the 'politicians of bargaining'	Iraq is, overall, going well for the mujahideen; their ranks are growing stronger, the conditions of the Americans are deteriorating and the British are 'fleeing'. The Petraeus report to Congress was trying to cover up the struggles America is facing and the fact that the 'treacherous' Iraqi army forces were failing and would crumble as soon as America left. America not coping with costs, public dissatisfaction. Iraqi Army abandoned and unprepared, treasonous tribal militias loosing their leaders. The claim that the Americans are depriving the mujahideen of grounds shows that they are either lying or have learned nothing from the attack-and-retreat-war in Iraq or Vietnam. On the Islamic Army in Iraq: says there is no proof of their killing of innocents or stirring up ethnic hatred. The ISI abides by

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			the Shariah, does not have shedding innocent blood in its methodology, has been facing a protracted propaganda campaign from the Americans. Non of its actions are worse than those groups cooperating with America. The ISI also declared readiness to 'redress every grievance'.
UBL [December 2007] "The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies"	27		'The crimes of Muqtada al-Sadr's army, the Badr Corps under Abdelaziz al-Hakeem and members of the Dawa party both outside and inside the Maliki govt and their attempts to spread these crimes outside Iraq.
AAZ [early 2008] "Exoneration.."	20	No difference to US bombing of chemical factory in Sudan to 9/11. The same for sanctions against Libya, Iraq and attacks on Afghanistan. "We did not put you through investigative trials as your brothers did to our brothers, and we did not massacre you as your brothers did to our brothers in Srebrenica, Sabra and Shatilla." Sykes-Picot. On the strength of the Jihad: "The nation that subdued the Crusaders alliance in Iraq and Afghanistan, Algeria and Somalia is not a weak nation. The nation, that stood up to the savage Russia, four and a half centuries ago in the Caucasus, is not a powerless nation. The nation that expelled the Jews from Gaza is not a paralysed nation.; the nation that gave birth to Imam Shamil, Umar al-Mukhtar, Hassan al-Banna, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, Sayyid Qutb and Khalid al-Islambuli, Issam al-Qamari, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Ubaydah al-Banchari, the leader Abu Hafs , Muhammad Atta, Khattab, Shamil Basayev, Aslan Maskhadov, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Ahmad Yassin, Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, Abu-al-Walid al-Ghamdi, Abu Umar al-Sayf, Abdallah al-Rasud, Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and Mullah Dadollah isn't a barren nation; and the nation whose emigrant and mujahidin sons stood their ground against the fiercest Crusade in the history of	Publication of 'Rationalizing' serves the interests of the Zionist-Crusader-Arab ruler alliance and is designed to sedate the mujahideen and convince them that they cannot bring about change in Egypt. Publication of document a 'desperate attempt' during overwhelming jihadist awakening, aims to stop Muslim resistance. Comes at a time when the US is showing double standards in its approach to elections (HAMAS, Morocco, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt). Reference to Al-Azhar protest, Cairo. American atrocities in Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya and elsewhere. Jews' seizure of Palestine, India's control over Kashmir, Russia's control over Chechnya, and Spain's control over Ceuta and Melilla - all of these are recognized by corrupt Arab regimes. Wadi-al-Arbah, Oslo, Annapolis treaties with Israel. 1947 resolution on partition and Resolution 242.

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		Islam, isn't a submissive nation.	
AAZ [March 2008] Letter to Abu Umar al-Baghdadi	44		'It's not hidden from you what the Danes have committed in renewing their assailment on the person of the prophet, peace be upon him, even when they don't dare to mention the Jews in a negative manner'. This is a part of 'the raging crusader war against Islam and its people'.
UBL [March 2008] "May our Mothers be Bereaved of us if we fail to help our Prophet, peace be upon him"	11		The al-Yamamah deal (i.e. BAE Systems) with Saudi Arabia. Indirect references to US reluctance to ICC and incarceration of people questioning holocaust in Europe. Cartoon drawings. Bombing of Muslims women and children. However this atrocity pales in the comparison with the drawings
UBL [March 2008] "A Way for the Salvation of Palestine"	6		Siege of Gaza, Palestine. 'Siege of hundreds of thousands of orphaned children and widowed women'. Arab support for Annapolis accords. Religious scholars endorsing these leaders
AAZ [March 2008] "A Call to Help our People in Gaza"	17		Gaza siege - Egyptians are preventing help from reaching Gazans and giving Israel free range to attack Gaza, exactly as the Lebanese Christian forces did during the 1982 invasion, allowing for the Sabra and Shattila massacres. References to the West 'ridiculing' the Prophet.
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting part one.."	105		<p>'The dispute between America and Iran is a real dispute based on the struggle over areas of influence, and the possibility of America striking Iran is a real possibility' ... 'the situation will be in the interests of the Mujahideen if the war saps both of them', fierce battles will break out between the Mujahideen and whichever state is victorious, if any. . The sufferings of Fatah al-Islam in Nahar al-Barid in Lebanon. These events were not addressed specifically when they were occurring, since Fata al-Islam had denied a link to AQ, and Zawahiri felt that an open endorsement would not be helpful at that stage.</p> <p>Mubarak: Israel, Gaza blockade, military courts, State Security, US bases, 'vulgar media', 'immoral Culture Ministry', secular laws, corruption.</p>
AAZ [April 2008] "Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri – On the Fifth Anniversary of the	7	Munroe doctrine, Sykes-Picot, Opium wars, Hiroshima, Nagasaki	Iraq invasion, 'financial plundering' in Egypt and elsewhere. On Petraeus testimony to Congress, US losing war. Also Afghanistan.' Iranian-American conspiracy' – Democrats wanting to strike

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Invasion and Torture of Iraq”			deal with Iran. Iran wanting to annex south and west Iraq. Will cause Sunni revival. Era of jihad battles, safeguarding and autonomy taking over era of colonizing, plundering and oppressing Muslims. Zionist-American plot to starve the people of Egypt and Gaza. Economic hardship in Egypt, also Yemen, Arabian peninsula and elsewhere due to US embezzlement
AAZ [April 2008] “The Open Meeting.. Part 2..”	107		<p>'The situation in Iraq demonstrates signs of a victory for Islam'.</p> <p>Recognising the UN means recognising the occupation of its member states of Muslim lands, including 'Russia's sovereignty over the Muslim Caucasus, the sovereignty of the Philippines on its Muslim south, the sovereignty of India over Kashmir until the referendum takes place, which the international powers will not allow, the sovereignty of China on eastern Turkistan, and the sovereignty of Spain over Ceuta and Melilla, and indeed on the entire Andalusia, and so on'</p> <p>Talks of the 'massive jihadist awakening' in Afghanistan and Pakistan.</p> <p>Asked about global warming, he says that the West and US has failed in dealing with it and believes these failures will convince the world of the barbarism of the West and increase support for the Muslim jihad against America.</p> <p>The crusader forces attacking women and children to force fighters to withdraw or surrender in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestine.</p>
UBL [May 2008] “Reasons of the Struggle on the Occasion of the 60 th Anniversary of the founding of the Occupying State of Israel”	8	Palestine. This is basic issue for ummah, motivation for UBL since childhood and source of clash with Western civilization. Since then, Lebanon and other actors of oppression lead to 9/11. Creation of state of Israel. Israel is terrorist – kills women and children, e.g. Deir Yassin and subsequent massacres. Recognition of Begin and peace prize.	
UBL [May 2008] “A Message to the Muslim Nation”	24	Palestine falling into the hands of Christians and then the Jews.. Salah-al-Din abided by the teachings of Islam, confided with	60 year anniversary of Israel. The Jewish state has survived, not because it is powerful - but because the Arab leaders have relinquished jihad. The Jewish state

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		pious ulema, fought the supporters of the Crusader forces, allowed free jihad.	cannot 'bear one hundredth' of the force unleashed on the USSR and America in Iraq.
AAZ [June 2008] "On the Anniversary of the Naksa.."	15	The 1967 war and loss of territory. The setbacks in Palestine have been due to treasonous and corrupt leaderships of Arab countries, particularly Egypt. The secular Arab regimes have no principles, values or beliefs and cannot protect its population. This system has continued to capitalize on the Palestinian situation. The borders of Sykes-Picot and the insistence of the corrupt Arab regimes to maintain them.	The siege of Gaza, primarily due to the 'fence of treason' built by Hosni Mubarak and protected by his soldiers, this allows the Zionist and crusaders to persist in their oppression. The security fence prevents aid from reaching Gazans, but allows Israeli tourists to enjoy Gaza without visas.
AAZ [August 2008] "A Message from Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri to the Pakistani Army and the People of Pakistan"	41	Ataturk's secularisation and its influence on Perves Musharraf. ... Draws allegories with resistance against the British Indian Army. The current crusade of Bush mirrors exactly that of British rulers against Muslims before. The Malta detention centre where Sheikh-ul-Hind and Sayyed Hussain Ahmad Madni were jailed is comparable to Guantanamo. 'Isn't it clear that we are fighting a new battle in an old war? It is the same struggle against the same enemies. The facts are the same, only the names and faces have changed.' - "The king's viceroy in Delhi has become the American ambassador in Islamabad, the British Indian Army has become the American Pakistani Army, the prime minister in London has become the president in Washington, and Sayyed Ahmad Shaheed and Shah Ismail Shaheed and their mujahideen are today the mujahideen fighting to expel the neo-crusaders from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the entire sub-continent. But the difference is that the jihadi awakening of today is by the grace of Allah much stronger, wider spread, and not limited to the sub-continent and the American crusader empire is facing by the grace of Almighty Allah humiliating defeats in	Red mosque 'massacre'. The toppling of the emirate in Kabul with the assistance of Musharraf. The assaults on the Red Mosque and in the tribal areas exposed the anti-Islamic face of the Pakistani military leadership. Had this been an attack on a church or if a single Briton or American had been killed then worldwide protests would have broken out and Pakistan condemned, but the Red Mosque was just seen as a legitimate security operation. Pervez has ignited civil war in Pakistan, through its fruitless campaign in the tribal areas. This has also made Pakistan strategically vulnerable against India. Musharraf has allowed in the CIA and FBI to snatch anyone they want, Pakistani security agencies have become their 'hunting dogs'.

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		Afghanistan and Iraq'.	
AAZ [November 2008] "The Exit of Bush and Arrival of Obama"	100		<p>On the election of Barack Obama and the American peoples' acknowledge of defeat in Iraq. By electing Obama, the American people declared their anxiety and apprehension about the future and Iraq. Obama does not know the history of Afghanistan, the success of the mujahideen and the failures of the Soviets and British, 'the dogs of Afghanistan have found the flesh of your soldiers to be delicious, so send thousands after thousands to them'. He himself has admitted defeat in Iraq and his military commanders have admitted defeat in Afghanistan.</p> <p>Obama's commitment to Israeli security and statements to this effect 'confirmed to the Ummah that you have chosen a stance of hostility to Islam and Muslims'. Also on pledges to attack into Afghanistan and send more troops to Afghanistan. Obama not a honourable black American like Malcolm X. 'And in you and in Colin Powell, Rice and your likes, the words of Malcolm X (may Allah have mercy on him) concerning "House Negroes" are confirmed.'</p>
AAZ [November 2008] "Al-Azhar: The Lions Den"	237	Traces betrayals of House of Saud of Muslim interests and how it sabotaged the Palestinian uprising of 1936, harmed the Mujahideen efforts in Afghanistan, sought to recognise Israel and force HAMAS to do the same through the Mekkah accords.	<p>The 'awakening' councils in Iraq and how they will be abandoned by Americans. Karzai and his appeal to Saudis to help broker a deal with the Taliban. .</p> <p>Egyptian embargo of Gaza. . 'Al-Azhar has turned into a government agency' with the government selecting friendly shaykhs such as Shaykh Tantawi. The case of Wafa Constanine. . Reference to the 9 September speech by Bush on alleged improved situation in Iraq and Petraeus's warnings that things may still go wrong. America has been defeated in Iraq, is leaving and the Islamic state is staying. The Awakening councils will be abandoned as all other agents by America. They will not be assimilated by the Shiite government into the security services, 'because it can't possibly accept a non-Shi'ite force in Iraq'. Iran will not come to their aid since they would not be a strong enough force against the mujahideen, and also are preoccupied with their own security concerns. Furthermore, 'Iran, which abandoned Najaf and Karbala and allowed American rockets</p>

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			<p>to penetrate the walls of the resting place of Imam Ali (may Allah bless him) while it warns of woe and destruction for anyone who touches a speck of Iran's soil, is prepared to sacrifice any ally to protect its own interests and benefits'. [no desire expressed or indicated in terms of getting closer to Iran, but perhaps the attitude to Shia outside government is different, certainly in terms of targeting]. . The economic recession in America: traces this to the 9/11 attack and the subsequent downturn and reduction in consumer confidence, causing 'economic haemorrhages' which will not cease until the Americans withdraw from Muslim lands. After 9/11, the government pumped billions of tax dollars into the economy in order to revitalise it, giving the banks the impression they had ample liquidity and thus providing cheap loans, especially mortgages. This caused house prices to increase, and the banks envisaged making a profit from selling repossessed houses from byers who couldn't pay back the loan, house prices tumbled leaving mortgages lenders out of pocket and banks without liquidity. The government has then tried to pump even more money to save the capitalists and there interest-based economy. Thus, there are three major causes; usury [interest] and fraud (both problems of the capitalist system), and the 'aggressive Crusader nature' against Muslims which resulted in 9/11 and the costly, failing Crusade. What would help the West is to stop this costly, futile war.</p> <p>Complains that Hezbollah is receiving more media attention for less impressive attacks than the mujahideen carried out, such as the strikes on Kandahar prison.. On the mujahideen uprising in Yemen. . On the ICC arrest warrant for the Sudanese president. He has been abandoned by the Crusaders that he sought to help previously by evicting the Mujahideen. He never received recognition of this and is now experiencing the same fright and turmoil he inflicted on the Mujahideen. But this is part of a bigger plot against Sudan, which 'is being targeted in its Islam and Arabness'. Does not deny the human suffering in Darfur [although he has done in the past] but points to inconsistencies</p>

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			with the West when it cares not about humanitarian crisis it inflicts on people in Muslim countries. Darfur is 'land of the Quran', and the problems should be resolved by intelligent people and imams coming together and applying the Sharia in resolution of disputes, away from the influences of Khartum, the UN or 'powers of the cross'. And the people of Sudan need to prepare for jihad against the Crusader forces.
AAZ [January 2009] "The Massacre of Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors"	121	Draws comparisons between current developments in Gaza to the Sabra and Shattila massacres in Lebanon and the way in which 'Jews' cooperated with the Kataeb forces there and Hosni Mubarak now.	Israeli airstrikes and fighting in Gaza killing and injuring hundreds of civilians, the entire world doing nothing to stop it.
UBL [January 2009] "Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault"	122	<p>Goes through how the rulers of Muslim countries during the time of the 1948 war, were in fact pawns of British generals in the region, including Jordan [gen. Glub Basha [Maj. Gen. John Bagot Glubb]] and the Arabian Peninsula ['non-enthroned king General Philip' Sir Philip Chetwode??].</p> <p>The French Revolution mentioned as a thing the Ummah should copy in order to remove the kings. Voting is not a solution here, only removing the Kings through force like the French did and the Americans against the British.</p>	<p>This deceptive system in place when the British were in control continues today in the form of US control, as 'in each capital today there is [a] "Bremer" [...] overtly or secretly', there is an "Allawi" to take orders, and a "Sistani" [the Shi'a cleric] and Tantawi [head of Al-Azhar] supported by writers, journalists and other groups to give legitimacy to this deception. Another system of deception is the transferal of the issue of Palestine to the UN and Security Council, which Arab rulers do in order to free themselves of responsibility. . The US war against the mujahideen left it 'drowning in the economic crisis'. The Zionist entity will lose out on support due to this 'terrible and fast recession of the American power'. This was a crucial reason for Israel's invasion of Gaza, since the last drop of support had to be squeezed from the Bush administration. Quotes Biden in saying the situation is worse than expected and that the whole economy is 'exposed to collapse'. Also quotes Spanish Minister of Finance, Alan Greenspan, Sarkozy, and German Finance Minister on the economic collapse and recession. Quotes US intelligence report on diminished power and influence of US.</p>
AAZ [February 2009] "The Sacrifices of Gaza"	131		<p>Israeli Gaza conflict, death of 1300 'martyrs'.</p> <p>'What is taking place in Gaza is only part of the Zionist-Christian Crusade targeting this Muslim Ummah in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia,</p>

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			Algeria, and Darfur.
AAZ [February 2009] “From Kabul to Mogadishu”	132	On Kenyan, Ugandan and Burundian invasions of Somalia and how the current state of affairs is no different in revolving around the need to ensure Somalia stays an Islamic country. These area all 'infidel invading forces' .. America killed 'tens of thousands' in Somalia in order to 'eliminate Islam in it' and turn it into a 'colony'. The PLO 'drowned in the swamp of Oslo'.	Recent events in Somalia, mainly the success of the mujahideen in expelling foreign and hostile forces from cities like Baidoa and others America 'pulverized' villages in Afghanistan and Iraq, and provided weapons to Israel to do the same in Palestine. America also sieged Iraq and killed a 'million children'. References to interrogation in Guantanamo (Shihri).
UBL [March 2009] “Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine”	133	90 years of occupation in Palestine.	Gaza crisis, and especially the use of white phosphorus. . 'Jews and Christians carry out the murder of our brothers in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Waziristan, Somalia, Kashmir, the Philippines and Chechnya'.
UBL [March 2009] “Fight on, Oh Champions of Somalia”	134		The Muslim world has been surrounded and penetrated by nonbeliever armies and their proxies, this includes 'From the direction of the west, there is another Crusader march, this one against the Sudan and advancing from Darfur'
AAZ [April 2009] “Six years since the invasion of Iraq..”	136	Egypt - Israeli peace accords which resulted in a more assertive Israel in the region. Iraq war. .. Cowardice of the Egyptian leadership saw it losing the initial momentum it had in the 1973 war with Israel.	Claims that the economic crisis in America and the West was due to the wars and quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan. Refers to reports showing the economic cost of the war.. Talks about the 'human rights of the Westerner to enslave all other humans' and how these efforts were key in the Iraq invasion. The West is invading and causing suffering in the Muslim world in order to impose its version of democracy and freedom.' True democracy is only for the West or in its service'. HAMAS and the Algerian FIS received only bombs when they ran for election (even though this also was in breach of the Shariah). Talks of the 'criminal traitors' in Egypt who preside over talks between Israel and Palestinian representatives, prevent the sending of arms through tunnels to Gaza and embargo the strip.
AAZ [June 2009] “The Executioner,	137		Arrival of Obama for official visit in Egypt.

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Egypt and the American Puppets Welcome Obama”			<p>Obama's message to the Muslim world has already arrived; through his praying at the Wailing wall, in his support for Israel and Jerusalem at AIPAC, condoning of Gaza bombings, promising of more troops for Afghanistan, bombings and threatened interventions in Pakistan, Bagram prison, refusal to apply the Geneva Convention to Muslim prisoners, ignoring of Geneva racist conference to protect Israel etc. ..</p> <p>Wafa Constanine and other ongoing cases of violation at the hands of Egyptian elite and through their collusion with America and Israel.</p>
AAZ [July 2009] “My Muslim Brothers and Sisters in Pakistan”	139		Pakistan's future in jeopardy because of 'blatant American Crusader interference'
AAZ [August 2009] “The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy”	140		<p>US bombing in Waziristan allegedly killing 60 at a funeral held for victims of another bombing. Says Obama's hands dripping with blood of Muslims. ..</p> <p>In response to question about the debate in France on the Hijab/burqa: 'The publicized crusader campaign did not stop [criticizing] Hijab only, and before that there was the offensive cartoons of the prophet Muhammad, prayer and peace upon him, and before that was insulting the Holy Qur'an in Guantanamo Bay and in Iraq.' ..</p> <p>Goes through alleged French animosity towards Muslims through the ages... Goes through various acts of Obama perceived as hostile against Muslims inc sending Muslims to secret prisons, bombing and killing civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and elsewhere, ignoring the Geneva racist conference etc. Thus there is not 'change'.</p> <p>The most important reasons of hostility between Muslims and America? Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Somalia, the American occupation of the Arabian Peninsula, stealing the wealth of the Muslim Nation with force threats, the corrupted and corrupting regimes that cooperate with America, and war against</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
			<p>Islam in the name of terrorism.' .. Suggests Obama is worse news for Palestinians than Bush was.</p> <p>The 'killing the Muslims on the hands of the Shiite militias in Iraq and burning them and nailing their heads with electric driller'</p>
AAZ [August 2009] "The Path of Doom"	142		<p>On the operations of Pakistani Army against mujahideen in Waziristan and elsewhere on the border with Afghanistan, in collusion with Nato forces and 'traitors' in Afghan Army designed to deplete moral of mujahideen, cause suffering of local population, disguise the losses of the Nato forces and their aim to secure control for US and allies over South Asia. The Pakistani Army calls the operation 'The Path to Salvation' because, according to Ayman, they are trying to save the Americans from defeat. This is in actuality a 'path of doom'. The Pakistani Army is treacherous and designed to aid the Americans. It arrested Pakistani nuclear scientists and let inspectors to the nuclear weapons.</p>
UBL [September 2009] "A Statement to the American People"	144	<p>The reasons for 9/11: US support for Israel and its oppression of Palestinians, which has even been confirmed by the likes of President Obama in his address in Cairo and Jimmy Carter. Talks of 'murderous siege' on the people of Palestine, the use of white phosphorus and other weapons from America. The prevalence of 'zionist' economic lobby.</p> <p>Americans could have known that the White House planned on murder when the 'butcher' from Vietnam, Rumsfeld, was appointed Defence Secretary.</p>	<p>Obama is powerless to stop the war since he retained senior figures from the Defence establishment from the previous administration instead of appointing some of the generals who opposed the war, such as Gen Sanchez. .. On the economic calamities being experienced by America due to their war of attrition with the mujahidoon.</p>
UBL [September 2009] "A Message to the European People"	143		<p>Talks about the unjust Nato campaign where Europeans are supporting the Americans against innocent people in Afghanistan, even though they have done nothing wrong towards Europe. The war started as a result of the 'anger of Bush' to which Europeans reacted even though they had nothing to do with it. Europeans should learn from the cries for American help from Georgia during the war with Russia that America is not a trustworthy ally.</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [September 2009] “Shaykh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri: Eulogy for the Role Model of Youth”	147		<p>On Pakistani Army failing to secure peace in Pakistan, treacherous in their collusion with the Americans against the Emirate in Afghanistan. ..</p> <p>The role of Germany: “I wonder how the Germans, who were defeated by the Americans and the English in Second World War, robbed and controlled by them, are willing to die instead of them in a war that is destined to fail? I wonder how their prime minister can stand in the parliament and lie to them, saying that sending more German forces to Afghanistan is needed in order to protect the peace and security of these countries? How can she lie like that!?’</p> <p>Laments that Americans have turned their embassy in Kabul into a brothel and that no such vice was permitted under the Taliban.</p>
AAZ [October 2009] “Eulogy for Ibn Sheikh al Libi by Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri”	145		On the death of Ali Mohamed Abdelaziz al Fakhiri, also known as Ibn Sheikh al-Lib in custody. Something Ayman blames on torture by American agents in order to force out a confession concerning the link between Saddam Hussain and Al-Qa’ida.
AAZ [December 2009] “The (Palestinian) National Unity”	146	<p>Cites the various treaties that have seen 'nine-tenths' of Palestine going to the Israelis including Oslo, Annapolis, Mecca accords Y-River and meetings in New York and Camp David. .</p> <p>Mahmud Abbas is no better then Al-Sharif Husain who followed 'his British masters' and gave Palestine to the Jews and Syria to the French. .. Talks of the 'wicked fruits' of national unity that were introduced to the Muslims after the Sykes-Picot agreement that 'split the Islamic nation'.</p>	<p>Talks of the 'tyrant' Mubarak who is trying to please America by torturing mujahidoon in order to put his 'tyrant son' to power. Meanwhile the Egyptians are blocking aid for the mujahideen and people in Gaza whilst Israeli tourists are welcomed in Egypt. This torture is being carried out by Egypt and other agents like it on the order of Obama. Siege of Palestine is his real plan for the region and represents a new episode in the Crusade against Muslims..The same treachery is taking place in Pakistan where the Pakistani Army is taking up the role of the British Indian Army or the North Africans in the French Army during WW2 in dying for their master's cause.</p>
AAZ [December 2009] “The Morning and the Lamp..”	141		'Pakistan has become a service provider to the army of America, its security and secret agencies. The leadership and politicians are actually competing with each other to affirm their support of America and the West in its New Crusade against Islam, under the guise of the “War on Terror”.'
UBL [February	148		US support for Israel, suffering in Gaza

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
2010] “From Osama to Obama”			
			Causes of climate change and the impact of climate change. The global financial crisis, also caused by America, as well as the consequences of globalisation. ... Iraq was invaded because of oil [UBL does not cite animosity towards Muslims as a cause as done previously]. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo 'ugly crimes which shook the conscience of humanity'
AAZ [July 2010] “Al Quds will not be converted to Judaism”	223	Dayton Accord	<p>US hostilities, apostate complicity, primarily Afghanistan, Bayt al Maqdis (Jerusalem). The 'detentions' 'torture centres' and courts of Americans.</p> <p>'The painful tragedy of Jerusalem' which is being Judaized and which has been betrayed by 'Arab Zionists' who support sanctions and prevent uprisings and jihad</p> <p>US forces 'burning' villages and torturing mujahideen, including Sheikh al Liby. Americans occupying Afghanistan, Iraq, the Gulf, large parts of Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, the Islamic Maghreb and Yemen.</p>
AAZ [August 2010] “Message to the People of Turkey”	225	<p>Collapse of Ottoman rule allowed Jews and secularism to settle in Bayt al Maqdis and Muslims to be humiliated. ...</p> <p>The 'English Crusaders' who stabbed the Muslims in the back during WWI. Abdul Aziz Al Saud 'stabbed the Ottoman empire within an English dagger' as did Sharif Hussain.</p>	<p>Israeli killing of Turks the 'Freedom Flotilla' to Gaza. Turkish participation in war in Afghanistan, and cooperation with Israel. Turkey has become secular. ...</p> <p>The 'Safavids' are stabbing the Ummah in the back in Afghanistan and Iraq, just as they did when the Ottoman empire was about to conquer Austria [safaiyoon - not rafidah e.g.], but this time with the help from secular Turkey.</p>
AAZ [September 2010] “A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade”	226		<p>Pakistani collusion with NATO and crusaders in their imprisoning and torture of Muslims, burning down Lal Masjid.</p> <p>Nine years have passed since the beginning of the contemporary Crusade.</p> <p>Accuses Americans of replacing existing lackeys like Musharraf with opposition members that are serving American agendas, such as Benazir Bhutto, who in turn was replaced by another 'agent' Zardari. ...</p> <p>Egypt became an 'international terminal for torture' under Mubarak.</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [October 2010] “Some points regarding the method of relief work”	227		'What our nation is going through by way of great climate changes and its effects in terms of the catastrophes and great natural disasters that have taken place in many Islamic countries, it is not sufficient any more to accept what has been done in terms of rescue work as it has been done in the past.' The human cost of natural disasters relating to climate change is even greater than from war. Draught in Africa and floods in Pakistan
UBL [October 2010] “Help your brothers in Pakistan”	228	Red Army defeat	<p>The flood victims in Paksitan have received help from Malaysa, Turkey and other countries, but the issue has received insufficient attention in the media. These media organisations place more emphasis on securing the power of the countries' ruler, rather than focusing on the plight of millions in Pakistan. The floods in Pakistan and resulting famine was 'one of the most catastrophic events in the past century.' Talks of how the Secretary General of the UN travelled to the affected regions a month after it happened 'as part of his job' and described it as the greatest catastrophe, but yet the Arab leaders never ventured there despite being much closer.</p> <p>Suggests a course of action, in terms of human relief, shelter, assessing roads and infrastructure in the aftermath etc so we can learn from this and apply to others living in areas where conditions are similar e.g. by riverbeds.</p> <p>Affects of climate change and natural disasters now produce more victims than war, the media have war correspondents so they should also have specialists in fields related to these consequences, e.g. civil engineering, agriculture, medicine, rescue etc.</p>
AAZ [November 2010] “Who is going to support Aifa Siddique”	229		'An American court has sentenced our sister Afia Siddiqui for more than eighty years'
UBL [November 2010] “Message from Shaykh Usama bin Ladin to the People of France”	230		France assists America in the killing of Muslim women and children. French are meddling in the affairs of North and West Africa, stealing its wealth and inflicting suffering. The French who ban 'free women' from wearing the hijab can expect those meddling in Africa to be targeted
UBL [January	231		Kidnappings of French in Africa, French

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
2011] “From al-Sheikh Osama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the French People”			participation in wars in Afghanistan and presence in Africa
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(1)”	232	Sykes-Picot, Treaty of Darin. Traces the origins of the modern Egyptian state, from Napoleon (described as a criminal secularist and 'Christian at heart with a tinge of Zionism') and his promises of a Palestinian homeland for Jews. On the impact of British control over Egypt and the region: introduction of secular constitutions, Islamic principals in society and governance torn down, impact throughout region.	"History repeats itself today. Today Egypt has a president, a government, a parliament, an army and police, but the real ruler changed his seat from the British to the American Embassy!' The same can be said about all the other 'Arab Zionist' and corrupt rulers of Muslim lands, they run torcher champers, armies and courts with the real rulers being the 'office in the embassy, usually the American, but may also be Russian, British, French, or maybe even the Israeli embassy.'
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(2)”	233	The British corrupted the Egyptian judicial and political system by giving the Egyptians 'fake independence' whilst imposing their will. The British broke the Caliphate into pieces and introduced nationalism.	<p>"Who helped the US implement sanctions against Iraq? Who helped them invade it? Who helped them invade Afghanistan? Who is implementing the sanctions on Gaza? Who are the ones in pursuit of the Mujahideen, arresting, torturing and killing them? Aren't they these corrupt regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan and Algeria?'. Egyptians allow US and other ships through the Suez even though they are used in the campaign against the Muslims. [note how the focus has become local again - near enemy]. .. Over the expanse of the Islamic</p> <p>The invading Crusader forces in their imperialistic Crusades have been faced with a heroic resistance, but its advancement in weaponry allowed it to gain victory. Do we ask, why have we fallen back in the sciences and arts of war? How have they advanced over us? 'Political weakness and corruption' as fundamental reasons. 'It is also due to our preoccupation in the errors in dialectics, Sufism, and superstitions which have made us neglect the natural sciences. Another cause is the West's control over us and our resources, and thus our deprivation from any proper usage of them which would enable us to advance and strengthen ourselves.' .. 'These Western Crusader policies to dissolve and divide the Islamic world still continue today. Iraq is being divided into three regions: the Kurdish</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
			<p>North which has, basically, already been partitioned, the Sunni middle, and the Shiite South. As for Sudan, the South has seceded from the North, and they seek to divide it even further by supporting the secessionists in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and the East. They are planning to divide Saudi Arabia into three regions: the Eastern, the Central and the Western. As for Egypt, they seek to divide it into two: the Southern Copts with their capital Asyut, and the Muslim north, by supporting the Orthodox minority and pretending to cry over the injustices being meted out to them, while overlooking the aggressions of its Church against the Muslims.' Accuses the church of killing Wafa Constantine and hiding other women converts to Islam and of trying to establish an independent Coptic state in Egypt..The leadership sees Muslims as guests in Egypt and allied with Hosni Mubarak..The crisis has been further enflamed by the Mubarak regime, scholars of Al-Azhar, corrupt judiciary and parliament, and US administration. All ignore the 'torture chambers' the Coptic Orthodox church uses.</p>
AAZ [February 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(3)"	234		<p>"These Arab Zionists who wage war against Islam and its laws, ban the Hijab, seek the spread of licentiousness and ignobility, build bridges with the Zionist entity, participate with America in their war against Islam [...]besiege our fellow Muslims in Gaza [...] and those who suppress and torture their people, pillaging their blood, sanctity and resources.' This is part of the 'world order' at war with Islam, led by America.</p> <p>"The events of Tunisia and Egypt, the results of which have reached Jordan, Yemen and other Muslim lands, must be studied carefully, so that the anger of the noble and uprising of the freeborn do not go to waste, and the fruit born of their efforts are not stolen after they watered its tree with their souls, blood and years of imprisonment.' [Seeking to focus anger vented in Arab uprisings against far enemy:] 'For these reasons, those global forces directly aid and support these local governments, turning a blind eye to their crimes, injustices, suppression, lies,</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
			<p>fabrications, and pillage.' ..</p> <p>America has only dumped their agent regimes after they've become counterproductive, only to seek to install new ones.</p>
AAZ [March 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(4)"	235		<p>"Propagate moral depravity and licentiousness, cooperate with Israel against the Mujahideen, continue to blockade Gaza while providing Israel with the water of the Nile river and gas from its reserves, and deprive the people of Gaza from entering Egypt for medical treatment or trade, at the same time allowing tens of thousands of Israelis to cross into the Sinai without even a visa, to practice their licentious sins to fill the pockets of the lead criminals with unlawful wealth. These corrupt and corruptive governments which have participated with America</p> <p>in their war on Islam and the Muslims.' .. America wishes to introduce diluted Islam which is not true Islam, it ceased its support of the Mubarak regime only when it saw the security forces were no longer in control but will seek to ensure the next government will secure the safety of Israel and enable America to carry through its plan to 'Judaize' Palestine and demolish Al Aqsa... America and Israel and the West want democracy for the Muslim lands in order to keep occupying them and stealing their wealth.</p>
AAZ [April 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(5)"	236		<p>Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya. Withdrawal of US troops in Afghanistan (Defeat). ..</p> <p>America and its allies did nothing to alleviate the pain of Libyans during the Qaddafi regime and sent prisoners there to be tortured. People should not be deceived by their 'crocodile tears' for the suffering of the local population now that he has become unpopular. .. "Also, what does it mean by saying that this sector will be assigned to counterterrorism? What is this 'terrorism'? Is it the terrorism in the American-Israeli meaning, which was prevalent in the collapsed era? And consequently, participating in invading Iraq and Afghanistan is countering terrorism? And establishing secret prisons in Egypt and transforming them into</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
			international torture stations is counter terrorism? And chasing the mujahideen of Gaza and torturing them to know the locations of their leaders and their headquarters and their financing tunnels, and informing Israel about them, is countering terrorism? And working according the signed security agreements with the United Nations is countering terrorism? And protecting the Israeli prostitution trade in Sinai, with the collapsed regime's gaining its profits, is countering terrorism? And oppressing the people of Sinai in protection of Israel, and in deterring them from supporting their brothers in Gaza, is countering terrorism? And is arresting everyone who tries to participate in Jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq and Gaza, or supporting them financially, is countering terrorism? What is this 'terrorism'? Explain to us so the deception doesn't continue and the prosecutors return in new forms." .. America hypocritical when it comes to stances towards torture, imprisonment, democracy, governance, self-determination etc, whereby it pays lip services to these elements whilst inflicting this harm on Muslims.
UBL [May 2011] "The Speech by the Martyr of Islam.."	240	"The rulers had sought to make people give up their most important rights that Allah had given to them, so they sabotaged the minds of the Ummah and marginalized its rule in the important public affairs by co-opting the efforts of the media and religious governmental institutions so as to give them legitimacy"	The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. "The revolution was not one of food and clothing but one of dignity and defiance, a revolution of sacrifice and giving." Praise for those involved.
AAZ [May 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(6)"	238		The Arab revolutions. The "Crusader war, which America is launching against our Ummah." The imprisonment of political prisoners by the military council in Egypt. "Speaking about the political prisoners reminds us with the prisoners in the Coptic Church jails". Social and judicial issues in Egypt. On Egyptian gas exports to Israel.. On "The [Egyptian] relation with America and Israel, and the case of Gaza's sanctions." .. Talks of the "disgraceful" relationship with Israel.
AAZ [June 2011] "The Noble Knight	239	"America, which signed the Geneva Conventions in order to protect civilians and prisoners,	On the killing of bin Ladin: "The noble knight, who loved Palestine with a love that possessed his heart, left, and he said to

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Dismounted”		and then was the first to violate them in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Guantanamo, and its secret prisons all over the world. And America snubbed the treaties it signed and required others to follow the decisions of the International Criminal Court, while it was too high with its arrogance to follow them."	its people, "To our brothers in Palestine, we say to you, 'Indeed, the blood of your sons is the blood of our sons'. Compares the killing of Bin Ladin to that of Ali Al-Husayn in Karbala [Shia appeal?]: "Abu Abdullah Usama bin Laden was killed as Abu Abdullah Al-Hussein, may Allah be pleased with him, was killed amid his family and children." .. Incitement success: "And today, all praise be to Allah, America does not face an individual, group, or sect. No, it faces a rising Ummah that has awoken from its slumber in a Jihadi awakening that challenges it wherever it is." .. "This is the Islam which America gladly brings to us, a transgressing Islam, fabricated and deceitful, which stoops to influence the arrogant, and does not know allegiance, nor enmity, nor enjoining the good, nor forbidding evil, nor Jihad."
AAZ [July 2011] "Glory of the East. The first Being Damascus.."	241	Sykes Picot	Suppression and oppression in Syria. Golan Heights. .. American 'war against Islam'. Syrian regime seen as 'guardian of Israeli borders' ... The 'global hegemony' of America. America, after cooperating with the Assaf regime, now pretends to be on the side of the rebels, 'after its plans were foiled in Tunisia and Egypt, two of its most important agents.' America now wishes to replace the Syrian regime with another that will stifle jihad and safeguard Israel.
AAZ [August 2011] "A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings..(7)"	242		"America administered a peaceful transition of power that preserves its interests, so that the popular revolution turned into a military coup d'état in which rule was transferred from one wing to another under American supervision." America wishes to suppress Islamism, keep Egypt as a strategic power serving US interests, and to guarantee safety of Israel. . The Gaza blockade has not been lifted whilst there is "obscene welcoming of thousands of Israeli tourists" into Sinai. .. "This is the collapse we have reached at the hands of the Military Council that has turned the defiant revolution of the Egyptian people into a military coup d'état that preserves the interests of America, protects the borders of Israel and supplies it with gas." .. "Crusader intervention" in Libya whilst the

Communiqué and author	[ID]	(A) References to past important events [excerpts, quotes, notes]	(B) References to ongoing political events and crises [excerpts, quotes, notes]
			Arab League sits idle. Had it helped the Crusader intervention would have been "unnecessary" [interesting implicit acknowledgement that it is as a result a viable option].
AAZ [August 2011] "Do not become weak or grieve"	243		"why then isn't normalization with Israel and exchanging ambassadors with her halted, as well as removing sanctions from Gaza, thus allowing the transfer of products and persons from her and to her? It is not rational that tens of thousands of Israeli tourists enter Sinai without a visa in order to practice adultery, while our families in Gaza are not allowed entry into Egypt except through tearing souls apart"

APPENDIX 3.3 (a) Ultimate Objectives

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to a pious society and ways to achieve the ultimate goal [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [unknown date] "Methodological Guidelines.."	112	Quoting an Islamic authority: 'The author identifies six criteria for restoring Islam: 1) love for God, 2) compassion for fellow believers, 3) counselling each other to goodness and obedience to God's commands, 4) hurting unbelievers, 5) jihad in the cause of God, and 6) fearlessness in the face of critics. Muslims must establish an Islamic state through unity, hearing and obeying, and emigration and struggle (hijra and jihad)'.
AAZ [unknown date] "The Forbidden Word"	113	Asked what Egypt will look like if an Islamic state is established, Zawahiri states that Hudud [Shari'a punishment] would be implemented immediately. But Non-Muslims would be protected under Shar'ia law [with Dhimmi status].
UBL [July 1994] "The Banishment of Communism from the Arabian Peninsula: The Episode and the Proof"	38	Implementing the will of the Prophet and 'expelling all the unbelievers from the Arabian peninsula, no matter what colour or shape'.
UBL [May 1995] "Scholars are the Prophet's Successors"	67	The scholars' responsibilities: 1) 'a scholar must be a role model not only in his knowledge but actions as well, 2) 'a scholar needs to make sure of all conditions of a fatwa. If he is asked to issue a fatwa, he needs to think very hard about the purpose of the person asking him to issue it along with its consequences, 3) 'a scholar needs to be aware of the possibility of being lead into temptation, exploitation and deceit, especially by rulers who declare war against Allah', 4) 'a scholar needs to have courage to speak out, no matter what. His courage is what sets him apart from others as a role model for others. He needs to say to whoever is/was offensive, that he is/was wrong', 5) 'a scholar should stay away from suspicious ways of rulers of which the Prophet, peace upon him, and his companions have warned against'. 'If scholars do that we ought to respect and honour them'.
UBL [July 1996] "interview with Saudi Dissident.."	4	All Muslims would live under Sharia. 'A guilty man would only be happy if he was justly punished.'
UBL [November 1996]	150	US must remove forces from the 'area of the two holy mosques' and end 'material support' for the Jews in Palestine.
UBL [March 1997] "Pakistan Interviews Usama bin Ladin"	154	'We have to drive out the United States from the Arabian peninsula because this is the root of all problems.'.. A 'pious Caliphate' will be established, spreading from Afghanistan. Banking will be interest-free, as the mujahideen are against both capitalism and socialism. Says the Taliban are not against the education of women, and this should be permitted, 'un-Islamic' conditions in education, however, should be avoided.
UBL [May 1998] "Supporting the Fatwa..."	71	'The Prophet's last wish, may Allah's prayers and peace be upon him, is to drive the Jews and the Christians out of the Arabian Peninsula, and this must be acted on'.
UBL [November 1998] "Bin Ladin: Expel	175	The struggle will continue until Americans and their allies are expelled from all the holy sites of Islam and Shari'ah is established.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to a pious society and ways to achieve the ultimate goal [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Jews, Christians From Holy Places”		
UBL [February 1999] “Esquire interview with Bin Ladin”	179	The first objective is to rid the Arabian peninsula of American presence
UBL [February 1999] “May 1998 Interview with bin Ladin Reported”	182	Ridding Saudi Arabia and other Muslim lands of US presence. See on near and far enemy: 'We have focused our attention on Israel and the United States. First we want to expel them, after which a Muslim state will be established and those who are forcefully ruling the people will be given severe punishments.' [Near enemy not precluded from UBL strategic thinking]
UBL [June 1999] “Usama bin Ladin: The Destruction of the Base”	184	'We want to free our lands of the Americans.' ..
UBL + AAZ [September 2000] “Bin Ladin, others, pledge ‘jihad’ to release prisoners in US, Saudi jails.”	191	'On this blessed night, we pledge to God Almighty to do all we can to support our religion, to establish the shari'ah of Islam in the land of Islam, to expel the Jews and the Christians from the sacred places, and to endeavour to release our ulema from the United States, from Egypt, from Riyadh, and from all Muslim lands.' [UBL]
UBL [January 2001] “Daily Prints Usama bin Ladin Letter..”	192	'Today, every member of the Muslim world agrees that all the Muslim countries of the world having geographical boundaries on the basis of nationality, geography, religious discord, colour and race, should be merged into one Muslim state, where men do not rule men. There should be one caliph for the whole state whose capital should be Mecca. There should be one currency and defence for this state and the Holy Koran should be its constitution. The name that has been proposed for this vast state is Global Muslim State. I want to congratulate you that by the grace of God, from today, we have begun the task of achieving a highly important and strong target of domination of Islam over all other religions.'
UBL [April 2001] “Letter from Usama bin LAdin to the scholars of Deyubende in Peshawar”	120	'The unity of Islam which does not distinguish between nationalities and skin colour and does not take in consideration, borders or barriers'.
UBL [October 2001] “Tayseer Allouni interviews bin Ladin in Afghanistan”	130	'Our aim is also to remove the rules that the United States has imposed on its agents in the region. We want this nation to be ruled according to the book of God, who created it.' 'We want the revival of this nation under the Islamic caliphate, as predicted by the prophet in his traditions.'
AAZ [December 2001] “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”	119	Lessons from Afghanistan: 1) need for a base: 'A jihadist movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator where its seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, and organizational matters. 2) The Islam was pure, free of nationalism and leftist politics and other influences which affected the Palestinian cause. 3)

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to a pious society and ways to achieve the ultimate goal [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>Afghanistan following Russian withdrawal demonstrated the role of jihad in bringing down local rulers who prevent the implementation of the Shari'a, like Najibullah; 'He prayed, fasted, and performed pilgrimage. At the same time he prohibited government by Islam and allied himself with the enemies of Islam, allowed them to enter his country, and brutally oppressed the Muslims and the mujahidin'. 4) The Afghan jihad destroyed in the minds of young Muslims the idea of superpowers. 'That jihad was a training course of the utmost importance to prepare Muslim mujahidin to wage their awaited battle against the superpower that now has sole dominance over the globe, namely, the United States'.. The pivotal importance of Egypt: 'This would be followed by the earth-shattering event, which the west trembles at the mere thought of it, which is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Egypt. If God wills it, such a state in Egypt, with all its weight in the heart of the Islamic world, could lead the Islamic world in a jihad against the West. It could also rally the world of Muslims around it. Then history would make a new turn, God willing, in the opposite direction against the empire of the United States and the world's Jewish government'. . 'Conclusion: Has the jihad movement failed or succeeded in the past 36 years? The answer is: A. We must admit that the fundamentalist movement's goal of establishing an Islamic government in Egypt is yet to be achieved. B. The jihad Islamic movement, however, has not set a specific date for achieving this goal. More importantly, this is a goal that could take several generations to achieve. The Crusaders in Palestine and Syria left after two centuries of continued jihad. The Islamic nation at the time had jihad rulers and regular and disciplined armies. It was led by prominent scholars, such as Al-Izz Bin-Abd-al-Salam, Al, Nawawi, and Ibn-Taymiyah, God have mercy on their souls. Despite this, the Crusaders did not leave in 30 or 50 years. '.</p>
UBL [December 2001] video statement	129	Fighting so "the word of Allah becomes dominant and the word of the disbelievers becomes abased".
n/a [August 2002] internal document	34	Al Qaeda believes in the Sunnite, following the traditions of the noble ancestors. It seeks: 'the victory of the mighty religion of Allah, the establishment of an Islamic Regime and the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate.
UBL [October 2002] "Statement from Shaykh Osama bin Ladin..."	211	Talks of 'propelling this battle toward its desired aim and intended objective of spreading Allah's religion in the world and applying His shari'ah.'
UBL [October 2003] "Second letter to Muslims in Iraq"	98	'Jihad must continue until an Islamic government is ruling according to the revealed law'.
UBL [early 2004] "Bin Ladin warns of 'grand plots'..."	111	'The religion of Islam encompasses all the affairs of life, including the religious and the worldly, such as economic, military, and political affairs, as well as the scales by which we weigh the actions of men--rulers, ulema, and others--and how to deal with the ruler in line with the rules set by God for him and which the ruler should not violate. Therefore, it becomes clear to us that the solution lies in adhering to the religion of God, by which God granted us pride in the past centuries, and installing a strong and faithful leadership that applies the Koran among us and raises the true banner of jihad'.
UBL [May 2004] "People of Iraq"	82	'The most important meaning of "there is no God but Allah" is that there is no ruler and no legislator except for Allah'.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to a pious society and ways to achieve the ultimate goal [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	84	'We look forward to seeing no land other than the land of al-Haramain, from which we have been away for a long time'. [continued emphasis on Saudi Arabia]. 'We seek to expel [the enemy] from this land'.
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	86	'Islam is one unit that can not be divided', 'If someone believes in a part of it and rejects another part, then he becomes an infidel and his prayers and fasting will be to no avail', 'if people abide by all the laws of Islam, but do not prohibit usury, and sanction dealing with banks that deal in interest, then the constitution of this country is a constitution of infidelity'. Muslims are allowed to take part in the selection of emir or president, but only if he intends to rule according to Islam. Even if 90 per cent of regulations are derived from the Islamic Shariah in a society and 10 per cent from man-made legislation, then such a constitution would still be 'a constitution of infidelity'.
AAZ [February 2005] "The Freeing of Humanity.."	109	'Our freedom is the freedom of Tawheed, morals, chastity, fairness, and justice'. Reform must be based on three principles: 1) Rule of the Shari'a, 'If a person believes in Allah then it is not logical to argue with His Lord the details of His laws, or to give himself the right to remove himself from those laws', 2) 'Freedom of the homelands of Islam', 'freeing it from every occupying robbing thief', including Israel. 3) 'The Freedom of Humanity', on the rights and obligations of the Ummah.
AAZ [June 2005] video statement	72	'The real reform is based on three principles; the first principle is the rule of Sharia because it is the sharia that was revealed from God of the world that guarantees their interests, freedom, dignity and their prestige and it protects their honour'. 'The second principle for reform is the freedom of Muslim countries. We cannot imagine having any kind of reform while our country is occupied by the Crusader forces spread in all corners of our countries'. 'The third principle for reform is the freedom of the Muslim nation in running its affairs. This kind of reform can only be achieved through two things. The first is the freedom of independent and Sharia-based judiciary, the implementation of its rules and ensuring its stature, influence and power. The second is the freedom of the Muslim nation and its right to order virtue and prevent vice'.
AAZ [December 2005] first interview with Zawahiri	49	'There is no way of achieving reform except by uprooting these corrupt and corrupting regimes, and be establishing a Muslim government that will protect rights, defend sanctities, institute justice, spread consultation, raise the banner of jihad, and confront the invaders, the foes of Islam.'
AAZ [June 2006] "Support for Palestinians"	85	'The application of Shari'ah is the hope of every Muslim in Egypt'.
AAZ [June 2006] "Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr.."	32	Iraq must become a Muslim state, then operations will be launched from there to free Jerusalem.
AAZ [June 2006] "The Zionist Crusader's Aggression in Gaza and Lebanon"	88	'It is jihad for the liberation of Palestine, all Palestine, as well as every land that was home for Islam, from Andalusia to Iraq'.
UBL [July 2006] "To the ummah in general and the mujahideen in	93	'Establish the state of Islam with Almighty God's help' in Iraq, Somalia.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to a pious society and ways to achieve the ultimate goal [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Iraq and Somalia in Particular”		
AAZ [September 2006] “Hot issues with Shaykh Ayman Al Zawahiri”	21	The goal is to establish Islamic emirates in Afghanistan and Iraq. These then can be used as bases in the defence of Islam, and thus the Muslims can re-establish the Caliphate, from Spain to Iraq. [note that AQ relies on utilizing new military fronts opened by the US and then rallying the mujahiden to these locations, rather than being fully in control of its destiny]. From Iraq the Mujahideen can infiltrate Jordan and liberate Jerusalem.
AAZ [December 2006] “Realities of the Conflict between Islam and Unbelief”	94	See further on section ‘Criticising Muslims’ Litigation to Divine law only, and no other laws; recovery of every land that was once Muslim. 'What is the authority which rules? Is it the majority of votes? Or Divine Shari'ah?' 'Establish the Islamic state which rules by the Shari'ah and defends the rights of the Muslims' 'It is the duty of the Ummah's vanguard to strive for change, because getting rid of these puppets is the doorway to deliverance and the beginning of the serious Jihadi challenge to the Crusader invasion'.
AAZ [February 2007] “Lessons, examples and great events in the year 1427”	97	Setting up a mujahid Islamic state in Iraq which would proceed to liberate Jerusalem 'and take steps towards the reestablishment of the Caliphate state which the Crusaders and their helpers toppled'.
AAZ [March 2007] “Palestine is the concern of all Muslims”	18	Muslims must liberate all Muslim lands from al Andalus to Iraq and fight until 'the Word of Allah is supreme and the Caliphate returns to protect the sanctuary of Islam'. Muslims must spread its Shariah.
AAZ [May 2007] “The Empire of Evil is about to end..”	23	The Jihad in Iraq will lead to the establishment of an emirate and enforcement of Shariah law. The oppressed will get their rights back and it will become a base for liberating Jerusalem. If elections are held under Islamic constitutions and without foreign interference then they are to be welcomed, but if they are held under secular constitutions and for falsifying rulers then they should be banned and resisted. On the Strategy: 'The road to reform, and Allah knows best, requires, in the Arabian Peninsula and the other Islamic lands, work on two plans. The first is in the near term, and seeks to strike Crusader and Zionist interests so that the ground erupts in flames under the feet of the Zionists and Crusaders in our countries and theirs and everywhere we are able to strike their interests until they leave our countries and stop their continuous and increasing interference in our affairs. And the second plan is for the longer term, and depends on two pillars: the first is preparation for the confrontation, by going forth to arenas of battle like Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, and the second pillar is diligent work to change the corrupt and corruptive regimes through invitation, incitement, mobilization and planning, and to persevere in that however much time it takes or sacrifice it requires. And every time we achieve victory in one arena, that will ease – with Allah’s help – victory in the next one. And from this, the critical importance of the Jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan becomes clear, because the defeat of the Crusaders there – soon, Allah permitting, will lead to the setting up of two Mujahid Emirates which will be launch pads for the liberation of the Islamic lands and the establishment of the Caliphate, with Allah’s permission.'

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to a pious society and ways to achieve the ultimate goal [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [June 2007] "Forty years since the fall of Jerusalem"	101	End rule of Crusader-Zionists and govern by Sharia - only then will Muslims have freedom.
AAZ [July 2007] "The Advice of One Concerned"	102	The goals of jihad: 'the word of Allah be supreme and that the vanguards of the Mujahideen knock at the doors of Jerusalem, liberate the usurped lands of the Muslims from Spain to East Turkistan, and raise the banner of the Caliphate to flutter nobly after a long absence'.
AAZ [July 2007] "Malicious Britain and Indian Slaves"	103	'Liberate all of the Muslim lands that have been occupied from the times of the occupation by Andalusia and up to the occupation of Iraq' 'To establish God's way on earth, to fight so that God's religion becomes supreme'. Make the word of God supreme and implement the rule of the Shari'ah, free all occupied Muslim lands and establish a Caliphate 'that does not know national affiliation and does not adhere to Sykes-Picot borders'.
UBL [September 2007] "The Solution: A Message from Shaykh Osama bin Ladin to the American people"	10	In the Islamic society there will be no taxes apart from the 2.5%
UBL [September 2007] "Come to Jihad: A Speech to the People of Pakistan"	14	'Allah, the Most High, says, "And fight them until there is no Fitnah [polytheism], and religion is wholly for Allah." (8:39) So if some of the religion is for Allah and some of it is for other than Allah, fighting is obligatory to make the religion entirely for Allah, the Most High.'
AAZ [December 2007] "Annapolis: The Betrayal"	12	'We must return to the pure uncompromising faith, which forbids these political tricks, and diplomatic frauds that destroys both the religion and the world'. 'Free every conquered part of the Islamic world - starting in Andalusia and ending with Chechnya.'
AAZ [December 2007] "A Review of Events..."	13	Addressing Jihadi media operators: 'You must strive to bring the Ummah, long exiled from its Shariah, back to the pristine Mohammed fountain and the way of life of his rightly-guided Successors, Good companions and purified House'.
UBL [December 2007] "The Way to Frustrate Conspiracies"	27	Full empowerment cannot be a precondition of establishing an Islamic state or pledging allegiance to an imam, since the enemy has military superiority and can invade any country and overthrow its government. Thus the time to establish an Islamic emirate is now, even though the country is broken. [how to get from A to B]. (The strength then lies in the unity of the mujahideen and support of the Ummah).
AAZ [early 2008] "Exoneration..."	20	'Al-Qa'ida is not merely demanding the expulsion of the crusader occupiers and the Jews from the Muslim countries, but also that petroleum should be sold at its real price. This call poses the threat of destructive effects on the US global hegemony, which was erected on the basis of its theft of Muslim resources.' 'If it is said that the benefit to be reaped by expelling the Zionist enemy from Palestine is greater than the loss of Palestinian lives, then the answer that it is also a benefit to establish a mujahidin Islamic state in Egypt that will seek to liberate Palestine and every Muslim land, eliminate corruption, establish justice, and restore Egypt's historical role of defending Islam and the Muslim people. This benefit is greater than the loss

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to a pious society and ways to achieve the ultimate goal [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		represented by the shedding of some innocent blood.' 'We in Al-Qa'ida of Jihad do not seek internal conflict. We seek to expel the invaders from the Muslim lands and establish a Muslim state. As we have been led by the mental efforts we made to act in accordance with Shari'ah, our practical plan, which we have repeatedly announced, is the following: (a). striking at crusader and Zionist targets; and (b). making serious efforts to change these corrupt regimes and establish an Islamic order.
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting.."	105	<p>'What is important isn't to ask about stopping the bequeathing or not stopping it, but rather is to liberate the countries from the American Crusader hegemony among the symptoms of which is Mubarak's regime and the effort to bequeath power to his son'.</p> <p>'I expect the Jihadi influence to spread after the Americans' exit from Iraq, and move towards Jerusalem'.</p> <p>The objective: 'at this stage [it] is the withdrawal of all unbelieving forces from the lands of the Muslims. The defeat of America 'will end in the White House, with Allah's permission' [when asked where the defeat of America, which began in Kabul and continued in Baghdad will end].</p> <p>'Even if Usama bin Ladin doesn't become ill, he must die one day, whereas Allah's religion will remain until Allah inherits the earth and everything on it'.</p>
AAZ [April 2008] "On the Fifth Anniversary of the Invasion and Torture of Iraq"	7	Iraq will become 'fortress of Islam' from where assaults on Israel will be conducted. Need for independent Islamic authority in Egypt. 'Expel the Jewish-crusader invasion from the Muslim lands and to establish an Islamic state subordinate to the rules of Sharia'
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting..P.2"	107	<p>The leader of the faithful in the world will be the imam of the caliphate state which every faithful Muslim seeks to establish.</p> <p>Muslims have established an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan and Iraq, but have not yet restored the Caliphate. Large sections in Iraq and Afghanistan are controlled where the rule of religion is implemented. Counters criticism of the Afghan emirate saying it is still 'viable emirate', just as it always has been, but has redeployed its forces from the capital into the mountain areas and forced the enemy out of these areas and into fortified places. The southern and eastern areas of Afghanistan are under the Emirate control and implement the sharia, appoint governors and officials. It has also been inflicting 'painful attacks' on the occupiers and they have admitted their defeat in Afghanistan. America tries to pressure its European allies to attack in the mountains and die instead of it. The Taliban also enjoy influence and control 'vast areas' in Pakistan. 'Musharraf's hunting dogs were forced to conclude agreements with the Taliban in order not to harm them' [see on success and failure]. The ISI controls large areas of Iraq and is the strongest force fighting the Crusaders and Iranian ambitions. 'We hope that the caliphate state will be established soon to unite them [the Emirates in Afghanistan and Iraq] with all Muslims. Sheikh Osama bin Laden [...] is one of the soldiers of [the] leader of the faithful, Mullah Mohammed Omar'. 'The establishment of the Islamic state or emirate is a religious duty and a realistic necessity. This cannot be delayed for the lack of the best circumstances for electing the ruler'.</p>
UBL [January 2009] "Call for	122	'We Muslims believe it is the nation's right to elect its president and we believe in Shoura, however we believe that the Western democracy -beside

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to a pious society and ways to achieve the ultimate goal [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Jihad to stop the Gaza assault”		being a big trick- it is an illegitimate heresy from the Islamic point of view'.
AAZ [February 2009] “From Kabul to Mogadishu”	132	Discusses meetings being held in Baidoa after the Al-Shabaab took over with the city's intelligentsia and notables 'in order to lay down new arrangements for the city'. The meetings have 'not been lacking in frankness' .. Muslims urged to fight until 'Allah's word is supreme'.
AAZ [August 2009] “The realities of Jihad and fallacies of Hypocrisy”	140	'The minimum limit the mujahideen would [satisfactorily] accept is the withdrawal of the Kufr forces from all the Islamic lands, to stop robbing the wealth of Muslims with military force and exchange the wealth and benefits with true fair prices, and to stop supporting the corrupt apostate regimes in the Islamic World, and to release all the Muslim prisoners, and to stop interfering in the affairs of the Muslims World.'
AAZ [September 2009] “Eulogy for the Role Model of the Youth, The Commander and Shahid Baitullah”	147	'We must be determined and work in order to liberate every land that was taken from the Muslims, from Caucasia to Andalusia.'
AAZ [December 2009] “The Palestinian National Unity..”	146	'What are the most important practical goals for Muslims in Palestine and the rest of the world?': freeing Muslim lands from the Kuffar and establishing Shar'iah law.
AAZ [December 2009] “The Morning and the Lamp to be Extinguished”	141	'We are not calling for dictatorship nor despotism nor tyranny in the name of religion, for that is one of those things that Islam itself is battling against. We are only calling the ummah to return to ruling by shūrā; justice; non-partisanship and elimination of discrimination between people except on the basis of taqwā; righteous deeds; enjoining the good and forbidding the evil; servitude of both the ruler and the ruled, the noble and the lowly, the strong and the weak, to the Sharī'ah, without any discrimination or division; that the ummah elect its ruler and be able to hold him to account, just as was witnessed in the time of the khilāfah of the rightly guided.' [And yet there is praise for the Taliban and their tyrannical regime]. [Then he goes on to insist upon the implementation of what appears to be a tyrannical regime]: 'Therefore, one must demand that it be the Sharī'ah that rule in Pakistan (and in all other Muslim homelands) rather than it itself being ruled over by other systems. That its authority not be in need of any referendum and not open to cancellation, not have to compete with alternatives as an equal and not be subject to amendments and substitutions.'
UBL [February 2010] “The Way to Save the Earth”	149	In order to rid the world of corruption and solve climate change people need to: (1) rid themselves of the corruption in their hearts and deeds and embrace Islam; (2) avoid wastefulness in that which they consume and use; (3) stop purchasing American goods, since this will lead to the closure of polluting American factories; (4) punish the leaders of US corporations for the damage they have inflicted, this applies to Americans too who have suffered from Hurricane Katrina and the economic downturn; (5) stop using the dollar in order to 'liberate humanity from enslavement and servitude to America and its corporations.'
AAZ [July 2010] “Al-Quds will not be converted to Judaism”	223	'Change will not come except through Jihad in order to remove the invasive forces and to overthrow these corrupt and corrupting regimes, and the alternative is more failure, humiliation, occupation and dependency' [this follows right after condemning democratic reform movements, and yet this is precisely what brought about change in Egypt and elsewhere - out of

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to a pious society and ways to achieve the ultimate goal [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		touch]. 'Establishing the Shariah of Allah, and control for the state of Islam, that which does only govern with the Shariah [...] spreads justice, lays the Shurah, and not in the cause of nationalist, socialist, secular state that governs with the which of the majority.'
AAZ [September 2010] "A Victorious Ummah – A Broken Crusade"	226	Loyalty must 'only be to Allah and Sunnah [tradition] of his Prophet and to their brothers in Islam' .. Muslims must be aware of the facts, and the most important is the aqeedah of tawheed, which must be the ruling authority in all systems. ... 'Our desired objective is ruling by Shar'iah [...] liberation of Muslim lands; spreading justice; opening the door to Shura
AAZ [February 2011] "A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (3)"	234	'To fulfil the hopes of the Muslim Ummah of the establishment of a free Muslim nation in the Islamic world, which governs with the Shariah, promotes justice, implements Shura, liberates the Muslim lands, ends the blockade of Gaza, guards morality, destroys the nation of ignobility and corruption, establishes a Shura system in which the Ummah chooses its rulers without domination, forgery or rigging, holds them to account, enjoining them with good and forbidding them from evil, and guards Muslim resources from domestic thieves and their international masters who loot the treasures of our lands.'
AAZ [March 2011] "A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (4)"	235	"The cure is to uproot this corrupt government and replace it with proper and just government which rules with the Shariah, implements the Shura, spreads justice, gives way for the Ummah to participate in the selection of its rulers and holds them to account, involves them in the administration of its affairs through its representatives, and works to be just in distributing the wealth of the Ummah, preventing its theft, prohibiting depravity and immorality, confronts Western hegemony over our lands, and helps to free all oppressed people from injustice' .. Thus, the noble and freeborn Muslims who are jealous of their religion, sanctities and honour must not suffice with merely removing the tyrant whose removal is an obligation, but rather they must continue their Jihad and struggle until an Islamic government is established which guarantees justice, freedom, and independence.'
AAZ [April 2011] "A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (5)"	236	"'I also call upon our people in Libya to be patient, steadfast and coalesced in order for their goal to be achieved by establishing a Muslim state in Libya, to rule by Sharia, bring Shura, spread justice, support the oppressed, and seek to liberate Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, and every occupied inch of the Muslim homelands.'" America, which accuses al-Qadhafi of killing civilians, has killed and is killing civilians everywhere; from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Iraq and Afghanistan, and from the most recent events killing 60 civilians, amongst them women and children, in Ghazi Abad village in Kunar province in February.' America hires mercenaries and kills and tortures in secret prisons, and yet pretends to be affected by Qaddafi's use of the same. ... "And the anticipated holistic reforms can be summed in three ways, and they are: the legislative, political, and social reform": introduction of Shar'iah; Egypt must return to its leadership role within the Ummah (including severing all ties with Israel, opening borders with Gaza and 'liberate the Ummah from the shackles of oppression and fear'; install a 'righteous government in its behaviour and practices that preserves morals and values, and stops the spread of vice and dissolution' (tackle corruption, achieve just distribution of

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to a pious society and ways to achieve the ultimate goal [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		wealth, tackle drug abuse etc).
UBL [May 2011] "The Speech of the Martyr of Islam.."	240	"I remind the faithful people that the creation of a council to offer opinion and advice to the Muslim people on all the important points is a Shariah duty"
AAZ [May 2011] "A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (6)"	238	<p>Talks of internal and external challenges that need to be addressed in Egypt: "As for the internal challenges; the most important includes legislative and judicial reforms", this includes amending the second article of the constitution allowing for rule by shari'ah. ...</p> <p>Wants Egypt to return to its "role in defending the Islamic and Arab Ummah and the rest of the weakened in the world."</p>
AAZ [July 2011] "The Noble Knight Dismounted"	239	<p>"and it is incumbent upon us to continue the work on the path of Jihad to expel the invaders from the Muslim lands and purge them from oppression and the oppressors." ...</p> <p>"To make the Shariah the ruler and not the ruled, to cleanse the lands from the corrupt and thieves, to end the tragedy of the oppressed prisoners, to divide wealth fairly and justly, to end all types of social and political oppression, and return your lands to being like citadels for Islam and support for the Muslims in Palestine and everywhere."</p>
AAZ [July 2011] "Glory of the East.."	241	The revolt in Syria must not end until the flag of jihad is raised over Mount Scopus in our beloved and usurped land of Jerusalem'
AAZ [August 2011] "A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings.. (7)"	242	<p>"So be steadfast, our Muslim Ummah, and do not back down from insisting on toppling the agents of America, and do not back down from establishing just rule that rules with the Shariah, spreads justice, implements Shura and uproots corruption and the corrupters." ...</p> <p>"Your sons, the mujahideen, are paving the way for the heralded change with their blessed strikes against the Global Crusader Alliance that has started to stagger due to their impact" [hardly reflects events of the Arab spring and its aftermath]. ...</p> <p>"The shariah is the sole source of legislation." Suggests the Constitution is rewritten with the clause "Islamic Shariah is the sole source of legislation, and all the articles of the constitution and the law which opposed it are null and void." Talks of this as the "noble aim" of the "Islamic movement."</p>
AAZ [August 2011] Do not become weak or grieve"	243	"My Muslim brothers and beloved Mujahideen: we have crossed strides on the road, but we still have other strides before us until victory is achieved, and we still have Jihad with the hand and the tongue before us until we purify all of the Muslim homelands from the occupiers, and until we remove from them the corrupt rulers. And until we establish a Sharia-based...rule that spreads justice and removes corruption."

APPENDIX 3.3 (b) Ultimate Objectives

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to desirable past or existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [November 1996] “Bin Ladin interviewed on Jihad against US”	150	Taliban Afghanistan
UBL [March 1997] “Interview with Usama bin Ladin”	155	We believe that Taliban are sincere in their attempts to enforce Islamic religious law. We saw the situation here before (they took over) and after, and have seen an obvious improvement.'
UBL [November 1998] “Bin Laden: Expel Jews, Christians from Holy Places”	175	'By enforcing Shariat in Afghanistan Taleban have established the system of God on God's land'
UBL [February 1999] May 1998 interview with bin Ladin reported	182	The Taliban 'established peace and restored the confidence of the public.'
UBL [May 2000] “Usama speaks on Hijra and the Islamic State”	189	'Afghanistan is the only country in the world today that has the Shari'ah. Therefore, it is compulsory upon on all the Muslims all over the world to help Afghanistan. And to make hijra to this land, because it is from this land that we will dispatch our armies all over the world to smash the kuffar all over the world.'
UBL [April 2001] “Letter from Usama bin Laden..”	120	The Afghan emirate is the only one properly implementing the Shari'a.
AAZ [February 2005] “The Freeing of Humanity..”	109	'What is our fault, as there is none amongst us who claim the right of forgiving sins, nor the engaging in the wealth of the people without consequence, nor do we sell stamps in exchange for forgiveness. What is our fault, as never did we fight scientists and science, rather we are a nation that honoured science and scientists, and our natural sciences like medicine, architecture and astronomy all developed in the arms of the mosque and the school'.
AAZ (and Adam Gadhan) [September 2006] “An invitation to Islam”	33	Islam according to Ibn Tamiyya's interpretation, dedication to God etc...

Communiqué and author	[ID]	References to desirable past or existing societies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [December 2012] “Realities of the Conflict between Islam and Unbelief”	94	Caliphate, Salahuddin, Sultan Muhammad the Conqueror..
UBL [September 2007] “The Solution..”	10	When rulers ruled according to Islam
AAZ [April 2008] “The Open Meeting..”	107	The Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan have 'supported and accepted the Islamic Emirate', since it replaced the 'deterioration and damage' that existed before. This can be seen in several issues: (1) 'Citizens in the various provinces and districts have welcomed and incited the Taliban to come to them to purge their areas of those who spread mischief'. This lead to the Taliban's controlling of 95 per cent of Afghanistan. (2) 'Two thousand scholars at the Qandahar conference pledged allegiance to leader of the faithful, Mullah Mohammad Omar', (3) 'The Islamic Emirate took control over large parts of Afghanistan' despite the onslaught from crusaders, their collaborators, and despite 'the Pakistani treason'. 'The Emirate's control is spreading and becoming stronger due to the great popular support it enjoys'. (4) other jihadist groups have also stressed thes factors [assumes support of the people, when there is none]. The Islamic Emirate was the only side which recognised the mujahid government in Chechnya. The Afghan people support the Taliban and their jihad.
AAZ [June 2008] “On the Anniversary of the Naksa..”	15	The Ottoman caliphate, without borders, which protected the Palestinians.
AAZ [August 2010] “Message to the People of Turkey”	225	The Ottomans defended the lands of Islam for five centuries.
AAZ [September 2010] “A Victorious Ummah, a Broken Crusade”	226	Ottoman empire, defended Muslim lands

APPENDIX 3.4 (a) Approaching Violence

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [unknown date] "Response to a Grave Uncertainty.."	117	Jihad an individual duty. On the need to take up arms to topple corrupt rulers and fight Israel.
UBL [unknown date] "Methodological Guidelines"	112	9/11 showed that America could be struck. Jihad is the only way.
UBL [unknown date] Letter to Mullah Omar	61	Possible WMD: 'It is a fact that the Islamic Republics region is rich with significant scientific experiences in conventional and non-conventional military industries, which will have a great role in future Jihad against the enemies of Islam.'
AAZ [unknown date] "Introduction to Characteristics of Jihad"	35	Importance of martyrdom operations
AAZ [purported] [unknown date] "Jihad, Martyrdom, and the killing of innocents"	48	<p>A treatise which uses lengthy religious arguments, mainly from the hadith to suggest that martyrdom operations are permitted (justified due to the intent of killing in the service of Islam), and that bombardment of areas where protected people may be harmed is permissible, as long as there is need for the Muslims to do so or if refraining from attack would delay the jihad.</p> <p>'Loving martyrdom and engaging in battle lead to glory and strength [for the Muslims]'</p> <p>'There is no difference between a man killing himself with his own hands or through the agency of another [...] provided that this is all done for the good and glory of Islam'.</p> <p>The siege of Taif, where the Prophet used catapults.</p> <p>Sets out three views towards killing those who should be protected from the Hadith; total prohibition, total legitimacy with blood money, based on al-Shaf'i and the Hanbalis - permission to kill these groups, 'as long as there is a need or an obligation for Muslims to do so, or if not striking leads to a delay to jihad. As for blood money and atonement, these are to be judged individually.' 'This third view is the one that we hold' → (1) open warfare with the infidels is impossible, so 'bombarding the organizations of the infidels and apostates [...] becomes imperative'. (2) The leaders of infidels shelter themselves in armoured cars and the like, so it is imperative to strike them explosives, rockets and such weaponry. (3) The leaders do not travel in isolation and often with many people around them. (4) Explosives and missiles have proved very helpful in Egypt, Algeria, Palestine, and Lebanon. (5) The mujahideen should take care to repeatedly warn the Muslims who are intermixed with the tyrants and their aides, to stay away from their centres, offices etc. (6) Those Muslims who intermingle freely with the tyrants are 'less sacred in the religion than those Muslims who are coerced and used as shields' (who can however also be fired upon). (7) If a Muslim is knowingly killed, then</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		atonement should be made. Blood money should only be paid if there are financial surpluses. ... Quotes Ibn Taymiyya saying: 'It is imperative to distinguish between repulsing the invading, oppressive infidel and pursuing him in his own lands.' [these arguments easier to justify than the more offensive ones].
AAZ [early 1991] "The Bitter Harvest"	46	Criticises the Brotherhood's rejection of violence.
AAZ [early 1992] "The Black Book: An account of the Torture of Muslims in the Time of Husni Mubarak"	114	Armed resistance, jihad necessary.
AAZ/Islamic Jihad [early 1993] "Advice to the Community to reject the Fatwa of Bin Baz.."	99	"These rulers are unbelieving apostates whom it is necessary to fight until the unbelief and the corruption that hover over our countries are eliminated".
UBL [July 1994] "The Banishment of Communism from the Arabian Peninsula"	38	On the jihad operations against Yemeni socialists. 'All those who oppose the faith of the ummah will face this type of ending' [defeat through jihad].
UBL [August 1995] "The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two Mosques"	69	Sending arms and fighting in Bosnia recognised as something that should have happened
AAZ [early 1996] "Healing the Hearts of the Believers"	118	Discusses the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad and explains this in Shari'a context. Emphasis on that this was done due to the Egyptian regime calling for loyalty of other things than God. The operation was carried out both to punish Egypt for its crimes, and Pakistan for its espionage and hostility towards mujahideen. . Legitimacy of 'martyrdom' operations according to Shari'a: suicide justified 'in the interest of religion'. Adopts Shafi'i/Hanbali views on targeting Muslims and protected non-Muslims when necessary. But ancient arguments written to suit a particular context are twisted and turned and interpreted to show that suicide operations are allowed. Since it is so difficult to get to leaders themselves since they are protected, the 'structure' can be targeted in stead. In defence of suicide attacks cites examples of Muslims who were captured and told to recant their faith or die, thus justifying suicide for the greater good [but this did not involve taking other lives]. Those who work for OR support the oppressive, jahil governments must take responsibility for this. These includes the media. Thus all falling within this category can be targeted. This view, Zawahiri then transferred onto the West when developing the attitude and strategy of AQ in this regard.
UBL [September 1996] "Bin Ladin Declares Jihad on Americans/Letter from Usama bin Muhammad bin Ladin to his Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula.."	5	Importance of asymmetric warfare – light and agile forces operating in secrecy. 'Jihad and explosives', shedding of blood' of enemy only way of ridding the Peninsula of American occupation

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [November 1996] “Bin Ladin interviewed on Jihad against US”	150	<p>'Terrorism – if it is against criminals, thieves, and bandits – is a legitimate thing adopted by all states in all ages. The blameworthy terrorism is the kind committed by thieves against nations.' Welcomes recent Al-Khobar and Riyadh attacks as 'praiseworthy terrorism because it was against thieves, not individuals but major states which went there to plunder the riches of this nation and to encroach on its greatest holy sites.'</p> <p>When asked why they had not attacked after Jihad was declared against America earlier in the year, UBL responds that 'major operations' take time to prepare.</p> <p>Claims he, and other Arab veterans from the Soviet war, fought Americans in Somalia.</p>
UBL [February 1997] “Correspondent meets with opposition leader bin Ladin”s	151	People need 'to not only hit American military but also demand the expulsion of civilians.' People should 'kill American soldiers'
UBL [March 1997] “Bin Ladin Cited on Prince Sultan’s US Visit”	152	Urges support for mujahideen in order to tackle the US occupiers and Isreal
UBL [March 1997] “Bin Ladin Charges US involvement in China bombings”	153	Urged attacks on US, UK, and French troops in ME/NA.
UBL [March 1997] “Pakistan interviews Usama bin Ladin”	154	'Only Americans were killed in the explosions in Riyadh and Al-Khoba. No Saudi citizen suffered any injury. When I got the news about these blasts, I was very happy.' Claims he was not responsible but urges Saudi's to embrace such tactics to remove the Americans. .. Claims to have sent 250 men to fight Americans with Farah Aidid in Somalia, to have been responsible for many US deaths, including the downing of a helicopter and the displaying of the pilot's body.
UBL [March 1997] “Interview with Usama bin Ladin”	155	"if liberating my land is called terrorism, this is a great honour for me".
UBL [April 1997] “The Saudi Regime and the Reputed Tragedies of the Pilgrims”	70	The group leaders of the 'pure youth who are zealous about their belief, their country, and their nation' who killed American soldiers in SA, offered to the Americans.
UBL [August 1997] “Usama bin Ladin Urges ‘Befitting Reply’ to Horan”	157	Muslims must respond to Horan's remarks with a 'befitting reply'. Americans will be 'punished' for this 'crime'.
UBL + AAZ + others [February 1998] “Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans”	161	<p>'And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries'</p> <p>'The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.'</p>
UBL [March 1998] “Bin Ladin Urges	162	Talks of 'expulsion' of 'invaders' with implicit endorsement of violence

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Expulsion of Invaders..”		
UBL [March 1998] “Interview with Usama bin Ladin Reported”	163	Denies attack on US personnel in Saudi Arabia but calls for 'annihilation' of America
UBL [May 1998] “Clerics in Afghanistan Issue Fatwa..”	165	Need to 'move the polytheists out of the Arabian Peninsula.'
UBL [May 1998] “World Islamic Front Backs Intifadah of Palestine’s Sons/Wounds of Al-Aqsa”	167	Urges Jihad against Israel and America everywhere and 'jihad against the atheists among Americans Christians and Israeli Jews.'
UBL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin Creates New Front Against US, Israel”	168	Since the Americans could be pushed out of Somalia and Yemen, they can be pushed out of Saudi Arabia - they almost pulled their forces out, according to UBL, when their forces suffered losses in an attack [Khobar and Riyadh bombings]
UBL [May 1998] “United States Admits that Keeping its Troops in the Gulf is Causing Dissatisfaction...”	169	Importance of jihad
UBL [June 1998] “Bin Ladin Congratulates Pakistan on Possession of Nuclear Weapons”	170	Muslims 'should not be lax in possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons' and follow the example of Pakistan in this regard. Urges jihad against India, Israel-US.
UBL [June 1998] “In the Way of Allah”	171	Jihad against India, US/Israel imperative.
UBL [August 1998] “Bin Ladin Calls for ‘Jihad’ against Jews, America”	172	Claims East Africa embassy bombings were not his responsibility]. Jihad urged against US/Israel
UBL [August 1998] “The Battle Has Not Yet Started”	173	Concerns aftermath of Africa bombings, Americans warned that further attacks will follow
UBL [November 1998] “Bin Ladin: Expel Jews, Christians, from Holy Places”	175	Urges support for the mujahideen's jihad against Americans/Christians and Jews/Israel
UBL [December 1998] “Bin Ladin Denies Role in Bombings of US Missions”	176	Does not regret East Africa bombings, even though claims not to have been responsible
UBL [January 1999] “Taliban let Bin Ladin Break his Silence”	177	Denies involvement in East Africa bombings .. 'If instigating Jihad against the Jews and the Americans in order to liberate Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Ka'aba is considered a crime, then let history be a witness that I am a criminal."
UBS [January 1999] “Wrath of God..”	178	'The International Islamic Front for Jihad against the US and Israel has issued a crystal-clear fatwa calling on the Islamic nation to carry on jihad aimed at liberating holy site'

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>Claims not to be behind the East Africa bombings but praises them and says he understands the 'motives' of those who carried them out.</p> <p>On WMD: 'If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.'</p>
UBL [January 1999] "Accused Terrorist Leader Usama Bin Ladin Declares War on All Americans"	180	Importance of violence against Americans
UBL [February 1999] "Esquire interview with bin Ladin"	179	<p>On the glory of past days of jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Bosnia.</p> <p>'We believe that the biggest thieves in the world and the terrorists are the Americans. The only way for us to fend off these assaults is to use similar means.'</p>
UBL [February 1999] May 1998 interview reported	182	<p>Important for Pakistanis to 'strengthen their nuclear power and demonstrate it with full strength' in response to Indian nuclear tests. Pakistan should have a nuclear bomb of 'better quality' than India's ... Explains that the jihad against the Americans has already begun with attacks in Saudi Arabia which he applauds - these have already brought the result that America is seeking to scale down its presence in the country.</p>
AAZ [April 1999] "Letter to Abu Yasir"	123	The letter attacks the decision to stop violent operations and urges support for the Global Islamic Front established in 1998 against Jews and Christians.
UBL [June 1999] "Usama bin Ladin Pens Letter in Support of Kashmir Jihad"	183	'Armed jihad' needed to liberate Kashmir - this would include operations inside India
UBL [June 1999] "Usama bin Ladin, The Destruction of the Base"	184	<p>Praises Riyadh, Al-Khobar and East Africa attacks as they 'removed the brand of shame from the forehead of our [Islamic] nation'. Praises militants in Palestine.</p> <p>American males should be attacked. Americans support violence, their president becomes more popular if he kills the innocents. This needs to be replied to in kind. Muslims should pursue nuclear weapons as Israel and Christian West are in possession of such weapons. ... Admits to 'instigating' and 'urging' jihad.</p> <p>East Africa embassy attacks 'deserved' due to CIA conspiracies being run in these embassies. ... 'Our duty -- and we carried it out -- is to rouse the nation for jihad against the United States, Israel, and their supporters for the sake of God. We continue to move in the direction of instigating people.'</p> <p>Demands the right to secure WMD, and since both Israel and most of the Christian world have these weapons - 'it is the duty' of Muslims to possess these weapons too. ... East Africa bombings 'delighted' Muslims. ... Claims that more than 15,000 men received training in the jihad camps of Afghanistan. ... Any country that has insured the</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		necessary requirements for jihad -- number and equipment -- Muslims there should embark on jihad against the great infidel.' .. 'As we know, a person between birth and the age of 15 is not duty bound for jihad and not fully aware of its demands. And 25 years onward, a person will have been involved in family obligations'
UBL [July 1999] "Bin Ladin Calls on Muslims to Declare Jihad against US"	185	Jihad urged against US
UBL [September 1999] "UBL Orders Mujahideen to Shoot US Commandos.."	186	Urges Muslims to 'shoot on sight' US commandos.
UBL [May 2000] "UBL Sees Holy War in 'Every Street' of US"	188	Calls for jihad in 'every street' of US.
UBL [May 2000] "Usama Speaks on Hijra and the Islamic State"	189	On the glory of 'martyrdom for Allah's sake'. . Muslims need to fight the Christians and Jews, 'smash the kuffar all over the world', they need to be killed.
UBL [June 2000] "Usama bin Ladin Renews Calls for jihad"	190	Jihad needed against Jews and Christians.
UBL [September 2000] "Bin Ladin, others pledge 'Jihad' to release Prisoners.."	191	Time for action and jihad
UBL [January 2001] "Daily Prints Usama bin Ladin Letter Calling for Global Islamic State"	192	Jihad needed to liberate Muslim lands and establish global Muslim state
Muhammad bin Ladin [January 2001] video speech addressed to his father	127	'I envision you all as Salahuddin Ayubi himself, wielding his all conquering sword and his sword is dripping with the blood of the infidels. I envision Salahuddin Ayubi coming out of the clouds and in our hearts and minds is recreated the remembrance of the battles of Badr and Khyber.'
UBL [March 2001] "Ausaf receives Bin Ladin's Poem.."	193	'I have vowed to continue my jihad against the infidels, because oppression cannot be fought with resolutions, but only with jihad.'
UBL [March 2001] poem/message	194	Implicit endorsement of USS Cole bombing
UBL [April 2001] letter to scholars of Deyubende in Peshawar	120	Jihad only way to triumph
UBL [April 2001] "Usama urges Muslims to help Afghans"	196	Clear importance of Jihad in the name of Allah
UBL [May 2001] "Usama urges Ummah to continue Jihad"	197	Praises the glory of the Martyrs who fight for the Umma, its dignity. .. Need for a new Salahuddin 'wielding his all conquering sword and his sword is dripping with the blood of the infidels'

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [may 2001] "Bin Ladin sends voice message to Palestinian People.."	199	Possible implicit referral to USS Cole (Yemen coming to the aid of Palestine)
UBL [September 2001] "Afghanistan: Bin Ladin denies involvement in terrorist attacks.."	200	On 9/11: 'Following the latest explosions in the United States, some Americans are pointing the finger at me, but I deny that because I have not done it. The United States has always accused me of these incidents which have been caused by its enemies'
UBL [September 2001] "Bin Ladin: from rich kid to terrorist.."	181	Indiscriminate targeting
UBL [September 2001] "Text of bin Ladin letter to the Pakistani People"	201	Defensive Jihad paramount
UBL [September 2001] "The US Should search attackers within itself"	202	'Al-Qua'ida was set up to wage a jihad against infidelity, particularly to encounter the onslaught of the infidel countries against the Islamic states. Jihad is the sixth undeclared element of Islam.' Jews are the main cause of pain for Muslims and targeting should be aimed against them, even Americans are slaves of American Jews
UBL [October 2001] "Tayseer Allouni interviews bin Ladin in Afghanistan"	130	Admits to inciting violence against America, although does not claim responsibility of 9/11 attacks - implicit approval though. Argues America is defeatable, since the USSR was defeated, but also because he has heard from his companions in Somalia that they are worthless soldiers, "We found they had no power worthy of mention". "The events of Tuesday, September the 11th, in New York and Washington are great on all levels. Their repercussions are not over." Claims the attacks caused the West under American leadership to quickly abandon its values of freedom of speech and human rights. They are preventing the news from reporting the other side of the story, the suffering of Muslims etc. Bush and Blair declared that a Palestinian state should be created - this demonstrates the success of the attacks, "They only understand the language of attacks and killings. Just as they're killing us, we have to kill them so that there will be a balance of terror. This is the first time the balance of terror has been close between the two parties, between Muslims and Americans, in the modern age." Talks of how 'terrorism' can be good, such as that which the police uses to constrain the criminal, America and Israel are applying "condemned terrorism", "We practice the good terrorism which stops them from killing our children in Palestine and elsewhere." Welcomes the economic impact of the 9/11 attacks on US.
UBL [November 2001] "Bin Ladin condemns the US"	77	'The great strikes that hit the United States in its most important locations in New York and Washington'.
UBL [November 2001] "Al-Jazirah carries bin Ladin's address.."	203	'Terror' has struck America, 9/11 praised, but this is still 'a very small thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years.' Hijackers viewed as 'martyrs'.
UBL [November 2001] Osama claims he has nukes (article title)	125	On Nuclear WMD: 'I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.' Refuses to

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		answer how / where the weapons were acquired.
AAZ [December 2001] “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”	119	<p>On the attack in Egypt: says that the primary target was the American embassy, and if that would prove impossible, then another American target or a Western embassy of a Western country 'famous for its historical enmity to the Muslims'. When these proved out of reach the Egyptian embassy was targeted, in response to Egyptian efforts in Pakistan to target Egyptian Islamists. Says the search through the debris revealed Egypt-Indian espionage cooperation.</p> <p>Stresses that violent attacks need to be well planned and complains that not enough attention has gone into planning of attacks within the jihad movement, they are too haphazard. . 'There is no solution without jihad'.</p> <p>The gains achieved through targeting Americans and Jews: 1) striking a blow against the ‘great master’, 2) gathering support from the masses who dislike these the most, 3) expose apostate regimes that come to the aid of Americans and Jews (131). 'With the available means, small groups could prove to be a frightening horror for the Americans and the Jews'.</p> <p>'The mujahid Islamic movement must escalate its methods of strikes and tools of resisting the enemies to keep up with the tremendous increase in the number of its enemies, the quality of their weapons, their destructive powers, their disregard for all taboos, and disrespect for the customs of wars and conflicts. In this regard, we concentrate on the following: (1) The need to inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, for this is the language understood by the west, no matter how much time and effort such operations take. (2) The need to concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahidin in terms of casualties. (3) The targets as well as the type and method of weapons used must be chosen to have an impact on the structure of the enemy and deter it enough to stop its brutality, arrogance, and disregard for all taboos and customs. It must restore the struggle to its real size.(4) To reemphasize what we have already explained, we reiterate that focusing on the domestic enemy alone will not be feasible at this stage'.</p>
UBL [December 2001] “The Fact of the Conflict between us and America”	129	<p>9/11: "The blessed attacks on world-wide evil against the head of disbelief, America" (but implies the Arab mujahideen in Afghanistan are not to blame).</p> <p>"The events of 11 September are but a reaction to the continuous injustice and oppression being practiced against our sons in Palestine and Iraq and in Somalia and Southern Sudan and in other places like Kashmir and Assam. This matter concerns the whole Islamic nation." Those who condemned "this operation" failed to put it in context and view the past. [Gives an analogy which implies the attacks did not harm America that much, which contradicts later statements c.a. Min 10]. 9/11 "blessed and successful strikes". It has shattered the idol of America based on its economic strength. "Loss of upwards of a trillion dollars".</p> <p>Economic targeting: emphasises the need to "strike at the economic base that forms the foundation of the military establishment".</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>Important to strike the American economy further.</p> <p>"And when the youths - we beseech Allah to accept their martyrdom - exploded a bomb in Nairobi - a bomb that weighted less than 2 tons - America declared it a terrorist strike and that this is a mass destruction weapon" [mentions in relation to the US dropping 7 ton bombs in Afghanistan].</p> <p>"Our terrorism [nachnu irhabuna] against America is praiseworthy terrorism in order to repel the injustice of the oppressor so that America withdraws from its support of Israel who kills our children". ... Those who claim martyrdom operations are not permissible are in fact agents of America and speak the words it wants to hear.</p> <p>More attacks are required against America, "I advise the youth to find more of the American economic hubs" and attack them.</p>
UBL [February 2002] in Al-Jazirah article	204	<p>'The battle has moved to inside America' and the fight will continue. ... 'If urging people to do this [attacking US] is viewed as terrorism, then let history record that we are terrorists'.</p> <p>On the Anthrax attacks: 'These diseases are a punishment from God and are in response to the call of persecuted women in Lebanon and Palestine.'</p>
UBL [March 2002] "Usama bin Ladin: Prince Abdallah's initiative is High Treason"	205	<p>'Then came the New York invasion that ignited the house of the idiots of the age, smashed their citadels, nullified their witchcraft, exposed all the flags that marched behind them, and announced the beginning of their end, God willing'</p> <p>This presented as direct continuation of the Al Aqsa intifada. ... 'Hero' Khalid Islambouli for assassinating Sadat. ... Ummah should kill 'Americans and Jews with a bullet, a knife, or a stone' and support the mujahideen [see 2].</p>
UBL [April 2002] "MBC Carries video of Bin Ladin"	206	<p>Responsibility and praise expressed for 9/11 (Sulayman Abu-Ghayth) in response to suffering of Palestinians, Chechens, others.</p> <p>UBL welcomes the economic impact of 9/11 on America with losses in the stock exchange, the airline industry, through 'psychological shock' after the attacks and other developments. Praises God for the 'successful and blessed strikes' and calls the hijackers 'martyrs'.</p>
UBL/AAZ [April 2002] "The Wills of the Martyrs.."	207	<p>Zawahiri, bin Ladin [in numerous different interviews/statements], and other speakers praise the efforts of the 19 9/11 hijackers and present them as models for other Muslims to follow.</p> <p>'Martyrdom' in the form of suicide bombing described as the way to victory over the enemies.</p> <p>Film introduces Haznawi as a hero of Islam. UBL talks of the 'huge difference in psychological power' between the mujahideen and their enemies, especially Americans, which compensates for the lack of manpower and hardware.</p>
UBL/others [April 2002] "The Wills of the Martyrs.."	108	<p>The film is dedicated to the 'martyrs', the 19 9/11 suicide hijackers. Bin Ladin introduces them saying they 'destroyed the idol of the times and destroyed its values.</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		.. UBL: the 9/11 attacks were 'more effective than a million books in clarifying the doctrine of allegiance to the believers and disassociation from the unbelievers'. .. 'These men [the 19 hijackers] have demonstrated and proven that the capability exists to defeat the head of infidelity [America] so the youth of Islam must follow the methodology of Mohammed [...] by making jihad, as it is obligatory today].
UBL [May 2002] "British-based Islamic news agency receives encrypted bin Ladin video"	209	Campaign of which 9/11 was part, implied other acts will follow
UBL [purported] [June 2002] "Al-Qaeda's declaration in response to the Saudi Ulema.."	43	<p>'As for the atmosphere of shared understandings, what evidence is there for Muslims to strive for this? What did the Prophet, the Companions after him, and the righteous forebears do? Did they wage jihad against the infidels, attacking them all over the earth, in order to place them under the suzerainty of Islam in great humility and submission? Or did they send messages to discover "shared understandings" between themselves and the infidels..?'</p> <p>Approaching the West and wishing for dialogue mean the 'tearing down the wall of enmity from the infidels'.. And 'rejecting jihad-especially offensive jihad' which is an 'established and basic tenant of the religion'. .. 'The essence of all this comes from the halls of the United Nations, instead of the Divine foundations that are built upon hating the infidels, repudiating them with tongue and teeth till they embrace Islam or pay the jizya [tax paid by non-Muslims living in Muslim states: Ibrahim: xx] with willing submission and humility'. ... 'Does Islam; or does it not, force people by the power of the sword to submit to its authority corporeally [through paying of the jizya] if not spiritually. Yes'. (42).</p> <p>The matter is summed up for every person alive: Either submit, or live under the suzerainty of Islam, or die'. .. The ulema should have said: 'we will rise up individually and collectively in order to support jihad and the mujahideen, and we will support and increase martyrdom operations.'. .. 'Islam is spread with the sword alone'.</p>
UBL [June 2002] "A Site Close to Al-Qa'ida posts Poem..."	210	"I have sworn by God Almighty to fight the infidel."
AAZ [September 2002] "The Interview of Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri"	22	"The continual attacks on the American system, has finally pulled the Biggest Satan to the arena of Jihad [...] Once in the arena of war, it will start feeling its own losses [...] 'Our weapon in this battle is patience (sabr), perseverance (musaabara) and reliance upon Allah (tawakkul) in our fight against America. By the permission of Allah, this war will continue until the bleeding of America will result in its collapse'... 'It is imperative that we acknowledge the victory achieved by the Muslims against the Crusader forces, in New York and Washington. It was a clear success, which was more damaging to the Empire of Evil, than the heaviest blow ever sustained by the enemies of Islam. The bleeding continues even today and only Allah knows how long it will continue for. If the only fruit of these attacks is to demonstrate to the Mujahid Muslim youth the importance of the few, it would be enough. This small group, in numbers and equipment, were able to inflict immense slaughter on the greatest idol worshipped today, despite its power and

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		arrogance' Importance of martyrdom operations: 'we possess, what they cannot. The love of death in the path of Allah'. 'It is the love of death in the path of Allah, that is the weapon that will annihilate this evil empire of America'.
UBL [October 2002] "A Message Addressed to the American People"	75	'I call on you to understand the message of the two battles of New York and Washington that came in response to some of your former crimes and know that the one who has started it is the real oppressor'. On targeting centres of American economy.
UBL [October 2002] "Statement from shaykh Usama bin Ladin, may God protect him, and the Al-Qa'ida Organization"	211	'The mujahidin, with the Grace of Allah, still maintain their pledge; they do not forgive or give up.' Praise for Muhammad Atta and the like. .. Praise for the oil tanker attack off Yemen,
UBL [October 2002] "Letter from Usama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the American People"	212	Threats of attacks matching those of 9/11. Importance of martyrdom in the name of Islam.
UBL [October 2002] "Al-Majallah Obtains Bin Ladin's Will.."	213	'The New York and Washington action represented the third of the increasing blows dealt to the United States. The first was the bombing of the Marines in Lebanon and the second was the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi from where the US invasion of Somalia was launched during which 31,000 of our brothers were killed under the UN flag.'
UBL [November 2002] "Osama bin Laden hails recent opertaions.."	76	The 9/11 attacks, killing of Germans in Tunisia, French in Karachi, destruction of French oil tanker in Yemen, killing of Marines in Failaka, killing of British and Australian in Bali, and attack in Moscow - 'all these events are nothing but a reaction and equal treatment that were carried out by the sons of Islam who stood up to defend their religion and to follow the orders of Allah'. "Australia, which we had already warned not to participate in the aggression against Afghanistan let alone is abhorrent role in splitting East Timor (from Indonesia), ignored our warnings until it woke up at the sound of the explosions in Bali. All the time until then, its government had falsely stated that they weren't targeted'. Attacks in Tunisia, Karachi, Faylaka, Bali, Amman. Attacks in Moscow response to killings in Chechnya.
UBL [November 2002] "Statement from Abdullah Usama bin Ladin to the Peoples of countries Allied to Tyrannical US Government"	214	'Reciprocity is only fair. What has happened since the New York and Washington conquests to this day -- such as the killing of Germans in Tunisia and the French in Karachi, the bombing of the French super tanker in Yemen, the killing of the Marines in Faylaka, the killing of the British and Australians in the Bali bombings, the recent Moscow operation, and the miscellaneous operations here and there -- are only reactions and reciprocal actions carried out by the ardent sons of Islam to defend their religion'.
UBL [November 2002] "Bin Ladin in a special message to the people of the Peninsula.."	215	Muslims in the Peninsula should prepare to fight, 'even with light arms'. .. 'We will do to the United States what pleases the Muslims and fill their hearts with joy, God willing.'

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AAZ [December 2002] “Al Wala Wa al Baraa..”	45	<p>Jihad should be waged against 'original infidels' occupying the lands of Islam, and against apostate rulers in the lands of Islam (those who do not rule according to the sharia, the friends of Jews and Christians), and against the hypocrites.</p> <p>Importance of warfare against the infidels.</p> <p>'Two blessed raids on New York and Washington'.</p>
UBL [February 2003] audio statement	78	<p>The victory against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the Russians in Chechnya.</p> <p>On the success of violent attack on US forces: (1) 'Let me remind you of the defeat of the American forces in Beirut in 1982 [...] when the Lebanese resistance was personified by the truck laden with explosives that struck the main military base of the US Marines in Beirut, killing 242 soldiers'. (2) 'Then after the Second Gulf War, America deployed her forces to Somalia and killed over thirteen thousand sons of the Muslims therein, before the lions of Islam from amongst the "Arab Afghans" and their brothers from that region pounced upon her and rubbed here arrogance into the dust, killing scores of them, destroying their tanks and downing their aircraft. Thus America and her allies fled in the darkness of the night'. (3) 'During the same period the young Mujahideen prepared for them explosives in Aden and after their detonation, the cowardly Americans ran away and fled the country in less than 24 hours'. (4) 'Then in 1995, the explosion in Riyadh took place, killing four Americans', 'the following year, another explosion in al-Khobar killed 19 Americans and wounded more than 400 of them, prompting them to move their bases from the cities to the desert', (5) 'Then in 1998, the Mujahideen warned America to cease their support to the Jews and leave the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, but the enemy refused to heed this warning, so the Mujahideen, with the ability from Allah, smashed them with two mighty smashes in East Africa'. (6) 'Then again America was warned, but she refused to pay attention [...] so the Mujahideen destroyed the American Destroyer, the USS Cole, in Aden, in a martyrdom operation'. (7) 'Following that, the Mujahideen saw the black gang of thugs in the White House hiding the Truth, and their stupid and foolish leader, who is elected and supported by his people, denying reality and proclaiming that we (the Mujahideen) were striking them because we were jealous of them (the Americans), whereas the reality is that we are striking them because of their evil and injustice in the whole of the Islamic World, especially in Iraq and Palestine and their occupation of the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries. Upon seeing this, the Mujahideen decided to teach them a lesson and to take the war to their heartland. On the blessed Tuesday 11 September 2001' [...] 'They destroyed the idols of America, they struck at the very heart of the Department of Defence and they hit the black heart of the US economy'. 'Yet [with 9/11] there occurred an even bigger destruction: that of the Great American Dream and legend of Democracy [...] one of the many positive results from the retaliatory attacks on New York and Washington is that it has exposed the true characteristics of the Crusaders and revealed the extent of their hate towards the Muslims'. 'The ties of brotherhood between Muslims became stronger', 'The American public is also now aware of what is happening in Palestine and that what happened to them in Manhattan was because of the policies of the leaders that they elected'. 'In</p>

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		<p>conclusion, America is definitely a great power, with an unbelievable military strength and a vibrant economy, but all of these have been built on a very weak and hollow foundation. Therefore it is easy to target that flimsy base and concentrate on their weak points and even if we are able to target one tenth of these weak points, we will be able to crush and destroy them and remove them from ruling and conquering the World'.</p> <p>To the youths: 'so know that targeting the Americans and killing them in any corner of the Earth, is the greatest of obligations and the most excellent of ways to gain nearness to Allah. Furthermore, I advise the youth to use their intelligence in killing them secretly'.</p>
UBL [February 2003] “A Message to our Brothers in Iraq”	79	'We stress the importance of the martyrdom operations against the enemy - operations that inflicted harm on the United States and Israel that has been unprecedented in their history'. Emphasises camouflage and trenches in fighting the enemy.
UBL [April 2003] “Usama bin LAdin urges Muslims to launch suicide attacks against US”	217	<p>Martyrdom for those who die for the right cause.</p> <p>'If you launch suicide attacks [presumably 'martyrdom operations' in original], I assure you, the US citizens all over the world will be frightened. The United States will retreat in the face of your suicide mission'</p>
UBL [May 2003] “Riyadh, Casablanca Attacks”	218	'Punishments will rain down on the Arab regimes that are the henchmen of the United States and which refrained from reacting during the war.'" Statement thought to be precursor to Riyadh attacks (12 May 2003) although aired after the event.
AAZ [May 2003] statement	54	<p>Nothing will do Muslims good except 'through arms and taking revenge against your enemies', 'The crusaders and the Jews do not understand but the language of killing and blood. They do not become convinced unless they see coffins returning to them, their interests being destroyed, their towers being torched, and their economy collapsing'.</p> <p>'O Muslims, take matters firmly against the embassies of America, England, Australia, and Norway and their interests, companies, and employees'.</p>
UBL [May 2003] report on statement	219	Promises bloody response to Saudi authorities
UBL [July 2003] letter	220	Claims not to be linked to May 2003 Riyadh bombings
UBL/AAZ [September 2003] Audio statement	110	9/11 hijackers true Muslims. 'He who is not convinced of killing should go away and not influence those who are convinced [of killing]' [UBL].
UBL [October 2003] “Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq”	98	Martyrdom is 'the Prophet's way'. The economic impact of 'that blessed day in New York' - repercussions that have reached over a trillion dollars, and a budged deficit for the third consecutive year - record high.
UBL [November 2003] “Al-Jazirah TV: Al-Qa’ida claims responsibility for Istanbul bombings”	221	The attack on two synagogues in Istanbul after detection of the 'presence of Israeli intelligence agents inside the synagogues'
UBL [January 2004] “Resist the New Rome”	111	'Jihad is the effective power to foil all their [the West] conspiracies. Jihad is the path, so seek it.'

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UBL [April 2004] Peace offering to Europeans	80	<p>'What happened on 11 September and 11 March is your commodity that was returned to you', these acts are in reaction to violence against Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine, e.g. the killing of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.</p> <p>'The killing of the Russians was after their invasion of Afghanistan and Chechnya; the killing of Europeans was after their invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan; and the killing of Americans on the day of New York was after their support of the Jews in Palestine and their invasion of the Arabian Peninsula'. Somalia.</p>
UBL [May 2004] "People of Iraq"	82	<p>'Religion does not develop with pennies and seconds, rather with fighting'. The importance of killing occupying soldiers. 'In al-Qaeda, we are committed to a reward of 10,000 grams of gold for whoever kills the occupier, Bremer, his deputy, the American Forces leader, or his deputy in Iraq'. 'Whoever kills Kofi Annan, or his envoy to Iraq, or his representative like al-Akhdar al-Ibrahimi, he will receive 10,000 grams of gold. A reward of 1,000 grams of gold for killing any military or civilian individual from the Veto countries [Security Council 5] like the Americans or the British. A reward of 500 grams of gold for killing military or civilian individuals from the slaves of the General Assembly in Iraq like the Japanese and the Italians. [classifies countries according to UN status]. Due to the security circumstances, distributing the awards will take place in the nearest opportunity'. Although the greatest award is martyrdom with the award going to the heirs in stead.</p>
UBL [October 2004] Threat of the US	31	<p>The plan is to bleed America to bankruptcy. Provoking it to take part in costly wars. Talks of how he came up with the idea of 9/11.</p>
UBL [October 2004] "Message to Americans"	83	<p>'Just as you lay waste to our nation. So shall we lay waste to yours'. The story behind 9/11: 'it had never occurred to us', but after it became unbearable and we witnessed the oppression and tyranny of the American/Israeli coalition against our people in Palestine and Lebanon', 'the events that affected my soul in a direct way started in 1982 when America permitted the Israelis to invade Lebanon', 'in those difficult moments many hard-to-describe ideas bubbled in my soul, but in the and they produced an intense feeling of rejection of tyranny, and gave birth to a strong resolve to punish the oppressors', 'and as I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind [...] that we should destroy towers in America'. 'Is defending oneself and punishing the aggressor in kind, objectionable terrorism? If it is such, then it is unavoidable for us'.</p> <p>As for its results, they have been, by the grace of Allah, positive and enormous, and have by all standards, exceeded all expectations'. ... The importance of provocation: 'All that we have mentioned has made it easy for us to provoke and bait this administration. All that we have to do is send two mujahideen to the furthest point East to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses without their achieving for it anything of note other than some benefits for their private companies. This is in addition to our having experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers'. 'So we are continuing this policy of bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy'. The policy of the White House that demands opening up new fronts to keep corporations happy, has brought spectacular gains for AQ. This 'bleed to bankruptcy plan' is</p>

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		succeeding, evident for instance in Bush resorting to emergency funds to continue the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Royal Institute for International Affairs emphasised the impact of 9/11, costing 500 thousand and inflicting 500 billion dollars worth of damage, at least. Claims Atta was given 20 min to carry out the attacks, but the lack of US, and esp. Bush's, response, meant they had three times that time.
UBL [December 2004] "Message concerning Saudi Arabia"	84	<p>The Saudi Regime does not rule according to the principles of Islam, 'The solution is to unseat the ruler. If he declines, then arms would be taken up to unseat him'. 'If a ruler becomes an infidel, his imamate becomes null and void, and it would become required to take up arms against him'. 'Rights cannot be restored from a regime when the ruler becomes renegade or refuses to follow religion except by force'.</p> <p>'Targeting America in Iraq in terms of economy and losses in life is a golden and unique opportunity'. Oil: 'exert all you can to stop the greatest stealing operation that takes place in history', 'be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf for this is their fate'.</p>
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	86	'I urge you to strike supply routes and oil lines, and to plant twice as many mines that leave no wounded, and to assassinate company owners who provide the enemy with supplies, whether in Riyadh, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, or other places'. 'You should become diligent in carrying out martyrdom operations; these operations, praise be to God, have become a great source of terror for the enemy. They have perturbed its movement, frustrated its plans, and challenged its weapons and soldiers'.
AAZ [February 2005] "The Freeing of Humanity.."	109	Jihad and martyrdom key to reform.
AAZ [June 2005] video statement	72	<p>'To get the invading Crusader forces and the Jews out of the lands of Islam cannot be achieved by demonstrating and screaming throats in the streets only, reform and driving the crusaders out of the Muslim lands will only happen by fighting for God's sake'.</p> <p>The only way of getting rid of the Saud and Mubarak and like rulers is through fighting them in a Jihad, and their American backers. Otherwise they will not budge.</p>
AAZ [August 2005] interview	128	Urges further attacks in Britain, US.
AAZ [November 2005] "Wills of the Knights of the London Raids"	53	'The blessed London raid, which came as a slap in the face to the conceited crusader British arrogance, and made it drink from the same cup from which it had long made the Muslims drink. This blessed raid, like its glorious predecessors in New York, Washington, and Madrid, brought the battle to the enemy's soil'.
AAZ [December 2005] interview	49	<p>[Indirect]: 'The clear declaration of their failure came one day after the blessed raid on London, when the Americans and English declared they were preparing to leave Iraq'.</p> <p>'The jihad movement is growing and rising. It reached its peak with the two blessed raids on Washington and New York. And now it is waging a great historic battle in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and even within the Crusaders' own home. The latest raid on the Crusaders' home was the blessed raid against London, which was a slap to the face of British Crusader arrogance - and this is after the mujahid lion of Islam, sheikh</p>

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		<p>Osama bin Laden had offered the peoples of the West a treaty, if they leave the countries of Islam.' .. 'the arrogant Jack Straw [then foreign secretary], said that these proposals should be treated with contempt. So let them pay the price! - of their government's fifth and arrogance'.</p> <p>'I call upon the mujahidin to focus their campaigns on the stolen petroleum of the Muslims. Most of its revenue goes to the enemies of Islam, and what's left is plundered by the thieves who rule our countries. This is the greatest theft in the history of mankind.[...] If the only way to repel these thieves is by killing them, then let them be killed - without dignity'.</p> <p>'The blessed London raid is one of the raids that the Qaedat al-Jihad organization had the honour of carrying out against the British Crusader arrogance'.</p>
AAZ [December 2005] "Obstacles to Jihad"	25	<p>References to the effectiveness of jihad in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, 9/11 against the Americans, Afghanistan against Russia, in Palestine etc. If everyone is satisfied with debating and protesting, then there will be 'no hope for deliverance'. Mujahideen operations have been successful in Iraq where the enemy is reeling from the blows inflicted by the mujahideen.</p> <p>A day after the London raids, the date was set to withdraw troops from Iraq. Jihad is the path to victory and honour. Sacrifice of Muslims has been key in spreading the religion and defeating enemies. The Mujahideen have kept the enemies of Muslims at bay.</p>
AAZ [March 2006] "The Alternative is Da'wa and Jihad"	73	<p>The only way forward is jihad removing the corrupt regime, setting up an Islamic government.</p> <p>Importance of economic attacks: 'The first front is that of inflicting losses on the Crusader West, especially its economic structure, through dealing strikes which will make it bleed for years. The strikes in New York, Washington, Madrid and London are the best example of such strikes. In this regard, we have to prevent the Crusader West from stealing the Muslims' oil, which is being drained in the biggest robbery in human history'.</p> <p>On martyrdom operations: 'The only way to halt the plot of Crusaders of taking over all Muslim lands is 'through the martyrdom and sacrifices of mujahideen in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya'.</p>
AAZ [April 2006] "Four Years since the Battle of Tora Bora"	238	<p>The London bombings: 'those who carried out the bombings said repeatedly and unambiguously that they carried out these heroic operations because of Britain's crimes against the Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq'. [not direct indication that the attacks were ordered by AQ].</p> <p>'Any other path than jihad will lead to failure'. Quoting Shaqi: 'if you confront evil with goodness, you will be frustrated; but if you confront evil with evil, it will retreat'.</p>
AAZ [April 2006] "Letter to the People of Pakistan"	81	'The group Qaida al-Jihad in the Land of Two Rivers alone has carried out 800 martyrdom operations in 3 years, besides the sacrifices of the other Mujahideen, and this is what has broken the back of America in Iraq'
UBL [May 2006] "A	91	Zacarias Moussaoui has no connection with the events of 9/11,

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Testimony to the Truth”		'because I was responsible for entrusting the 19 brothers - Allah have mercy upon them - with those raids, and I did not assign brother Zacarias to be with them on that mission'. 'The participants in September 11th were two groups: pilots and support teams for each pilot in order to control the aircraft'.
AAZ [June 2006] “Support for Palestinians”	85	'Palestine shall be liberated [...] by the blood of the martyrs, suffering of the prisoners, and Jihad in the Path of Allah'. Importance of mujahideen and Jihad throughout.
AAZ [June 2006] “Elegizing the Ummah’s Martyr..”	32	Jihad is the way forward
AAZ [June 2006] “The Zionist Crusader’s Aggression in Gaza and Lebanon”	88	On 9/11: 'In Kandahar, approximately one year before the New York and the Washington raids, the late leader Abu-Hafs [...] was delivering a lecture to a number of trainees on the situation in Palestine and the conditions of Muslims. At the end of the lecture, the hero Mohammed Atta [...] stood up and asked the leader, Abu-Hafs, with seriousness and fervour: How can we then resist the aggression in Palestine? America knows the rest of the story very well'.
UBL [June 2006] “Elegizing the Ummah’s Martyr..”	92	Importance of martyrdom and carrying the banner.
UBL [July 2006] “To the Ummah in General and the Mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia in Particular”	93	'The harm by these Crusader infidels and renegades can only be stopped through fighting'. Abu-Hamzah al-Mujahir urged to focus his attacks on the Americans and their supporters in Iraq. Those countries that send forces to Somalia may expect attacks in their own countries, as well as against their troops.
AAZ [September 2006] “Hot issues..”	21	The West only understands retribution and punishment. Must focus on its economic interests, particularly petroleum.
AAZ [December 2006] “Realities of Conflict Between Islam and Unbelievers”	94	On the fallacy of trying to introduce an Islamic state through democratic means (see -free text). 'There is no solution without Jihad', any other solutions will be futile and 'like treating cancer with aspirin'. 'The Mujahideen's love of martyrdom', not elections, or cooperation or respect for international law pushed the Americans back in Iraq and Afghanistan.
AAZ [December 2006] “Congratulations on the Eid to the Ummah of Tawhed”	95	Victory is not brought about through fatwas, or parliamentary elections, but only through martyrdom seeking. Must not differentiate between foreign invaders and their domestic agents.
AAZ [January 2007] “Rise and Support our Brothers in Somalia”	96	To the Somalian mujahideen: 'employ ambushes, mines, and martyrdom-seeking campaigns so as to devour them exactly as lions devour their preys'.
AAZ [January 2007] “The Correct Equation”	28	Duty of all Muslims to bear arms or serve and support those who are bearing arms. Jihad is the only way of freeing the Al-Aqsa mosque.
AAZ [February 2007] “Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427”	97	'My Muslim Ummah, the duty of each one of us today is to fight in Allah's path and bear arms. And the one who is unable to bear arms must serve those who bear arms'.
AAZ [March 2007] “Palestine is the concern of all Muslims”	18	Muslims must 'stay in their trenches' and be 'proud of their guns'.

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AAZ [May 2007] “The Empire of Evil is about to End”	23	The Muslims must not beg for rights from their corrupt rulers, such an approach is fruitless. The movement which is forcing the Americans out of the region is the movement of violence. 'At this stage, it is the duty of the Muslim Ummah to bear arms against the trespassing invaders and their interests. Everyone who trespasses on the Muslim Ummah must have his hand cut off, whether this aggression is in Chechnya, or in Afghanistan, or Kashmir, or Iraq, or Palestine or Somalia. And along with this confrontation of the invaders, the Muslim Ummah must also beware of those defenders of the invaders who stab it from behind, and must strive from today to work for their removal'.
AAZ [June 2007] “Forty Years since the Fall of Jerusalem”	101	'Jihad is the road to salvation for the Muslim nation and indeed for all mankind'. 'The duty of the Muslim nation today is to carry arms in the way of God. If it cannot do so it must give support to those who carry arms in the way of God'.
AAZ [July 2007] “The Advice of one Concerned”	102	<p>'Smashing of the two dens of American espionage in Nairobi and Dar al-Salam, to the destruction of the destroyer Cole, to the greatest conquests in the raids on New York and Washington' these were all mujahideen victories, as were conquests in Afghanistan and Iraq, and all over the world - from Indonesia to Spain.</p> <p>'If every officer who murdered an innocent person was to be found killed, they wouldn't dare to murder. If every officer who violated someone's honour was to be killed, they wouldn't dare to violate honour'. ... The two-pronged plan to confront the enemy alliance: 'The near-term plan consists of targeting Crusader-Jewish interests [...] in our country and in theirs'. In the long term: 'force must be an element in change'. 'The long-term plan is divided into two halves: the first half consists of earnest, diligent work to change these corrupt and corruptive regimes' - many different strategies according to each individual situation - but several characteristics in all: patience paramount in all; as is 'striving to achieve popular sympathy for the Islamic Mujahid movement for change'; force through mass-popular uprising, military coup, mass disobedience, guerrilla warfare, armed political resistance; Ummah must get used to challenging falsehood and declaring the truth; 'there must be an organization and leadership leading change. 'As for the second half of the long-term plan, it consists of hurrying to the fields of Jihad like Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia for Jihad preparation and training' [see also 15] [strategy].</p>
UBL [September 2007] “The Solution..”	10	'This innocence of yours [the Americans] is like my innocence of the blood of your sons on the 11th'
UBL [September 2007] “Come to Jihad..”	14	Rising up against the Musharraf regime is obligatory according to Shariah even if this means shedding of blood. 'Fighting in Allah's path is an act of worship and it is based on sacrifice of selves. Muslim blood is spilled and poured out to protect the religion.'
AAZ [December 2007] “A Review of Events”	13	The Jihadi intifada and awakening in Pakistan in the tribal regions defeated Musharraf.
AAZ [early 2008] “Exoneration..”	20	There is no peaceful solution to the problems of Egypt, especially after the regime banned public protests in mosques after demonstrations in the Al-Azhar where crushed. See on end goals. The Muslims are the wronged party and they should not be encouraged from attacking the enemy. Five indicators of the 'greatness' of 9/11: (1) brought Islam to the forefront in the battle against infidels, over ethnic and nationalistic causes for conflict, (2) underlined importance of jihad in bringing about changes, (3) ended the idea of the nation state, (4) ended the era

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		<p>where the US can attack Muslims with impunity, (5) marked the beginning of the collapse of America. 'In their current state, Muslims cannot confront America and Israel by conventional warfare, with armies containing fleets, airplanes, armoured vehicles, and artillery. They can, however, avert the evil of all those weapons trained on them by means of jihad operations that make use of the methods permitted by the Shari'ah'.</p> <p>On WMD: 'Nuclear weapons are the invisible participant in all the negotiations between the Arabs and Israel' in order to achieve balance of power (p 178). Importance of attacking tourists: 'They followed it to defend Muslims' lands, lives, and honour. In Jerba, Tunisia, Jewish tourists were killed to defend Muslims in Palestine. In Bali, Indonesia, Australian tourists were killed to defend Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. When the Taliban kidnapped Koreans, for example, they kidnapped them because they were Christian missionaries operating under the protection of crusader bombers. When the mujahidin struck tourists, they did not strike tourists from Brazil in Finland or from Vietnam in Venezuela!'</p>
AAZ [February 2008] "An Elegy to the Martyred Commander Abu Layth al-Libi"	19	Congratulates al-Layth al-Libi for 'joining the caravan of martyrs'.
AAZ [March 2008] "A Call to Help our People in Gaza"	17	Muslims need to carefully plan, seek funding and weapons and carry out attacks, seeking martyrdom. Mere public protests are useless.
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting part one.."	105	<p>'Qaida al-Jihad struck the Jews in Jerba, Tunisia, and struck the Israeli tourists in Mombassa'. Dealing blows to America, England, Spain, Australia, and France in Afghanistan, Iraq, Peninsula, Yemen and Algeria. AQ will strive to 'deal blows to the Jews inside Israel and outside it' (1/1). . Zarqawi's bombing of the UN hq in Iraq, which forced them out of Iraq and destroyed the plot of Crusader forces to add internationals in order to not provoke Arab and Islamic sensitivities (as is done in Lebanon).</p> <p>The importance of a vanguard to implement change: 'among the most important of its requirements [to effect change] is the presence of a secure base and mobilisation of popular support. And the most important cause around which the Arabs and Muslims gather is the fighting of the Jews and Crusaders'. America has armed the Egyptian Jihad more than the Egyptian regime, hence the need to 'strike at the head of unbelief'.</p> <p>'It is permissible to kill the officers of State Security and the rest of the personnel of the police [in Egypt], whether we declare them unbeliever individually or declare them unbelievers in general, if that is in the framework of a combat campaign [...] of the jihad', in the context of the 'obligatory defensive Jihad'. . The 'raids on New York and Washington' were 'identifying marks' to the collapse of America.</p> <p>'The means of change differ from one territory to another', for example in Algeria the mujahideen target both Jewish/Western interests and wage guerrilla war against the 'hireling government' because circumstances allow them to do so .</p>
AAZ [April 2008] "The	107	Jihad against the apostate governments is an 'inevitable step' on the

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Open Meeting.. Part 2..”		<p>road to the Caliphate. . 'Going to jihad is a priority over seeking knowledge or marriage because it is an individual duty.'</p> <p>Violence is crucial given the oppression and violence Muslims are suffering. . (Responding to a question regarding how AQ has benefited from its actions): 'al-Qaeda has benefited in terms that it has incited Muslims to perform jihad, and showed them that the Americans and their henchmen are not super humans, but they are weak human beings who can be defeated and harmed' [see on success-failure debate]. AQ is doing a 'great service to the human community' by 'stopping the aggression by America and the crusader West against mankind' [and not just Muslims]. . Dodges a question on the perceived success of suicide bombings through citing Quranic verses.</p> <p>On the legitimacy of the AQ jihad: Ayman sees one of the greatest sources of this in the fact that America and Nato have acknowledged al-Qaeda is their greatest threat [success - failure]. . 'We have stated more than once very clearly that it was we who not only destroyed the World Trade Center, but the Pentagon as well, thanks be to God'. .</p> <p>Claims he assisted in assassinating Sadat rather than taking part directly. Feels that the assassination achieved only some of its objectives: it did not bring about regime change but did scuttle some of the US-Israeli plans in the region. But killing the head is not sufficient, it has to be part of a wider plan of 'escalating confrontation'.</p> <p>'There is no hope to remove the corrupt regimes in Muslim countries except by force'. Algerian, Egyptian and Jordanian treatment of peaceful initiatives to bring about Islamic change are evidence enough about their futility.</p>
UBL [May 2008] “A Message to the Muslim Nation”	24	<p>'O youths of the generation: Jihad is the only way to liberate Palestine and Al-Aqsa Mosque and to regain the orthodox caliphate'. .</p> <p>.. 'nothing other than the sword is useful to the youths of the generation'.</p>
AAZ [June 2008] “On the Anniversary of the Naksa..”	15	There is 'no other solution in Palestine' than to multiply martyrdom operations, rockets and ambushes.
AAZ [November 2008] “The Exit of Bush and Arrival of Obama”	100	Must continue to harm the US, because the criminal expansionist project in Muslim lands will only be stopped through the sacrifices of the mujahideen.
AAZ [November 2008] “Al-Azhar: The Lions Den”	237	'Confronting this Satanic pact can only be successful through sacrifices, blood and fighting'. . 'Jihad is one of the greatest causes of the forgiving of sins'. 'The New York and Washington raids forced America to allow some semblance of freedom in the Arab world', but this was limited and only to allow for more plundering, as the prison administrator allows rest and recreation from time to time.
AAZ [January 2009] “The Massacre of Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors”	121	'Protests do no good in the face of bombs, Muslims must take 'effective steps'. Muslims must fulfill the individual obligation of jihad. Zionist Crusader interests must be struck wherever possible.
UBL [January 2009] “Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault”	122	Jihad needed to reclaim 'Bayt al-Maqdis and al-Quds'. Youths should not be satisfied 'protesting in the streets without arms'. 9/11 brought down American hegemony.

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AAZ [February 2009] “The Sacrifices of Gaza”	131	<p>'This Zionist-Christian Crusader invasion has revealed that if we do not defend ourselves and fight Jihad, the jets, tanks, and missiles which struck Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia will strike Riyadh, Cairo, Algeria and Islamabad tomorrow.'</p> <p>'If the Zionist-Christian Crusade is confronting us everywhere, striking at Islam and the Muslims all over the world in what they call the "War on Terror", while in actuality it is a "War against Islam", why can't we strike them everywhere? Why must we wait for the enemy to choose for us the time, place, battleground and mode of warfare?'</p> <p>Jihad is now an individual obligation (see 2).</p>
AAZ [February 2009] “From Kabul to Mogadishu”	132	<p>'Demonstrations must be followed by explosions' (Al-Wuhayshi). .. Ayman emphasises how 'Crusader and Jewish targets are spread all over the world' and the enemy will not impose the field, place, time and way in which we fight him'. Promises fighters in Gaza support and training. 'The entire world is our field against the targets of the Zionist Crusade'</p>
UBL [March 2009] “Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine”	133	<p>A 'sufficient force' of mujahideen needs to be assembled to liberate Gaza and end the embargo.</p> <p>The strategy for the liberation of Palestine would be for the Iraq-based mujahideen to secure that country, move on to Jordan (where half the population is Palestinian) before capturing the West Bank. This is 'practical and realistic' as well as the Sharia'h-compliant way. This campaign will be lead by competent leaders relying on Fiqh committees of the Shari'ah 'with branches all over the Islamic world'.</p>
UBL [March 2009] “Fight on, Oh Champions of Somalia”	134	<p>'Shaykh Shareef is one of them, he must be dethroned and fought.'</p>
AAZ [April 2009] “Siz years since the invasion of Iraq..”	136	<p>'Palestine can never be liberated without jihad.' 'If things are tight in one area, they area easier in another area. Our Crusader and Jewish enemies can be found anywhere' [encouraging out of area/global targeting]. Other jihadis are willing to help those in Gaza and use their resources, homes, training camps etc.</p>
AAZ [July 2009] “My Muslim Brothers and Sisters in Pakistan”	139	<p>'The only hope to save Pakistan from this disastrous fate is Jihad' . 'So the only force capable of bringing about the changeover to the Islamic system is the Jihadi force.'</p>
AAZ [August 2009] “The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy”	140	<p>'Continuation of the defeats, losses, fear and terror of the Crusader West, until victory is achieved Allah-willing.' (see context in 23). .. 9/11 'blessed attacks'.</p> <p>'The enemy [in Palestine] has spread-out targets everywhere; the enemy is not just Israel, but also who assists and supports and supplies Israel with weapons that by which our people in Palestine are killed'. .. 'The system in Egypt and in most of the Arabic and Islamic countries cannot be removed except by force.'</p>
AAZ [August 2009] “The Path of Doom”	142	<p>The only way out of the predicament described is Jihad. People of Pakistan should support the jihad with their persons, wealth, opinions, prayers and call on others to do the same.</p>
UBL [September 2009] “A Statement to the American People”	144	<p>Reflects on the causes for the 9/11 attacks.</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [September 2009] “A Message to the European People”	143	Implicit justification for Madrid and London bombings
AAZ [September 2009] “Shaykh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri: Eulogy for the Role Model of Youth”	147	Meshud showed that attacks on convoys of the Pakistani army and martyrdom operations are permissible and valuable, as much as they are against the American convoys in Afghanistan.
AAZ [December 2009] “The (Palestinian) National Unity”	146	The way out of the predicament described is embracing Shari'ah and jihad in the way of Allaw in order to liberate Palestine and the rest of Muslim lands - this should be aimed at the Jews as well as their allies - America and the Westerners and focus of jihad should be on the latter if no easy targets are found in the former.
AAZ [December 2009] “The Morning and the Lamp..”	141	'Even if we were to assume that a country had all its laws and systems in compliance with the Sharī'ah, but then it made a single law and legislated it against the Sharī'ah, as a result it would become a non-Islamic state. In fact, as a result of that, it would be mandatory to fight against it, by the consensus of the scholars, until it returned to its original affair.'
UBL [February 2010] “From Osama to Obama”	148	'If our messages to you could be carried by words, we would not have delivered them by planes.' Omar Farouk (Abdulmutallab) reiterated the message sent on 9/11
AAZ [July 2010] “Al Quds will not be converted to Judaism”	223	Celebrates series of 'martyrdom operations' in Afghanistan. Praise for Mujahid 'Nidal Hasan Malik'
AAZ [August 2010] “Message to the People of Turkey”	225	Praise of Turkish mujahideen and martyrs in Afghanistan
AAZ [September 2010] “A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade”	226	Rejects peace-making and bargaining. ... The secular west refers to Jihad as Irhab [terrorism]. Calls for jihad free of all nationalistic or patriotic and secular influences. .. The only way forward is jihad and sacrifice in the name of Allah of self, wealth and any means possible. .. The Crusaders have been weakened and are leaving Afghanistan due to the blows inflicted by the mujahideen. Attacks, ambushes and martyrdom operations against NATO in Afghanistan.
UBL [October 2010] “Some points regarding the method of relief work”	227	Asks Allah to have mercy on the martyrs, whether from the fields of jihad or those who died in floods and other disasters
UBL [October 2010] “Help your brothers in Pakistan”	228	The people of the Islamic Crescent will unite in defeating 'greedy enemies' as they defeated the Red Army
AAZ [November 2010] “Who is going to support Aifa Siddique”	229	American killings and bombings will be answered in kind. .. Muslims urged to seek revenge for Aifa Saddique by joining the jihad.' There is no good in speaking without action.'
UBL [November 2010] “Message from Shaykh Usama bin Ladin to the People of France”	230	The 'capturing' of French nationals in Niger and other threats to French security is in response to the 'oppression they impose upon the Ummah.'

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		‘As you kill, you will be killed, and as you capture, you will be captured, and as you ruin our security, we will ruin your security, and the one who started it has done the greater injustice.’
UBL [January 2011] “From al-Sheikh Osama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the French People”	231	Urges targeting of French interests in France and Africa. French public can be targeted
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(2)”	233	<p>"If we cannot produce weapons in this stage that can match those of the Crusader West, we can still ruin its complex system of economics and industry. We can exhaust its forces that fight without any creed until they flee. For this reason, the Mujahideen had to innovate new techniques which the West could not think of. From these types of bold and courageous ideas was to use airplanes as powerful weapons, as was done in the blessed raids on Washington, New York and Pennsylvania.'</p> <p>Justifications for the terrorist attack against Coptic church in Alexandria, although denies AQ had anything to do with it.</p> <p>Clear focus on far enemies: 'we in Al-Qaeda have reached the conclusion that the Zio-American enemies – who have invaded our religion, lands, and sanctities – and their lackey aides need to be focused on more than others. If this invading enemy breaks, then by Allah’s permission their agents and others who seek their help and emboldening will also break. So let us focus our efforts on this Zio-American invading enemy and its agents'</p>
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(3)”	234	Jihad against Crusaders
AAZ [March 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(4)”	235	<p>Talks of how the 'blessed' 9/11 attacks prompted a change in US foreign policy now when it has sought to distance itself from despotic leaders and appeal to the people directly.</p> <p>"Thus, your brother Mujahideen promise that by they Help of Allah, they will continue to strike America and its allies and damage them until they leave all Muslim lands, by Allah’s leave, and stop their support of the despotic tyrants who rule them'</p>
AAZ [April 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(5)”	236	The Americans are abandoning their corrupt allies, this is a process that began with the 9/11 attacks. Promises more attacks on America and their allies in the 'new Crusade' until they've left Muslim lands and the Ummah is united in a Caliphate.
AAZ [May 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(6)”	238	“Be patient O’ lions of Ash-Sham, because the ground has begun shaking underneath the titan tyrants, and be patient O’ our Ummah everywhere as America has encountered four big disasters in the last ten years, starting with the New York, Washington and Pennsylvania battles, then it was defeated in Iraq, and here’s it being defeated in Afghanistan, and the fourth: her agents began collapsing like the dry leaves of the fall in Tunisia and Egypt, and tomorrow in Libya, Yemen, Syria and the Arabian Peninsula.
AAZ [June 2011] “The Noble Knight Dismounted”	239	"And America has faced in the last decade four crushing disasters: First: The blessed raids in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, where the martyred eagles smashed the symbol of the American economy in New York, and the centre of the American military

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>leadership in the Pentagon, with all that it symbolizes as moral, economic, and military losses. Then, there was the second disaster, its defeat in Iraq at the hands of the Mujahideen, with the Islamic State of Iraq at their head. So it withdrew, after losing its wealth, equipment, and the souls of its sons. And there was the third disaster in Afghanistan, where American is sinking into the mud of defeat, bleeding continuously. And it was forced to announce the beginning of its withdrawal this coming July, despite its approval and recognition of the control of the mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate over most of Afghanistan. Then, there was the fourth disaster: the collapse of the corrupt and corrupting agents of America in Tunisia and Egypt, and the rocking of their thrones in Libya, Yemen, and Syria. America tried to contain the ferocious popular volcano; it declared, after hesitating, its support for the popular revolutions. But the popular movements in Egypt and Tunisia slapped America when the youth of the revolution in Tunisia demonstrated against the visit of Hilary Clinton, and they rejected meeting her in Egypt."</p> <p>"Likewise, we send a message of support to the all the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Islamic Maghrib. We urge them to exert greater effort in killing fighting the Crusaders and their servants."</p>
AAZ [July 2007] "Glory of the East..The first Being Damascus.."	241	Martyrdom and jihad glorified -- no specifics
AAZ [August 2011] "A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings..(7)"	242	Salutes the "heroes" who blew up the gas pipeline to Israel.
AAZ [August 2011] "Do not become weak or grieve"	243	<p>"America, the leader of the Western Crusade anti-Islamic alliance was attacked in her homeland – which she had considered a protected fortress, occupying a continent, surrounded by two great oceans – and the attack arrived on its symbol of economic power and the centre of its military leadership" "Thus, the reputation of America and the Crusade alliance have fallen, and this is one of the most important gains from the blessed battles of September the Eleventh."</p> <p>"Seek to attack America that has killed the Imam of the Mujahideen and threw his corpse in the sea and then imprisoned his women and children. Seek to attack her so history can say that a criminal state had spread corruption on earth and Allah sent her his servants who made her a lesson [for others] and left her as a memory."</p>

APPENDIX 3.4 (b) Approaching Violence

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Perceived legitimacy of civilian targeting [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [early 1996] “Healing the Hearts of the Believers”	118	Hosni Mubarak and government officials demand obedience and loyalty, which should only be given to God, and therefore those working in the Islamabad embassy could be targeted. Their demands are un-Islamic and thus they are infidels.
UBL [June 1998] “Bin Ladin Congratulates Pakistan on Possession of Nuclear Weapons”	170	Endorsement of WMD
UBL [December 1998] “Bin Ladin Denies Role in Bombings of US Missions”	176	Legitimises East Africa bombings which involved indiscriminate killing of (mostly African) civilians
UBS [January 1999] “Wrath of God..”	178	It is permissible to carry out attacks that result in the deaths of Muslims if the goal is to harm America
UBL [January 1999] “Accused Terrorist Leader Usama Bin Ladin Declares War on All Americans”	180	'All Americans are our enemies, not just the ones who fight us directly but also the ones who pay their taxes.'
UBL [February 1999] “Esquire interview with bin Ladin”	179	"We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa' [referring specifically to the killing of Americans in Saudi Arabia]. Anyone who 'share or take part in killing Muslims, assaulting holy places, or those who help the Jews occupy Muslim land'
UBL [June 1999] “Usama bin Ladin, The Destruction of the Base”	184	'We differentiate between the man, the woman, the child, and the old people. The man is a fighter, whether he carries arms or helps kill us by paying taxes and by gathering information. He is a fighter. With regards to reports among Muslims that 'Usama is threatening to kill civilians, then, what are they killing in Palestine?' and then goes on to say: 'You may have heard these days that almost three quarters of the US people support Clinton's strikes against Iraq They are people whose president becomes more popular when he kills innocent people. They are people who increase their support for their president when he commits cardinal sins. They are a lowly people who do not at all understand the meaning of values.'
UBL [September 2001] “Bin Ladin: from rich kid to terrorist..”	181	"Our enemy, the target, if God gives Muslims the opportunity to do so, is every American male, whether he is directly fighting us or paying taxes."
UBL [October 2001] “Tayseer Allouni interviews bin Ladin in Afghanistan”	130	On the killing of innocents: "So we kill their innocents, and I say it is permissible in law and intellectually, because those who spoke on this matter spoke from a juridical perspective." The prohibition on killing children and innocents is "not absolute". Concedes that the Prophet forbade the killing of children and innocents but quotes a "saying": 'If the infidels killed women and children on purpose, we shouldn't shy away from treating them in the same way to stop them from doing it again.' [How is a 'Saying more powerful than

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Perceived legitimacy of civilian targeting [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>the words of the Prophet' - does 'saying' mean Hadith?]. Says the 9/11 hijackers did not set out to "kill babies" and that the WTC was not a "children's school".</p> <p>'When we kill their civilians the whole world from East to West cries out, and the United States instigates its allies and small agents. Who says that our blood is not bad and theirs is good?' The infidels should be treated in kind.</p>
UBL [November 2001] Osama claims he has nukes (article title)	125	<p>When asked about the civilians and Muslims who perished on 9/11: 'This is a major point in jurisprudence. In my view, if an enemy occupies a Muslim territory and uses common people as human shield, then it is permitted to attack that enemy. For instance, if bandits barge into a home and hold a child hostage, then the child's father can attack the bandits and in that attack even the child may get hurt. America and its allies are massacring us in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq. The Muslims have the right to attack America in reprisal. The Islamic Shariat says Muslims should not live in the land of the infidel for long [...] If a child is above 13 and wields a weapon against Muslims, then it is permitted to kill him. The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government, they elect their president, their government manufactures arms and gives them to Israel and Israel uses them to massacre Palestinians. The American Congress endorses all government measures and this proves that the entire America is responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against Muslims. The entire America, because they elect the Congress'.</p>
UBL [April 2002] "MBC Carries video of Bin Ladin"	206	Praise for 9/11 and acknowledgement of responsibility
UBL [October 2002] "Letter from Usama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the American People"	212	<p>Americans can be targeted due to support for the government, and their taxes: 'By electing these leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian people, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the slaughter of the children of Iraq. The American people have the ability and choice to refuse the policies of their Government and even to change their Government, yet time and time again, polls show that the American people support the policies of the elected Government. 'The tax paid by the American people is spent against us' through arms, support for Israel etc. Moreover - the 'America army is part of the American people', 'This is why the American people are not innocent. The American people are active members in all these crimes.' America kills civilians, steals Muslim wealth and resources and destroys cities - thus their cities will be destroyed, civilians killed and economy targeted.</p>
UBL [February 2003] "A Message to our Brothers in Iraq"	79	Those who supported the Crusaders, even just with words: 'they are apostates and outside the community of Muslims. It is permissible to spill their blood and take their property'.
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	86	'Those Iraqis who get killed, and who belong to Allawi's renegade government - such as members of the Army, the security agencies, and the National Guard [...] their killing is sanctioned and they are infidels'. They should not be buried in Muslim cemeteries, their wives should be divorced from them.
AAZ [April 2006] "Letter to the People of Pakistan"	81	[implicit] looks at how the people, and not just governments are guilty (see 9).

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Perceived legitimacy of civilian targeting [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [June 2006] "The Zionist Crusader's Aggression in Gaza and Lebanon"	88	'According to the Sharia, all these governments and their people are fighting the Muslims'.
UBL [June 2006] "Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr.."	92	'To those who accuse our nation's knight of killing some segments of the Iraqi people I say: If someone claimed that a man gouged out his eye, you should be patient until you see the defendant because it could be the complainant had gouged out the defendant's two eyes'. [so the Iraqis had it coming]. 'Whoever insisted on fighting along with the Crusaders against Muslims should be killed, regardless of their sect or tribe'.
AAZ [September 2006] "Hot issues.."	21	The Shariah does not differentiate according to civilian and soldier, only combatant and non-combatant. The Mujahideen target: 'every target whose striking will have the effect of weakening the Zionist/Crusader campaign of aggression against the lands of Islam.' Military and civilian differentiation does not exist in Shariah, only combatant and non-combatant. The combatant is he who fights or helps in the fighting with money or opinions. Thus the people of the West are combatants., because they have chosen their rulers, and chosen the legislative authority which monitors the executive and takes it to account. These people also pay taxes and provide the regimes with manpower. Even those who oppose the policies, still consider the governments legitimate. Also, all the political parties in the West supported the creation of Israel.
AAZ [early 2008] "Exoneration.."	20	On the killing of Muslims, Zawahiri refers to Ithaf Al-Ibad Bi Fadail Al-Jihad and says: 'Ignorance of this Shari'ah rule has cost the Muslims many victims. A police informant used to come and take a man's wife away in the middle of the night but the man would not kill him out of fear of shedding another Muslim's blood.' 'This Hadith shows that women and young boys, that is, those who may not be killed separately, may be killed if they are mixed with others and it is not possible to distinguish between one and the other. The Muslims were asking about night raids, when it is not possible to distinguish one person from another. The prophet permitted this because an act that follows another as a consequence is permitted even if it is not permitted separately. Second: Muslim commanders used catapults in their wars with the infidels. It is known that a catapult cannot differentiate among those whom it hits. It might hit those so-called innocent people. Yet the Muslim custom in their wars was to use catapults. They used them against Al-Ta'if's inhabitants.' 'Third: Muslim jurists permitted killing Muslims used as human shields by the enemy after they fall captive into the infidels' hands. If the infidels use Muslim captives to protect themselves from the Muslims' arrows, they may be killed although they are faultless. Ibn-Taymiyyah, may he rest in peace, said: The ulema have agreed that if the infidel army uses captive Muslims as human shields and there is fear for the Muslims' lives if they do not fight, they should attack even if this leads to killing the human shields.' Three categories of civilian casualties: (1) 'They might be those who do not fight alongside the countries they live in and do not help them with their persons, wealth, counsel, or other types of assistance. These may not be killed but on condition that they hold themselves separately from the others. If they are not separated from the others, it is permitted to kill them including old people, women, young boys, sick persons, incapacitated persons,

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Perceived legitimacy of civilian targeting [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>and unworldly monks. Ibn-Qudamah said: Women and children may be killed during a night raid on condition that they are not killed intentionally and separately. It is permitted to kill their riding animals and livestock if this helps the Muslims to kill them. There is no disagreement on this point. He added: It is permitted to carry out a night raid on the enemy. Ibn-Hanbal said night raids were permitted especially against the Byzantines. We will not discourage anyone from carrying out night raids. (2) Some do not go forth in their own persons to fight alongside their belligerent countries but they assist them with money or counsel. These are not called innocent persons because they support the troops. Ibn-Abd-al-Birr, may he rest in peace, said: The ulema never disagreed that the Muslims are permitted to kill women and children if they fight and also young boys able to fight and who do so. Ibn-Qudamah reported a consensus among the ulema that it is permitted to kill women, young boys, and the old and infirm if they help their people in battle. Ibn-Abd-al-Birr said: They all recounted that the prophet killed Durayd Bin-al-Sammah in the Battle of Hunayn because he gave clever counsel to his people in war. All ulema agree that an old man of this type should be killed in war. Al-Nawawi, citing the book "Consensus on Matters of Jihad," said that old men among the infidels should be killed if they are men of counsel. Ibn-Qasim, may he rest in peace, wrote in his commentary: The unanimous opinion is that those who support the troops should be killed. Ibn-Taymiyyah cited this unanimous opinion. He also said that those who give any kind of aid to the sect that refuses to accept Islam should suffer the same fate. (3) If they are Muslims, they may not be killed if they stand apart from the rest. However, if they mix with others and one cannot avoid killing them along with the others, then it is permitted to kill them. This is obvious in the case of Muslim captives used as human shields.' Expressing regret or concern at the killing of these people represents a breach of the Shariah. See Al-Nahl, 16:126 and Al-Ahzab, 42:39,40 in Koran. Detailed discussion of various positions regarding the killing of Muslims when mixed with infidel targets (human shield debate) (see pp 156-166). Emphasises disagreement among scholars in this regard. Says the Shariah permits attack by night even if discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims cannot be secured. Indiscriminate weaponry (such as artillery shelling is permitted). This is partially based on the Prophet's use of catapults and the siege of Taif. Emphasises the right of 'repaying like for like' according to Shariah - quotes Koran (2:194). 'to bomb them as they are bombing us and blow them up as they are blowing us up'. Civilians may be taken prisoner for ransom, furthermore, they may be killed as collateral damage. Finally, since the Women and elderly tacitly or directly support and interact with governments that wage wars against the Muslims, recognize Israel and so on, they become targets too since the legitimacy of these governments is based on their recognition. Thus Muslims may always 'reply in kind'. The citizenship means that the individual is 'part of this group' i.e. the country that attacks Muslims. The Hadith by Al-Sa'b Ibn Jathama on night raids: "This Hadith proves that women and children and those whose killing is not permissible as individuals can be killed when mixed with others and could not be singled out". Also Catapults. Muslims as human shields - mixed with others. [note the determined desire to kill]. All Jews support</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Perceived legitimacy of civilian targeting [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		Israel and are all therefore Zionists, the critics of Israel are such a small minority it doesn't matter.
AZ [August 2008] "A Message from Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri to Pakistan Army and the People of Pakistan"	41	'Possible form of killing a Muslim is when a Muslim fights alongside Kuffar against other Muslims or aids them in war so that the Kuffar attain success and victory, and when a war is waged between Muslims and non-Muslims, he sides with Kuffar. This form of the said crime embodies the gravest type of Kufr and transgression, and represents such an extreme condition of the death of a person's belief and annihilation of his Islam, that no worse form of infidelity and disbelief can possibly be imagined'.
AAZ [August 2009] "The Path of Doom"	142	Calls for 'Annihilation' of Jews, Americans, Apostate leaders and hypocrites who help them.

APPENDIX 3.5 Strategy and Tactics: Methods Alternative to Violence

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Identified political/activist tools outside violent attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [unknown date] Letter to Mullah Omar	4	Media operations: 'Many international media agencies corresponded with us requesting an interview with us. We believe this is a good opportunity to make Muslims aware of what is taking place over the land of the two Holy Mosques as well as of what is happening here in Afghanistan of establishing and strengthen the religion, and applying Sheri 'a (Islamic laws). 'It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.'
UBL [September 1996] "Bin Ladin Declares Jihad on Americans/Letter from Usama bin Muhammad bin Ladin to his Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula.."	5	Economic boycott of American goods. Women 'expected' to do their part in this as well
UBL [March 1997] "Pakistan interviews Usama bin Ladin"	154	Calls on Muslims to boycott American goods.
UBL [September 2001] "The US Should search attackers within itself"	202	'Economic boycott of the West is not possible unless economic self-sufficiency is attained and substitute products are brought out'. 'Tools for building public opinion' need to be procured to instigate economic boycott and mobilise the umma internationally.
UBL [October 2001] "Tayseer Allouni interviews bin Ladin in Afghanistan"	130	Economic boycotting of America
AAZ [December 2001] "Knights under the Prophet's Banner"	119	'The weakness of the message to the people: The fundamentalist movement's message continues to be mostly geared toward the elite and the specialists. The public and the masses do not understand this message. This is a gap that the jihad movement must strive to fill earnestly, as we will explain later. If we add to the foregoing the media siege imposed on the message of the jihad movement as well as the campaign of deception mounted by the government media we should realize the extent of the gap in understanding between the jihad movement and the common people'.
UBL [March 2002] "Usama bin Ladin: Prince Abdallah's initiative is High Treason"	205	Boycott of Jewish and US goods, 'disowning' the Arab treacherous rulers, demonstrations and civil disobedience [see 2]
AAZ [September 2002] "The Interview of Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri"	22	Need to cease trading with Americans.
UBL [February 2003] audio statement	78	Boycott of America and her allies.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Identified political/activist tools outside violent attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [January 2004] “Resist the New Rome”	111	The assembly of a council of notables to remove apostate leaders and select a righteous Imam, Ahl al-Hall wa al-Aqd.
AAZ [February 2005] “The Freeing of Humanity..”	109	America must also be confronted in the field of 'beliefs and principles'.
AAZ [March 2006] “The Alternative is Da’wa and Jihad”	73	On the economic strikes: 'We should also implement popular economic boycott against Denmark, Norway, France, Germany and all countries that took part in this lowly insult, and against all the countries that took part in the Crusader campaign against Islam and the Muslims'. 'When Prophet Mohammed was asked about the greatest kind of jihad, he said that it is to utter a word of truth before an unjust ruler' - scholars 'should spread a call underlining the need to change the corrupt and disgraceful situation we are currently facing so that this call would turn into a powerful current that sweeps away corruption and corruptors'.
UBL [April 2006] “Oh People of Islam”	90	Boycott should continue and focus not only on Denmark but also Europe and America and all those who follow them, even though a boycott alone is not enough.
AAZ [December 2006] “Realities of Conflict Between Islam and Unbelievers”	94	'We must exploit all Da'wah, student and union activities to back the Jihadi resistance'. These must help the mujahideen by making it easier for Ummah to join Mujahideen, stake out targets and observe activities of the American-Zionist presence, raise funds, spread awareness, and 'disseminate the Mujahideen's public relations and rebut the fallacies of the governments and their publicists' [counter-messaging], declare general strikes. 'The Muslim Ummah must exploit all methods of popular protest, like demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, refusing to pay taxes, preventing cooperation with the security forces, refusing to provide the Crusaders with fuel, hitting traders who supply the Crusader forces, boycotting Crusader and Jewish products, and other ways of popular protest'. Students 'must take their anger to the streets'. Praises student protests in Turkey against Pope. 'I also remind our brothers who work in Islamic media of their crucial, critical role in the Muslim Ummah's battle against the Zionist Crusade in clarifying the facts, dispelling misconceptions and removing the masks from the traitors'.
AAZ [December 2006] “Congratulations on the Eid to the Ummah of Tawhed”	95	Emphasises 'Jihadi media' operations spoiling 'the enemies' publicity campaigns'.
AAZ [February 2007] “Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427”	97	Muslim brothers in the jihadi media, 'which have deprived the Crusaders, Zionists and their aides of sleep'. Calls on them to combine their efforts, concentrate on critical issues, esp. the issue of the 'treasonous religion-traders' and 'encourage the Ummah to go forth with men and money to the fields of jihad, and to reveal to their Ummah just how ugly the crimes of the corruptive rulers really are'.
AAZ [May 2007] “The Empire of Evil is about to End”	23	'I call on all my brothers in Islamic Jihadi media to hone their resolve and sacrifice everything in their power, for they are a fundamental part of the Jihadi resistance in the face of the fiercest Crusade ever faced by the Ummah of Islam'

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Identified political/activist tools outside violent attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		'And I can't forget in closing to express my thanks to my honourable brothers in al-Sahab Media, who are digging rock with their fingernails to spread the invitation to Islam, Jihad, garrisoning and resistance, so may Allah reward them for what they have done for Islam and Muslims'.
AAZ [July 2007] "The Advice of one Concerned"	102	<p>Asks villagers, neighbours, students, mosque-goers to rise up and besiege the police station every time someone from their community is arrested.</p> <p>The two-pronged plan to confront the enemy alliance: 'the long-term plan is divided into two halves: the first half consists of earnest, diligent work to change these corrupt and corruptive regimes' - many different strategies according to each individual situation - but several characteristics in all: patience paramount in all; as is 'striving to achieve popular sympathy for the Islamic Mujahid movement for change'; force through mass-popular uprising, military coup, mass disobedience, guerrilla warfare, armed political resistance; Ummah must get used to challenging falsehood and declaring the truth; 'there must be an organization and leadership leading change. 'As for the second half of the long-term plan, it consists of hurrying to the fields of Jihad like Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia for Jihad preparation and training' [see also 14] [strategy].</p>
AAZ [July 2007] "Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves"	103	Need to boycott British goods.
AAZ [December 2007] "A Review of Events"	13	'Jihad information media' are waging an extremely important the Zionist-Crusader enemy. The media was initially only split between government media and then organizations that claim to be independent but are essentially government outlets, such as the BBC. The Jihad information media demolished this monopoly and is winning in the information-propaganda war.
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting part one.."	105	Whoever cannot fight must back the Mujahideen 'with financing, opinion, information and invitation in schools, universities, unions and mosques, and by taking care of the families of Mujahideen's captives and martyrs and specializing in the beneficial legal and practical sciences which are of use to the Jihad [...] and by mastering the techniques of Jihadi information media'. 'The one without sufficient funds is excepted from jihad'. 'Jihadi media has demolished - by the grace of Allah - the monopoly of the Western and governmental information outlets which we have been suffering for decades'.
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting.. Part 2.."	107	<p>Counter campaign to those who criticise Jihad.</p> <p>When asked about those who seek negotiating with AQ, he says only that truce was offered to Europe but was only met with 'curses'.</p>
AAZ [November 2008] "Al-Azhar: The Lions Den"	237	People need to 'rise up with their tongues, pens, and hands' in protest. Urges general strike for two weeks of students and workers. 'This is a peaceful struggle which doesn't require bearing of arms or fighting'. Even though he later also mentions that it is a duty of all Muslims to bear arms. [Amyan is challenged on this by the interviewer who asks if he had not previously said that peaceful

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Identified political/activist tools outside violent attack [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		protest was futile] - 'bearing arms might not be easy for everyone'. Popular action can support jihadi action.
AAZ [January 2009] "The Massacre of Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors"	121	'Strikes, protests, and demonstrations'.
AAZ [August 2009] "The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy"	140	Protests in Egypt until embargo on Gaza is lifted.
UBL [October 2010] "Some points regarding the method of relief work"	227	The need to create a 'special aid agency' to deal with the effects of climate change. This should for instance review the safety of settlements close to rivers.
AAZ [June 2011] "The Noble Knight Dismounted"	239	"Usama bin Laden, may Allah have mercy on him, went to his Lord, after he achieved what he desired. He was aiming to incite the Ummah to Jihad, and his message reached from East to West and all over the world. The Muslims answered it, as did all the oppressed on the face of the earth." [success - incitement]
AAZ [August 2011] "Do not become weak or grieve"	243	<p>"The Muslim Ummah in general and the Jihad Movement in particular must engage in the battle of statement just as they engage the battle of teeth, and their need for the battle of statement is higher than the need of the entire Ummah for it, because it [the Muslim Ummah] is more insightful towards the hubs of danger, as it is the one that faces it and confronts it daily. And it [the Jihad movement] has more expertise on the vicious, degraded nature of the enemy."</p> <p>"And the battle of statement has opened many arenas with the grace of Allah; as the modern means of communication have allowed big opportunities for production and information, and may Allah reward the knights of the Jihad Media the best of rewards."</p>

APPENDIX 3.6 Constraints on the use of Violence

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Mentioned constraints on the use of violence [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [unknown date] “The Forbidden Word”	113	From report: 'Al-Zawahiri claims the group's actions are not "terrorism", rather the removal of an unjust government that is sanctioned by the Shari'a. He mentions the arrests, torture and death of members of various factions in Egypt as evidence of government corruption and justification of the group's means'. Asked if Jama'a hurts Egypt and Islam: He categorically denies that it hurts Egypt or Islam since their two main targets are the corrupt government and the Jews, and those are permissible targets. He supports the violent actions of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya since they issue warnings before they carry out an attack'. Non-Muslims in Egypt can be killed because they do not have Dhimmi status from a legitimate authority [this protected non-Muslims living in the Ottoman empire]. Stresses that al-Jihad is not a 'takfiri' group and does not see sinning Muslims as apostates.
AAZ [purported] [unknown date] “Jihad, Martyrdom, and the killing of innocents”	48	'Those whom it is not permitted to kill - such as Muslims, dhimmis, women and children, and so forth'.
AAZ [early 1996] “Healing the Hearts of the Believers”	118	Muslims should be given prior warning if they are in a vicinity of an area of legitimate targets, such as Jews and Americans, before an attack. But argues that the overwhelming enemy and exceptional circumstances justify the deaths of children and Muslims.
UBL [November 1996] “Bin Ladin interviewed on Jihad against US”	150	Implicitly alludes to terrorism against individuals (as opposed to 'thieves') as wrong. Urges 'wise Europeans' to leave Muslim lands, but stresses most of the anger for the time being is against US who now constitute the major infidel force in the region.
UBL [February 1997] “Correspondent meets with opposition leader bin Ladin”	151	Note 'expulsion of civilians.' American soldiers should be killed [note who even after the first declaration of war the violence is still limited in this way].
UBL [March 1997] “Pakistan interviews Usama bin Ladin”	154	See how UBL mentions no Saudis were killed - Muslim deaths still undesirable at this stage, 'collaborator' label comes later. Insists no Pakistani troops were killed by mujahideen in Somalia [in sharp contrast to e.g. Ayman later - seems to be recognition at this stage that this is sensitive].
UBL [March 1997] “Interview with Usama bin Ladin”	155	Claims 'we are not against the American people'
UBL [August 1997] “Usama bin Ladin Urges ‘Befitting Reply’ to Horan”	157	Although Aimal Kasi's attacks are mentioned and the perceived hypocrisy against the condemnation he received and the celebration Rushdie received is addressed. The attack is not directly endorsed.
UBL [March 1998] “Bin Ladin Urges Expulsion of Invaders..”	162	Note 'expulsion' and focus on US military in Saudi

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Mentioned constraints on the use of violence [excerpts, quotes, notes]
BL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin: Afghanistan’s inclusion on US terrorism list is ‘Certificate of good conduct’ for Taliban”	166	[Although not directly relevant to targeting - see how US killings of 'hundreds of thousands of children, women, and elderly people' (through starvation) in Iraq are considered illegitimate categories of killing]
UBL [May 1998] “World Islamic Front Backs Intifadah of Palestine’s Sons/Wounds of Al-Aqsa”	167	Perhaps some implicit discrimination in terms of targeting in setting blame on governments, ruling elites, parliaments.
UBL [June 1998] “In the Way of Allah”	171	Geostrategic focus of violence - .e.g. not on China as this will deflect focus away from US/Israel
UBL [February 1999] “Esquire interview with bin Ladin”	179	Does imply that Islam limits violence (when he accuses America of having no such limitations in its religion)
UBL [June 1999] “Usama bin Ladin, The Destruction of the Base”	184	<p>'Our enemy, the target -- if God gives Muslims the opportunity to do so -- is every American male, whether he is directly fighting us or paying taxes.' ..</p> <p>Acknowledges 'people regretted the death of some innocent people of that country' after the East Africa bombings.</p>
UBL [November 2000] short telephone interview with Kuwaiti newspaper	124	UBL says he had nothing to do with the USS Cole attack. Also that he had nothing to do with individuals the Kuwaiti authorities had arrested shortly before the attack though to be planning terrorist attacks within Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. 'Neither myself nor my followers have any plans to strike against oil installations or civil or military targets within Kuwait or any other Arabic country'.
UBL [March 2001] “Ausaf receives Bin Ladin’s Poem..”	193	Laments US killing of children and elderly in Afghanistan - thus implied this is wrong.
UBL [September 2001] “The US Should search attackers within itself”	202	<p>'As a Muslim, I try my best to avoid telling a lie. Neither I had any knowledge of these attacks [9/11] nor I consider the killing of innocent women, children, and other humans as an appreciable act. Islam strictly forbids causing harm to innocent women, children, and other people. Such a practice is forbidden ever in the course of a battle.' But goes on to say that US policies, particularly in Palestine would call the 'wrath of Allah' onto America.</p> <p>'We are against the American system, not against its people, whereas in these attacks, the common American people have been killed.' .. 'the American people are themselves the slaves of the Jews'</p>
UBL [November 2001] Osama claims he has nukes (article title)	125	'The Sept 11 attacks were not targeted at women and children. The real targets were America’s icons of military and economic power. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) was against killing women and children. When he saw a dead woman during a war, he asked why was she killed?'. Says he is not against American people [even though they are targets] but only the US government. 'The mission is to spread the word of God, not to indulge massacring people. We ourselves are the target of killings, destruction and atrocities. We are only defending ourselves. This is defensive Jihad. We want to defend our people and our land. That is why I say that if we don’t get security, the Americans,

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Mentioned constraints on the use of violence [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>too would not get security.' .</p> <p>Claims the list of Arabs the Americans presented as hijackers after 9/11 were only passengers [refusal to admit to 9/11].</p>
AAZ [December 2001] “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”	119	<p>'Our brothers in the Al-Jihad Group carried out the attack on the motorcade of Prime Minister Atif Sidqi using a booby-trapped car, but the Prime Minister survived the attack. His car escaped the full power of the explosion by a split second, although some shrapnel hit it. As a result of the attack, a child named Shayma was killed. She was a student in a nearby school who was standing near the site of the incident'. 'The unintended death of this innocent child pained us all, but we were helpless and we had to fight the government, which was against God's Shari'ah and supported God's enemies'. Says people were warned to stay away from 'pillars of the regime', and that a survey was conducted prior to the attack which concluded the school was under construction and not operational. 'As regards the consequences resulting from the intentional harm done to Muslims, we have opted for the opinion of Imam al-Shafi'i, may God have mercy on him, who called for paying blood money to the relatives of those killed. Therefore, we believe that those who kill Muslims unintentionally in such operations must pay blood money to their relatives'.</p>
UBL [December 2001] “The Fact of the Conflict between us and America”	129	<p>"One of [the] instincts that all humans agree on is that even if some injustice has inflicted them; their souls are not able to kill innocent children".</p> <p>Talks of the "revolting " killing of children. Quotes Quran: "because of what we ordained for the Children of Israel that if anyone killed a person not in retaliation of murder and (not in order to prevent the spread of mischief in the world it would be as if he killed all mankind."</p>
UBL [October 2002] “Statement from shaykh Usama bin Ladin, may God protect him, and the Al-Qa’ida Organization”	211	<p>Refers to 'military' and 'economic' targeting (although this includes 9/11)</p>
UBL/AAZ [September 2003] Audio statement	110	<p>'We tell them [Americans] that we are not advocates of killing and destruction, but with God's help, we will cut any hand that carries an aggression against us' [Zawahiri] - some elements of discrimination.</p>
UBL [October 2004] Threat of the US	31	<p>Sweden taken as example of country which isn't on the attack list</p>
UBL [October 2004] “Message to Americans”	83	<p>'Contrary to Bush's claim that we hate freedom. If so, then let him explain why we don't strike for example - Sweden?'</p>
UBL [December 2004] “Message concerning Saudi Arabia”	84	<p>'If some Muslims die in the operations of the mujahidin, we ask God to have mercy on them. Those are killed by mistake. We ask forgiveness from God and we shoulder the responsible' [sic].</p> <p>Quoting hadith: "If the people of earth and heaven kill a Muslim, God will throw them all in hell", and the Quran: 'If a man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein forever: And the wrath and curse of Allah are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is prepared for him'.</p>
UBL [December 2004]	86	<p>'And be very aware of killing innocent people, except for what is</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Mentioned constraints on the use of violence [excerpts, quotes, notes]
audio statement		permissible by religion, such as the innocent who are used as shields, without going to excess, and this issue should be left to the judgment of the Mujahidin scholars'.
AAZ [December 2005] interview	49	The Muslims didn't attack the Swiss or Vietnamese for instance.
AAZ [April 2006] "Four Years since the Battle of Tora Bora"	238	In Iraq, violence is focused on occupation forces, i.e. the Americans and coalition troops, and unity urged among Muslims.
UBL [May 2006] "A Testimony to the Truth"	91	Some scope left for negotiations with different leader
AAZ [July 2007] "The Advice of one Concerned"	102	Unlike HAMAS killing Fatah people and vice versa, the ISI 'only kills spies and traitors, and declares its innocence of any inviolable blood which one of its soldiers might spill, and not just that, but its Amir announces his readiness to appear before a judicial council in any complaint and that he is prepare to have the right taken from him personally if the legal ruling is issued against him.' Yet despite all this a storm of media campaigns and allegations is whipped up against them - but not HAMAS.
UBL [September 2007] "The Solution.."	10	Jews of Morocco, Christians of Egypt – societies within Muslim countries which will not be targeted
UBL [December 2007] "The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies"	27	'Those Muslims who are slain during any of the operations against the Crusader infidels or their agents, we have not meant to kill him, and only Allah knows how it hurts and grieves us when some Muslims die in operations we are responsible for. We seek Allah's forgiveness from this and we ask Allah to grant these souls mercy and grant them paradise and help their families. It is apparent that our enemies intend to establish their garrisons among Muslims in order to use them as human shields [...] and I stress to my mujahideen brothers that they must be very cautious during operations targeting army garrisons which are located near Muslims'.
Z [early 2008] "Exoneration.."	20	'Shari'ah forbids killing children, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Indeed Hizballah's missiles that were fired on northern Palestine killed Arabs. Similarly Al-Qassam's missiles are fired haphazardly and it is not known if they kill old people or children.' 'You might be asked, do you justify the killing of innocent people? Do you claim that there have been no mistakes in jihad? The answer is that those who have made mistakes can be held accountable and those who suffered damage can be recompensed according to Shari'ah, but jihad must continue. As in any other human activity, mistakes have been and will be made in jihad. For every mistake, there is accountability according to Shari'ah. This Shari'ah was not revealed to govern angels, but was revealed to humans who sometimes do right but sometimes make mistakes.' 'My answer is this: We have heard a lot of talk from the establishment ulema accusing the mujahidin of killing innocent people. They brand them as infidels who damage property and do many other wrong things. However, you are the first to use the false accusation that the mujahidin killed persons because of their skin or hair colour. This is an example of the document's tendency, one to which I referred in the fifth observation, to make accusations without proof. Therefore I urge the writer, or writers, to mention specific incidents and specific dates, so that we can deal with them and discuss them. Making accusations without proof is the method of security services and police detectives. It is not the method of someone who wishes to rationalize jihadist action.' A Muslim cannot be killed intentionally - that is a

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Mentioned constraints on the use of violence [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		deadly sin - but a Muslim can be killed by mistake whilst undertaking jihadi operations. "As I said previously, the property or life of a non-believer are protected only by peace treaty (sulh), status as a protected alien (dhimmah), or safe-conduct (aman). If none of these things is confirmed, matters remain in their original state." Not all Christians are equal - some resist the Jew-Crusader alliance, some try to mend relations with the West and Arab Christians oppose Israel and are proud of the Prophet in their history. Copts warned against supporting the alliance or Mubarak, but says "we do not want to battle against you". On Shimaa again and how this was regrettable, but that people should have heeded warnings not to be close to govt buildings, routes etc [even though the bomb was by a school]. But "we have fought this regime that fights Islam to protect our daughters and daughters of Muslims and to protect Shimaa and every Shimaa".
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting part one.."	105	'We haven't killed the innocents [Muslims], not in Baghdad, nor in Morocco, not in Algeria, nor anywhere else'. If an innocent was killed by mujahideen it was due to: (1) mistake, (2) 'out of necessity in cases of al-Tatarrus (see chapter 8 in Exoneration, plus 'The Healing of the Believers' Chest) (1/1). . According to a communiqué from AQIM the 11 December attacks did not kill Muslims but 'Crusader unbelievers'. It targeted UN, constitutional assembly and police academy, not 'children's schools or women hospitals' (2/1). How do HAMAS justify killing innocents with the 'blessed Qassam rockets' which don't discriminate between child, adult, Muslim or Jew? (3/1). Attacks in Algeria: the truth has been distorted, the Batna attack was attempt on the president (but the martyr blew himself up when discovered by security forces) and the Dellys attack was against a Naval base. Quotes from AQIM charter on targeting showing how they avoid elderly men, women and children.
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting.. Part 2.."	107	Advises the mujahideen 'to be absolutely cautious in preparing for their operations as much as possible and not harm Muslims'. The AQIM 'cannot intend to kill a single Muslims wrongly'. Says that 'your brothers in the al-Qaeda organisation in the Islamic Maghreb are most eager to preserve your souls, property, honor and dignity, and they are waging jihad in the path of God to liberate you [Algerians] from America, France, and the sons of France'. Muslim dead are either mistake or claims for government propaganda. . Replies to an accusation that it has supported the use of car bombs against mosques and markets saying this is 'propaganda of the United States' and the media.
AAZ [November 2008] "Al-Azhar: The Lions Den"	237	When asked about the accusations that AQ kills innocents: says such accusations have throughout history been used by tyrants and colonialists against freedom fighters and that AQ has been the focus of a concerted media campaign of deceitful information by the West. And at the same time American and Western forces kill millions under the pretext of combat operations. Muslims should imagine what they would do about their current situation if Al-Qaida had never emerged.
AAZ [April 2009] "Six years since the invasion of Iraq.."	136	There are references to the American public's frustration with the Iraq war, and their expressions through elections that the war should end.
AAZ [September 2010] "A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade"	226	'I emphasise to my brothers the mujahideen everywhere that true victory is in adherence to Allah's Shari'ah and not being negligent in applying it. That's why the mujahideen must be diligent in abiding by the sacredness of Muslim, and that's why their operations must be

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Mentioned constraints on the use of violence [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>regulated by the noble Shari'ah, and that's why they must study ever operation from all sides. And the Mujahideen must disown every operation which is falsely attributed to them despite their innocence of it and which is aimed at the Muslims in their markets, mosques and gathering places. Moreover, we disown any operation which a Jihadi group carries out in which it doesn't show concern for the safety of the Muslims.' [So there is anxiety over Muslim deaths - and an attempt to place distance between AQ and targeting of Muslims in Iraq, Pakistan and elsewhere, but there is also an interesting admission that 'Jihadi' groups are partly responsible, and that when they are, these attacks should be 'disowned.']</p> <p>Mujahideen travel to Afghanistan to carry out attacks against NATO, not Muslims.</p>
AAZ [February 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(2)"	233	<p>"There are some operations which are ascribed to the Mujahideen, some by due right and others otherwise, in which transgressions occur against Muslims in their mosques, their markets, and other gathering places. About this, I say the following: Regardless of whether the ascription of these acts to the Mujahideen are correct or incorrect, my brothers and I in Al-Qaeda declare to Allah that we are innocent from these attacks, and that we object to them, whether those who carry them are the Mujahideen or others'. 'When planning any operation, they should try their utmost to avoid the deaths and injuries of anyone whose blood is prohibited, whether Muslim or otherwise. They should try as much as possible to avoid harming innocent Muslims in their attacks of the enemy, who have planted themselves in their midst (called tatarrus), as well as any others who are impermissible to kill, of course, other than what is necessary or that which unintentionally results from a mistake. They should be very careful not to be lax in this matter of tatarrus' [even though Ayman was one who popularised this caveat as an excuse for wider targeting.] [guilty Muslimism seemingly still fair game]. Talks of 'transgressions of the Orthodox Coptic Church and its encroachment of and transformation into a government within the government, or to be more exact, a government superior to the government.'</p> <p>There are some Christians who take great measure to improve relations with the Muslims, who don't accept the Zio-Christian occupation of the Arab and the Muslim World, and who are resisting this occupation for whatever reason. There are those pure Arab Christians whose racial jealousy forbids them from accepting the Jewish occupation of Palestine and the American presence in Arab and Muslim lands, and there are those who take pride in their Arab roots and with the Prophet of Islam.'</p>
AAZ [April 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(5)"	236	Shari'ah law and Islamic governance will not 'contradict living and coexistence with the nation's partners of Christians and non-Muslims.'
AAZ [June 2011] "The Noble Knight Dismounted"	239	<p>"In Tora Bora, after the ceasefire agreement, around 100 hypocrites fell into a trap of the Mujahideen. And the only thing between them and their deaths was a command for the mujahideen to open fire. But the Sheikh Usama bin Laden ordered his brothers to let them leave the trap, and they did not fire a single shot upon them." .</p> <p>"Likewise, I urge my Mujahideen brothers everywhere to join with the masses of the Muslim Ummah and strive to serve them, defend them,</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Mentioned constraints on the use of violence [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		and secure their safety and their sanctities. Stay away from any operation that exposes them to danger in the markets, mosques, or crowded areas. We did not leave our homes and migrate from our homelands except to defend them and their honour."

APPENDIX 3.7 (a) Approaching Non-Muslims

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Threats and warnings to non-Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [March 1997] “Pakistan interviews Usama bin Ladin”	154	Implicit warning to US
UBL [June 1997] “Usama bin Ladin Dares US Commandos to Come to Afghanistan”	156	If US sends commandos to arrest UBL or other mujahideen they will meet the same fate as they did in Somalia
UBL [November 1997] “Daily Reports Usama bin Ladin’s Threat against Americans”	158	Americans warned to force its government to stop 'international acts of terrorism' against the Muslim world or else 'there cannot be any guarantee for the safety of American interests and its citizens in any part of the world'
UBL [August 1998] “The Battle Has Not Yet Started”	73	Threatens action against US in response to US bombings of camps in Afghanistan - 'the battle has not yet started and that the answer is what you see, not what you hear'
UBL [January 1999] “Taliban let Bin Ladin Break his Silence”	177	To America: "Tell them the war has just begun; the Americans should now await the answer,"
UBL [January 1999] “Wrath of God..”	178	'The Americans should expect reactions from the Muslim world that are proportionate to the injustice they inflict.'
UBL [January 1999] “Accused Terrorist Leader Usama Bin Ladin Declares War on All Americans”	180	Americans everywhere are a target
UBL [February 1999] “Esquire interview with bin Ladin”	179	"Every day the Americans delay their departure, they will receive a new corpse."
UBL [May 2001] “IF Taleban allow, I can make US life miserable”	198	UBL to make 'life miserable' to US
UBL [November 2001] “Al-Jazirah carries bin Ladin’s address..”	203	'As for the United States, I tell it and its people these few words: I swear by Almighty God who raised the heavens without pillars that neither the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad, may God's peace and blessing be upon him.'

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Threats and warnings to non-Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [December 2001] “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”	119	'This book has been written as a warning to the forces of evil that lie in wait for this nation. We tell them: The nation is drawing closer every day to its victory over you and is about to inflict its rightful punishment [<i>qasas</i>] on you step by step'.
UBL/AAZ [April 2002] “The Wills of the Martyrs..”	207	UBL refers to his previous message to America sent out on ABC News where he warns 'that America has picked a fight with the sons of the Two Holy Places that will make it forget the horrors of Vietnam.' UBL: 'America will not be able to dream, not even in their sleep, of living in peace and security, as long as we don't live in real peace in Palestine, in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, and throughout the Islamic world'
UBL/others [April 2002] “The Wills of the Martyrs..”	108	Excerpts from earlier statement by UBL are played where he threatens 'America and those who live in America' that they will not experience security until it becomes reality in Palestine etc.
UBL [May 2002] “British-based Islamic news agency receives encrypted bin Ladin video”	209	He adds that if he "specifically targeted Britain and America -- this war is not confined to them -- it served as an opportunity for other nations to revise their stance."
AAZ [September 2002] “The Interview of Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri”	22	America is still under threat, as much as it was prior to 9/11. America should expect the same destruction it inflicts on others, including that inflicted by Israel. AQ continues will continue to attack the American economy. America 'should expect to be treated the same way it has acted' in Afghanistan, Palestine and Muslim lands. AQ advises America and its deputies to know their 'crimes will not go unpunished' and they must withdraw.
UBL [October 2002] “A Message Addressed to the American People”	75	Americans have not learned anything from 9/11. If America does not reduce the intensity of their aggression, 'we will respond in an equal manner'.
UBL [October 2002] “Statement from shaykh Usama bin Ladin, may God protect him, and the Al-Qa’ida Organization”	211	'Our threat to the Americans and Jews that they shall remain restless, shall not feel at ease, and shall not dream of security until they take their hands off our nation and stop their aggression against us and their support for our enemies'
UBL [October 2002] “Letter from Usama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the American People”	212	'Here we outline our reply to two questions addressing the Americans: Q1) Why are we waging Jihad against you? Q2) What advice do we have for you and what do we want from you?' Americans are being fought for they continue to attack Muslims, especially in Palestine. 'The blood pouring out of Palestine must be treated - with revenge of equal quantity.' .. 'So it is clear that it is essential that we remove these policies [of 'agent' governments failing to implement Shari'ah, insulting the ummah, stealing its wealth, surrender to the Jews] to make the Shariah (Law of Allah) the supreme law, and that we heal the wounds of Palestine. As you are the Chief designers and sponsors for these policies that are causing immeasurable harm to this Ummah (nation), our fight against these policies is the same fight against you.' [See dynamics in terms of far and near enemy debates]. (see long list of grievances blamed on US in 19 & 20). 'After all, how can you expect that after you have attacked us for more than half

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Threats and warnings to non-Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		a century, that we will then let you live in peace?!!'
UBL [November 2002] "Osama bin Laden hails recent operations.."	76	'Just as you kill, you will be killed. And just like you bombarded, you will be bombarded. Be prepared to receive the glad tidings of what will be bad for you'.
UBL [November 2002] "Statement from Abdullah Usama bin Ladin to the Peoples of countries Allied to Tyrannical US Government"	214	'We had previously warned Australia against participating in Afghanistan in addition to its objectionable endeavours for East Timor's secession. It ignored the warnings until it woke up to the sound of explosions in Bali and its government then claimed falsely and untruly that they were not targeted.' 'The time has come for us to be equal. Just as you kill you are killed. Just as you bombard you are bombarded. Rejoice at the harm coming to you.'
AAZ [August 2003] audio statement	55	America will pay dearly for any harm inflicted upon Muslims in captivity, as will anyone who assisted in their capture. 'what you have seen until now is nothing but the first skirmishes. The real battle has not started yet'.
UBL/AAZ [September 2003] Audio statement	110	'We are concerned about telling you more than this and emphasize to you that what you have seen so far are only the first skirmishes and the beginning of the clash. The real battle, however, has not started yet. So, prepare yourselves to be punished for your crimes.' Mothers of soldiers urged to pressure the government to get them back, if they want to see them alive. [Zawahiri]
UBL [November 2003] "Al-Jazirah TV: Al-Qa'ida claims responsibility for Istanbul bombings"	221	Warns of more attacks like the Istanbul Synagogue bombings to come
AAZ [February 2004] audio statement	58	"We remind Bush that he did not crush two-thirds of Al Qaeda. On the contrary, thanks be to God, Al Qaeda remains on the battleground of the holy war, raising the banner of Islam in the face of the Zionist-Crusader campaign against the Islamic community." "Bush, fortify your targets, tighten your defence, intensify your security measures, because the fighting Islamic community – which sent you New York and Washington battalions – has decided to send you one battalion after the other, carrying death and seeking heaven."
UBL [April 2004] Message to Europe	52	AQ will avenge the death of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin on America.
UBL [April 2004] Peace offering to Europeans	80	We will punish America for the killing of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. 'Reciprocal treatment is fair and the one who starts injustice bears greater blame'.
UBL [October 2004] Threat of the US	31	Responds to Bush's claims that the mujahideen hate freedom, saying 'because we are free men who do not remain silent in the face of injustice'. Just as you violate our security we will violate yours. The American people warned that Bush is striving only for his own personal financial gain. The hand-signals of those who jumped from the towers should be examined; they were saying that the American people should not have let Washington anger the Muslims which brought on this attack.
AAZ [August 2005] interview	128	'As for the English, I say to them: Blair has brought destruction upon you, to the centre of London, and he will have more of it, Allah willing. Oh the peoples of

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Threats and warnings to non-Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		the Crusader coalition, we have offered you, at least, to stop your aggression against the Muslims. We have offered you... The lion of Islam, the mujahed Sheik Osama bin Laden, may Allah protect him, has offered you a truce, so you will leave the lands of Islam. Did Sheik Osama bin Laden not tell you that you could not dream of security before we live it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad? But you have made rivers of blood in our countries, so we blew up volcanoes of rage in your countries. Our message to you is clear and unequivocal: You will not be saved unless you withdraw from our land, stop stealing our oil and our resources, and cease your support of the corrupt (Arab) rulers'. To Americans: 'Oh Americans, what you have seen in New York and Washington, and the casualties you witness in Afghanistan and in Iraq, despite all the media blackout, are nothing but the casualties of the initial clashes. If you continue the same policy of aggression against the Muslims, you will see, Allah willing, horrors that will make you forget what you saw in Afghanistan... I mean, in Vietnam'.
AAZ [November 2005] "Wills of the Knights of the London Raids"	53	The 'blessed' London raid. 'O People of the Crusader alliances, we have alerted you and warned you, but it appears that you want us to make you taste death in all its horribleness'. Reference to UBL's peace offering and Jack Straw's dismissal. Blair 'continues to exploit the heedlessness and negligence of his people and obstinately insists on treating them as if they are idiots incapable of understanding by reputedly telling them that what occurred in London had no connection to the crimes he has committed in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq'.
AAZ [December 2005] "The Victory of the Islamic Religion in Iraq"	26	As long as the people of the Crusader nations 'fail to interact with the Muslim Ummah on the basis of respect and mutual understanding, you shall continue to move from one disaster to the next, and your disasters shall not cease until you leave our lands and end your theft of our treasure and stop your support to the corrupt rulers of our countries'.
AAZ [December 2005] interview	49	'Whoever strikes us [...] we chop off his hand; and whoever acts with insolence toward us will pay the price for his audacity'. The Crusader west which follows Bush and Blair will pay the price, and the 'battle is still in its first stages'. 'The blessed London raid is one of the raids that the Qaedat al-Jihad organization had the honour of carrying out against the British Crusader arrogance - as well as the British Crusader aggression toward the Muslim umma for more than one hundred years; and against the British historic crime of establishing Israel; and against the continual crimes the English perpetrate against Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq. ' We address them [the British] in the only language they understand; and if they don't understand it this time around, we will repeat it until they understand it completely.' ..'If they really oppose it [the government], then let them depose it; but if they are satisfied with it, then they should pay the price for this satisfaction'.
UBL [January 2006] Bin Ladin truce offer to Americans	50	'As for the delay of similar operations in America, this has not been because of failure to break through your security measures. The operations are under preparation and you will see them in your own homes once they are readied'.
AAZ [January 2006] "Bajawr Massacre and the Lies of the Crusaders"	51	To the American people: 'Bush and his gang are shedding your blood and wasting your money in failed adventures. They have involved you in a struggle - which you cannot win - against the Muslims, [in order to] increase their wealth'. 'Your leaders - due to their desire to accumulate wealth - insist on casting you into perdition and destroying your souls, in Iraq and Afghanistan - no, even more: in your own homes, Allah willing.
AAZ [April 2006]	238	I address his [al-Jafari] two masters: Bush and Blair. I say, God willing, you

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Threats and warnings to non-Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
“Four Years since the Battle of Tora Bora”		will pay for these statements [of the Iraqi defence minister saying houses of Muslims could be destroyed]’.
AAZ [June 2006] “Elegizing the Ummah’s Martyr..”	32	We take revenge for anyone killed. Americans asked how many of them have been killed, how much the economy has suffered, how much moral has suffered in the ranks, and the extent of Muslim hatred towards Americans. 'You are facing neither individuals nor organizations: rather, you are facing the Islamic Ummah
UBL [July 2006] “To the Ummah in General and the Mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia in Particular”	93	'We warn all countries of the world against responding to America by sending international forces to Somalia [...] we will fight their soldiers on the land of Somalia [...] We will also reserve our right to punish them on their own territory and everywhere possible at the right time and using the method we deem most appropriate'.
AAZ [September 2006] “Hot issues..”	21	To the people of the West: 'your leaders are hiding from you', 'new events' are coming, the Western people have given the mujahideen every legal justification for attacking them. They have been reputedly warned and offered truce. Now full legal and rational justifications are in place for attacking the West until its people surrender or Western power destroyed. Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are all but defeated, fighting their last battles. The West will be expelled from the Gulf, ruining its economy, and from Israel, which will be destroyed.
AAZ [September 2006] “Bush, the Vatican’s Pope, Darfur and the Crusades”	89	To Bush: 'We, by the grace of Allah, are seeking to exact revenge on behalf of Islam and Muslims from you and your soldiers and allies'.
AAZ [December 2006] “Realities of Conflict Between Islam and Unbelievers”	94	To Democrats in US: 'And if you don't refrain from the foolish American policy of backing Israel, occupying the lands of Islam, and stealing the treasures of the Muslims, then await the same fate' [be killed by Mujahideen]. Democrats and Republicans in US told that a process of negotiation with different tribes will not work in Iraq. The American people: 'a nation which chooses Bush as its president is a nation of negligible morals, ideology and intellect'. Argues the Americans chose Democratic at 2006 midterms due to Mujahideen operations. They will never dream of security until it is experienced in Palestine and all lands of Islam.
AAZ [January 2007] “The Correct Equation”	28	To Americans: 'most of you don't recognise the language of religion, morals and principles, and instead understand the language of running after pillage, and plunder [...] if you want to live in security you must accept the facts of what is happening on the ground and reject the fantasies [of Bush] [...] You must honestly try to reach a mutual understanding with the Muslims for then, and only then, you might enjoy security. If, however, you continue with the policy of Bush and his gang you will never even dream of peace' ... 'If we are secure, you might be secure'. 'You are facing Islam's rage'. 'What awaits you [...] is much worse than anything you have yet seen'.
AAZ [February 2007] “Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427”	97	People of the West are not facing organizations or individuals, but 'Jihadi Intifada of the angry, alert Muslim Ummah'. If the West continues with its current policies it will be defeated in Afghanistan and Iraq. This will then only embolden the mujahideen and enhance the confrontation. 'So pay attention before it's too late'. The American people voted for Democrats [in the mid-terms] because they were opposed to Bush, but in fact they are treading the same line and face certain failure. 'And the American people shall discover that

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Threats and warnings to non-Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		you are all one side of the same coin of tyranny, criminality and failure'.
AAZ [May 2007] "The Empire of Evil is about to End"	23	'The Empire of Evil is about to come to an end'....'a new dawn is about to rise'. 'The Americans deserve what they're getting. They chose this liar two times, so let them pay the price for their choice'.
AAZ [July 2007] "Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves"	103	'Therefore, I say to Elizabeth and Blair that we got the message and we are preparing for a strong response'. To Blair's successor: 'if you did not learn a lesson, we are ready to repeat it' [London].
UBL [September 2007] "The Solution.."	10	Normal Americans claim to be innocent, and yet they failed to bring the leaders responsible for the Vietnam war to justice. And elected Bush twice and gave him continued mandate to wage war.' This innocence of yours is like my innocence of the blood of your sons on the 11th'
UBL [March 2008] "May our Mothers be Bereaved of us if we fail to help our Prophet, peace be upon him"	11	Revenge for the drawings will be more severe than for killing of women and children
AAZ [November 2008] "The Exit of Bush and Arrival of Obama"	100	To the American people: references the note sent to the American people from Bin Laden telling them to cease all interference in Muslim affairs and withdrawing troops. 'So choose for yourself whatever you like, and bear the consequences of your choice, and as you judge, you will be judged.'
AAZ [November 2008] "Al-Azhar: The Lions Den"	237	'I tell Bush: the dogs of Afghanistan have yet to eat their fill of the flesh of Americans. And I challenge you, if you're really a man, to send the entire American army to Pakistan and the tribal regions, for it to end up, with Allah's help, in Hell'.
AAZ [January 2009] "The Massacre of Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors"	121	Pledges that the oath of bin Laden will be fulfilled that 'neither America nor those who reside in it will ever even dream of security until we ourselves live it practically in Palestine, and before all the infidel armies have withdrawn from the land of Muhammad' [quoting bin Laden].
AAZ [April 2009] "Six years since the invasion of Iraq.."	136	Americans will continue to face bloodshed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama has not changed the policies of Bush. Americans are killing Muslims in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, stealing Muslim resources, occupying their lands and assisting corrupt rulers to stay in power. American leaders are trying to hide from their people that 'the Muslim nation is experiencing an awakening in which it is returning to jihad', 'arresting, killing and torturing' will not change this.
UBL [September 2009] "A Statement to the American People"	144	If Americans decide to continue this war 'we will have no choice but to continue this war of attrition against you on all possible fronts.'
UBL [September 2009] "A Message to the European People"	143	Europeans should recognise that Americans are not reliable allies, and they will be left alone to battle the mujahideen. If Europeans were aware of the atrocities committed by America they would understand the causes for the Madrid and London attacks.
AAZ [September 2009] "Shaykh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri: Eulogy for the Role Model of Youth"	147	Americans will see that the jihad will escalate after Baithulla's murder. ... 'And we say to the Germans, the Americans and the English, [...] Whoever wants to lose his child should send him to Afghanistan. Whoever wants to lose his money, should spend in on Afghanistan. Whoever wants to damage his equipment, should send it to Afghanistan. And whoever wants to bring defeat to his army, should send it to Afghanistan.'

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Threats and warnings to non-Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [October 2009] "Eulogy for Ibn Sheikh al Libi by Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri"	145	"You criminals, you murderers, you vampires [...] your blood will be spilled and your economy will be drained so that you stop your crimes [...] We will take revenge for every mujahid, orphan, or Muslim you have killed. ' 'Obama, you who talks about human rights; how many secret prisons are there? Where are they located? How many are their victims? How many of them were killed? How many were disabled? What is their fate? To whom were they handed over? Why did you hand them over. 'Why did your administration conspire with the Libyan regime to kill Ibn Sheikh al-Libi?'
UBL [February 2010] "From Osama to Obama"	148	'America will not dream of security until we experience it as reality in Palestine'
AAZ [November 2010] "Who is going to support Aifa Siddique"	229	'By the Lord of the heavens and the earth, we will fight you until the Day of Judgement or you stop your crimes.'
UBL [November 2010] "Message from Shaykh Usama bin Ladin to the People of France"	230	'As you kill, you will be killed, and as you capture, you will be captured, and as you ruin our security, we will ruin your security, and the one who started it has done the greater injustice.' French must withdraw from Afghanistan.
UBL [January 2011] "From al-Sheikh Osama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the French People"	231	<p>"Our message to you today and yesterday...is that the release of your prisoners from the hands of our brothers is dependent upon the exit of your soldiers from our homelands."</p> <p>"O' people of France, your president's refusal to leave Afghanistan is a result of his subordination to America. And this refusal is a green light to kill your prisoners immediately in order to get rid of the consequences of your case, but we won't do it on the time he assigns."</p> <p>"And his stance will cost him and cost you highly, over various axes, inside France and outside. And it's not hidden from you that the size of your debts and the weakness of your budget are not in need for opening new fronts."</p>
AAZ [June 2011] "The Noble Knight Dismounted"	239	<p>Zawahiri refers against to the words of bin Ladin, the "Imam of the Age of Jihad against America", that "America and those who live in American will not dream of security before we truly live in security in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad, may Allah's prayers and peace be upon him." Later Zawahiri refers to the pledge of ensuring security in all Muslim lands before America and its agents can dream of this.. Abu Abdullah Usama bin Laden responded in Abbottabad, "Just wait! Humiliation is coming to America! Just wait! Humiliation is coming to Crusader arrogance! Just wait! Humiliation is coming to the Pakistani agents! How wrong is the neglect of the sanctuaries, the holy sites, and the honor of the Ummah!"</p> <p>Obama and America have rejoice repeatedly after their perceived successes against the mujahideen but have always been disappointed, now they rejoice with the death of Usama: "so wait for what befalls you after all this rejoicing."</p>

APPENDIX 3.7 (b) Approaching Non-Muslims

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Appeals & conciliatory approaches, promises of truce [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [February 1999] “Esquire interview with bin Ladin”	179	'And we tell the mothers of soldiers and American mothers in general that if they value their lives and the lives of their children, to find a nationalistic government that will look after their interests and not the interests of the Jews. The continuation of tyranny will bring the fight to America, as Ramzi Yousef and others did. This is my message to the American people: to look for a serious government that looks out for their interests and does not attack others, their lands, or their honour. And my word to American journalists is not to ask why we did that but ask what their government has done that forced us to defend ourselves'
UBL [February 1999] May 1998 interview reported	182	To China: 'It was the United States that dropped the atomic bomb on Japan. So I suggest the Chinese government be more careful of the US and the West. China must use its force against the United States and Israel and should be friendly towards Muslims.'
UBL [November 2001] Osama claims he has nukes (article title)	125	'I ask the American people to force their government to give up anti-Muslim policies. The American people had risen against their government's war in Vietnam. They must do the same today. The American people should stop the massacre of Muslims by their government.' .. 'There are many innocent and good-hearted people in the West. American media instigates them against Muslims. However, some good-hearted people are protesting against American attacks because human nature abhors injustice.' 'The Muslims were massacred under the UN patronage in Bosnia. I am ware that some officers of the State Department had resigned in protest. Many years ago the US ambassador in Egypt had resigned in protest against the policies of President Jimmy Carter. Nice and civilized are everywhere. The Jewish lobby has taken America and the West hostage'.
UBL [October 2002] “A Message Addressed to the American People”	75	'Indeed, I'm a trustworthy adviser to you. I invite you to the happiness of this world of the hereafter and to escape your dry, miserable, materialistic life that is without soul. I invite you to Islam'.
UBL [October 2002] “Letter from Usama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the American People”	212	'The first thing that we are inviting you to is Islam, the religion of Tawheed.' 'We call you to Islam; the last religion that has replaced all the previous religions' .. America 'advised' to: cease support for Israel, Russia re Chechyna, Phillipines re Mindanao, Indians re Kashmir; to vacate Muslim lands, and cease supporting puppet leaders and interfering in the affairs of these lands.
UBL [November 2002] “Statement from Abdullah Usama bin Ladin to the Peoples of countries Allied to Tyrannical US Government”	214	'Why did your governments ally themselves to the United States in this attack on us in Afghanistan, and I mention in particular Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany, and Australia?'
UBL [April 2004] Message to Europe	52	'This is a message to our neighbours north of the Mediterranean, containing a peace proposal in response to positive reactions' [Ibrahim points out that in Arabic, what was offered to the Europeans was 'mudabarat sulh' essentially a long lasting peace treaty. To the Americans he offered 'hudna', a temporary truce, easily abrogated, p. 303]. 'Our actions are merely reactions to yours, represented by the murder and

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Appeals & conciliatory approaches, promises of truce [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>destruction of our people in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine'. 'Reciprocal treatment is part of justice; and he who initiates aggression is the unjust one'. 'We both suffer injustices by your leaders, who send your sons, despite objections [made], to our countries, to kill and be killed. Thus it is in both our interests to stop the ones who shed their own people's blood, for both their own narrow, personal interests and the interests of the gang residing at the White House'.</p> <p>'I therefore offer them [Europeans] this peace treaty, which essentially is a commitment to cease operations against every country that pledges not to attack Muslims or interfere in their business - including the American conspiracy against the greater Islamic world. This peace treaty can be renewed at the end of a government's term and the beginning of a new one, if both sides consent. It will commence with the departure of its last soldier from our lands; it is available for a period of three months starting from the day this statement is issued'.</p>
UBL [April 2004] Peace offering to Europeans	80	<p>To the people of Europe: 'The examining of the developments that have been taking place, in terms of killing in our countries and your countries, will make clear an important fact; namely, that injustice is inflicted on us and on you by your politicians, who send your sons - although you are opposed to this - to our countries to kill and be killed'. 'Therefore it is in both sides' interest to curb the plans of those who shed the blood of peoples for their narrow personal interest and subservience to the White House gang'.</p> <p>'Based on the above, and in order to deny war merchants a chance and in response to the positive interaction shown by recent events and opinion polls, which indicate that most European peoples want peace, I ask honest people, especially ulema preachers and merchants, to form a permanent committee to enlighten European peoples of the justice of our causes, above all Palestine. They can make use of the huge potential of the media. I also offer a peace initiative to them, whose essence is our commitment to stopping operations against every country that commits itself to not attacking Muslims or interfering in their affairs'. To be renewed by each new government, starting with the departure of foreign troops from Muslim lands, offer on the table for three months.</p>
UBL [October 2004] Threat of the US	31	The security of Americans is in their own hands, not Bush, Kerry or Al-Qaida - 'any state that does not toy with our security automatically guarantees its own'.
UBL [October 2004] "Message to Americans"	83	To Americans: the Bush family and administration is gaining a lot from the war, through its corporations like Halliburton. The real losers here are the people of America and their economy. 'So I say to you, over 15,000 of our people have been killed and tens of thousands injured, while more than a thousand of you have been killed and more than 10,000 injured. And Bush's hands are stained with the blood of all those killed from both sides, all for the sake of oil and keeping their private companies in business'. 'Your security is in your own hands. And every state that doesn't play with our security has automatically guaranteed its own security'. [trying to distance the American public from the administration].
AAZ [June 2005] video statement	72	'I address the stupid ones who follow Bush and send their sons to Afghanistan and Iraq to the massacre [...] we advised you before and invited you to Islam so you get out of the mud of materialism to the lights of Islam, we advised you to at least stop your aggression against

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Appeals & conciliatory approaches, promises of truce [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		the nation of Islam'. References to the truce offer by UBL. 'If their bodies [of your sons] come back to you, don't cry over it, you are the one who killed them'. Calls on the West to establish an independent committee to establish the exact number of dead from the West during the war on terror, then they will discover the extent of 'official American lies'.
AAZ [November 2005] "Wills of the Knights of the London Raids"	53	Blair 'is also taking lightly your (British) blood, he is taking you to the inferno in Iraq and exposing you to death and killing [in] your own homeland because of his Crusade against Islam'.
AAZ [December 2005] interview	49	'We call on Americans to join Islam. Instead of waging failed wars against the Muslims and continuing to oppress and attack them, we call upon them to listen to the voice of truth, to be honest with themselves and to realize that their current creed - which is composed of materialistic secularism, the distorted Christianity that has nothing to do with Jesus Christ [...] will only lead them to destruction. [...] So we call upon every rational American and Westerner to conduct a personal soul-search'. Muslims are not enemies of the People of the Book, they exalt all the prophets, they are not hostile to the Torah and the Gospels, only they request that original and authentic versions are provided. The Koran has not been distorted or altered.
UBL [January 2006] Bin Ladin truce offer to Americans	50	<p>'What has roused me to speak are the continual mistakes your President Bush commits regarding his comments over the results of your opinion polls, which indicate that an overwhelming majority of you wish American forces withdraw from Iraq.' An announcement of defeat in Iraq is only a matter of time.</p> <p>'So we have no qualms in offering you a long-term truce on fair conditions that we adhere to. For we are the umma that Allah has forbidden from double-crossing and lying. Both sides would be able to enjoy security and stability under this truce so we can build Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which have been devastated by the war. There is no shame in this solution, which prevents the wasting of billions of dollars that have gone to those with influence and the merchants of war in America'. 'If you are sincere in your desire for peace and security, so here it is - we have answered you.' Recommends Rouge State by William Blum.</p>
UBL [May 2006] "A Testimony to the Truth"	91	'Perhaps there will one day come from the Americans someone who desires justice and fairness, and that is the path to security and safety, if you are interested in it'.
AAZ + Gadhan [September 2006] "An Invitation to Islam"	33	<p>Zawahiri asks Allah to open the hearts of Americans and Westerners, for them to join Islam. The hearts even of the most hardened of enemies can be softened, Gadhan makes 'heartfelt invitation to my religion'. All the Prophets were Muslims. Islam is the final religion.</p> <p>Gadhan: even for the leaders of the Crusaders and those who have been attacking Islam, they can still repent and embrace Islam and be saved, even Bush. Gadhan all unbelievers invited to Islam.</p> <p>Gadhan: the leaders of the mujahideen want the best for the unbelievers, they have no choice but to fight those who fight them, they would prefer that the unbelievers abandon aggression and embrace Islam.</p>
AAZ [September 2006] "Hot issues.."	21	AQ does not need to fight until the end, 'we have repeatedly declared our political offer to the West, but the leaders of the West deliberately cause confusion about them. UBL offered ceasefire, Zawahiri said the way to

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Appeals & conciliatory approaches, promises of truce [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		peace was for the West to pull out of Muslim lands, and stop plundering its resources, stop supporting corrupt governments. All victims of America invited to Islam, and if they do not convert, then at least they should take advantage of the mujahideen strikes against America and rid themselves of its influences, each under his own banner. This is a historic opportunity.
AAZ [September 2006] “Bush, the Vatican’s Pope, Darfur and the Crusades”	89	Pope Benedict and all Christians invited to Islam which does not allow superstition and did not allow its book to be distorted and changed.
AAZ [May 2007] “The Empire of Evil is about to End”	23	<p>Denies having suggested negotiations with Americans, when said that they weren't negotiating with the real powers in the Muslim world - by this he means the mujahideen.</p> <p>'I am hurt when I find a black American fighting the Muslims under the American flag. Why is he fighting us when the racist Crusader regime in America is persecuting him like it persecutes us, and oppressing him like it oppresses us? And perhaps his slave ancestors whom America kidnapped from Africa were Muslims like us.' Condoleeza Rice and Powel are, what Malcolm X referred to as, "house slaves". 'That's why I want blacks in America, people of colour, American Indians, Hispanics, and all the weak and oppressed in North and South America, in Africa and Asia, and all over the world, to know that when we wage Jihad in Allah's path, we aren't waging Jihad to lift oppression from the Muslims only, we are waging Jihad to lift oppression from all of mankind, because Allah has ordered us never to accept oppression, whatever it may be'. 'I also invite all the world's weak and oppressed ones to Islam' [this invitation seems genuine - not a justification for coming violence]. 'And this is why I want every oppressed one on the face of the earth to know that our victory over America and the Crusader West – with Allah's permission – is a victory for them, because they shall be freed from the most powerful tyrannical force in the history of mankind'.</p>
AAZ [July 2007] “The Advice of one Concerned”	102	<p>'If you are real men, then compete with us by yourselves in the arena of ideology, invitation and information, which are the arenas in which you yourselves have admitted your defeat',</p> <p>'you are now practicing the same Communist brainwashing methods you used to attack, so stop your lies about freedom and human rights' [on the issue of prisoners under pressure speaking out against jihad].</p>
UBL [September 2007] “The Solution..”	10	As the people of the West escaped from slavery, feudalism, the Middle Ages etc. so they should escape form the shackles of capitalism. Americans must embrace Islam in favour of Democracy and Capitalism, this will fix all their woes, including ending the war in Iraq
AAZ [April 2008] “The Open Meeting part one..”	105	Asked about the Coptic influence in Egypt: 'regarding the Christians in Egypt, I don't see them as the biggest threat to Islam; rather the biggest threat to Islam is the Crusader/Zionist assault and its agents, the apostate rulers'.
AAZ [April 2008] “The Open Meeting.. Part 2..”	107	Invites one of the questioners to Islam and urges him to stay away from secularism.
AAZ [August 2008] “A Message form Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri to the Pakistani Army and the	41	Hopes that one day the people of the West embrace Islam and then their languages can become languages of Islam. But now English is only the language of the enemy.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Appeals & conciliatory approaches, promises of truce [excerpts, quotes, notes]
People of Pakistan”		
AAZ [November 2008] “Al-Azhar: The Lions Den”	237	Message for the Crusader West: 'We tell them: Embrace Islam and you will be safe. Embrace Islam to live a life free of greed, exploitation, forbidden wealth, and the beasts of capitalism who crush the poor'.
AAZ [August 2009] “The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy”	140	(Discussing earlier offers from UBL, rather than anything new:) If Obama wanted to negotiate, they he should respond to the two offers of Sheikh Usama, and they are fair offers.'
UBL [September 2009] “A Statement to the American People”	144	Americans asked to review the causes for 9/11, as the victims of the attacks are calling for. This is the first step in ending the war. Americans need to free themselves from the 'ideological terrorism' of the neoconservatives and Israel/lobby and reconsider its policies towards Israel and Palestine in order to live in peace. 'We are ready to work with you on this option.'
UBL [September 2009] “A Message to the European People”	143	'An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure'. Europeans should learn from their mistakes and withdraw from Afghanistan, especially since their economy is in tatters.
AAZ [July 2010] “Al Quds will not be converted to Judaism”	223	To Orthodox Copts: 'Isn't there anyone of sound intellect amongst you? Why all this instigation of the Muslims? Are we not neighbours in the same country? Why do the leaders of your church and some of your brothers seek to embolden themselves with the American invaders who will inevitably retreat just like France in the past and, with them, General Yaqoob? We have lived with you and will continue to do so as long as Allah wills. Allah Most High has commanded us to differentiate between those non-Muslims who show enmity to us and those who don't. Why do you side with those who show enmity to us? We don't want to start a battle with you,'

APPENDIX 3.8 (a) Approaching Muslims

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	ID	Motivational appeals to Muslim audiences excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [unknown date] “Response to a Grave Uncertainty..”	117	Muslims must see that the corrupt leaders of Arabs are not real leaders according to the Hadith. Jihad must be waged against these rulers.
UBL [unknown date] “Methodological Guidelines”	112	<p>Erring Imams must be replaced with righteous imams. The Muslim youth must get proper education.</p> <p>Unity in Jihad is crucial if Muslims are to succeed. The American enemy is not all powerful as the strikes have shown. Jihad has to be supported with any means possible.</p> <p>Fear has divided the community into three main groups: 1) those who sink to joining the government, 2) those who praise the government out of fear of losing their possessions or statuses, and 3) those who fight in the cause of God.</p> <p>Success corresponds to the level of faith. Muslims should look to old righteous leaders such as Sala-al-Din to see examples of proper leaders and not follow the 'neo-Ghassanids' of Arab rulers and ulema who sell out to the West.</p> <p>Muslims must not follow unjust rulers.</p>
UBL [unknown date] Letter to Mullah Omar	61	'We need to cooperate all together to continue this matter, especially Jihad continuation in the Islamic Republics will keep the enemies busy and divert them away from the Afghani issue and ease the pressure off. The enemies of Islam problem will become how to stop the spreading of Islam into the Islamic Republics and not the Afghani issue. Consequently, the efforts of the Russians and their American allies will be scattered.'
AAZ [unknown date] “Introduction to Characteristics of Jihad”	35	<p>Stresses the importance of jihad to follow the past good deeds of the early Muslims, and strong belief on the Koran and its rules.</p> <p>Muslims must decide to which party they belong - 'Do you belong in the party of America, Israel, France, Russia and their allies among the apostate rulers of our countries, their assistants, their soldiers, their journalists, their judges, and their clerics who spread confusion, pledge allegiance to them, and call them the care takers of the Muslims' affairs? Or, do you belong in the party of the monotheistic, Salafi Mujahideen?'</p>
AAZ [purported] [unknown date] “Jihad, Martyrdom, and the killing of innocents”	48	'If believers are weak, they are to wage jihad with their hearts and tongues; if they are able, they are to enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil, fight the infidels, and spread the call of tawhid'.
AAZ [early 1991] “The Bitter Harvest”	46	If a ruler is Muslim, 'but transgresses by becoming cruel and despotic, the Sunni madhhabs say that it is forbidden to overthrow him [...] However, should the sultan become an infidel, then he is not to be obeyed, and its is obligatory for you to wage jihad against him, if you can'. [the difference from the

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		'freedom-fighting' ethic of the West/US etc]. 'It is forbidden to overthrow a tyrant, but it is a duty to overthrow an infidel'.
AAZ [early 1992] “The Black Book: An account of the Torture of Muslims in the Time of Husni Mubarak”	114	Need to rise up against this system of corruption and torture. The poor and uneducated are treated almost as badly as the activists and prisoners who face torture. The way out is to support al-Jihad and other Islamist groups which seek to mobilise the masses and grant them freedom from this oppression.
UBL [June 1994] “Saudi Arabia Supports the Communists in Yemen”	37	Asks the righteous ulema to declare the actions of the Saudi authorities in Yemen as dangerous and illegal and to proclaim this to the Ummah and Muslim armies.
UBL [July 1994] “The Banishment of Communism from the Arabian Peninsula”	38	'One of the main lessons from Yemen, is that the Western world, most of all the United States, was not willing to take the risk of intervention in order to protect or assist corrupt regimes that do not have the support or endorsement of their publics'. [indicating that the West would not come to the aid of other illegitimate regimes, such as Riyadh].
UBL [July 1994] “Quran Scholars in the Face of Despotism”	39	The ummah is following the lead of the ulema, allowing for Sharia edicts and protesting against the authorities.
UBL [September 1994] “Saudi Arabia Unveils its War against Islam and its Scholars”	40	Righteous preachers and venerated scholars have to be patient and steadfast, they will be victorious. To the Muslim people: Stay committed to the 'true religion's practices'. Follow the advice of the venerated scholars and do not be confused or lead astray by the authorities and their outlets. To the Muslims in the government organizations: 'we salute the large majority that sympathizes with the scholars. We would like to remind those who had a misstep that there is no obedience in disobeying the creator' [more polite, less aggressive than later]. 'You are legally forbidden to obey the orders of your superiors, to arrest the scholars'.
UBL [September 1994] “Urgent Letter to Security Officials”	42	Need to reveal the truth to those Muslims who give support to the oppressors, but are unaware. 'Perhaps they will repent'. To the brother Muslims in the security apparatus: you were trained to protect the interest of your people, their religion, property etc. 'Your rulers today want to take this great and honourable position away from you and reduce you to a low and submissive rank'. 'They want to turn you into slaves'. The members of the security services must not obey these orders and turn their spears onto the ummah and ulema. The Ulema are not the ones who are responsible for stealing land from the tribes, giving it to family members, building palaces, establishing banks that charge interest, neglected the army, corrupted the media etc. The Ulema are the ones who opposed these crimes and called for the implementation of shariah. 'Arise, our brothers! Do not call on the Dajjals [devil] of the Sa'ud family'. 'They will drive you to god's wrath and punishment'. 'Let the ummah see that you are slaves of God alone'. The brothers in the security apparatus should do the following: 1) repent and seek the forgiveness of god, 2) not obey the tyrants when the command you to take action against the ulema or Muslims, 3) urge colleagues to do the same, 4) helping the people from moving the tyranny, 5) to cease

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		in trusting the regime and partaking in their crimes, 6) strive to release the shaykhs.
UBL [September 1994] "Urgent Letter to Security Officials"	47	Appeal to the audience not to be deceived by the Saudi authority's creation of the Higher Committee for Islamic Affairs, which is meant to veil the regime's efforts to silence the ulema and sheikhs. Through it seeks to 'destroy true Islam'.
UBL [December 1994] "Open Letter for Shaykh bin Baz on the Invalidity of his Fatwa on Peace with the Jews"	63	The ulema represent the ideal model for the ummah.
UBL [January 1995] "Second letter to Shaykh Abd Al-Aziz bin Baz from the Reform and Advice Foundation"	64	'We are warning the ummah against such discredited fatwas that do not meet the requirements [e.g. are contradictory to Islamic law, not issued by experts in the particular field]. We are asking ummah to go back to fatwas that have been approved by those who combined religious knowledge with current affairs, who believe in the word of Allah and who did the right thing and did not fear anyone by not speaking out'.
UBL [February 1995] "Prince Salman and Ramadan Alms"	65	All donors warned against donating funds or zakat to the new organizations established by the royal family, as this will only be used to serve their interest. Donors should give to the needy directly, both outside and inside the Peninsula, or hand donations to trusted individuals. They should avoid using bank accounts in Saudi Arabia, in order to avoid the regime's spies.
UBL [March 1995] "Saudi Arabia Continues its War against Islam and its Scholars"	66	Ummah is warned 'about the viciousness of those declaring aimlessly false and unfounded political statements, whether on platform or on TV'.
UBL [May 1995] "Scholars are the Prophet's Successors"	67	<p>'It is known that religious knowledge is the prophecy's succession as scholars are to prophets' ... 'Talking negatively about scholars is the beginning of launching destruction of their credibility and creating a religious leadership void in the ummah' [does UBL himself not later fall into this category, of questioning the scholars?]. However, there are bad scholars - those who fail to lead their people and follow materialistic ambitions. A bad scholar departs from the right path by failing to act according to their religious knowledge or changing what Allah said and interpreting laws for their own benefit. Islamic scholars must stand up to bad scholars. 'True scholars are known for speaking the truth and not being afraid of an unjust king or infidel ruler'.</p> <p>Scholars are not prevented from making mistakes and glorification of them should not be exaggerated, to ensure that people do not follow scholars who do not rule in accordance with religion. 'The more they move away from speaking the truth, the more animosity is geared towards them'.</p>
UBL [July 1995] "Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commissions"	68	<p>'On our path to reform we are tasked with bringing the regime's dangers to the attention of the people' .. 'for this reason this statement has been released'.</p> <p>People urged not to invest in government projects and privatisation deals.</p>

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UBL [August 1995] “An Open Letter to King Fahd on the Occasion of the Recent Cabinet Reshuffle”	62	<p>'It is needless to alert people's attention to the towers of usurious banks that compete in height with the minarets of the two great mosques and apply your positive laws.'</p> <p>The process of toppling the Saudi regime: 'That cannot be specifically achieved by rash personal effort or an individual provocative decision. It has to be accomplished by the nation's leadership of honest scholars, missionaries, and reformers whose hardships and misfortunes have proven their competence and qualifications to confront such grand undertakings'.</p>
UBL [August 1995] “The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two Mosques”	69	Muslims urged to help their brethren in Palestine and Bosnia, but to avoid institutions controlled by the regimes.
AAZ [early 1996] “Healing the Hearts of the Believers”	118	The main issue facing Muslims is freeing Palestine. Then toppling apostate regimes.
UBL [September 1996] “Bin Ladin Declares Jihad on Americans/Letter from Usama bin Muhammad bin Ladin to his Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula..”	5	Majority of Saudis said to oppose regime. Fighting the Americans is a collective duty. Everyone should do his best to ward off the enemy. Muslims must avoid infighting. Need to protect the oil wealth. Members of the military addressed specifically. Young men addressed specifically (‘Mohammed’s companions were young men’).
UBL [February 1997] “Correspondent meets with opposition leader bin Ladin”	151	Duty of Muslims to rid the peninsula of foreign occupying forces
UBL [March 1997] “Bin Ladin Cited on Prince Sultan’s US Visit”	152	'We expect a further widening of the resistance against the US occupation of the country of the Two Holy Mosques and also the Zionist occupation of the Palestinian land.' Concerned with 'awareness' of Muslims and urges them to join the mujahideen.
UBL [March 1997] “Pakistan interviews Usama bin Ladin”	154	<p>'If Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and China get united, the United States and India will become ineffective..'</p> <p>Muslims encouraged to rise up against US presence in Arabian peninsula.</p>
UBL [April 1997] “The Saudi Regime and the Reputed Tragedies of the Pilgrims”	70	'We offer our deep condolences to the nation of Islam in general, and to the families of the victims in particular'
UBL [November 1997] “Daily Reports Usama bin Ladin’s Threat against Americans”	158	'Duty' of Muslims to take action against the US since they are now the biggest enemy of Muslims
UBL + AAZ + others [February 1998] “Text	161	'We -- with God's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to

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of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans”		kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's US troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.'
UBL [March 1998] “Bin Ladin Urges Expulsion of Invaders..”	162	Urges 'young men, ulema, notables, traders, and tribal chiefs' to fight the US occupation in the Arabian Peninsula
UBL [March 1998] “Interview with Usama bin Ladin Reported”	163	'Duty' of Muslims to fight US
UBL [April 1998] “Bin Ladin warns against Richardson Mission to Afghanistan”	164	Implicit appeal that they resist US efforts to reach out to the Taliban
UBL [May 1998] “Supporting the Fatwa of the Afghani Religious Scholars of Ejecting the American Forces from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques”	71	The responsibility of declaring jihad and ejecting the American occupiers from LTHM lies with the entire Muslim ummah, not only the residents of the Peninsula.
UBL [May 1998] “Clerics in Afghanistan Issue Fatwa..”	165	Calls on 'everyone to adopt and implement it [The fatwa of the Ulema Union of Afghanistan], because it is issued by ulema' and 'move the polytheists out of the Arabian Peninsula.'
UBL [May 1998] “World Islamic Front Backs Intifadah of Palestine’s Sons/Wounds of Al-Aqsa”	167	Appeal to Muslims to support 'the jihad against the Americans and the Israelis wherever they are'
UBL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin Creates New Front Against US, Israel”	168	Muslims are already 'awakening' and the ulema are increasingly critical of the Americans and Israelis
UBL [May 1998] “United States Admits that Keeping its Troops in the Gulf is Causing Dissatisfaction...”	169	'All Muslims must declare jihad against them (the US troops) and expel them from the holy land.'
UBL [June 1998] “Bin Ladin Congratulates Pakistan on Possession of Nuclear Weapons”	170	Urges all Muslims to support Pakistani Muslims in their struggle against Indian aggression. They should also seek to follow the example of Pakistan in acquiring CBRN weapons, as this will halt Western, 'atheist', Indian and Zionist efforts to dominate power.
UBL [June 1998] “In the Way of Allah”	171	Appeal for united front against the 'big' enemy of America/Israel

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UBL [August 1998] "Bin Ladin Calls for 'Jihad' against Jews, America"	172	'Bin Ladin calls on Moslem Ummah (nation) to continue Jihad against Jews and Americans to liberate their holy places. In the meanwhile, he denies any involvement in the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings'
UBL [September 1998] "Bin Ladin Praises Pakistanis for Love of Islam"	174	Praises Pakistanis for their love of Islam and Pakistani journalists for their willingness to undergo treacherous journeys to meet him
UBL [September 1998] Letter to anti-US Islamist conference	126	Pakistani nation and youth thanked for their efforts, their fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir and supporting the mujahideen. Obligation of all Muslims to sacrifice their lives and money until all Muslim lands are free of the Jewish and Christian occupation and the Shari'a is implemented. It is also their duty to support the Taliban in Afghanistan 'because by enforcing Shari'a in Afghanistan, Taliban have established the system of God on God's land'.
UBL [November 1998] "Bin Ladin: Expel Jews, Christians, from Holy Places"	175	Expresses gratitude for help from Pakistanis to expel US occupiers and their Israeli lackeys. .. 'Obviously, for the enforcement of Shariat, it is essential for all Muslims that they should establish an Islamic system on the basis of teachings of the Prophet Mohammed.' .. 'Obligatory' for all Muslims to support the jihad against America and its allies with their wealth and lives. It is a 'religious obligation' of all Muslims to support both the mujahideen and the Taliban.
UBL [January 1999] "Wrath of God.."	178	Jihad and 'hostility towards America is a religious duty'. 'Usama Bin Ladin is confident that the Islamic nation will carry out its duty. I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called superpower that is America.'
AAZ [January 1999] "Muslim Egypt between the Whips of the Torturers and the Administration of Traitors"	116	Asks all Muslims to support his brothers in al-Jihad and similar movements in Egypt.
UBL [February 1999] May 1998 interview reported	182	'I believe that at present the Pakistani nation should unite and should end the sectarianism provoked by its opponents.' .. Urges Chinese Muslims [when asked by Chinese journalist] to contact him and 'extend their relations' to other Muslim groups. .. Jihad against India obligatory for Pakistanis.
UBL [June 1999] "Usama bin Ladin Pens Letter in Support of Kashmir Jihad"	183	Praises Pakistanis as a 'mujahid nation'
UBL [June 1999] "Usama bin Ladin, The Destruction of the Base"	184	'We seek to instigate the nation to get up and liberate its land, to fight for the sake of God, and to make the Islamic law the highest law, and the word of God the highest word of all. 'Nowadays, jihad needs to be waged by the nation.' 'The Muslims, particularly those in power and people of good judgment -- true ulema, faithful merchants, and tribal chiefs --

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		<p>should emigrate for the sake of God and seek a place where they can raise the banner of jihad and mobilize the nation into safeguarding their religion and worldly affairs.'</p> <p>'This is serious. People must do all they can to rouse the nation with all the means in their power; with their tongues, pens, and persons.'</p>
UBL [July 1999] "Bin Ladin Calls on Muslims to Declare Jihad against US"	185	Muslims must declare jihad against US
UBL [September 1999] "UBL Orders Mujahideen to Shoot US Commandos.."	186	Muslims need to 'speed up' jihad against infidels
UBL [January 2000] "Usama bin Ladin Denounces US-Sponsored 'World Order'"	187	Urges Muslims everywhere to help each other out. They must be united in order to defeat the enemies of Islam.
UBL [May 2000] "UBL Sees Holy War in 'Every Street' of US"	188	<p>Urges jihad against America and Jews.</p> <p>Calls for 'unity' in rank and file of Mujahideen.</p>
UBL [May 2000] "Usama Speaks on Hijra and the Islamic State"	189	<p>'As Muslims, we should all implement the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad (saw). We should all implement his commandment.'</p> <p>'So it's incumbent on all the Muslims to ignore these borders and boundaries, which the kuffar have laid down between Muslim lands, the Jews and the Christians, for the sole purpose of dividing us'. Muslims in the comfort of their homes should recognise the sacrifices of the Sahaaba who migrated to the battle, left their families to fight the jihad.'</p>
UBL [June 2000] "Usama bin Ladin Renews Calls for jihad"	190	'How can we remain silent spectator to this situation. It is the joint duty of Muslims to wage Jihad against the Jews and Christians"
UBL [September 2000] "Bin Ladin, others pledge 'Jihad' to release Prisoners.."	191	<p>'Dear brothers, I am not trying to play on your emotions or ask you for your sympathy; rather, we are now talking business, we are talking jihad. The situation now is not that of glittering statements; today's struggle – brothers – is a relentless one.'</p> <p>'Dear brothers, we have spoken much and done little.' [AAZ]</p>
UBL [January 2001] "Daily Prints Usama bin Ladin Letter Calling for Global Islamic State"	192	<p>Muslims need to focus on a 'collective and strong target' of Israel and the US.</p> <p>'No matter which movement or organization you belong to, you should propagate this message from your respective platforms in such a way that it becomes a voice of the two billion Muslims, so that practical steps might be taken as soon as possible' [See emphasis on movement and goals, rather than strict adherence to AQ]</p>
Muhammad bin Ladin [January 2001] video	127	The role of the mujahideen: 'Your lives and the last drops of your blood are to be shed for the everlasting glory of the umma and it

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speech addressed to his father		is through these martyrs and their blood that shall bring forth the grace and goodness of the umma. They shall always serve as the bridge to help give honour and dignity to the umma'. Traders and businessmen urged to part with their riches to support the mujahideen and Palestinians.
UBL [April 2001] letter to scholars of Deyubende in Peshawar	120	'The nation waits for a clear Fatwa from you and a clear plan to follow so they can lift away this aggression, imposed on them, the holy places, and their children. Are you willing to participate?'. 'Teach them that the Jihad for the sake of Allah does happen only through a jama'a or a group that listen[s] and obey[s] the one EMIR, that God will unite the nation, so there won't be separation, and preserve the entity of the nation so it won't be torn' [this leader is Mullah Omar and the Islamic state to be supported is his Afghan 'emirate'].
UBL [April 2001] "Usama urges Muslims to help Afghans"	196	'The decisions taken by Mulla Omar about the destruction of statues, stopping poppy cultivation and standing in front of world campaign must be supported.' Specific appeal to Muslim youth to join jihadi training camps in Afghanistan, and te wealthy Muslims to 'pay donations and invest in Afghanistan'. People need to 'speak boldly' at the conference and address the needs of Afghanistan. 'The duty of the ulema [religious scholars] is to explain to the people actual problems. The ulema should throw light on the importance of 'Jihad-fi-sabillelah (Holy War in the Way of Almighty Allah).'
UBL [May 2001] "Usama urges Ummah to continue Jihad"	197	'Your bravery and courage has lifted that veil which Kuffir [infidelity] had embalmed in the eyes of the followers. You surfaced and created a wall against Kuffir.' 'Unafraid of the might and size of the infidels, an appreciable small number of committed Mujahidin, shall prevail upon them.' None should infer that you are all without that light which your forefathers had carried in their hearts in fights against the infidel.'
UBL [may 2001] "Bin Ladin sends voice message to Palestinian People.."	199	UBL, Muslims, coming to the aid of Palestinians
UBL [September 2001] "Text of bin Ladin letter to the Pakistani People"	201	'We incite our Muslim brothers in Pakistan to deter with all their capabilities the American crusaders from invading Pakistan and Afghanistan'
UBL [September 2001] "The US Should search attackers within itself"	202	'Pakistan is a great hope for the Islamic brotherhood. Its people are awakened, organized, and rich in the spirit of faith'. Urges people to support the coming jihad in Af-Pak
UBL [October 2001] "Tayseer Allouni interviews bin Ladin	130	Urges Pakistanis to help win the war in Afghanistan and rise up against their collaborating government.

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in Afghanistan”		
UBL [November 2001] “Al-Jazirah carries bin Ladin’s address..”	203	'Every Muslim should rush to defend his religion.'
AAZ [December 2001] “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”	119	<p>'This book was written in an attempt to revive the Muslim nation's awareness of its role and duty, its importance, and the duties that it needs to perform' (in prologue).</p> <p>The Islamic movement in general, and the jihad movements in particular, must train themselves and their members on perseverance, patience, steadfastness, and adherence to firm principles. The leadership must set an example for the members to follow.' A powerful leadership is needed to lead on the mujahideen. And: 'The jihad movement must come closer to the masses, defend their honour, fend off injustice, and lead them to the path of guidance and victory', 'We must win the people's confidence, respect, and affection. The people will not love us unless they felt that we love them, care about them, and are ready to defend them' - [see significance for later, in killing of innocent Muslims and how this alienated the leadership]. 'We must not blame the nation for not responding or not living up to the task. Instead, we must blame ourselves for failing to deliver the message, show compassion, and sacrifice' .</p> <p>'In order for the masses to move, they need the following: (1) A leadership that they could trust, follow, and understand. (2) A clear enemy to strike at. (3). The shackles of fear and the impediments of weakness in the souls must be broken'.</p>
UBL [December 2001] “The Fact of the Conflict between us and America”	129	Muslims must "wake up from their sleep".
UBL [March 2002] “Usama bin Ladin: Prince Abdallah’s initiative is High Treason”	205	<p>'In view of the bloody events that our nation is subjected to, everyone is today required to take up the jihad and serious action.' ..</p> <p>'Patience is good unless it harms religion, and that forbearance is commendable unless there is an opportunity.'</p> <p>'O nation of Islam, rise against injustice and tyranny, oppression and aggression, and humiliation and degradation. Bread is not more dear to us than our religion, nor is money more precious than our honour, or death more difficult than our sense of humiliation and degradation'. Muslim nation should: (1) 'stage public demonstrations and exercise civil disobedience until the overthrow of the traitorous governments', (2) 'disown the leaders of disbelief and hypocrisy', (3) 'Striking at US interests in the world in general and on the land of our Arab and Islamic nation in particular', (4) 'boycotting US and Jewish goods', (5) 'Killing Americans and Jews with a bullet, a knife, or a stone', (6) 'Backing the mujahidin and giving them every encouragement and support.'</p> <p>To Palestinian people: 'We swear by the one and only God that</p>

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		we will support you until you achieve victory and Muslim Palestine is returned'
UBL [April 2002] "MBC Carries video of Bin Ladin"	206	Muslims must not 'turn their back on the enemy'
UBL/AAZ [April 2002] "The Wills of the Martyrs.."	207	Much of the film is set to appeal to Muslims (mainly through Haznawi's commentary) to support the mujahideen
UBL/others [April 2002] "The Wills of the Martyrs.."	108	UBL: 'the youth of Islam must follow the methodology of Mohammed [...] by making jihad, as it is obligatory today.'
UBL [purported] [June 2002] "Al-Qaeda's declaration in response to the Saudi Ulema.."	43	<p>'Muslims, and especially the learned among them, should spread sharia law to the world - that and nothing else'.</p> <p>'Muslims are obligated to raid the lands of the infidels, occupy them, and exchange their systems of governance for an Islamic system, barring any practice that contradicts the sharia from being publicly voiced among the people, as was the case at the dawn of Islam.'</p>
Unknown AQ leader [August 2002] "Constitutional Charter"	34	<p>Conditions of joining AQ: (1) compliance with AQ beliefs and goals, (2) subordination and obedience with the higher command, (3) forbidden to have membership with any other Islamic group besides AQ, (4) operation security, (5) good physical fitness, except in admin posts, (6) candidate must not be suspect in lacking religion, fairness or morality, (7) taking the pledge of allegiance. The principal duties: (1) maintaining unity within AQ, (2) maintaining good Islamic behaviour, (3) eating kosher food, (4) maintaining fitness and military training, (5) be discreet about AQ work, (6) maintain strong Islamic belief and in Jihad, (7) guard AQ money, (8) do not deceive brothers and give good advice to superiors.</p> <p>Note one piece of advice: 'We advise all brothers to avoid arguments in religion, and it is forbidden to speak on religion without knowledge.'</p>
AAZ [September 2002] "The Interview of Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri"	22	<p>Those who doubt the Jihad will see the Muslims enslaved and subjugated, following American and Israel.</p> <p>'Jihad, by necessity entails hardship, expense and sacrifice'. The Muslims have 'suffered the worst and most serious disasters, for more than a century' - lands occupied, resources plundered, deprived of free will, rights thrown away, sanctuaries surrounded and taken over, corrupt and submissive ruling regimes, 'So what harm, after all this harm, are they crying over?'.</p> <p>'We implore the Muslim nation to act immediately' in stopping the enemy from destroying the Muslim nation.</p> <p>'Have full trust in the victory of Allah and know that America has no power against you, if you unite as one body in its face!'</p>
UBL [October 2002] "Statement from shaykh Usama bin Ladin, may God	211	'An appeal to the Nation:' There can be no doubt that all Muslims are under attack. 'How do we confront this blatant aggression and defend our creed, honour, and dignity and therefore earn the honour of this world and win the Hereafter?' (1) 'A return to

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protect him, and the Al-Qa'ida Organization”		<p>Allah'; (2) 'Hold fast all together by the rope of Allah' - unity in creed, dogma and 'the schools of shari'ah'; (3) 'Mobilizing and unleashing the nation's resources', they are 'the battle's fuel and the conflict's motor'. The 'scholars and propagators' have the foremost duty to mobilise the ummah. .. 'In addition to the scholars, there is the group of the Muslim youths who have been the driving force of change throughout this nation's history'. ..</p> <p>Appeal to the 'media men' to unite in propagating the message</p> <p>Appeal to 'merchants and financiers', urged to spend in the way of jihad.</p> <p>'There is the Muslim woman whose role is by no means less than that of men.' In giving birth do those who fight the enemies of Islam, the martyrs, supporting the mujahideen sons, husbands and brothers and even through their own sacrifice.</p>
UBL [October 2002] “Letter from Usama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the American People”	212	'So the removal of these policies [implemented by 'agent' governments preventing establishment of Shari'ah etc] is an individual obligation upon us so as to make the Shariah the supreme law and to regain Palestine. Our fight against theses policies is the same as fighting against you [America].'
UBL [November 2002] “Bin Ladin in a special message to the people of the Peninsula..”	215	<p>Muslims should not think that the aggression against Iraq is in isolation, 'It is between you, all our Muslim brothers, and us on one side and the crusaders and the Jews on the other.'</p> <p>Muslims in the Peninsula should prepare to realise their duty.</p>
AAZ [December 2002] “Al Wala Wa al Baraa..”	45	<p>Warns Muslims: 'These enemies [Crusaders] have launched a campaign of intellectual and doctrinal deception in tandem with their militaristic, Crusading campaign'. Their goal is to sustain the corrupt leaders in Muslim lands, prevent the uptake of sharia, and make this land vulnerable to conquest. Deviating from the doctrine that prohibits befriending infidels is the greatest threat to Islam.</p> <p>The Koran strictly forbids befriending infidels. 'We call the umma - on all its factions, classes, and groups - to join the caravan of jihad'. Saving the umma from its current reality consists of: 'staying clear of idolatrous tyrants, warfare against infidels, loyalty to the believers, and jihad in the path of Allah'. 'We must act and act quickly</p> <p>Let the Muslim youth not await anyone's permission</p> <p>Young people of every class must assume responsibility for the umma and make plans to defend it from its foes. We must set our lands aflame beneath the feet of the raiders; they shall never depart otherwise' (114) [this not aimed at Muslims in Europe or the West, squarely aimed at those in Muslim lands].</p>
UBL [January 2003] “Islamic Action between Causes of Consequences and Advocates of Disagreement”	216	On the 'need for unity and consensus and renunciation of disunity and differences and for concentrating on the effects and damages that differences in views cause.' People should adhere to the Sunna and measures should be in place to protect the Islamic brotherhood scholastic from disunity, regardless of differences regarding 'views and practical interpretations.'

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		<p>When will Muslims wake up from the long slumber and deep sleep? When will they rise to carry out serious action for their religion and call?'</p> <p>'The situation that Muslims are living in today requires the mobilization of everyone who belongs to this religion and the utilization of his resources and efforts in the battle that Islam is fighting against the crusaders' alliance, which has bared its teeth and revealed its true objectives from fighting Islam and Muslims, and is not content anymore with what its agents in the region are doing.'</p> <p>People should not be punished for honest mistakes if their cause is noble.</p>
UBL [February 2003] audio statement	78	<p>Muslims warned against the Crusader plan of conquering Saudi Arabia after Iraq, and trying to establish Greater Israel. 'The way to protect ourselves from the evil of disbelievers is Jihad in the Path of Allah'. 'The Ummah today possesses huge capabilities'. 'The Ummah has been promised victory by Allah'. 'The Muslim Ummah is the greatest human power on the face of the Earth only if it establishes Islam properly'. Recites a number of historical events where the Ummah was victorious, in order to 'raise the morale'. Why the battle against the Crusaders will be won: The Soviets were beaten in Afghanistan, and the Russians in Chechnya, the defeat of American forces in Beirut 1982, in Somalia 'the "Arab Afghans" and their brothers from that region pounced upon her and rubbed her arrogance into the dust', 'thus America and her allies fled in the darkness of the night', then goes through a series of attacks against the US and concluded that the US power stands on a 'weak and hollow foundation' that can be attacked.</p> <p>Restrictions to embarking upon jihad: (1) corrupt leaders domestically, 'it is prohibited by Shariah to pledge allegiance to them and follow them', Muslims must distance themselves from these leaders. (2) Scholars 'who love the Truth and hate Falsehood, but they sit back from Jihad'.</p> <p>'The Ummah [...] must unite the ranks of the Muslims against the ranks of the disbelievers [...] [and] shun a life of play, amusement, extravagance and fun, and prepare itself for the real life of killing, fighting, striking, and damaging'.</p>
UBL [February 2003] "A Message to our Brothers in Iraq"	79	<p>Message to Iraqis before the looming war: (1) 'fighting should be for the sake of one God. It should not be for championing ethnic groups, or for championing the non-Islamic regimes in all Arab countries', (2) must ask forgiveness from sins (according sharia) and prepare for jihad, (3) 'in combat [the Americans] mainly depend on psychological warfare. This is in the light of the huge media machine they have. They also depend on massive air strikes so as to conceal their most prominent point of weakness, which is the fear, cowardliness, and the absence of combat spirit among US soldiers', 'we also realized that one of the most effective and available methods of rendering the air force of the Crusader enemy ineffective is by setting up roofed and disguised</p>

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		<p>trenches in large numbers' [emphasize camouflage, but not the IED or other tactics that proved potent]. Goes on to explain how trenches were important in Tora Bora. 'The US forces dared not break into our positions, despite the unprecedented massive bombing and terrible propaganda targeting this completely besieged small area. This is in addition to the forces of hypocrites, whom they prodded to fight us for 15 days non-stop'. 'Dig many trenches', by hunkering down and waiting, the enemy will run out of bombs. 'We also recommend luring the enemy forces into a protracted, close, and exhausting fight, using the camouflaged defensive positions in plains, farms, mountains and cities. The enemy fears the city and street wars most, a war in which the enemy expects grave human losses'. Martyrdom operations important.</p> <p>Muslims should mobilize to free their lands of foreign influence and implement Gods law.</p>
UBL [April 2003] "Usama bin LAdin urges Muslims to launch suicide attacks against US"	217	<p>Religious obligation to wage jihad against the US and its domestic agents. Urges Muslim women to support the mujahideen and raise the moral of Muslims.</p> <p>Those who cannot take part in jihad directly should support it with their funds.</p>
UBL [May 2003] "Riyadh, Casablanca Attacks"	218	Muslims urged to rise up against those who help the Americans in Iraq and those leaders who have remained silent. This is their duty.
AAZ [May 2003] statement	54	Muslims need to be aware because after Iraq, the enemy seeks to move on to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria and Pakistan, leaving fractured states around Israel.
UBL/AAZ [September 2003] Audio statement	110	Palestinians addressed 'and assured the issue is at the central, 'the wound of Palestine is bleeding in the heart of every Muslim'. Palestinians urged not to be deceived by American-backed treasonous efforts such as the 'road map to hell'. Palestine will only be liberated through Jihad. They must be aware of making the wrong allies with un-pious forces. [Zawahiri].
AAZ [September 2003] "Message to the Muslims in Pakistan and Afghanistan"	56	<p>The Crusaders seek to 'undermine Islam as a faith and shari'a, subjugate the Muslim nation, and turn it into herds following the masters of the world in Washington, Tel Aviv, and London'. Muslims in Pakistan must rise up against Musharraf, topple him and install a government that protects Muslims and their interests.</p>
UBL [October 2003] "Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq"	98	<p>The Iraqi resistance is restoring hope in the hearts of Muslims, especially Palestinians. 'It is not surprising that you were able to do this to America, to strike such blows against it, because you are the sons of the courageous knights who gave Islam to the east, all the way to China'.</p> <p>'Beware of listening to men who obey only their desires [...] or those who put faith in their oppressors'.</p> <p>'People of Rabia and Mudar, O Kurds! Raise the banner and God will raise you up. Do not be intimidated by these armed mules'.</p>
AAZ [December 2003] audio recording	57	'America has thus been militarily defeated by those fighters despite all the huge military arsenal and the dollars with which

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		they have flooded Afghanistan'. America is losing against the Mujahideen'. 'as we were, chasing the Americans and their allies everywhere, even in their own doorsteps'. 'After two years of Tora Bora, the bloodshed against the Americans has escalated in Iraq. The Americans proved incapable of defending themselves and even of defending officials such as Wolfowitz, the arrogant Zionist' and Americans are being driven out of Afghanistan.
UBL [January 2004] "Resist the New Rome"	111	'Ground rules' in the fight between Muslims and the occupiers: no dialogue with the occupiers except through arms. Muslims must confront apostate, cooperative rulers in Palestine, Iraq and elsewhere - otherwise they will be punished. Urges the creation of a council of ulema, merchants, dignitaries and other notables in a secret place, free from prying eyes of corrupt rulers, which would form a council for the removal of apostate rulers and selection of a righteous one (called Ahl al-Hall wa al-Aqd). 'The right to appoint an Imam is for the nation'.
AAZ [March 2004] audio statement	59	Every Muslim in Pakistan must do his best to get rid of the Musharraf regime which cooperates with the enemy.
UBL [April 2004] Message to Europe	52	'In response to the positive interactions [...] reflected in recent events and the opinion polls that demonstrate that most people in Europe want peace, I call upon just men - especially the ulema, media, and businessmen - to form a permanent commission to enlighten the European peoples of the justice of our causes, particularly Palestine.'
UBL [May 2004] "People of Iraq"	82	Appeal for unity in Jihad in Iraq: 'Jihad is designated for all the Muslims in Iraq, in the north, the middle and the south, and those who claimed their religious leadership in the Interim Council have no excuse after this Council approved infidel Bremer's constitution'. 'What is happening in Iraq will be repeated where you are'. 'Defending the rest of the Muslim countries especially the Two Holy Places starts by fighting in their front lines in Iraq. O Muslims, wake up and realise the size of the danger'. The crisis in Iraq did not come about due to lack of religious knowledge, but rather 'our slackness to act on what we know owing to lack of honesty, truth and certainty'. Appeals to the youth 'to fight the crusaders and the Jews and remember God more often', explains the wonders of martyrdom. Calls on the youth of the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kurds, Turkey [knights of Mohammed al-Fateh], Hama [Umm al-Fida], Aleppo, Jordan, Yemen to support their brothers in Iraq.
UBL [December 2004] "Message concerning Saudi Arabia"	84	Appeal for unity among Muslims
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	86	Pleased with the steadfastness of the Iraqi people. People of Iraq: 'continue to pray and to unite', attack the enemy tanks. 'The prowess of the faithful has begun to show results'. To the Muslim Ummah: 'the most important and serious issue

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		<p>today for the whole world is this Third World War, which the Crusade-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation. It is raging in the land of the two rivers'. Jihad an individual duty, 'the nation should devote its resources, sons, and money to fight the infidels and drive them out of its land'.</p> <p>It is the duty to conduct Jihad in Palestine and Iraq, and the countries closest to them, Al-Haramayn, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, and Kuwait. And then countries closest to them if this doesn't work.</p> <p>Urges Muslims to support AQ and the mujahideen with men or money, talks of how expensive it is [see free text].</p> <p>'Unity is mercy and division is torture'. 'Victory is imminent'. Everyone must partake in the 'war of destiny between infidelity and Islam'.</p>
AAZ [February 2005] "The Freeing of Humanity.."	109	<p>'As the Highest helper, Allah the Exalted has guided us to confront the lying American power, vexing it, and bringing it down to its true size, and to show that its defeat is possible on the hands of the people of Jihad and martyrdom, so must we also confront America in the field of beliefs and principles, to expose their Shirk, sinfulness and hypocrisy'.</p> <p>'The Ummah must harness its right to choose its ruler, to judge him, to criticize him and to remove him, to harness its right to command what is right and forbid what is evil, the Ummah must confront all types of aggression against the sanctity of people, their freedom and their rights, the Ummah has to confront force, harshness, robbery, forgery, rottenness, inheriting of rule which our rulers practice with the blessings and support of America'</p> <p>'The Ummah must accept the authority of the Sharee'ah judgement, and that no person has the right to touch the rights of others except with its ruling.'</p> <p>Soldiers and generals need to use their weapons to defend Islam not attack Muslims. . Jihad is an obligation, and Muslims must also pay Zakat to support the mujahideen.</p>
AAZ [June 2005] video statement	72	<p>Congratulation to Muslim nation 'for its heroic steadfastness in front of the new crusades in its 4th year'. 'My dear brothers, the real reform starts by supporting jihad in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and wherever there is jihad. Reform will not happen unless we support jihad and the mujahideen'. To the people of Iraq: 'I call upon and appeal to them in the name of God as Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen to group under the banner of the great Islam to make up a front that will be ready to take over the government after the Americans leave'. 'This front should be built, based on the rule of the Sharia, jihad, shura [consulting], and the protection of the Muslims' honours'.</p> <p>Palestinians urged 'not to trust the secularists who sold Palestine for a cheap price and not to allow themselves to be dragged into the game of secular elections under a secular constitution'.</p>
AAZ [August 2005] interview	128	<p>'I call upon the Muslim clerics, the writers, the thinkers, the tradesmen, the merchants, and the officers to convene and</p>

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		deliberate on the ways to get rid of these corrupt and corrupting regimes that burden our nation. I call upon them to start preparing for a change, however much time and effort it takes, and to spread the call for change throughout the nation. They must know that victory comes at a price, since a dark destiny awaits us unless we resist.'
AAZ [December 2005] "The Victory of the Islamic Religion in Iraq"	26	<p>Need to support victims of earthquake in Pakistan, but avoid sending money to Pakistani authorities. Muslims need to come to Pakistan themselves, to avoid the authorities taking advantage of their aid.</p> <p>The Ummah will only enjoy free elections, protected sanctities and government accountable to its people, and a respectable, dignified judiciary when they have been freed of Crusader-Jewish occupancy and that can only be done through Jihad. [inconsistencies: other statements decry the rule by the people and the majority rule].</p> <p>Mujahideen brothers in Iraq need to unite.</p>
AAZ [December 2005] interview	49	<p>'Jihad in the path of Allah is greater than any individual or organization. It is a struggle between Truth and Falsehood, until Allah Almighty inherits the earth and those who live on it.'</p> <p>'Muslim brothers, reform will never be realized through endless talk and chatter about the corruptions of America, or through hoarse shouting at demonstrations'.</p>
AAZ [December 2005] "Obstacles to Jihad"	25	<p>The first battle Muslims need to win is with themselves - that is the key to beating the Crusaders. This battle is with weakness, hesitation, attachment to the earth, inability, fear, position, standing, family, children and wealth. The enemies are victorious against the Muslims for two reasons only: fear and hesitation of the Ummah and ignorance of warfare and fighting. These are the only reasons the enemy succeeds, since his armies are fearful and greedy. They only succeed when their numbers are much greater.</p> <p>Victory in the jihad is imminent.</p>
AAZ [January 2006] "Bajawr Massacre and the Lies of the Crusaders"	51	Pakistanis urged to 'hold tightly to the rope of Allah and struggle for the rule of Shariah and unite under the banner in confronting Musharraf'. Pakistanis urged to 'gather around' Mullah Omar.
AAZ [March 2006] "The Alternative is Da'wa and Jihad"	73	<p>Expresses condolences to families of those who died in the al-Salam 98 Ferry incident.</p> <p>Cartoon crisis: 'These insults should be confronted not only through demonstrations or burning of embassies after which we return to our homes to practice our life as usual [...] Confronting these insults requires a true awakening by the nation in order to combat the Crusader campaign against Islam with hand, tongue, words, and swords'. 'We should work on four interrelated fronts': (1) 'inflicting losses on the Crusader West, especially its economic structure through dealing strikes which will make it bled for years '. (2) 'Expelling the Zionist-Crusader enemy from the lands of Islam, particularly from Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine'. The collapse of the economies of the warring states is</p>

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		<p>crucial for their removal, allowing for establishment of caliphate. (3) 'Changing corrupt regimes which have sold our dignity and pride to the Crusader West'. (4) 'All clerics, scholars, writers and thinkers of the Muslim nation should play their role in alerting the nation to the danger it is facing, motivating it to return to Islam, working on implementing the laws of sharia, and warning it against any course, even if disguised in Islam, that is against the rule of sharia [...] 'they should motivate the nation to support its mujahideen sons financially and morally'. 'The Muslims should rush to support jihad with men, money, equipment and expertise'.</p> <p>To Muslims in Palestine: they must stay committed to applying Gods law, Jihad in Palestine cannot be pursued 'on the basis of a narrow, arrogant national approach that sidelines the rule of sharia and respects secularists who sold Palestine. Palestinians must not accept the legitimacy of the PA.</p> <p>Muslims must be wary of the 'American game entitled the political process' which seeks to force Muslims to abandon the sharia, accept the status quo, lay down arms, and welcome foreign occupation.</p> <p>'If we sacrifice the rule of sharia and bestow legitimacy on those who sell nations and sign the surrender agreements [...] we will lose both religion and the present life and the land will remain occupied, injustice present, and sanctities violated'.</p>
AAZ [April 2006] “Four Years since the Battle of Tora Bora”	238	<p>In the wake of the earthquake in Pakistan: 'It also requires from us a sincere return to religion, so that God would spare us His wrath'.</p> <p>'The establishment of a caliphate is the duty of every Muslim and is the hope of the Muslim nation.'</p> <p>'Brother Muslims [...] I bring you the good tidings that your brothers in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine are striking painful blows and directing deadly stabs against your enemies'.</p> <p>Muslims in Iraq: 'Stand fast and hold your ground. Victory is achieved through patience and perseverance'. Unity crucial in Iraq - among 'the Arabs of Jihad, the Kurds of conquest and the Turks of faith'. To the mujahideen in Iraq: 'I do not ask you only to treat well your brothers in Iraq, but I also ask you to serve them, make sure their needs are met, lend support to them, and defend their faith, dignity and sacred things'. Tribes, clans and noble men urged to support mujahideen, and ulema urged to 'guide the nation' and promote jihad, 'to preserve the ideology of monotheism against those who want to belittle the governance of sharia or the doctrine of al-Wala and al-Bara, and establish a government based on race, ethnicity, secularism or renouncing of the governance of the sharia'. Muslims in Turkey, al-Sham and the Arabian Peninsula urged to support mujahideen of Iraq, with men, money, ammunition and prayers. 'They are fighting at the gates of Palestine'.</p>
UBL [April 2006] “Oh	90	'It is obligatory upon the Ummah with all its groups and sections

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People of Islam”		and its men and women, young and old, to provide themselves, their wealth, their expertise, and all types of moral and material support what suffices to carry on the Jihad in the fields of Jihad'. 'Happy is he who stands to defend the banner of Tawheed, and happy is he who makes a shield out of himself and his chest as he defends the religion of Allah'.
AAZ [April 2006] “Letter to the People of Pakistan”	81	Calls on Pakistanis to 'stand against the Zionist/Crusader assault on the Islamic Ummah and on Pakistan, and I call on them in earnest to topple this bribe-taking, treacherous criminal, and to back their brothers the Mujahideen in Afghanistan'. Calls on soldiers and officers in the Pak army to disobey their orders.
AAZ [June 2006] “Support for Palestinians”	85	'I call on Muslims everywhere to support their brothers the Palestinians, that support which must be directed first to the Mujahideen, then to the families of the martyrs and prisoners, and then [...] the remainder can be directed to the social and life-style aspects, in order for the Jihad to remain vital and effective'. This is the duty of all Muslims. Hopes Palestinians remain committed to 'the creed of Tawheed' and the rule of Shariah and refute the secularists, referendums.
AAZ [June 2006] “American Crimes in Kabul”	87	Appeal to Muslims in Kabul and Afghanistan to defend Islam and reject injustice. They need to stand united, invaders are expelled and the shari'a implemented.
AAZ [June 2006] “Elegizing the Ummah’s Martyr..”	32	On the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: he had to die because 'every soul must taste death'. It doesn't matter when we die, only how. Abu Musab wore his explosive jacket and didn't try to escape death in a basement or aeroplane. Iraqis must not lay down arms until 'Allah decrees for you victory or martyrdom'. The Islamic ummah has put its hope in the Iraqi people, they must establish an Islamic state in Iraq, then make their way towards captive Jerusalem. The mujahideen of Iraq must unite, and defend the Muslim people of Iraq. Muslims in regions around Iraq must not abandon the Iraqi mujahideen but support them any way they can.
AAZ [June 2006] “The Zionist Crusader’s Aggression in Gaza and Lebanon”	88	'Dear Muslim brothers everywhere, I do not wish to move your feelings with an over-zealous speech or with an emotional address. But I ask you by God Almighty; by your love for God's messenger [...]; and by the obligation of jihad, which is the duty of every Muslim, to rise and seek martyrdom to hurt the Crusaders and the Zionists'. Need to support the campaign in Iraq due to its proximity to Palestine.
UBL [July 2006] “To the Ummah in General and the Mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia in Particular”	93	To Iraqis: 'I tell you that the first step that needs to be taken to ensure the stability in Iraq is the expulsion of the Crusader armies through fighting them, and then punishing the leaders of the parties [...] who lied to the people' and urged participation in the political process. 'The defenceless people of Islam in the land of the two rivers are facing genocide by the gangs of rancour and treachery, which were spread in all sensitive areas in al-Ja'fari's previous government'. Muslims must help their brothers in Iraq with men and money. Iraqis must know that there can be no peace with 'the Crusaders and renegades and no half solutions'. They must avoid disunity and conflict.

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		<p>To the Mujahideen of Somalia: they must fight Abdullahi Yusuf and not let him get away. 'As for the international forces, their issue is easy, God willing. Their soldiers lack a fighting ideology. They do not have a cause to fight for [...] prepare the necessary means, especially tank mines and anti-armour RPGs', be patient - the US will be defeated in Somalia again.</p> <p>Take notice that the situation in Iraq is dangerous [...] If you leave Baghdad today, then you will leave Damascus, Amman, the Gulf, and Riyadh tomorrow'. 'Be cautious of the consequences of procrastination'.</p>
AAZ [September 2006] "Hot issues.."	21	<p>All Muslims must come to the aid of Palestine and Lebanon by striking the interests of Jews and Crusaders and those who collaborate with them. Lebanese must disregard international law. The Kurds must not allow the Americans to incite infighting between them by supporting secular forces. The Kurds are 'defenders of Islam and defenders of Jerusalem'. The Ummah is boiling but needs a vanguard in order to organize its efforts into a manageable force for change. The need is to address the main ill facing Muslims - rule by corrupt, rotten regimes, since all other problems branch out from this. Congratulates Somalis for embracing Shariah and calls on them to reject the Americans and their supporters and confront the Ethiopians. Muslims in Somalia must not only establish an Islamic state but expel all Zionist/Crusader forces from the Horn of Africa and support the mujahideen in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine.</p>
AAZ [September 2006] "Bush, the Vatican's Pope, Darfur and the Crusades"	89	<p>The Muslim nation should realise the powerlessness of the governments of Muslim lands in the face of the Crusade. These governments recognised the legitimacy of the UN, prohibited by Islamic law since it meant recognising Israel and are also submissive to the US and West. The Muslim ummah also needs to recognise the impotence of treacherous Muslims: 1) those ideologically defeated, those who accepted governance of the masses in stead of Sharia, recognised the Sykes-Picot borders in stead of the Islamic caliphate, 2) 'the deceptive merchants of religion' in Iraq who colluded with the occupiers, 3) 'clerics of beggary' who 'sold their religion for salaries and posts' who recognise Israel.</p>
AAZ [December 2006] "Realities of Conflict Between Islam and Unbelievers"	94	<p>Brothers in Palestine: 'Hold onto your Qurans, hold on to your rifles'. 'All Muslims stand with you', 'so stand with your brothers in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Iraq, and let the world hear your support for them'.</p> <p>Muslim Ummah has two choices: to 'live under the control of the arrogant enemies of Islam, dishonoured, humiliated, plundered and occupied' or to 'rely on your Lord, renew your Tawheed, rise up with your true faith', 'and there is no third choice'.</p> <p>'The ummah must arm itself with an awareness guided by the light of the Shari'ah, in order for it to determine: who are its helpers? Who are its enemies?' otherwise it will never move on to victory.</p> <p>The battle is not 'of a group or organization, but is the battle of</p>

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		<p>the entire Ummah', partisanship must end, and the Ummah unite and support the mujahideen. 'So we extend our hand and invite every independent and honorable one striving to establish Allah's Law on earth [...] to cooperate with us'.</p> <p>To Turks: 'you know that the entire Islamic Ummah is with you, with your Muslim brothers in Cyprus'. To the Kurds: 'secularist traitors are striving to sow discord between you and your brothers the Mujahideen, who sympathized with you when you were hit by the crimes of the criminal, pagan Ba'athists. And you know that your Mujahid brothers, especially in Qaida al-Jihad, are - by the grace of Allah - the farthest people from ethnic fanaticism. They have pledged allegiance to the Commander of the Believers, Mulla Muhammad Omar, as their commander, and he isn't an Arab'. 'Restore the glory of your forefathers'.</p> <p>Educated Muslims must confront the Zionist Crusaders and 'idol-kings, tyrants and arrogant ones'.</p> <p>To brothers in Somalia: 'you are the southern garrison of Islam, so don't allow Islam to be attacked from your flank'. Chechen rebels not alone. GSPC, 'the guards of Islam's western garrison'.</p>
AAZ [December 2006] “Congratulations on the Eid to the Ummah of Tawhed”	95	<p>Congratulates Ummah on the 'defeat of Americans and their Crusader allies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and I ask Allah that we see the same thing soon in Palestine'. Congratulates Muslims in Iraq for their jihad against Americans and their collaborators. Urges unity in Iraq among the mujahideen. Congratulates Muslims in Afghanistan. Congratulates mujahideen brothers in Kashmir - they must clear their ranks of ISI. Congrats Chechen Mujahid and Mujahideen in Indonesia and the Philippines, Muslim brothers in Somalia, Mujahideen in Algeria facing the 'Franco-American Crusade', Mujahid brothers in Yemen, brothers working in the Jihadi media - encouraged to expend even more effort to spoil the enemies publicity campaigns, captive brothers everywhere and in Egypt - who are asked to be steadfast 'in face of the carrot-and-stick policies practiced by the regime as a service to America and Israel'. Congratulates 'knights of Tawhid' and its scholars in prisons of 'The American State of Al-Saud'. Congratulates every Muslim woman in prisons of the 'Idol Kings' and Americans and the mothers and wives and orphan and son of captured or killed mujahideen. Congratulates Muslim women wearing the Hijab despite 'the fierce Crusade' against it, since it is a symbol of her modesty and purity.</p>
AAZ [January 2007] “Rise and Support our Brothers in Somalia”	96	<p>Brothers in Somalia must be steadfast, 'moreover, when you pursue your Jihad, make sure you adhere to the creed of loyalty and purity and let the Koran be your reference'. The Somalian's have defeated the Americans there once before. Muslim brethren everywhere asked to respond to the call for Jihad in Somalia. Brothers in Yemen, Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Sudan, the Arab Maghreb en everywhere 'through offering sacrifices, money, opinion, and expertise'. Urged not to listen to defeatist calls. Muslims in Somalia must be patient and steadfast.</p>
AAZ [January 2007] “The Correct Equation”	28	<p>It is the duty of every Muslim to bear arms or support those who do and defend Islam. Also responsibility of all to free those in captivity, esp. Umad abd-al Rahman.</p>

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		<p>The Muslim Ummah must deafen its ears to the corrupt rulers and scholars of beggary who argue against the jihad. The mujahideen are the righteous one, the defenders of the religion and honour, who broke the back of the invading forces and declined to follow the path of nationalism.</p> <p>To Muslims in Palestine: Al-Aqsa will only return through jihad. The fighting in Palestine must be for Allah's cause - not the nationalistic cause of the secular traitors.</p> <p>Calls on Arab nationalists to come back to Islam.</p>
AAZ [February 2007] “Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427”	97	<p>Muslims, and esp. those in media organizations need to highlight the concept of Islamic brotherhood, regardless of tribe or race and to disregard nationalism. Calls on nationalists and leftists in Palestine to return to Islam, and 'join the march of Jihad'.</p> <p>Importance of unity in Iraq.</p> <p>Calls on Muslims in Afghanistan and Pakistan and their neighbours to aid the Mujahideen with money, manpower, opinion and expertise.</p>
AAZ [March 2007] “Palestine is the concern of all Muslims”	18	<p>Muslims must wage individual jihad until all Muslim lands are liberated - from 'Al-Andalus [subtitles in video: Spain] to Iraq' and until 'the word of Allah is supreme', they must disown the international treaties and powers holding them captive. Muslims must leave political organizations they have joined.</p>
AAZ [May 2007] “The Empire of Evil is about to End”	23	<p>Appeals to all those who love the Prophet to take up arms against Americans. Asks the followers of Ali bin Abi Talib, al-Hasan and al-Husayn whether they would be pleased with the occupying forces [rallying shia]. Appeal to the Palestinians: 'I call on this garrisoned, patient, resolute, heroic, Mujahid Muslim people to never concede one sand-grain of Palestine, however great the pressure applied to it, however intense the embargo becomes and however numerous the conspiracies might be'</p> <p>'And in general terms, and to reach a beneficial result: I call on the Muslim ummah with all its factions to combine its efforts to make the purified Shari'ah the highest authority which is unrivalled by any other authority, and to take away legitimacy from the corrupt and corruptive rulers and end recognition of them, their constitutions and their laws'. 'I ask the Muslim Ummah in Egypt, and not just in Egypt but in all lands of Islam, to bear arms in defence of Islam, to spend in defence of Islam, to sacrifice in defence of Islam, and to die in defence of Islam'. 'And let us keep in mind that our fundamental battle is with ourselves: with our fear, with our hesitation, with our backtracking, weakness and inability and with our craving for this lowly life in which we die every day instead of the honourable life in which we die with dignity one time'.</p>
AAZ [May 2007] statement announcing the death of Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah Akhud	30	<p>The ummah encouraged to continue the march of Dadullah and 'be among the patient award-seekers'.</p>

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AAZ [June 2007] “Forty Years since the Fall of Jerusalem”	101	<p>'Who is defending the Muslim nation today? Is it not the mujahideen?'</p> <p>To HAMAS: We, together with the entire Muslim nation, are with you. However, you must correct your march'. They must remember that achieving power is not a goal in itself, only part in implementing 'God's course on Earth'. They must unite with the rest of the mujahideen.</p> <p>To HAMAS: 'We are with you in your confrontation of Israel and its agents, the secularists who sold Palestine'. 'How can we help the mujahidin in HAMAS and the rest of Palestine?' By going there in person, through funds, helping delivering weapons and supplies. This is a religious obligation of all neighbouring Palestine, and Gaza in particular.</p> <p>Muslims must not 'go astray' and aspire to become 'a minister, an ambassador, a director, a wealthy person, a notable, a distinguished writer, a skilful physician, a successful engineer or a prosperous businessman, we will lose the afterlife and we will be defeated in this world'. 'My Muslim nation, America is not a god' it can be defeated.</p>
AAZ [July 2007] “The Advice of one Concerned”	102	<p>People of Iraq: 'The first thing which our beloved brothers in Iraq must realize is the critical nature of unity, and that it is the gateway to victory'.</p> <p>'We must study how to take the upright middle path, in order to make use of and benefit from every achievement achieved by our Mujahid brothers. Those who didn't agree to setting up of the ISI must, nonetheless keep in contact with them and seek unity. And the brothers in ISI must accept these brothers and listen to their comments, and advise about shortcomings of others. The mujahideen are human and 'not innocent of deficiency, error and slips' and they must always submit to Shari'ah. Thus the Mujahideen must resolve the differences amongst themselves, they must be 'compassionate and merciful towards each other.' But their problems should not be made public. 'And I invite all Muslims in all lands of Islam in general and in Iraq in particular to support this blessed fledgling Mujahid garrisoning state with funds, manpower, opinion, information and expertise'. ...</p> <p>Prisoners: 'I caution my Muslim brothers everywhere against the statements and retractions of the graduates and guests of the prisons on the Peninsula and in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Indonesia and all lands of Islam, because they are either those who have been coerced [...] or are those who are disheartened and fallen and looking for a way out of prison</p> <p>This applies to people under house arrest too. Reminds of those who did not collapse but grew stronger in prison, Qutb and Abd al-Rahman.</p> <p>The Kurds 'are the protectors of the Muslim Ummah throughout its history', they must not allow anyone to pollute this history.</p>
AAZ [July 2007] “Malicious Britain and	103	Ummah needs to confront the Britons, Crusaders and their agents. Urges Muslims in Lebanon not to accept international

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its Indian Slaves”		forces and agreements. This is the duty of every Muslim in Lebanon. Muslims must denounce global and Arab agreements justifying occupation of Muslim lands, the latest being the Mecca agreement selling four-fifths of Palestine. Appeals to the HAMAS leadership which signed the accords, to embrace Shari'ah and reject all rulings which have partitioned Palestine, starting in 1947. The HAMAS leadership can decide between leading a national liberation 'that has nothing to do with the causes of the Muslim nation' or 'to lead an Islamic jihadist movement that seeks to establish God's way on earth'. To Palestinians: asks them to unite around the book. 'Beware, beware of retreating or going backward, deceived by political solutions and regional deals'. 'I very seriously warn them to be wary of the Arab regimes, especially the Egyptian, the Saudi, and Jordanian regimes', especially 'the palace scholars'.
	104	'I call on the Ulema in Pakistan and tell them: this is what you are worth to Musharraf' and the Crusaders, 'and if you don't retaliate for your honour, Musharraf won't spare any of you, and won't stop until he eradicates Islam from Pakistan'.
	12	The Palestinians must declare that they are mujahideen 'who aspire to implement Shariah law', that they 'renounce popular sovereignty and every other sovereignty besides that of the Quran and Sunnah.' You must declare that you will take action to support the cause of establishing the Caliphate and fight until Allah's word reigns supreme.' The rest of Muslims must unite in Jihad against the Zionist-crusader enemy and renounce treaties which sold out Palestine, e.g. Mecca agreement. 'My Muslim brothers in Palestine: join together under the flag of Islam and the path of jihad in the cause of Allah and abandon these secular organizations that have sold you out.' Many religious rulings and Muftis cannot be trusted. Egyptian soldiers urged to disobey Mubarak's orders and pass on arms and supplies to Gaza and join the mujahideen.
AAZ [December 2007] “A Review of Events”	13	Muslims urged to stop supporting treacherous groups cooperating with the Americans in Iraq. Urges unity in Iraq to the cause of Tawheed. The Iraqi mujahideen must settle their differences based on the Shariah law and the advice of righteous scholars, not those of the sultans (Saudi Arabia) and rid their ranks of traitors. The methodologies of the Jihadi movements must be founded on the rule of the Shariah, not the rule of the majority; they must be founded on the brotherhood of Muslims. The must emphasise setting up a caliphate which is demanded by Shariah, they must emphasise liberating Muslim lands, especially Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and every Muslim land occupied by the infidels. This is an individual duty of all Muslims since the fall of Spain. ... 'Each of us must do all he can to carry out the individual obligation of confronting this satanic alliance sitting on the chests of our Ummah in Egypt and other lands of Islam'. Muslims must not accept the constitutions; participate in elections and councils which do not rule according to the Shari'ah. Palestinians must not compromise even 'one grain' of Palestine. Those who follow secular organisations must 'return to the truth'. ... Pakistanis must support Jihad 'because Pakistan has turned

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		into Americastan and they must save it before it turns into Indiastan or Israelistan' and the Pakistani army must place its allegiance in Islam and move against Musharraf.
UBL [December 2007] "The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies"	27	<p>The mujahideen need to unite in fighting America and its agents. It is obligatory for Muslims to unite and support the mujahideen in order to bring about an Islamic state, Allah has ordered unity. It is a duty of Muslims to pledge allegiance to the 'most sincere' and follow them in the establishment of the Islamic state.</p> <p>People of Palestine reassured that the jihad will spread to liberate their land. Nothing will stop jihad spreading to Palestine if the mujahideen are successful in Iraq.</p> <p>To the Muslim nation: 'Stop playing around, listen, understand, wake up and pay attention [...] rush forward and do your duty [...] today Baghdad, and tomorrow Damascus, Amman, and Riyadh'.</p>
AAZ [early 2008] "Exoneration.."	20	<p>Wants to avoid recriminations between 'brothers'. Claims to criticise only the author's words, not himself, for whom he has great respect. Serious efforts are needed to bring about change - not protests: the need to sacrifice one's dearest possessions.</p> <p>'Those who support Shaykh Usama or Mullah Omar, may God preserve them, do not do so for a whim or out of fanaticism. They support them because they see that these two men always back the righteous course and make sacrifices for its sake. We pray that their actions and the actions of all Muslims will find favour with God.'</p>
AAZ [March 2008] Letter to Abu Umar al-Baghdadi	44	<p>Zawahiri says he has been tasked by Bin Laden to urge Baghdadi to 'focus whatever effort you or those with whom you contact abroad can muster on the Danes, in order to champion the person of the prophet, peace be upon him. We also pray that you clarify this in your talks and your media'. Bin Laden urges Baghdadi to: (1) establish a department within the bureau focusing on the mujahideen to identify specific skills and offer training, (1) establish a sharia court, (2) advancing the committed and faithful in important posts [within Iraq], and offer training in financial matters etc., (3) to include in their communiqués requesting external support, the nature and quantity of expertise needed - this will then be backed up by AQ leadership communiqués.</p>
UBL [March 2008] "A Way for the Salvation of Palestine"	6	<p>Appeal for support from Muslims everywhere for ending the siege of Gaza and Palestine through force. 'Endeavour to liberate our nation, Palestine and the Masjid Al-Aqsa'. Particular appeal to Muslims of the Levant to join and support forces in Iraq, since this will lead the way to Palestine</p>
AAZ [March 2008] "A Call to Help our People in Gaza"	17	<p>Muslims must attack the interests of Jews and Christians.</p>
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting part one.."	105	<p>Must keep away from the places the enemy gathers. . Warns Palestinians not to be caught up in the moves to forget the Palestinian territories that were 'stolen' before 1967, and not to settle for a two-state solution.</p> <p>When asked about Palestinian organisations: 'I respond to it by stressing that we invite all people to Islam, and we invite</p>

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		<p>Muslims and their organisations to unite around the word of Tawhid'.</p> <p>Ummah in Egypt and elsewhere urged to strike Jewish Crusader interests wherever they can be found, push out the occupiers and cease endorsing corrupt regimes. . Does not agree with declaring HAMAS leaders unbelievers. It deserves to be supported.</p> <p>'Uniting of the Ummah must be around the word of Tawheed', and must not compromise the Shari'ah.</p>
AAZ [April 2008] "Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri – On the Fifth Anniversary of the Invasion and Torture of Iraq"	7	<p>Appeal for support. No begging and no elections, only uniting in Islam and fighting the oppressors</p>
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting.. Part 2.."	107	<p>Calls on different factions in Iraq to merge into one entity (the Islamic State). [On Shia]: points out that the Sunni are in a majority in Iraq, since the Kurds and Turkomen are also Sunni. The Islamic State of Iraq: 'the mujahideen groups [in Iraq] must express allegiance to the state and not vice versa'.</p> <p>Need to support the mujahideen with money, and technological and scientific assistance.</p> <p>'I ask those who are firm in their covenant not to pay attention to this propaganda war that the United States is launching in its prisons, which are located in our countries'. . Calls on wealthy Muslims to send funds to the mujahideen and for theoreticians and sharia experts as well as those with skills to assist the mujahideen.</p> <p>On AQIM: Says that 'your brothers in the al-Qaeda organisation in the Islamic Maghreb are most eager to preserve your souls, property, honour and dignity, and they are waging jihad in the path of God to liberate you [Algerians] from America, France, and the sons of France'. Mistakes will be made in this war, but jihad must not stop.</p> <p>Appeal to Islamic organisations in Palestine to stop consulting secular constitutions and international laws. . Expertise is needed to support the jihad and also funds, 'funds are the nerve and fuel of war'.</p> <p>'The most important thing jihad today needs is that the nation free itself of the shackles of impotence, fear, and hesitation', of being affected by propaganda campaigns of the enemy, being attached to 'crumbs of life in this world'.</p>
UBL [May 2008] "A Message to the Muslim Nation"	24	<p>It is the duty of Egyptians to break the blockade of Gaza. The present Ummah needs to learn from history in order to avoid the same mistakes in trying to liberate Palestine. 'Is it not time for you to disavow Arab and non-Arab tyrants, from Indonesia to Mauritania'?. There is no way to get to Palestine except to fight the regimes and parties that surround the Jews and prevent fighting them.</p>

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AAZ [June 2008] “On the Anniversary of the Naksa..”	15	The way to salvation is adherence to God and return to His religion. Muslims in Sinai must help their brothers in Gaza and break down Mubarak's security fence. 'Why does the Muslim nation go hungry when it is the richest nation on earth?' The money disappears in the pockets of the Crusader invaders, the Jews and their treasonous agents - if the Muslim nation does not rid itself of them then let it 'die of starvation'. Jihad and commitment to Islam is the only way to salvation.
AAZ [August 2008] “A Message form Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri to the Pakistani Army and the People of Pakistan”	41	<p>Muslims in Pakistan need to rise up to their moral and religious responsibility - rise up against the Pakistani army. ... How can a soldier in the Pakistani army be convinced that he is defending Islam and Pakistan when his superiors tell him to kill Muslims, Pakistanis, fight against the Taliban etc.? The Americans view the Pakistani army only as their 'hunting dog', doing their dirty work and are plotting with India behind the scenes.</p> <p>When a Muslim country is invaded by non-Muslims, the it is the duty of all Muslims to expel the invader.</p> <p>The need to create awareness of the current state of invasion in Pakistan and alert the nation - the Ulema play a crucial role here. .. The Pakistani soldiers need to repent and join the Mujahideen.</p> <p>'Finally, I request every Muslim in Pakistan to ask himself seriously: Does he want Pakistan to truly become Pakistan? Or is he going to stand by idly and passively until it becomes part of Greater Hindustan?’</p>
AAZ [November 2008] “The Exit of Bush and Arrival of Obama”	100	Muslims must stick to the path of martyrdom attacking the US since its invasion into Muslim lands continues. Addresses the mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia and emphasises that they are winning, the enemy is fleeing, the US troops and the Ethiopians, 'don't put down your weapons before the Mujahid state of Islam and Tawheed has been set up in Somalia'.
AAZ [November 2008] “Al-Azhar: The Lions Den”	237	<p>Responsibility of Muslim Umma in general and especially Egyptians to rise up and protest against the Egyptian embargo on Gaza. The entire population of Egypt needs to go on strike to end the blockade on Gaza. Calls on brothers on Islamic and Jihadi internet sites to spread such a call. Calls on the Ulema of Al-Azhar to lead the uprising of the people.</p> <p>The Ummah needs to ensure that the council of ulema in Egypt is financially and administratively independent.</p> <p>'Foreign enemies are only able to master us with the help of our domestic enemies'. 'Trying to change our regimes by working according to the rotten and corrupt system and law is fruitless futility'.</p>
AAZ [December 2008] “The Death of our Heroes and Betrayal of our Rulers”	106	Jihad has become an individual duty for every Muslim fighting the new Christian campaign.
AAZ [January 2009] “The Massacre of	121	Palestinians urged to be 'steadfast on the path of jihad', 'The entire Muslim nation is with you' and every person 'killed,

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Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors”		<p>injured, widowed and orphaned in Palestine and the rest of the Islamic world' will be revenged. 'We dream of the day we are able to stand by your sides to liberate the land which shelters Al-Bait Al-Maqdis'. This latest aggression is a link in the ongoing Zionist-Christian crusade. 'We are marching towards you swiftly', 'we will break up all these boundaries and restrictions which prevent us from reaching you'. The American withdrawal from Iraq is one of the signs that 'we are drawing nearer to you'. 'I myself wish I could be amongst you in these times, treating the injured'.</p> <p>Egyptians urged to plan strikes, protests and demonstrations until the siege on Gaza is lifted, involving students and employees. Members of the Egyptian military should follow the example of Sulimain Khatir [Egyptian soldier who killed seven Israeli tourists in Sinai in 1985]. To 'defiant and honourable tribes in Sinai': 'today is your day' to help brothers in Gaza. Allah will ask them when the day comes how they have contributed to the salvation of Gaza.</p> <p>To Muslims; Obama 'mercilessly killing your Muslim brothers and sisters in Gaza'.</p> <p>Muslims in the 'garrisoned Levant, in the Arabian Peninsula, in Yemen, [...], in Somalia, the land of Jihad and Hijrah, in Iraq, [...], in Khurasan, and Chechnya': increase your severity against the Zionist-Crusader alliance and their interests!"</p>
UBL [January 2009] “Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault”	122	<p>'I am not the one who stands in front of you [Muslim Ummah] in these difficult days under the guise of condemnation and denunciation'</p> <p>'The duty is to instigate the youths to do jihad and to arrange them in battalions to fight for the sake of Allah the Zionist-Crusader alliance and its agents in the region'</p> <p>The Ummah should rise up to defeat the Zionists, regardless of the position of the 'governors' [Arab governments]. Two examples show that this is possible: the victory against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and 9/11 which shattered the American image of hegemony and in the subsequent war, which left America 'drowning in the economic crisis'. Patience is key in fighting the enemy. The war has lasted seven years, and they should be prepared to fight for another seven and seven more.</p> <p>Says he knows from experience how expensive jihad is, and therefore urges the wealthy to donate more to the cause. . The Ummah must be aware of the deception of the ballot box. Reminds Ummah that freedom from kings in Europe was brought about only through uprising and revolution, especially the French revolution.</p> <p>Sympathy for Palestinians. Says the Mujahideen are living in the same situation as the Palestinians.</p>
AAZ [February 2009] “The Sacrifices of	131	<p>'The Ummah must make a serious and effective move, for protests, even though they express the anger of the masses, are</p>

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Gaza”		<p>not sufficient to combat jets and tanks.' ..</p> <p>No sincere person who seeks the Pleasure of Allah should await the permission of anyone, for Jihad today is an individual obligation in which permission is not sought from one's father, spouse, or loaner.'</p> <p>To the wealthy: 'The wealthy must support the Mujahidoon financially so that the Crusaders do not succeed in their plans of besiegement' (Surah Mohammad 35-38 is quoted).</p>
AAZ [February 2009] “From Kabul to Mogadishu”	132	<p>Somalis urged to support the jihad and realises the illegitimacy of the Shaykh Shareef regime.</p> <p>Urges Tribes in Yemen to match the resolve of the Baluch and Pushtun tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan in assisting the mujahideen in attacking America and their allies.</p> <p>Urges Afghan Muslims to support the Taliban.</p>
UBL [March 2009] “Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine”	133	Appeal for support of the Jihad
UBL [March 2009] “Fight on, Oh Champions of Somalia”	134	<p>'I address my brothers the Mujahideen, the honest sons of Somalia, and call on them to continue their steps on the path of Jihad.'</p> <p>'I send my appeal to the Muslim Ummah everywhere, and ask them extend a helping hand to our family in Somalia.'</p>
AAZ [April 2009] “Six years since the invasion of Iraq..”	136	<p>Muslims urged to support the ISI, the jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere. The 'truthful scholars' urged to 'expose those who barter the religion' by helping the invading and agent powers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Urges scholars to convince the Ummah to topple the corrupt leaders in the Muslim world who came to power due to the sanction of the Zio-Crusader forces.</p> <p>Urges Muslims to support the jihad and not believe the lies of Americans or their allies and agents that they are making progress.</p>
AAZ [June 2009] “The Executioner, Egypt and the American Puppets Welcome Obama”	137	'Our people in Egypt: Be the supporters of God and his messenger (peace and blessings be upon him). Do not be among those who befriend the enemy of God'
AAZ [July 2009] “My Muslim Brothers and Sisters in Pakistan”	139	Pakistanis should not 'run away from confronting the real facts' and realise that Muslims are being targeted by a 'new Crusade'
AAZ [August 2009] “The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy”	140	<p>'I advise the leaders of the Islamic Movements to come to Afghanistan and learn lessons from the Taliban and Mulla Muhammad Omar, to fix with that their approaches and renew their faith.’ ..</p> <p>To 'Kurdish brothers': 'The Americans and the Jews are using your government to their benefits.' ..</p>

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		Egyptians urged to mount forceful protests until the embargo on Gaza is lifted.
AAZ [August 2009] “The Path of Doom”	142	The battle in Swat and elsewhere in the region is part of the wider struggle against the Crusaders in Afghanistan and elsewhere. To people of Pakistan: 'there is no honour except through jihad'.
AAZ [September 2009] “Shaykh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri: Eulogy for the Role Model of Youth”	147	<p>Muslims in Pakistan and Afghanistan: 'look at the mujahideen and join them'.</p> <p>“Oh, respectable dear Afghans! Stand with your brothers, the soldiers of the Islamic Emirate, while they protect your religion, your dignity, your force, your forbidden things, your country and your nation.'</p> <p>'How can the Turkish liberated Muslim people agree with these crimes against the Islamic religion and the Muslims?'</p> <p>It is the duty of Muslims in Gaza and elsewhere to support the jihad.</p> <p>Special appeal to Muslim youth.</p>
AAZ [December 2009] “The (Palestinian) National Unity”	146	Muslims urged to realise that all the battles that the mujahideen are fighting in Afghanistan, Waziristan, Somalia, Palestine, Iraq and Islamic Maghreb are not bound to that particular part of the world - they are being fought for the pride of all the Muslim umma.
AAZ [December 2009] “The Morning and the Lamp..”	141	'that the Muslims of Pakistan become conscious of the reality of what is going on around them and to what end.' .. On desire to create mass movement: 'Finally, this awareness must be propagated amongst the Muslims of Pakistan until it takes the form of a mass movement that endeavors for a sound change; not one that loses its way like those movements that preceded it: on entering the threshold of politics and the pursuing the mirages of conferences.'
AAZ [July 2010] “Al Quds will not be converted to Judaism”	223	<p>The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is presenting a practical example and is realist in the field of jihad, Muslims are urged to follow this example.</p> <p>Special appeal to the youth of Islam, who are urged to prepare for jihad, be patient and careful in preparation before going 'forth like lions against your enemies.' People with money are urged to support the Jihad. Those with qualifications and skills that Jihad can use should go forth in jihad or support through other means. The 'knights of the jihadist media' praised. Muslim women urged to fight pressure to uncover themselves, retain their purity and raise children for jihad. Praise for Muslim prisoners.</p>
AAZ [August 2010] “Message to the People of Turkey”	225	Condolences for those who fell in Israeli raid on 'freedom flotilla'. Muslims must engage in the religious duties of Islam and defend its honour.
AAZ [September 2010] “A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade”	226	Condolence for Pakistanis over recent floods. Pakistani authorities will not help them as they're too busy spending money on the relationship within the West and the army is too busy killing Muslims. ... 'Change won't be achieved under the banner of the secularists' [in Egypt]. .. Urges Muslims to spread

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		<p>this knowledge that the current corrupt situation is unacceptable.</p> <p>Palestinians must recognise the difference between the two methodologies - secularism which involves submission to the West and Israel and includes the Palestinian Authority and all Arab states. This involves ruling by majority, which they call 'democracy'. The other methodology believes in the rule of Shari'ah the unity of the Muslim ummah and the brotherhood of Islam</p> <p>'it relies on the explicit and definite proofs of the Qur'an and Sunnah and cites the historical and political reality of the Muslim Ummah.' An Islamic state must be established in Palestine.</p>
UBL [October 2010] "Some points regarding the method of relief work"	227	Asks Muslims to aid fellow Muslims in Pakistan suffering the consequences of floods. Appeals for more to be done to alleviate the effects of: climate change; famine and malnourishment; underdevelopment; food security; sustainable water consumption in Muslim lands; and generally to alleviate suffering of those Muslims less able.
UBL [October 2010] "Help your brothers in Pakistan"	228	<p>All Muslims, young and old, men and women need to help the victims of the Paksitan floods.</p> <p>Muslims need to volunteer to help with relief efforts and do so in an organised fashion, emphasising the skill of managers (including those working for the Red Crescent); using the tremendous financial resources of Muslims collectively. Urges unity in responding to these crises and preparing for future catastrophes.</p>
AAZ [November 2010] "Who is going to support Aifa Siddique"	229	Pakistanis urged to join the Mujahideen in jihad and revenge for Afia Siddique
AAZ [February 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(1)"	232	Talks of the importance of Islamic principles and laws over secular and nationalist norms that govern Egypt and the region
AAZ [February 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(2)"	233	<p>Urges Muslims not to target those 'Arab Christians' who do not attack or harm the interests of Muslims.</p> <p>'I advise the Muslims two things: a) That they differentiate between those Christians who show enmity to the Muslims and those who don't. b) That they focus their strikes against the Zio-Christian Crusader invaders and their agents.'</p>
AAZ [February 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(3)"	234	<p>"I salute every freeborn and noble Muslim jealous over their religion, nation, sanctity and nobility, who has risen against their oppressive and traitorous rulers'</p> <p>'Thus, it is a must that the freeborn people of Tunisia who are jealous in their religion, their Shariah, and Muslim sanctity and lands, to stop these political tricks which lie in wait. They must continue their sacrifice and struggle until Tunisia once again becomes a fortress of Islam, Jihad and Ribat, and frees itself from corruption, bribery, theft, suppression, injustice, debauchery and enslavement, and until Tunisia once again fulfils its proper role in the Muslim Ummah, defending its western</p>

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		borders (or Al Aqsa Mosque) and supporting the Mujahideen in the various Islamic lands, coming to the aid of the weak and oppressed, and working to liberate the Muslim lands from the armies of the neo-Crusades, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia and the Islamic Maghreb.' .
AAZ [March 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(4)”	235	<p>'I salute all freeborn and noble Muslims who have sacrificed their lives and comfort to confront these corrupt and corruptive evil tyrants in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, and the rest of the Muslim lands.' 'indeed your brother Mujahideen are with you, confronting the same enemy. They have stood up to face America and its Western allies, who have cast Hosni Mubarak, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Abdullah bin Husain and their likes over you.' .</p> <p>'Every noble and freeborn Muslim who is jealous for his religion, sanctities, and nobility must hold fast to their principles, constants and creed, and work on fulfilling and empowering them.' .. 'Thus, the noble and freeborn Muslims who are jealous of their religion, sanctities and honour must not suffice with merely removing the tyrant whose removal is an obligation, but rather they must continue their Jihad and struggle until an Islamic government is established which guarantees justice, freedom, and independence..'</p> <p>'O' lions of Azhar! O' lions of Islam! This is your day! Rise and lead the Ummah in its resistance to establish an Islamic government.'</p>
AAZ [April 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(5)”	236	<p>"In the beginning, I would like to send greetings to the free, honourable ones who are protective of their religion, honours, countries and dignity, from amongst the sons of our Ummah, who rose and keep rising against the injustice, oppression, tyranny, and dependency on the foreign, arrogant infidel that has launched on our Ummah and our Islam the contemporary crusade war in the name of war on terrorism.'</p> <p>Asks Egyptians and especially those of the Western Tribes to assist the Libyans with weapons, food and medicine.</p> <p>'I also would like to alert my Muslim brothers in Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and the rest of the Muslim homelands, that if the Americans and the NATO forces entered Libya, their neighbours in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and the rest of the Muslims must rise to fight both the al-Qadhafi mercenaries and the NATO crusaders.'"</p> <p>Appeal for release of prisoners, praise for those who stormed the state security headquarters in Cairo. “ And I call upon every honourable and free lawyer and journalist, and everyone who possesses details on the corruption of the security forces in Egypt, to publish them and trace those criminals.” ..</p> <p>“Then, we are before a network of interconnected interests that remain in governance until today. And so, we should not close an eye away from the dimensions of the true struggle, and not imagine that our problems will only be solved with changing</p>

Communiqué and author	ID	Motivational appeals to Muslim audiences excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>Hosni Mubarak or changing his regime. There is another, more dangerous enemy that is ambushing us and keeps interfering in our affairs.” [America].</p> <p>'The third message is to the Muslim Ummah everywhere: America is dwindling – with the grace of Allah – under the attacks of the Mujahideen, so mobilize and rise and resist against America and her allies with your tongues, hands and money, and break the chains of fear and life-yearning and do not fear the enemies of Islam'</p>
UBL [May 2011] “The Speech by the Martyr of Islam..”	240	<p>"We rejoice for your joy, and we grieve for your distress. Congratulations to you for your triumphs, and may Allah have mercy on your martyrs, treat your wounded, and release your prisoners". Praise for those who toppled the tyrannical regimes.</p> <p>To the "noble rebels": "Maintain the initiative, and beware of dialogue, for there is no half-way meeting point between the people of righteousness and the people of deception." Talks of an "opportunity for advancing the Ummah and becoming liberated from serving the whims of the rulers, manmade laws, and Western domination."</p>
AAZ [May 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(6)”	238	<p>"Muslims in the neighbouring countries around Libya and especially Egypt, and in particular the western desert tribes must rise up and support their brothers in Libya with money, food, medicine, and weapons and to fight along their side against the mercenaries of the tyrant al-Gadhafi." Tactical advice for fighters in Libya.</p> <p>“Thus, O’ Ummah of the Qur’an and O’ [Qur’an’s] supporters and soldiers: engage in the battle of the Qur’an and take off in defence of the Qur’an, its rulings and legislations in an inciting, popular Da’wa that would bring together the Ummah of the Qur’an in defence of the Qur’an.” “I call upon all the workers for Islam to take advantage of this chance before it gets lost, and before the secular government trick the Ummah." .. “The Youths must continue their march so Egypt can return to bring independent and free, and to take charge of her usual role in defending the Islamic and Arab Ummah and the rest of the weakened in the world, and Egypt shall not return to that role except through breaking the shameful, disgraceful relation with Israel.” ..</p> <p>Urges revolutionaries to fight on in Syria, dismissing any voices of support from US. .. America is losing [see 14]</p>
AAZ [June 2011] “The Noble Knight Dismounted”	239	<p>Encourages Palestinians, Yemenis and Pakistanis to stand fast. "O Muslim people of Pakistan, rise up as did your brothers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Shake off the dust of humiliation, and cast off those who sold you in the slave market to America." .. "do not accept humiliation from an atheist like Gaddafi or the Crusader NATO alliance. Do not permit the NATO Crusaders to bargain your independence, your dignity, and your creed." .</p> <p>"My brothers working for Islam, the doors have been opened in uprising Tunisia and garrisoned Egypt to make the corrupting</p>

Communiqué and author	ID	Motivational appeals to Muslim audiences excerpts, quotes, notes]
		tyrants disappear. So, cooperate, support each other, rely on one another, and incite the Muslim Ummah into a massive popular movement and a collective inciting wind in order to make the Shariah the ruler and not the ruled,"
AAZ [July 2011] "Glory of the East. The first Being Damascus.."	241	<p>Tribute to the subjugated, tortured and oppressed, those who enjoin good and forbid evil.</p> <p>Urges Syrians to show America that they are waging a war for liberation and freedom, 'liberation from the corrupt idolc tyrants and liberation from the Muslim lands.'</p> <p>'Our brothers and fellow Muslims of Sham, the land of Ribat and Jihad! Allah knows that if it weren't for this raging war with the New Crusaders in which we are engaged, and were it not for the borders and restrictions penned by Sykes and Picot, then sanctified by our rulers, my brothers and I would be at your side today, in your midst, defending you with our necks and chests.' [statement follows calls for Syrian rebels to capture Jerusalem].</p> <p>Heavy emphasis on poetry throughout.</p>
AAZ [August 2011] "A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings..(7)"	242	Congratulates the Ummah for the "beginning of the American Crusader's withdrawal from Afghanistan"
AAZ [August 2011] "Do not become weak or grieve"	243	<p>Jihad " doesn't stop with the death of a commander or the loss of a leader."</p> <p>Emphasises that the mujahideen are of the ummah, that they share its suffering and are "not alienated from its suffering."</p>

APPENDIX 3.8 (b) Approaching Muslims

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	ID	Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [unknown date] “Introduction to Characteristics of Jihad”	35	The infidel leaders of Muslim countries. These 'collaborating rulers' use huge armies of traitors consisting of soldiers, writers, teachers, artists, judges, legislators, journalists and media people to support their regimes against the Muslims and their Jihadist vanguard'. Officials from ministries of religious endowment 'who sell Islam in exchange for benefits and security'.
AAZ [early 1991] “The Bitter Harvest”	46	<p>'Thus whoever claims to be a 'democratic Muslim,' or a Muslim who calls for democracy, is like one who says about himself 'I am a Jewish Muslim,' or 'I am a Christian Muslim' - the one worse than the other. He is an apostate infidel'.</p> <p>'The current rulers of Muslim countries who govern without the sharia of Allah are apostate infidels. It is obligatory to overthrow them, to wage jihad against them, and to depose them, installing a Muslim ruler in their stead'. These rulers scatter and divide the umma, leading them to abandon the sharia. 'Regimes that exchange the sharia of Allah are outcasts from the Muslim umma'.</p> <p>Those who are governed by Allah alone are Muslims, those who do not submit to this are not Muslims, even if they claim to be. ... Whoever agrees to democracy is an infidel. Highest authority must never be accorded to the nation. Declaring freedom of religion means limitless apostasy, since jihad against the apostates is abolished, and the jizya din dhimmi conditions applying to non-Muslims citizens are abolished. Such a declaration would also bring about 'abolition of man's dominion over woman' [quotes 4:34, which-in Ahmed Ali's translation is far less direct then the quote: "Men have authority over women, for Allah has made the one superior than the other"].</p> <p>'And whoever participates while fully aware of the truth of democracy is an apostate infidel, an outcast from the Islamic umma'.</p>
AAZ/Islamic Jihad [early 1993] “Advice to the Community to reject the Fatwa of Bin Baz..”	99	'Someone who claims to be a Muslim and cites a democratic or socialist thinker becomes an unbeliever and an apostate'.
UBL [June 1994] “Saudi Arabia supports the Communists in Yemen”	37	King Fahd opposes the Islamic Awakening, supports anti-Islamic regimes and parties, including the Soviet Union before its collapse, the Algerian junta, and Sudanese govt. The Saudi government collaborates with the UN and conspires against Muslims. This will breed disunity within Muslim ranks, worsen the economic situation and strengthen the enemies of Islam.
UBL [July 1994] “The Banishment of Communism from the Arabian Peninsula”	38	The conduct and policies of Saudi authorities will only 'bring it shame in this world and torture in hell'.
UBL [July 1997] “Quran Scholars in the Face of Despotism”	39	Saudi government’s anti-Islamic policies. - Rulers of debauchery.
UBL [September 1994]	40	King Fahd is trying to drive people away from the path of Islam.

Communiqué and author	ID	Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
“Saudi Arabia Unveils its War against Islam and its Scholars”		'To the Saudi Government headed by King Fahd: the people of the Peninsula are proud people [...] they are guards of the Prophet's heirs'. 'Your allegiance to the enemies has reached its end'.
UBL [October 1994] “Higher Committee for Harm!”	47	Saudi rulers, who hate Islam and its true preachers and fight against it.
UBL [December 1994] “Open Letter for Shaykh bin Baz on the Invalidity of his Fatwa on Peace with the Jews”	63	'God and His messenger have proclaimed war against the one who tolerates usury without putting an end to it'.
UBL [January 1995] “Second letter to Shaykh Abd Al-Aziz bin Baz from the Reform and Advice Foundation”	64	'Secularism amounts to atheism'
UBL [February 1995] “Prince Salman and Ramadan Alms”	65	'The Saudi regime exploited the nation, besieged its resources, and had its hand on its capabilities in order to prevent it from serving Islam' 'The regime has seized its citizens' liberty and religious rights. The regime deprived scholars and those speaking the truth of their rights. It punishes whoever exercised his rights and his duties in defending the ummah's religious rights by facing the regime's injustice'. It also failed economically, and has removed charities aimed to help people in need and replaced them with organizations which benefit the royal family, especially Prince Salman. Fatwas from Shaykh Bin Baz, the one of the family's mufti have tried to legitimise these. Prince Salman is known for his actions against Islam, he does not care about the people, and the regime will not distribute the money to the needy, but only use for their own cause.
UBL [March 1995] “Saudi Arabia Continues its War against Islam and its Scholars”	66	The Saudi regime has opened a 'new chapter of an open war against Islam and those calling for an implementation of its teachings'.
AAZ [April 1995] “Our Stance towards Iran: Response to the Accusation of Cooperation Between the Salafi Jihad Movement and Renegade Iran”	115	On Shia: vehemently denies receiving or seeking help from the Iran. Describes the Shia heresy according to the report: 'The Shiites created a heresy in the Sunni orthodox religion after distorting the Qur'an and the image of the Islamic caliphate through the 12th Imam concept and offending the companions of the Prophet. Zawahiri adds that anyone who believes in this, even after being showed all the facts, is outside the realm of Islam'.
UBL [July 1995] “Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commissions”	68	'Our differences with the Saudi Regime surpass important incidental matters like economic collapse, administrative corruption, oppressing the people, and confiscating their legal rights. These differences become more important, greater, and deep-rooted matters. It is concerned with the basic matter of the requirements of monotheism and witnessing that (there is no God but God and Mohammad is his messenger. The Saudi regime has abandoned these concepts, and thus is has completely lost its legitimacy.'
UBL [August 1995] “An Open Letter to King Fahd	62	King Fahd attacked for 'atrocities you and your clan have perpetrated against God and His religion, against the rights of His worshipers and

Communiqué and author	ID	Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
on the Occasion of the Recent Cabinet Reshuffle”		<p>His country, and against the sanctity of His holy lands and nation'. The Saudi leadership has oppressed simple people and driven them from their rights. King Fahd is guilty of 'insulting its dignity and honour, sacrilege its holy lands, plundered its resources, and robbed its wealth'; he has led the country to economic collapse.</p> <p>'Whoever permits himself or others to follow a positive or man-made law is transgressing God's Law and therefore is an infidel and an apostate who no longer belongs to our religious community'.</p> <p>'He who follows [corrupt, man-made law] is an infidel who must be fought until the rule of God and His messenger is regained so that no one else judges no more no less'.</p> <p>On the issue of Palestine: 'you have blessed the efforts of normalization, submission, and deception of the Palestinian cause, the mother of all Islamic causes. You continued the process of the imposed peace and submission in Palestine. You volunteered to pay a huge bulk of the cost of the process despite the economic hardship that Saudi Arabia experiences. You donated \$100 million to Yasir 'Arafat's secular authority which was brought in to exercise oppressive ways against the Palestinian people that the Jewish occupation authority has so far failed to accomplish. You are at war with the Palestinian people's jihadi movements especially the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)'.</p> <p>'From what we said above, it is proven, O King, that your regime has committed the forbidden things in Islam which nullify its validity before God. The devastating failure and the dishonourable corruption which have been proven against your regime are enough reasons to overthrow it. By legislating the positive blasphemous laws and obligating people to seek judgment by them, by pledging your allegiance and support to the infidels against the Muslims, you have committed many of the things which are contrary to the teachings of Islam and which demand that you be revolted against and removed.' .. 'We ask that you abdicate.'</p> <p>'You have aged too much'. All the ministers and those culpable for the dire state of affairs need to resign too.</p>
UBL [August 1995] “The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two Mosques”	69	Fahd's 'opposition to the will of Allah' as made clear by 'his use of laws of positivism', loyalty to infidels and animosity towards Muslims, especially the ulema.'It is clear that this regime has deviated from Islam, and it has committed apostasy'. 'How can this regime bring victory to Muslims when it is an apostate?'.
AAZ [early 1996] “Healing the Hearts of the Believers”	118	Leaders of many Islamic countries are infidels since they demand loyalty to other entities than God, they interact with the UN and have neglected to pull Palestine into the Islamic Ummah. This includes Saudi Arabian government which supports Israel indirectly through its alliance with the US, and also through interaction with the UN.
UBL [November 1996] “Bin Ladin interviewed on Jihad against US”	150	Implicit takfir of Saudi authorities and other Arab leaders.
UBL [January 1999] “Wrath of God..”	178	Muslim rulers have accepted invasion of occupying forces, Muslims need to rise up and expel these forces

Communiqué and author	ID	Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [February 1999] May 1998 interview reported	182	Ahmed Shah Masoud seen as enemy.
UBL [June 1999] "Usama bin Ladin, The Destruction of the Base"	184	'Agent' rulers of the Arab world, colluding on Palestine and submitting to the West.
UBL [March 2001] "Ausaf receives Bin Ladin's Poem.."	193	The 'stooges of the US' who signed resolutions with Israel
UBL [October 2001] "Tayseer Allouni interviews bin Ladin in Afghanistan"	130	"He who claims there will be a lasting peace between us and the Jews is an infidel."
UBL [November 2001] "Bin Ladin condemns the US"	77	'Anyone who lines up behind Bush in this campaign has committed one of the 10 actions that sully one's Islam. Muslim scholars are unanimous that allegiance to the infidels and support for them against the believers is one of the major acts that sully Islam.' There can be no isolation of battles being fought by Muslims, it is all one big conspiracy by the Zionist-Crusader West and all Muslims need to unite under one banner: 'Those who distinguish between America and Israel are the real enemies of the nation.'
AAZ [December 2001] "Knights under the Prophet's Banner"	119	'The crowds that serve their [tyrant rulers] purposes, including the writers of falsehoods, those who exploit principles for personal gain, and those who sell their fatwas [religious rulings] as commodities'.
UBL [March 2002] "Usama bin Ladin: Prince Abdallah's initiative is High Treason"	205	'High treason' of Saudi ruling family for approaching Israel for peace. .. Prince Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz (Zio-American in Saudi Government's clothes)' - he is no better than those who helped the English commanders and Jews against the Palestinians in the first half of the 20th Century. .. 'Traitors' and 'agents' of the West in the Muslim lands (Arab rulers).
UBL [purported] [June 2002] "Al-Qaeda's declaration in response to the Saudi Ulema.."	43	'Cooperation with the West against what they call Islamic extremism, whether it's performed by one word, or a declaration, or any other manner, either directly or indirectly, is apostasy from the religion of Allah Most High'. 'Thus whoever refuses the principle of terror against the enemy also refuses the commandment of Allah [...] and His sharia' (54)
AAZ [September 2002] "The Interview of Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri"	22	Treachery of the Pakistani authorities.
AAZ [December 2002] "Al Wala Wa al Baraa.."	45	References to the leaders who collaborate with the west, submit to and recognise Israel. Take money from the Americans, like the Northern Alliance, to battle the mujahideen. The apostasy of the ruling clique in Muslim lands: 'this clique governs without sharia, it also befriends and submits to the external enemies of Islam - in particular, the Jews and Christians.'
UBL [January 2003] "Islamic Action between Causes of Consequences and Advocates of Disagreement"	216	Crusader 'agents' in the region.
UBL [February 2003] audio statement	78	The rulers of the region cooperate with the Bush & Blair plans. .. 'Evil government scholars, corrupt ministers, salaries writers, and those similar to them'. 'Karzai is an American agent and supporting him against the Muslims takes the person outside the fold of Islam'.

Communiqué and author	ID	Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		The Crusaders appointed the Karzai of Kabul, the 'Karzai of Pakistan', Karzai of Kuwait', 'Karzai of Bahrain', 'Karzai of Qatar' and 'Karzai of Riyadh'. These leaders have betrayed the Muslim nation.
UBL [February 2003] "A Message to our Brothers in Iraq"	79	'We also point out that whoever supported the United States, including the hypocrites of Iraq or the rulers of Arab countries, those who approved their actions and followed them in this Crusade war by fighting with them or providing bases and administrative support, or any form of support, even by words, to kill Muslims in Iraq, should know that they are apostates and outside the community of Muslims. It is permissible to spill their blood and take their property'.
UBL [April 2003] "Usama bin LAdin urges Muslims to launch suicide attacks against US"	217	Condemnation of 'agent' governments in the Middle East
UBL [May 2003] "Riyadh, Casablanca Attacks"	218	Condemnation of Arab 'agent' regimes for their complicity with America and failure to react to the Iraq war
UBL [May 2003] report on statement	219	King Fahd will 'see' rather than 'hear' the response from UBL in response to the killings of the two clerics. 'We will not issue a statement on the matter other than one dripping with blood that will be a strong deterrent to anyone who is tempted to harm the nation's jihadist ulemas'
AAZ [August 2003] audio statement	55	Those who assisted America with the capture of Muslims will suffer, they will not be protected by the US which cannot protect itself.
AAZ [September 2003] "Message to the Muslims in Pakistan and Afghanistan"	56	Musharraf enabled the Americans to topple the Taliban and seeks sending troops to Iraq.
UBL [October 2003] "Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq"	98	Governments created by the Americans, including the Karzai regime and Mahmud Abbas, are 'treacherous puppet regimes'.
AAZ [March 2004] audio statement	59	Pakistani soldiers fulfilling the regime's plans are infidels.
UBL [May 2004] "People of Iraq"	82	'The members of the Interim Council are considered unbelievers', 'they do not rule by the law of God in all of our affairs while they are allies with America'. ... 'Whoever assisted the infidels against Muslims like assisting the occupying forces and what derived from it like the temporary or permanent government has committed sin; his money and blood are sanctioned and his wife would be divorced from him'.
UBL [December 2004] "Message concerning Saudi Arabia"	84	<p>The Saudi regime 'went beyond the mortal to deeds that lead to one becoming non-Muslim'. 'The regime supported the infidel America against Muslims'. 'It is known that this is one of the 10 things that lead to one becoming non-Muslim'.</p> <p>'Absolute obedience and supremacy are given to the king and his laws, and not to God's religion'.</p> <p>Denies the accusation from the Saudi authorities that he is Khawarij [rebels in early Islam who pursued a very strict interpretation of Islam], 'we believe that the sins that are less than infidelity, such as killing and drinking alcohol, do not deprive the believer of his faith.</p> <p>To the 'Riyadh rulers': 'you have oppressed the people without their</p>

Communiqué and author	ID	Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		agreement and without consulting them with the support and backing of the British [...] the people have woken up from their slumber and realized the extent of the tyranny and corruption that you exercise' [...] Therefore you have two options. The first is to restore the trust to the people in a peaceful manner and let the inhabitants choose the Muslim ruler who will govern them on the basis of God's book and the teachings of the prophet [...]. The second option, if the rulers refuse these rights, is to face the people when they demand their rights and the security services will not cope, as was the case with the Shah of Iran and Ceausescu in Romania.
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	86	<p>'The one who stays behind and fails to join the Mujahideen when Jihad comes commits a cardinal sin'. Supporting 'the infidels against the Muslims', 'foreign and Arab', like America or the regimes of Allawi (Iraq), Karzai, or Abbas, is 'tantamount to infidelity and a cause for departure from the [Islamic] nation'. Included are owners and workers of companies who transport food supplies, ammunition and any other needs for the infidels. 'Everyone who aides and supports them in any kind of way has defected from religion and must be fought'.</p> <p>Collaborators with the Allawi regime, from the Army, National Guard etc are infidels.</p> <p>Those who call jihad terrorism and champion apostate rulers by hand, tongue or pen, then they have 'no right to live'.</p>
AAZ [November 2005] "Wills of the Knights of the London Raids"	53	'Here are the ulema of beggary, O Muslims, working to please [Queen] Elizabeth, head of the Church of England, blindly imitating her and issuing fatwas according to her views. They say: We are British citizens subject to Britain's Crusader laws and we carry its passports and are proud of our submission to Sultan Blair, who fights against Islam, and Elizabeth, head of the Church of England'.
AAZ [December 2005] "The Victory of the Islamic Religion in Iraq"	26	<p>Pakistani rulers.</p> <p>'Dealers of religion, scholars of beggary and spreaders of myths who have forbidden resistance against the occupier and those who make traitorous pacts with the Crusaders, the Crusaders shall leave them alone just as Satan abandons his allies'.</p>
AAZ [December 2005] interview	49	<p>On the Shia: 'Movements attempting to sever the south [of Iraq] purport to belong to "Islam", yet they agreed with the Americans, led by the Crusader Bush, to occupy Iraq'. On Kurdistan: 'So now there is an independent state in the north, infiltrated by Jewish intelligence agencies, and which is divided between two collaborating [with invading forces] political parties that fight over every little thing. The agreement is only on secularism and combating Islam, under the American banner'.</p> <p>Pakistan and Pakistani military. 'Musharraf wants a Pakistan without Islam..and they are inventing a new religion, which they composed for him in America. They call this fairy tale "enlightened moderation".'</p>
AAZ [December 2005] "Obstacles to Jihad"	25	The 'idol-kings' that rule the Muslim world. Those who deny the effectiveness and importance of jihad and say it only brings death and misery. They support the cause of apostate rulers and the West. Says the West would have invaded Afghanistan and Iraq even if 9/11 had

Communiqué and author	ID	Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		not happened.
AAZ [March 2006] “The Alternative is Da’wa and Jihad”	73	Lashes out against Palestinian Authority, who 'sold Palestine'
AAZ [April 2006] “Four Years since the Battle of Tora Bora”	238	<p>The religious scholars of beggary, the ulema of flattery and the philosophers of defeat.</p> <p>People in Iraq: those who discourage jihad against the occupiers are traitors to God.</p>
UBL [April 2006] “Oh People of Islam”	90	Labour minister of Saudi Arabia an unbeliever
AAZ [April 2006] “Letter to the People of Pakistan”	81	<p>In Iraq: 'The faction of traitors falsely associated with the Muslims, these traitor who made pacts with the Crusaders [...] and promised it that they would be loyal guards of its interests after it leaves; they are traitors, even if they dress like Muslims or have the same names', 'even if their beards are long and turbans great', even if they claim noble descent or a connection with the unseen' [shia?]. Take not Jews and Christians for your friends</p> <p>In addition to those in Iraq, those 'affiliated with the clan of Hasim in Jordan, and their peers on the Arabian Peninsula, those who permit the recognition of Israel and making peace with it, and those like them in Egypt, who help the French against the veiled Muslim women and receive the Israeli ambassador [...] all of them are traitors, and the Muslim Ummah must confront them'.</p> <p>'The traitor Musharraf'.</p> <p>Calls to the Pakistani Army's attention, that they have become tools in the destruction of Pakistan, 'aligned under Bush's cross', and they will suffer in the afterlife. Musharraf is 'throwing them into the burner of civil war'.</p>
AAZ [June 2006] “Elegizing the Ummah’s Martyr..”	32	<p>'Grand treason' being committed by those who falsely affiliate themselves with Islam in Iraq but help the occupiers.</p> <p>The 'perversion' of the Turkish secular model, abandoning Shariah, welcoming American bases and recognising Israel and take part in military exercises with it.</p> <p>The 'scholars of beggary' in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula.</p>
UBL [June 2006] “Elegizing the Ummah’s Martyr..”	92	<p>'hypocrites [in Iraq] disowned their covenants and joined the ranks of the Christians and the Jews'.</p> <p>'Supporting the infidels against Muslims is one of the ten things that nullify Islam, as stipulated by scholars'.</p>
UBL [July 2006] “To the Ummah in General and the Mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia in Particular”	93	'Southern Iraqis cannot participate with the United States and its allies in invading al-Fallujah, al-Ramadi, Ba'qubah, Mosul, Samarra, al-Qa'im and other towns and villages while their areas remain safe from reprisal and harm' [shia].
AAZ [September 2006] “Hot issues..”	21	The charlatans of Iraq supporting America.
AAZ [September 2006] “Bush, the Vatican’s Pope,	89	Talks of categories of Muslim traitors

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Darfur and the Crusades”		
AAZ [December 2006] “Realities of Conflict Between Islam and Unbelievers”	94	The 'secularists who have approved these resolutions [on Palestine] are criminals in the eyes of Islam', they are traitors, enemies of Islam and cannot be seen as brothers or rulers.
AAZ [January 2007] “The Correct Equation”	28	The nationalist, leftist movements in Palestine have submitted to international accords and sold Palestine and satisfied themselves with the reality drawn up by Washington.
AAZ [February 2007] “Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427”	97	<p>The long beards, huge turbans, majestic titles, purported lineages and popular myths are no substitute for the truth and cannot conceal the crimes of cooperation with the Crusaders, loyalty to the infidel invaders and killing of the Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan'. Those who cooperate with the Zionist-Crusaders are traitors.</p> <p>The secular Kurdish parties were trying to implement America's plan of splitting up the lands of Islam. 'There are doctrinal and legal taboos which, if committed, call into question the legitimacy of any group claiming to belong to Islam': agreeing to the rule of something else than Shari'ah, helping invading enemies, embracing their institutions, laws etc.</p> <p>Mahmoud Abbas and Mohammed Dahlan 'represent a class of corrupt secularists who cooperate with America, sell Palestine, surrender to Israel, and make war on Islam'. Fatah began as a secular organization, fighting for a secular state, not Islamic, in Palestine.</p>
AAZ [March 2007] “Palestine is the concern of all Muslims”	18	HAMAS leaders have joined the Sadat caravan of humiliation and surrender. It first sold the rule of Shariah, and then Palestine itself. All in order to keep some power. They 'took a ride with the American devil and his Saudi representative'.
AAZ [May 2007] “The Empire of Evil is about to End”	23	<p>On the treachery of supporters of America in Iraq. Allah will punish those who cooperate with the occupiers. Condemns the methodology that lead to the acceptance of King Farooq, Mubarak, the leaders of the 'petrol shop' Gulf states, the PLO etc and the culture of obedience and acceptance by Muslims. Quotes Malcolm X when he addressed his 'repressed black brothers in America': “If you're not ready to die for it, take the word ‘freedom’ out of your vocabulary.”</p> <p>Quotes extensively from Malcolm X.</p>
AAZ [June 2007] “Forty Years since the Fall of Jerusalem”	101	'Jerusalem is lost because of an extremely corrupt regime which sent its army against its people and betrayed its religion and history' - tortured prisoners, allied with Muslims and nationalists. The 'secular regimes that have fought the Sharia from the time of King Faruq until Hosni Mubarak' [Egypt focus].
AAZ [July 2007] “The Advice of one Concerned”	102	Al-Saud
UBL [September 2007] “Come to Jihad..”	14	Musharraf and his aides and excusers, including from the Ulema, are kufr and apostates. Al-Qaeda will revenge for the killing of Maulana Abd al-Rashid Ghazi and rebels in Waziristan.
AAZ [December 2007] “A Review of Events”	13	'Treasonous hypocrites' in the ranks of Iraqi mujahideen who cooperate with the Americans. These must be cast out of the Iraqi caliphate, their destiny is death and hell. The Americans will not be protecting them for long, and then they will lose their lives and religion. 'History is recording everything'. All governments in

Communiqué and author	ID	Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		Muslim lands are illegitimate since they are not based on Shariah, all their leaders are apostates, and the Muslim population is being oppressed by them. When asked about how to stop shia-sunni fighting in Iraq, Zawahiri responds: 'don't ask the one under attack not to defend himself' - the Shia must stop their aggression before the matter is resolved. Only when the militias stop cooperating with America, start fighting them, release captives and compensate for their crimes, can there be basis for agreement.
UBL [December 2007] "The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies"	27	<p>Many 'free and proud tribes' refused to sell their religion to American occupiers in Iraq but there were some deviants like Abdel Sattar Abu Risha and his followers. The 'lions of Islam' punished these people in order to deter others from taking the same path.</p> <p>The person who participates in a government of national unity 'is headed to a fate of eternal punishment in the Hellfire' since this government would mean that law is man-made rather than the Shariah, the nation is the most sacred thing. ... People and parties that participate in Islamic scholarship, missionary work an jihad have participated in the treachery of America and its agents in Iraq under the banner of nationalism and patriotism. The Iraq Islamic Party even called for negotiations with America on security.</p> <p>HAMAS sold out its religion when it engaged in the al-Saud peace initiative and took part in the unity govt. ... King Abdullah of Riyadh is the 'most important American agent in the region' - why do some leaders in Iraq then cooperate with him? ... The apostate Shia militias.</p> <p>Compares the treachery of some Iraqi leaders with those from Afghanistan who decided to collude with Americans, e.g. The Northern alliance. Supporting the infidels against the Muslims makes these leaders apostates. This is not a 'forgivable stumble' but a sin that will not be forgiven.</p>
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting part one.."	105	'Officers of the State Security Investigations [Egypt] - Anti-Religious Activities Branch and those like them who interrogate the Muslims and torture them are infidels, each and every one of them'. But does not recommend declaring whole armies as infidel, there are 'particulars'. Apostates in the Awakening Councils [Egypt]. . The secular Fatah movement. . 'It is not permitted to work in the police force which executes and protects the man-made laws and rules and forces the people to abide by them'.
UBL [May 2008] "A Message to the Muslim Nation"	24	Arab leaders are apostates - they rallied under America's flag, shunned Islamic teachings, bribed ulema with jobs, and jailed resisters, corrupted the media, stopped jihad.
AAZ [June 2008] "On the Anniversary of the Naksa.."	15	Egyptians are free to enter Gaza and anyone who stands in their way 'should only blame himself'.
AAZ [August 2008] "A Message form Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri to the Pakistani Army and the People of Pakistan"	41	<p>Rulers of Pakistan have betrayed their Muslim brothers and are also killing their citizens and destroying their houses, even mosques and madrassas. 'This greedy gang worships its salaries, benefits and bribes.' .. Soldiers in the Pakistani army are enemies of Islam. Musharraf has prevented mujahideen from entering India and has conceded on Kashmir.</p> <p>There will be grave consequences for those who assist the kafirs</p>

Communiqué and author	ID	Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		against the Muslims'.
AAZ [November 2008] "Al-Azhar: The Lions Den"	237	The nationalists, left wing activists and so on in Palestine who cooperate with the Americans and Israeli intelligence.
AAZ [January 2009] "The Massacre of Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors"	121	Mubarak is part of the plan to 'kill the Muslims of Gaza'. . The traitors: Abdullah ibn Abdul-Azeez inventing the 'mockery of "interfaith"' in order to recognise Israel. Ali Abdullah Salih 'turns the honourable and defiant Yemen into a supply base for the Christian Crusade'. Nouri al-Maliki 'begs America to keep its troops in Iraq'.
UBL [January 2009] "Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault"	122	There is an "Allawi" to take orders from the "Bremers" [the American CIA controllers], and a "Sistani" [the Shi'a cleric] and Tantawi [head of Al-Azhar] supported by writers, journalists and other groups to give legitimacy to this deception. All these groups are enemies of the Ummah.
AAZ [February 2009] "The Sacrifices of Gaza"	131	'The treachery and betrayal of the official Arab regimes', especially the 'traitorous Egyptian regime'
AAZ [February 2009] "From Kabul to Mogadishu"	132	Features Shareef Shaykh Ahmad who is presented as dismantling the Shariah constitution and allying with America.
UBL [March 2009] "Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine"	133	Arab rulers who cooperate with America and their allies, whose 'necks need to be cut'. Talks about Hassan Nasrallah's recognition of UNSCR 1701 resulting in blockade of Palestine and showing that 'there is no difference in this issue between Hassan and Hosni [Mubarak] and the rest of the Arab idol-kings'. Cooperating with the nonbelievers is Kufr resulting in expulsion from Islam.
UBL [March 2009] "Fight on, Oh Champions of Somalia"	134	Abdullahi Yousef, Shaykh Shareef and others who turned against the Mujahideen such as Ahmed Shah Massoud. .. 'If a ruler becomes an infidel during his reign, his authority collapses, and he must be removed with armed force.'
AAZ [August 2009] "The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy"	140	'the governing corrupt political class, and the oblique military group leading the Pakistani Army, who works as hunting dogs for the Americans and receives bribes and commands from the American Ambassador.' Condemned the 'traders of faith' in Iraq. Warning to those in the 'Crusader awakenings' in Iraq that they will have to beg for redemption if they are not to suffer in the afterlife. .. Mahmoud Abbas described as a tool of the Mossad and CIA. Salam Fayyadh (Fatah PA prime minister) also condemned.
AAZ [August 2009] "The Path of Doom"	142	Anyone who supports the Pakistani Army is in fact supporting the Americans and Crusaders against the Muslims. Soldiers in the Pakistani Army will end up in hell unless they recant.
AAZ [September 2009] "Shaykh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri: Eulogy for the Role Model of Youth"	147	Turkish and Pakistani leadership and military. Other 'collaborators'.
AAZ [December 2009] "The (Palestinian) National Unity"	146	The group lead by Mahmud Abbas is treacherous since it does not seek to govern by Islamic law and embraces 'national liberation' for own personal gain. But even on this front they fail to live up to the

Communiqué and author	ID	Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		banner of national liberation since they invite the occupiers to take over their land and seek to live under their authority. 'Mahmoud Abbas is the one who kills, tortures and indicates the places of the mujahideen for the Jews'.
AAZ [December 2009] "The Morning and the Lamp.."	141	'Whosoever does that[rules by a legal system other than shari'ah] from amongst them then he is a kāfir.'
AAZ [July 2010] "Al Quds will not be converted to Judaism"	223	Muslims in US military condemned. 'Ulema of the Marines' who justify bloodletting of Muslims, permit these soldiers to operate and kill Muslims and sacrifice their honour condemned.
AAZ [August 2010] "Message to the People of Turkey"	225	Turkish government and military.
AAZ [September 2010] "A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade"	226	Members of the Pakistani security organs have befriended Jews and Christians, fought Muslims and committed major sin. Muslims of Pakistan warned: Allah will not only punish disobedience but also those who kept silent and did nothing to command them to do good. .. Talks of some from nationalist movements and even Islamic movements who now support the cause of the West, the most prominent of which is Fatah.. Ulema of the 'marines' in Cairo, Riyadh etc
AAZ [February 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(3)"	234	ElBaradei the 'secular replacement' for Mubarak in waiting: 'He is a replacement who voices no opinion over normalization with Israel, nor the acts of aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq, the blockade of Gaza, the Joint Arab Defence, supporting the low income strata with basic supplies, the sale of the public sector, and self sufficiency in staple crops. He is a replacement who lives in Vienna, visiting Egypt in his free time.'
AAZ [March 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(4)"	235	The leadership of the Egyptian army is in the pockets of the Americans and Israel, even though there are honourable people within its rank and file.
AAZ [April 2011] "A Message of Glad Tidings...(5)"	236	The Mubarak elite, military council, judicial leadership etc

APPENDIX 3.9 Criticising Muslims

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	ID	Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [unknown date] “Response to a Grave Uncertainty..”	117	Criticism of Saudi Shaykh Nasruddin al-Albani for supporting passivity, diverting attention from jihad.
UBL [unknown date] “Methodological Guidelines”	112	Criticism of 'Neo-Ghassanids' of corrupt Arab rulers and ulema who cooperate with the Zionist-Crusaders
AAZ [unknown date] “Introduction to Characteristics of Jihad”	35	Muslims need to support jihad with any means possible if they don't take part directly. The people fail to criticise the sinful media and begin to engage in some of these sinful acts, like kissing, in the street, under the banner of freedom. Thus an Islamic generation has grown up far from the Islamic manners and behaviours except for those who were saved by God. They began imitating these actors and actresses. They should emulate the Prophet in stead. They need to learn 'good morals', the need for this has been highlighted by the Prophet
AAZ [early 1991] “The Bitter Harvest”	46	'The Brothers have abandoned pursuing legitimate Muslims government in place of the current governments that rule Muslim lands. This deviation has made the Brothers idle from fulfilling their true calling, as Allah wills it'. The brothers have not fulfilled their duty of waging jihad, and have described infidel governments as legitimate, and have 'joined them in the jahiliyya governing, that is democracies, elections, and parliaments'. Criticism of Hassan al-Banna's and the Brotherhood's adoption of 'constitutional legitimacy, democracy, support for the regime, and rejection of violence'. The Brothers must mend their ways, implement sharia, denounce tyrants, embrace jihad.
AAZ/Islamic Jihad [early 1993] “Advice to the Community to reject the Fatwa of Bin Baz..”	99	Errors of Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz, who authorised entering the National Council (parliament), with his fatwa distributed by the Muslim Brotherhood. In order to give legal opinion, one must have precise knowledge of the reality and context, in addition to sound character and religious knowledge - Bin Baz lacks knowledge of reality. Thus he is an erroneous religious scholar. His message condones all the illicit aspects of the secular society and forbids jihad.
UBL [July 1997] “Quran Scholars in the Face of Despotism”	39	'Let the servant of the Dinar and the ones who sold their religion for a life of power be miserable'.
UBL [September 1994] “Saudi Arabia Unveils its War against Islam and its Scholars”	40	To the scholars that stayed silent or let the influences of the Saudi authorities get to them: they are required to stand with their fighting scholar brothers 'Otherwise it is a betrayal of trust, which will be viewed as a disgrace [...] on the day of judgement'.
UBL [September 1994]	42	Allah will judge those who harm the ulema. Following orders is no

Communiqué and author	ID	Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings [excerpts, quotes, notes]
“Urgent Letter to Security Officials”		excuse for those who do so. 'You are servants of God, you are not servants of the Saudi rulers'.
UBL [October 1994] “Higher Committee for Harm!”	47	Why do some ulema support the anti-Islamic actions of the Saud?
UBL [December 1994] “Open Letter for Shaykh bin Baz on the Invalidity of his Fatwa on Peace with the Jews”	63	<p>'We want to remind you in this time in which the liar struts about, and evil prattlers make noise, and the truth is buried alive, and preachers imprisoned, and reformers silenced. It is strange that you do not know of this and are silent, especially since your fatwas and positions have dealt with these matters'</p> <p>Not only has usury been tolerated - it has directly been sanctioned and supported by the regime. Although the Shaykh has decreed usury as haram, he as not spoken out against the leaders who allowed this to happen. The Shaykh sought to legitimise and justify the positions of the regime as regards the occupying of the country by the Jewish and Crusader enemies, support for Yemeni communists, attacks against members of the ulema and other crimes.</p> <p>Now the Shaykh has recommended peace with the Zionist enemy, issuing a fatwa allowing for peace to support the regime's policies. This fatwa serves to ad a veneer of legitimacy to the occupation. This goes directly against earlier fatwas from the Shaykh which called for jihad to liberate Palestine. The Shaykh has legitimised the actions of the apostate rulers, and this fatwa goes against his previous rulings. Perhaps he did not know the situation well enough. 'You are advanced in years and were skilled in the services of Islam previously'. The Shaykh should consider these words 'polite advice'.</p>
UBL [January 1995] “Second letter to Shaykh Abd Al-Aziz bin Baz from the Reform and Advice Foundation”	64	<p>The Shaykh saw a deal making peace with the Jews and recognising their authority over Palestine as permissible reconciliation with the enemy. We expected you to change course after evidence showed the invalidity of the fatwa. But instead of changing course the Shaykh issued an explanation supporting his previous conclusion.</p> <p>'If you cannot bear the consequences of speaking the truth and of supporting those who speak out against leaders, then you should remove yourself from official positions in which the regime has placed you, and leave those leaders who declared war against Allah. In this way you will not suffer as they will'.</p>
UBL [May 1995] “Scholars are the Prophet’s Successors”	67	<p>Criticism of bad scholars, who follow materialistic goals and fail to follow the right path. For instance shaykhs of the Al-Azhar who sought to legitimise Nasser's socialism and the actions of him and his regime. Standing up to these kind of scholars is a priority in defending Islam. 'Responding to this category of scholars does not correspond to addressing mistakes made by true scholars because bad scholars are those who are against Islam and are not fully integrated in what is called "people of knowledge" within this religious context'.</p> <p>What should be said to the scholars who align themselves with the Jews to fight the mujahideen in Palestine or other places? What should be said to those who collude with bad rulers and buried the truth? If they do this intentionally or if they issue fatwas without being familiar enough with the issue, they should be reprimanded. Scholars: 'The more they move away from speaking the truth, the more animosity is geared towards them'.</p>

Communiqué and author	ID	Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [July 1995] “Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commissions”	68	Economic mismanagement of the Saudi rulers, the privatisation of the national airline, job losses, and job gains in the US because the fleet will be renewed, unnecessarily.
UBL [August 1995] “The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two Mosques”	69	The Saudi ruling family has 'sought to block all abilities and capabilities of the ummah by placing control over it', it has insisted on full political and economic control meaning the charities which were supposed to support Muslims have been taken over by institutions controlled by the royal family. 'The regime has disappointed us in the big causes, especially the Palestinian cause, which is the mother of all Islamic causes'
UBL [March 1997] “Pakistan interviews Usama bin Ladin”	154	Criticism of Borhanoddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masud and Golbodin Hekmatyar, who were mujahideen but then became responsible for infighting, supporter Dostum against the Taliban and sought relations with India.
UBL [August 1997] “Usama bin Ladin Urges ‘Befitting Reply’ to Horan”	157	Duty of Muslims to respond to these remarks.
UBL [January 1998] “Bin Ladin Claims Foiling of UN’s Afghan ‘Conspiracy’”	159	Accuses Ahmad Shah Masud, Hekmatyar and Rabbani of willingly signing a UN plan for coalition government in post-war Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal, giving communists access to power.
UBL [March 1998] “Bin Ladin Urges Expulsion of Invaders..”	162	Criticises royal court ulema 'who have gained status through the rulers' money, power, and tyranny, selling their [reward in the] hereafter for others' lives'
UBL [January 1999] “Wrath of God..”	178	'Whoever denies even a minor tenet of our religion commits the gravest sin in Islam.' Condemnation of PLO/Palestinian Authority for seeking to negotiate with Israel, this has brought them nothing.
AAZ [April 1999] “Letter to Abu Yasir”	123	'Let me repeat, once more, that the declaration [of a truce] contradicts, for a large number of brothers, the principles on which Islamic Jihad was founded and its proud legacy. If one is to believe media reports and analyses, the initiative represents a serious setback to, with you continuing silence giving me the impression you accept it'. 'Beware of losing both in this world and thereafter. Your loyalty must be to God and His Prophet. Righteousness will be you salvation in this world and the next'.
UBL [June 1999] “Usama bin Ladin Pens Letter in Support of Kashmir Jihad”	183	Criticism of Arab rulers who 'bow before evil'
UBL [June 1999] “Usama bin Ladin, The Destruction of the Base”	184	Criticism of those who do not engage in jihad: 'Without even engaging in combat, they suffered a psychological defeat. They acknowledge the necessity for jihad. Nonetheless, they say that they cannot fulfill such an obligation'. Muslim regimes that 'anesthetize' Muslims by convincing them the way of international legitimacy is the way forward. If people did not rise up when their qiblah [Saudi Arabia] was occupied, when will they rise up? Criticises that 'generation of scholars' who have no experience of jihad, claiming now that it is not obligatory - they are not in a position to state such claims. Unfortunately, some youths are influenced by this hesitation.

Communiqué and author	ID	Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		Criticism of the rich and benevolent among the Muslims who have turned their back on Afghanistan.
UBL [July 1999] “Bin Ladin Calls on Muslims to Declare Jihad against US”	185	If Muslims do not rise up against US, it will split them apart and eliminate them.
UBL [May 2000] “Usama Speaks on Hijra and the Islamic State”	189	<p>'Any person who does not follow the Holy Qu'ran and the Sunnah of our beloved Prophet Muhammad (saw), not only is he astray, but he should lead a wretched life.'</p> <p>Criticism of those who seek to secure worldly gains rather than live by the tenets of the faith.</p> <p>'What will be your excuse when you stand in front of Allah and you are asked: what did you do to drive out the jews and the Christians from the (Islamic) peninsula'</p>
UBL [September 2000] “Bin Ladin, others pledge ‘Jihad’ to release Prisoners..”	191	Muslims have spoken much but done little to fight 'tyrannical' and 'heathen' enemies [AAZ]
UBL [March 2001] “Ausaf receives Bin Ladin’s Poem..”	193	'We live in a world where the majority of the people constantly worry about accumulating wealth. How should I correct those who sell themselves for a few pennies?'
UBL [April 2001] letter to scholars of Deyubende in Peshawar	120	Official Arab and Islamic conferences are useless and do not address the real concerns of the ummah. They are endorsed by the corrupt tyrannical rulers who cooperate with the enemy.
UBL [April 2001] “Usama regrets curbs by Taliban”	195	To Taliban: 'It is surprising that the United States is free to do whatever it feels like and I have been placed under restrictions.'
UBL [April 2001] “Usama urges Muslims to help Afghans”	196	<p>Talks of the 'duty' of ulema in Pakistan and elsewhere to make clear for people their role in the jihad.</p> <p>Why have Muslims not come to the aid of the Afghans during the UN sanctions?'</p>
UBL [May 2001] “Usama urges Ummah to continue Jihad”	197	How can the wealthy hold on to their riches when the Palestinians are defending themselves without arms?
UBL [May 2001] “If Taleban allow, I can make US life miserable”	198	Implicit criticism of Taliban - that UBL could 'make life miserable' for US if Taliban allowed
UBL [September 2001] “Text of bin Ladin letter to the Pakistani People”	201	Warns that those who fail to support the Jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan will face punishment from God on the Day of Judgement
UBL [September 2001] “The US Should search attackers within itself”	202	Those leaders who support or condone the coalition against Afghanistan and cooperate with the Western alliance should consider 'what will remain of their religious and moral position'
UBL [November 2001] Osama claims he has nukes (article title)	125	'The Islamic Shariat says Muslims should not live in the land of the infidel for long'.
AAZ [December 2001] “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”	119	<p>Expresses amazement that the Muslim Brotherhood did not revenge Kama al-Sananiri's death.</p> <p>The Palestinian movement mixing Islam with leftist politics and</p>

Communiqué and author	ID	Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		nationalism. 'They allied themselves with the devil, but lost Palestine' 'Failure of some leaders to continue the confrontation: The best proof of this is the initiative made by the Islamic Group leaders in the Turah Prison to suspend military action. We will talk about this in detains, God willing'.
UBL [March 2002] "Usama bin Ladin: Prince Abdallah's initiative is High Treason"	205	Criticism of those who lie in slumber and do not realise their duty to support the jihad.
UBL/AAZ [April 2002] "The Wills of the Martyrs.."	207	Haznawi warns that 'Muslims will be in sin' if they fail to support the jihad. Complaints about those who have 'abandoned Islam'
UBL [purported] [June 2002] "Al-Qaeda's declaration in response to the Saudi Ulema.."	43	Defeatism of the ulema who signed the letter. This letter is not based on Koranic verses or the hadith. The religion of Islam described by these advocates of dialogue does not contain the doctrine of Loyalty and Enmity, jihad or boundaries established by the Shariah. 'Are the intellectuals unaware that the "Muslim" governments and the Western governments are in league to strike the essence of Islam and religiosity in the Islamic world, striving to secularise the people, and [initiating] a separation of religion and state?' The signatories have no right to speak on behalf of the Muslims living in the land of the Two Holy Sites [does AQ?]. And they lack religious authority, 'they were trained in general matters, and their degrees are in natural sciences'. [what about AQ, is the speaker bin Laden, who has been sensitive of this issue, and himself trained as a civil engineer?]
UBL [June 2002] "A Site Close to Al-Qa'ida posts Poem.."	210	[implicit criticism] 'What can I say if we are living in a world of laziness and discontent?' 'For how long will real men be in short supply?'
AAZ [September 2002] "The Interview of Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri"	22	This is not the time for deliberations or preparation - only the time for action, and no attempts should be made to negotiate with 'oppressive, sinful rulers'.
UBL [October 2002] "Statement from shaykh Usama bin Ladin, may God protect him, and the Al-Qa'ida Organization"	211	The 'dangerous act of deception and misguidance practiced by the authority's scholars and the rulers' clerics who are trading with religion, who were put in charge of it before the nation, and who have sold their faith for temporal gain.'
UBL [October 2002] "Al-Majallah Obtains Bin Ladin's Will.."	213	'My mujahidin brothers and I were grieved when we saw our nation in the east and west watching the United States, the head of unbelief, afflicting the worst of torment on the oppressed men, women, and children while the nation watched the painful scene as if it was watching an entertainment movie." Laments how many of the Taliban fled before confronting the enemy in Afghanistan. 'Clean-shaven clerics' issuing fatwas on demand for America. .. 'If every Muslim asks himself why has our nation reached this state of humiliation and defeat, then his obvious answer is because it rushed madly for the comforts of life and discarded the Book of Allah behind its back.' 'Today, the nation has failed to support us and

Communiqué and author	ID	Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		support the loyal ones from the students of religion who established the first Islamic state in Afghanistan that applied Allah's shari'ah.' .. 'O women kinsfolk. Do not ever use cosmetics or imitate the whores and mannish women of the West. Be a school that graduates men and mujahidin in the cause of Allah, protect your honour and be a good example for the mothers of the faithful.'
AAZ [December 2002] "Al Wala Wa al Baraa.."	45	<p>'Due to the events of this war [between the Muslims and infidels] and its realities, there is an urgent need to comprehend the doctrine of Loyalty and Enmity in Islam. Negligence and indolence have spread in regard to upholding this great pillar of Islamic faith'.</p> <p>'We warn the umma against falling to defeatism and ignoring the dangers that oppressively lie atop our chest. Behold! The Crusader-Jewish military machine occupies exalted Jerusalem! It crouches a mere ninety kilometres from the shrine in Mecca. It surrounds the Islamic world with a series of bases, armies, and fleets. It gears its aggression against us through a network of submissive rulers'.</p>
UBL [January 2003] "Islamic Action between Causes of Consequences and Advocates of Disagreement"	216	<p>Frustration with lack of response from Muslims.</p> <p>"In addition to being disobedience to Allah the Almighty, disunity and differences are the cause of betrayal, defeat, and failure."</p>
UBL [February 2003] audio statement	78	<p>The followers of the state: 'implore the people that the treacherous rulers are our righteous rulers and that it is necessary to support them in order to keep our nation in tact and firm. These people have deviated from the path so it is obligatory to shun them and warn against them'. Notes the immense difference between the 'scholars who act and the scholars who compromise'. 'Sitting and giving lectures' is not enough'.</p> <p>'So Jihad today is compulsory on the entire Ummah and she will remain in sin until she produces her sons, her wealth and her power to the extent of being able to wage Jihad and defend against the evil of the disbelievers'. 'So as for the believer who stays back from Jihad with his hand and his tongue, then it is obligatory upon him to make Jihad with his heart and this entails hating the enemies of Allah and supplicating against them; supporting the believers and the Mujahideen'. 'Although Jihad in person is obligatory upon the entire Ummah, then it is even more obligatory upon the youths in the prime of their lives than upon the old'.</p>
AAZ [May 2003] statement	54	Protests, demonstrations and conferences will not do Muslims any good. The only way of protecting the holy places and evicting the enemy is by taking up arms.
UBL/AAZ [September 2003] Audio statement	110	Borderline criticism of Palestinians for not being faithful enough to the jihadist cause. [Zawahiri]
UBL [October 2003] "Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq"	98	Those 'calling for a peaceful and democratic solution, calling for collaboration with apostate regimes', 'those men have weakened sincere Muslims [...] by participating in parliaments, they have lost their way and led many others astray with them'. Beware of collaborating with Americans or those who have sided with them, since this will result in apostasy, the same applies to those who support impious political parties like the Baath, the Kurdish democratic parties etc.
UBL [January 2004]	111	Complains about lack of 'correct and comprehensive' understanding

Communiqué and author	ID	Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings [excerpts, quotes, notes]
“Resist the New Rome”		of Islam.
AAZ [March 2004] audio statement	59	'To Pakistanis: 'Taliban and their supporters are your brothers, so how can you allow the agents of crusaders and Jews to hurt them?'
UBL [December 2004] “Message concerning Saudi Arabia”	84	Examples of the hypocrisy of the scholars supporting the Saudi Regime: they declared Abd-al-Nasir an infidel, but retracted their declaration when he made peace, they did the same to Al-Qadhafi until he agreed with them and the verdict was changed, the condemned Al-Sadat for his deal with Israel, but then had nothing but praise for Prince Abdullah when he did the same. 'The scholars of evil and hired writers change their attitude to best suit the ruler'.
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	86	<p>If the nation fails to rise up and stop the infidels, 'then everybody will be sinful'. The lack of support of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan when fighting the Soviets, which lead to their weakening and undermining their efforts.</p> <p>'Stop supporting Allawi's renegade government'. Nobody should take part in this regime 'for a few coins'.</p> <p>'On elections: 'it is no secret that the selection of emirs or presidents is the right of the nation. However, this right is governed by conditions, whose absence makes participation in the selection of an emir prohibited'. Muslims can only take part in elections when the ruler is Muslim who will rule according to the law of God.</p> <p>'If anyone participates in the above-mentioned elections knowingly and willingly, he would then have rejected God Almighty'.</p> <p>'Muslims should know that there is no difference between believing that it was right to elect the first Abu-Jahl, Amr Bin-Hisham and between electing' Allawi, Mahmud Abbas, Karzai, Mubarak, King Fahd'.</p>
AAZ [November 2005] “Wills of the Knights of the London Raids”	53	Why did the ulema of beggary who gathered in front of the British parliament to demonstrate their support for Blair and attack the mujahideen not gather and protest against the sanctions against Iraq? Or bombings of mosques in Afghanistan? Or the killing of Shaikh Ahmed Yassin? Or during the Fallujah bombings? Or the desecration of the Koran? These ulema issued no fatwa against these. On the contrary, the ulema issued fatwas in support Muslims joining the Crusader armies.
AAZ [December 2005] “The Victory of the Islamic Religion in Iraq”	26	Pakistani authorities used the earthquake to justify the presence of American military advisors and intelligence people in the country.
AAZ [December 2005] “Obstacles to Jihad”	25	<p>The corrupt regimes keep winning over the mujahideen because the Ummah is too afraid of its individual safety and of family members. As long as this 'malignant illness' dwell with the Ummah then there is no hope for victory.</p> <p>'The Muslim Ummah has turned into a pile of people assassinated by subjugation, ignorance, fear and resignation'. Much time goes into attacking those who have been criticising the mujahideen.</p> <p>There is no justification for supporting jihad against the Jews and foreign enemy but not against their agents at home. They must also be targeted. Nothing in the Koran or Sunnah justifies such a</p>

Communiqué and author	ID	Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		distinction.
AAZ [January 2006] "Bajawr Massacre and the Lies of the Crusaders"	51	Members of the Pakistani Army are 'humiliated and disgraced'.
AAZ [March 2006] "The Alternative is Da'wa and Jihad"	73	To the Palestinians: 'Should these criminals [PA] receive a majority in any upcoming elections, then we will have to accept their right to sell Palestine. However, nobody, be he Palestinian or not, has the right to relinquish a grain of the Palestinian soil. This was an Islamic country, which the infidels occupied'.
AAZ [April 2006] "Four Years since the Battle of Tora Bora"	238	Thinly veiled criticism of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: 'God knows better his hidden intents, which I hope are better than his public ones. O Abu Musab: Be patient, stand fast, and rely only on God' [see full paragraph in sec 10].
UBL [April 2006] "Oh People of Islam"	90	<p>'It is not permissible for the Muslim to listen to any program in which there is a discussion with the Zindeeqs [unbelievers] or any play in which the religion or the religious is mocked, for that is one of the greatest sins'.</p> <p>Government in Khartoum failed to implement the Shariah and gave away southern Sudan, even though interests with it do overlap.</p> <p>'The Ummah is sinful if it does not provide what meets the sufficiency, and the sufficiency can be met with only a few of our sons and a little of our wealth and expertise'.</p>
AAZ [June 2006] "Support for Palestinians"	85	<p>The corruption of the Saudi regime: 'How, O Ummah, have you kept silent about this corruption in order for it to reach this degree of despotism?'. 'Muslims are in sin from the fall of Spain until today, because they have not performed their personal duty of freeing lands of Islam from the infidels'.</p> <p>To Judges of Egypt: 'You shall not achieve your independence because America and Israel [...] don't want that [...] But I must be frank with you and tell you that you are part of the problem. You are pleased with the constitution and secular laws which were imposed on the Ummah by armed force and repression and torture and fraudulent elections. And you are the ones who have helped to violate the rights of the nation; your hands write the rulings which devastate Muslims, and with your hands, they are ruled by the emergency laws and laws of ruin and repression'. These laws are opposed to the Shariah and imposed on the people through force and false elections. Despite the crimes being committed against the people of Egypt, its children and free women, the torture, the infiltration of the security services in all sections of society and the deals with Israel, the judges do not protest, conduct sit-ins etc. They did not protest against the launching of aircraft from Egypt to bomb Iraq, nor did they seek to investigate the police or security services for misconduct, protest against US warships coming through the Suez, Jews operating in Sharm without visa or many of the other issues. 'You are regrettably a part of the secular regime which makes war on Islam and submits to America and Israel and rules its peoples through repression, theft, contrived constitutions, secular laws of ill repute, and rigged elections'. If they would sacrifice their wealth and jobs they would be victorious [constant focus on the domestic: a message which in its title points to an emphasis on Palestine, pays almost lip service only</p>

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		to this issue - most of the time goes to talk about a specific issue of Egypt]. 'I say to the Muslim Ummah [of Egypt]: you shall continue to be surprised and repressed so long as you don't liberate yourselves from the Crusade and its lackeys'.
UBL [June 2006] "Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr.."	92	The king of Jordan should allow Abu Musab to be buried in Jordan, and he should not be there but in the Hijaz where he belongs, he is only in this area because his grandfather was put there by the British.
UBL [July 2006] "To the Ummah in General and the Mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia in Particular"	93	Iraqis: 'beware of being deceived by the parties and groups that entered and participated in these governments' [the public invariably seen as gullible and dumb, needing clear and steadfast guidance, rather than choices]. 'If you abandoned your God's order to fight them, you would be disappointed and routed and you would have disobeyed'. 'Stick to fighting, join the ranks of the mujahideen, and listen to and obey the jama'ah'. To Muslims in Somalia: 'You can survive only by upholding Islam and being one hand with the Islamic Courts, which seek to establish an Islamic state'. Any Muslim in Somalia who helps 'the renegade Abdullahi Yusuf and the invading international forces will be considered an infidel and deviant from the creed. There will be no prayer at his funeral and he will not be buried in a Muslims cemetery. His wife will be divorced from him and he will have no right to inheritance'.
AAZ [September 2006] "Hot issues.."	21	'Charlatans' in Iraq who abandoned Sharia and supported the occupiers. The danger is the occupier's goals will be fulfilled if these traitors stay in place. These are criminals, with full intent (like the killer of al Husayn bin-Ali) and religion-sellers. All betrayals of those who collaborate with the crusaders are documented. The worst are the rulers of Egypt, the Arabian peninsula, Jordan and the traitors in Iraq. Along with the religious-trading charlatans, the Americans also cooperate with 'defeatists' (those who accept the status quo and embrace majority rule and Sykes-Picot), and 'beggars' - 'those who sell their religion for position, salaries, visas and citizenships', like those who join the Western military forces, 'like those who take pride in their British citizenship'. Those who recognized Arafat as leader of the Palestinians and permitted the French to ban the veil. All these groups have renounced the shariah, accepted the status quo, and curse and abuse the mujahideen.
AAZ [September 2006] "Bush, the Vatican's Pope, Darfur and the Crusades"	89	'As for the government of Khartoum, which conceded the south, is too weak to defend Darfur after inciting wars and seditions in it. This government permits the impermissible, seeks its own interests, and garners spoils'.
AAZ [December 2006] "Realities of Conflict Between Islam and Unbelievers"	94	The duties of the Ummah: (1) "the fighting must be for elevating the Word of Allah, and that the elevation of Allah's word on His earth means the elevation of His Law (Shari'ah), and that the Muslim cannot possibly be a believer without litigating to Divine Law alone to the exclusion of all other laws'. (2) 'And the second of these facts is that the recovery of every land which was once a land of Islam is the personal duty of every Muslim'. Thus recognizing any of the international Resolutions on Palestine amounts to 'recognizing the Hebrew state', 'criminalizing Jihad against it'. (3) every way other than Jihad will only lead us to loss and failure. (4) Membership of the

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		<p>UN also means recognising Israel.</p> <p>Some brothers in Palestine have gradually been going down the path of submission in Palestine, accepting resolutions, taking part in elections etc. 'How is it that they didn't demand that Palestine have an Islamic constitution before entering any elections? Aren't they and Islamic movement? [HAMAS].</p> <p>I call on every independent, honourable and intelligent follower of the religion-sellers who support and beg for the Crusader presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and forbid Jihad against it to examine himself and to remember that he will meet his Lord alone'. 'And I call on [them] to ask himself a courageous and brave question: were Imam Ali [...] or our chief Hasan [...] or our chief Husayn [...] present today in Iraq or Afghanistan, would they have colluded with the Crusaders in the invasion of the lands of Islam, and then cooperate with them and fight the Mujahideen in defence of them? Would they have participated in the governments out in place by the Crusaders and blessed by the United Nations, and would they have obeyed the order of Bremer, Tommy Franks and Lakhdar Brahimi? Or would they have declared Jihad against them and those who help them?' [Shia - criticism, but perhaps also outreach].</p>
AAZ [January 2007] "Rise and Support our Brothers in Somalia"	96	'He who cooperates with the invaders is similar to them and shall face the same disgraceful fate'.
AAZ [January 2007] "The Correct Equation"	28	If the Islamic organizations become an obstacle to fulfilling the objectives of Allah, then Muslims must free themselves of them. ... There is no excuse for accepting the resolutions on Palestine.
AAZ [February 2007] "Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427"	97	<p>[veiled criticism of shia:] 'and those who claim that confronting the Zionist Crusade in Lebanon is Jihad whereas confronting it in Iraq is strife and foolishness are the real instigators of strife'. 'He who claims that the fighting in Iraq is an American plot to create warring sectarian mini-states fools no one with such claims. The entire world knows who cooperated with the Americans in their Crusade, before, during and after the invasion'.</p> <p>'Arab League became a museum for mummified Arab dignity'. ... Arab nationalists have sunken to extreme lows, esp. with giving up Palestine - the most important nationalist cause. Islam forbids fighting on a patriotic basis. Asks Fatah to return to Islam to fight for an Islamic state in all of Palestine, not a secular state in the 'crumbs of Palestine'. 'Regrettable' that some Palestinians follow Abbas. To Palestinians: 'for the sake of what have you abandoned ruling by Shari'ah?', for a 'farical government', 'the soap opera of embargoes and pursuits and killings and denunciations' will continue unless Palestine is liberated and Shari'ah implemented.</p>
AAZ [March 2007] "Palestine is the concern of all Muslims"	18	HAMAS leadership has 'trampled on the rights of the Muslim Ummah' by reclaiming to respect what it calls international accords. Mourns the loss of HAMAS leadership, it has sunk into a swamp of surrender. It wants to win the affection of America and get close to it [implied through poem]. Has abandoned martyrdom and bowed to international legitimacy. The leadership is contemptuous of Muslims' intelligence in implying it will respect but not comply with international agreements. Doctrinal deviation facilitates behavioural deviation. Having abandoned the Shariah, it was easy for them to

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		abandon Palestine. If Muslims fail to fight they will 'lose both this life and the next'. The people of Egypt have recognized the authority of Mubarak, citizenship instead of Muslim brotherhood, and the secular political institutions and renounced the Shariah and cooperated with the foreign Crusader occupier.
AAZ [May 2007] "The Empire of Evil is about to End"	23	<p>Leaders in Iraq are driving their supporters to losing their religion, those who support the Iraqi authorities support America and Israel. They must cease doing so. On the HAMAS signing the Mekkah accords - 'they have been transformed from a Mujahid movement to part of the Arab consensus which surrenders to America', 'which sells the lands of Muslims', 'which represses the Muslim Ummah'. 'Awareness is a must, because the governments have betrayed, the organizations have abandoned, and the leaderships have tired, and the Ummah must wage its Jihad and depend on its Lord and shoulder its responsibility without waiting for any straggler, haggler or manoeuvre'. 'What does the preservation of Palestinian blood have to do with the abandonment and selling of Palestine and its interment in the tomb of oblivion? Palestinian blood must be sacrificed cheaply for the elevation of Allah's word and the liberation of Palestine'. HAMAS must not relinquish Shariah. 'I request every Muslim to look at this map to appreciate the ugliness of the crime in which the leadership of HAMAS took part.'</p>
AAZ [June 2007] "Forty Years since the Fall of Jerusalem"	101	<p>'The nation discovered that it had been worshipping a calf that could do no harm or good' [Nasser]. Mahathir Mohammed [Malaysian PM until 2003] - spoke correctly of Western oppression but is to blame since he did not implement Sharia and fought the mujahidin. 'Surprised at those Arab nationalists and leftists', how have they not reconsidered after monumental failures? 'Why do leftists stubbornly insist on their views to this day? Russia and China have become two trading companies: one is controlled by the Mafia, while the other is dominated by the Communist Party which is immersed in the market'.</p> <p>Criticism of HAMAS leaders who claim to seek positive relations with the West, see the Chechen issue as a local Russian affair and disagree with UBL [all conflicts are the same here, Chechnya not separate from Palestine. HAMAS has crossed several 'red lines' in relinquishing rule of Sharia, accepting majority rule, a national state in stead of Caliphate etc, international resolutions etc.</p>
AAZ [July 2007] "The Advice of one Concerned"	102	<p>Why do critics attack the ISI when the so-called government of HAMAS in Gaza and Ramallah, has no power, was forced to relinquish a third of seats and four-fifths of Palestine, and the right to negotiate to Mahmud Abbas. ISI has more soldiers and supporters than HAMAS, welcomes all Palestinian brothers who had to flee, is attacking America. HAMAS leaders in contrast disown their mujahidin and declared Chechnya an internal Russian issue. ... Dr Saud al-Hashimi, believes in non-interference in the affairs of the rulers [includes excerpts from his speeches]. The most dangerous weapon of the Saudi-American alliance, are individuals who 'cowardly profess advice, guidance and instruction, while they are in fact mouthpieces of Al Saud'.</p> <p>[appeal to shia and criticism:] 'the Mujahideen are the supporters of al-Husayn [...] and are his allies and soldiers', Americans and Crusaders are enemies of al-Husayn, asks where is their intellect, conscience and religion, 'you obey al-Husayn [...] by obeying</p>

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		<p>America?! And you raise the banner of al-Husayn [...] under the cross of America?! And you champion al-Husayn [...] in the armies of America?! And you pave the way for the state of al-Husayn [...] by pleading for the forces of America to stay?!' [not doctrinal animosity as with Zarqawi, but rather criticism of their current policies and alliances in Iraq].</p> <p>Prisoners must not neglect the trust they have been shown.</p> <p>HAMAS leadership abandoned government by Shari'ah and abandoned four-fifths of Palestine, and agreed to only a third of the government, all for nothing. Loyalty to Allah must be more than to organisations or leadership. The deviation from march must be corrected. The leadership of HAMAS must 'return to the truth', otherwise they will get something worse than Arafat got. And what would the Muslim Brothers and their Guide, Muhammad Mahdi Akif, think of the Arab peace initiative in Palestine? Which would concede four-fifths. And what would the Guide say about the words of Dr. Sa'ad al-Katatni on BBC radio 7 April, concerning a two state solution - Israel and Palestine - to be the best one? To Fatah: how do they justify killing HAMAS members, flying a secular banner and aiding Israeli spies? They must return to their religion and join HAMAS. Arab nationalists have lost both Islam and Arab-ness. They need to return to Islam. Kurdish nationalists led Kurds from one occupation to another in Iraq.</p>
AAZ [July 2007] "Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves"	103	Pakistanis should not waste time in 'fictitious' elections, but rather support the jihad in Afghanistan. Some forces in Lebanon [Hezbollah] are being contradictory when they say fighting Jews and Americans is permissible in Lebanon and Palestine, but not Iraq and Afghanistan.
AAZ [July 2007] "The Aggression against Lal Masjid"	104	'Muslims of Pakistan: your salvation is only through Jihad. Rigged elections will not save you, politics will not save you', 'so you must now back the Mujahideen in Afghanistan with your persons, wealth, opinion and expertise'. 'Aren't there any honourable ones in Pakistan?', 'Isn't there anyone who prefers the hereafter to the life of this world?' 'O you who believe! What is the matter with you, that, when you are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, you cling heavily to the earth?' 'Unless you go forth, He will punish you with a painful punishment'.
UBL [September 2007] "Come to Jihad.."	14	Muslims obliged to remove Musharraf as he is a traitor, soldiers must resign. Toppling apostate rulers is obligatory according to Shariah. There are only two ways: jihad, which is an individual obligation, or sitting and doing nothing which is the way of the disobedient ones.
AAZ [December 2007] "Annapolis – the Betrayal"	12	It is time Palestinians declare they are not a national resistance movement but rather a 'fighting Islamic movement', above nationalism, believing in Islamic brotherhood who will not 'accede anything except Shariah rule'. Palestinians betrayed their brothers in Chechnya by interacting with Russia. The mujahideen are closer to Palestinians than Abbas. People of Egypt allowed it to become a base of support for crusaders.
AAZ [December 2007] "A Review of Events"	13	On Shia: 'People of the House' have been wrong twice: once at the hands of unjust rulers and on the hands of religion traders who used them to get rich, worship humans and collect money from invented rituals, then bombed themselves in order to get richer and more

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		<p>powerful, and who cooperated with the Americans. 'We haven't heard even one Fatwa from one Shiite authority, whether in Iran or elsewhere, calling for Jihad against the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan'.</p> <p>Hassan Nasrullah allows himself to be controlled by the Ayatollahs and has not fought for the Sheb'a Farms and is 'narrow, nationalistic, partisan'. And he adheres to UNSCR 1701.</p> <p>'The primary cause of the humiliation and disgrace we have reached in Egypt and the other countries of the Muslims is in the Muslims' tardiness in resisting oppression, enjoining good and forbidding evil. Fear; hesitation; clinging to life's crumbs; the culture of withdrawal; the methodology of defeatism; these are the most important reasons for Egypt being transformed from a fortress for the defence of Islam into a helper, aide and partner in the American-Zionist Crusade assault'. Need for a 'believing vanguard to press forward'.</p>
UBL [December 2007] "The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies"	27	Islamic leaders and scholars in Iraq have neglected to support the efforts of the mujahideed against the Badr Corps, Sadr's army and other such criminals, initially spearheaded by Zarqawi. The leaders have forced the division of the mujahideen since some support only attacks on Americans and not on the police or these apostate militias. ... Hassan Nasrallah has deceived his people by accepting the foreign troops in Lebanon under Resolution 1701 - he has signed similar agreements as Sadat and King Hussain.
AAZ [early 2008] "Exoneration.."	20	The 'author' began his revision with the 1994 publication of 'The Compilation', other members of the Islamic Group went down this path of 'the no-violence imitative' in 1997, and again after 9/11. The advice included in the document would mean the complete submission of the Egyptian people. Claims the author 'washed his hands' of jihadist activity 14 years ago [references to the 1997 pacification of EIJ].
UBL [March 2008] "A Way for the Salvation of Palestine"	6	Three factions: (1) mujahideen and their supporters, (2) the apathetic, those refraining from supporting jihad, (3) advocates of the Christian-Zionist treaty.
AAZ [March 2008] "A Call to Help our People in Gaza"	17	Screaming and shouting every time a Muslim gets killed does nothing and will lead to defeat.
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting part one.."	105	<p>Hizballah criticised for withdrawing and respecting international protocols. . Shaykh al-Qardawi repeats lies of the 'criminal Algerian regime', in his accusations of AQIM. This is the man who supports Mubarak, who has committed so many crimes against Muslims. His fatwa condoning Muslim participation in Western armed forces and taking part in the battles against those thought to be or help terrorists condemned. This amounts to 'grand treason'. Qardawi has also no problems recognising Israel and normalising relations with it, if Palestine can be created in the 'scraps' left for it.</p> <p>HAMAS: 'I took a gradual approach with HAMAS, from support to repeated advice to warning to general criticism'. This became even more profound when they signed the Mekkah accords. They entered elections, complied with secular constitutions, abandoned brothers in Chechnya and four-fifths of Palestine. But the leadership of HAMAS needs to be separated from the rest of the mujahideen, who are</p>

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		<p>supported. .</p> <p>Dr Fadl's publication of al-Jaami fee Talb al-'Ilm ash-Sharif, [written before 'document of guidance'] containing numerous issues al-Jihad disagreed with such as attacking Islamic scholars rather than leaders and being resentful of Abdallah Azzam and Abd al-Rahman of Islamic Group.</p> <p>Shia: 'my stance towards the Shii'ite laity is [...] that they are excused through their ignorance', 'those who participated with their leaders in cooperating with the Crusader and attacking the Muslims, their status in that case is that of the groups refraining from the laws of Islam', those who didn't assist the Crusade: 'our way with them is invitation and displaying of facts, and clarifying the extent of the crimes committed by their leaders against Islam' [leaders separated from the rest]. Hassan Nasrullah welcomes Crusader forces in Lebanon, Rafsanjani has backed from the demand to remove Israel, Iran is a member of the UN.</p> <p>Those who supported the 'document of guidance' by Dr Fadl, constituted a small minority within al-Jihad, many were not members or had left, and some claimed support just to deceive the government. Many prominent figures in prison spoke out against the document. Dr Fadl left al-Jihad 15 years ago.</p> <p>HAMAS has followed the 'disasters of the Muslim Brotherhood' in entering elections and embracing man-made laws. 'It is the duty of the Mujahideen of al-Qassam to advise their leaders and demand of them to return to the correct methodology'. Loyalty to Allah must come before loyalty to the organisation.</p> <p>'I only criticised the Muslim Brothers after it became intolerable and their compromising lead them to request [...] him [Mubarak] to extend his presidency'. The Second printing of the Bitter Harvest was published after the Brothers organisations in Afghanistan and Iraq committed treason by joining the government. Makes clear distinction between HAMAS mujahideen and its compromising leaders. Says he didn't attack the Islamic Group, but only its compromising leadership who consider Sadat a martyr, recognise Mubarak as president and called for the Islamic Emirate's extradition of Usama. As for the Islamic Group represented by Umar Abd al-Rahman, 'my stance towards it is one of support and appreciation'. 'Criticism of mistakes is a must, especially with those which touch doctrinal constants, like agreeing with democracy'.</p>
AAZ [April 2008] "Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri – On the Fifth Anniversary of the Invasion and Torture of Iraq"	7	Criticism of apathy of Egyptians, allowing enemy to operate in Israel, Iraq, killing Muslims. Cooperating with Egyptian authorities
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting.. Part 2.."	107	'I call on the Islamic nation to fear the day when God will ask it why it failed to back its mujahideen brothers'. Long debate about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in response to a question arguing that it was split and that parts of it wanted to embrace Sharia, support the mujahideen, ban Christian and female presidents etc. Ayman argues the Brotherhood still embraces the secular constitution and does not

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		<p>see that the Brotherhood's agenda embraces government by sharia. It only pledges support for vague 'principles of Sharia' which can apply to many sets of laws and does not exclude man-made law as well.</p> <p>The Brotherhood's suggestion of a Ulema Commission is a step in the right direction but insufficient and it is too weak and its role unclear. The programme does not support the mujahideen or express support for jihad, even though it does claim the need to liberate every inch of Palestine (but calls for a referendum on the issue of peace agreements with the Hebrew states). It claims it would embrace UN resolutions based on the majority of nations, but this would include the 1947 decision of partitioning Palestine. In some ways the draft programme is a step in the right direction, but the Brotherhood should seek further reform.</p> <p>The 'jurisconsults of the marines' who support Mubarak's decisions and legitimise his reign. They do not deserve to be called imams. Reminds young followers of these that since they do not support the sharia those whose mothers or sisters are assaulted, they will not be allowed to defend them. . 'Muslims in the West are prohibited from residing permanently under the laws of the infidels except in necessity', their duty is to defend Islam. [in response to another question] 'permanent residence in the countries of infidelity is only allowed when necessary. This is because this means that he accepts their laws to be applied to him'. . 'The Islamic world has not only failed to support the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, but a propaganda campaign was launched against it by the rulers' scholars, Iran's agents, and groups affiliated with Islam in support of their colleagues who were in control of five per cent of Afghanistan'. 'Muslims should repent to God for failing to support [the] Taliban, and they should know that God will ask them about their failure to support it' [this goes a bit against the notion expressed in section 21 about how the Taliban had the support of the majority].</p> <p>In his criticism of the Muslim Brothers and others, Ayman stresses that it is important to be objective in criticism and differentiate between leaders and followers, and that this is amended in the second version of the Bitter Harvest.</p>
UBL [May 2008] "A Message to the Muslim Nation"	24	<p>'Every one of us bears responsibility for the death of our oppressed kinfolk in the Gaza Strip, where scores have died as result of an unjust blockade'. The Muslims did not realise the impact of the power vacuum left by the Ottoman state and this lead to the colonial powers entering. Then they entrusted the liberation of Palestine to the corrupt leaders.</p> <p>Hassan Nasrallah cooperated with the UN and failed liberate Palestine.</p> <p>Criticism of the ulema who recognize apostate rulers.</p>
AAZ [June 2008] "On the Anniversary of the Naksa.."	15	<p>'People who have collapsed and are still collapsing' -beginning with the acceptance of resolution 242 and including cooperation with Mossad. Jihad is the only salvation for Muslims from the corrupt Arab regimes, jihad is an individual duty. There can be no acceptance of the 1967 borders, Palestinians must multiply their rocket attacks, martyrdom operations and ambushes.</p>
AAZ [November 2008]	237	<p>'Our fundamental enemy is this defeatist spirit, hesitation, and</p>

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“Al-Azhar: The Lions Den”		attachment to safety which motivates us to backtrack whenever the tyrants attack us and to plead with them' and to protest only with means they deem acceptable.
AAZ [January 2009] “The Massacre of Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors”	121	Arab rulers doing nothing to stop the massacres of Gaza, only giving empty statements. . Muslims of Egypt: 'ending the siege of Gaza is an obligation upon you which you must fulfil'. Egyptian soldiers: 'how much longer will you remain soldiers of Satan?' .
UBL [January 2009] “Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault”	122	The Ummah cannot give up their responsibility of Palestine and expect their rulers to act. . Criticism of the wealthy who fail to donate funds to the jihad, they must not fail to realise that their actions will be judged in this life.
AAZ [February 2009] “From Kabul to Mogadishu”	132	Why did Somalis 'sacrifice thousands of martyrs' defending against America, when they then allow a government to rule that says America has 'a positive role in Somalia'? On the futility of protests and demonstrations (Al-Wuhayshi). .. How can Yemeni tribes accept Saleh as a ruler, a 'treasonous traitor'? 'Be helpers of Allah and not of America'. Those groups who initially criticised the Taliban for being a Pakistani agent, and now welcome the presence of '20 Crusader banners' over Kabul.
UBL [March 2009] “Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine”	133	Why have Muslims being so slow in responding to the suffering of the people of Gaza? Warns those who think secularists [Obama] are 'Gaza's hope' in the crisis, since they are part of the problem. Muslims need to 'wake up' and abandon rulers, scholars, leadership of Islamic groups and others who stand in the way of the liberation of Palestine.
UBL [March 2009] “Fight on, Oh Champions of Somalia”	134	'My Muslim brothers in Somalia: you must beware of the initiatives which wear the dress of Islam and the religious institutions even as they contradict the rules of Islamic Shari'ah.' Criticism of Ulama of Somalia who gave Shaykh Shareef a deadline to implement Shari'ah. 'My Muslim Ummah: the victory of the Mujahideen in Somalia is a matter of extreme importance, and not backing them nor taking their hand is extremely dangerous, because if the limbs are eaten, it is easy for the enemy to devour the heart of the Islamic world, and in that is a move from occupation by proxy to direct occupation by the Zionist/Crusader coalition.' 'So exonerate yourselves from loyalty to the idol-kings.'
AAZ [April 2009] “Six years since the invasion of Iraq..”	136	Implicit criticism of HAMAS in taking part in political negotiation rather than fighting. Later more explicit criticism of Hamas leadership and their role in the Mekkah talks. Expresses anger and dismay with their appreciation for negotiations. Speeches, demonstrations and protests will not suffice to change the ways of the Zionist Crusaders.
AAZ [June 2009] “The Executioner, Egypt and the American Puppets Welcome Obama”	137	Obama is not to be welcomed or greeted in Egypt.

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AAZ [July 2009] “My Muslim Brothers and Sisters in Pakistan”	139	<p>'It is the individual duty of every Muslim in Pakistan to join the Mujahedeen, or at the very least, to support the Jihad in Pakistan and Afghanistan.'</p> <p>'If we stand by passively without offering due support to the Mujahedeen, we shall not only contribute to the destruction of Pakistan and Afghanistan, but we shall also deserve the painful punishment of Almighty Allah.'</p>
AAZ [August 2009] “The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy”	140	<p>Criticism of Shia. Extensive criticism of Hizballah and Hasan Nasrallah who is declared hypocrite for his lack of support for people of Gaza whilst complaining about Egyptian blockade. Compared to Mubarak. Said to be reluctant to attack Israel, and yet accusing his detractors of cooperating with Israel. Hizballah described as an essentially secular organisation because it takes part in the party political process. Complains that the Arab media focuses much more on it than the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. Warns people of Lebanon not to support groups that support negotiations and reminds them they constitute an 'Islamic trench' against Israel.</p> <p>'The duty of Muslim girls and women in the Islamic Maghreb is to face-off those who want to remove their Hijab.'</p>
AAZ [August 2009] “The Path of Doom”	142	<p>One of the reasons for the terrible state of affairs in Pakistan is that the Muslims have come to love the worldly life. 'Muslims have abandoned the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil'. The Muslim umma in Pakistan must appreciate that America is waging a unique war against them seeking to detach religion from society and governance.</p> <p>Warns Muslims in Pakistan that if they fail to meet their obligation of jihad they will be punished by Allah.</p>
AAZ [September 2009] “Shaykh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri: Eulogy for the Role Model of Youth”	147	<p>'Hizbullah wants to take part and play in the secular political field, and then pass away its weapon to Beirut'. Muslims must avoid the example set by Hizbullah of political bargains and domestic politics.</p> <p>'Oh, my Muslim nation! If you will not stand against the crusader-Zionist campaign and their allies with all your force, you will inherit only shame to our next generation.'</p>
AAZ [December 2009] “The Morning and the Lamp..”	141	<p>'I was amazed: how was this fraud successfully carried out against major scholars and preachers of Islam - those that honor this Constitution and recognize it? I am even more amazed at those “virtuous ones” who continue to adhere to it: those that even after sixty years, persist to this day in propagating these expectations about the false promises that the Shari'ah will be implemented.' .. 'The expulsion of the Crusading invaders from Afghanistan and Pakistan is an individual obligation on every Muslim in Pakistan', just as was declared during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.</p>
AAZ [July 2010] “Al Quds will not be converted to Judaism”	223	<p>Implicit frustration that Hezbollah fires on rocket on Israel and everyone takes note, whilst the successes and heroics of Afghan mujahideen are not noted by the media</p> <p>Criticism of defeatist ulema, 'juristrs of the Marines' who wrote Fatwas urging people to stay home. The 'Mujahideen of Khorasan' today teach a lesson in unification and dependence on Allah', 'so did you learn anything O' holders of certificates, degrees, positions,</p>

Communiqué and author	ID	Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>podiums and channels?'</p> <p>For too long Muslims have favoured safety and been lazy in their acquiescence of Jewish and American control over Palestine. Derides those who say attacking America brought them to the lands of Muslims, they were already there with all their bases, Israel being the biggest of them. The 'tendency to be enslaved' is the reason Muslims have not won Palestine back. Derides those who fail to fight for Palestine out of fear over material possessions and gain, favouring truce making and public protest. Muslims are losing Palestine since some call for unity with 'Arab Zionists' who are even more dangerous than Jewish Zionists. These include Mubarak. The metal wall surrounding Gaza is 'the shame of the people of Egypt who let the leader of Zionist Arabs [Mubarak] sanction their brothers and families.' Jihad must be carried out against him [but he was toppled by other means by the people!]. 'We are the biggest reason in losing Palestine because we regressed in fighting for the cause of Allah.' .. 'Sorrowful and shameful' that Muslim groups in Egypt accepted invitations to listen to Obama speech and that others flocked to hear him speak. They accept the constitution and secular laws, 'shouting for fake elections.'</p>
AAZ [August 2010] "Message to the People of Turkey"	225	<p>Change will not come by sending a few aid shipments and through protesting. Change will only come if the people of Turkey demand that their government stops cooperating with Israel and sending troops to Afghanistan.</p> <p>How can the sons of the Ottomans be reduced to sending a few aid shipments?</p>
AAZ [September 2010] "A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade"	226	<p>The silence of the people of Pakistan in the face of corruption is the reason for the incapability of Pakistan to relieve them during natural disasters and is the cause of the catastrophes that have befallen Pakistan. Talks of the 'deviations from Islam' among 'many of the people of Pakistan.' Many are secularists or only take part in Islam as ritual which is meaningless beyond the walls of the masjid, many are polytheists and accept innovation.</p> <p>Pakistanis must repent and re-enter Islam.</p> <p>Talks of two orientations during the nine years against the contemporary Crusade, the brave mujahideen who rule according to correct aqeedah, and those who are 'defeated people' with 'distorted creeds' who 'prefer safety' and 'beg for residency permits and citizenships' [see inability to appeal to Diaspora] and those who embrace Western style politics, calling for 'civil government' which is another word for 'non-religious government' and nationalism.</p> <p>Condemns those who follow Mohammed el Baradei, who 'fell on us out of the sky of American providence'</p> <p>Muslims must change 'from the falsehood of shirk ruling by other than Shari'ah and vassalage to the enemies of Islam to the truth of Tawheed, ruling by Shar'iah and liberation from the enemies of Islam'</p>
UBL [October 2010] "Help your brothers in Pakistan"	228	Governments of Pakistan and other Islamic countries have not helped the victims of the floods and the media did not discuss it in detail
AAZ [November 2010]	229	Muslims of Pakistan: 'Your government and the leaders of your army

Communiqué and author	ID	Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings [excerpts, quotes, notes]
“Who is going to support Aifa Siddique”		have made you into an people without honour without sanctity, without pride, rather without any worth.’
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(1)”	232	The current condition of Egypt is that it has deviated from Islam (main focus on government apparatus)
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(3)”	234	'Be extremely cautious that your sacrifices are not stolen, that your suffering is not used by others, and that outer appearances change, but injustice and servitude continues to exist.'
AAZ [March 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(4)”	235	Warns Muslims of the evils of democracy and how this would only be a tool wielded by the West to control Islamic lands and secure Israel, fight jihad and Shari'ah, introduce vices, etc
AAZ [April 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(5)”	236	<p>[benign warning] “The Egyptian people’s revolution succeeded in removing the tyrant, and then what? And this is the dangerous question and the big challenge.” The leadership of the Egyptian armed forces is not to be trusted. The military council accepted and carried out Mubarak's tyranny, imprisonment, oppression etc.</p> <p>“I warn those who are trying to establish a regime in Egypt that is estranged from its religion, that they are creating an extended Fitna that won’t calm’</p>
UBL [May 2011] “The Speech by the Martyr of Islam..”	240	<p>Warns of the sin participants will incur if this opportunity to "establish justice and faith" are missed.</p> <p>Talks of weak awareness in many of the sons of the Ummah that is a result of the wrong culture spread by the rulers for many decades" and recommends “Concepts that Must be Corrected” by Sheikh Muhammad Qutb..</p>
AAZ [May 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(6)”	238	<p>"As for our message for our people in Libya, I wish for our Muslim Ummah in Libya to be very careful concerning the NATO plot against Libya."</p> <p>"The military council that’s governing in Egypt, which surrendered supporting the Muslim, Arab neighbours, and he welcomed the invaders’ neighbouring of Egypt"</p>

APPENDIX 3.10 Geographic Scope of Activism Message

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [unknown date] “Methodological Guidelines”	112	Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan.
UBL [unknown date] Letter to Mullah Omar	61	Need to support brothers in 'Burkhart, Samarqand [Uzbekistan] Tormoz and other Muslim countries'. Afghanistan. The importance of Saudi Arabia: 1) due to the Kabah and the Prophet's mosque, 2) the existence of 75% of the worlds oil, 'and whoever controls the oil controls the world's economy'. Need to continue jihad operations in Central Asian republics, not least to alleviate pressure of Afghanistan.
AAZ [early 1992] “The Black Book: An account of the Torture of Muslims in the Time of Husni Mubarak”	114	Stresses the need to remove American and Israeli interests/agents from Egypt in particular, and to counteract the influences of Zionism and Christianity in the region in general
UBL [April 1994] “Our Invitation to Give Advice and Reform”	36	Saudi Arabia: 'God only knows how much we miss our homeland, and there is no other country that we long for. How could this not be true, given that it is the cradle of Islam'.
UBL [September 1994] “Urgent Letter to Security Officials”	42	Saudi Arabia
UBL [December 1994] “Open Letter for Shaykh bin Baz on the Invalidity of his Fatwa on Peace with the Jews”	63	The religiously required solution for Palestine is jihad in the way of God until it is liberated and back into Muslim hands. 'May the rippling flag of jihad be raised high so that the ummah may restore its honour and dignity. May the flag of unity be raised above all the stolen land of Islam beginning with Palestine and continuing to Andalusia, and other lands of Islam lost due to the treachery of rulers and the helplessness of Muslims'.
UBL [February 1995] “Prince Salman and Ramadan Alms”	65	Saudi Arabia
UBL [March 1995] “Saudi Arabia Continues its War against Islam and its Scholars”	66	Saudi Arabia
UBL [July 1995] “Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commissions”	68	Saudi Arabia
UBL [August 1995] “The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two Mosques”	69	Palestine, Bosnia, and elsewhere. [Although the Bosnian cause is mentioned extensively, the main emphasis is on the Saudi Arabian context, and how this underlines the apostasy and infidelity of the regime, and its inability to rule].
UBL [June 1996] “Usama bin Ladin Reportedly Interviewed..”	3	"To put it simply, the Bin Ladin Establishment's aid covers 13 countries, including Albania, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Netherlands, Britain, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and some Gulf countries which there is no need to mention."
UBL [July 1996] “Interview with	4	America's war against the Saudis means war against all

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Saudi Dissident Bin Ladin”		Muslims. Resistance will spread throughout Muslim world. Solution to crisis is removal of US forces from Peninsula.
UBL [November 1996] “Bin Ladin interviewed on Jihad against US”	150	<p>On sanctuary: 'Iraq is not on the cards. The choice is between Afghanistan and Yemen's topography is mountainous, and its people are tribal, armed, and allow one to breathe clear air unblemished with humiliation.'</p> <p>'This nation is linked together like electricity. I am talking about the nation as a whole. I am not addressing the sons of the peninsula only; US interests exist throughout the Islamic world, the world has become a small village, and with God's help, the contacts exists and the interaction is there.'</p> <p>Asked to respond to criticism Palestine is not high on the list: 'Interest in issues is determined by their closeness to the people's life and their sequence. Without doubt the Afghan issue [Soviet invasion] was the most recent responsibility compared with the al-Aqsa Mosque and then came the country of the two holy mosques [US 'occupation']. The event was a hot issue and prompted the nation's interest, so God helped us to stage the jihad in Afghanistan. The same applied to the two holy mosques, they were occupied recently compared with the occupation of the al-Aqsa mosque, which made them more important because they are the qiblah of all Muslims.'</p>
UBL [March 1997] “Bin Ladin Cited on Prince Sultan’s US Visit”	152	Arabian peninsula and Palestine
UBL [March 1997] “Bin Ladin Charges US involvement in China bombings”	153	In recent interview, Ben Ladin called for jihad against foreign troops whether US, British or French.'
UBL [August 1997] “Usama bin Ladin Urges ‘Befitting Reply’ to Horan”	157	Against US
UBL + AAZ + others [February 1998] “Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans”	161	Global
UBL [March 1998] “Bin Ladin Urges Expulsion of Invaders..”	162	Saudi Arabia
UBL [May 1998] “Supporting the Fatwa of the Afghani Religious Scholars of Ejecting the American Forces from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques”	71	Need to declare jihad against the American occupiers in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques.
UBL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin: Afghanistan’s inclusion on US terrorism list is ‘Certificate of good conduct’ for Taliban”	166	Afghanistan
UBL [May 1998] “World Islamic Front Backs Intifadah of Palestine’s Sons/Wounds of Al-Aqsa”	167	No limits on geographical targeting against Israel and America
UBL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin Creates New Front Against US, Israel”	168	Arabian Peninsula
UBL [May 1998] “United States	169	Saudi Arabia

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Admits that Keeping its Troops in the Gulf is Causing Dissatisfaction...		
UBL [February 1999] May 1998 interview reported	182	'I announce that geographical boundaries have no importance for us. We are Muslims and wish to be martyred.'
UBL [June 1999] "Usama bin Ladin Pens Letter in Support of Kashmir Jihad"	183	Kashmir - India
UBL [May 2000] "UBL Sees Holy War in 'Every Street' of US"	188	Mujahideen in 'all corners' of the world ready to strike
UBL [May 2000] "Usama Speaks on Hijra and the Islamic State"	189	Arabian Peninsula and other holy lands of Islam, but with further global connotations
UBL [June 2000] "Usama bin Ladin Renews Calls for jihad"	190	Kashmir, Palestine, and 'other oppressed Muslim places'
UBL [January 2001] "Daily Prints Usama bin Ladin Letter Calling for Global Islamic State"	192	All Muslim lands, although emphasis on holy lands of Saudi Arabia and Palestine at first
Muhammad bin Ladin [January 2001] video speech addressed to his father	127	Liberation of Palestine
UBL [April 2001] letter to scholars of Deyubende in Peshawar	120	The entire Ummah needs to support the fight in Afghanistan.
UBL [April 2001] "Usama urges Muslims to help Afghans"	196	Afghanistan/Pakistan
UBL [September 2001] "Text of bin Ladin letter to the Pakistani People"	201	Pakistan is 'the first line of defence for Islam in the region'
UBL [September 2001] "The US Should search attackers within itself"	202	There are areas in all parts of the world where strong jihadi forces are present, from Indonesia to Algeria, from Kabul to Chechnya, from Bosnia to Sudan, and from Burma to Kashmir. Then it is not the problem of my person.' Afghanistan/Pakistan
UBL [October 2001] "Tayseer Allouni interviews bin Ladin in Afghanistan"	130	When asked why he has now started to focus more on Palestine, when previously the focus was on Saudi Arabia: 'I say that no doubt the jihad to liberate Al-Aqsa and save the oppressed people in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and all Muslim countries is a religious duty. No doubt also, the liberation of the Arabian Peninsula from the infidels is a religious duty. But the talk that I have given priority to the Palestine question is not correct.' 'Sometimes, developments in one issue prompt us to take more action in its direction without ignoring the other direction.' Claims the intifada prompted greater focus on Palestine.
AAZ [December 2001] "Knights under the Prophet's Banner"	119	'The battle today cannot be fought on a regional level without taking into account the global hostility towards us'. Saw Afghanistan as a 'tributary and a base for jihad in Egypt and the Arab region, the heart of the Islamic world, where the basic battle of Islam was being fought'.
UBL/AAZ [April 2002] "The Wills of the Martyrs..."	207	UBL emphasis on 'the Land of the Two Holy Places', described as 'the land of faith, the greatest treasure of

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>Muslims' which produced 15 of the hijackers.</p> <p>References to the importance of fighting for Palestinians as defensive jihad.</p> <p>9/11 and similar attacks presented as the way out for Muslims from the 'oppression' and 'occupation' they are suffering and a way for true Muslims to show their devotion to their faith and cause.</p>
UBL/others [April 2002] "The Wills of the Martyrs.."	108	'Spain has yet to return after five centuries' [UBL]. Palestine, Afghanistan.
AAZ [September 2002] "The Interview of Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri"	22	America.
UBL [October 2002] "A Message Addressed to the American People"	75	America or its interests abroad
UBL [October 2002] "Statement from shaykh Usama bin Ladin, may God protect him, and the Al-Qa'ida Organization"	211	'We reiterate our support for our brothers who are holding the live coal around Bayt al-Maqdis in Palestine and the mujahidin and the ones standing fast in Chechnya, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Kashmir, and elsewhere.'
UBL [October 2002] "Letter from Usama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the American People"	212	US interests
UBL [November 2002] "Osama bin Laden hails recent operations.."	76	Palestine
UBL [November 2002] "Statement from Abdullah Usama bin Ladin to the Peoples of countries Allied to Tyrannical US Government"	214	West/ countries allied to US
UBL [November 2002] "Bin Ladin in a special message to the people of the Peninsula.."	215	<p>Arabian Peninsula</p> <p>Iraq and elsewhere</p>
UBL [February 2003] audio statement	78	<p>Palestine, 'and the other lands of the Muslims'.</p> <p>'Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Indonesia, the Philippines, and other Muslim lands'. 'It is a compulsive obligation upon the Ummah today to lend assistance to the Jihad in Afghanistan because it is one of the most important arenas of Jihad'.</p>
UBL [February 2003] "A Message to our Brothers in Iraq"	79	'The most important regions for liberation are Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the land of the two holy mosques, and Yemen'.
AAZ [May 2003] statement	54	Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq.
UBL/AAZ [September 2003] Audio statement	110	Palestine, Peninsula, Iraq
UBL [October 2003] "Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq"	98	<p>Young Muslims everywhere, especially in Yemen.</p> <p>Iraq, Palestine. And Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines, and Afghanistan.</p>
AAZ [December 2003] audio recording	57	Iraq, Afghanistan.
UBL [January 2004] "Resist the	111	Iraq, Palestine. Fighting against apostate Arab rulers and

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes]
New Rome”		occupiers in the region.
AAZ [March 2004] audio statement	59	'The crusade in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya and Palestine is targeting Pakistan primarily, because America does not want Pakistan to be a special power in the center of Asia'.
UBL [April 2004] Message to Europe	52	Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine.
UBL [April 2004] Peace offering to Europeans	80	Europe
UBL [May 2004] “People of Iraq”	82	Iraq, Muslim world. Iraq. Also Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Philippines, Chechnya, Pakistan.
UBL [October 2004] “Message to Americans”	83	Iraq, Afghanistan.
UBL [December 2004] “Message concerning Saudi Arabia”	84	Saudi Arabia. Palestine, Iraq, Bosnia, and Chechnya, Afghanistan. Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Chechnya. ... 'It is no secret that the most heated issues of the nation nowadays has to do with jihad in Palestine and Iraq. Support them the best you can'.
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	86	Iraq: 'the nation today has a very rare opportunity to come out of the subservience and enslavement to the West and to smash the chains with which the Crusaders have fettered it'. Palestine, Afghanistan. If fighting in Palestine is impossible: 'there are ways to strike the Americans, the allies of the Jews. This includes Jihad in Iraq through the help of trustworthy guides' [implicitly emphasises Iraq over Palestine]. Chechnya and 'other jihad arenas'.
AAZ [June 2005] video statement	72	'My dear brothers, the history of our victorious nation is being written in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kashmir'.
AAZ [December 2005] “Obstacles to Jihad”	25	Afghanistan, Iraq mostly. But also where the ummah needs to rise up against corrupt rulers
AAZ [March 2006] “The Alternative is Da’wa and Jihad”	73	'Palestine represents the spearhead of the Crusader campaign on Islam and the Muslims [...] Palestine is the cause of every Muslim'. Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya.
AAZ [April 2006] “Four Years since the Battle of Tora Bora”	238	'The nation should support the heroic mujahideen of Iraq who are fighting in the frontline to defend Islam's glory and dignity'. American withdrawal will 'mean a capable Islamic state that seeks to mobilize the Muslim nation in a war of liberation from the crusader-Zionist aggression'. 'O Bush, the son of Bush, you should know that in spite of you, and if it means you die of your frustration and lose your mind, removing Israel is an individual duty on every Muslim'. Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Chechnya'. 'O nation of Islam: The arena of jihad in Iraq is now the most important arena of jihad in this age'.
UBL [April 2006] “Oh People of Islam”	90	Western Sudan. 'Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, the Sudan, Kashmir, and Chechnya'. The 'axis and mill of this war [against the Zionist/Crusader] is located in Baghdad'. Nigeria and Indonesia too.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [April 2006] "Letter to the People of Pakistan"	81	Pakistan Iraq
AAZ [June 2006] "Support for Palestinians"	85	Palestine. Also Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Guantanamo. Palestine. Egypt. Sudan.
AAZ [June 2006] "The Zionist Crusader's Aggression in Gaza and Lebanon"	88	'The whole world is an open field for us. As they attack us everywhere, we will attack them everywhere'. 'We must today target Jewish and American interests everywhere. We must also target the interests of all the countries that took part in the aggression against the Muslims in Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon'. 'Iraq is characterized with its to Palestine. The Muslims must support its mujahideen so that a mujahid Islamic emirate can be established there which can, with the will of God, move jihad to the borders of Palestine. Then, the mujahideen inside and outside Palestine can unite and the great contest will arrive, God willing'.
UBL [June 2006] "Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr.."	92	'Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan, until we waste your money and kill your men, and until [...] you return defeated to your homeland'.
UBL [July 2006] "To the Ummah in General and the Mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia in Particular"	93	'Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sudan'. Also Kashmir, Chechnya, Algeria and the land of the two holy mosques.
AAZ [September 2009] "Bush, the Vatican's Pope, Darfur and the Crusades"	89	'Afghanistan and Iraq are the two most important fields for confronting the contemporary Crusader war'.
AAZ [December 2006] "Realities of Conflict Between Islam and Unbelievers"	94	Palestine. Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir. 'The backing of the Jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq today is to back the most important battlefields in which the Crusade against Islam and Muslims is in progress'.
AAZ [January 2007] "Rise and Support our Brothers in Somalia"	96	Somalia
AAZ [January 2007] "The Correct Equation"	28	Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Algeria and 'all lands of Islam'.
AAZ [February 2007] "Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427"	97	'Chechnya, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Somalia, Algeria, and everywhere the Crusader and Zionists have desecrated the lands of Islam with their feet'. Mauritania, Kashmir, Indonesia.
AAZ [May 2007] "The Empire of Evil is about to End"	23	The regions where jihad is taking place: from the Maghreb, through Iraq and Afghanistan, Chechnya. Palestine. The suppressed peoples everywhere - minorities, blacks etc. Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Egypt.
AAZ [June 2007] "Forty Years since the Fall of Jerusalem"	101	'Today we must support the mujahideen in Palestine, including the mujahideen in HAMAS, despite all the mistakes of their leaders' Palestine
AAZ [July 2007] "The Advice of"	102	Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Palestine and 'the Atlas

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes]
one Concerned”		Mountains' [range in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria]. Striking the enemy: 'in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia, and everywhere we are able to strike their interests' (at home and in their countries).
AAZ [July 2007] “Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves”	103	Palestine. Afghanistan.
AAZ [December 2007] “Annapolis – the Betrayal”	12	'We will not surrender out faith, nor Andalusia, nor Ceuta and Melilla, nor Bosnia, Kosovo, Cyprus, Jerusalem, Haifa, Um Rashrash (Eliat), Baghdad, Kabul, Kashmir, and Grozny.
AAZ [December 2007] “A Review of Events”	13	Iraq. Muslim countries in general. Iraq is the most important fields in which the mujahideen are engaging. Egypt. Palestine, Somalia, Chechnya and 'other fields of competition'. Pakistan.
UBL [December 2007] “The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies”	27	Iraq, the Ummah Iraq, Afghanistan, Islamic Maghreb, Somalia.
AAZ [early 2008] “Exoneration..”	20	Egypt: 'There is a US occupation in Egypt and the number of Muslim dead who were killed by US planes that took off from Egypt and from the US warships that passed through the Suez Canal were supplied at Egyptian ports and were loaded from the US military stores in Egypt was greater than the number of Palestinians whom the Jews are killing in Gaza; 1 million Iraqi children were killed by the embargo, not the war.' The current regime in Egypt has carried out more death penalties than any other Egyptian regime, sold Egypt to the Zionist-US-Israeli crusade. Talks of victories in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and importance of these battles and those of Chechnya and others. Predicts protracted conflict in Algeria, Iraq and Afghanistan.
UBL [March 2008] “May our Mothers be Bereaved of us if we fail to help our Prophet, peace be upon him”	11	Europe/Europeans responsible for drawings
UBL [March 2008] “A Way for the Salvation of Palestine”	6	Waziristan, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Islamic Maghreb, Kashmir, Somalia, and the most important – Baghdad. The 'nearest field' to support the Palestinian people is the Iraqi field.
AAZ [March 2008] “A Call to Help our People in Gaza”	17	The battle against Jews and infidels is not limited to Palestine.
AAZ [April 2008] “The Open Meeting part one..”	105	Egypt. Global. Battalions will go from Iraq to Jerusalem. Somalia, Iraq, Algeria, Afghanistan.
AAZ [April 2008] “The Open Meeting.. Part 2..”	107	Defends his decision not to attack Palestine directly in favour of focusing on Afghanistan and Iraq by quoting Abdallah Azzam at length where he explains how the mujahideen in Afghanistan need aid and how leadership structures and movements are prepared for a wider battle. 'Afghanistan is Palestine and Palestine is Afghanistan' says Azzam.
AAZ [June 2008] “On the Anniversary of the Naksa..”	15	Remembering the setback raises the issue of Egypt's 'pivotal role in the history of Islam'. If the leadership of Egypt is strong and mujahideen it leads the Muslim nation to victory, when it is treacherous the nation fails. Egypt's historic role is defending the people of Islam. Therefore the people of Egypt have a clear duty of ridding it of its treacherous leaders. Need

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		to regain all of Palestine through hostile action.
AAZ [August 2008] “A Message from Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri to the Pakistani Army and the People of Pakistan”	41	<p>Pakistan, 'we have a deep emotional and sentimental relationship with this land and its people'. 'Pakistan [...] represented a hope and a dream of establishing a strong, independent Muslim government after the colonial era'.</p> <p>'I still consider Pakistan to represent a hope and a bastion for the establishment of a strong independent Muslim country not only in the post-colonial era but also in the face of the contemporary Zio-Crusader campaign'.</p> <p>'My belief that there are millions of Muslims in Pakistan ready to sacrifice all that can be sacrificed for the victory of Islam'.</p> <p>Kashmir - the jihad there has to be freed of the influences of the ISI 'because corrupt governments spoil jihads'.</p>
AAZ [November 2008] “Al-Azhar: The Lions Den”	237	Egypt Afghanistan, Palestine - Gaza. Sudan. Yemen.
UBL [January 2009] “Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault”	122	The enemy need to be exhausted on the battlefield in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Waziristan, Islamic Maghreb, and Somalia.
AAZ [February 2009] “The Sacrifices of Gaza”	131	<p>Seeking revenge in 'Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Algeria, battling the Modern Crusades from Chechnya to Somalia, and from Afghanistan to the Islamic West.' 'This Zionist-Christian Crusader invasion has revealed that if we do not defend ourselves and fight Jihad, the jets, tanks, and missiles which struck Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia will strike Riyadh, Cairo, Algeria and Islamabad tomorrow.'</p> <p>'What is taking place in Gaza is only part of the Zionist-Christian Crusade targeting this Muslim Ummah in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Algeria, and Darfur.' ..</p> <p>'All those capable of making Jihad must set out to the present battlefields of Jihad in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, and Algeria.'</p>
AAZ [February 2009] “From Kabul to Mogadishu”	132	Discusses four major fields of operations where support for the jihad is needed and where progress is being made: Somalia; the Arabian Peninsula, specifically Yemen; Gaza, and specifically the Arab-supported siege of Gaza; Afghanistan and Pakistan.
UBL [March 2009] “Fight on, Oh Champions of Somalia”	134	<p>Somalia. Areas of jihad.</p> <p>'The war which has been taking place on your soil [Somalia] these past years is a war between Islam and the international Crusade'</p>
AAZ [April 2009] “Six years since the invasion of Iraq..”	136	<p>Emphasises global targeting.</p> <p>'A front has been established in the beloved land of Iraq free from the shackles of any government or regime', the Islamic state of Iraq 'burns with the passion to towards Masjid Al-Aqsa.' [when did this justification for supporting the IsI since it will target Israel next start?] Iraq is the 'gateway to Jerusalem'.</p>
AAZ [July 2009] “My Muslim	139	'New Crusade, being waged against Muslims from Algeria to

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes]
Brothers and Sisters in Pakistan”		<p>East Turkistan and from Somalia to Chechnya. And Pakistan without a doubt is at the heart of that campaign.'</p> <p>The scholars of Islam have unanimously agreed that if the infidel enemy enters a Muslim country, it is the duty of all of its inhabitants – and when needed, their neighbors – to mobilize for Jihad; and the Americans are today occupying Afghanistan and Pakistan, so it is the duty of every Muslim in Pakistan to rise up to fight them.'</p>
AAZ [August 2009] “The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy”	140	<p>Crusader forces failed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and are now failing in Pakistan.</p> <p>Emphasises that Muslims who want to see Palestine freed from the Israelis must first assist the jihad in Iraq, since success here will open up a front against Israel.</p>
AAZ [August 2009] “The Path of Doom”	142	<p>Pakistan is a hot spot, but only the latest manifestation in the wider Crusader plot against Muslims, 'one of the battlefields of the contemporary Crusade.'</p>
AAZ [December 2009] “The (Palestinian) National Unity”	146	<p>'Crusader-Zionist campaign over Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and the rest of the Muslims homelands.' 'The battle in Waziristan and the battle in Pakistan and the battle in Afghanistan aren't tribal or familial or regional or state or country battles; they are the battles of Islam against Kufr.'</p>
AAZ [July 2010] “Al Quds will not be converted to Judaism”	223	<p>Claims the mujahideen in Afghanistan are winning the war, but that its victories are ignored in the mainstream media. 'O' Obama whether you admit it or not, the Muslims have defeated you in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they will defeat you - and the powers that brought you - soon, Inshallah in Palestine, Somalia, and the Islamic Maghreb.'</p> <p>Emphasises the local: 'My dear nation: we first have to liberate ourselves in order to liberate what is outside of it, we will not liberate our homelands if we are weak slaves with our fear, incompetence, greed, and delusions', Jihad can be fought outside Palestine</p> <p>Then he says Jihad is not tied to Palestine but is taking place elsewhere, e.g. Chechnya etc. In this sense Jihad in Iraq by the ISI presents real hope in the liberation of Palestine. Palestine is not a case of national liberation but jihad in the name of Allah. The mujahideen are taking revenge for events in Palestine by striking the enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq.</p> <p>Praises Jihad successes in Somalia, Islamic Maghreb, Yemen, Pakistan, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir.</p>
AAZ [August 2010] “Message to the People of Turkey”	225	<p>Turkey</p> <p>Primary emphasis on Turkey, at end of communication mujahideen support for oppressed Muslims in Cyprus, Kashmir, Philippines, Somalia and elsewhere pledged. Afghanistan</p>
AAZ [September 2010] “A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade”	226	<p>The plight of Muslims by the hands of Western secularism and their lackeys form 'east Turkistan to Ceuta and Melilla'</p> <p>Afghanistan, other fields of jihad (Chechnya, Isl Maghreb elsewhere) but primarily focus is on Pakistan, Turkey,</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		Palestine, Afghanistan, Egypt
UBL [October 2010] “Some points regarding the method of relief work”	227	Sudan, Africa, Pakistan
UBL [October 2010] “Help your brothers in Pakistan”	228	Islamic Crescent - all areas where Muslims live
AAZ [November 2010] “Who is going to support Aifa Siddique”	229	Mostly Pakistan
UBL [November 2010] “Message from Shaykh Usama bin Ladin to the People of France”	230	French in Africa primarily, France.
UBL [January 2011] “From al-Sheikh Osama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to the French People”	231	France and French interests/individuals in Africa
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(1)”	232	Focuses on Egypt but seeks to offer 'practical examples' to Muslims elsewhere where situations are similar.
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(2)”	233	Egypt for support Clear focus on far enemies for activism and blame: 'we in Al-Qaeda have reached the conclusion that the Zio-American enemies – who have invaded our religion, lands, and sanctities – and their lackey aides need to be focused on more than others. If this invading enemy breaks, then by Allah’s permission their agents and others who seek their help and emboldening will also break. So let us focus our efforts on this Zio-American invading enemy and its agents'
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(3)”	234	Egypt, Tunisia, region Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia and the Islamic Maghreb.
AAZ [March 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(4)”	235	Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen chiefly
AAZ [April 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(5)”	236	Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen primarily
AAZ [May 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(6)”	238	Focus on "Libya, Egypt and Syria due to the danger of what’s taking place there" Egypt, Israel, Libya, Syria. Also against US.
AAZ [June 2011] “The Noble Knight Dismounted”	239	Emphasis on UBL's love for Palestine. "Likewise, we confirm to all the Muslim people that we are their soldiers, and we will not spare any effort, Allah willing, to liberate them from the occupiers in Kashmir, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, and Palestine. And we support their blessed uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. We are fighting a single battle with them against America and its servants. We call upon the masses of the Muslim Ummah in beloved Syria to continue the struggle, the fight, and the jihad against the corrupt, criminal regime which sheds the blood of its people."
AAZ [July 2011] “Glory of the East. The first Being Damascus..”	241	Syria + Jerusalem/Palestine

APPENDIX 3.11 Recognised Friends, Loyalties and Temporary Allies

UBL=Usama bin Ladin
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [unknown date] "Response to a Grave Uncertainty.."	117	Article co-written with `Abd al-Qadir [a.k.a. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif / Dr Fadl].
UBL [unknown date] Letter to Mullah Omar	61	Talks of close ties with brothers in Tajikistan: 'We were able train a good number of them, arm them and deliver them to Tajikistan. Moreover, Allah facilitated to us delivering weapons and ammunition to them'
UBL [March 1994] 'Usama bin Ladin Denies "Terrorism" Link'	1	Cordial but lose relations with other 'Islamic groups'.
UBL [July 1994] "Quran Scholars in the Face of Despotism"	39	The righteous ulema - scholars and preachers who took the just stand in the Yemeni issue, Gulf war, Saudi govt etc.
UBL [September 1994] "Saudi Arabia Unveils its War against Islam and its Scholars"	40	Righteous preachers and venerated scholars
UBL [December 1994] "Open Letter for Shaykh bin Baz on the Invalidity of his Fatwa on Peace with the Jews"	63	The 'stone throwing heroes and the Muslim youth of jihad in Palestine'
UBL [February 1995] "Prince Salman and Ramadan Alms"	65	Numerous members of the ulema
UBL [March 1995] "Saudi Arabia Continues its War against Islam and its Scholars"	66	Numerous members of the ulema
UBL [May 1995] "Scholars are the Prophet's Successors"	67	Scholars are successors of the Prophet and defenders of religion, although one should be careful to distinguish between scholars working to further the word of Allah and those 'preferring earthly things'. Several scholars praised for their 'courageous stand for speaking the truth'.
UBL [June 1996] "Usama bin Ladin reportedly interviewed"	3	Talks of 'Iranian friends' he met in Turkey before Afghanistan. Close association with Sudanese Al-Tahir whom he met in Afghanistan. Hassan Al-Turabi
UBL [November 1996] "Bin Ladin	150	'The British and others respected the feelings of more than 1 billion Muslims, which is why they did not occupy the land of the two holy mosques' since they stopped in

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
interviewed on Jihad against US”		<p>Oman and did not enter the land of the two holy mosques. [This contrast subsequent rhetoric and also the historical narrative of Zawahiri who blames the British for much of the problems Muslims are facing. It also brushes over the relationship with Sharif Husayn, to which Zawahiri has alluded.]</p> <p>Claims the Sudan authorities asked him to leave because they came under intense pressure from Saudi authorities to stop UBL from issuing open letters criticising the regime.</p> <p>of 'good' relations with the Taliban whom he credits with 'eliminating fear' from the region where they rule and says they were 'accepted' and their measures 'welcomed' by the people .</p>
UBL [March 1997] “Bin Ladin Charges US involvement in China bombings”	153	On alliances with 'extreme anti-US groups, including Mohammad al Masari, head of the Saudi Committee of the Defence of Legitimate Rights, Ayman al-Zawahiri of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Ashra al-Hadi of the Egyptian Islamic Group.'
UBL [March 1997] “Pakistan interviews Usama bin Ladin”	154	Shia/Iran: 'The United States is the common enemy of both Iran and the Taleban. One day, relations between Iran and Afghanistan will improve.' 'If Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and China get united, the United States and India will become ineffective.' [Geopolitics before Salafist doctrine].
UBL [March 1997] “Interview with Usama bin Ladin”	155	More tolerance for Europe, since it is distancing itself from America.
UBL [February 1998] “Bin Ladin Condoles with Al-Bashir on Salih’s Death”	160	Sudanese president
UBL + AAZ + others [February 1998] “Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans”	161	Co-signatories, in addition to UBL and Zawahiri [As leader of Al-Jihad]: Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, a leader of the [Egyptian] Islamic Group; Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlul Rahman, amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.
UBL [March 1998] “Bin Ladin Urges Expulsion of Invaders..”	162	<p>Praises the 'courage' of Prince Talal Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz (brother of King Fahd) who said in BBC interview that the US and UK forces in the country were occupation forces.</p> <p>May God help our ulema and shaykhs who are behind bars: Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, Shaykh Salman Bin-Fahd al-'Awdah, Shaykh Safar Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman al-Hawali, Shaykh Yahya al-Yahya, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Dubyan, Shaykh Sa'id Bin-Zu'ayr, Shaykh Bishr al-Bishr, and their brothers.'</p>
UBL [May 1998] “Supporting the Fatwa of the Afghani Religious Scholars of Ejecting the American Forces from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques”	71	The Religious scholars of Afghanistan who issued the Fatwa. And other religious scholars who issued earlier fatwas calling for ejection of US forces from LTHM. The Imam of the Prophet's Holy Mosque.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [May 1998] “Clerics in Afghanistan Issue Fatwa..”	165	Ulema Union of Afghanistan who issued a fatwa condemning US presence in Arabian Peninsula, the seeking of help from such atheists and demanded their expulsion. .. UBL also praises the Saudi-based ulema who spoke out in similar terms at the start of the US 'occupation': Shaykh Salman al 'Awdah and Shaykh Safar al-Hawali.
UBL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin: Afghanistan’s inclusion on US terrorism list is ‘Certificate of good conduct’ for Taliban”	166	US decision to add Afghanistan to list of state sponsors of terrorism is 'certificate of good conduct for the Taliban government and proof that it is not subservient to the United States as it had previously been accused of.'
UBL [May 1998] “World Islamic Front Backs Intifadah of Palestine’s Sons/Wounds of Al-Aqsa”	167	Praise for 'Sons of Muslim Palestine' and their 'blessed intifadah'
UBL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin Creates New Front Against US, Israel”	168	Talks of imprisonment of vocal oppositionists in Saudi Arabia for criticising US presence in the Peninsula
UBL [June 1998] “Bin Ladin Congratulates Pakistan on Possession of Nuclear Weapons”	170	Pakistani efforts praised [note difference with later]
UBL [June 1998] “In the Way of Allah”	171	Urges Muslims to focus on US/Israel as enemies not e.g. China.
UBL [August 1998] “The Battle Has Not Yet Started”	173	Praises Taliban for not giving up Arab fighters in their midst
UBL [September 1998] “Bin Ladin Praises Pakistanis for Love of Islam”	174	Praises Pakistani journalists who have been coming to see him and spreading his message
UBL [September 1998] Letter to anti-US Islamist conference	126	Taliban
UBL [November 1998] “Bin Ladin: Expel Jews, Christians, from Holy Places”	175	Tablian

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
UBL [December 1998] “Bin Ladin Denies Role in Bombings of US Missions”	176	Taliban 'more Islamic' than previous mujahideen administrations in Afghanistan
UBL [January 1999] “Taliban let Bin Ladin Break his Silence”	177	Introduction refers to previous meeting where the contact points were Harkatul Ansar (renamed Harkatul Mujahidin). .. Taliban
UBL [February 1999] May 1998 interview reported	182	Saudi scholars who opposed the presence of US in the Peninsula and called for jihad against it. 'Eminent' scholars from Afghanistan and Pakistan who have also declared jihad against America occupying these regions
UBL [June 1999] “Usama bin Ladin Pens Letter in Support of Kashmir Jihad”	183	Praise for Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif as protector of Muslim interests during the Afghan war.
UBL [June 1999] “Usama bin Ladin, The Destruction of the Base”	184	Praises Abdallah Azzam and HAMAS for their efforts in jihad. Describes the Taliban as a blessing from God, refutes claims the group was 'being pushed' from abroad, argues it was 'a pulling force from the inside', welcomed by the people and popular.
UBL [September 1999] “UBL Orders Mujahideen to Shoot US Commandos..”	186	'Brothers' in Kashmir and Chechnya
UBL [May 2000] “Usama Speaks on Hijra and the Islamic State”	189	Afghanistan and its implementation of Shari'ah law
UBL [September 2000] “Bin Ladin, others pledge ‘Jihad’ to release Prisoners..”	191	Praise for Omar Abd Ar-Rahman and other incarcerated mujahideen.
UBL [January 2001] “Daily Prints Usama bin Ladin Letter Calling for Global Islamic State”	192	Other groups, organisations of movements seeking to establish Shar'iah and an Islamic state
Muhammad bin Ladin [January 2001] video speech addressed to his father	127	"The Palestinians are the one who in name of Allah, take on the enemies without arms and equipment"
UBL [March 2001] “Ausaf receives Bin Ladin’s Poem..”	193	'Our chief' Mullah Omar.
UBL [April 2001]	120	The leader of the Islamic nation is Mullah Omar. Hamud bin Akla al-Shabi, Saudi

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
letter to scholars of Deyubende in Peshawar		cleric, and other like-minded scholars who have argued that the Afghan emirate is the only state properly implementing the Shari'a. It is under the leadership of Mullah Omar that the Islamic Emirate will be established.
UBL [April 2001] "Usama urges Muslims to help Afghans"	196	Conference hosted by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. 'Almighty Allah and you should be witness that I, Oasma-Bin-Mohammad-Bin Ladin, am giving 'Baiat' [allegiance] to Mulla Omar.'
UBL [September 2001] "Afghanistan: Bin Ladin denies involvement in terrorist attacks.."	200	'His Eminence Amir al Momenin' [Mullah Omar] has been contacted following 9/11 - for he does not allow such operations to be prepared from Afghan territory
UBL [September 2001] "Text of bin Ladin letter to the Pakistani People"	201	Follows the leadership of Mullah Omar
UBL [September 2001] "The US Should search attackers within itself"	202	Taliban/Mullah Omar
UBL [October 2001] "Tayseer Allouni interviews bin Ladin in Afghanistan"	130	Scholars Sami Zai of Pakistan and Abdallah bin Ukhma al-Shahabi of Saudi Arabia who both endorsed the fighting against Jews and Christians (although the question refers to 'Christians' and UBL talks about 'Americans').
AAZ [December 2001] "Knights under the Prophet's Banner"	119	Isam al-Qamari and other mujahideen leaders. On the mujahideen groups: 'They possess a quality that their enemies cannot hope to acquire', using God's strength to turn 'into a power that is feared and that threatens the stability of the new world order'. Kamal al-Sananiri - A Muslim brother who set up the clinic in Pakistan to help Afghan mujahideen, imprisoned and allegedly tortured in Egypt to death. . On Sayyid Qutub, Al-Zawahiri says: "He [Sayyid Qutub] affirmed that the issue of unification in Islam is important and that the battle between Islam and its enemies is primarily an ideological one over the issue of unification. It is also a battle over to whom authority and power should belong-- to God's course and shari'ah, to man-made laws and material principles, or to those who claim to be intermediaries between the Creator and mankind'. ' "This affirmation greatly helped the Islamic movement to know and define its enemies. It also helped it to realize that the internal enemy was not less dangerous than the external enemy was and that the internal enemy was a tool used by the external enemy and a screen behind which it hid to launch its war on Islam'.
UBL [December 2001] "The Fact of the Conflict between us and America"	129	Taliban. "Our battle is no different from the battle of our brothers in Palestine like Hamas". Praise for the 9/11 hijackers, special praise for those who came from SA.
UBL/others [April 2002] "The Wills of the Martyrs.."	108	'Scholars in the Arabian Peninsula' [UBL].
UBL [October	211	'There is the group of the media people and writers who have a prominent impact on

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
2002] “Statement from shaykh Usama bin Ladin, may God protect him, and the Al-Qa’ida Organization”		and a big role in directing the battle, breaking the enemy's morale, and boosting the nation's morale. The time has come for the media to occupy its rightful position and play its required role in confronting this vicious campaign and the declared Crusade with all its visual, audio, and written organs. The media men -- whether they are writers, journalists, analysts, or correspondents -- should rise to the level of responsibility and the event and play their required role of enlightening the nation, revealing the truth about the enemy, and exposing his schemes and ploys'
UBL [October 2002] “Al-Majallah Obtains Bin Ladin’s Will..”	213	Small number of clerics who have stayed true to their cause
UBL [February 2003] audio statement	78	Sheikhs Umar Abdur-Rahman and Saeed bin Zuair, and our brothers in Guantanamo.
UBL [February 2003] “A Message to our Brothers in Iraq”	79	Implying that supporters of Saddam should unite with others fighting the Americans: 'Under these circumstances, there will be no harm if the interests of Muslims converge with the interests of the socialists in the fight against the crusaders, despite our belief in the infidelity of socialists'. Explains how in the fighting against the Byzantine, interests converged, temporarily, with the Persians.
UBL/AAZ [September 2003] Audio statement	110	The 9/11 hijackers: Sa'id al-Ghamidi, Muhammad Ata, Khalid al-Mihdar, Ziyad al-Jarrah, Marwan al-Shihhi. [UBL]
UBL [November 2003] “Al-Jazirah TV: Al-Qa’ida claims responsibility for Istanbul bombings”	221	The 'Martyr Abu-Hafs al-Misri Brigades' announced that they carried out the Istanbul bombings
UBL [January 2004] “Resist the New Rome”	111	Ulema, notables, popular leaders etc
AAZ [March 2004] audio statement	59	The tribes in North-West Pakistan, 'which defended Islam throughout all of its history, will not give up to one slave of America'. 'I call on the Pakistani army: you, poor army, what a miserable state Musharraf has put you in' 'will you stay silent if Pakistan is divided again?' ... The Taliban.
UBL [May 2004] “People of Iraq”	82	The mujahideen fighting in Iraq.
UBL [December 2004] “Message concerning Saudi Arabia”	84	'I love Hijaz from the bottom of my heart, but the rulers there are wolves. In Afghanistan I have a home and companions'. ... 'We beseech God to have mercy on our brothers the martyrs everywhere in Palestine, Iraq, the land of the two holy mosques, Maghreb, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Nigeria, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. May God have mercy on Sheikh Yusuf al-Uyayri, Abu-Ali al-Harithi, Khalid al-Hajj, Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Isa al-Ushan, and all their brothers'.
UBL [December 2004] audio statement	86	On the fighter in Fallujah: 'They did not only raise the head of the Islamic nation, but also raised the head of humanity at a time when the culture of slavery, humiliation, and submission prevails in the world'. 'They stood firm before them despite their small numbers and their inadequate gear; bareheaded with chests uncovered'. 'The nation searched for you for a whole century', like a mother who is looking for its lost child'.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>'The Iraqi who is waging Jihad against the infidel Americans or Allawi's renegade government is our brother and companion, even if he was of Persian, Kurdish or Tukomen [sic] origin' [Shia].</p> <p>Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 'the emir of Tanzim al-Qaeda fi Bilad al-Rafidayn', and the groups affiliated with him, 'we, in the al-Qaeda organization, warmly welcome their union with us'.</p>
AAZ [June 2005] video statement	72	<p>Mujahideen brothers in Iraq, who foiled the plans of the crusaders. 'I thank my dear brother Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, all his brothers, all the emirs of the mujahideen, their brigades and their groups'. The 'honest scholars of Iraq'.</p> <p>The mujahideen of Afghanistan and their leader, Mullah Omar, 'the emir of the believers'.</p>
AAZ [December 2005] interview	49	Mullah Omar as an ally.
AAZ [December 2005] "Obstacles to Jihad"	25	Mullah Omar, the Commander of the Faithful and the Taliban.
AAZ [January 2006] "Bajawr Massacre and the Lies of the Crusaders"	51	Mullah Umar.
AAZ [April 2006] "Four Years since the Battle of Tora Bora"	238	'My beloved brother Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who I knew very well and was close to him. God is my witness. I have only seen good things from him. I know that he is sincere and faithful and his heart is pained by the pains of his nation. God knows better his hidden intents, which I hope are better than his public ones. O Abu Musab: Be patient, stand fast, and rely only on God. I urge you to take good care of your brother mujahideen, and I urge your mujahideen brother to take good care of you'.
UBL [May 2006] "A Testimony to the Truth"	91	Zacarias Moussaoui
AAZ [June 2006] "Support for Palestinians"	85	Zarqawi, the mujahideen of Iraq, the Shura of the Mujahideen in Iraq. Mullah Muhammad Umar. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (CSPC). Lions of Islam in Chechnya, Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, the Philippines, Egypt, the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula and every where else.
AAZ [June 2006] "Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr.."	32	Mullah Omar and the Taliban.
UBL [June 2006] "Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr.."	92	<p>'Abu Musab always held his head high and was proud, generous, and loyal. He never yielded when his religion was involved, he never tolerated injustice, and he never cajoled anyone on matters of truth. He was tough on infidels and merciful toward the believers'. 'He had established a base for defending religion and regaining Palestine'. 'He avenged the oppressed there' by killing Americans, the allies of Jews. 'He appeared, together with a small group of believers. They were 17 men, not 17 armies'. 'Thus, our knight got off his horse, carrying the banner, determined to fight to the end'. Mullah Mohammed Omar.</p>
UBL [July 2006] "To the Ummah in General and the Mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia"	93	Association of Muslim scholars - esp. Sheikh Bashar al-Faydi, Aheikh Abd-al-Salam al-Kubaysi, Sheikh Harith al-Dari. 'We have heard that' Abu-Hamzah al-Mujahir is to succeed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as emir of the Al-Qaeda organization in Iraq. 'I also urge him to strongly remain in the Mujhaideen Shura Council. Disagreement is full of evil. Union is mercy, but division is nothing but a plight'.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
in Particular”		
AAZ + Gadhan [September 2006] “An Invitation to Islam”	33	Zawahiri recognises Assam Amriki as a brother who heeded the call to Islam. G: George Galloway, Robert Fisk and others recognized as those who have supported and recognized the greatness of Islam, but urged to 'stop sitting on the fence' and come to Islam.
AAZ [September 2006] “Hot issues..”	21	Anyone who resists America and seeks to establish the rule of Islam in Iraq, 'we are prepared to talk and come to an understanding with him'. The Mujahideen consist of Muslims of all races and ethnic groups, from the Philippines to Iraq. AQ pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar who is not an Arab - regions are of no consequence. Declares the joining of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat to Qaeda al-Jihad.
AAZ [September 2006] “Bush, the Vatican’s Pope, Darfur and the Crusades”	89	Khalid al-Shaykh Muhammad... 'leader of a march, pioneer of an awakening and vanguard of a nation'.
AAZ [December 2006] “Realities of Conflict Between Islam and Unbelievers”	94	Mullah Muhammad Umar. Representing a new era: 'Khalid Islambouli, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Hafs the Commander, Khattab, Muhammed Atta, Muhammed Siddique Khan, and Shehzad Tanwir'. Mujahiden in Iraq, Somalia, Chechnya, Lebanon, Afghanistan etc. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.
AAZ [December 2006] “Congratulations on the Eid to the Ummah of Tawhed”	95	The 'Emir of the Islamic State of Iraq, the Mujahid Shaykh Abu Umar al-Baghdadi and all groups of the champion mujahideen'. 'Commander of the Faithful, Mullah Muhammad Omar'.
AAZ [January 2007] “Rise and Support our Brothers in Somalia”	96	Mujahideen in Somalia
AAZ [January 2007] “The Correct Equation”	28	Mullah Omar, Commander of the Faithful.
AAZ [February 2007] “Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427”	97	<p>'The Muslim Ummah and its mujahid vanguard do not make alliances and hold animosities on the basis of tribalism and nationalism, nor to help Arabs against the Persians [shia], or the Kurds against the Arabs, and the Amazight against the Arabs. Rather [...] we ally ourselves to the helpers of Islam, even if they be Afghans, Persians [shia, Iran], Turks or Kurds, and we are hostile to its enemies who collude with the Crusaders and Jews, even if they be pure-blooded Hashemite, Qurayshite Arabs'. ..</p> <p>'And we [...] have pledged allegiance to the Commander of the Believers, Mulla Muhammad Umar, who is an Afghan'.</p> <p>Islamic State of Iraq and its 'Mujahid Amir, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi'.</p> <p>Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Somalia).</p> <p>The 'western garrison of Islam' in Algeria. Brothers in the Maghreb and Mauritania.</p> <p>Sheikh Umar Abd al-Rahman, and brothers in Guantanamo and secret prisons.</p>
AAZ [March	18	Taliban and their attack on Bagram airbase when Cheney was there.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
2007] “Palestine is the concern of all Muslims”		
AAZ [May 2007] statement announcing the death of Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah Akhud	30	References to the Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah and his 'martyrdom' in Helmand province. Mullah Omar addressed and he urged to 'be patient and seek your reward'.
AAZ [June 2007] “Forty Years since the Fall of Jerusalem”	101	HAMAS, despite their mistakes. Claims to support people of Palestine with information, experience and opinion, as well as by attacking Zionist Crusader interests.
AAZ [July 2007] “The Advice of one Concerned”	102	Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a 'forerunner' in establishing unity in Iraq through joining Qaida al-Jihad and pledging allegiance to UBL, he 'resurrected' in the Ummah the 'spirit of unity, solidarity and aid'. Zarqawi's successor - Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and the establishment of ISI. The ISI 'declare their defence of all causes of the Muslims from Grozny to Ceuta and Melilla' and strive to free Muslim captives, the foremost among them is Ahaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman.
AAZ [July 2007] “Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves”	103	Praises Dr Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi for his comments on the need to besiege America through economic blockade, terror blockade, media blockade, and tourism blockade.
UBL [September 2007] “The Solution..”	10	Noam Chomsky trying to speak the truth to the American people
UBL [September 2007] “Come to Jihad..”	14	Mufti Sizamuddin Shamzai
UBL [November 2007] “Message to the People of Europe”	9	Mullah Umar, Hajji Mansoor Dadullah
AAZ [December 2007] “A Review of Events”	13	On the merger of the main part of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Says there is no 'al-Qaeda' in Iraq. The 'Qaeda al Jihad in Mesopotamia' merged with other jihadi organizations into the Islamic State of Iraq, a legitimate emirate. The al-Qaeda organization in Mesopotamia, then the Mujahideen's Shura, then the Pact of Perfumed ones, then the ISI all tried to unify the mujahideen in Iraq. ISI is the primary force in Iraq and others have a duty to support it. Calls out to the 'noble brothers' in Ansar al-Sunnah, the lions of Islam in Iraq with sound methodology aiming to establish a Caliphate and their Shaykh Abu Abdullah al-Shaafee. Calls for the unification of this group with ISI. The ISI has 'pristine methodology'. 'The Kurds are a genuine part of the Ummah and every Muslim is proud of their sacrifice and history'. And sympathise with their injustices and demands. But no-one can tolerate establishment of a secular Iraqi Kurdistan.
UBL [December 2007] “The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies”	27	Welcomes allegiance pledged to 'Shaykh Abu Omar al-Baghdadi'. Although shared consultation is important, the establishment of the Islamic State (ISI) could not be delayed - and therefore not everyone could be consulted. 'Appointing an Amir comes before the unification of opinion' if that unity is not already in place. ... Acknowledges that many do not recognize the biographies of Iraqi leaders, esp. Baghdadi - but he was recommended by the mujahideen, including Zarqawi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. 'Joining hands with the true mujahideen in HAMAS' not those who sold Palestine.

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting part one.."	105	<p>'Unknown soldiers' in the 'jihadi media'. Ansar al-Sunnah (although urged to respect unity, i.e. follow ISI). .</p> <p>Refers all questions about the friction between Islamic Army of Iraq and ISI to the 'Commander of the Faithful Abu Umar al-Baghdadi'. .</p> <p>The 'truthful notables of the Salafist call' in Egypt. . The 'Fighting Islamic Group' in Libya joining AQ. .</p> <p>'The brothers in Fatah al-Islam are heroes of Islam'.</p> <p>Shaykh Hamid al-'Ali and Shaykh Abu Baseer al-Tartoosi 'receive all our respect and appreciation', despite their opposition to Islamic State of Iraq, 'no human is infallible' and these differences will be discussed 'through scientific and applied research'. .</p> <p>'We bless and support the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus'</p> <p>Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 'heroic Amir'</p>
AAZ [April 2008] "The Open Meeting.. Part 2.."	107	<p>'The Commander of the Faithful, Abu-Umar al-Baghdadi [...] is one of the leaders of the Muslims and the mujahideen in this age'. .</p> <p>Zawahiri explains how UBL has explicitly called for allegiance and loyalty to Abu Umar al-Baghdadi and the ISI and dismisses criticism of them. . The al-Qaida organization in the Islamic Maghreb, those who live there urged to rush to its support. .</p> <p>'Liberation [of brother captives] is a debt we will have to pay'. These include Rifa'i Taha and Abu-Talal al-Qasimi and Abu-Mus'ab al-Suri whose theories 'prevents a rich thought from which the mujahideen will benefit'. .</p> <p>Islamic movement for reform in Pakistan.</p> <p>'Sincere mujahideen scholars' like Abdallah Azzam, Omar Abd-al-Rahman, Humud al-Uqala and Abdalla al-Rushud.</p> <p>'The intellectual wealth of Sheikh Abu Musab, may God free him from his captivity, is considered a rich source of support for the mujahideen' [never seems to speak about him when not asked directly in a question].</p> <p>Sheikh Ahmad Yasin 'one of the nation's renowned heroes'.</p> <p>The emir of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, Mullah Muhammad Omar.</p> <p>Qualifies the alliance between the al-Qaeda group and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Muqatilah), saying that the group did not merge with AQ but only that 'a group of the notables' of al-Jama'ah had joined AQ.</p> <p>Couple of innuendos towards the end that AQ is not only for Muslims, i.e. it seeks to stop America and Crusader West aggression against 'mankind', providing a 'great service to the human community', it 'seeks to lift injustice from Muslims and all the victims of the system of the Western-Crusader-Zionist injustice'.</p> <p>The ISI continues to be a major force facing the crusaders and their agents and confronting Iranian ambitions. It still controls large areas of Iraq. 'The ISI's banner and creed are one of the purest banners and creeds in Iraq' and 'threatens the usurper state of the Jews with destruction'.</p>

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
		<p>(see section 21) - Assumes that the Taliban state of Afghanistan has the support of the majority.</p> <p>In responding to a question urging Zawahiri to be critical of the Sudanese government openly for cooperating with the UN, the Saudis and others, Ayman replies 'I think the Sudanese Government has enough problems, and can do without any more'.</p> <p>Sheikh Hamid al-Ali - 'the youth should express to him the love, appreciation, and respect they harbor toward him', 'I longed to meet him and benefit from his knowledge and experience'. If he were to meet him, Ayman would stress the importance of establishing the Islamic State of Iraq.</p>
AAZ [August 2008] "In Lamentation of a Group of Heroes"	74	Shaykh Abu Khabaab who was martyred recently, along with his friends: Shaykh Abi al-Faraj al-Masri, known since childhood, whose father is in captivity. Also Shaykh Abdul Wahab and Shaykh Abu Islam - 'This blessed caravan departed to their Lord, to complain to him about the injustice of the Americans and treachery of the Pakistani government'.
AAZ [November 2008] "The Exit of Bush and Arrival of Obama"	100	<p>Malcolm X - Malik al-Shabazz 'condemned the crimes of the Crusader-West against the weak and oppressed'.</p> <p>Islamic State of Iraq and its Amir - the 'towering mountain Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi: your enemy has admitted defeat, and the forthcoming stage is expected to be dominated by conspiracies and betrayals in order to cover the American withdrawal, so you must persevere, for victory is in an hour of perseverance'.</p>
AAZ [November 2008] "Al-Azhar: The Lions Den"	237	<p>The 'bright side' of Al-Azhar, the 'lions of Al-Azhar' including Rahman and Azzam, not dark side, such as Sayyaf, Rabbani, Mujadidi, and Tantawi.</p> <p>'The honest Ulema, whom the Ummah respects', like Shaykh Hamood al-Uqla, Abdullah al-Rashood, Umar al-Sayf (deceased) and Umar Abd al-Rahman.. Abu Basir Nasir al-Wuhayshi mujahideen leader in Yemen.</p>
AAZ [December 2008] "The Death of our Heroes and Betrayal of our Rulers"	106	Notes the 'martyrdom' of Amrozi Nur Haasheem, Ali Ghufuran Nur Hasheem, and Abdelaziz Imam Samudra [the executed Bali bombers].
AAZ [February 2009] "From Kabul to Mogadishu"	132	<p>Al-Shabaab al Mujahideen. Video features Abu Saleem 'field commander', Hasan Turki 'one of the commanders and Ulama'. Turki mentions his allegiance to AQ but also with all other mujahideen (including HAMAS).</p> <p>Second part features Sa'eed al-Shihri 'Deputy Amir' AQ in the Arabian Peninsula as well as other leaders of the group sitting in a circle, including 'Amir of Qaida Al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula Abu Baseer Nasir Al-Wuhayshi'.</p> <p>Mullah Omar and the Taliban.</p>
UBL [March 2009] "Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine"	133	<p>Need to identify and list 'the honest scholars, preachers, thinkers and writers who advise their ummah' and make their works available. These include: "Achievement of the Glorious' by Shaykh Abd al-Rahman bin Hasan Al Shaykh; "Two books by Shaykh Muhammad Qutb, 'Concepts Which Must Be Corrected' and 'Are We Muslims?'"</p> <p>'The Clarification of the Unbelief of He Who Aids the Americans' by Nasir bin Hamd al-Fahd. Another book of value evaluates the Islamic regimes. Many of these and others are available on the website al-Tawheed wal-Jihad.</p>
UBL [March	134	Somali Mujahideen

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
2009] “Fight on, Oh Champions of Somalia”		
AAZ [April 2009] “Six years since the invasion of Iraq..”	136	Islamic State of Iraq and its leaders Omar al-Baghdadi and Al-Husseini al-Quraishi and other 'lions' in Iraq, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and his 'brothers and beloved from Ansar al-Islam especially his excellence, Sheikh Abu Abdullah Al-Shafi'i.
AAZ [July 2009] “My Muslim Brothers and Sisters in Pakistan”	139	Pakistan 'is deeply involved in a fierce internal struggle between two forces', one of them represents 'Islamic values' in a struggle against foreign occupation and intervention, domestic corruption etc.
AAZ [August 2009] “The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy”	140	Lists and endorses numerous militant Islamist leaders in response to question concerning AQ's critical rhetoric, as well as political groups Inc. Front of al-Azhar Ulama.
AAZ [August 2009] “The Path of Doom”	142	Plays last message from Abdul Rashid Ghazi urging revenge against Pakistani military establishment and their allies.
UBL [September 2009] “A Statement to the American People”	144	Praises book by John Perkins - Confessions of an Economic Hitman - and argues this shows how America has harmed the world. Also quotes a statement from Jimmy Carter during a visit to Gaza expressing horror over the living conditions of local population. Notes how Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer have warned against the power of the Jewish lobby.
AAZ [September 2009] “Shaykh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri: Eulogy for the Role Model of Youth”	147	Baitullah Meshud and his Taliban Movement in Pakistan, which consolidated the efforts of local tribes, all of which come under the overall command of Mullah Omar. 'Do we have doubts, that the Jews will not stop committing their crimes without Jihad? The Quranic verses of Shia agree about these laws.' Appeal to the 'jihadi information field' [media]
AAZ [December 2009] “The (Palestinian) National Unity”	146	'We will not forget Omar Abdulrahman, Ramzi Yusef and his companions, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad'
UBL [February 2010] “From Osama to Obama”	148	Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab
UBL [February 2010] “The Way to Save the Earth”	149	Quotes, and expresses agreement, with works by Noam Chomsky and James E Hansen. Calls for help to 'disaster stricken people' in Asia, Africa and South America [Note scant emphasis on Islam or Muslims]
AAZ [July 2010] “Al Quds will not be converted to Judaism”	223	Mulla Bradar, Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani and other Afghan mujahideen and martyrs. Renewes his 'bay'at', allegiance to Mullah Omar. 'Knights of the jihadist media' thanked for their efforts and encouraged to 'spread awareness and encourage the nation and wake it up [...] and uncover the traitors.'
AAZ [August 2010] “Message to the People of Turkey”	225	Turkish mujahideen and martyrs
AAZ [September	226	Islamic Emirate Afghanistan, Mujahideen world over

Communiqué and author	[ID]	Friends, loyalties, temporary allies [excerpts, quotes, notes]
2010] “A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade”		
UBL [October 2010] “Help your brothers in Pakistan”	228	Note relatively friendly descriptions of UN role in Pakistan [in terms of leadership arriving to survey damage]. Red Crescent work in appreciated
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(1)”	232	Some brave scholars in al Azhar, elsewhere
AAZ [April 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(5)”	236	Sheikh Omar Abdulrahman, Sheikh Aboud al-Zumurand, Sheikh Muhammad al-Zawahiri, and other incarcerated brothers. References to large number of pious Egyptian (and other) activists such as Hassan al Banna, Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, and others with the wish of reinstating Egypt according to their vision.
AAZ [May 2011] “A Message of Glad Tidings...(6)”	238	Quotes from Malcolm X
AAZ [June 2011] “The Noble Knight Dismounted”	239	"I mention as examples and not exhaustively: Sheikh Hafiz Salama, Mufti Kifayatullah, Sheikh Hasan Aweys, Professor Ismail Hanniya, and many others, may Allah reward them all greatly." Renews his pledge to Mullah Omar.
AAZ [July 2011] “Glory of the East. The first Being Damascus..”	241	Praise for several notable Syrians through the ages, such as Ibn Tamiyyah
AAZ [August 2011] “A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings...(7)”	242	"I am with Usama in the desired meeting in paradise where we live amongst the happy" [part of poem at the beginning]. Mullah Omar.

