

**LOVE AND MADNESS IN PLATO'S *PHAEDRUS***

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**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD  
at the  
University of St Andrews**



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# Love and Madness in Plato's *Phaedrus*

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## ABSTRACT

The central thesis of the dissertation is that in the *Phaedrus* philosophy is presented as a kind of madness in a strict sense, that is to say, the claim is not that philosophy is necessarily unappreciated by the many, hence considered by their standards as insane, but that the philosophical soul is in a way *not* in rational control, but in a state of mind that can fairly be defined as madness, and that the philosophical life is arranged in order to visit or revisit this state of mind.

Socrates' account of eros and madness is based on his account of the soul, thus the first chapter shall give a close reading of Socrates' account of the soul. The second chapter, in turn, interprets Socrates' account of eros in light of his account of the soul. The third chapter, again, looks into Socrates' depiction of eros as a certain kind of madness in light of the first two chapters, focusing respectively on the following three characterizations: madness as the opposite of *sōphrosunē*, madness as the opposite of *tekhnē*, and madness as the core of the best human life, namely, the philosophical life.

This dissertation, hopefully, gives a faithful interpretation of Socrates' account of eros in the *Phaedrus* on the one hand, on the other hand reveals the rationale behind Socrates' conception of eros and its highest form, philosophy, as a kind of divine madness. By doing so, I wish to contribute to our understanding of Plato's Socrates and his life as a paradigm of philosophy.



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## Introduction

As the title indicates, this dissertation is about Plato's account of erotic love (*erōs*) and madness. Plato has a lot to say about erotic love (henceforth *eros*), since, one might say, *eros* is an important phenomenon in human life, hence naturally constitutes a subject matter of moral philosophy. But this is not sufficient to explain the significance that Plato attributes to *eros*. Plato has a lot more to say, and puts a lot more weight on *eros* than our other great teachers of moral philosophy, say, Aristotle and Kant among others. This is partly because Plato alone conceives philosophy as the perfection of *eros*, and the philosophical life, the best human life according to him, as an erotic life, not only in the sense that the philosopher is in love with wisdom or knowledge, but also in the sense that the philosopher is, characteristically, in love with other human beings.<sup>1</sup> According to Plato and other ancient philosophers, the nature of the human being is not to be found in something common to all humans, such as physiological processes, but in the paramount of all humans, the philosopher, since the philosopher in his philosophical life embodies the most developed and fulfilled human nature. If Plato has a science of human being, to understand it requires understanding the philosopher or the philosophical life; to understand that, in turn, requires understanding the philosopher's characteristic eroticism. Therefore, Plato's accounts of *eros* involves not only his thinking of the subject matter as a phenomenon in human life, but also his thinking of the human life in general, through his own approach to it: looking into the best human life, namely, philosophy.

The reflections above clearly rest on some premises. When I said 'the philosopher', I had Socrates in mind; when I said 'the philosopher's characteristic eroticism', I presupposed that such characteristic of the philosopher is not accidental, but intended by Plato to characterize the philosophical life. All these can be interpreted otherwise. It is better to state clearly the underlying premises (although they cannot be defended given the space) since the interpretation of Plato in this dissertation will also rely on them: that is what I am about to do. Surely Socrates is not the only philosopher in the Platonic dialogues. Plato makes other philosophers speak in his dialogues, such as Parmenides, the Eleatic stranger, etc.; he also makes his characters speak about philosophers, such as the 'unmanly' philosopher described in the *Gorgias*, the unworldly philosopher described in the *Theaetetus*. Nonetheless, it is Socrates, no other, who has the decisive impact on

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<sup>1</sup> *Symposium* 216d, 222b; *Alcibiades* 103a, 122b, 135e; *Charmides* 154b-c.

Plato, and whose life and death constitute a subject of Plato's life-time philosophic thinking from his earliest dialogues to the latest.<sup>2</sup> The first premise that I rest on is (a) Socrates is Plato's paradigmatic philosopher.<sup>3</sup> Related to that, since Socrates is a paradigm, the presentation of Socrates is not meant merely as a presentation of an individual, but as a presentation of the philosopher as such, through all the uniqueness of the individual though. So the second premise is (b) the characteristics attributed to Socrates should not be understood as accidental, but essential to the understanding of the philosopher and the philosophical life.

Given the premises, the philosophical life is presented by Plato as an erotic life, in the sense stated earlier. The main purpose of this dissertation is to call attention to one aspect of the philosopher's eros which, in my opinion, has not been properly understood, although it is stated more than clearly in the *Phaedrus*, that the philosopher's eros is a divine madness, that the philosopher is a divinely mad man. This statement is usually underplayed or even interpreted away in one way or another, and usually construed as conveying some textbook Platonic doctrines known to us elsewhere, such as recollection and tripartite soul, under a different heading. Only a few scholars, for example Nussbaum, try to do justice to this aspect of Plato's representation of philosophical life, but, in my opinion, on the basis of an unsatisfactory interpretation of the dialogue. We shall come back to her interpretation later in the very last section of this dissertation, to see what can be yielded from her attempt. My aim in this dissertation is to clarify and justify the claim that the philosopher is a divinely mad man in light of Socrates' account of eros in the *Phaedrus*.

The central thesis of the dissertation is that in the *Phaedrus* philosophy is presented as a kind of madness in a strict sense, that is to say, the claim is not that philosophy is necessarily unappreciated by the many, hence considered by their standards as insane, but that the philosophical soul is in a way *not* in rational control, but in a state of mind that can fairly be defined as madness, and that the philosophical life is arranged in order

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<sup>2</sup> The dialogues that make explicit reference to Socrates' trial and death are among all periods of Plato's career: 'early dialogues' such as the *Apology*, 'middle' dialogues such as the *Phaedo*, 'late' dialogues such as the *Theaetetus*. Other pivotal dialogues, such as the *Republic* and the *Symposium*, also refer to Socrates' trial and death in one way or another. NB: I take the chronological scheme simply as, at most, a chronological scheme, not as a developmentalist scheme. It is noteworthy that the chronology of the dialogues, especially the distinction between middle and early dialogues (or between middle and 'Socratic' dialogues), is now highly suspect to many scholars.

<sup>3</sup> In the *Symposium*, Plato makes eros the philosopher, and Socrates the eros incarnate; cf. *Phdr.* 257a7-8 where Socrates claims an *erōtikē tekhnē*.

to visit or revisit this state of mind.

Before turning to an overview of the arguments in each chapter, it is better to say something about the scope of this dissertation in the first place. This dissertation is a study of the *Phaedrus*, but it does not attempt to be a comprehensive study of the dialogue. This is to say, we shall not treat the second half of the dialogue, a discussion about the art of rhetoric (257b7-279c8); instead we shall focus on the first half, the three successive speeches on eros, especially the third one, Socrates' second speech, the so called 'palinode' (243e9-257b6). This approach seems to view the speeches in separation of the context. A brief justification of this approach will be given in 2.5, showing that the theme of eros deserves attention for its own sake. I shall accordingly not deal with the notorious problem of the *Phaedrus*' unity, which has received much attention.<sup>4</sup> But here it seems necessary to me to reflect the problem itself for the following reason. The unity problem, briefly speaking, is how to unify the first half of the dialogue consisting of three speeches on eros and the second half consisting in a theoretical discussion of rhetoric. Many scholars have pointed out that the three speeches are set in the framework of a rhetorical contest, with three speeches exemplifying rhetorical art, and a discussion of rhetorical art. So the unity problem has so far been construed as how to integrate the theme of eros into the framework of rhetoric. Given this understanding of the plot of the dialogue, it is implied that the interpretation of the eros theme depends on the interpretation of the rhetoric theme. Ferrari's study, for example, treats the second half of the dialogue as prior to the first half out of the same consideration.<sup>5</sup> Were this the case, our approach in this dissertation would run the risk of starting in the middle of the project, that is, we would be treating A when we should treat B in the first place, as the former depends on the latter. However, that the speeches about eros are delivered as rhetorical sample pieces does not make the theme of eros subordinate to the theme of rhetoric. Rhetoric becomes one of the themes of the dialogue because it is elaborately discussed in the second half, not because the frame of the dialogue is set to be a literal contest. Think of the *Republic*, the first introduced topic is age, yet it never comes back (at least not as a theme) after the conversation is directed towards justice, and we never consider it as one of the themes of the dialogue. Suppose that the *Phaedrus* were to close at the end of the third speech, the only appearance of rhetoric at the beginning would

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<sup>4</sup> Among the articles dedicated to the problem are Rowe 1986b, Heath 1989, Rowe 1989, Werner 2007, Moss 2012.

<sup>5</sup> Ferrari 1987, 37.

make it as unimportant as the appearance of age in the *Republic*, and in that case the theme of the dialogue would be undoubtedly eros alone. It is exactly the second half in which rhetoric is examined that produces the unity problem, therefore the problem should be re-formulated as such: why is the dialogue extended beyond the grand discourse of love and turns to the discussion of rhetoric, since if it is to deal with another theme with its own right, this should belong to another dialogue (think of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*: both share the same dramatic setting does not make them one dialogue). But the discussion of rhetoric follows the erotic speeches, so we must assume that it has something rooted in the erotic speeches, something with which Plato must continue to deal ---what is it? Whatever the answer is to this question, it is worthwhile to treat the eros theme in its own right, as we shall do in this dissertation, for it could be rich and rewarding without taking into account of the rhetoric theme. The full explanation of the two themes, however, will be the subject of another study.

Here is the outline of my dissertation. Socrates' account of eros and madness is based on his account of the soul, thus in the first chapter I shall give a close reading of Socrates' account of the soul, which roughly corresponds to 245c3-249d4 in Socrates' second speech. We shall first examine the argument for the soul's immortality (245c6-246a2), which stands at the beginning of Socrates' 'demonstration' that the fourth kind of divine madness, namely eros, is most beneficial to humans. The argument aims at the immortality of the soul, which is construed as eternal motion of the soul, through a definition of the soul as that which moves itself (1.1). This definition of the soul, I shall argue, also gives rise to a characterization of the soul's motion that is crucial to the whole account, that is, the motion caused by the soul has a teleological structure, with the *telos* of the motion construed as the well-being of the soul (1.2). The well-being of the soul, in turn, is characterized in Socrates' presentation of the universe by circular motion on the one hand, on the other hand by its twofold activity, consisting of a 'practical' one and a 'theoretical' one: remaining in and ordering the universe, and rising above and contemplating the intelligible. The well-being, I shall argue, is ultimately constituted by the latter (1.3). And then I argue that the pursuit of well-being on the part of the non-divine soul is construed in Socrates' account through the notion of *homoiosis theoi*, or becoming like god, which, according to Socrates' conception of the divine soul, gives rise to the idea of flight from the world. This idea will turn out to be closely related to the madness of the philosopher (1.4). Finally in this chapter, I clarify and examine the cause of the soul's fall. I argue that the cause of the fall, the absence of intelligence and the

consequent battle between the souls, defines the post-fall human condition, from which eros is supposed to uproot the soul (1.5).

The second chapter is on Socrates' account of eros in 249d5-256e2. With an examination of the notion of recollection (*anamnēsis*) in the context of the *Phaedrus*, I argue that recollection is a recovery of the horizon of being rather than the knowledge of being, that is to say, the soul would not know what X is through it, but through it the soul is fixated on what is, uprooted from what appears. The encounter with beauty will make this happen since what appears beautiful indicates the presence of what is beautiful (2.1). Then we analyze Socrates' account of erotic experience, showing that the encounter with beauty, in uprooting the soul from the Cave of appearance, undermines *nomos* as the authority of value with compulsive eros, either natural or unnatural. We then examine the function of god in the experience of natural eros (2.2). In the following two sections I make a comparison between the tripartite soul in the *Republic* and that in the *Phaedrus*, in order to reveal the state of mind that Socrates attributes to the philosopher here in the *Phaedrus*. It turns out that the rational part of the philosopher-ruler is bound by the considerations of what is necessary, the considerations through which the city is established, whereas the rational part of the philosopher in the *Phaedrus* is not bound by considerations of that sort, and is given full liberty. The account of the soul in the *Republic* is set out to respond to the question 'in order for the whole soul to fare well, which element of the soul is capable of, hence ought to assume the task of being concerned with the well-being of the soul as a whole?'; the account of the soul in the *Phaedrus*, on the other hand, is set out to respond to a different question, namely, 'in order for the whole soul to fare well, which desire within the soul should get the upper hand?'. Although the same answer is given to those questions (the answer being the rational part), their difference is the point: the soul in the *Republic* is under compulsion of duty, whereas that in the *Phaedrus*, under no compulsion of duty, is subject to its natural impulse (2.3). I call the former 'moral psychology', the latter 'erotic psychology'. The moral psychology, we will see, is also found in the *Phaedrus*, and is presented as a state of mind which stands in the way of the state of mind depicted in the erotic psychology. I will argue that the moral psychology relies on the working of *thumos*, which according to Socrates' account of the soul is implanted in the soul through a certain kind of rhetoric, and must be overcome in order to free the soul's natural desire (2.4). Finally, we shall put Socrates' palinode under assessment against the background of the first two speeches, seeing how eros is supposed to work out harmfully or beneficially. I try to clarify what Socrates recants,

how he recants it and to what degree, and what Socrates does not recant and why. It will be made clear that in Socrates' new account of eros, the beloved will turn into a lover, and the benefit that he receives from having a relationship with a lover resides precisely in this change (2.5).

The third and last chapter of this dissertation focuses on madness in light of the first two chapters. First we look into the figure of 'non-lover' in Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech. Having shown the intrinsic difficulty of this figure, we trace down the difficulty back to the understanding of *sōphrosunē* in ordinary morality as a detachment from natural desire, on account of the underlying metaphysical scheme that alleges the divergence between the human good and the natural desire. On the other hand, divine madness in Socrates' second speech is understood in light of a Platonic metaphysical scheme in which the human good and the natural desire go together (3.1). And then we turn to Socrates' understanding of art (*tekhnē*) in his second speech, as divine madness is introduced in Socrates' speech in relation to art. I shall argue that according to Socrates' account of the soul and his metaphysics in the *Phaedrus* an art must be perfected by inspirational madness, madness not only construed as eccentricity compared to social norms, but as a state of mind in which the soul in a way loses self-control, not knowing what it is doing (3.2). Finally, madness will be viewed from the standpoint of its place in the human life. We shall examine Nussbaum's claims on this issue made in light of her interpretation of the *Phaedrus* and Rowe's arguments against her claims, and come to consider the central question in Nussbaum-Rowe debate, whether philosophy as such is understood as a kind of madness in the *Phaedrus*. I shall argue that the answer to that question is yes, since according to the accounts in the dialogue the philosophical life is arranged with a view to the inspirational madness of recollection, rather than a calm contemplation that is supposed to be succeeded by recollection and its madness (3.3).

I hope that this dissertation on the one hand gives a faithful interpretation of Socrates' account of eros in the *Phaedrus*, and on the other hand reveals the rationale behind Socrates' conception of eros and its highest form, philosophy, as a kind of divine madness. By doing so this dissertation hopes to contribute to our understanding of Plato's Socrates and his philosophical life.

## Chapter 1 Soul

### 1.1 Immortality of the Soul

Socrates' account of divine madness of eros is based on his account of the soul, which this chapter shall analyze and examine. Socrates' second speech has a natural break marked off by the sentence 'This is the point where our whole account of the fourth kind of madness has reached' at 249d4, before which Socrates pictures the soul in a cosmological and even metaphysical background, showing its nature, destiny and fate, and after which the perspective is switched to the earth, concerned with the human soul in particular. The text relevant to this chapter thus is mainly but not exclusively 245c3-249d3.

His account of the soul begins with an argument for the immortality of the soul (245c6-246a2).<sup>1</sup> The immortality of the soul is a repeating motif in Platonic dialogues. Some major dialogues deal with the topic, for example, the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, and the *Timaeus*. This section has two major aims. First, I shall explicate Socrates' reasoning, following the text, and assess each part of the argument in its own right. Second, I shall offer a reconstruction of the whole argument, and on its basis make clear the meaning of its conclusion: 'All soul is immortal'.

Socrates' argument goes like this (245c6-246a2):

- (1) All soul is immortal (Ψυχή πᾶσα ἀθάνατος). (2) For that which is always in movement (ἀεικίνητον)<sup>2</sup> is immortal; that which moves something else and is

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<sup>1</sup> *Phaedrus* 245c6-246a2 is unanimously referred to as an 'argument' by scholars like Hackforth (1952, 64), Rowe (1986a, 174), Ferrari (1987, 123), Yunis (2011, 135), in comparison (explicit or implicit) to the main part of the palinode and the *apodeixis* which is more mythical or poetical ('μυθικὸς ὕμνος', 265c1). It is, one might say, a rational account (*logos*) with highly scientific style, rather than a tale (*muthos*). (*Muthos* does not mean "myth" as we usually understand the term, just as 'logos' means more than 'rational account' or 'argument'; but it seems a *muthos* must be a discourse that has a story in it, but a *logos* need not be). The comparison, as the scholars point out, is intended, but I cannot follow them so far as assuming that the argument is 'regarded by Plato as incontrovertible' (Hackforth). That a discourse is a *logos*, even a *logos* in a strict sense, i.e. a rational account, does not entail that it is regarded as what we would call 'sound reasoning'. There could be more than one *logos* for the same subject matter, and they cannot be all true or equal in value. My point is that Plato need not regard the argument for immortality as 'sound' in our sense of clearly true premises plus faultless deduction – it is enough if he thinks it an argument worth listening to, or a well-made case (to borrow a legal parallel).

<sup>2</sup> The alternative reading is 'ἀυτοκίνητον'. Cicero quotes it and renders as '*quod semper*

moved by something else, in ceasing from movement, ceases from living. (3) Only that which moves itself, because it does not abandon itself, never stops being moved [or, moving itself] (οὐποτε λήγει κινούμενον). (4) It is also source and first principle of movement for the other things which are moved (ὅσα κινεῖται). (5) A first principle is something which does not come into being. (6) For all that comes into being must come into being from a first principle, but a first principle itself cannot come into being from anything at all; for if a first principle came into being from anything at all, it would not do so from a first principle. (7) Since it does not come into being, it must also be something which does not perish. (8) For if a first principle is destroyed, neither will it ever come into being from anything nor anything else from it, given that all things must come into being from a first principle. (9) It is in this way, then, that that which moves itself is first principle of movement. (10) It is not possible for this either to be destroyed or to come into being, or else the whole universe and the whole of that which comes to be might collapse together and come to a halt, and never again have a source from which things will come to be moved. (11) And since that which is moved by itself has been shown to be immortal, it will incur no shame to say that this is the essence and the definition of soul. (12) For all body whose motion is from outside is soulless, whereas that whose motion [being moved] is within itself and from itself is ensouled, this being the nature of soul; (13) and if this is so---that that which moves itself is nothing other than soul, soul will be necessarily something which neither comes into being nor dies.<sup>3</sup> [Rowe's translation. modifications are applied]

Clearly, the argument consists of several subsections. Let us turn to the first one (up to 245c9). This subsection is centred on the relation between the self-mover and what is always in motion. In the second sentence 'what is always in motion is immortal' (2), Socrates links life with motion, and correspondingly, death with rest. It is analytically true that what is always alive, is immortal, or deathless (here we have to understand 'A is always alive' as = '(t) A is alive at t'. If instead we understand it as '(t) if A exists at t then

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*movetur* (*Rep.* 6.27; *Tusc.* 1.53). See Yunis 2011, 137. Logically, Socrates in the following lines argues that the self-mover is constantly in motion; given that the conclusion of the argument is that the soul, or the self-mover, is immortal, here the connection between immortality and 'always moving' is supposed to be supplied. No other alternative readings in this passage are philosophically significant, so I shall not note them henceforth.

<sup>3</sup> In this thesis the English translation of the *Phaedrus* are Rowe's (in Rowe 1986a) or Nehamas & Woodruff's (in Cooper's edition); the English translations of the other Platonic dialogues are quoted from Cooper's edition. Modifications are applied.

A is alive at  $t'$  then A is not necessarily deathless as there may come a time when A does not exist/is dead). And Socrates asserts that what is always in motion is always alive. He must think of the motions like pulse or breath, etc., the cessation of which signifies the cessation of life. Given the premises above, what is always in motion is immortal. Socrates, it is clear, does not understand life and death in terms of mere existence and non-existence, but of motion and rest.

What, then, is always in motion? (3) implies that only that which moves itself is always in motion, because it “does not abandon itself” (οὐκ ἀπολείπον ἑαυτό). What does it mean? A number of scholars believe that it means the self-mover does not abandon its own nature.<sup>4</sup> What Socrates intends to say, according to them, is that the self-mover, due to its self-moving nature, has the property of constant motion, and the cessation of motion goes against its nature. In other words, constant motion is an essential property of the self-mover; the self-mover will never cease moving as long as it is what it is. However, a premise required for this interpretation is not explained by Socrates, that is, he does not account for the premise that constant motion is an essential property of the self-mover.<sup>5</sup> We can, on the other hand, see ‘never abandon itself’ from another perspective; we would find that Socrates explains, in a plain way, why the self-mover is constantly in motion. The key is to understand that the status of motion concerns the relation between the mover and the moved. That which is in motion must be the passive subject of the transitive act of ‘moving’; in another word, it must be something moved. This is taken for granted by the Greeks; Aristotle, for example, takes it as one of the starting points of his philosophical reflection on motion. ‘Of things which move in their own right,’ he says, ‘some [are moved] by themselves, others by something else’ (*Physics* VIII. 254b12-13). It is implied that whatever is in motion must be moved by something, either by itself or by something else. From this perspective, what Socrates says is this, that the self-mover never stops being moved, since it never loses its own

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<sup>4</sup> Griswold 1986, 82; Yunis 2011, 137; Bett 1986, 5.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Bett 1986, 5. Bett makes a conjecture that Socrates’ implicit argument for the premise is as follows. If the self-mover stops moving, it must start over from something, either from itself or from another. If it starts over from itself, it must be the case that one part of itself moves the other, so the whole never entirely stopped moving; while if it starts over from another, it would not be a self-mover. I, however, do not think his argument is valid, since even if one part of the self-mover moves the other, it does not imply that the moving (transitive) part is in motion. One might say that this was not seen clearly until Aristotle. But even if Plato might have made this argument (which we do not know for sure), he as a matter of fact does not. It undermines the credibility of an interpretation if it is based on a conjecture of an implicit argument that might have been made.

mover, that is itself; what is moved by another, on the other hand, is likely to be left behind by its mover, hence to be moved by nothing, or unmoved, and it comes to rest if it is unmoved.<sup>6</sup> Strictly speaking, this interpretation is not sufficient. It too assumes something, namely that, if the self-mover is X, the property of ‘moving [transitive] itself’ is essential to X. It is one thing to say that it is essential to X that if X is moved it is moved by itself--this allows that X may not be in motion, while it is another thing to say that it is essential to X that it is moved by X, and essential to X that it moves X. The inseparability of the mover and the moved only entails that the motion will not cease because of the separation of the mover and the moved, in other words, the moved will not stop moving as long as the mover moves it. But it is possible for the mover, even though inseparable from the moved, not to move the moved.

Neither interpretation, however, succeeds in explaining why the self-mover would be always in motion. Bett makes it very clear that Socrates’ argument, assuming that it is valid, only makes this point, that for any X, in so far as it is self-mover, it is constantly in motion, that is to say, X cannot both be self-mover and not be in constant motion. But if X ceases to exist, its motion ceases.<sup>7</sup> On such grounds, Bett and some other scholars believe that Socrates’ argument fails. Is that a fact? Perhaps it is too early to assess Socrates’ argument now. Let us proceed to examine the second subsection of his argument.

The second subsection is longer (245c9-e2), including seven sentences from (4) to (10). Socrates first establishes that the self-mover is the arche of all motion. This point is not unfamiliar to Plato’s reader.<sup>8</sup> Neither does the arche come to be (5-6), nor does it perish (7-8). Therefore the self-mover neither comes to be nor perish (10). As Bett says, this part of the argument is somewhat obscure, but its general idea seems clear. Since coming to be

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<sup>6</sup> It is worth noting that this interpretation could either be an independent one (to understand οὐκ ἀπολείπον ἐαυτό as the inseparability of the mover and the moved), see Rowe 1986a, 174 and Benardete 1991, 135, or be a supplement of the former reading (to understand οὐκ ἀπολείπον ἐαυτό as ‘does not abandon its own nature’, and further, to explain this nature as the inseparability of the mover and the moved), see Hackforth 1952, 66.

<sup>7</sup> According to Bett, ‘X never ceases to be F’ can mean either ‘It is impossible that there should be an X which is not F’, or ‘Xs are eternally F’. What Socrates really needs is the latter, but what he actually proves is the former. See Bett 1986, 5-6.

<sup>8</sup> Plato *Laws* 894e4-895b7; Aristotle *Physics* 256a13-20. It is well known that Aristotle believes that the arche is the unmoved mover rather than the self-mover, as Plato believes it to be. However, I believe that one should not exaggerate the difference between Plato and Aristotle, as in Aristotle’s *Physics*, all motion is caused by something that somehow moves itself (256a4-21). The idea of unmoved mover is not meant to reject the idea of self-mover, but to reply the further question ‘if a thing moves itself, in what sense and in what manner does it do so?’ (257a32). What he actually rejects is that the self-mover moves itself in this manner, that is, *as a whole* (257b2-6).

is one kind of motion,<sup>9</sup> everything that comes to be comes to be from the arche of motion. This arche cannot come to be from something else, otherwise it would not be an arche; Socrates seems to introduce an implicit premise that nothing comes to be from itself. Given that, the arche cannot come to be. On the other hand, the arche cannot perish, since all motion of the universe would cease if it perished. Socrates seems to take for granted that that would be an impossible case. But why is it impossible for all motion in the universe to cease? His thought might be like this: if all motion in the universe ceased, everything in it would die; the gods however cannot die, so the universe cannot come to complete rest.

Anyway, in this cosmological speculation, arche is taken collectively to be something singular. If every individual soul is an arche, then the destruction of some particular souls does not exhaust the motive energy of the whole universe, as other souls can serve as archai as well. In this part of the argument, the arche must be seen collectively, whose perishing as a whole leads to the rest and death of the universe.<sup>10</sup> In other words, the alleged impossibility of complete rest of universe only gives rise to the conclusion that there must be souls in the universe at any point, not that there must be any particular individual soul in the universe at any point. On this ground, the 'all soul' to which immortality is attributed must be construed collectively. More precisely, it either refers to a plurality of individual souls (but nothing in this implies that any of them exists at every moment), or to some kind of soul-stuff in general.<sup>11</sup>

If Socrates, however, meant to argue for the immortality of the soul in the collective sense, this argument would lack any substantial connection with the whole speech, especially with the myth of soul that follows, where the soul appears as individual souls. (102.17-20).<sup>12</sup> If, then, 'all soul' is construed collectively, Socrates' argument is valid, yet

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<sup>9</sup> Plato *Laws* 894b11; Aristotle *Physics* 201a14-15.

<sup>10</sup> Aristotle *Physics* 259a6-7: 'Motion, then, being eternal, the first mover, if there is but one, will be eternal also'. Here and henceforth the English translations of Aristotle's works are quoted from Barnes' edition.

<sup>11</sup> Among them are Bett 1986, 12; Yunis 2011, 136-37; Thompson 1868, 44; Ferrari 1987, 138.

<sup>12</sup> According to Hermias, the introductory sentence preceding the argument---'first we must comprehend the truth about the nature of soul, both divine and human' (245c3-4)---seems to imply that what is concerned in the following argument is not the soul in the collective sense, but 'every soul' must be construed distributively. Hermias' commentary on the *Phaedrus* is the only extant ancient commentary on the dialogue. Hermias was a fifth century Neo-Platonist in Alexandria. He and Proclus were fellow students of Syrianus. Hermias' commentary interprets the dialogue sentence by sentence, with each sentence quoted at the top (lemma). Its content is believed to be much indebted to Syrianus' lectures on the dialogue. Allen says that it is more akin 'to a collection of scholia' (1980, 110). Henceforward

what it argues for is irrelevant to the whole story; if, on the other hand, 'all soul' is construed distributively, it is relevant to the whole story, yet Socrates' argument is faulty. It seems that Socrates either is confused or deliberately exploits the ambiguity between the soul in collective sense and the soul in distributive sense.<sup>13</sup>

The argument up to this point is about the self-mover. Socrates has to identify the soul with the self-mover in order to argue that the soul is immortal. (12-13) serves this purpose. Socrates does not speculate on the soul itself, but observes its causality. Obviously, the soul is not something that can be observed directly. The causality of the soul can be observed in the ensouled body. Precisely, it comes to light in this fact: the motion of the ensouled body comes from inside; the motion of the soulless body comes from outside. Of course, not all motion of the ensouled body comes from inside, for example, if I get pushed, the consequent motion is from outside. Clearly, the motion in question is that according to its nature, not that against its nature. The text makes clear that 'from inside' is 'from itself' (245e5-6); accordingly 'from outside' is 'from something else'. The body with a soul in it, an animal for example, walks from one place to another; this motion is from inside or from itself, and it is self-moved. The body without soul, a rock for example, is carried from one place to another; its motion is from outside or from something else, and it is not self-moved. All body is moved either by itself or by something else; the former indicates that it has a soul within, whereas the latter that it has no soul.

That which has a soul in it moves itself. How does this fact give rise to the identification of the soul with the self-mover? It is well known that Aristotle argues that the soul is an unmoved mover on the same basis.<sup>14</sup> It has been suggested that Plato either never considers the possibility of an unmoved mover, or regards it as requiring no

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I shall use 'they' rather than 'he' to refer to the source of the commentary. The commentary is edited by P. Couvreur, in *Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum Scholia* (Paris, 1901).

<sup>13</sup> Bett offers an explanation, attempting to connect 'all soul' in the collective sense and in the distributive sense. That what is true of the soul in general, according to him, is also true of any individual soul, just as what is true of water as such is also true of any pool of water (1986, 12). This explanation assumes that there is an argument for the soul similar to the following syllogism: (1) The human is immortal; (2) Socrates is human; (3) Socrates is immortal. However, Socrates' cosmological argument does not give (1); it gives no more than this: 'at any given time there must be at least one soul in the universe'. It thus does not follow that this or that soul (e.g. Socrates' soul) must be in the universe, not to mention every individual soul.

<sup>14</sup> *Physics* VIII.256b13-27, 257a32-258a25.

refutation.<sup>15</sup> As a matter of fact, Socrates makes the identification from a different perspective.

What is moved from outside, or from something else, is not moved from itself. Therefore (12) equals to:

(12') That which is self-moved has soul in it; that which is not self-moved has no soul in it, for the self-mover is the nature of the soul.

The nature (*phusis*) of the soul is also its essence (*ousia*) and definition (*logos*, 245e3). To apply this definition of the soul to the first half of the sentence, we have:

(12'') If something is self-moved, it has the self-mover (that which is self-moved) in it; if something is not self-moved, it has no self-mover (that which is self-moved) in it.

Now the relation between 'self-moved' (=F) and the thing that is or is not self-moved (=X) becomes clear:

(P) If X is F, there is F in X.

This proposition is a Socratic formula, by which Socrates explains why something is beautiful, ugly, good, bad, big, small, etc. For example, if something is beautiful (τι καλόν ἐστίν), there is the beautiful in it (τὸ καλόν ἐστὶ παρὰ τινι).<sup>16</sup> On this ground it can be alleged that something is beautiful because of the presence of the beautiful (τοῦ καλοῦ παρουσία), or sharing in (κοινωνεῖν) or participating in (μετέχειν) the beautiful.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, in the current context this formula is applied to explain why something is self-moved. Socrates' identification of the soul with the self-mover can follow this line of reasoning: if something is self-moved, according to P, there is the self-moved (=the self-mover) present in it as the cause of its being self-moved; if something is not self-moved, for the same reason there is no self-mover in it. That thing in the former case is also seen as something with soul in it, that in the latter case something without soul in it; we thus know that 'soul' is the name for the cause of being self-moved, namely,

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<sup>15</sup> Menn 2012, 57.

<sup>16</sup> It is worth noting that this is merely a transformation in language that is taken for granted, thus Socrates in the *Phaedo* speaks of the causal explanation on its basis as simple, naïve, even foolish (τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἑμαυτῶ, 100d3-4), whereas the other explanations as clever (τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας, 100c9-10).

<sup>17</sup> *Phaedo* 100c4-6, d4-6. As for how the beautiful as such makes beautiful things beautiful, what is the relation between the beautiful and beautiful things, Socrates admits frankly that he is not sure (100d6-8).

the self-mover; the self-mover is the definition of the thing entitled 'soul'.

In this explanation, the soul, or the self-mover, is no longer understood as it is in (3-10) to be the source of motion; rather, it is understood to be the cause of this sort: because of its presence, its logos (in this case 'self-moved') can be predicated of that in which it is present: X is so and so (in this case 'is self-moved'). In other words, the cause formulates the look or form (εἶδος) in which X appears. In (12), to apply Aristotelian terminology, the soul, *qua* cause, is understood as a formal cause,<sup>18</sup> although for Plato whether the formal cause *qua* cause is completely disentangled from the efficient cause is perhaps still an open question.

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates speaks of his critical turn in his inquiry, which he refers to as his 'second sailing' (δεύτερος πλοῦς). He at his early age follow the path of those whom we call presocratics, particularly the Ionian way of inquiry, trying to understand the world solely in terms of what will be conceptualized by Aristotle as material and efficient causation.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, Anaxagoras tries to explain the world with *nous* and the good. Having been frustrated by the unavailability of a universal teleology, Socrates turns to his 'second sailing', in postulating theoretically an 'X itself', the presence of which accounts for something 'being X' (99d-102a). Compared to pre-Socratic natural science, the Socratic way is characterized by himself as εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφεύγειν (99e5). It is, as Socrates sees it, simple, even foolish, but safest to say that something is beautiful, because it shares in the beautiful, or, because of the presence of the beautiful in the beautiful thing (100c4-6, d3-6). By the same token, we say that something is self-moved, because of the presence of the self-mover, which bears the name 'soul'. Although we do not know whether or not Plato had those passages in the *Phaedo* in his mind when he was writing the *Phaedrus*, it is nonetheless clear that in the defining process of the soul Socrates appeals to the same strand of thought.

Now it is time to view the argument as a whole. The whole argument consists of two premises, respectively provided by (2-10) and (11-12):

(I) The soul is that which moves itself; (11-12)

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<sup>18</sup> *Physics* 194b26-29=*Metaphysics* 1013a26-29: ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ... καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.

<sup>19</sup> (3-10) understands motion solely in terms of efficient causation. Yunis points out that the argument takes a form of 'gnomic, oracular qualities fifth century Ionian philosophical prose' (2011, 136). Many scholars also point out its connection to a fragment of Alcmaeon of Croton (DK24 A12), see Hackforth 1952, 68; Rowe 1986a, 74; Yunis 2011, 136. The stylistic resemblance is hardly a coincidence, since a presocratic style corresponds to a presocratic causal inquiry.

(II) That which moves itself is immortal; (2-10)

Therefore, (III) the soul is immortal.

The argument for premise (I) is relatively simple; that for premise (II), however, is more complicated. Given our analysis of the text, (2-10) give rise to the following propositions:

(2) That which is always in motion is immortal.

(3) That which moves itself never stops moving.

(4-10) That which moves itself neither comes to be nor perishes.

Clearly, (4-10) alone constitutes an argument for the immortality of the soul, in so far as what is immortal is construed as something ungenerated and imperishable, that is, everlasting, which is precisely the central task of the immortality argument of the *Phaedo*. Provided that (4-10), along with the premise (I), has already constituted an argument for the immortality of the soul, what is (2-3) doing in the entire argument?

A well accepted view is that (2-3) through a mistaken identification of 'X never stops moving' and 'X is always in motion', make another argument of immortality, independent of the argument in (4-10). In Bett's reconstruction, for example, (2-3) make a sub-argument (A):

Ai) That which is its own source of motion is always in motion.

Aii) That which is always in motion is immortal.

Therefore, that which is its own source of motion is immortal (A).

And (4-10) make another sub-argument (B):

Bi) that which is its own source of motion is a source of motion for everything else that moves.

Bii) that which is a source of motion for everything else is ungenerated and imperishable.

Therefore, that which is its own source of motion is ungenerated and imperishable (B).

Similarly, Hermias outlines the argument in question, considering it to be twofold (104.6-12):

The first, on the one hand, is like this: the soul is self-moving; the self-moving thing is always in motion; that which is always in motion is immortal. This argument,

then, shows us that [the soul] does not cease to be from itself (ἐξ ἑαυτῆς οὐ φθείρεται). The second, on the other hand, is like this: the soul is self-moving; the self-moving thing is arche of motion; the arche of motion is not generated; the ungenerated thing is imperishable; the imperishable thing is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal. This argument shows us that the soul does not cease to be by something else (οὐδ' ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς φθείρεται). [My translation]

Bett points out that this reconstruction is roughly in agreement with his own, with some insignificant difference in formal terms.<sup>20</sup> As Hermias makes clear, immortality in this understanding of the argument is understood as 'not ceasing to be' (οὐ φθείρεται), namely, everlasting existence. Bett understands it in the same way. As has been said, the argument of immortality as everlasting existence requires (4-10) alone, or the sub-argument (B) alone. (2-3), on the other hand, although it gives that the self-mover would not cease to move as long as it exists, fails to give that the self-mover exists forever as Hermias or Bett would expect. In other words, according to the reconstruction of Hermias or Bett, (2-3) is an awkward argument, since, firstly, it fails to give sub-argument (A), secondly, it does not supply anything for the whole argument, as the whole argument is identified with the sub-argument (B), namely, the self-mover exists forever (Hermias' distinction between 'ceasing to be from itself' and 'ceasing to be by another' cannot find any support in the text).

More importantly, (2-3) is not concerned, as Bett supposes, with the everlasting existence of the self-mover at all. That X does not come to be nor does it perish only makes it always be (4-10); it must be supplied also that X is always in motion so as to be alive, which could be supplied by (2-3). This link is missing according to Bett's interpretation of the argument. For Bett, not only something ungenerated and imperishable is simply taken to be immortal, but what is always in motion is immortal simply because it always is, not always is alive. For Bett, it can be proved that X is immortal (=X is always) as long as it can be proved that X always is F; the content of F is irrelevant.<sup>21</sup> But for Socrates, F must be 'moved' or 'in motion', given the link between life and motion. Immortality, in a word, can be construed either as ever-lasting existence or

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<sup>20</sup> Bett 1986, 3; 3n.5.

<sup>21</sup> Bett 1986, 6. 'The trouble is,' says Bett, 'that "X never ceases to be F" (of which "that which moves itself never ceases moving" is an instance) can mean either "It is impossible that there should be an X which is not F" (i.e., F is an essential property of Xs) or "Xs are eternally F"; the second entails that Xs are immortal, but the first does not'. It is clear that what F is for him is irrelevant.

as ever-lasting motion. The latter is the characteristic attributed to the soul in the current argument.

Rowe's reconstruction, as I understand, agrees more with Socrates' intention. Briefly speaking, Rowe takes (4-10) to be supplementary to (3): (3) argues that the self-mover is in constant motion as long as it exists; (4-10) argues that the self-mover exists forever.<sup>22</sup> The argument would go as follows:

- (I) The soul is that which moves itself; (11-12)
  - (II) That which moves itself is immortal; (2-10)
    - (i) That which moves itself is that which is always in motion;
      - (a) That which moves itself is constantly in motion as long as it exists; (3)
      - (b) That which moves itself always exists; (4-10)
    - (ii) That which is always in motion is immortal; (2)
- Therefore, (III) the soul is immortal.

Rowe's reconstruction does not have to assume, as Bett does, that Socrates confuses 'X is always in motion' with 'X is in constant motion as long as it exists'; it also gives (3) a proper place so that it need not be considered superfluous. Moreover, it captures the link between life and motion that is missing in the other reconstruction.

To sum up, Socrates' argument does have some difficulties. But the difficulties do not include, as some might think, that Socrates fails to argue in (2-3) that the self-mover is in motion forever, since the more plausible reconstruction shows that (2-3) does not constitute an independent argument, but merely one step of the whole argument. The real difficulty consists in the fact that Socrates fails to connect 'all soul' as construed collectively (the sub-argument II-i-b above requires this notion of 'all soul') and 'all soul' as construed distributively (the following account of the soul requires this notion of 'all soul').

However, Socrates' intention in this argument, despite its possible flaws, is clear. When he says 'X is immortal', it is implied that 'X is in motion forever' rather than 'X exists forever'. The latter is a necessary condition of the former, but not a sufficient one. That is to say, simply from that the soul exists forever that the soul is in motion forever does not follow. Although scholars tend to compare the immortality argument here in the *Phaedrus* to that in the *Phaedo*,<sup>23</sup> they are concerned with different questions. The latter is

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<sup>22</sup> Rowe 1986a, 174-75.

<sup>23</sup> E.g. Hackforth 1952, 68.

concerned with existence and non-existence, since immortality is construed there simply as everlasting existence; the former with motion and rest, since immortality here in the *Phaedrus* is construed as everlasting motion. Socrates argues for the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo* in order to dissuade his interlocutors from their childish fear, which is of any trace of existence being completely wiped out after death (77d). With a view to this fear, an argument that the soul remains existing without destruction whatsoever is appropriate. Here in the *Phaedrus*, however, an argument as the one in the *Phaedo* is insufficient, for here immortality is understood as everlasting life, which is connected to everlasting motion, rather than everlasting existence alone. That Socrates argues for the immortality of the soul through its everlasting motion suggests that motion is going to be central to the whole account of the soul in the following part of the speech. In the next section, we shall see the primary characterization of the motion of the soul: it has a goal.

## 1.2 The Motion of the Soul and Generic Eros

This section, as has been said, focuses on a characteristic of the soul's motion, its aiming at an end. In the argument that stands at the beginning of Socrates' 'demonstration' (*apodeixis*), the nature of the soul is identified to be 'that which moves itself'. Socrates does not go on to argue that what moves itself must cause motion with a view to an end; the following account of the soul, however, depends heavily on the idea that all soul strives for its well-being as its end (this will be thematically dealt with in 1.3). So our attempt to disclose the conceptual connection between self-motion and motion towards an end is equivalent to an attempt to inquire into a missing link between the immortality argument and the following account. This rather obscure connection, as we shall see, can be disclosed through the notion of generic eros that is developed in other Platonic dialogues, mainly in the *Symposium*.<sup>24</sup>

It is indeed Plato, perhaps Plato alone among the major figures in the history of western philosophy, who makes eros one of his central philosophical concerns. Not only in the fact that his Socrates once identifies philosophy with eros or the highest form of eros (*Sym.* 204b), but its centrality also, and more crucially, consists in the fact that Plato makes eros essential to our existence (*Sym.* 205a).

'Now this desire for happiness, this kind of love—do you think it is common to all human beings and that everyone wants to have good things forever and ever? What would you say?'

'Just that,' I said. 'It is common to all.'

'Then, Socrates, why don't we say that everyone is in love,' she asked, 'since everyone always loves the same things? Instead, we say some people are in love and others not; why is that?'

'I wonder about that myself,' I said.

'It's nothing to wonder about,' she said. 'It's because we divide out a special kind of love, and we refer to it by the word that means the whole—"love"; and for

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<sup>24</sup> One might wonder if this approach, that resorting to another dialogue to understand the *Phaedrus*, is in any way justifiable. In my defense, our interpretation does not assume (although it might be true) that the *Symposium* must be composed earlier than the *Phaedrus*, or that in composing the *Phaedrus*, Plato has the relevant passage in the *Symposium* in particular. Our analysis of the notion of generic eros is something such as auxiliary lines in geometrical demonstrations. It is a handy tool to make visible a connection otherwise obscure.

the other kinds of love we use other words.'

Everybody is in love, not just so called lovers are in love. Moreover, it is not the case that everybody loves occasionally, as if he at one time loves, at another time stops loving; he is in love for always (*aei*, 205a7). According to Diotima's account, one loves as long as one lives.

Obviously, Diotima here expands the ordinary use of the term. She is speaking of an essential passion of life rather than a certain kind of emotion or impulse in life (cf. *Sym.* 205d). For clarity, I shall call the former generic eros, in distinction to what we usually call eros. It is worth noting that in the *Phaedrus*, especially in the thesis 'love (eros) is a divine madness', not generic eros but ordinary eros is referred to, in a refined form though. However, as I am about to argue, the character of human life that is designated in the *Symposium* as generic eros still plays a central role in the *Phaedrus*, since it coheres with Socrates' account of the soul in the latter.

Diotima's characterization of generic eros has the following implication. If we are always in love as long as we live, it implies that we are in love not only when we feel a passionate desire, whether it be for horses, dogs, money, fame, or friends (cf. *Lysis* 211d8-e3), but also when we hate or fear or act in many other matters. That may sound strange, but it turns out not to be strange once one comes to understand the object of generic eros and what it means to love generically. In Diotima's accounts, she assigns 'the good' to generic eros as its object, and the good alone: 'there is nothing that human beings love other than the good' (205e7-206a1).<sup>25</sup> What it means, then, for everyone to love the good and the good alone?

Presumably, it means something like this. I desire X, because X is good. A further question immediately arises: by 'X is good', does it mean 'X is actually good', or 'I think (know/believe) that X is good'? The former seems to go against our intuition, since it is clear that sometimes we desire what is not good (given the assumption that there are things good by nature, or objective values in things); the latter turns into another thesis: I desire X, because X seems good. Here I follow Rachel Barney in calling the former 'the Reality Thesis', that all desire is for what is actually good, and the latter 'the Appearance Thesis', that all desire is for apparent good.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> To be precise, Diotima expresses this idea by several phrases. She claims that everyone loves or wants 'the good', 'the good to be one's own', 'the good to be one's own for always' (205a, 206a). What is essential in her account is 'the good'.

<sup>26</sup> Barney 2010a, 35.

At the first glance, the Appearance Thesis seems more plausible. That I desire what I believe to be good seems to be the only possible way for me to desire the good. It must be possible for me to be wrong about what is good, when I desire something that seems good to me but in fact is not. Clearly, the ability to discern what is actually good relies on intelligence. From the Appearance Thesis arises this inference: only the soul associated with intelligence wishes (and produces, if it is possible) the actual good. The divine soul that operates the universe, whether it be individual or collective, is supposed to wish for the best and carry it out, because it is associated with perfect intelligence. The human soul, on the other hand, only shares in intelligence to a highly limited degree and thus is liable to the failure of recognizing the actual good, let alone working it out.

Nonetheless, whether I get my desire right or wrong, I follow the lead of apparent good. Socrates, of course, accepts this thesis every now and then as a true description of our psychological process. For example, he takes for granted in the *Protagoras* that ‘no one who *knows* or *believes* there is something else better than what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be doing what is better’ (358b7-c1). In the *Meno*, similarly, he asserts that ‘those who do not know things to be bad do not desire what is bad, but they desire those things that they *believe* to be good but that are in fact bad’ (77d7-e2). In the *Timaeus*, again, the Demiurge wanted everything in order ‘because he *believed* (*hēgēsamenos*) that order was in every way better than disorder’ (30a6).

As Barney points out, Socrates advances to a more radical position in the *Gorgias*, when he argues that the tyrant does not want to do what he does, since what he does *is* not good, despite that what he does may seem good to him (466d-468e). This seems to imply strongly that only what is actually good, rather than what seems good, could be the object of wanting or love. In another word, as far as his position in the *Gorgias* is concerned, Socrates sticks to the Reality Thesis.

If so, how to make sense of the Reality Thesis, given that so often we are not going after actual good? Barney suggests that the Reality Thesis could be understood as a gloss on the Appearance Thesis, which is taken for granted. Her interpretation is based on this insight: ‘when Plato (or for that matter Aristotle) says that wealth is desired as an apparent good, what he means is that the desiring agent takes it to be a real good—“apparent goods” aren’t some natural kind that we might prefer to real ones, but are just

the class of things thought to be genuinely so'.<sup>27</sup> Barney's insight, actually, is anticipated by Socrates' remark in the *Republic* VI (505d5-9):

In the case of just and beautiful things, many people are content with what are believed to be so, even if they aren't really so, and they act, acquire, and form their own beliefs on that basis. Nobody is satisfied to acquire things that are merely believed to be good, however, but everyone wants the things that really are good and disdains mere belief here.<sup>28</sup>

According to this insight, the Reality Thesis and the Appearance Thesis are simply two facets of one matter: one's intention is based on the belief or anticipation that what one intends will bring one actual good. In so far as one's intention is based on belief, it gives the Appearance Thesis; in so far as one's intention is set towards actual good, it gives the Reality Thesis.

Barney acutely captures this ambiguity, and she interprets it as the mechanics of motivation. It means, according to her, that all desire is preceded by an evaluative belief. We are always motivated by the anticipation of having the truly valuable. Within this psychological process there must be evaluative cognitions involved. 'When we desire,' says she, 'there is something we are trying to get right',<sup>29</sup> and when we fail, we are not doing what we really want. This position, which she refers to as 'cognitivism', distinguishes Plato from those who reject the idea that evaluative cognitions are involved in the mechanics of motivation, e.g. Thomas Hobbes, to whom the good is nothing but what we happen to desire, hence there is no right or wrong about it.<sup>30</sup>

I believe that Barney's account of cognitivism is in principle right as far as Plato's

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<sup>27</sup> Barney 2010a, 35.

<sup>28</sup> Socrates' remark, however, says more than the question about the Reality Thesis and the Appearance Thesis. It seems to suggest, if we are not careful enough, that beauty and justice are two objects of wanting or desire that are parallel to the good. However, although Socrates keeps saying 'the good, the just and the beautiful' in conversations, such a phrase does not imply that the three are regarded equally. As Socrates often implies, the good is more fundamental, and the just and the beautiful are the two 'parts' of the good (cf. *Gorgias* 464b-465d).

<sup>29</sup> Barney 2010a, 46.

<sup>30</sup> Barney quotes from *Leviathan* I.6: 'Whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill.... For these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so'; and *De Homine* I.xi.4: 'The common name for all things that are desired, insofar as they are desired, is good; and for all things we shun, evil'.

position regarding desire is concerned. We shall see in the following sections that Socrates in the palinode offers a vivid picture about the human souls that illustrates the relation between the good, desire, and cognition. However, I am not adopting her story to account for the relation of the good to generic eros, simply because Barney's interpretation is too sophisticated to be something which Socrates or Diotima takes for granted, and with which they start. What Barney takes for granted is the Appearance Thesis, and the Reality Thesis only comes to light as a gloss on the Appearance Thesis after a careful analysis of the Appearance Thesis once one adopts cognitivism regarding desire. In the *Symposium*, for example, the notion of generic eros is introduced simply and straightforwardly, and it is clearly the Reality Thesis that is meant to be introduced in that way. The Reality Thesis, then, must make sense *as the starting point of an inquiry*.

Above we gloss 'everyone is always in love with the good' as 'X is pursued, because X is good'. As Barney reads it, it means that a psychological inclination to do X will occur once the judgment 'X is good' is made,<sup>31</sup> and presumably the action of doing X will come after the psychological inclination. So in her view, the thesis is establishing a causal relation between an action or an intention and a preceding psychological state as an efficient cause. I call it the 'psychological reading'. But there is another reading: 'X is pursued, because X is good' means nothing but 'X is pursued for the sake of the good'. The object of desire is that for whose sake things are pursued. In the *Gorgias*, for example, Socrates asks Polus 'Do you think that when people do something, they want the thing they're doing at the time, or the thing for the sake of which they do what they're doing?', and the answer is the latter. In *Republic VI*, following the remark that I quoted earlier to support Barney's insight that we aim at actual good in pursuing apparent good, Socrates explains his idea by declaring that the good is 'what all soul pursues and does everything for the sake of' (505d11-e1). The good is the object of generic eros, in the sense that all action is done for its sake. It is our attempt at the actual good in every case that makes us following the lead of apparent good, not vice versa. The Appearance Thesis thus is a derivative of the Reality Thesis. I call it the 'teleological reading'.

The 'teleological reading' is not concerned with the agent's psychological process when he desires or loves. It merely states this obvious truth: when we speak of the 'because' of an action, it only makes sense to say 'because doing so is good'; to say 'one

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<sup>31</sup> As Barney suggests, such judgment need not be made explicitly. The agent only need take the object to be of what she calls 'mid-level values', say, pleasant, and taking those mid-level values as good.

does so, because doing so is not good' is absurd. 'He does it, *despite* the fact that it is not good'---this is a sensible statement; 'he does it, *because* it is not good'---this does not make sense. X is done for the sake of the good, no matter how I evaluate X, and no matter whether my evaluation is right or not. Socrates' radical position in the *Gorgias* should be understood in this way: if my evaluation is right, that X is actually good, I want X and I want the good; if my evaluation is wrong, so that X is not good, I still want the good, and I only think that I want X in the false belief that it is good. In this sense I do not really want X.<sup>32</sup>

In the teleological reading, 'love' is the logical correlate of the adverbial of purpose '*tou agathou heneka*' (for the sake of the good). It does not mark off any special type of desire: it means 'desire-for-an-end' in general; hence wherever there is purpose there is love. Today, philosophers would be happy to say this for 'want' or 'desire'. '*tou agathou heneka*' is applicable to the account of human action of any sort. So it is natural for Diotima to assert that everyone has this same eros, and for the same object (*Sym.* 205a9-b1).<sup>33</sup> The teleological reading and the psychological reading give two understandings of an action. The same action with its motive could be described as 'I do it for the sake of the good' as well as 'I want it, so I do it'. The teleological reading understands the action in terms of final causation, so to speak, the psychological reading in terms of efficient causation. According to the psychological reading, wanting, or generic eros, in so far as it is one's own wanting to do something, is the source of motion within oneself. It is the living being, or the animate being, that has its motion from an internal source, or from itself. Therefore, these three characterizations are equivalent: the motion caused by the soul, the motion caused by one's own wanting, and the motion for the sake of an end. They all describe, from different perspectives, the motion initiated by the agent itself.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. Barney 2010a, 47-49. Barney finds the argument in discussion problematic.

<sup>33</sup> Aristotle attributes the same universality to the good and our aiming at it. He starts his work of ethics by stating 'Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good' (*N.E.* 1094a1-2), from which he formulates a universal social teleology (1094a18ss.) His disagreement with Plato is merely on the question whether any individual good is good because of an *idea* or *eidos* of good, and whether one desires the *idea* of good (*N.E.* I.6).

<sup>34</sup> Such motion can also be labeled as voluntary action in the broadest sense. Cf. Aristotle *Eudemian Ethics* II.8. Aristotle establishes a criterion for defining voluntary and involuntary actions by saying 'whenever something external moves it or brings it to rest against the impulse in itself (*para tēn en autōi hormēn*), we say it is in compulsion; otherwise, not in compulsion' (1225a3-8). Accordingly, an action counts as involuntary if 'someone holding (another's) hand strike some other one, against the will and desire of the person whose hand is held', for 'whenever the origin is from within, (the action) is not in compulsion'

The soul causes a form of motion to which the teleological explanation applies ('doing X for the sake of...'). There are, however, two teleological explanations, closely related though, in Plato (also in Aristotle). One of them, which we have discussed, is to ascribe to all activity one single end, namely, the good as follows:

A<sub>1</sub> is done for the sake of the good.

A<sub>2</sub> is done for the sake of the good.

...

A<sub>n</sub> is done for the sake of the good.

Clearly, that is what it means to say 'there is nothing that human beings love other than the good' (*Sym.* 205e7-206a1), or to say 'Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good' (*N.E.* 1094a1-2). This teleological explanation is applied universally to each and every activity. It, however, is a purely formal one. From this explanation neither are we able to see any connections between any particular activities among A<sub>1</sub> to A<sub>n</sub>, nor can we give any qualification of the *telos*.

The other explanation, on the other hand, is this:

A<sub>1</sub> is done for the sake of A<sub>2</sub>.

A<sub>2</sub> is done for the sake of A<sub>3</sub>.

...

A<sub>n-1</sub> is done for the sake of A<sub>n</sub>.

In this explanatory scheme, each particular account about activities (A<sub>1</sub> is done for the sake of A<sub>2</sub>, and so on) conforms to the universal formula given in the first teleological explanation (A is done for the sake of the good), since no matter what A<sub>2</sub> is, as an end of A<sub>1</sub> it in a way constitutes 'the good' that A<sub>1</sub> aims at. But now we are given connections between them. Activities are linked together and constitute an explanatory chain, which as Plato believes cannot be infinite and must end somewhere.<sup>35</sup> That is to say, not everything I pursue I pursue for the sake of something else. There must be something pursued for its own sake. The end, or the top, of this chain, for whose sake all the other pursuits are pursued, is designated in the *Lysis* as 'the primary object of love' (*prōton philon*, 219d). This primary object of love, in Plato as well as in Aristotle, cannot but be *eudaimonia*, happiness or well-being (cf. *N.E.* 1095a18). For example, I set up the alarm for

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(1224b11-15).

<sup>35</sup> No argument is supplied for this premise, cf. *Lysis* 219c; also cf. Aristotle *N.E.* 1094a18-23.

the sake of getting up early; I get up early for the sake of morning jogging; I jog in the morning for the sake of health; I pursue health for the sake of living well (happiness). There is no need to ask further what happiness is for. The explanatory chain reaches its natural end when well-being or 'happiness' (*eudaimonia*) is suggested to account for the preceding pursuit and then all pursuits (*Sym.* 204d1-205a4):

Then she said, "Suppose someone changes the question, putting 'good' in place of 'beautiful,' and asks you this: 'Tell me, Socrates, a lover of good things has a desire; what does he desire?'"

"That they become his own," I said.

"And what will he have, when the good things he wants have become his own?"

"This time it's easier to come up with the answer," I said. "He'll have happiness."

"That's what makes happy people happy, isn't it—possessing good things. There's no need to ask further, 'What's the point of wanting happiness?' The answer you gave seems to be final (*telos*)."

"True," I said.

This teleological explanatory scheme therefore gives further qualification of the good, or the *telos*. According to it, the good in the first explanation is understood in reference to happiness, which in this context, as Vlastos points out, is strictly self-referential. It is particularly the agent's happiness, the agent's own well-being that closes the questions about the reason of an action.<sup>36</sup> Whereas according to the first explanation (A is done for the sake of the good) 'I want it because it is good for me' and 'I want it because it is good for someone else' equally make sense, according to the second explanation the end of my action must have something to do with myself in effect. I want good for someone else, from this point of view, because doing it constitutes my own end, for example, because I really want to be a noble man, and being a noble man is a constituent of being happy.<sup>37</sup> Every action aims ultimately at one's own well-being.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Vlastos 1999, 108.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Aristotle *N.E.* 1169a16-b1: 'It is true of the good man too that he does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honours and in general the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for himself nobility; [...] They will throw away wealth too on condition that their friends will gain more; for while a man's friend gains wealth he himself achieves nobility; he is therefore assigning the greater good to himself. The same too is true of honour and office;

Moreover, the first explanation has a universal application, yet it is a theory of *action*, not a theory of *life*. Life consists of numerous actions, but it is more than the sum of all my actions but has a totality above them. This totality can be found in the second explanatory scheme, since happiness or well-being (of one's own) stands at the end of every conceivable chain of goals. According to the first explanation, we always love the good at every turn; according to the second explanation, the good with which we are in love is nothing but that which is inclusive of the agent's happiness. With such an explanation we are entitled to speak of one's life (*bios*) as a whole meaningfully rather than of particular actions alone, and hence of the choice of the way of life (*bios*) rather than choices of this or that action in life. One's own happiness therefore makes an integrator of the series of actions that one has been through into a life (*bios*) that is more than an accumulation of those actions but a subject of moral worth in its own right. The life, as whole, aims at its final end, one's own happiness.

It is worth pointing out that when we say 'the life as a whole aims at happiness' the concept of life in question is not confined as if only mortal life, the life of a living being, is concerned. Socrates in his speech defines 'living being' (*zōin*) as the combination of soul and body, thus the disembodied soul by Socrates' definition is not a living being (or does not have life in the sense of 'the state of living', *zōē*). Nevertheless, our claim is that the soul, either embodied or disembodied, leads a 'life' (*bios*) that aims at its own well-being indifferently, since none of our explication of the soul and its motion requires that the soul in question *must* be the embodied soul. When we speak of 'life' (*bios*) aiming at happiness, we merely speak of the totality of 'experiences and actions' of the soul (245c4), which need not be within the span of mortal life (*zōē*).<sup>39</sup>

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all these things he will sacrifice to his friend; for this is noble and laudable for himself. Rightly then is he thought to be good, since he chooses nobility before all else. But he may even give up actions to his friend; it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend's acting than to act himself. In all the actions, therefore, that men are praised for, the good man is seen to assign to himself the greater share in what is noble'.

<sup>38</sup> Whether it means that all actions are self-regarding or there are no genuinely other-regarding actions is a delicate question. Julia Annas, for example, suggests that eudaemonist motivation does not entail self-interest, since my other-regarding virtues or actions could be conceived to make me happy in a non-instrumental way (1995, 322-25). Be that as it may, it is my own happiness, rather than someone else's happiness, that my other-regarding virtues or actions constitute.

<sup>39</sup> At 248a1, Socrates concludes his account of the divine souls by saying 'this is the life (*bios*) of gods', and he earlier contends that gods are pure souls hence not 'living beings' (*zōin*). At 256d8, Socrates characterizes the state of the winged soul after its departure from the body as 'leading a life in brightness' (*phanon bion diagontas*).

Anyway, through our analysis of the notion of generic eros, we come to see the connection between the nature of the soul, identified as that which moves itself in Socrates' initial argument, and the teleological structure of the soul's motion, which is the primary characteristic of the soul in the following account. In the following section, we shall see, further, how the end in this teleological structure, the well-being of the soul, is characterized in Socrates' picture.

### 1.3 The Well-being of the Soul

The soul is that which moves itself. This is part of what the argument that stands at the beginning of Socrates' account of the soul establishes. The teleological reading of this definition, as we argued in the last section, maintains that all activity caused by the soul has a teleological structure *a priori*, manifest in the phrase 'for the sake of the good', which is applicable to any account of action. This teleological structure, in turn, applies to the life as a whole as well as to particular actions. The life as whole, as particular actions in life, aims at a final end, one's own well-being (*eudaimonia*), to which 'the good' is understood in reference. This understanding of the soul and the life is most clearly stated in the *Symposium* in Diotima's doctrine of generic eros, that everyone is driven by the universal eros towards the good and then towards well-being. This section will in turn look into Socrates' characterization of the soul's end, its well-being, in his account.

Socrates later refers to his second speech as a *muthikos humnos* (265c1). Although Socrates claims to outdo every poet on earth (247c3-4), the palinode is still an ode. Socrates emulates another poet, Stesichorus, who knew an ancient purification that Homer did not know (243a3-b3). The purification is for those who err in *muthologia*, or tale-telling. Homer lost his sight for his errors in telling false tales about Helen, and, unlike Stesichorus, he failed to make a palinode to purify his wrong-doing to regain his sight by saying that the story was not true.

No matter what Socrates means by *muthos* here, the major part of the palinode consists of a mythical tale, or a myth, so to speak, of divine and human souls (246a3-257a2). The teleological structure of life is translated into mythical language in the palinode. The soul, according to the preceding argument, is that which moves itself and is always in motion. Socrates now makes an image of soul with the argument in mind. The soul is likened to a winged team of a pair of horses and their charioteer, strictly speaking, to their grown-together power (*dunamei*, see 246a6-7).<sup>40</sup> The soul-chariot is an image of motion, moved from within.

The motion of the soul-chariot, moreover, is not aimless. Towards the end of the speech, we come to know that the life of the human soul is a 'true Olympics', and we are

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<sup>40</sup> Ficino in his interpretation grasps the horses and wings as powers that cause motion (Ficino 2008, 68); also see Griswold 1986, 93, where he links the image of soul to motion. They both find the motion caused by soul is twofold: the horizontal motion caused by the horses (presumably standing for the attraction between the lover and the boy) and the vertical caused by the wing.

all players of the Olympics, not spectators.<sup>41</sup> The souls are in a contest, and the winner, if it wins three times in succession, enjoys the greatest good for human soul (256b3-7). In a few lines, this greatest good is identified with well-being or happiness (*eudaimonein*, 256d8). The soul, in the great myth, is illustrated as a chariot journey towards *eudaimonia*.

But how is *eudaimonia* represented in the myth? To put it another way, what is a *eudaimōn* soul like? First, it seems that *eudaimonia* belongs to the soul that lives in the heaven. On the one hand, the divine gods, 'the tribe of the happy' (*genos eudaimonōn*, 247a5), remain in the heaven forever. They indeed sometimes rise above the heaven (247b6-c2) but never fall below it. On the other hand, the human soul, on the condition that it leads a well-ordered, philosophical life on earth, will become winged and light (256b4), and by virtue of its wings depart for 'the place from which it has come' (248e5-6), that is, the heaven, where it travels in brightness and happiness (256d8). In contrast, the rest, which are not blessed with happiness, at this point will undergo judgement. Some will end up under the earth, and others be sent to *touranou tina topon* (249a7), literally 'some region of heaven'.<sup>42</sup> But this region must not be the region where the blessed souls are sent. The blessed souls reside along with gods somewhere aloft (*anō*, 246d6), up there in the air (*meteōporei*, 246c1), thus it is always connected with becoming winged and light. I use 'heaven' to refer to that lofty place. So the destination of the souls that depart without growing wings cannot be the heaven; some under the earth, others to some region within the universe, since the word *ouranos*, however, does not denote the lofty heaven alone in Socrates' speech, but also denotes 'universe' (cf. 245d8, 246b7). Wherever this place is in the universe, it is neither on the earth nor under the earth (because the underworld, *ta hupo gēs* at 249a6, is the place where the unjust soul pays penalty). Both kinds will not become winged and return to the heaven after ten thousand years of transmigration.

What makes a soul live in the heaven or live on the earth? The most obvious condition of staying in the heaven is that the soul must have its wings lifting it aloft (246d6). Wings intrinsically belong to the form (*idea*) of the soul (246a7); wings however are liable to damage in the case of non-divine souls. If a soul loses its wings, it would certainly fall down, becoming mortal, and distancing itself from the state blessed with happiness (246b6-9):

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<sup>41</sup> Note that in these Olympics we wrestle with ourselves not against each other, 256b2. This metaphor suggests that the soul-chariot is not in a competition with other souls as the soul themselves suppose.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Hackforth 1952, 85n.3.

All soul (ψυχὴ πᾶσα) has the care of all that is soulless, and ranges about the whole universe, coming to be now in one form, now in another. Now when it is complete (τελέα) and winged (ἔπτερωμένη), it travels in the air and governs the whole cosmos; but the one that has lost its wings is swept along until it lays hold of something solid, where it settles down, taking on an earthly body, which seems to move itself because of the power of soul, and the whole is called a living creature (ζῶον), soul and body fixed together, and acquires the name 'mortal'.

If the happiness of a thing as its *telos* could be understood as the fulfilment of its nature,<sup>43</sup> the completion of the soul in form (growing the wings) seems to be the metaphor of the completion of the soul in nature. Now how is this state of fulfilment characterized?

It is notable that the phrase 'all soul' (ψυχὴ πᾶσα) appears again. It appears before at the beginning of the argument of the soul's immortality (245c6). There all soul is argued to be immortal; here all soul is said to range about (περιπολεῖ) the universe. The soul that moves within the universe takes on various forms. It either travels in the heavens, or enters a body on earth, somehow moving its body with its own motive power. It, however, never ceases to move. This is a precise illustration of the argument, that all soul is immortal, in so far as it is always in motion. One might say that the immortality of the soul is reflected in the myth as the soul's survival of the death of its current life and each death thereafter. In the myth all soul leaves its body after death; having been judged and paid its due, the soul chooses its next life and reincarnates. After ten times cycles of reincarnation, all soul returns to the place where it has come from. Thus closes a big cycle of incarnation and begins another. Each cycle lasts for ten thousand years (248e5-249b5). The soul, according to this story, is not born at any birth, nor does it perish at any death. This, however, does not exhaust the implication of 'all soul is immortal'. As has been shown in our reconstruction of the argument, the conclusion 'all soul is immortal' implies both that the soul neither comes to be nor perishes, and in addition that the soul is always in motion.

But now 'all soul' is assigned another task. It is also said to 'take care (*epimeleitai*) of all that is soulless' (246b6). Presumably taking care of the soulless depends upon the soul's ability to transmit motion into the soulless, since there is no way to take care of a

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<sup>43</sup> Cf. 249c6-8: 'A man who uses reminders of these things correctly, being always initiated (*teloumenos*) into the perfect mysteries (*teleous teletās*), he alone becomes perfect (*teleos*) indeed'.

thing without making a change on its part, that is, imparting a certain motion or changing the original motion. But surely not all motion that the soul causes in the soulless can be seen as a successful 'taking care'. What immediately follows is Socrates' assertion that the soul of a certain sort, those 'complete and winged', manages the whole world-order (*panta ton kosmon dioikei*, 246c2). In a few lines, the soul of Zeus, which is one of those 'complete and winged', is said to 'put all things in order and care for all' (*diakosmōn panta kai epimeloumenos*, 246e5-6). What it means to take care of things, as it seems, is to put things in order, or at least involves putting things in order. Apart from being the source of motion, the soul is also recognized as the source of cosmic order, and by implication of motion in general.

Again, not all motion is in order. Given that the soul is the source of all motion, it must be source of disorderly motion as well as orderly motion. On similar grounds the Athenian stranger in *Laws X*, where the soul is similarly defined to be self-motion and identified to be the prime mover of the universe (894e-895a), infers that there are at least two souls, one responsible for the good, one for the evil (896e). Now only the souls that are 'complete and winged', the souls that travel in the air, induce the orderly motion. They are, as has been noted, the soul blessed with happiness. Among them are the divine souls, whose motion is identified with or reflected in astral movements, and their inferior followers (246e6-247a7):

First in the heavens travels Zeus, ... after him there follows an army of gods and divinities, ordered in eleven companies... Many, then, and blessed are the paths (διέξοδοι) to be seen along which the happy race of gods turn about (ἐπιστρέφεται) within the heavens, each of them performing what belongs to him; and after them follows anyone who wishes and is able to do so...

As Hackforth points out, the word διέξοδοι is commonly used for the orbits of celestial bodies.<sup>44</sup> Celestial bodies repeat circular motion eternally, constituting the cosmic order. The imperfect souls, if they are able to follow, take part in this circular motion, too. The soul blessed with happiness is characterized by circular motion.

In *Laws X*, the circular motion of the universe is taken as the primary example of 'noetic motion' (*nou kinēsis*, 897d3), or rational motion, which is (a) regular, (b) uniform, (c) always at the same point in space, (d) around a fixed center, (e) in the same position relative to other objects, and it is ascribed to the soul associated with *nous* or intelligence

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<sup>44</sup> Hackforth 1952, 73n.3.

(898b-c).<sup>45</sup> Here in the *Phaedrus*, Socrates makes the same connection between the cosmic revolution with *nous*, through the introduction of the ‘superheavenly region’ (*huperouranios topos*),<sup>46</sup> or the place beyond heaven (247c6-d1):

What is in this place is without color and without shape and without solidity, a being that really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge, visible only to intelligence (*nōi*), the soul’s guide (*kubertētēi*).<sup>47</sup>

The cosmic order cannot be established without guidance. Now intelligence acts as the guide, introducing order into the motion of the soul. It turns out that the soul is the source of all motion, whereas the soul associated with intelligence (*nous*), having somewhat access to the intelligible region, is responsible for the order of the universe, which is characterized by circular motion.<sup>48</sup> In *Laws* XII, when the Athenian stranger

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<sup>45</sup> Menn convinces me that *nous* means ‘intelligence’ rather than ‘mind’, see Menn 1995, ‘What Does “Nous” Mean?’, 14-18.

<sup>46</sup> Strictly speaking, the superheavenly region is only a poetic imagination. The intelligible beings that are located there actually cannot be located anywhere (cf. Rowe 1986a, 179). Compare Diotima’s account of the beautiful itself: ‘First, it always is and neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes nor wanes. Second, it is not beautiful this way and ugly that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another, nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another; nor is it beautiful here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and ugly for others. Nor will the beautiful be imagined (*phantasthēsetai*) by him as some sort of face or hands or anything else that belongs to the body, nor as some speech or some knowledge. It is not anywhere in something else, as in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by itself with itself, it is always one in form’ (*Sym.* 210e6-b2). The intelligible beings are in principle beyond representation. That is why ‘neither did any poet here on earth ever praise the superheavenly place, nor will he ever praise in a worthy way’ (247c3-4), as poetry is a mimetic art, that is, an art that makes representations. Cf. Aristotle *On the Heaven* I 279a11 ff.

<sup>47</sup> The *kubernētēs* of the soul, its guide or steersman, is not identical to the *hēniokhos* (charioteer) of the soul: the charioteer of the soul is the best part of the soul, its intellect (*dianoia*), to which the truth is most appropriate (248b7) and which is nourished by *nous* or intelligence (247d1), its guide. *Nous* is the nourishment of the charioteer, which is in line with another piece of text saying that the vision of the truth is the nourishment of the intellect and the soul (248b5-c2). Cf. Hermias 150.26-27: ‘This is clear that the guide is something more accomplished than the charioteer and the horses’ (τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸν κυβερνήτην τελειότερόν τι τοῦ ἡνιόχου καὶ τῶν ἵππων). Hermias presumably has in mind the three-fold division of *nous*, rational soul, irrational soul, which comes from the Neo-Platonist reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle (cf. Menn 2012, 60; Proclus *Elements of Theology* 14, 20, and *Platonic Theology* 1.13). This is a circumstantial evidence that *nous* is not construed by ancient readers as identical to the intellect or the charioteer.

<sup>48</sup> Hermias asserts that the motion of the rational soul is that which ‘turns back to itself’, namely, rotation: ‘it belongs to the rational soul to perfect itself, to wake itself, and to turn back to itself’ (τῆς γὰρ λογικῆς ἔστι ψυχῆς τὸ ἑαυτὴν τελειοῦν καὶ ἀνεγείρειν καὶ ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς ἑαυτήν, 114.24-25). Cf. Menn 2012, 58-60.

looks back to his account in Book X, he distinguishes two arguments that encourage belief in the gods: ‘One is the point we made about the soul, when we argued that it is far older and far more divine than all those things whose movements have sprung up and provided the impulse which has plunged it into a perpetual stream of existence. Another argument was based on the systematic motion of the heavenly bodies and the other objects under the control of *nous*, which is responsible for the order in the universe’ (966d-e). It is by virtue of intelligence that the soul itself is completed and completes the cosmic order.<sup>49</sup> It therefore is reasonable to say that soul is the source of motion and intelligence is the source of order. The souls that generate orderly motions are source of order in the secondary sense: only because they are the carriers of intelligence.<sup>50</sup> Anyway, the souls associated with intelligence are the intermediary between the universe and what is beyond universe, between the visible and the intelligible, by transmitting the order of the latter into the orderly motion of the former.<sup>51</sup>

So far we have explored the characteristics of the soul in the state of well-being: the blessed soul is complete both in form (as it is furnished with wings) as well as in nature (as it is perfect in so far as it is possible), with wings intact so as to stay in the heaven, where it is in circular motion. It seems that the soul’s association with *nous*, with the

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<sup>49</sup> Cf. *Timaeus* 47e3-5, where Timaeus contrasts τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα (what *have been* crafted through intelligence) with τὰ δι’ ἀνάγκης γινόμενα (what *are becoming* through necessity). Note that the former is phrased with a perfect participle and the latter with a present participle. Arguably this suggests that the order of the universe is a completed state, a work that has been done. (The perfect can also be explained by the fact that the work of *nous* has already been presented before we get to Necessity, but this is, as I believe, less plausible.)

<sup>50</sup> In *Timaeus*’ cosmology, the soul is made to regulate the universe, since the cosmic order must be the work of intelligence, and ‘it is impossible for anything to possess intelligence apart from the soul’ (30b-c). Disorderly motion, on the other hand, precedes the making of the soul (30a).

<sup>51</sup> The *Phaedo* comes to the same conclusion from another line of reasoning. According to the affinity argument (77e-80b), the soul in its true nature is more akin to the intelligible than the visible, the unchanging class of objects rather than the class of objects liable to change. Bett in his paper (1986) makes an unwarranted inference on this ground that the soul is itself motionless because of its kinship to the motionless realm (17). Actually, Socrates in the *Phaedo* only insists that the soul in the state of wisdom ‘ceases to stray and remains in the same state’ (79d4-5; cf. 79c7); he does not say that the soul would accordingly be motionless or stand still. On the basis of his unwarranted explanation of the *Phaedo*, Bett takes the conception of the soul in the *Phaedrus*, that the soul is always in motion, to ‘undoubtedly stand in opposition to that of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*’ (18). Actually, the affinity of the soul to the intelligible world, as has been argued, does not imply the motionlessness of the soul, not even that the soul associated with intelligence should be relatively less motive than the soul without intelligence.

superheavenly region, is the condition for being in such a state. In other words, the cosmic order depends upon the operation of the blessed soul. However, establishing cosmic order is the soul's 'care of the soulless' (246b6). The universe that is taken care of by the intelligent soul is in good hands; the soul itself is not taken good care of through its care of the soulless. One might say that the care of the universe could enhance the well-being of the soul itself, since external good is considered to be necessary for well-being (cf. *N.E.* 1099a31). But that only implies that external good is a necessary condition of well-being rather than its constituent, if the well-being of the soul means the perfection of its intrinsic nature. The blessed soul, then, is characterized by its management of the universe, but its well-being is not constituted by its management of the universe.

The soul must take care of itself as well as it takes care of the soulless. Moreover, the soul must be taken care of before the soulless can be taken care of. The self-cultivation of the soul is represented in Socrates' account through the metaphor of *trephein* or 'nourishing' (247d1-5):

Now a god's intellect (*dianoia*) is nourished (*trepomenē*) by intelligence and pure knowledge (*nōi te kai epistēmēi akēratōi*), as is the intellect of any soul that is concerned to take in what is appropriate to it, and so it is delighted at last to be seeing what is real and watching what is true, feeding on (*trepheetai*) all this and feeling well (*eupatheī*), until the circular motion brings it around to where it started.

This last sentence above should not be understood as saying that the vision of the superheavenly region is dependent upon the cosmic revolution, since the cosmic revolution itself is maintained by nothing but the soul 'complete and winged', and later the wings of the soul is also said to be 'nourished' by the superheavenly vision or the vision of the truth (248c1-2). *Nous* and its object, the truth, nourish both the wings of the soul and its intellect (*dianoia*). In other words, the growth and the action of the wings go hand in hand with the development of the intellect; both are due to the 'nourishment' of the vision of the truth. It is noteworthy that only the horses of the divine soul are fed on nectar and ambrosia, whereas in Homer this is the food of the complete gods. Thus even if the horses are divine the most perfect gods of Plato have a higher 'food' than the gods of Homer.

The vision of the truth completes the soul. The soul, therefore, aims ultimately at the very activity of understanding the intelligible, the highest form of rational activity, rather than the 'practical' use of intelligence in regulating the universe. The heaven, Socrates

makes clear, is not the summit of the soul's journey (247b6-c2):

But when the souls we call immortals reach the top, they move outward and take their stand on the high ridge of heaven, where its circular motion carries them around as they stand while they gaze upon (*theōrousi*) what is outside heaven.

Given the tentative principle that the spatial height indicates the situation of the soul, the fact that the superheavenly region is even beyond the heaven indicates that the soul's perfection rests in the superheavenly region. The soul associated with *nous* is the highest within the universe; as long as it is within the universe it is dealing with what is lower than it, that is, the soulless. But the best state of existence does not consist in dealing with what is lower, even though the soul is able to manage it by transmitting to it the higher order; rather it consists in dealing with what is higher, comprehending the higher order. The final end of the soul, as suggested in this picture, is the vision of the superheavenly itself.

One might contend that the journey beyond the heaven only belongs to the gods. The other souls can never stand outside the universe. Actually, they can do no better than lifting the head of the charioteer beyond the outer surface of the universe (248a1-3). Be that as it may, they nevertheless take the superheavenly vision as their ultimate aspiration: as Socrates says, they all have 'great eagerness (*pollē spoudē*) to see the plain of truth' (248b6). The reason for such eagerness is: (a) 'the pasture from that meadow' happens to be appropriate (*prosēkousa*) for the best part of the soul; (b) the nature of the wing, by which the soul is lifted, is nourished by it. We referred to this above to show that the vision of truth is the condition for the development of the intellect and the growth of the wing. Since both the development of the intellect and the growth of the soul point to the well-being of the soul, the reason for which there occurs this eagerness for the superheavenly vision is that such vision simply is the ultimate end of the soul. There is no such eagerness on the part of the divine soul because, presumably, they rise up and enjoy the vision so easily (247b1-2) that it is never possible for the vision to be taken away from them.<sup>52</sup> But for the divine soul and the non-divine soul alike, both of them aim ultimately at the vision of the intelligible.

Now it comes to be clear why happiness of the heavenly soul is an appropriate reward for the soul drawn to a 'well-ordered life and philosophy' (256a7). Well-ordered

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<sup>52</sup> Cf. *Symposium* 204a: 'In fact, you see, none of the gods loves wisdom or wants to become wise—for they are wise—and no one else who is wise already loves wisdom'.

life and philosophy rehearse the state of the heavenly soul, which is being in orderly motion and being eager to see the truth, therefore the soul leading an orderly and philosophical life on earth deserves to be sent back to heaven where all soul leads a life like that.

One might question whether it is true to say that all heavenly (non-divine) souls are philosophical, whether eagerness to behold the truth on their part should be taken as an indication of their love of wisdom. It seems to be the case that among all souls only one type out of nine is philosophical (248d3); if all soul in heaven is philosophical, it seems to follow that every soul that has fallen down to the earth would be of philosophical type. To this question I shall contend that that is a misinterpretation of Socrates' account, due to a confusion of the term 'philosophical soul'. When we say that all soul is philosophical in heaven, we mean that all soul in heaven has this desire for truth, not all soul will be implanted into a philosopher. What determines the type of the soul on earth is how much of truth it actually saw, not whether it used to desire the vision of truth. That all soul in heaven is philosophical is compatible with that only those who actually see a lot of truth will be the souls of the philosopher on earth.

To conclude, the well-being of the soul, as its final end, belongs to the soul associated with intelligence, and is characterized by a certain form of motion, that is circular motion. But the activity of this soul in circular motion is depicted by Socrates as twofold: one is regulating the universe, by transmitting the order from the superheavenly world, that is, the intelligible world, into the visible world; the other is rising up beyond heaven to behold the intelligible world itself. The latter, as it seems, is superior to the former, as the former is the application of intelligence, whereas the latter its source. Arguably only the theoretical aspect of its life constitutes its well-being. Anyway, the life of the soul blessed with *eudaimonia* is characterized both as orderly and as philosophical. It is a life of passionate love as well as a life of reason. What is the proportion between love and reason, the two elements apparently in tension, and in what way they can make a life characterized by both of them? We shall come back to these questions in chapter 3. But next, we are about to see the aspiration of the non-divine soul that will turn out to constitute a passage for the earthly soul to return to its heavenly paradise.

## 1.4 Becoming Like God

This section is concerned with the relation between gods and human souls in Socrates' speech. Let us start with a simple observation. Socrates' account of god in this speech is no doubt rather different from tradition, from the Homeric account of god, for example. Socrates himself emphasizes his departure from the Homeric tradition: he regards the idea that god is the immortal combination of soul and body as groundless, and asserts that god actually is pure soul without body (246c6-d2). Besides, the gods travel within the heaven, and are carried by cosmic revolution, alluding to the movement of celestial bodies. This account of gods seems to suggest some kind of natural theology, which distinctly deviates from the tradition, not to mention that during revolution the gods behold (*theōrousi*) the intelligible beings (246d6-247e6). However, as Rowe observes, 'in this speech the gods retain at least some of their traditional features'.<sup>53</sup> Their number is twelve; each of them bears a Homeric name. Although it is not unusual for philosophers to assign traditional names to their gods and gods' names were assigned to the planets, of course, this is something unusual: it turns out that each god has a pattern of life or character that corresponds to their characters in tradition. Zeus acts with dignity and has a nature of leader; Hera has a royal nature; Ares tends to be murderous (252c3-7; e1-5). This feature of Socrates' account clearly requires explanation, since according to Socrates' description of the life of god, there is no occasion for god to display the alleged characters, which are presumably displayed in ordinary life of humans.

One might say that the reason for this aspect of the account consists in its *genre*. Although Socrates claims to outdo every poet on earth (247c3-4), the palinode is still an ode. Socrates later refers to his palinode as a *muthikos humnos* (265c1). No matter what he means by *muthos*, the major part of the palinode consists of a tale of divine and human souls, or a mythical tale (246a3-257a2). Socrates emulates another poet, Stesichorus, who knew an ancient purification that Homer did not know (243a3-b3). The purification is for those who err in *muthologia*, or tale-telling. Homer lost his sight for his errors in telling tales and, unlike Stesichorus, he failed to make a recantation to atone for his wrongdoing and to purify himself in order to regain his sight. In composing the myth, Socrates lends himself to poetry and myth. But this is clearly insufficient to explain the Homeric allusions in Socrates' account here. By no means does Platonic myth-making entail the

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<sup>53</sup> Rowe 1986a, 178.

preservation of traditional elements. The account in the *Timaeus*, for example, is called an *eikos muthos* (29d2, etc.), yet has none of the traditional elements retained in the palinode: the created gods there are said to be spherical (34b), and the demiurge and his assistant gods appear to be incorporeal. Plato clearly is not committed to keeping traditional elements in his accounts of gods simply because the account is presented as a *muthos*, so it requires a more powerful explanation for the fact that he does in the palinode of the *Phaedrus* keep the traditional elements to a considerable degree, for example, naming one god with Ares and connecting him with warlikeness.

I suggest that this fact can be explained by the employment of an influential notion in ancient Platonic tradition, *homoioōsis theōi*, or becoming like god.<sup>54</sup> Socrates makes clear that each god is the role model for those who used to follow them in the heaven (252d1-5):

So it is with each of the gods: everyone spends his life honoring the god in whose chorus he danced, and imitates (*mimoumenos*) that god in every way he can, so long as he remains undefiled and in his first life down here. And that is how he behaves with everyone at every turn, not just with those he loves.

The assimilation to god is not only the way in which the human soul, as long as they are able to remember, or 'recollect', their heavenly experience,<sup>55</sup> but the way of his life in general ('in every way', 'with everyone at every turn'). As is explicated in a few lines, they adopt the god's 'customs and practices' (*ta ethē kai ta epitēdeumata*, 253a3). God turns out to be the ideal for divinely inspired humans. Besides, they not only assimilate themselves to their god, but also wish to make their beloved adopt the same way of life (253b3-c2). The divinely inspired couple, so to speak, engage in the common project of becoming like god as much as possible. God accordingly is attributed as the ideal of human the characters appropriate to humans. Socrates' account of god contains a certain kind of anthropomorphism, so to speak, not with respect to the shape of body, but with respect to the soul, more specifically, to different (and possibly mutually somewhat incompatible) characters of the soul.

The resemblance between the divine soul and the human soul is grounded in the first place in Socrates' argument, which is referred to as 'the *arche* of our *apodeixis*' (245c5),

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<sup>54</sup> Hackforth discerns this idea in the *Phaedrus*, see Hackforth 1952, 101-02. For the reception of this idea in ancient Platonism and beyond, see Annas 1999, 52-53.

<sup>55</sup> I take this as the implication of the text 'so long as he remains undefiled and in his first life down here'. See 252e5-253a5.

the origin, or the principle of Socrates' account. The argument starts with the phrase 'all soul' (*psukhē pasa*), and is concerned with all soul. Whether 'all soul' means collectively the whole of souls or distributively every (individual) soul has been a much debated issue.<sup>56</sup> But as Burnyeat points out, 'all soul' implies above all that the account of the soul in that argument is not confined to the human souls or the divine souls, but applies to them alike.<sup>57</sup> That is made clear in the sentence that precedes the argument: 'it is necessary to know the truth of the nature of the soul, both divine and human, by looking at their doings and sufferings' (245c3-4).<sup>58</sup> The argument, in which the truth is revealed, treats all soul indiscriminately, which implies that despite the difference between the divine soul and the human soul, they are not different in their nature, or essence or definition (cf. 245e3).<sup>59</sup> 'All soul' by nature is that what moves itself; 'all soul' moves and regulates all that is soulless (although in the human case the regulation is not perfect); and all soul, as we argued in the preceding sections, aims at the same *telos*, that is the vision of the superheavenly.

The divine soul and the human soul not only have the same nature, but also have the same form or structure. We have seen that, in light of the soul's nature, the form (*idea*) of the soul is likened to a chariot team, with a charioteer and two horses (246a6-7). There is indeed a difference, that both horses of god are good, whereas ours are mixed: one good and one bad (246a7-b4). In spite of this defectiveness, the human soul replicates the same structure as the divine soul. It turns out that the anthropomorphism (in terms of the soul) in Socrates' account stems from the isomorphism between the divine soul and human soul.

As Annas says, 'Becoming like God, or assimilating oneself to God, is not meant as an alternative to the idea that we seek happiness; it is just a specification of what happiness is'.<sup>60</sup> This specification, of course, is not made for all soul, but only for the non-divine soul. The divine soul is perfect, whose perfection is reflected in the perfection of the members of its chariot team, hence embodies the fulfilled nature of the soul. The imperfect souls, thus, can find their way to well-being through the assimilation to the perfect model.

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<sup>56</sup> See 2.1.

<sup>57</sup> Burnyeat 2012, 243-44.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *Phaedrus* 269c-270c, also 273d-4a, on rhetoric's need for a foundational scientific psychology, although the immediate reference there is to the psychology of humans.

<sup>59</sup> Ferrari, too, points out that 'the difference between the divine and the human soul is of degree rather than kind' (1987, 130).

<sup>60</sup> Annas 1999, 53.

God is the perfect model, presumably, either because of some reason, or simply because they are gods. If gods are perfect simply because they are gods, gods themselves must be the ultimate beings and ‘the measure of all things’, and becoming like god is the ultimate end of the imperfect soul. If, on the other hand, gods are perfect because of some reason, say, because they conform to the rational principles of the good, then the principles are even superior to gods. In this case, becoming like god is merely the way to a further end which is defined in terms of the rational principles. Given the former, the ultimate cause of the world is not intelligible, thus the highest knowledge cannot but be revelation. Given the latter, however, the ultimate cause is intelligible, and we can know about gods inasmuch as they embody or represent the rational principles that make them perfect. The highest knowledge, then, is that of the rational principles.

Socrates, as can be expected, picks the latter option. The divinity of god, according to him, is due to their association with the beings lying beyond the heaven (249c6). And presumably our approximation to divinity is due to the same association though less perfect. Becoming like god, thus, is not the ultimate end; it is rather a path to the end. To achieve the end requires us to imitate god, in so far as we associate ourselves with the Forms beyond heaven. These Forms are all so-called ‘moral Forms’: Justice (*dikaiousunē*), Moderation (*sōphrosunē*), and Knowledge (*epistēmē*) or Wisdom (*phronēsis*),<sup>61</sup> not the Form of Big or the Form of Equal, and not even the Form of Good.<sup>62</sup> The reason for the fact that only moral Forms appear in Socrates’ list is clear, given our previous interpretation of the anthropomorphism of Socrates’ account of god. These beings are what make god, i.e. the divine soul, perfect. They are the principles of the good for the soul. Such principles are good qualities or dispositions of the soul, that is, virtues. Gods are perfect, because they are just, moderate and wise. Each god, according to Socrates, does what belongs to himself (247a6), which alludes to the definition of justice in the *Republic*,<sup>63</sup> hence seems to show that gods are just; the gods free of jealousy do not mind sharing the divine feast with humans, hence seems to show their moderation (247a6-7); they are, above all, wise, as they have true and complete knowledge.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> *Phdr.* 247d5-7. Later what is called Knowledge here is paraphrased as Wisdom, see 250d4. It is noteworthy that Beauty (*kallos*) does not enter Socrates’ list until the speech turns to an account of recollection (249d5).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Burnyeat 2012, 254. It should be noted that Socrates in his speech never calls them by the name *idea* or *eidōs*.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Rowe 1986a, 179; Yunis 2011, 140.

<sup>64</sup> Benardete notes that among the cardinal virtues courage or manliness alone is not mentioned (1991, 141). I shall treat the apparent absence of courage in 2.4. Here I foretell the

Therefore, what Annas says about 'becoming like god' in general also applies to the account of the *Phaedrus*: 'the idea [of becoming like god] is also not intended as an alternative to the idea that virtue is sufficient for happiness; for it is explicated, in many of the passages in which it occurs, by the thought that becoming like God is what becoming virtuous is',<sup>65</sup> except that in the *Phaedrus* becoming virtuous is what becoming like god is, since god is subordinated to the Forms of virtues. Gods are vehicles of true virtues. There are two ways to learn how to become virtuous: to see what it is to be virtuous and to see what it is like to be virtuous. The vision of the moral Forms supplies the knowledge of what it is to be virtuous; the gods supply the images that reflect what it is like to be virtuous. The complete vision of the Forms belongs to the gods alone; for the non-divine souls the vision is bound to be limited and partial (248a1-6):

One that follows a god most closely, making itself most like that god, raises the head of its charioteer up to the place outside and is carried around in the circular motion with the others. Although distracted by the horses, this soul does have a view of the things that are (*ta onta*), just barely. Another soul rises at one time and falls at another, and because its horses pull it violently in different directions, it sees some and misses others.

The gods would be, as it seems, dispensable in the pursuit of virtues, if the non-divine soul were able to have the full and complete vision. But due to some natural constraint (the mixture of the horses), the non-divine soul is not able to have the full and complete vision. The gods, thus, turn out to be critical to our becoming virtuous. What it is to be, say, just cannot but be a unitary being; what it is like to be just, however, can be reflected in a number of (eleven in Socrates' account) patterns of life. These patterns of life therefore are images of the true virtues. Socrates assigns eleven patterns of life to the eleven gods, each of which embodies justice in its own way. We need a kind of religious enthusiasm to become just; the gods need only the intellectual vision of the forms to preserve their perfect justice.

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gist of the story: the virtue of courage of the non-divine souls consists in the passionate endeavour of the chariot towards the vision of the Forms (when it sees the Forms) or going ahead of one another (when it is blind to the Forms). It is noteworthy that the divine soul, according to our interpretation, does not have the virtue of courage: it is too easy for them to enjoy the vision of truth. Aristotle notably refuses to think of the gods as courageous, for different reasons. He withholds justice from them only by construing justice in a very narrow way – a construal that helps his argument ad loc (*N.E.* 1178b8-12).

<sup>65</sup> Annas 1999, 53.

The realization of these patterns in the human context presumably is not found on the part of the divine soul. For example, the divine soul is not supposed to exercise its virtue of justice by paying its debt, for the gods are not supposed to deal with any money matters in the first place, nor are they supposed to exercise moderation by controlling their base appetites, for there are presumably no such appetites in the divine soul. The human soul, in adopting one of these patterns, must realize it in ordinary life, dealing with worldly situations that would never occur to the divine soul. On these grounds Aristotle considers praising god for justice or moderation, and the virtues of this sort to be tasteless, since the circumstances of these 'virtuous' actions are unworthy of gods (*N.E.* 1178b8-18). From this consideration Aristotle concludes that the only virtue worthy of god is the intellectual one, and the only activity worthy of god is contemplation (1178b18-24).<sup>66</sup> However, that god does not exercise the virtue of justice by paying its debt or in any worldly way does not imply that god does not exercise justice in its own way. It does not follow, as Aristotle believes, from the fact that god does not deal with the worldly situations in an intra-mundane fashion that god only exercises intellectual virtue. As a matter of fact, god in Socrates' speech is assigned a 'practical' task, which is clearly distinct from its 'theoretical' activity. That is managing (*dioikei*) the whole universe (246c1-2).<sup>67</sup> The gods manage the universe just as we manage our own worldly business, household business for instance. Both activities depend upon the exercise of 'practical' virtues, which require dealing with somewhat 'messy' situations. And only by exercising 'practical' virtues, the soul induces order to a certain degree to the circumstances in which it lives.

As has been noted, the gods do not only manage the universe. They also rise up and contemplate the Forms, detaching themselves from the visible world. And these two activities are in a hierarchy: it is the latter, the theoretical activity, that is the fulfilment of the soul's end and constitutes its well-being. God does not only play the role of an ideal

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<sup>66</sup> Plotinus mentions the similar point that cast doubt on the idea that what it means to 'becoming like god' is to become virtuous. He solves this difficulty by distinguish between 'political virtues' (*politikē aretē*) and 'purified' or genuine virtues, and asserts that by performing 'political virtues' we are prepared for the genuine virtues. But the genuine virtues for Plotinus are intellectual virtues (*Enneads* I.2.3). He after all does not assign 'practical virtues' to god. Cf. Annas 1999, 66-67.

<sup>67</sup> One might say that according to the text it is 'the soul that is complete and winged' that manages the whole universe. Yes, but it is also true that this task falls mainly on the shoulders of god, cf. 246e5-6. Besides, the fact that the divine soul and the non-divine soul are referred indiscriminately confirms precisely our point that they are performing the same kind of virtues.

manager, but also of an ideal spectator. And the latter is higher. Becoming like god, therefore, does not consist in tidying up the messy world alone, but primarily in contemplating the intelligible, the Forms of virtues above all.

Between the theoretical and the practical, the gods' management of the world is dependent upon their theoretical study of the Forms. However, through assimilating itself to god, the non-divine soul's exercise of virtues in its practical life is not dependent on its theoretical study of the Forms, for god supplies several patterns of virtuous life for the non-divine soul to imitate without knowing what it is to be virtuous. Despite this difference, the superiority of the theoretical is preserved on the part of the non-divine soul, reflected in the superiority of the philosophical life. Socrates on the one hand characterizes the philosophical life as one pattern of life among others (the one supplied by Zeus), on the other hand as distinguishing itself from other lives. Thus the soul of the philosopher on the one hand resembles his god just as other human souls, on the other hand resembles his god in a way different from other human souls. When the soul of the philosopher was in heaven, it is said to 'follow and resemble' (*hepomenē kai eikasmenē*) god best (248a2; cf. 248d2-4). The philosopher, just like its soul once in heaven, if inspired by god resembles its god better than the rest on earth, better precisely because the philosopher not only imitates god as what it is like to be virtuous, but emulates god in setting out to study what it is to be virtuous. In other words, he not only exercises the 'practical' virtues in the worldly situation, assimilating his life to a divine, well-ordered pattern in dealing with his ordinary life, but also lifting up his eyes beyond the heaven inquires into the realm of the intelligible, in emulation of god's contemplation of the superheavenly Forms. His soul will be the winner of the soul's Olympics (256b5), and as a reward it will be sent back to the heaven earlier than any other earthly souls (249a1-5). Each of the rest, on the other hand, when inspired by his god remembering the pattern of life attached to his god, imitates his god by reproducing the pattern in his own life alone. But he does not embark on a philosophical life but on a life which Socrates later identifies as philotimic or honour-loving life, 'a coarser way of life' (256b7-c1). His soul will not get to return to the heaven as the soul of philosopher does; it on the other hand will not be sent to the underworld either (256d6-8). Where will it go? Actually Socrates assigns a place to these souls earlier (249a5-b1):

[For non-philosophers,] once their first life is over, they come to judgment; and, once judged, some are condemned to go to places of punishment beneath the earth and pay the full penalty for their injustice, while the others are lifted up by justice to

a place in heaven where they live in the manner the life they led in human form has earned them.<sup>68</sup>

The philotimic souls, in adopting a divine pattern, lead an earthly life free of injustice.<sup>69</sup> They thus will be sent to 'a place in heaven',<sup>70</sup> without undergoing penalty. This is what they deserve. In strict sense only the soul of the philosopher is becoming like god, since it alone will depart the body with wings grown; the philotimic soul, although it will depart with 'no small reward', namely, the impulse to gain wings (256d3-6), fails to fully resemble the divine soul since it is not yet completed and winged.

Annas explores the idea of 'becoming like god' in Plato and the Platonic tradition and finds under this same heading two different ideas, which, according to her, Plato fails to distinguish.<sup>71</sup> 'If becoming like God,' says she, 'is living according to your reason, then it need imply no more than a very ordinary, indeed traditional, practice of virtue, understood as a rational activity. God here is just reason, understood as the divine in us, with no implication that reason is actually different from what we already supposed it to be, namely something which can guide practice as well as theory. But if becoming like God is actually a flight from the mix of good and evil in our world, then God is being thought of rather differently, as something perfectly good outside human experience and not to be characterized in human terms, but which nonetheless it makes sense for humans to try to emulate'.<sup>72</sup> An example of the former idea can be found in the *Republic* 613a, where assimilation to god is 'adopting a virtuous way of life'. The context suggests, as Annas points out, that assimilation to god is not said to consist in flight from the world, and this is confirmed by the description of the philosopher in Book VI as reproducing the divine order that he himself absorbs in the soul of other people as well (500c-d).<sup>73</sup> The virtues exercised here may not be ordinary virtues as those shared by all citizens, but they are exercised in practical activities. Anyway, according to this idea virtue is conceived to be 'a practical skill exercised on the familiar materials of everyday life'.<sup>74</sup> The latter idea, on the other hand, Annas calls the 'unworldly strand'. This strand is

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<sup>68</sup> Rowe rightly links this passage to 256d5-e2; see Rowe 1986a, 182, 190.

<sup>69</sup> A just life is supposed to be a well-ordered life (cf. *Gorgias* 504d); those adopting a divine pattern make their life in order so that they are free of injustice.

<sup>70</sup> Or 'a place in universe'. It is not the heaven to which the philosophical soul will be sent back, see 1.3.

<sup>71</sup> Annas 1999, 63, 65.

<sup>72</sup> Annas 1999, 64.

<sup>73</sup> Annas 1999, 62.

<sup>74</sup> Annas 1999, 70.

found manifestly in the *Theaetetus* and the *Phaedo*, in the idea of the philosopher as an unworldly figure and that of purification and release from the body.<sup>75</sup> She then also includes the *Phaedrus* in this group.<sup>76</sup> Now it is clear that the two different ideas, which Annas distinguishes under the heading 'becoming like god', correspond in our interpretation respectively to the two different aspects of 'becoming like god', which stem from the two activities of god as an ideal model: god on the one hand manages the universe, on the other hand transcends the universe within which it resides (246d7), although these activities are linked. *Pace* Annas, Plato does distinguish the two ideas under the heading 'becoming like god' consciously and clearly, and moreover gives them a hierarchy by assigning an even better post-mortem fate to the soul assimilating itself to god in seeking the understanding of the intelligible.<sup>77</sup>

Despite its unsatisfactory reading of Plato, Annas' exploration of 'becoming like god', captures this fundamental difficulty of the human life in relation to its divine ideal, that if Plato's double account of the human ideal is true, man would be 'torn' between the different ideas of 'becoming like god', between the engagement of the world and the flight from the world.<sup>78</sup> And in the *Phaedrus*, as Annas points out, it is the flight idea, that the truly virtuous life in its highest form consists in flight from the world, rather than managing the world. It is implied in Annas' account that the two aspects of the divine ideal present themselves as two alternatives, that is to say, if one is to go after one aspect of ideal, he must give up the other. For the human soul, if it assimilates itself to the divine ideal in the 'theoretical' virtue, the 'practical' virtue would be unavailable for it, and vice versa. One cannot resemble the god in both aspects all at once. The reason for that does not consist in the fact that the human soul is necessarily deficient (like any other non-divine soul), but in the fact that the human soul is embodied. The soul of philosopher is nourished by the vision of the intelligible; his body cannot be nourished by such vision.

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<sup>75</sup> Annas 1999, 59-62.

<sup>76</sup> Annas 1999, 63.

<sup>77</sup> Annas doubts if any solution (Plotinus' as an example) that gives precedence to the latter idea, or the 'flight idea' as she puts it, only sketches a religious attitude and 'lacks resonance as an ethical theory' (1999, 71). I assume that her doubt is based on the belief that our ethical life must be a life surrounded by a 'messy' world, and moral value is attached to our endeavour and choice to deal with the human condition, which is not pure, spiritual or ideal. The flight idea, she might think, is not facing all these troubles but avoiding them. Be that as it may, turning back to the worldly concern itself constitutes an ethical choice here, meaning that it is not a rejection of life, but a choice and embracement of one type of life, the theoretical life, as one of greater value than others.

<sup>78</sup> Annas 1999, 70.

When the soul is taking care of itself, it cannot at the same time be taking care of its body, and vice versa.<sup>79</sup> Embodiment as a human condition constitutes a limitation of the soul's ultimate aspiration. The divine soul, in contrast, is not bothered by that: when they rise above the heaven the cosmic order is maintained. Becoming like god in the highest sense runs the risk of the falling apart of earthly, ordinary life.<sup>80</sup>

Right after Socrates' claim that the philosopher achieves perfection (249c8), he continues to speak of this result from the perspective of the many (249c8-d3):

He stands outside (*existamenos*) human concerns and draws close to the divine; ordinary people think he is disturbed (*parakinōn*) and rebuke him for this, unaware that he is possessed by god.

*Existanai* means 'to drive someone out of his senses'.<sup>81</sup> If he walks along this path as a way of life, constantly directing his soul away from the visible to the intelligible ('being constantly [*aei*] initiated in perfect mysteries', 249c7), presumably he would resemble in a decisive way the philosopher depicted by Socrates in the *Theaetetus* (176a8-b2), in seeking a flight from the worldly situation; here it is the philosophical couple that takes the flight.

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<sup>79</sup> Ferrari discerns the double activities attributed to god in the *Phaedrus*, and recognizes the gods not as an ideal of a single aspect, but an ideal that has a two-fold structure, one aspect of which involves contemplation, the other involves 'coping with contingency' as 'administrators'. This agrees with our interpretation. As an ideal, he goes on to argue, the gods can 'reconcile' their theoretical and their practical activities easily (1987, 131-32). Here he is introducing a second-order divine ideal that consists in the perfect reconciliation between the two aspects of the (first-order) divine ideal. This second-order ideal, if Socrates really meant to introduce it, must be construed on a basis different from the first order ideal. The unavailability of such reconciliation between the two aspects of the divine ideal is due to the contingent condition of embodiment of the human soul rather than intrinsic deficiency of the non-divine soul.

<sup>80</sup> In light of our interpretation, the contrast that Ferrari makes between the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* is implausible. Admittedly (as Ferrari argues), the *Phaedrus*, compared to the *Symposium*, juxtaposes the concern for personal relationship and the concern for a higher perspective; and the dialogue is concerned with personal relationship as much as, if not more than, the elevation beyond the personal perspective. However, the philosophic lover, *pace* Ferrari, is not concerned with maintaining his friendship with his beloved in any way comparable to the divine soul's administration of the universe. I shall argue in 3.3 that the concern for personal relationship is not equivalent to retaining worldly concerns in pursuing the transcendent truth, but is for the sake of a joint pursuit of transcendent truth.

<sup>81</sup> LSJ, s.v. *existēmi*.

## 1.5 The Cause of the Fall

The rest of this chapter is concerned with the fall of the soul, which connects the soul in heaven, blessed with happiness, and our soul, the human soul.

Above all, we should clarify some relevant concepts, although we have employed them every now and then. First let us define the human soul clearly. The human soul is usually supposed to be contrasted with the divine soul on the one hand, on the other hand with the animal soul or some other inferior soul. We explored the idea of ‘becoming like god’ in Socrates’ speech on that presupposition, but the notion of the human soul requires more careful definition. Strictly speaking, the strict parallel between the divine soul and the human soul does not exist in Socrates’ account, since the divine soul is by itself divine, but there is no soul that is human by itself. The human soul is the soul of human, or more precisely, is the soul in a human body. According to Socrates, there are strictly speaking no human souls in heaven. I mean that none of the souls in heaven are already human souls. In heaven there are gods, or divine souls, which are perfect, and there are non-divine souls, so to speak (‘the other souls’ [*hai de allai psukhai*, 248a1] or ‘the others’ [*ta men theōn okhēmata... ta de alla...*, 247b1-3]), which are imperfect. Some of the non-divine souls remain in heaven; some of them fall down to earth and enter human bodies, and there come human souls (248c2-e5). The very same souls could also be reincarnated in animal bodies after their human lives (249b1-5). We may also, somewhat loosely, use the term ‘human souls’ to designate retrospectively those non-divine souls in heaven which are going to be incarnated in human bodies. Since all imperfect souls are likely to fall at least once in countless circuits of life, and in their first incarnation they must be planted in human bodies (248c8-d2), all non-divine souls can be loosely referred to as human souls, in so far as they are, or have been, or will be assuming human shape. Anyway, it is clear that human souls are non-divine souls, but at a given time not all non-divine souls are human souls.<sup>82</sup>

The divine soul, on the other hand, is not the soul of god in the way in which the human soul is the soul of human; that is to say, the divine soul is not the soul in a divine body. God, Socrates emphasizes, does not have a body. It is not, as the many usually

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<sup>82</sup> There is a clear distinction between the non-divine (rational) soul and the human soul in the account of Timaeus too (*Tim.* 69b-d), but there the descended (rational) soul acquires further soul ‘parts’ which are given when the body is given, whereas in the *Phaedrus* the non-divine pre-descent souls already have the full soul-nature that they will have when embodied.

conceive it to be, some immortal combination with soul and body fixed together (246d1-2). The divine soul is by itself divine, not defined by the body it happens to assume, like the human soul. Compared to the human soul, the divine soul is distinguished in that (a) the divine soul is perfect, the human soul is deficient; (b) the divine soul is immortal, the human soul is, in a way, mortal (we shall see in what way, since it is also made clear that 'all soul is immortal'). For Socrates' account, what matters most of all is that (a) and (b) are not equivalent,<sup>83</sup> as I am going to clarify.

The contrast between immortality and mortality, the contrast (b) above, is not a contrast of the soul's quality. Socrates makes clear at the beginning that 'all soul is immortal' (245c6). After the soul settles down in an earthly body, Socrates says, the complex of soul and body acquires the name 'mortal' (246c2-6). Mortality is the state of existence in which soul and body are fixed together, in other words, mortality is the state of embodiment, designating the fact that the animated body must die at some point. If we put aside the reincarnation story and consider the incarnation story alone, the distinction between immortality and mortality in fact points to that between the disembodied soul, the soul in the heavens, and the embodied soul, the soul on earth. The fall of the soul, then, is the critical turn between them.

The contrast (a), that between perfection and deficiency, on the other hand, is one of the soul's own intrinsic quality. Divine souls are perfect, non-divine souls deficient, no matter they are in heaven or on earth, that is, disembodied or embodied. Not all disembodied soul is perfect; not all deficient soul is embodied. There are souls that are disembodied and deficient, that is, the non-divine souls in heaven (248a1-b1). From this fact we can draw a significant conclusion, that the deficiency of the non-divine soul does not cause its fall directly. If the imperfect nature of the non-divine soul alone were the cause of the fall, then there would be no non-divine souls travelling across the heaven at all, since out of their imperfection they would have fallen down to earth all at once.

As Socrates makes clear, the divine soul owes its perfection to its complete and full vision of the superheavenly Forms (249c6); the non-divine soul, accordingly, owes its deficiency to its partial and limited vision.<sup>84</sup> One might say that the deficiency of the non-divine soul is due to the bad horse in our soul, while the perfection of the divine soul is due to the fact that their chariot team is all good (246a7-b4). According to this view, it is

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<sup>83</sup> This fact is suggested by Benardete 1991, 138.

<sup>84</sup> Here and henceforth, by 'vision' I mean the actual performance of (metaphorical) visual faculty, rather than the capacity of that faculty.

the imperfect equipment of the non-divine soul that prevents it from full vision of the truth.<sup>85</sup> However, Burnyeat calls our attention to the difference between the expositive order and the explanative order.<sup>86</sup> According to him, that the bad horse disturbs the journey of the chariot, and prevents the charioteer from seeing the truth fully and completely, is ‘the order of exposition’, to use Burnyeat’s language. On the other hand, ‘Anything else would be incompatible with Socrates’ statement, already cited, that a god’s being a god is to be explained by his presence with the Forms. Priority in the order of explanation belongs to the gods’ complete and perfect knowledge of the Forms’.<sup>87</sup> On that account, the deficiency of the non-divine soul must be explained ultimately by nothing else but the poor vision of the Forms, rather than, say, the imperfect equipment of the non-divine soul.

Be that as it may, I believe that Burnyeat goes too far to explain the presence of the black horse (i.e. our imperfect equipment) by the imperfect vision or knowledge of the Forms. According to him, the priority of the soul’s intellectual condition in the order of explanation goes so far that what is taken as given, that is, the imperfect equipment of the non-divine soul, must be explained by its intellectual condition.<sup>88</sup> Given this explanation, Burnyeat is led to believe that the evil horse, not being evil as given, but comes to be evil because of the deficient vision of the Forms.<sup>89</sup> But this is not what Socrates says. The non-divine soul was never perfect; its black horse was never white; the vision of the non-divine soul neither has been nor will be perfect. There is indeed such a limit imposed on the non-divine soul that it must be taken as given. The presence of the black horse, as I understand, is Socrates’ way to impose the limit of the non-divine soul and its distinction to the divine soul. A built-in bad horse symbolizes a built-in deficiency. The non-divine soul is by necessity (*ex anankēs*) deficient (246b4). It is our nature to be so, not that we could ever be perfect. Burnyeat tries to explain this given fact by the soul’s intellectual condition because he worries that the priority of the intellectual condition in the order of explanation, the principle established clearly in Socrates’ account, might be challenged by a factor that in a way explains the intellectual condition. I claim, however, that such a causal factor does not challenge the principle established, for there are three

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<sup>85</sup> See *Phdr.* 248a1-b1, where the soul that follows god best, ‘disturbed by its horses scarcely (*mogis*) catches sight of the things that are’;

<sup>86</sup> Burnyeat 2012, 246.

<sup>87</sup> Burnyeat 2012, 246-47.

<sup>88</sup> It is ‘the soul’s intellectual condition’ that ‘determines the character of one’s horses’ (Burnyeat 2012, 246).

<sup>89</sup> Burnyeat 2012, 247.

factors, instead of two (as Burnyeat understands), in the expected causal account: the equipment of the soul (whether the horses are both good or one of them is bad), the intellectual condition of the soul (whether the soul has the full and complete vision of the Forms), and the status of the soul (whether the soul is divine and perfect or non-divine and imperfect). It is true that the intellectual condition of the soul is the ultimate explanation of the status of the soul; it is also true that the equipment of the soul partly explains the intellectual condition of the soul. There is no contradiction here. For example, Usain Bolt is a better runner than I am (the status), because he is more athletic than I am (the athletic/intellectual condition). Besides, his legs are longer than mine (the equipment). This last fact, obviously, cannot be explained by his better athleticism, but in a way explains his better athleticism. However, the ultimate explanation of Bolt's superiority is his better athleticism rather than the length of his legs, even though the latter partly explains the former. The black horse is the shorter leg. It is the natural constraint that makes our vision of the Forms necessarily imperfect, although the imperfect vision of the Forms is the ultimate explanation of our being imperfect.

To point this out, surely, is not irrelevant to the critical distinction made earlier, that between immortality/mortality and perfection/deficiency. Given that the perfection of the divine soul is due to its full and complete vision of the truth, and the deficiency of the non-divine soul to its limited and partial vision, limited and partial vision is not the cause of the fall or of mortality. In other words, the non-divine soul in heaven will not fall from heaven to earth just because of its limited and partial vision. Which souls, then, are going to fall, and which souls are not? Regarding that, the Inescapable Law (*thesmos Adrasteias*) is:

That whichever soul follows in the train of a god and catches sight of part of what is true (*ti tōn alēthōn*) shall remain free from sorrow until the next circuit, ...; but whenever through inability to follow it fails to see (*mē idēi*), and through some mischance<sup>90</sup> is weighed down by being filled with forgetfulness and incompetence, and because of the weight loses its wings and falls to the earth, then it is the law that... (248c2-5)

That is to say, the soul will not lose its wings as long as it sees any truth at all. The

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<sup>90</sup> *Pace* Burnyeat, who suggests that once all souls were perfect and they become imperfect because of some *suntukhia* or misfortune by referring to the text here (2012, 247). Actually, what such mischance is said to cause here is not the limited vision of truth that makes the soul imperfect, but the failure of that vision and the consequent fall of the soul (248c5-8).

limited vision of truth, which makes the soul deficient, does not undermine the wings; rather, it nourishes the soul and is sufficient by itself to keep the soul aloft. What makes the soul lose its wings, is the utter failure of the superheavenly vision (*mē idēi*).<sup>91</sup>

The soul's vision of truth, then, could be in three possible statuses: full vision, limited vision, and no vision at all. Only the souls in the first status are perfect; all imperfect souls, on the one hand, are liable to lose its vision, on the other hand, only those that at this given moment actually lose their vision completely are going to fall (see Figure 1).




Figure 1 Perfection and Immortality

Failing to catch a sight of the superheavenly Forms causes the soul to fall. This happens as an unfortunate event, as is made clear by the phrase 'through some mischance' (*tini suntukhiiai*) at 248c6, rather than as the manifestation of some intrinsic inferiority of the soul. Before its failure and the consequent fall the soul used to see the truth, since 'a soul which has never seen the truth will not enter this shape' (249b5-6). The degree to which it used to see the truth determines its place in the human rank of life once it is incarnated (in its first life on earth it cannot be incarnated in a beast, see 248c8-d2). There are nine kinds of life in the human rank. Those who used to see most of all, not surprisingly, will be incarnated in a philosopher, the second in a king, and so on and so forth (248d2-e3).<sup>92</sup> The key point is: every human soul once had a glimpse of truth, even

<sup>91</sup> Hackforth interprets '*hotan... mē idēi*' wrongly. He rejects the straightforward interpretation 'whenever... it does not see', for he thinks according to 249b5, all human souls have seen something more or less (1958, 83n.2). Surely every human soul has seen some truth, yet it does not imply that every human soul is able to do so forever. Once failing to see, the soul is bound to fall, no matter how much it used to see.

<sup>92</sup> It has been widely noted and discussed that there seem to be an inconsistency between Socrates' praise for the prophecy, purification, and poetry in his initial account of four kinds of divine madness, through which 'the greatest good come to us' (244a5-245a8), and their lower rank in human lives (the prophetic or mystic life ranks five in the list of nine, poetic life six). As Burnyeat points out, Hackforth concludes too quickly that Socrates cannot have in mind the divinely inspired mystery or poetry when he assigns mystic and poetic life to fifth and sixth place (2012, 241). Actually, the poet, as well as the prophet or the priest does

that of a tyrant who ranks ninth and the last; every human soul fails to see the truth before the fall, even that of a philosopher who ranks first.

With that in mind, we can avoid a pitfall that has tripped many scholars, one regarding 248a1-b1, where the heavenly life of imperfect souls is described:

As for the other souls [i.e. non-divine souls], one that follows a god most closely, making itself most like that god, raises the head of its charioteer up to the place outside and is carried around in the circular motion with the others. Although distracted by the horses, this soul does have a view of the things that are, just barely. Another soul rises at one time and falls at another, and because its horses pull it violently in different directions, it sees some real things and misses others. The remaining souls are all eagerly straining to keep up, but are unable to rise; they are carried around below the surface, trampling and striking one another as each tries to get ahead of the others.

Socrates illustrates both the souls that will stay in heaven and those that are going to fall in one picture. One soul that is said to follow the god best has a limited vision of the beings (248a1-5). This soul, in so far as it follows its god best, presumably has the largest vision within its power, still rather poor as it must be. It thus is going to be a philosopher, if by any chance he falls down to earth; but it is not the soul of a coming-to-be philosopher at the moment, since as long as he catches a sight of truth, he is free from falling (248c3-5). Another soul that has even poorer vision might enter a human shape of the other ranks after its fall, yet it is also free from falling for the moment. Other souls, in trampling and jostling one another, are kept under the surface and deprived of the sight of being and thus are about to fall (248a6-b1). They are the coming-to-be human souls, from that of philosopher, who used to be the best follower and have the largest vision within human capacity, to that of tyrant, who is lowest in human rank and used to see

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not accomplish their work, great as they are, by their own power. They are mouthpieces, so to speak, of a divine voice without. And according to Socrates in the present life (on earth) they seek no vision of their own of the Forms since they follow non-Zeus gods. The philosopher, on the other hand, are divinely inspired but by 'a deity within', to use Burnyeat's language (2012, 241-43). This 'deity within' is reason or intellect. The human lives are ranked in accord with their 'intellectual condition' (Burnyeat 2012, 246) or intellectual talent, in so far as this condition is predetermined by the soul's pre-life, rather than their 'worth to society' (Hackforth 1952, 83). Benardete notes that the list of nine lives is dominated by the words with the suffix of *'-ikos'*, which designates knowledge or expertise (1991, 143).

least of truth, nevertheless not none.<sup>93</sup>

To be brief, poor vision of truth makes the non-divine soul deficient; failure of that vision makes them fall hence incarnated. But why the cause of the fall is the failure of the vision of truth? Let us look at Socrates' allegorical account first. It is clear that the soul is able to stay in heaven because of its wings, whose nature is to lift heavy things upward (246d6-7). The soul's fall, accordingly, is due to the damage of its wings (248b3). Why are the wings of the soul damaged? They are broken in the great confusion, competition and exertion among the souls that fail to catch a sight of the truth (248b1-2). This is Socrates' story; to understand it, on the other hand, we have to translate it back into plainer terms.

The decisive moment in the soul's pre-life is the outbreak of a battle among souls. Because the souls all have this eagerness to see the truth (248b5-6), Socrates says, they all try to be in front of the others (*hetera pro tēs heteras*; 248a6-b1). That gives rise to a battle and in the battle the soul's wings are damaged, and then fall to the ground.

Is all soul, one is led to ask, not eager to see the truth? Why are some of them (those who fail to see the truth) at odds with each other, some others fine? To answer this question, one should see why divine souls, which are the ideals of the rest, are in concord. The rest keep in line in so much as they follow their ideals.

Let us consider this. Homeric and Hesiodic gods are at odds, even at enmity with one another. From the poets we learn that the gods split into two sides supporting

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<sup>93</sup> The pitfall against which I warn is failing to see that the picture comprises falling souls and staying-in-heaven souls at once. This failure is due to the confusion of the rule that any soul which are having any vision of the truth at the moment will remain in heaven (248c3-4), with the rule that the more the soul used to see, the higher it ranks after the fall (248d2-e2). Because of the confusion, scholars tend to project the three groups of souls mentioned in this picture into the nine ranks of human life. For example, Burnyeat in his paper, admirable as it is, believes that 'only the better ones are able to see the Forms at all (248ab)' (2012, 246). Clearly he takes the third group (248a6), the souls which fail to see the Forms, so to speak, to be inferior ones, and the first and the second soul 'better ones'. But actually, that they at the moment fail to see does not imply that they never saw the Forms. Some of them could well have been seeing a lot of truth, as much as a philosopher used to see, and will become accordingly a philosopher (otherwise there would not be philosophers on earth at all). Thus this soul in the third group is better than the second soul, which sees less than a philosopher ought to see. Yunis, similarly, interprets as if the first soul, the second soul, and the rest stand for three categories of human in rank. He moreover is confused by the statement that a soul which has never seen the truth cannot enter a human shape (249b5-6), and submits that the souls in the last category will not be incarnated in human (2011, 142-43). That is obviously in contradiction to the law of incarnation that "the soul shall not be planted in any wild creatures at its first birth" (248c8-d2). Actually, every human soul used to behold truth, thus the third group of souls that at the moment fail to see the truth used to be among the first two groups.

respectively the Achaeans and the Trojans, and actually fight for each side, and that Olympians fight against Titans and Giants. In the *Euthyphro*, Socrates says that the gods would be at war with each other if they are at odds on the issue of the good and bad, the beautiful and the ugly, the just and unjust (7b-e). The discussion of the hostility, together with the following discussion on the relation between the god-loved and the pious (10a-11b), points to a picture where the intelligible rather than god's will determines the meaning of a virtue. If the good, the beautiful, and the just is something like the greater number, the larger, and the heavier, the dispute would vanish as there is a common measurement accepted by all. If the pious is dear to god because it is pious, not vice versa, the god's will would not be in conflict and there would be no theomachy. If, on the other hand, the pious is dear to god simply because it is liked by god, neither would the gods necessarily be constant about what is pious nor would they necessarily agree on it with each other, for nothing makes them so. Now in the palinode, there are superheavenly beings beyond gods. What truly is good is the source of divinity. In other words, the gods are what they are because they 'have gazed and feasted' on the rational principles of the good (247e3). They therefore have perfect knowledge and accordingly agree on what is good with each other.<sup>94</sup> The gods thus must be in perfect harmony, hence there cannot be such thing as theomachy. The poets' ignorance about the gods' harmony is due to their ignorance about the superheavenly region and the supremacy of the Forms (247c3-4).

Now we come to understand why the condition of the fall is the failure of the vision of truth, known as '*thesmos Adrasteias*', the Inescapable Ordinance (248c2-5). If a soul could catch a glimpse of the truth, it would keep pace with its god. If it loses all vision of the truth, however, it gets lost in conflict and doomed to fall, since people with knowledge are in agreement with each other, and those ignorant are at odds. There cannot be theomachy, but there must be a battle between the souls deprived of knowledge.

We mentioned earlier Bett's interpretation of the soul's association with intelligence and the intelligible world in relation to motion. Bett in his paper compares two groups of

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<sup>94</sup> The knowers agree on each other, whereas the non-knowers are at odds, also cf. *Rep.* 349e-350b. 'In any branch of knowledge or ignorance,' Socrates asks, 'do you think that a knowledgeable person would intentionally try to outdo other knowledgeable people or say something better or different than they do, rather than doing or saying the very same thing as those like him?' And the answer is the latter (350a). One might say that the fact that everyone agrees, for example, that money is good, does not preclude them from conflict. However, those competing for money or what is widely agreed to be good do not agree with each other that it is good for one person rather than another to have it.

dialogues, one including the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, the other including the *Laws*, the *Sophist*. In his opinion, the *Phaedrus* is closer to the latter group in regard to its account of the soul. His central argument is that in the former group of dialogues, the disembodied soul is akin to the intelligible world which is unchanging, hence the soul itself is motionless; in the latter group, the sharp distinction is blurred between the changing visible world and the unchanging intelligible world, the soul being considered to be in motion.<sup>95</sup> We have pointed out that his point is based on a misinterpretation of the account of the soul in the *Phaedo*, where the soul is said to be akin to the Forms (79b, 80b).<sup>96</sup> The soul, being akin to the unchanging realm, is not itself unchanging, but is in motion only with more order and uniformity: the association with the unchanging realm only prevents the soul from straying (79d). However, Bett's point on the motion and motionlessness of the soul could make sense in a certain way in light of Socrates' account of the battle and peace between the soul. Only in so far as souls with the vision of truth are at peace with one another, whereas souls without the vision are at war against one another, the former could be conceived to be somehow at rest and the latter in motion, for war as opposed to peace is considered to be motion as opposed to rest (cf. *Tim.* 19b).

Strictly speaking, however, the soul associated with intelligence is in motion as much as the soul deprived of intelligence, since orderly motion is after all no less a motion than disorderly motion. The soul at peace is in motion as much as the soul at war is. That all soul is immortal, here in the *Phaedrus*, as has been shown, implies that all soul is in motion eternally. Be that as it may, Socrates indeed suggests that some souls engage in motion more than others. Towards the beginning of the speech Socrates uses *ὁ κεκλινημένος* to refer to the man who is excited by eros, as opposed to the sane (245b4). In seeing beauty here, Socrates says, the soul on earth 'becomes winged (*πτεροῦται*), fluttering (*ἀναπτερούμενος*) with eagerness to fly upward' (249d6-7). The stream of beauty, Socrates says in his description of erotic experience, 'sets the lover all of a flutter' (*ἀναπτεροῦσαν*, 255c7). As Rowe's translation captures elegantly, *ἀναπτερόω* means both 'to furnish with new wings' and 'to excite'.<sup>97</sup> The embodied soul, when being free of erotic excitement, is in a way at rest; when it is excited on account of beauty, starting to grow wings, the soul breaks the chains that confine it and engages in a certain kind of motion. Contrary to Bett's understanding, the soul directed to the unchanging,

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<sup>95</sup> Bett 1986, 17-27.

<sup>96</sup> See 1.3 n.54.

<sup>97</sup> *LSJ* s.v. The pun is pointed out by Benardete (1991, 145).

intelligible world, characterized by wing-growing, is not unchanging; rather, it is in a certain kind of motion, whereas the soul turning away from the unchanging realm lacks this kind of motion. This specific kind of motion, known as eros of the beautiful (249e1-4), in contrast to generic eros which characterizes all motion of the soul, is the central theme of Socrates' great speech and of the next chapter of our dissertation.

## Chapter 2 Eros

### 2.1 Beauty and Recollection

If we set aside Diotima's innovative definition of an extended notion of love as love of the good, the Greek term *eros* is by tradition of the beautiful (as indicated in *Sym.* 178d, 186a, 201a, 204b; *Phdr.* 238b-c). But the word *kalos* only occurs three times from the beginning of Socrates' *apodeixis* at 245c6 all the way to 249d3, which contains the whole account of the soul's nature and its fate.<sup>1</sup> Almost immediately after 249d4, Socrates first states clearly that 'the man who is in love with the beautiful things (*ho erōn tōn kalōn*) is called a lover' (249e3-4). The word *kalos* or *kallos* occurs sixteen times in the next few Stephanus pages (249e5, e4, 250b5, c8, d7, e2, 251a3, b2, 251c6, d7, e3, 252a2, a7, b2, 252d5, 253c4; from 253c7 Socrates starts another, more specific topic, which one might designate as moral psychology).

Picking 249d3 as the cutting point is not arbitrary. Socrates himself marks a break: 'this is the point at which the whole account of the fourth kind of madness has arrived' (249d4-5). By this point Socrates has accomplished setting the framework of his account of *eros* by giving an account of the soul: the final end of the soul is its well-being, which consists in contemplating what truly is good, or the Forms of virtues; in this natural motion of the soul towards the Forms, the eleven Olympian gods are intermediaries between the non-divine souls and the Forms; the greatest good for the human soul on earth, which is bestowed by divine madness of love, is to regain its heavenly vision in the trains of the gods, or to prepare for it. 'All the rest of the *muthikos humnos*,' as Hackforth says, 'is an expansion of this conception of love'.<sup>2</sup> The divine madness of love, in turn, must involve recollection at its core, as the true object of love comes to light only through recollection (249d5-e1):

When someone sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded of true beauty,

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<sup>1</sup> These three times are: 246b2, where one horse of the chariot is said to be *kalos te kai agathos*; 246e1, where Socrates states that the divine (*to theion*) is *kalon, sophon, agathon*; 248d2, where the kind of human life that ranks first is said to be that of the wisdom-lover (*philosophos*) or the beauty-lover (*philokalos*), along with the *mousikos* or the *erōtikos*. Only in the third occurrence *to kalon* is explicitly treated as the object of love. None of these occurrences is essential for understanding the story in which they are woven: beauty does not really enter Socrates' account before 249d4.

<sup>2</sup> Hackforth 1952, 94.

he takes wing and flutters in his eagerness to rise up, but is unable to do so; and he gazes aloft, like a bird, paying no attention to what is down below—and that is what brings on him the charge that he has gone mad.

It is in recollection, the passage that links the earthly life of the soul to its life in heaven, that beauty is preeminent. This explains why when Socrates first enumerates the superheavenly Forms in the context of the soul's life in heaven, *kallos* or *to kalon* is not even among them (247d6-7). Before 249d3 the soul is viewed from the heavenly and cosmic perspective; after 249d3, the soul is viewed from the earthly and human perspective. To exaggerate a bit, beauty matters primarily, if not only, from the human perspective, as the frequency of the word's occurrences indicates.

The significance of Beauty itself in recollection is due to its unique power that distinguishes it from the other Forms. There is something that only Beauty can do and the other Forms hardly can. We must define precisely the domain in which Beauty has its 'magic' power. Here Socrates makes two distinctions, the first between on the one hand the soul that scarcely saw the Forms and now have lost memory of them, and on the other hand 'a few whose memory is good enough' (250a2-b2). This distinction is made between the soul that has potentials, so to speak, of recollection, and the soul that does not have. For the latter, neither other Forms nor the Form of Beauty is able to trigger recollection in them. Beauty is not omnipotent; it cannot restore the memory that has been damaged; in this respect it is just like the other Forms. Only for 'a few' souls that retain sufficient memory, Beauty makes a difference by virtue of its manifestness in its earthly likenesses (250a6 ff.), where we find the second distinction between Beauty itself and the other Forms.<sup>3</sup> For 'the many', whose memory has been damaged, Beauty itself and the other Forms do not make a difference: they are blind to Beauty itself (they are erotically responsive to its images though) as much as they are to the other Forms.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Ferrari takes 'a few' (*oligoi*) at 250b4, who detect Justice itself and Moderation itself from their earthly images, to suggest a contrast with the 'unstated implication' that 'the beautiful itself is likely to be detected... by a broader range of people' (1987, 144). But more plausibly 'a few' at 250b4 corresponds to 'a few' (*oligai*) at 250a5, being a constraint of numbers of soul having potentials to recollect. Only a few souls retain sufficient memory, and any attempt to recover the former vision is impossible apart from these 'a few'. If our reading is right, Ferrari is mistaken about beauty by implication being detected by more people: it is not the case that 'a few' come to see the other Forms whereas 'a lot' come to see Beauty itself; rather, 'a few' come to see the other Forms with difficulty (*mogis*); this same 'a few' come to see Beauty itself, by implication, with ease.

<sup>4</sup> Ferrari suggests that beauty 'announces itself, as it were, as an object of concern' (1987, 146). This effect of beauty is indeed not restricted to 'a few' people who still have potentials to

The other superheavenly Forms, Socrates explains, are as radiant as beauty to the souls in heaven, along with the choruses of the gods (250b5-7).<sup>5</sup> Since all the divine is beautiful, wise and good (246d8-e1), and the source of divinity is the moral Forms (249c6), the Forms of Justice, Moderation and Wisdom must be extremely beautiful, too; and whenever we get a clear vision of them, they will cause terrible love (250d4-6). They are all ‘the lovely’ (*erasta*, 250d6), as they are all truly good and truly beautiful. This love caused by the vision of the superheavenly Forms is mentioned in the previous account as the ‘great eagerness to see the truth’ (248b5). Now the human on earth has trouble getting a clear vision of them, so his love for the truth becomes extinguished. It is beauty alone that is capable of rekindling eros. Beauty rekindles our love towards the truly good and beautiful by virtue of its exclusive privilege: being both most manifest (*ekphanestaton*) and most lovely (250d7-e1). As we have seen, the other Forms, namely the Forms of true virtues, are extremely beautiful and lovely as well; so the privilege of Beauty is really its manifestness. There is not radiance (*phengos*), Socrates says, in the earthly likenesses of Justice and Moderation (250b1-3). The earthly likenesses of Beauty, presumably, are

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recollect, but is common to most people, if not all (this is what he stresses by saying ‘this is something we all readily feel’). He is obviously responding to the fact that many people fall in love with beautiful persons. Presumably he thinks that the Beauty itself is behind this – it is what strikes them, and the contrast with Wisdom, etc. (250d4) is that the latter do not strike most people in the same way. Be that as it may, Ferrari’s suggestion is not sufficient to account for the distinction between Beauty itself and the other Forms *in regard to recollection*, since recollection, as has been argued, is only possible for ‘a few’, and Beauty itself distinguishes itself from the other Forms in regard to recollection in its effect on this ‘a few’, not on the many, who with corrupted memory could only respond to beauty in a bestial manner (250e4). Nowhere does Socrates ever say that the earthly images of Beauty itself are able to remind most people of Beauty itself.

<sup>5</sup> κάλλος δὲ τότ' ἦν ἰδεῖν λαμπρόν, ὅτε σὺν εὐδαίμονι χορῶ μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν, ... (250b5-7) should not be read as if *kallos* alone is radiant. Possibly *kallos* here refers not to the distinct Form of Beauty, but to the beauty of justice etc. Or (which I think is more plausible) *kallos* at b4 does refer to the distinct Form of Beauty, and the contrast with Justice and other superheavenly Forms is meant to be: Beauty, although like the others it shone forth to the souls in heaven, is the only one to shine forth to (some) incarnate souls. However, before completing this contrast Socrates gets carried away and in a sense side-tracked into the image of the mysteries, and only completes the contrast (explicitly resuming as if he had got diverted) at d1. *Peri de kallous* indicates his reversion to the main track (‘as I was saying, about beauty’). A few lines later Socrates makes clear that ‘the whole, simple, unchanging and blissful revelations’---these qualifications obviously suggests that the revelation is about the entire superheavenly region---are beheld in pure light (250c2-4). Moreover, in the next passage when Socrates summarizes his previous account, he confirms that ‘as we said, [beauty] shone forth (*elampen*) along with those others’ (250c8-d1). Afterwards comes the contrast between beauty and other superheavenly beings from the point of view of earthly eyes (250d1-e1).

bright and clear in contrast to the obscure and blurred images of Justice, Moderation or Wisdom (250b1-5; d1-3).

Having identified the unique power of Beauty, which has so far been depicted in the text in metaphorical terms, we now have two immediate explanatory tasks before us. The first is to explain what Socrates means by speaking of recollection or being reminded by earthly likenesses. The second is to explain what Socrates means by speaking of the manifestness of Beauty, or the radiance in its likenesses, etc., thanks to which Beauty has its unique power in regard to recollection. The first question is purely exegetical; the second, however, requires perhaps a phenomenology of beauty that explains what is made clear by answering the first question. So the first question must be treated first.

So what does it mean to be reminded of the Form by its earthly likenesses? First it can be made clear that it does not mean that we are reminded of what it is to be beautiful (or just, etc.) in its visible instances, so that we can answer the question ‘what is it to be beautiful?’ etc. with a correct definition. Most incarnated souls, as has been shown, have forgotten their heavenly vision; but even those few with ‘sufficient memory’ (*to tēs mnēmēs hikanōs parestin*) lack sufficient perception (*to mē hikanōs diaisthanesthai*), even though they are said to be divinely maddened through recollection (250a5-b1).<sup>6</sup> Beauty is so manifest that it (in its sensible instances) is apt to trigger recollection, yet recollection does not guarantee full knowledge of what the beautiful is. Beauty, actually, or any other Form, never comes to light fully to non-divine souls, not even back in heaven. That has been made clear before (248a1-6). The human soul is not able to be reminded fully of what it never had full access to. To be reminded of the Forms, therefore, does not imply coming to know what it is to be F in recollection.

The non-divine soul, before it falls down and becomes the human soul, used to enjoy a rather poor vision of the Forms. What the human soul can be reminded of is no more than this poor vision. If full vision of the Form of X means to know what it is to be X, what does it mean to have a poor vision of X? Anyway, to know partly what it is to be X seems to specify a state characterized not by knowledge but by love of knowledge, a state between complete knowledge and complete ignorance (*Sym.* 204a1-7)

In fact, you see, none of the gods loves wisdom or wants to become wise—for they are wise—and no one else who is wise already loves wisdom; on the other hand, no one who is ignorant will love wisdom either or want to become wise. For what’s

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Ferrari 1987, 142.

especially difficult about being ignorant is that you are content with yourself, even though you're neither beautiful and good nor intelligent. If you don't think you need anything, of course you won't want what you don't think you need.

As has been interpreted, all non-divine soul in heaven is eager to see truth, or is all 'philosophic'.<sup>7</sup> It does not know what it is to be just, moderate, wise, and beautiful, but it knows something so that it recognizes that what is just, moderate, wise, and beautiful is what it wants to know, manifest in its 'great eagerness' to see them (248b6). In mythical terms, the non-divine soul does not enjoy the full vision of the plain of truth, but in catching sight of the plain it is aroused with eagerness to see it fully (248b5-c2). This poor vision alone does not give rise to any knowledge (although it must give some traces by which the objects of knowledge are recognized when the soul encounters them), but merely to an eagerness to see what is truly worthy beholding. Since this vision is what is supposed to be restored through recollection, recollection in Socrates' current account is not concerned with the origin or condition of knowledge as some other accounts of recollection in Plato,<sup>8</sup> but with the desire for knowledge. To be reminded of a Form means to realize that there is an intelligible object responsible for its various sensible instances, immediately accompanied by a desire to inquire into the cause. When Beauty is compared to Wisdom (*phronēsis*), the manifestness of Beauty makes it induce 'terrible love' (*deinos erōs*), which Wisdom due to its lack of manifestness is not able to induce in us on earth but only back in heaven (250d4-6). To recover the poor vision is to recover the eagerness, or eros for the truth.

The core of this poor vision is the recognition that the Forms exist and are the objects of true knowledge (cf. 247c8). No matter what else the soul used to see, when in heaven it does see something of the Forms. It catches sight of the Form of X, whatever it is, which

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<sup>7</sup> This is different from saying that they all will become philosophers in earth. For the difference, see our previous interpretation in Section 1.3.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Meno* 80d-81e; cf. *Phaedo* 74c-75a. In both cases, the soul is supposed to have seen, by implication, the whole of the things that are, and not only had a glimpse of them, so recollection there does give rise to knowledge, not just desire for knowledge. Pace Rowe, the account of recollection in the *Phaedrus* does not offer 'a shorthand version of the account in the *Phaedo*' (1986a, 182). The example of being reminded of Simmias when we see his picture does not imply that we desire to have knowledge of the real Simmias, as with Simmias' look in mind we have nothing to desire. Insofar as the case of being reminded of the Equals is supposed to be like that, it seems that being reminded does not involve desire to know what the Equals are/is. I can, e.g. recognize that these sticks etc. are not strictly equal, hence (Plato seems to think) I am bringing to bear some standard of perfect Equals for comparison, without a positive desire to know what Equality is.

is up there. That is to say, the soul once knew that X is, although it did not know fully what X is. Although philosophers later would debate whether or not 'that it is', namely its being or existence, is part of 'what it is', namely its essence,<sup>9</sup> such a question is surely not the concern of Plato and his Socrates. What matters here is that the soul did see the Forms being up there beyond heaven. This is what the teachers of Greece, Homer and other poets, have never taught and will never be able to teach (247c3-4). The ultimate aspiration of the soul must arise on the basis of the discovery or recovery of its true objects, which simply are rather than just come to be (cf. 247d7). Recollection at the current context is the vehicle of the recovery of the horizons of being.<sup>10</sup> In mythical terms, that is rising above the universe, which is the realm of becoming, to the beyond.

For this reason, as we shall see, Socrates links recollection to predication (249b6-c2):

A man must comprehend what is said (*legomenon*) universally (*kat' eidos*), arising from many sensations and being collected together into one through reasoning; and this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw.

Recollection happens through *logos*. By our sensation we perceive many; only collected into speech as a single predicate, the species of X, as one single form, comes to

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<sup>9</sup> The distinction is conceptualized by Thomas Aquinas in his *De Ente et Essentia*, but the origin of the idea must go way back, as Thomas Aquinas himself cites Avicenna in asserting that god has no whatness or essence (*Deus non habet quidditatem vel essentiam*, *De Ente et Essentia* V), where the distinction between *quidditas* or *essentia* and *esse* is clearly discernible. This idea in Avicenna, in turn, probably goes back to Alfarabi. Although Thomas Aquinas' distinction is considered by Etienne Gilson as 'the most important philosophical event after the end of Greek philosophy' (2011, 123), it is not plausible to assume that Greek philosophers had no awareness of the distinction, although perhaps not in exactly the same way Thomas Aquinas conceives it. In so far as Plato distinguishes the superheavenly horizons and the limited and partial vision of the Forms, he is aware of the fact that the awareness of the existence of the Forms and the specifications of the Forms do not go together (although this epistemological distinction is surely different from the ontological distinction made by Thomas Aquinas). And precisely on this condition the soul has a desire for true knowledge: if we already have full vision of the Forms, we do not desire it; if we do not have the awareness of the existence of the Forms, we do not know where to seek knowledge.

<sup>10</sup> Ferrari rightly alludes to *Republic* 523b-524d, where Socrates takes the sight of fingers as an example to distinguish the experience which awakens thought and that which does not. The perception of fingers, Socrates says, does not awaken thought, but the qualities of bigness and smallness of the fingers are something that awaken thought, because in experience the bigness and the smallness must be mixed: a finger is always big compared to a smaller one and small compared to a bigger one, whereas in thought the bigness and smallness must be separated. Situations like that, Socrates says, give rise to the question of 'what is' and the distinction between the visible and the intelligible (524c10-11). This wakening effect must be an alternative of to recollection, both serving as paths from becoming towards being.

emerge. The human is rational animal, in so far as he speaks and thinks by general species (*kat' eidos*), in collecting a manifold of perception into intellectual unity. This is equivalent to lifting one's eyes beyond the horizon of becoming and focusing one's gaze on being. The things that come to be are sensible; the things that are are intelligible. To recollect is to comprehend particulars in terms of universals, to understand that what he sees is not what he sees but a species, or a kind.<sup>11</sup>

As the arena of recollection, predication is in accord with our previous specification of recollection: what comes to light in predication is that it (a Form) is rather than what it is. Whatever is predicated, the just for example, is not disclosed in predication. When someone says 'Socrates is F', from the predication nothing is known definitionally about what F is; but merely that F is (in Socrates) is known. As Socrates takes for granted, 'S is F' implies 'there is F in S' (*Phd.* 100b-d). What it means to say that Socrates is just is that there is the just, or justice, in Socrates; what it means to say Alcibiades is beautiful is that there is the beautiful, or beauty, in Alcibiades. In saying so someone is merely stating that justice or beauty is there, without indicating what justice or beauty is. An *eidos* does not come to light with its *logos*. That it is we are pretty sure, whereas what it is remains obscure.<sup>12</sup>

Having addressed the first question, namely, what Socrates means by speaking of recollection or being reminded by earthly likenesses, we now can address in turn the second question of what Socrates means by speaking of the manifestness of Beauty, or the radiance in its likenesses, which constitutes the privilege of Beauty in contrast to the

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Phdr.* 250b3-5: those who manage to recover the vision of Justice and Moderation, says Socrates, 'behold with difficulty, when approaching the images, the genus (*genos*) of what is imaged' (250b3-5). This is an attempt to recover the kind of vision which is supposed to be recovered in recollection, although it is not the recollection of Beauty that is elaborated in the speech. Hackforth's translation omits *to genos* and renders as '... behold that which is imaged' (1952, 93); Rowe renders it as '... observe the nature of what is imaged in them' (1986a, 69), interpreting that *to genos* as 'the nature', which would be wrong, if 'observing the nature' means grasping its *logos* (coming to know what it is to be X), as we have argued, the recovery of such vision does not entail a full analytic grasp.

<sup>12</sup> On this ground we can reject the interpretation of the uniqueness of beauty in regard to recollection as consisting in the supposition that the likenesses of beauty reflect their original more accurately or immediately than the likenesses of the other Forms reflect theirs. Such an interpretation is suggested by de Vries and Robin (see Ferrari 1987, 143). What is clearer in the likenesses of Beauty is not what Beauty is, but that it is. If the 'what' of Beauty is clearer through its likenesses, the question what it is to be beautiful would be easier to answer than the corresponding questions regarding justice and moderation. However, as Hippias agrees, what is beautiful is no less disputable than any other issue, and what is truly beautiful is not regarded by everybody as beautiful (*Greater Hippias* 294d).

other Forms. Given our interpretation of recollection in the current context, one might wonder what kind of uniqueness Beauty itself could possibly have in regard to recollection, considering that in predication, the arena of recollection, 'just', 'moderate' can be predicated as well as 'beautiful'. It is not in any way more difficult to comprehend justice than beauty in speech. My reply is this. Although it is made clear that recollection happens in predication, it is also true that not all predication is the arena of recollection, since the universals or the species (*eidos*) that are predicated of the subject need not be the true universals or natural species, that is, the things that are, but could be what are taken in their place. For example, when someone says 'S is just', as has been argued, he is in effect saying that justice is in S; but it usually does not indicate that justice itself, what truly is just, is indeed there in S, since that very justice attributed to S is not necessarily what truly is just, but merely what one conceives justice to be. For example, Cephalus would call someone just who pays his debt; Polemarchus would call someone just who benefits his friends and harms his enemies; Thrasymachus, in turn, would even say that whoever serves the interest of the stronger through folly is just. None of Socrates' interlocutors in the *Republic* I would agree from the beginning that the philosopher, within whose soul everything is in proper order, is just. This fact implies that even they come across a truly just man they are very likely to be unable to recognize the presence of what truly is just, that is to say, they are very likely to fail to be reminded of Justice itself by a just man. This holds as well in the case of moderation and wisdom and whatever could be added in this list (Socrates mentions them as *alla timia psukhais* at 250b2).

The failure of the likenesses of Justice itself etc. to trigger recollection is due to the psychological process through which the terms such as 'just' are predicated. We say that S is just or moderate on the basis of (a) a preconceived notion of justice or moderation in the first place, and (b) the fact that S happens to conform to our pre-conception. Therefore, nothing other than the conception of justice that we already have is called to mind through the predication of justice. Moreover, suppose that we have an opinion of justice, when we come across a person, we judge him in light of the opinion; believing him to be a just person or not, we then judge another in reference to our judgment of him; by repeatedly doing so, we strengthen our belief in what justice is. Predication in this case is a self-feeding and self-fed circulation, based on, and then reinforcing the opinion of justice that one already has, whether true or false. Although true belief or correct opinion may serve well as a substitute for knowledge (cf. *Meno* 97a-98c), beings, or that those which truly are, are not to reveal themselves to the closed mind which precludes

any ascending from appearances. The soul, as Socrates says, having fallen down feeds on the nourishment of appearance (*trophē doxastē*, 248b5),<sup>13</sup> instead of pasturage of truth or being (248b7). To recover the horizons of being from the Cave of appearance requires a turning around of the soul (cf. *Rep.* 518c).

Beauty itself,<sup>14</sup> on the other hand, constitutes an exception. It alone bridges in a way the gap between appearance and being. Unlike the others, the predication of beauty is not dependent upon any preconceived notion of beauty. Rather, a man without any preconceived notion of beauty would appreciate beauty straightaway, while a man with a preconceived notion of beauty would be ready to discard it before the shining of true beauty in a face or a body, if his preconceived notion goes against his experience. I could see beauty in someone in front of me even if I *thought* otherwise.<sup>15</sup> Whereas predicating 'just' depends on having a pre-conception of justice in the first place, and correctly predicating on a correct one, predicating 'beautiful' of the instances of Beauty itself is not thus dependent. (Since pre-conceptions of justice etc. are usually provided by culture, predicating 'just' is usually culturally dependent.) What it is to be beautiful is directed connected to what it appears to be beautiful (through our senses), without the mediation of what it is conceived to be beautiful (which is also a form of appearance).

As for why Beauty itself has such power to connect being and appearance, Socrates

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<sup>13</sup> The alternative translation 'what appears to nourish' does not make a significant difference philosophically. Given that what really nourishes the soul is what truly is, what appears to nourish the soul must be what appears to be.

<sup>14</sup> Plato uses the term *kallos* rather than *to kalon* for what we call beauty here, as opposed to virtues like justice, moderation and wisdom, which are also *kala* (246e1). Note especially *auto to kallos* at 250e2, instead of *auto to kalon* as one might expect (cf. *Sym.* 211d3). In Greek, the noun *kallos* has a narrower denotation, usually of erotic attractiveness, than the adjective *kalos* and hence the substantive adjective *to kalon*, which is usually rendered as 'the fine' or 'the noble', etc. Erotic attractiveness, of course, is usually found in, but not confined to, physical beauty. One example: compare the phrase *kalōs legeis* ('well said') or its numerous equivalents in Plato with Socrates' use of *kallos* (perhaps ironically) on the Gorgianic style of Agathon's speech in the *Symposium* (198b4-5). Konstan 2015 explores this distinction in great range of classical literature. I am grateful to Professor Konstan for letting me consult his unpublished work, and my work is much in debt to the discussion with him. As we shall see, the manifestness of *kallos* is closely related to the compulsion of eros that it causes. Admittedly, not everything that is fine (*kalos*) shows its beauty as clearly as, say, a beautiful face does. On the fine activities (*kala epitēdeumata*) and customs (*kala nomima*) people have more strife than on anything else (*Hippias Major* 294c8-d4). The beauty of law or knowledge, as well as that of virtues, is not easily appreciated as that in the human body is. Those *ta kala* lack the *kallos* that causes eros and triggers recollection.

<sup>15</sup> A relevant case occurs in the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates, whose beauty is detected by Alcibiades, even though Alcibiades actually does not know what the truly beautiful is (*Sym.* 219a).

does not explain in the *Phaedrus* any more than metaphorically. Any answer to that question, then, cannot but be highly speculative. In Socrates' speech, both beauty itself and its likenesses are characterized by some kind of 'light' on it (*phengos*, 250b3; *augē*, c4) or by their 'shining out' (*lampron*, 250b6; *elampen*, d1; *stilbon*, d2). The repeated metaphor of (flashing) light is reminiscent of Socrates' analysis of the conditions of seeing a visible object: apart from the sight of eyes, the object to be seen, there is still a third thing which makes the vision of the object possible, that is light (*Rep.* 507d-e). Light (*phōs*) is different from, but presupposed by anything that comes to light (*phainetai*). Light declares its presence (that it is), even though it is not made seen through itself as other things are made seen through light (what comes to light). In other words, we see that light is without seeing what it is. I take this beauty-light parallel to convey Socrates' or Plato's insight about beauty, that beauty is not what appears but the way in which things appear. Things are beautiful when they appear in a shining way. The second definition of the beautiful in the *Great Hippias*, naïve as it is, dimly reflects this insight (289e). The beautiful there is defined as gold, since 'wherever that is added, even if it was seen to be foul before, it will be seen to be beautiful when it has been beautified with gold'. Gold makes things beautiful because it makes their appearance shining. It is nothing but this mode of appearance that makes a thing beautiful. And precisely because of that, the being of beauty can be disclosed by the appearance of beautiful things.

To sum up, Socrates' account of beauty can be sketched as follows. For a few people whose memory has not been damaged, their souls are able to recover the horizons of being, which they used to have, through recollection. Thus recollection is a path that allows the soul to 'ascend' from the realm of coming to be (*genesis*) towards the realm of being (*to on*), coming to realize that the true objects of knowledge lie not in the world to which we are accustomed, the things which we believe to be but actually are only coming to be, and which we grasp through our senses, but in the things which truly are, and which are grasped only by intelligence. This path can be found through predication, since in predication the sensible in sensations is understood in terms of the intelligible in thought. Now when it comes to justice, moderation and other virtues or 'values' (cf. 250b2), the major obstacle in the ascending is not pleasure and passion that are supposed to be attached to the realm of becoming (cf. *Phaedo* 81b), but appearances, especially what appear to be just etc. in artificial light, namely, accepted opinions or beliefs about justice, etc. They stand in the way of recollection because the soul is confined within the scope that has been pre-defined by the opinions. To recover the horizons of being, in the cases

of justice etc., the soul must be forced to turn back on appearances and to face being. That is the turning around of the soul, which is bound to be only with great difficulty (250b4) and probably with force and compulsion.<sup>16</sup> Beauty, on the other hand, can lead the soul towards being without forcing the soul to turn around, because the being of beauty declares its presence in its very appearance. If we compare the 'ladder of love' and the ascent from the Cave, both being prominent imagery of philosophical ascending, the critical difference consists in the fact that the former is an ascent through appearances of beauty (beauty as in bodies, in characters, in sciences, etc.) to the beautiful itself, whereas the latter is an ascent that requires a thorough rejection of appearances, true or false, a 'turning around' of the soul. In erotic ascent, the soul does not have to turn its back on appearance, for when it is facing appearance of beauty it is facing the being of beauty. Since the soul in facing beauty is not locked up in appearances, it is not compelled to turn around with resistance as the freed prisoner does in the Cave. That is Beauty's privilege.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> The language of compulsion (*anankē*) and force (*bia*) is recurrent in the analogy of the Cave (*Rep.* 515c6, d5, e1, e6, e8, 516a1). Scholars have wondered about its meaning. Whatever it is to put the prisoner under compulsion, as Barney argues, 'we should understand necessity in the Cave in purely functional terms, as whatever overcomes resistance' (2008, 367). The resistance to ascending is implied in the mentions of discomfort during the way along which the prisoner is dragged out of the Cave, which, as Barney points out, echoes an important theme in *Republic* 5-7, namely the resistance to philosophy. 'Together with passages like the image of ship and the stargazer in book 6 (487a-488a), the Cave explains why the philosopher is the object of unjustified (though understandable) scorn and hostility in ordinary societies' (Barney 2008, 364). The cause of this resistance lies in the self-contained game of shadows: one is used to identifying the current shadows or even to predicting shadows to come through his memory of the previous shadows, and in repeating the game one strengthens his trust in the shadows (516c-d; cf. 515d); see above on the circulation in predication of justice.

<sup>17</sup> Barney suggests that an erotic ascent triggered by beauty is a candidate reading of the liberation of the prisoner in the Cave allegory (2008, 371). To make sense of this reading, she interprets the compulsion along the ascent of the prisoner as the compulsion of eros (368-370). Although eros is often depicted in Plato as a compulsive force, and as such precisely in the *Phaedrus*, Barney's erotic reading of the Cave allegory fails to identify clearly what kind of resistance is felt in an erotic ascent that corresponds to the resistance felt by the liberated prisoner. Actually, what is striking in an erotic ascent is the lack of resistance: the soul as a whole embraces the vision of Beauty willingly. (There is resistance to sexual indulgence, but that is irrelevant to the resistance of turning around.) The erotic ascent does not fit in the picture.

## 2.2 Erotic Experience and God

Erotic experience arises from the encounter with Beauty in its earthly likenesses (249d5-e4). Recollection is part of erotic experience, but only for 'a few' people who have sufficient memory (250a5). The other people, or their souls, whose memory is damaged due to their unfortunate turning to injustice by keeping certain kinds of company (250a3-4), whatever it is, are paraphrased by Socrates later as those 'whose initiation was not recent, or who has been corrupted' at 250e1. The initiation in question is made clear at 250b8 as of the heavenly vision. If this vision was so remote that the soul has inevitably forgotten it, or the soul has forgotten the vision because of the corruption, presumably by injustice, Beauty cannot trigger recollection (250e2). The response to Beauty on their part is to pursue sexual intercourse like a four-footed beast (250e1-251a1).

That eros for beauty may work out badly is a piece of common sense. One might expect that Socrates has an explanation of the bad effect of eros in spite of his praise of eros. This expectation is made all the more reasonable due to the fact that the condemnation of eros in the first two speeches, which Socrates now sets up to recant, is based on that common sense about eros. A simple solution is to distinguish between two kinds of eros, one good and the other bad. This solution is so convenient that it is applied on almost every occasion where the complication of eros requires an explanation. For example, in the *Symposium*, Pausanias and Eryximachus insists on the duality of god Eros, making a good one responsible for the good effects and a bad one for the bad (180d-181a; 186a); in the *Phaedrus*, too, when Socrates was about to start his recantation, he ascribes the vices of the lover to eros of a vulgar sort, in contrast to eros belonging to free men (243c2-d1); later when he looks back on his two speeches and assigns each of them to a certain kind of eros: the condemnation to the 'left-handed' eros and praise to the 'right-handed' one (265e3-266b1). Because of that one is likely to connect the bestial response to beauty described in 250e1-251a1 with the condemnation of eros in Socrates' first speech.<sup>18</sup>

Such connection, as a matter of fact, is misplaced. Eros is condemned in Socrates' first speech on these grounds: there are two rival motivations ('ruling and leading ideas') within us, one being 'inborn appetite (*emphutos epithumia*) for pleasure', and the other being 'acquired judgment (*epiktētos doxa*) that aims at the best'.<sup>19</sup> If the latter prevails, the

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<sup>18</sup> For example, Yunis 2011, 151.

<sup>19</sup> *Doxa* can mean both 'judgment' and 'opinion'. Here 'judgment' is probably a better translation, as the text here is meant to convey the idea that in the mind of the lover his

soul is in the state of *sōphrosunē* or moderation; if the former prevails, the soul is in the state of hubris. Eros is condemned because it is a species of hubris; that is to say, it is a state of mind in which the ‘inborn appetite’ prevails over the ‘acquired judgment’ (237d6-238c4). In this psychological picture, there is no inborn appetite for the good (although it is possible for appetite to be in accord with the good, see 237d9); all conceptions of the good must be imported in from some external source. So his ‘judgment’ must be ‘acquired’ (*epiktētos*), based on accepted opinions of the good and calculation in their light. If one wants to do well, his inborn appetites must give in, if ever in conflict with them, to the considerations regarding what is believed to be good, e.g. health, honour, wealth, etc. However, according to our previous discussion of Beauty, when the accepted opinion of beauty is at odds with the experience of beauty, it is the former that gives in. The ‘acquired judgment’ of the divine lover is also impaired; therefore, in contrast to him, the lover suffering bad eros is not the only one to be condemned, if the condemnation is made on the grounds of the impairment of one’s ‘acquired judgment’. On the other hand, the judgment of the divine lover is presumably sounder than anybody’s. His judgment, however, is by no means ‘acquired’ from outside. The soundness of his judgment is presumably due to his recollection of what is truly good for the soul (but we must not assume that his judgment is made on the basis of reasoning). As the term ‘recollection’ itself indicates, the vision recovered in it is not imported from any human culture, but is called to mind as a memory of what the soul itself once witnessed in heaven. In this sense this judgment is no less ‘inborn’ than any appetite. In recollection the sound judgment and the natural desire for beauty go together, if they are not simply the same thing.

If a kind of accepted opinion of the good has particular significance in human life, it must be *nomos*, which declares what ‘seems good’ to the city.<sup>20</sup> Among ‘food of opinion or appearance’ (*trophē doxastē*) which the soul feeds on after its fall (248b5), *nomos* is or should be the staple. Socrates’ first speech thus is on the same level as Pausanias’ speech in the *Symposium*, in so far as they both, when judging between the goodness and badness of eros, resort to accepted opinion. *Nomos* guides humans when knowledge and intelligence, with which one can be legitimately guided by himself, is in fact not available for them (*Laws* 875c-d; cf. 716a); that makes it a substitute for the genuine food for the

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rational judgment is impaired by his irrational desire. So *doxa* at 237d8 is rendered as ‘judgment’ rather than ‘opinion’ in Rowe’s, Nehamas and Woodruff’s and Hackforth’s translation. However, ‘opinion’ is not completely irrelevant here, as we shall see.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. 258a4-5, where Socrates mentions that Athenian laws usually begins with such phrase: *edoxe tēi boulēi* or *tōi dēmōi*, or both.

soul, the vision of the Forms. It plays the same role which true belief or correct opinion plays in the *Meno* (97a-98c). However, as has been shown, a useful substitute for knowledge can also prevent the soul from recollection of what truly is. In respect of being an ordering force of the soul's motion, the difference between the knowledge of the good and the public opinions of the good such as the *nomos* of the city seems merely to be one between the universal and the local. However, the *nomos* of the city will not be accepted just as some local 'knowledge'. When the people accustomed to eat their parents after their death are asked about the idea of cremating their late parents, or the Greeks asked about the idea of eating theirs, the idea would not be taken simply as 'another custom', but as something terrible (Herodotus 3.38). Both the parent eaters and the Greeks believe that their custom should be applied universally. As a conception of the good, *nomos* appears to the relevant people to make a universal claim, and therefore it does not accept another universal claim above it.<sup>21</sup> It usurps the universality and supremacy of knowledge, being 'the lord of all'. We are so deeply rooted in its conceptions of the good that we feel no need to lift our eyes beyond them. Despite its extreme importance for human life, *nomos* casts a spell on the soul. We are in the Cave and we feel at home in the Cave. We resist the attempt to go out.<sup>22</sup>

The spell, therefore, must be broken, and it is broken, as we have seen, in the encounter with Beauty. Under the lure of beauty, one 'despising all the customary (*nomimōn*) and the decent, in which he used to pride himself, is ready to be a slave' (252a4-6). Beauty lights up a way out of the *nomos*, leading to lawlessness in one way or another. Specifically, beauty lures one either downward to the pursuit of sexual pleasure (250e1-251a1), or upward to recollection. Now the downward path, or 'bad' eros, is not condemned by Socrates on the grounds of its indecency in light of the *nomos*, as it is in Pausanias' speech, but because it goes against nature (251a1).

A possible misunderstanding requires clarification here. It is contrary to nature (*paraphusin*), Socrates says, for a man to 'go on four feet like an animal and father offspring (*paidosporein*)' (250e4-5). Hackforth believes that the word *paidosporein* at 250e5 refers to heterosexual intercourse (because homosexual intercourse does not 'beget children'), and

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<sup>21</sup> How the law is supposed to be accepted is reflected in a comparison to the *Laws*: the Athenian stranger in Book X introduces a theology based on the nature of the soul being 'motion capable of moving itself', and accordingly, the source of motion (896a). In Book IV, moreover, a solemn passage (716a-d) 'is clearly an echo of the great myth in the *Phaedrus*' (Morrow 1965, 128). In spite of their resemblance, nothing equivalent to the superheavenly Forms and the 'plain of truth' in the *Phaedrus* ever occurs in the *Laws*.

<sup>22</sup> See 2.1 n.16.

Socrates here is condemning heterosexual intercourse.<sup>23</sup> Vlastos, however, argues that *paidosporein* simply means ‘to sow generative seeds’, and in light of the context does not refer to heterosexual intercourse, but to homosexual intercourse.<sup>24</sup> According to him, what is contrary to nature is homosexual ‘sowing’ which cannot actually reproduce. Vlastos’ reading is hardly plausible, since the distinction made between the pursuits contrary to nature and that which is natural is clearly one between sexual intercourse and restraint from sexual intercourse, not between a supposedly unnatural way of intercourse (homosexual) and a natural way of sexual intercourse (heterosexual), even though the latter distinction does appear in the *Laws* (841d). Actually, the pursuit of pleasure contrary to nature is obviously linked with the four-footed manner (*tetrapodos nomon*, 250e4), namely, the bestial manner. Thus the most plain and natural way to interpret ‘contrary to nature’ is, as Rowe suggests, that such pursuit of pleasure belongs to a wild animal, not a man (1986a, 184).

So what Socrates says here is this. The encounter with the earthly likenesses of Beauty, giving rise to the contempt of the law, could go either way. It could either trigger recollection, through which the soul recovers the vision of the Forms which defines human nature,<sup>25</sup> or it could result in the degradation of humanity, or bestialization.<sup>26</sup> This is the destructive force of eros of the beautiful for those outside ‘a few’ who have sufficient memory.

Socrates’ description of erotic experience of the divine lover, as we shall see, is set in contrast with sexual experience. For that Socrates exploits the Empedoclean theory of sight (251a7-d7).<sup>27</sup> Language of sight is translated into language of touch: the visual

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<sup>23</sup> Hackforth 1952, 98. Although Hackforth believes that Socrates does not really mean it.

<sup>24</sup> Vlastos 1973a, 25 n.76.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. 249b5-6: ‘For a soul which has never seen the truth will not enter this shape (i.e. human)’.

<sup>26</sup> Turning into animal is not the punishment paid by unjust men. Unjust souls have paid their full penalty beneath the earth (249a6-7), and when time comes they ‘come to the allotment and choice of their second life’, which, *pace* Hackforth, does not imply ‘our lives are partly pre-destined, partly self-chosen’ (Hackforth 1958, 88; Ferrari 1987, 134 also takes that for granted), for it is made perfectly clear that ‘each chooses whichever it wishes’ (249b3). Rowe is probably right to suggest that allotment is for the order in which every soul makes their choice, like the situation in the myth of Er at the end of the *Republic* (1986a, 182). The willing choice of the soul is the manifestation of their eros. So if a soul indulges in bestial pursuit of sex it probably will choose for its next circuit a life of animal. So it is reasonable to assume that the *thesmos Adrasteias* (248c2) works on human souls too. Once the soul fails to see the truth, it falls downward and incarnated into a human. It falls from heaven when it fails to see what is truly good; on earth if it fails to see its substitution, that is, *nomos* (because it is *trophē doxastē* of some sort), it falls again, turning into an animal.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Yunis 2011, 153.

experience of beauty now is described as the lover receiving through his eyes the 'particles' (251c6) or 'stream of beauty' (251b2). As this reception goes on, the eros or desire on the lover's part accumulates. Desire, as is usually acknowledged, arises with an awareness of lack (cf. *Sym.* 204a), from which the feeling of pain stems. The experience of desire is painful. The satisfaction, on the other hand, is pleasant. Now that desire in this new theory is also a stream that flows in or fills the lover, its experience is at the same time fulfilling and pleasant as much as needy and painful. This mixture of pleasure and pain in erotic experience, which Sappho elegantly specifies as 'bittersweet' (*glukupikros*, Campbell 130), is compared to the experience of cutting teeth (251c1-5).

In such a theory, psychology turns into physiology (in our modern sense of the word). It allows Socrates to make a graphic parallel between the erotic experience of the divine lover and sexual experience. As Yunis points out, sexual allusions like warming (251b3), melting (b4), swelling (b5), gushing (c1), chafing (c4), tingling (c4), throbbing (d4) suggest a mounting 'sexual' tension.<sup>28</sup> Just like actual sexual tension, erotic experience here is subject to a kind of reinforcing feedback, that the experience of pleasure causes the need for more pleasure of the same sort.<sup>29</sup> This can be explained by the following account: the stream of beauty springing from the beloved causes all the itch and ache on the lover's part; at the same time, it is this very stream of beauty that soothes the lover's pain. 'In order to overcome the irritation,' as Ferrari puts it, 'the lover's soul must embrace its cause'.<sup>30</sup> The cure of the lover's pain, according to the account, consists in its cause. The lover therefore is left in despair at the *atopia* of his suffering and raging in his *aporia* (251d7-8).

But the difference is also clearly marked out. This metaphorical sexual tension will not find full release, compared to actual sexual tension which will eventually release in orgasm, and the desire vanishes in satisfaction. Although 251e3-252a1 seems to suggest a final discharge of tension on the lover's part, Ferrari points out that the sight of the beautiful boy only makes the wing keep growing with unpleasant itch, not makes it stop.<sup>31</sup> Divine madness does not culminate in an equivalent of orgasm.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Yunis 2011, 152. Also see Ferrari on how Socrates using the imagery of swelling stem and moistened lips (1987, 154).

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Ferrari 1987, 156. He points this out in a comparison with Freud's account of sexual pleasure.

<sup>30</sup> Ferrari 1987, 155.

<sup>31</sup> Ferrari explains this difference in terms of the theoretical purposes of Freud's and Socrates' account, without inquiring into the intrinsic nature of the two kinds of experience (1987, 156). Ferrari seems to overlook the fact that sexual experience in the current text is precisely

The experience of divine madness will keep in its original track, and the urge felt gives rise to a greater urge without cessation. The soul of the divine lover is always in need, and does not rest on anywhere. The lover forgets his family, his friends, his wealth, and sleeps wherever he is allowed to get as close as possible to his beloved (252a2-7). We have a picture of eros extremely similar to that of the daemon Eros in the *Symposium* (203c-d):

As the son of Poros and Penia, his lot in life is set to be like theirs. In the first place, he is always poor, and he's far from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary people think he is); instead, he is tough and shriveled and shoeless and homeless, always lying on the dirt without a bed, sleeping at people's doorsteps and in roadsides under the sky, having his mother's nature, always living with Need. But on his father's side he is a schemer after the beautiful and the good; he is brave, impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter, always weaving snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all his life, a genius with enchantments, potions, and clever pleadings.

Eros is homeless. It is not that he has been deprived of what belongs to him, but that it is his nature (from his mother) to be in this situation. On the other hand, he is clever, courageous, resourceful because of his father.<sup>33</sup> But he is never said to have anything to do with fulfilment. He is not even searching for a home where he can rest himself. Eros is something between the beautiful and the ugly, between wisdom and ignorance, between the mortal and the immortal (202a-203a), but he is not something between lack and fulfilment, as it could be understood in this way, especially in sexual experience in which sexual desire is conceived to point to the final consummation. Eros, however, is lack itself, as one should comprehend that his mother, Penia or Poverty does not really need another as her generative partner to give birth to Eros, for the characteristic that Eros inherits from his father Poros, or Resource, is that he is contriving (*epiboulos*) the beautiful and the good (203d4), and Penia in contriving (*epibouleusa*) to bear Eros with Poros (203b7) presupposes an eros within herself and actually has merged Poros into herself: she on her

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set in contrast with the experience of divine madness or recollection.

<sup>32</sup> Pace Hackforth, nothing in Socrates' account suggests a full satisfaction, definitely not in a 'full spiritual union with the beloved'. See Hackforth 1952, 98.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Halperin 1986, 73: 'Plato's language [in *Sym.* 203d-204a] is designed to emphasize the active, restless character of the desire that is common to the passionate paederast and the aspiring philosopher'.

own is resourceful, and thus comprises all these aspects in her: lack, resource, and desire.<sup>34</sup> Eros therefore is not nostalgia. He is at home being homeless.

In erotic experience of the divine lover there echoes the heavenly life of the soul. The soul even back in heaven is restless. It follows one of the eleven gods who travel in heaven (247a6-7), but unlike god, the non-divine soul, which will be humanly embodied, is always on its way to see the truth and not once does it have full satisfaction, that is, it never have the full vision of the Forms, even though it does catch a glimpse of them. On the other hand, back there the soul never knows Hestia,<sup>35</sup> the goddess of hearth, who always stays at home when the other eleven travel across and rise above the heaven (247a1-2). The eros of the soul does not point to home.

God somehow gets involved in the erotic experience of the divine lover. Although Socrates does not apply the term 'recollection' (*anamnēsis*) to god, he nonetheless describes how the lovers, inspired by the beauty of their beloved, discover the nature of their god (*aneuriskein tēn spheterou theou phusin*), that is, the god whom they used to follow in heaven, and they grasp the god through memory (*ephaptomenoi autou tēi mnēmēi*). That, in a way, can be well specified as the recollection of god (252e5-253a5).

But at first it is not their god, Zeus or Apollo or some other god, that emerges in erotic experience. For those 'newly initiated', that is, as has been shown, whoever has sufficient memory and potential for recollection (251a2-7):

When he sees a godlike (*theoeides*) face or bodily form that has imitated Beauty well, first he shudders and a fear comes over him like those he felt at the earlier time; then when he gazes at him he reveres him like a god (*hōs theon*), and if he weren't afraid people would think him completely mad, he'd even sacrifice to his boy as if to a shrine and to a god (*hōs agalmati kai theōi*).<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Strauss 2001, 194.

<sup>35</sup> Hestia in early Greek cosmology often stands for earth, our home planet, cf. Hackforth 1952, 73; also see Rowe, Yunis on 247a1. Hestia is believed to be an allusion to earth and the whole cosmos in the *Phaedrus* a picture of a geocentric system. Arguably descending to earth is to follow Hestia, just as to rise to heaven is to follow the rest Olympians, cf. Griswold 1986, 263n.37.

<sup>36</sup> *agalmati kai theōi* at 251a6 is usually taken as a hendiadys, meaning 'statue of a god', (Hackforth, Rowe, and Nehamas & Woodruff), with the 'god' understood as someone among the Olympians that the soul of the lover used to see. But this is implausible, as has been argued, since there is no direct link between the beauty of the beloved and the Olympian god of the lover. I suggest that *kai* here is simply conjunctive: the boy is a shrine (i.e. an object of worship; cf. *Tim.* 37c7, Cornford *ad loc.*) and a god, for the reasons that I am about to put forth in the following main text. It is noteworthy that the duality of the beloved,

The question arises from this passage is what a 'godlike' face or body should be like? Although the soul did see gods back in heaven, it is made clear that gods themselves are pure souls without body (246c6-d2), hence they definitely do not have a face or body shape. Then how can someone see a godlike face or bodily form? The only explanation is that a face or bodily form is godlike not because it looks like the face or bodily form of a god, but because it 'imitates Beauty well' (251a3). Beauty we can recognize from its radiance; hence a radiant face or body is a godlike one. This can be attested by a later passage meant to expound the current one, in which the charioteer is said to be struck and reminded of Beauty itself by the beloved's face flashing (*astraptousan*, 254b5). God, as Socrates says, owes its divinity to its association with the Forms (249c6); by virtue of its association with Beauty itself, a beautiful face is godlike. It is not that the beloved is an *agalma* by virtue of pointing to a certain god, but that the beloved as a god points to something beyond him. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the beloved is a god precisely because he points to something beyond him, namely, Beauty itself. Anyway, in pointing to something beyond himself, the beloved is an *agalma* as well as a god (251a6).

Thus, on the sight of the beautiful boy the lover divinizes the boy,<sup>37</sup> not acting like a heretic, but according to Socrates' own account the boy himself, or part of him, is indeed something divine. The lover at this point is *not* said to be reminded of his god, Zeus or whichever, but to invent, or tend to invent a new god, his beloved. So the lover pays him religious reverence due to a god, which he once experienced (251a4). Yunis rightly takes this former experience to be referred to at 250b4-c4:<sup>38</sup>

But beauty was radiant to see at that time when the souls, along with the glorious chorus (we were with Zeus, while others followed other gods), saw that blessed and spectacular vision and were ushered into the mystery that we may rightly call the most blessed of all. And we who celebrated it were wholly perfect and free of all the troubles that awaited us in time to come, and we gazed in rapture at sacred revealed

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both as a god and as an *agalma*, is instantiated in Alcibiades' description of Socrates (also see n.37 below), given that Socrates is a sculpture of Silenus, as well as a Silenus called Marsyas (215a-b).

<sup>37</sup> Griswold (1986, 124) compares Socrates' account here to Alcibiades' speech in the *Symposium*, in which he being in love with Socrates divinizes him (215b, 216e-217a). But Socrates' body is so ugly that Alcibiades has to divinize his inner characters. So Socrates is likened to a Silenus, which contains a divine *agalma* inside (215b3, 216e6). But Griswold mistakenly poses the contrast between the outer ugliness and inner beauty, which is characteristic of Socrates alone, as if it is between the body of the beloved and the Beauty in it. The Beauty in the beloved's body, as we have seen, is reflected in his body itself.

<sup>38</sup> Yunis 2011, 152.

objects that were perfect, and simple, and unshakeable and blissful.

What reminds the lover of his god, i.e. the one among the Olympians, is not the beloved's face or physique *per se*, but the experience that he suffers before the physical beauty of the beloved, which is the same as that which he had once in heaven. Only by virtue of this connection, the god that the lover once saw is called to mind. Here Zeus and other Olympians emerge.

In this way the vision recovered in recollection includes more than Beauty itself. Although there is no resemblance between these gods and the physical features of the beloved (as the gods have no body), the gods come to light through the recovery of the soul's former vision. Now as for Beauty itself and the other Forms, the soul used to have a bare glimpse of them but never had a full vision, but the soul did have a substantial vision of its god, i.e. its ideal. That is to say, although we could never know, within the universe of the *Phaedrus*, what it *is* to be beautiful, we nonetheless could know what it *is like* to be beautiful. Moreover, the beauty reflected in the eleven Olympians is not physical beauty that the beloved displays, but beauty of the soul, presumably its virtues such as justice, moderation and wisdom. Through the remembrance of god, therefore, we could also be provided of an image that shows what it is like to be a virtuous soul.

On earth the soul fails to recognize true virtues; now the virtues are embodied in the gods and thus appear as beautiful as the physical beauty that the beloved displays. An ideal of the soul, or an ideal pursuit (*epitēdeuma*) or pattern of life (*idea*), starts to attract him. Therefore, the lover on the one hand adopts the pattern that belongs to his god (252c3-5), on the other hand selects his beloved from the point of view of the soul, and tries to shape his beloved's soul according to that ideal (252c5-253c3).

In this way Socrates' account introduces a third party, i.e. god, in erotic experience and alters its structure. Now there is the lover, the beloved, and their god as an extremely attractive image. This god is an image in two senses: first, it is a sort of reflection or embodiment of Beauty and other Forms; second, it is something called to the lover's mind, in other words, a mental image. After the lover recovers his former vision he is rather attracted to the image than the beloved himself, although he attributes all the traits of the god to the beloved (252d5-6, 253b3-4). His attribution is likely (but not necessarily) to be a fond delusion. It is not unusual that we fall in love with someone in the belief that the beloved must have such and such character but it turns out not to be so.<sup>39</sup> What the

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<sup>39</sup> Vlastos is absolutely right to point out that the fantasized quality might be located falsely in

lover really falls in love with is this image, or his fantasy, rather than the actual person. This feature in Socrates' account is sharply noted by Vlastos, and invites his comparison between Platonic love and romantic love. Vlastos clearly finds it unsatisfactory for the lover to fall for an image rather than the individual. The crux in Plato's theory of love, according to him, consists in the fact that '[w]hat we are to love in persons is the 'image' of the Idea in them. ... the individual, in the uniqueness and integrity of his or her individuality, will never be the object of our love'.<sup>40</sup> This report of Platonic love, in spite of the criticism that is drawn from it, is fair enough in general, although Socrates' account here in the *Phaedrus* is even closer than Vlastos takes it to be to romantic love: the image with which the lover falls in love not only reflects the Forms, but above all is an ideal in the lover's imagination. The following words of Rousseau capture the function of image (in the second sense) in love: 'There is no real love without enthusiasm, and no enthusiasm without an object of perfection, real or chimerical, but always existing in the imagination'.<sup>41</sup> Socratic or Platonic lover is not merely attracted to 'the image of the Idea', namely, the virtuous qualities in the beloved, but actually to a god as an anthropomorphic (in terms of the soul) image in his imagination.<sup>42</sup>

Plato and his Socrates, surely, would not regard that as 'the crux' of their theory of love as Vlastos does, but as an essential ingredient of all erotic experience. It is, within the context, an organic part of his whole story. In heaven the soul follows its god and in following its god catches a glimpse of the truth; on earth the greatest blessing for the human soul consists in the recovery of its heavenly vision and existence as far as possible. So it is right, or natural, to be attracted to the god and through it to the Forms, as that is how it was in heaven; it is wrong, or unnatural, to fix one's desire upon the individual.

On the other hand, Socrates' story is after all different from that of romantic love to this effect. In the story of romantic love, the image is conceived to be an idealized version of the beloved. Yes, this image is usually a fond delusion, but the beloved remains its archetype. In Socrates' account, on the other hand, the image, although it could be projected onto the beloved, is actually the ideal of the lover, the god of the lover. This is

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the beloved (1973a, 28).

<sup>40</sup> Vlastos 1973a, 31.

<sup>41</sup> *Émile*, quoted by Vlastos (1973a, 28).

<sup>42</sup> Griswold appreciates the role of imagination in Socrates' account more accurately than Vlastos does, see Griswold 1986, 126-28. Ferrari also notices this feature: "He [i.e. the philosophic lover] saw a statue and a god---saw, as I said earlier, his own vision made visible. So that already the icon of beauty, as well as the icon of Zeus, is in part a creation of the philosophic lover" (1987, 172).

most clear in the mismatched pairs,<sup>43</sup> for example, a Zeus type lover is paired with a Apollo type beloved, the god that is called upon to the mind clearly would be Zeus rather than Apollo; even in the pairs that are not mismatched, although the lover and the beloved are of the same type, that is, used to follow the same god in heaven, the god only comes to the lover's memory as his god. As Griswold points out, what happens in the remembrance of the god is actually self-discovery,<sup>44</sup> only this discovery is not sought by the lover himself, but is given to the lover through compulsion of love (253a2).

Among all eleven ideal patterns of life, only one of them, that of Zeus, leads the soul to philosophy (252e1-5). Philosophy is love of wisdom or knowledge, and the genuine kind of knowledge lies in the region beyond heaven (247c6-d1), the vision of which is recovered in recollection. That is to say, only for the Zeus-type lover, what is made available in recollection, the ascent towards being, becomes a pattern of life, not merely occasional events in life, as it is for the lover of other types. We should not forget that the non-divine souls in heaven are divided into two classes: one strives to hold its head beyond heaven seeing the Forms with great difficulty; the other rises at one time and sinks at another (248a1-5).<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Note 252d1-3: 'everyone spends his life honoring the god in whose chorus he danced, and emulates that god in every way he can, so long as he remains undefiled and in his first life down here'. The soul recognizes its god not without qualification. There must be mismatched pairs as the soul of the lover fails to recognize its own god either when it fails to remain undefiled or when it lives the succeeding lives after the first. Cf. Benardete 1991, 148.

<sup>44</sup> Griswold 1986, 126.

<sup>45</sup> See our interpretation in 1.3.

### 2.3 Necessity and Desire in the Tripartite Soul

Socrates' account of erotic experience is followed by and unfolded in a vivid account of the inner conflict within the scheme of the tripartite soul. Near the beginning of the speech Socrates likens the form (*idea*) or structure of the soul to a chariot team, with a charioteer and two horses (246a6-7). Almost every commentator takes the account of the soul-chariot in the *Phaedrus* to be an instance of the so-called doctrine of tripartite soul, comparable, if not parallel, to another case of tripartite psychology in the *Republic* IV.<sup>46</sup> In this section I shall compare the psychology in the *Phaedrus* with that in the *Republic*, so as to mark out the critical difference between the two accounts that, to my knowledge, has not yet been sufficiently appreciated. The failure to appreciate that very difference, in my view, is due to a dogmatic understanding of Socrates' accounts in the two dialogues, neglecting the bigger scheme in which the 'doctrines' are set. So in the following interpretation, I shall pay due attention to how Socrates gives his account as much as what he gives in his account.

The parallel between the tripartite scheme in the *Phaedrus* and that in the *Republic* is construed as follows. In both dialogues, the three parts of the soul are conceived to be the subjects of distinct desires, or loves, so to speak, potentially conflicting with one another. In the *Phaedrus*, the white horse is said to be a lover of honour (253d6); the black horse presumably a lover of carnal pleasure; the charioteer, apart from its eagerness to see the truth (248b5-c1),<sup>47</sup> is also said to be moved by the beauty of the boy: it is 'filled with tickles and pricks of longing' (253e6-254a1). In the *Republic*, similarly, three kinds of desire are assigned respectively to the three parts of the soul, which accordingly acquire the names with the prefix *philo-*: the appetitive part is assigned the desire for material gain and thus receives the name '*philokerdēs*'; the spirited part the desire for honour or victory, with the name '*philotimon*' or '*philonikon*'; the calculative part the desire for truth or wisdom, with the name '*philosophon*' (580d-581c). In both accounts, the most desirable condition of the soul is one in which the rational part of the soul, the calculative part in the *Republic* or the charioteer in the *Phaedrus*, gains the controlling position. However, the difference is obvious, too. In the *Republic*, the soul in which the rational part is in control

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<sup>46</sup> See Hackforth 1952, 72; Rowe 1986, 177; Griswold 1986, 94; Ferrari 1986, 200; Yunis 2011, 138; Sheffield 2012, 211, 222; Burnyeat 2012, 249; etc.

<sup>47</sup> One might say that there only the soul is said to have eagerness, not the charioteer specifically. But it is also made clear that the truth is only visible to the intelligence (*nous*, 247c8), whose possessor cannot but be the charioteer.

is a just soul; that in the *Phaedrus*, on the other hand, is a divinely mad soul. This difference will turn out to be not merely in name, as if the just soul and the divinely mad soul are one and the same state of mind with different designations, but consist in the fact that the *Republic* is concerned with the constraints imposed on the desires of the soul (especially the desire of reason) by necessity,<sup>48</sup> whereas the *Phaedrus* is concerned with the satisfaction of the desire of reason in relation to the well-being of the soul.

Let us start with the obvious. Regardless of the relatively superficial resemblance between the tripartitions of the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*, the former but not the latter is developed in the context of a discussion of (a) individual justice under social conditions and (b) justice of the city as a whole, whereas the latter is not. It must be pointed out that the political background of the *Republic* and the lack of it in the *Phaedrus* do not explain, by themselves, the difference between their accounts of the soul. It is not true, as it will turn out, that the just soul in the *Republic* and the divinely mad soul in the *Phaedrus* are in the same condition, merely with different designations only because the former is put in the political context and the latter is not. However, we must look at that obvious fact, namely that the account of the soul in the *Republic* is set in a political context, and see how this fact affects Socrates' account.

Let us follow Socrates' strategy and examine the status of the rational part in the city-soul analogy, that is, in light of the status of the rulers, its counterpart in the city. Bear in mind that the city in question, which is divided into three classes, is the second city, not the first, which emerges to fulfill the basic needs of human life, mostly if not exclusively the needs of body (369b-c). People in this first city live a life free from poverty and war (372c1), thus neither men of resource nor fighting men are necessary. So

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<sup>48</sup> The word 'necessity' requires some comments. Here 'necessity' (or 'compulsion', etc.) is meant to be the equivalent to the Greek word *anankē*, which is a word with many denotations (cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* V 1015a20-b15). Its significant uses in Plato, see Barney 2008, 366n.18, 367. In this section necessity or *anankē* is meant to convey these denotations: (a) what is necessary in a given situation (necessity entailed by some sort of practical rationality); (b) an unpleasant compulsion (internal or external) imposed on the agent somehow against his natural inclination. As we shall see, necessity or *anankē* in the sense (a) and (b) are pivotal to the account of the *Republic*, and in this context are closely related. But admittedly, sometimes Plato also uses *anankē* to denote (c) the compulsiveness or uncontrollability of desire or impulse (e.g. *Rep.* 458c8-d7, *Phdr.* 253a2; also cf. Gorgias *Helen* 18-19; Euripides *Medea* 530; Barney 2008, 368-69). In a sense, *anankē* (c) is characteristic of the psychology of the *Phaedrus*. It is worth noting that *anankē* (c) stands in opposition to *anankē* (b), since the agent under (b) is acting against his desire, while the agent under (c) is acting in accordance with his desire. To avoid confusion, in this section I shall not use necessity or compulsion to denote (c).

technically, in the first city, what we call political institutions are not yet established because the need for them has not yet arisen; they are introduced to answer the demands of Glaucon, who is obviously dissatisfied with the first city and calls it with scorn 'a city of pigs' (372d4). But the second city that Glaucon demands to accommodate luxurious way of life necessitates war (373e), which in turn necessitates men fighting for it. Here arise all the considerations of the class of guardians. Therefore, the presence of guardians and the whole institution built upon it to run and defend the city are merely something necessary for a feverish city (372e8), which is bound to wage wars against its enemies.<sup>49</sup> Anyway, the idea of living together in a city, both in its origin and in its following development, arises from the considerations of what is necessary (*anankaion*) rather than what is fine (*kalon*). The Callipolis is in this sense not *kalos*.

I above all recount the beginning of their 'founding' of a city in conversation, which seems not to be immediately relevant to the psychology in the *Republic*, because the following discussions, particularly that of the notorious 'philosopher-ruler', are strictly along the same line of reasoning. Socrates' question is what is necessary for the well-governance and flourishing of the second city. The answer is a wise class of rulers, which is able to determine the best course of action to take for the sake of the good of the city--- a feverish one rather than a healthy one---as a whole; a courageous class of auxiliaries, which follows the declarations of the rulers and fight against the enemies; and justice and moderation among all the three classes. Each class, although assigned a certain desire, above all is supposed to work out a certain function necessary for the city. Each part of the soul, accordingly, has its own work: *to logistikon*, reason or the calculative part, is something in the soul by virtue of which it calculates; *to epithumētikon*, appetite or desiring part, is something by virtue of which the soul loves, hungers and thirsts and gets excited by other desires; *to thumoeides*, spirited or thumos-like part, is something by virtue of which we get angry (439d5-8; 439e3). Justice consists in each doing its own work, not satisfying its own desire.

The 'philosopher-ruler' is introduced with the same kind of consideration. That is to say, the philosopher is not put in the ruler's position because he wants to rule, but

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<sup>49</sup> Rowe points out that the second city is owed to Glaucon rather than Socrates, so he suggests characterizing Socrates in the dialogue a 'reluctant political theorist'. To quote: 'Seeing no need for the things that cause war, dissent, disharmony, he sees no fundamental need for political institutions themselves – even if prevailing conditions might temporarily require them, they are not part, as it were, of the furniture of his world' (2007a, 46). Also cf. Rowe 2007b, 179, on Socrates' accounts in *Republic* II-IV do not satisfy himself as much as they satisfy his interlocutors.

because he is adequate for ruling as he is capable of running the whole city in the best possible way, working out the ruler's function adequately. Therefore the whole controversy regarding the philosopher is whether or not he or his knowledge is useful, to emphasize, for that city, rather than whether his knowledge itself is noble. As Pradeau points out, 'it is the function of government, the function of leadership, that determines the choice of the most competent men. ... He [i.e. Socrates] asks who is capable of assuming the function of government',<sup>50</sup> so 'the figure of "philosopher-ruler" can be regarded as the answer to a strictly political question',<sup>51</sup> in other words, to the requirements of mere necessity.

The same thing is true among the soul parts. Ferrari notices that in Book IV, the rational or calculative part is said to be concerned with the good of the whole (441e, 442c), whereas it is said in Book VIII and IX to desire wisdom or truth, that is, to be philosophic (581c). Ferrari is quite right to assert that this seemingly 'double orientation' is not an inconsistency, but what matters is what its implication is.<sup>52</sup> The calculative part should be concerned with the good of the whole soul in the way in which the philosopher-ruler should be concerned with the good of the whole city. They should be so concerned because that is their work. They alone are competent to make such deliberation for the whole of which they are a part, and their competence makes them 'appropriate to rule' (ἄρχειν προσήκει, 441e4); as a result, it is necessary for them to assume the work of ruling if the whole is to be well-governed; that simply does not make them naturally inclined to rule.<sup>53</sup> Ferrari puts it well: 'Even within the soul, ruling is work. (Philosophy, by contrast, though it takes exertion, is the finest and most serious play).'<sup>54</sup>

Could the job that one must take on, namely, what is necessary, happen to be what is naturally desired on the part of the philosopher or the philosophic? The text suggests otherwise. Philosophy, Socrates says, would turn out divine in the best constitution, and other ways of life merely human (497c). Ruling, thus, is only a human affair. And a lover of truth has no leisure to look down at human affairs but spend his time on looking at and studying the things that are (500b). The contrast between what is necessary and what is naturally inclined is made clear in the following lines (500c2-d9):

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<sup>50</sup> Pradeau 2002, 57-58.

<sup>51</sup> Pradeau 2002, 55.

<sup>52</sup> Ferrari 2007, 165, 166n.2.

<sup>53</sup> Pace Cooper, who takes the text to suggest that the rational part has a desire to rule other than its natural appetite for truth or knowledge, see Cooper 1984, 6. Actually, one qualification for ruling is that one is reluctant to rule (520d).

<sup>54</sup> Ferrari 2007, 166.

[A]s he [i.e. the philosopher] looks at and studies things that are organized and always the same, that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he imitates them and tries to become as like them as he can. Or do you think that someone can consort with things he admires without imitating them?

I do not. It's impossible.

...

And if he should come to be compelled (*ἀνάγκη*) to put what he sees there into people's characters, whether into a single person or into a populace, instead of shaping only his own, do you think that he will be a poor craftsman of moderation, justice, and the whole of popular virtue?

He least of all.

On the one hand, the philosopher admires and endeavors to imitate rational order of true beings, as a result (or being identical to) of his contemplation;<sup>55</sup> on the other hand, he reproduces this order in others, which the job of ruling involves, only through necessity or compulsion (*ἀνάγκη*). The philosopher alone is competent to rule, yet the philosopher is naturally inclined towards something else, so he must be compelled to rule (499b, c). Therefore, ruling is not only necessary for the philosopher to assume for the sake of the city, but also an unpleasant compulsion imposed on him. The need for compulsion is stressed further in the analogy of the Cave, when the philosopher has been shown to be reluctant to return to the Cave and to rule (519c8-5d7), and he not only prefers 'staying outside', but even despises political ruling (521b).<sup>56</sup> The notion of compulsion keeps occurring in this passage (520a8; 520e2; 521b7; 539e2), until the end of discussion on the philosopher's education, where its implication cannot be made clearer (540b2-5):

When his turn comes, he must labor in politics and rule for the city's sake, not as if he were doing something fine (*kalon*), but rather something that has to be done (*anankaion*).

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<sup>55</sup> In the *Timaeus*, as we have seen in the last section, the contemplation of cosmic order itself is the assimilation to the cosmic order (90c6-d7).

<sup>56</sup> Here we detect what Annas calls the 'unworldly strand' which she only attaches to the *Phaedo*, the *Theaetetus*, and to some extent to the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus*. For example, at 476a, *praktikoi* are not deemed true philosophers; at 486a-b, the philosopher is said not to regard this life of man a thing of great concern; at 496b ff., studying philosophy requires one keeping out from politics; at 497c, an assertion is made that philosophy alone is divine, all the rest are mere human; at 500b-c, the lover of truth is said to have no leisure to look downward upon the petty affairs of man; etc.

The fine thing to do is contemplating the Form of the Good (perhaps in doing so assimilating himself to it), which is the finest of all things (cf. 508e-509a; 506c). The thing that 'has to be done' (*anankaion*) is ruling, or concerning oneself with the good of the whole, which requires dealing with what is lower. In order to do what is necessary, he must give up on the finest activity, towards which his natural desire is directed. In other words, he must control his natural desire. The natural desire of the rational part of the soul, correspondingly, must be under control in the analogous state of the soul. It must turn back on what is and look at the shadows, that is, what appears or what comes to be (518c8).

Furthermore, it is not only that the philosopher does not desire to assume the political power from the point of view of an individual, but also that he must not desire to assume the political power from the point of view of the city. The worthy rulers must be precisely those who do not want to rule, otherwise the political power will be abused for the ruler's private good instead of the common good. That is to say, the ruler, for the good of the city, must be reluctant to rule (520e-521a):

Each of them will certainly go to rule as to something compulsory, however, which is exactly the opposite of what's done by those who now rule in each city. This is how it is. If you can find a way of life that's better than ruling for the prospective rulers, your well-governed city will become a possibility, for only in it will the truly rich rule—not those who are rich in gold but those who are rich in the wealth that the happy must have, namely, a good and rational life. But if beggars hungry for private goods go into public life, thinking that the good is there for the seizing, then the well-governed city is impossible, for then ruling is something fought over, and this civil and domestic war destroys these people and the rest of the city as well.

To sum up our analysis of the *Republic*, the philosopher's passion for vision of the Form of the Good and other Forms is both politically necessary and apolitical. Politically important because by contemplating the Forms he gets the wisdom which is the necessary qualification of ruling; apolitical because the passionate desire for this, without which one will not acquire it, makes return to the cave a sort of second best for him as a human individual, although it is the necessary thing for him considered as a product of the state (it has educated him precisely in order to take up the ruler's task). The fact that the philosopher is in this way apolitical is in turn politically important, since not wanting to rule is, apart from wisdom, another necessary qualification of a worthy ruler. In a

word, the political context gives rise to the sovereign of necessity. At the centre of the universe of the *Republic* stands the spindle of Necessity (616b-c). It is worth noting that if the philosopher in the *Republic* were to give free rein to his desire for pure wisdom, he would be assuming the freedom of a god, which does not belong to him, namely, going to live in the Isles of the Blest before he has discharged his human duty (519c). From the ordinary-human point of view this could look like madness, although Plato does not discuss that in the *Republic*.

Let us now turn to the *Phaedrus*. The decisive difference between the two dialogues turns out to be the lack in the *Phaedrus* of the political considerations that direct the account in the *Republic*. To be specific, in the *Phaedrus* Socrates does not present the rational part (i.e. the charioteer) as under necessity of ruling. He does not ask, as he does in the *Republic*, for which part it is necessary to rule, if the soul is to be well-governed, in a way analogous to a well-governed city. Therefore he does not assign the job of ruling to the rational part, as if some situation necessitates such assignment, even though nowhere in the *Phaedrus* suggests that the rational part by nature is not suitable to rule.

The tripartite soul in the *Phaedrus*, one might say, is not an analogue for an ideal city. Therefore in the *Phaedrus*, unlike the *Republic*, the idea of the reason controlling (thus, ruling) the other parts is not worked out as a *political* metaphor or simile. It simply does not follow from this, however, that reason in the *Phaedrus* is not concerned with the good of the soul as a whole, and that its function is not to rule the other parts. The charioteer, at any rate, has to deal with the lower parts (even in the divine soul the charioteer does feed the horses, see 247e4-6) and is supposed to take care of the whole chariot.

Admittedly, the well-being of the soul as a whole is in a way a concern of the soul itself, as we have argued that every soul desires its own well-being, and therefore this is *the* concern of Socrates' account. This concern, however, is not unfolded in such question as 'in order for the whole soul to fare well, which element of the soul ought to be concerned with the well-being of the soul as a whole (because it is suitable to do so)?' The answer to this question, as the *Republic* demonstrates, cannot but be that the rational part ought to concern itself with the well-being of the whole. The formulation of that question presupposes that the well-being of the soul must be actively and deliberately worked out by the soul itself. This presupposition is precisely in line with that which is held in the first two speeches in the *Phaedrus*, that the good can be delivered by sanity only, and madness must work out badly (244a5-6). This is exactly what Socrates intends to recant in his second speech. Here in his second speech, the concern for the well-being of the soul

as a whole is unfolded in this question: in order for the whole soul to fare well, which desire within the soul should get the upper hand? The answer is: only if the rational part gets what it naturally desires, the soul could fare well (256a7-b7):

Now if the victory goes to the better elements in both their minds, which lead them to follow the assigned regimen of philosophy, their life here below is one of bliss and shared understanding. They are self-controlled (*enkrateis autōn*) and orderly (*kosmioi*) now that they have enslaved (*doulōsamenoī*) the part that brought trouble into the soul and set free (*eleutherōsantes*) the part that gave it virtue. ... There is no greater good than this that either human self-control or divine madness can offer a man.

This blessed state, like that in the *Republic*, involves self-control and orderly life; unlike that in the *Republic*, the rational part of the soul is not compelled to burden itself with any work imposed by necessity, but enjoys freedom, that is, doing what it desires to do, and the lower motives of the soul are not regulated and taken care of, but simply have been subjugated (which is a result of the freedom of the rational part, as will be shown later). The well-being of the soul does not depend on the deliberation and calculation of the charioteer, but on giving in to the desire of the charioteer.<sup>57</sup>

Therefore, in the palinode the rational part of the soul is not under an unpleasant duty to assume the work of ruling, but enjoys its freedom. Only on this ground can we

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<sup>57</sup> One might ask if doing what has to be done, as it seems in the *Republic*, requires giving up (even in part) on what is naturally desired to do, does it mean that the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic* are inconsistent on the question of well-being? I submit that they are not necessarily inconsistent, since the well-being of the soul-chariot in the *Phaedrus* and that of the just soul in the *Republic* are not comparable. The blessed soul in the *Phaedrus* is in heaven, being rid of body; the best soul on earth is the soul most resembling its state in heaven; the soul in the *Republic* is after all the embodied soul on earth, which makes dealing with body indispensable. The key is the analogy between the soul and the city. A well-governed city must respond and satisfy the basic needs of body for the sake of which the city is established in the first place, let alone the luxurious appetites and their consequences that the 'feverish' city is designed to accommodate. Cf. Rowe 2007b on the soul in the *Republic* is discussed 'as it appears to be, or appears as being in life, not as it really is, i.e. what it can and should be' (168-69). The cases comparable to the *Phaedrus* are the *Phaedo* and the *Theaetetus*, in which the soul will fare best if it is separated from body as far as possible. The soul in such state cannot be a soul analogous to a well-governed city, which must take care of, and control over, but never ignore or even flight from body. The task of finding an appropriate place for bodily needs and regulating them is not fine, but necessary to take on for the embodied soul, just as political ruling is not fine, but a necessary task to take on for the city. One should not overlook the fact that the so-called city-soul analogy is at first an analogy between a city and a man (368e), that is, a combination of soul and body.

understand properly the interplay between the charioteer and the horses after the lover is close to the beloved enough to be reminded of the true Beauty and Moderation back in heaven (254b3-c3):

So they are close to him now, and they are struck by the boy's face as if by a bolt of lightning. When the charioteer sees that face, his memory is carried back to the real nature of Beauty, and he sees it again where it stands on the sacred pedestal next to Self-control. At the sight he is frightened, falls over backwards awestruck, and at the same time is compelled (*ēnankathē*) to pull the reins back so fiercely that both horses are set on their haunches, one falling back voluntarily with no resistance, but the other insolent and quite unwilling.

This response is complex. It begins with the charioteer's awestruck by the Forms, and that somehow leads to his interaction with the horses. Awe and reverence are natural reactions to beauty when the soul is reminded of the divine vision of the Forms (251a). In this sense the initial response is in accordance with the charioteer's nature. The charioteer, thus, is not acting (or reacting) under compulsion: first, the black horse fails to impose compulsion on him (cf. 254a5, b1); second and more importantly, the charioteer responds initially in this way not because he has to. Although, due to the disobedience of the black horse, the charioteer in a way has to (*ēnankathē*) pull back the reins (254b8), nonetheless the pulling is precisely caused by his natural impulse rather than stands against it.

Because the charioteer's response is spontaneous in the sense that he is reacting from his impulse, his struggle with the horses is different from the account of the inner conflict in the *Republic*. The struggle with the base appetites is now not something accepted as duty, but something spontaneous; it moreover does not arise from rational deliberation of any sort, but from the shock of seeing Beauty. The charioteer pulls the reins not with the concern for the good of the whole soul, or in the belief that letting the black horse drag the whole chariot approaching the boy is not good for them or is 'terrible and indecent' (254b1). He does not calculate or deliberate the good of the whole as the rational part of the soul ought to do in the *Republic*. He does what he does simply because cannot help doing what he does.

Partly because the charioteer is subject to a spontaneous but violent response, and partly because the black horse is not obedient to verbal command as its yokemate but is driven only by the whip and goad (*kentrōn*, 253e4), namely, by mere force,<sup>58</sup> the conflict

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<sup>58</sup> Just as the charioteer is driven by the 'goad (*kentrōn*) of longing' (254a1). It seems that

between it and the charioteer becomes savage (254d4-e5):

It [i.e. the black horse] struggles, it neighs, it pulls them forward and forces them to approach the boy again with the same proposition; and as soon as they are near, it drops its head, straightens its tail, bites the bit, and pulls without any shame at all. The charioteer ... violently yanks the bit back out of the teeth of the insolent horse, only harder this time, so that he bloodies its foul-speaking tongue and jaws, sets its legs and haunches firmly on the ground, and 'gives it over to pain.'

The black horse is eventually humbled, not because it is convinced that the charioteer is its natural ruler, but because of fear (*phobōi diollutai*, 254e8).<sup>59</sup> The charioteer gains control, not by persuasion but by force. His silent violence is made strikingly manifest by the black horse's employment of persuasive words and its appeal to moral righteousness: it rebukes the charioteer and the white horse for their cowardice and unmanliness (254c7-d1).<sup>60</sup> In a word, the rational part in the soul of the *Phaedrus* gains control not by what is considered 'rational' means but by what is usually considered 'irrational' means, by simply overpowering the irrational elements.

The *Republic* gives a picture in which the rational part persuades the thumic part to ally with it, fight together against the disobedient appetites (440a-b). Besides, when the appetitive part is eventually tamed, it believes that the rational part is its natural ruler (442c-d; cf. 432a). Thus the three parts are not only in right order but also in harmony and friendship (443d5). The picture in the *Phaedrus*, on the other hand, is strikingly violent and savage. This picture, in lack of reasoning and deliberation and any sort of rational contrivance on the charioteer's part, expounds Socrates' previous account of erotic experience. Although the soul in which the charioteer gets the upper hand refrains from seeking for sexual pleasure, it nonetheless is driven by a certain complex of pleasure and pain (cf. 251a1-252a1). Hackforth puts it accurately that divine *sōphrosunē* is 'not a passionless self-suppression, but a passionate self-surrender, which is nevertheless a profound satisfying of self'. We can make it more specific that it is the charioteer, the

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compulsion in this picture is all represented by the goad.

<sup>59</sup> Hackforth 1952, 107. Hackforth points out this feature 'seems to imply a complete suppression of the lowest part of soul than that of *Rep.* IV, where it has a legitimate function and needs to be controlled rather than suppressed; ... Even in *Rep.* IX, where it has become a "many-headed beast", it can still be brought into harmony with the higher parts (589b)'.

<sup>60</sup> Ferrari confirms this observation: 'in the struggle between the two it is the bad horse who adopts persuasive language and the methods of reason, while the charioteer maintains control by sheer strength and wordless violence' (1987, 186).

rational part of the soul, that is the self being satisfied; it is not under compulsion in any way: neither is it compelled by the base appetites, nor compelled by the duty of ruling the base appetites. In such a self-surrender or self-indulgence what is disregarded is not only sexual pleasure, but also one's family, property, reputation and even pride (252a1-b1), all worldly concerns, so to speak. To use Socrates' words, the soul granted this freedom is a divine madness as opposed to mortal self-control.

In sum, the just city in the *Republic* requires the philosopher to rule, so the philosopher is compelled to return to the Cave as a duty, and accordingly, the rational part of the soul is required to deal with the lower parts when its natural desire is of pure knowledge above; the mad soul in the *Phaedrus* sets free the charioteer, granted such liberty that it is no longer bound by any considerations of necessity, that is, it pays no attention to what has to be done, particularly the burden that it assumes in the *Republic*, namely, the compulsion of duty, however just or noble it is. Since the well-being of the soul, in the context of the *Phaedrus*, consists in its life by itself, separated from the body, what is necessary, even for bare survival of mortal life, is not taken into account. That is to say, not only the conditions of a feverish city, but the original purpose for whose sake the city is established in the first place is not taken into account. Socrates in the *Phaedrus* is removed from the city as far as possible. Whereas in the *Republic* Socrates is forced to stay at Piraeus (327c) to engage in a conversation at night hence in an artificial light, he is now driven by his eagerness to hear Lysias' speech (227d), outside the city, under the sun of high noon (242a4).

## 2.4 Moral and Erotic Psychology

In last section we examined the considerations that direct Socrates' accounts of the tripartite soul in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* respectively. The account of the tripartite soul in the *Republic*, as has been shown, is concerned with the consideration of what each part of the soul must do, or ought to do, if the soul as a whole is to be well ordered, whereas that in the *Phaedrus* is concerned with the consideration of which part of the soul should be set free if the soul as a whole is to fare well. The conflict in the soul-chariot, therefore, is illustrated quite differently from that in the soul-city. The difference consists on the one hand in the role which the rational part plays in each account, on the other hand in the way in which the parts of the soul interact. The charioteer in the account of the *Phaedrus* is set free, without being compelled to take on the burden of taking care of the whole soul as its counterpart in the *Republic*, the philosopher on the one hand, the philosophic part of the soul on the other, is; it moreover dominates over the two horses by mere force, without using persuasion as its counterpart in the *Republic* does (440a-b).

But the story above is in a way over-simplified. Socrates' account of the divinely mad soul is indeed contrasted to the account of the soul in the *Republic* as expounded above and in last section. The account of the divinely mad soul, however, does not exhaust the entire account of the soul's inner conflict in the *Phaedrus*. Socrates actually offers an account with two distinct episodes of the inner conflict rather than one, and they are distinct in event rather than in presentation. The distinction has not been paid due attention, partly because the two episodes are presented consecutively. I am referring to 253e5-254b1 and 254b3-255a1, which I designate respectively as moral psychology and erotic psychology. The role of the charioteer and its interplay with the horses are quite different as between those two psychological episodes. Once we come to appreciate the difference, it will be clear that the account of the soul as the *Republic* offers is not completely missing in Socrates' account here in the *Phaedrus*, but presented in the first episode of the inner conflict, or what I call moral psychology.

First let us look at the *Republic*. In *Republic* IV, Socrates conceives in sequence of three scenarios of inner conflict, meaning to distinguish the different parts of the soul. In those scenarios we are shown interactions between the soul parts. The first scenario is a man wanting and rejecting drink at the same time. We are told that the rational part rejects drink as a result of rational calculation (439c). In the third scenario, borrowed from Homer, the rational part out of rational calculation persuades his *thumos*, or spirit to

endure, (441b-c). The second scenario represents the conflict between the spirited part and the appetitive part (439e-440a). At first glance that has nothing to do with the rational part. But immediately Socrates points out the connection (440a-b):

Besides, don't we often notice in other cases that when appetite forces someone contrary to rational calculation, he reproaches himself and gets angry with that in him that's doing the forcing, so that of the two factions that are fighting a civil war, so to speak, spirit allies itself with reason?

In what way, then, does spirit ally itself with reason? Socrates goes on to say that spirit will listen to the voice of reason, like a dog to its shepherd (440d). That is to say, spirit is persuaded by reason. The alliance between reason and spirit, which relies on the persuasion of reason, is the ground of the just soul. So in the comprehensive picture, the rational part interferes with other motives in the soul with calculation or deliberation on what is best for the whole soul, which the other parts lack; if the lowest part is not obedient to reason, spirit is invoked to fight against deaf appetites (440b, e, 442b). But later we are told the deliberative or calculative part of the soul is also philosophic (581c). Being philosophic, the desire of the rational part cannot be persuading the spirited, just as the philosophers would be ruling the city only reluctantly. So the appetite of the soul is under control in this way: the reason controlling its own desire for knowledge concerns itself with the well-being of the soul as a whole; the spirit being persuaded allies itself with the reason and keeps the appetite in check.

This interplay between the parts of the soul is compared immediately to that between the classes of the city (440e-441a). It turns out that the rational part in the soul has a counterpart in the city, that is the deliberative class, or the rulers; the spirited part and appetitive part, too, have their counterparts, the auxiliary class and the money-making class. A well-ordered soul, thus, is compared to a well-ordered city, in which each class does what is suitable for them. The rulers rule the whole city by good counsel; they do not fight the enemies of the city, internal or external: that is the job of the auxiliary (442b; cf. 415d-e).

So in the account of the *Republic*, *thumos* or spirit plays a critical role in controlling appetites. Spirit is the element of the soul by virtue of which it gets angry (439e). The way in which spirit in allying with reason fights appetites is through moral indignation. As is made clear in the previous quotation, one reproaches himself and gets angry with the appetite (440a-b). A rather similar account can be found in the first episode of inner

conflict depicted in the *Phaedrus* (253e5-254b1):

Now when the charioteer looks in the eye of love, his entire soul is suffused with a sense of warmth and starts to fill with tingles and the goading of desire. As for the horses, the one who is obedient to the charioteer is still controlled, then as always, by its sense of shame, and so prevents itself from jumping on the boy. The other one, however, no longer responds to the whip or the goad of the charioteer; it leaps violently forward and does everything to aggravate its yokemate and its charioteer, trying to make them go up to the boy and suggest to him the pleasures of sex. At first the other two resist, angry in their belief that they are being made to do things that are dreadfully wrong.

The charioteer, as has been pointed out,<sup>61</sup> is attracted to the beauty of the beloved in the first place. But it does not act according to its desire, but rather restrains itself from acting according to it. But when the black horse, suggesting sex to the whole chariot team, forces them to jump on the beloved, the charioteer is said to resist the black horse along with the white horse (254a7-b1). The reason for which they resist the black horse's intention is that they get angry (*aganaktounte*, 254b1) at being compelled by the black horse to do terrible and the unlawful things (*deina kai paranoma*). In other words, it is moral indignation that causes the resistance to sexual appetite and through this resistance the soul is held back. This moral psychology is an accurate illustration of the account of inner conflict in the *Republic*, in which the rational part keeps in check its desire for pure knowledge, and allies with the spirited part to fight the appetitive part.

It is noteworthy that in the moral psychology nothing is mentioned about the central theme of Socrates' account of erotic experience, that is, recollection. And the absence of recollection is not due to the fact that Socrates cannot say everything at a time, but precisely to the fact that in the first episode the soul is not yet ready for recollection: only when the black horse drags the soul close enough, the beauty of the beloved 'shooting out lightning', reminding the charioteer of the true beauty and moderation back in heaven (254b3), the interplay between the charioteer and the horses transforms into the mode of divine madness, as we elaborated in last section (erotic psychology). In the moral psychology, although the soul is not reminded of any superheavenly Forms, particularly not that of Moderation, nonetheless it shows some trace of self-restraint, in reacting to the beauty of the boy in the way that is considered moderate (254a7-b1).

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<sup>61</sup> Ferrari 1987, 186.

Socrates later speaks of some sort of ‘mortal moderation’ (*sōphrosunē thnētē*, 256e5) or ‘human moderation’ (*sōphrosunē anthrōpinē*, 256b6) in contrast with divine eros or madness. We shall discuss the mortal moderation in relation to divine madness in Chapter 3. Here it suffices to point out that if anywhere in the palinode explains this ‘mortal moderation’, which is connected to the ‘wisdom’ of the non-lover (256e4), it must be in the account of moral psychology.<sup>62</sup>

‘Mortal moderation’, as has been shown, relies on moral indignation and spirit of the soul. Presumably, the spirit (*thumos*) of the spirit-like (*to thumoeides*) in the *Republic* is in a way related to, if not a counterpart of the white horse in the *Phaedrus*, as they both are characterized as the honour-loving element in the soul (*Rep.* 550b, 581a; *Phdr.* 253d6). However, spirit or moral indignation is not attributed to the white horse or any other part of the soul as its essential property. This fact has a particular significance on Socrates’ account of two psychologies within the *Phaedrus*. As I understand, it is meant to convey the idea that *thumos* is not a natural ingredient of the soul. This is not inconsistent, however, with the account of the soul in the *Republic*, as we shall see.

It is made clear that all soul consists of three parts: the divine soul has the charioteer and two good (white) horses; the non-divine soul has the charioteer and one good (white) and one bad (black) horse (246a6-b3).<sup>63</sup> This is true in heaven as well as in earth: in heaven the charioteer is said to be bothered by his horses (247b3, 248a4, a6). The horses are not acquired when the soul falls to the earth. On the other hand, ‘*Thumos*,’ Cooper points out, ‘seems closely connected in Plato’s eyes, as in Homer’s, with vigorous,

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<sup>62</sup> Socrates, however, never mentions in his second speech a genuine virtue of moderation, although he obviously believes that there is a genuine virtue of moderation since he includes it in the Forms beyond heaven (247d6), and presumably he poses a contrast between the genuine moderation and the ‘human’ or ‘mortal’ one (256b6, e5). The reason is clear. The genuine virtue of moderation must be dependent on the knowledge of the Form of Moderation, but the non-divine soul by its deficient nature is never able to have such knowledge. In Socrates’ account of the divinely mad soul, although it is reminded of Beauty and Moderation (which does not imply the soul comes to know what it is to be beautiful and moderate, as we have argued in 2.1), the resistance to lust is not based on the comprehension of the Forms but on the compulsive response of the charioteer. Actually, the word *sōphrosunē* occurs six times in the palinode, either referring to the Form in heaven (247d6, 250b2, 254b7), or to a worldly quality in negative sense (256b6, e5), or to an attribute of the white horse (253d6). The ‘moderation’ attributed to the white horse cannot be the genuine virtue of moderation, since it depends upon true knowledge, which is clearly stated to be the privilege of the charioteer alone (247c7).

<sup>63</sup> The number of horses in god’s chariot team has been disputed, cf. Hackforth 1952, 69 n.3; Burnyeat 2012, 244 n.7. But there cannot be any vagueness on the number of horses in the non-divine or human chariot team.

competitive action'.<sup>64</sup> There is, however, no trace of *thumos* as a facet of the soul when the soul is first introduced in the myth of the *Phaedrus*. Admittedly, the soul is likened to be a chariot, which could be geared up for a fight or race, but a chariot is not necessarily so. It is simply an image that captures the nature of the soul as something that moves itself. If everything goes fine, all soul is able to fulfill its natural end, namely the vision of the Forms by following god. There is no limitation on the numbers of souls which has the access of the vision, as gods are not jealous (247a), thus there is no need for competition. Indulging in the beauty of the superheavenly region, the soul probably would never be filled with anger or competitiveness. This *thumos*-less picture breaks up when the soul by some misfortune fails to see the truth. The soul deprived of the vision takes part in a battle with its fellows (248a6-b6). We gave an elementary explanation in 1.5, the gist of which is that the knowers are in agreement, while the non-knowers are at odds. But this does not explain the whole story, since disagreement alone does not entail war. When deprived of the vision of truth, the souls are not only at odds but moreover hostile, filled with a desire to overtake others (*hetera pro tēs heteras*; 248a6-b1). The desire for the good turns blind and warlike. The nature of the falling soul is not only imperfect in intelligence, but also spirited in character. If the soul-chariot is in a journey towards well-being, the journey should be an uncompetitive one in which whoever reaches the natural destiny (the intelligible realm) wins; now that the destiny is not known to the soul, the race turns into a competitive one, or a war.<sup>65</sup> Since the fallen soul is coming to be the human soul, it is the raw material of the human soul. It is then that *thumos* penetrates into the soul and becomes a fundamental aspect of the human.<sup>66</sup>

Socrates at first enumerates so-called moral Forms, that is, the Forms of virtues, including Justice, Moderation, and Wisdom or Knowledge lying beyond heaven (247d5-e2). The fourth of the cardinal virtues, *andreia*, manliness or courage, somehow falls out of the picture.<sup>67</sup> One might wonder where courage lies. On the one hand, courage in its ordinary sense is found primarily, not exclusively though, on the battlefield,<sup>68</sup> and its

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<sup>64</sup> Cooper 1984, 12.

<sup>65</sup> It is as it were a Hobbesian race, which 'we must suppose to have no other goal, nor other garland, but being foremost' (*The Elements of Law Natural and Politic* IX.21).

<sup>66</sup> It is worth noting that *thumos* here is an offshoot of fall towards embodiment; in *Timaeus* it is an offshoot of actual embodiment (70a-b).

<sup>67</sup> Benardete 1991, 141. In the *Protagoras*, too, courage is not as easily integrated to the unity of other virtues as the other individual virtues (249d).

<sup>68</sup> The first 'definition' of courage given in the *Laches*, insufficient as it is, is 'to remain at his post and to defend himself against the enemy without running away' (190e). Although

natural root is nothing but *thumos* (*Rep.* 375a-b). The virtue of courage thus is ascribed to this element of the soul (*Rep.* 442b-c). Rooted in *thumos*, courage in ordinary sense reveals itself in the aspiration of the soul when it is deprived of the vision of truth, therefore is not part of the vision of truth. The courage of philosopher, on the other hand, is a different issue. In his account of the philosopher in *Republic* VI, Socrates claims that the philosopher requires a certain kind of courage in his nature (486a, 487a, 490c, 494b, 503d). But it turns out this nature has nothing to do with spiritedness. It first comes to light in not fearing death since the philosopher does not regard highly of mortal life (486a), which implies that the philosopher is courageous because he knows what to fear and what not to fear (cf. *Laches* 195a); and in turn the courage of philosopher is revealed in not fearing the hardship of learning (503d). It is not far-fetched to say that *thumos*, which is manifest in the competitiveness in the battle of the souls, is the phantom image of the true courage, the philosophical courage, which shows in the craving for the truth. Nonetheless, the craving for the truth is not part of the truth after all. That is the main reason, I believe, why it is not on the list of the moral Forms.

Since *thumos* is not an original ingredient of the soul and its perfection is not the natural end of the soul, it must be necessary for some other purpose. The situation in which *thumos* is made necessary is disclosed in the *Republic*. As we have seen, the account of the soul-city in the *Republic* is unfolded strictly on the considerations of what are necessary for the city. In the first and the healthy city established (369b-372c), there is no need for war, hence no need for *thumos* and courage. The necessity for war is introduced with the rise of the second city, the feverish city, which is established in response to Glaucon's desire for luxury (372d-e). Here *thumos* makes its debut on the stage of the dialogue at 375b1, when they consider what characters the guardians of the city should have to be able to defend the city. But once it is introduced, it cannot be removed from the account of the *Republic*, since it is necessary for the soul, in so much as it is comparable to a city (in this case the second city rather than the first one), to defend itself, and without *thumos* neither a city nor a soul is able to do so.<sup>69</sup>

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Socrates enlarges the scope of courage, he acknowledges the courage in battlefield is the primary manifestation of the virtue (191d). Also cf. *Rep.* 429b: 'Who, in calling the city cowardly or courageous, would look anywhere other than to the part of it that fights and does battle on its behalf?'

<sup>69</sup> The defense of the city requires *thumos* is clear. The *Republic* however emphasizes more on the defense from internal rebels than the defense from external wrong-doings: *thumos* in a soul functions well in obeying the rational part and in assistance to the rational part ruling over the appetitive part (441e-442a). Be that as it may, the guardians of the city are said to

This necessity, however, does not arise in Socrates' account of divine madness. Sexual appetite is indeed condemned as an unnatural response to beauty that is supposed to be overcome (251a1), and *thumos* is indeed aroused to fight it in the account of moral psychology (253e5-254b1), nonetheless the considerations in Socrates' account are more of directing the soul into the natural response towards beauty, which comes about in recollection, rather than preventing it from the unnatural response. Along the path towards recollection, moral indignation is something that stands in the way (254b1-7):

At last, however, when they [i.e. the charioteer and the white horse] see no end to their trouble, they are led forward, reluctantly agreeing to do as they have been told. So they are close to him now, and they are struck by the boy's face as if by a bolt of lightning. When the charioteer sees that face, his memory is carried back to the real nature of Beauty, and he sees it again where it stands on the sacred pedestal next to Self-control.

Moral indignation is aroused against the natural desire (of the charioteer) and the unnatural desire (of the black horse) indifferently (we should not forget that in the moral psychology the charioteer's desire is under control). If moral indignation never failed to hold the soul back, the soul would never come close enough to the beloved to trigger recollection. Moral indignation must be overcome so that the wings of the soul, or its natural desire, could start to grow.<sup>70</sup>

That *thumos* stands in the way of recollection can be explained as follows. Moral indignation is aroused when injustice is perceived. But here injustice is perceived as unjust not by reference to the true nature of justice, as what truly is just hardly reveals itself in its likenesses (250b1-5), but in light of our conceptions of the good, especially *nomos*, the public opinion about the good (note *paranoma* at 254b1). These conceptions are called 'food of opinion' (*trophē doxastē*) earlier in the myth, and according to our interpretation, they are an obstacle of recollection.<sup>71</sup> It is the virtue of *thumos* or *thumos-*

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defend the city against other cities in the first place, but it turns out that they are also supposed to guard against internal 'friends' (414b), namely the fellow citizens constituting a faction against others in the city. Now in the counterpart soul, keeping lust in check can be regarded as part of this enlarged notion of defense or guardianship.

<sup>70</sup> As a mirror image of the process of the lover falling in love with the beloved, the beloved's 'counter love' (*anterōs*) is aroused only after he overcomes the moral prejudice towards the lover (255a4-b1).

<sup>71</sup> See 2.1; 2.2.

like part of the city ('political courage' as Socrates calls it) to preserve through everything the beliefs inculcated by *nomos* (*Rep.* 429c-d); the virtue of the corresponding part in the soul, accordingly, is preserving through everything the declarations of its rational part (*Rep.* 442b-c), that is, the conceptions of the good (since the rational part is to deliberate what is good for the whole soul). *Thumos*, in a word, makes the soul hold on to the beliefs or 'food of opinion'. Consider this: *thumos* at first is said to be indispensable for the guardians of the city (375b); however, as the discussion proceeds, the ruling class of the soul, as a class that is part of the guardians (414b), is said to have the virtue of wisdom, justice and moderation (the latter two are common in all the three classes of the city), but courage, on the other hand, is not its virtue.<sup>72</sup>

Now *thumos* in the tripartite soul-chariot is closely related to the white horse, which is characterized as 'companion of true opinion' (*alēthinēs doxēs hetairos*, 253d7).<sup>73</sup> The white horse is the central figure in the moral psychology: whereas the charioteer is filled with desire (253e5-254a1), the white horse keeps itself from the lure (254a1-3). Later the white horse along with the charioteer fights the black horse with moral indignation (254a7-b1). However, when the soul is carried away by recollection, the white horse at this point is not as active as it was. All it does now is to obey the charioteer willingly (254c2) and drench the soul in shame and alarm (254c4-5). It even vanishes in the middle of the account (254d7 ff.).<sup>74</sup> This symbolic disappearance, as I understand, indicates a transition from moral psychology to erotic psychology. The soul in erotic psychology is

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<sup>72</sup> *Rep.* 431e-432a: 'unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in one part, making the city brave and wise respectively, moderation spreads throughout the whole'. But this courage is particularly the courage as the perfection of *thumos*, not the courage of the philosopher (*Rep.* 486a, 503d).

<sup>73</sup> Rowe and Nehamas & Woodruff render the phrase as 'companion of true glory'; Hackforth as 'one that consorts with genuine renown'. I disagree, as that would make little difference to another characterization 'lover of honour' (*timēs erastēs* with *sophrosune* and sense of shame, 253d6). Hackforth believes that this phrase is meant to contrast with the characterization of the black horse as *alazoneias hetairos*, or companion of boastfulness (253e3), thus cannot mean 'true opinion'. But the complete characterization of the black horse is *hubreōs kai alazoneias hetairos*. We remember that in Socrates' first speech, which reflects ordinary man's morality, hubris is the state of mind in which judgment (*doxa*) is impaired by appetite, and there judgment is closely related to opinion. But surely Plato here can be exploiting both senses of *doxa* (in both the phrases above).

<sup>74</sup> Benardete notices that at some point the white horse 'drops out of Socrates' account', i.e. is no longer in the spotlight, and hereafter 'the charioteer seems to deal with a single horse' (1991, 150). Compare the duals *liponte* (254c8), *deomenōn* (254d2, see de Vries *ad loc.* for the combination of dual and plural; *ouk ethelontas* (254d1), *prospoioumenō* (254d3-4), which indicates the alliance of the charioteer and the white horse, and the text after 254d7, where duals disappear and all is happening between the charioteer and the black horse.

no longer in the state of 'mortal' or 'human moderation', but in divine madness. The divinely mad soul, resembling the soul in heaven, lacks *thumos*. Accordingly, the philosopher, fixed on the vision of truth, is strikingly lacking in *thumos*. Not once is Socrates presented as getting angry in Plato, even when he is confronting Thrasymachus or Callicles. In Callicles' great speech, the engagement of philosophy, which produces softness or unmanliness, or lack of *thumos*, so to speak, gets Socrates accused of inability to defend himself.<sup>75</sup>

On account of what, one might ask, is *thumos* aroused at one point and disappears at another point? To be specific, among three members of the soul-chariot, the black horse has a more or less consistent manner of behaviour,<sup>76</sup> and the charioteer behaves differently because of recollection; what, then, accounts for the different manners of behaviour on the part of the white horse? What is the mechanism, so to speak, of *thumos*?

Let us look into the moral psychology again. There is an intrinsic appetite for sex or the like, for it brings with it great pleasure, and thus it obviously needs no word to urge one towards it; there is, however, no intrinsic pleasure in resisting the temptation of pleasure. The power that drives the soul to resist sexual appetite is not like sexual appetite, which brings immediate pleasure that makes one naturally inclined to seek for it. There is no intrinsic appetite for resisting the lure of pleasure. One is driven towards resisting pleasure only when he is persuaded by reason that declares that such resisting is somehow good. This is attested by Socrates' later mentioning of the drunken couple (256b7-c5). Nothing is said about the white horses in their souls when their minds are undermined by alcohol; they would not be affected by the malfunction of reason if they were powers independent of reason (they are, in fact, absent because the drunkenness eclipses reason, hence there is no rational command for the white horse to obey). The white horse, Socrates says, follows the commanding word (*keleusmati kai logōi*) of the charioteer (253e1), or is obedient (*eupeithēs*, literally 'well persuaded') to the charioteer (254a1).<sup>77</sup> The black horse lover follows his heart, whereas the white horse cannot resist

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<sup>75</sup> See *Gorgias* 485a-486d.

<sup>76</sup> Surely the black horse at some point exploits speech as a weapon in inner conflict: it is said to 'repeatedly revile the charioteer and its companion for cowardly and unmanly desertion of their agreed position' (254c7-d1). As Ferrari observes that in general the charioteer and the black horse behave in the way more suitable to the other: the charioteer 'maintains control by sheer strength and wordless violence', while the black horse 'adopts persuasive language and the methods of reason' (1987, 186). Be that as it may, the black horse is consistently licentious, rebellious to the charioteer, only with different means.

<sup>77</sup> It is reasonable to assume that it is precisely what Aristotle discerns in the soul that is semi-

its yoke-mate until it is persuaded by reason to resist it.

Moral indignation, therefore, is aroused through self-persuasion, or application of certain kind of rhetoric to oneself. The same kind of rhetoric, on the other hand, can be applied to others as well, so for the soul of the audience to be filled with moral indignation at injustice, and thus to lead it, allying the audience with the speaker. This kind of rhetoric is exemplified by Socrates' first speech against eros. Socrates' first speech stresses in its definition of eros that the rule of eros is a tyrannical rule by force: even the name 'eros' comes from the word *rhōmē* or force (238b7-c4). In the following passages the tyrannical power of erotic desire over the lover is somehow transplanted as a model into the tyrannical power of the lover over the beloved: the lover forces his beloved to be unintelligent and unmanly, to be soft and feminine, to be completely destitute, that is, to be the perfect subject of tyranny.<sup>78</sup> The lover is presented to be a tyrant with a tyrant inside him in order to arouse moral indignation on the part of the audience, and in this way realize the intention of the speaker.

The purpose of provoking indignation explains the strange structure of the speech. The speech, as Phaedrus remarks, stops halfway through the original plan, which is to blame the lover for his harm and to praise the non-lover for his benefit (241d4-7). But in fact, the speech says nothing about the latter. The speaker declares, but he never actually shows in his speech that he does good to the boy and cares about him; rather, the argument is formulated negatively, by condemning the lover and his hubris, and in turn claiming that the goods that a non-lover has are opposed to the harms that have been rebuked in a lover (241e5-6). The whole effect is to show how harmful and selfish a lover would be. This strategy is explicable if one bears in mind that, with the indignation at the rule of desire as injustice imposed on its subject, the speech is supposed to show the harms that a lover inflicts upon the victim rather than the other side of the story, that is, how the lover delivers benefit to the boy.

What about Socrates' second speech? Its rhetoric in a way intends a reverse of the effect of the rhetoric exemplified in Socrates' first speech. The soul has an intrinsic desire for the vision of the Forms (which is natural) as well as for sex and other physical

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rational in the sense it is able to listen to the persuasive logos, say, of father or friend (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1102b31-1103a3).

<sup>78</sup> Benardete 1991, 124. Also cf. *Symposium* 182c, 'It is no good for rulers if the people they rule cherish ambitions for themselves or form strong bonds of friendship with one another. That these are precisely the effects of philosophy, sport, and especially of Love is a lesson the tyrants of Athens learned directly from their own experience: Didn't their reign come to a dismal end because of the bonds uniting Harmodius and Aristogiton in love and affection?'

pleasure (which is unnatural); the morally indignant soul, as has been shown, repels them indifferently: it prevents the soul from recollection as well as from sexual indulgence. The natural desire can be freed through the power of Beauty; it can also be freed through the power of persuasion. Persuasive speech can serve as an alternative to Beauty as a freeing force, at least it can overcome 'mortal moderation', making the lover get close enough to be struck by the beauty of the beloved. Socrates' second speech, and presumably his speech in general, have that persuasive effect. According to Alcibiades' report, the very first characteristic of Socrates is his irresistible speech, which makes him filled with divine frenzy (215c-216a).

## 2.5 Lover and Beloved

In this section we come back to the context of Socrates' second speech, assessing it against the background of the previous speeches. Socrates' whole account of eros in his second speech is designed to recant the condemnation of eros in the previous two speeches in the *Phaedrus*. The previous speeches condemn eros; Socrates' second speech, the palinode, praises eros. But this sketch is too loose. If eros is good, what is it good for? If it is an evil, what is it bad for? 'For the beloved.' The answer seems clear. The speeches are particularly concerned with the effect of eros on the beloved. One might say that this concern distinguishes the speeches in the *Phaedrus* from those speeches in the *Symposium*, which praise eros in general, and especially its effect on the lover.

That eros has its effect on the lover requires no remark, since the lover is the one who is 'in love'. Eros is responsible for the actions of the lover, as Phaedrus says in his speech in the *Symposium*, 'for he has the god (i.e. Eros) within him' (180b4). The same is not applicable to the beloved. The beloved is someone who is not in love. Surely the lover loves him, that is, he is loved by his lover, but that someone is loved is unlike, say, that someone is hit. If I hit someone, I immediately make him the patient of my action. If, however, I love someone, the loved one suffers nothing from my love. Whatever a lover like Hippothales does, nothing is happening to or even perceived by Lysis, his unaware beloved. Those who suffer from Hippothales' love are his friends who spend time with him (*Lysis* 204c-d). The beloved is not affected by eros unless he builds a relationship with ('grants his favour to', *kharizesthai*) his lover. The relationship between the lover and his beloved, like many relationships of other sorts, is in general called *philia*.<sup>79</sup> The speeches in the *Phaedrus* are giving advice precisely on whether or not a beloved should build such a relationship with his lover, on the basis of the prediction of what would happen to the beloved should he be in one: 'The question before you and me,' as the speaker of Socrates' first speech clearly states, 'is whether one should rather enter into *philia* with lover (*erōnti*) or non-lover' (237c6-8). It is clear that the speeches are about *philia* as much as they are about eros; they are about whether or not a lover is worthy of his beloved's *philia*, because it is in *philia* that the beloved will be affected only if the

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<sup>79</sup> The Greek word *philia* has a much wider denotation than the English word 'friendship'. In Plato and Aristotle, relationships of various sorts, from that between parents and children to that between fellow citizens, come under the heading '*philia*'. I shall stick to the Greek word rather than translate it (inaccurately) as 'friendship'.

beloved not just in a logical sense but will be interacting closely with the lover.

Before we turn to the specific arguments, for or against eros, in the speeches, we have to deal briefly with a view that the points made in the speeches should not be taken seriously, as the speeches are no more than playful examples of rhetorical art.<sup>80</sup> According to this view, it is the cleverness of the speeches that matters. Indeed, Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech are designed to demonstrate rhetorical skills. Be that as it may, it is one thing to say that the speeches are meant for showing off rhetorical skills, while it is another thing to say that the content of the speeches does not convey any philosophical doctrine. Socrates' second speech (243e9-257b6), the longest of the three, taking up the central place of the whole dialogue and one fourth of its length, is not responding to the question of how to make an artful speech, but to the warning of his divine sign that he has committed impiety by speaking evil of a god (242b8-d2). This divine interference reminds not only Socrates but the readers that what the speeches say matters, even though our initial concern is how they say it. Socrates composes his first speech to show that Lysias' speech is not well written; he composes his second speech to show that in his first speech 'that story was not true' (243a8). Socrates is indeed concerned with the true or false of what the speeches say about love. It is safe to say, as is recognized by the tradition,<sup>81</sup> that the subject matter of the speeches, eros or love, deserves attention in its own right.

The arrangement of Lysias' speech has received criticism from Socrates and scholars for its banality and prosaicness, and its apparent lack of order,<sup>82</sup> nevertheless the speech does make a clear point: the boy will be worse off in the *philia* with a lover than with a non-lover. In making his point, Lysias does not begin by denying the benefit delivered by a lover to his beloved; rather, he begins with a concession that a lover does deliver benefit to his beloved, as everyone can see; the lover's problem is the way he does it, the reason he does it and what he is supposed to do afterwards, etc. As Ferrari points out, 'his claim is not that love will bring no good, but that the good it brings is only temporary and will lead to a counterbalancing bad'.<sup>83</sup>

The speaker tries to make his case by appealing to the following arguments. First, eros is a mental sickness. As a state of mind it is contrary to *sōphrosunē*, and *sōphrosunē* can mean both self-control and prudence. The lover thus is supposed to be on the one

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<sup>80</sup> Rowe 1986a, 144.

<sup>81</sup> De Vries 1969, 22.

<sup>82</sup> Hackforth 1952, 31; Yunis 2011, 97.

<sup>83</sup> Ferrari 1987, 88; also cf. 97.

hand incapable of self-control (*hautōn kratein*, 231d4), or under [psychological] compulsion (*hup' anankēs*, 231a4), on the other hand imprudent, or 'thinking badly' (*kakōs phronousin*, 241d3). Because of the former, the lover is bound to repent what he did when he was in love (231a4-6), and to blame his loss on his beloved (231a6-b7); because of the latter the lover makes bad decisions with impaired judgment (231d4-6), becoming excessively boastful (232a2-4), flattering (233a5-b1), emotional (233b3-5) and peevish (233b2-3, 233c1-5). Another major vice of the lover in psychological terms is jealousy, because of which he will isolate his beloved from all good things like wealth, intelligence and friends (232c4-e2). The third argument is concerned with social pressure: the association with the lover invites censure and gossip (231e3-4, 232a6-b2). The fourth is concerned with instability of the relationship with a lover, because of his transient nature (231b7-c7). Besides, there is a fifth argument that is not preserved in Socrates' first speech in any form, the one that appeals to pure pragmatic calculation. The disadvantage of building *philia* with a lover is that there are not many options, whereas the boy would have a bigger pool from which to pick up the non-lover (231d6-e2); another reason to gratify a non-lover rather than a lover is that when choosing friends one should not choose those in need most but those capable of greater return (233d5-e7).

Socrates' first speech, on the other hand, is much more organized in its structure. The beloved, the speaker alleges, would be seriously harmed in his soul, his body, and his possessions (*ktēsis*). In respect of the soul, the lover is bound to make the beloved weaker and inferior; he is bound to be jealous, as a result he keeps the beloved away from philosophy, so he would be more dependent on him (238e2-239c2). In respect of the body, the beloved would be made weak, soft, effeminate and unmanly, just to cater to the lover's taste (239c3-d7). In respect to *ktēsis*, the lover would wish his beloved bereft of parents, relatives, friends, one's dearest associations, and suffering a loss of property (*ousia*), left in a situation in which he has no wife, no children and no home (239d8-240a9), because all those stand in his way. Apart from the harms that he inflicts on his beloved, the lover would be most unpleasant (240a9-e7) and untrustworthy (240e8-241c1).<sup>84</sup>

It is clear that although Socrates' first speech upholds more or less the same position as Lysias', what Socrates' speaker does is more than to organize the untidy arguments in Lysias'. In Lysias' speech, the lover is reproached on the grounds that he is mentally sick hence an untrustworthy partner. In Socrates' first speech, on the other hand, the mental sickness is now a moral defect. As Price points out, Socrates 'effectively expanded being

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<sup>84</sup> Cf. Rowe 1986a, 158.

'sick' (of mind) into being 'ruled by desire and enslaved to pleasure' (238e3-4).<sup>85</sup> If the Lysian non-lover's attitude towards the lover is pity (233b5), the Socratic non-lover's, as has been expounded in last section, is indignation or trying to provoking indignation.<sup>86</sup> The lover is condemned on the grounds that in lack of moderation he is not concerned with the well-being of his beloved, rather than that in lack of prudence he is not able to secure mutual benefit. As a result, the service of the lover is alleged to be mere appearance; his real intention is nothing but seeking for his own satisfaction: the affection of a lover for a boy is just like that of a wolf for a lamb (241c6-d1).

The theoretical need that causes this change (or development) is this. As has been said, the speeches in the *Phaedrus* are concerned with the question whether or not the boy should enter a *philia* relationship with a lover. This is related to, but not the same as, the question (of the speaker of Lysias' speech) whether a relationship with a lover is mutually beneficial; this is because *philia* is more demanding than what is related and similar to it, namely justice.<sup>87</sup> I make sure that you will get what you want and demand you do the same for me in return: this is the demand of justice or fairness in transaction. But *philia* demands more than that. As Aristotle says, 'when men are friends (*philōn*) they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship (*philiās*) as well' (N.E. 1155a26-27). Justice demands common advantage (τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον, N.E. 1160a14); *philia* thus demands more than fair-play and mutual benefit. The demand of *philia* is stated in Aristotle's classical definition (N.E. 1166a2-5):

A friend (*philos*) is one who wishes and does what is good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend (*ekeinou heneka*), or one who wishes his friend to exist and live, for his sake (*autou kharin*).<sup>88</sup>

On account of the demand of *philia*, the speaker of Socrates' first speech rejects mere

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<sup>85</sup> Price 1989, 64.

<sup>86</sup> It is supposed to be a worse injustice to harm a friend than a stranger. Cf. Aristotle N.E. 1160a3-8: 'The unjust increases with the degree of friendship involved. ... And the requirements of justice also increase naturally along with the degree of friendship'.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Aristotle N.E. 1159b25- : 'Friendship and justice seem, as we have said at the outset of our discussion, to be concerned with the same objects and exhibited between the same persons. For in every community there is thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too; ... And the extent of their association is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent to which justice exists between them'; also 1155a28: 'the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality'.

<sup>88</sup> In Aristotle's account, *spending time together* is also an aspect of ethical and hedonic friendships (N.E. 1157b). This aspect is also important in the first two speeches. But this aspect does not explain the difference between Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech.

mutual benefit as a sufficient foundation of desirable *philia*. The speech concludes in exhorting the boy whom he addresses to bear in mind that ‘the *philia* of a lover does not come with goodwill (*eunoias*)’. A mutually beneficial deal is not the ideal model for *philia* if there is no genuine concern for each other involved. The non-lover is superior, according to Socrates’ first speech, not only because the relationship with him is beneficial whereas that with a lover is harmful, but also because only the non-lover really cares about the well-being of the boy whereas a lover is supposed to care about nothing but the satisfaction of his own desire. This other-regarding spirit makes the non-lover more than a beneficial person; he is also a caring one.

Anyway, both speeches present the lover as an unworthy friend. The reasons that they give reflect the demands of *philia*. Friends are supposed to benefit each other, and to benefit each other with a genuine concern for the other’s well-being. In a word, benevolence is demanded of *philia*. If Socrates is to argue against the position shared in Lysias’ speech and his first one, he would have to show that the *philia* with a lover fulfills the demand, that a lover would be benevolent in *philia*, hence a worthy friend. How successful has Socrates’ recantation been?

From Socrates’ account of eros in his second speech, two things are clear. First, the condemnation of eros in the previous two speeches is actually not of eros *per se* but of an inferior kind of eros, sexual desire. Now in the soul of divine lover, sexual desire is subjugated. The licentious desire to procure pleasure, which is supposed to be the source of harmful and hubristic madness, now has been replaced by awe and reverence (251a2-7; 254e9-255a1). Second, the lover believes that the beloved is responsible for his recollection and the discovery of his god (253a5-6), which makes him be disposed to have goodwill towards his beloved, genuinely concerned with his well-being (cf. 255b4). Therefore, eros is on the one hand free of the vices reproached in the previous speeches, on the other hand meets the supposed demand of *philia* or friendship.

This, however, does not suffice, since at the beginning of the speech Socrates not only claims to defend eros against the previous speeches, but claims that ‘this madness is sent from the gods to achieve the greatest good fortune (*ep’ eutukhiai tēi megistēi*)’ (245b7-c1). In other words, Socrates needs to prove more than that divine eros is not bad, but as good as human good sense; he needs to prove that divine eros is even better than human good sense. At the end of his speech he clearly believes that he has carried out this proof (cf. 256b5-7, 256e4-257a2).

What kind of benefit is supposed to be delivered to the beloved in a relationship

with the divine lover? The eagerness of the lover, says Socrates, and its accomplishment becomes beautiful (*kalē*) and conducive to happiness (*eudaimonikē*) for the beloved, through the lover's attempt 'to lead him [i.e. the beloved] to complete resemblance to themselves (*hautois*) [i.e. the enthusiastic lovers] and to whichever god they honour' (253b8-c6). I shall offer my interpretation of this 'complete resemblance', starting with some observation on the surface of the text. First, about '*kalē te kai eudaimonikē... gignetai*' at 253c4. Hackforth renders *kalē* as 'glorious',<sup>89</sup> Rowe as 'nobility',<sup>90</sup> and only Nehamas and Woodruff render it as 'beautiful'.<sup>91</sup> Given that in Socrates' account it is precisely beauty (*kallos*) that inspires divine madness and thus brings happiness, here *kalē* and *eudaimonikē* should be closely connected. And as Rowe's and Nehamas & Woodruff's translation clearly indicates (Hackforth completely misses this point in his translation), the part regarding *eudaimonikē* should be read as 'conducive to happiness... for the loved one (*tōi philēthenti*)', that is to say, 'emphasizing the benefit to the young man'.<sup>92</sup> Here, presumably, Socrates is saying that the lover's endeavour is beautiful and conducive to happiness for the beloved, rather than asserting that the lover's endeavour is itself noble, as Hackforth's and Rowe's translation could be read. Bearing that in mind, as we shall see, this sentence would shed some light on our interpretation. Second, most readers would take the lover's attempt 'to lead him to complete resemblance to himself and to whichever god they honour' as simply 'to lead the beloved to complete resemblance to their god', since the lover himself would have made himself resembling the god in the first place, and to resemble the lover hardly makes any sense as conducive to happiness if it does not mean to resemble the god to whose resemblance the lover brings himself. So '[complete resemblance] to themselves', if it is not redundant, at least does not add anything to 'resemblance to the god'. I do not intend to challenge this understanding. But I wish to stress that 'resemblance to the lover himself' does emphasize a feature in this erotic relationship that might be neglected otherwise. Here comes my interpretation.

As we have shown, the beauty of the beloved causes a compulsive urge on the lover's part to imitate his ideal. 'And because they (i.e. the divinely inspired lovers) count their beloved responsible for these very things they love him even more' (253a5-6). Now the lover not only imitates the god, but also makes his beloved to resemble the god, in way of life, as far as possible, through persuasion and discipline (253a6-7, b5-7). It seems

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<sup>89</sup> Hackforth 1952, 100.

<sup>90</sup> Rowe 1986a, 75.

<sup>91</sup> See J. M. Cooper (ed.), *Plato Complete Works*. Hackett, 1997. pp. 530.

<sup>92</sup> Yunis 2011, 159.

that this is a great benefit delivered by the lover. In the erotic relationship, the beloved, as well as the lover, engages in the project of *homoiōsis theōi*, with the help of the lover. It is hardly reasonable to say, moreover, that the lover does this to his beloved for his, the lover's, own sake. The lover does need the beloved and his beauty to remind him of the god, yet the beloved's education is not in any place instrumental to the lover's becoming like god: becoming like god could lead to, but does not require making another become like god.<sup>93</sup> The lover's effort on his beloved can be naturally explained, as Hermias does, by the fact that "whatever they want for themselves, they want for the beloved" (192, 8-9). They are now sharing a life of one mind (*homonoētikon*, 256b1). 'What is a friend?' Hermias quotes from Aristotle,<sup>94</sup> 'another self (*allos egō*)' (192, 10-11).

How is it, one might ask, different from the traditional institution of aristocratic education, in which a mature male initiates a young male into manhood and virtues? How is the benefit in divine eros, given the claim that it is not only good but the greatest blessing, different from and better than the benefit in the moral education of a man of sanity or of a lover such as Theognis?

In traditional pederasty, one might say, or in other forms of education, people do not know about true virtues but merely conventional virtues. But even for the couple subject to divine madness, what it is to be virtuous is unknown due to the necessary limitation of human vision. Even the divinely mad couple do not have the knowledge of true virtues, they nonetheless take part in the project of 'becoming like god', which is not available for others. However, the beloved in Socrates' account, although he is practically brought to resemblance to god, does not engage in the project with the awareness that he is imitating a god. The lover is not said to be reminded of any god. Actually, he is totally 'at a loss', not knowing what he is experiencing (255d3-6). The divinely inspired lover instills virtues to his beloved through 'persuasion and discipline', just as a traditional lover does in a traditional pederastic relationship what the convention dictates. The benefit delivered by a lover with divine madness to his beloved a man of sanity is also able to deliver to his, if the benefit for the beloved is nothing but the lover's exhortation and advice on how to be a good man. So the question is: does the benefit *for the beloved* solely consist in his receiving the lover's moral lecture, or the lover's soul-leading

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<sup>93</sup> The same is true in Diotima's description of the *scala amoris*. See *Sym.* 211d8-212a5, which I quoted in 1.1 and argue that at the top of the *scala amoris*, beholding beauty itself alone "gives birth to" true virtue and sharing in immortality, with no mention of any beautiful youth involved.

<sup>94</sup> Aristotle, *N.E.* 1166a32, 1169b7, 1161b29; *E.E.* 1145a30.

(*psukhagōgia*), so to speak, alone, or does it also consist in something else?

Griswold, for example, must believe that the beloved's benefit only comes from the lover's hand. 'The beloved,' according to Griswold, 'is not said to recollect anything or to become enthusiastic. Nor does he try to shape the lover as the lover has him. The beloved is remarkably passive; thus the relationship between lover and beloved is asymmetrical'.<sup>95</sup> This alleged passivity implies that in their relationship their interaction is one-way street. The lover is a craftsman working on the beloved as some raw material.<sup>96</sup> Perhaps it is a little exaggerated to say that the beloved is what the lover makes him, since the material has its own potential that would affect the result of the maker's work; but the soul of the beloved, according to this interpretation, is decisively dependent upon the lover's modeling. The beloved's development goes as far as his potential godlikeness is brought out by the lover. The joint life that they share, thus, must result in the beloved's 'accepting as true the lover's fantasy about him'.<sup>97</sup>

On the other hand, Halperin in his paper challenges this view. He sharply points out the striking departure that Socrates makes from the traditional form of pederasty. By tradition, the beloved is not expected to be aroused in turn by his lover; actually he should be ashamed to be so.<sup>98</sup> In discussing the boy's role in Greek homosexuality, Dover compares him to 'the good woman' in nineteenth century literature, or 'a good Victorian wife', as Halperin puts it.<sup>99</sup> It is this traditional image of the boy, not that in Socrates' account, that fits Griswold's characterization of complete passivity. Socrates' account, as Halperin points out, astonishingly deviates from this tradition by asserting that the beloved is aroused and thus yields a counter desire (*anterōs*) for the lover (255b7-e4). The beloved, like his lover, abandons his prejudice, engaging in something shameful in light of custom (255a4-6; 252a4-7); he is, again like his lover, driven out of his sense (*ekplēttei*, 255b4). The most explicit evidence of the desire that rises in the beloved is that his black

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<sup>95</sup> Griswold 1986, 126.

<sup>96</sup> This metaphor is also adopted by Ferrari, who compares the lover as a 'sculpting hand' and the beloved as non-recalcitrant material (1987, 173). Ferrari does believe that the beloved has more to contribute in the relationship, 'more than merely to offer himself as suitable clay in which the lover can mould his preconceptions', yet the contribution attributed to him is regarding the development of the lover. Therefore, although Ferrari differs from Griswold on the interpretation that there is indeed interaction between the lover and his beloved, he takes it to be part of the lover's development. Regarding the beloved's development, the beloved is no more than 'rough hewn stone', which has some potential to actualize through the action of the lover as 'sculptor's chisel' (1987, 174).

<sup>97</sup> Griswold 1986, 126.

<sup>98</sup> Dover 1989, 103. Cf. Halperin 1986, 63-66.

<sup>99</sup> Dover 1989, 90; Halperin 1986, 63.

horse is said to be stirred up (256a1-5).

Socrates explains this counter-desire as a rebound of the stream of beauty to its own possessor. The stream has the same effect, milder as it is, on the beloved as it does on the lover: it flows in the beloved and 'sets him all of a flutter' (*anapterōsan*, 255c7). This experience, as Socrates elaborates earlier, is that of *erōs* or desire, not just friendly feeling or *philia*, although in ignorance of his own desire, the beloved calls it *philia*.<sup>100</sup> Socrates again exploits the pun of 'getting excited' and 'furnishing with wings', emphasizing that the wings of the beloved's soul is also made to grow. Later Socrates says that after their death their souls will be both winged (let us not forget that 'wing' or *pteron* is inseparable from *erōs* in its divine name *pterōs*), enjoying the greatest good for human (256b3-7); in a number of lines they are said to be happy (*eudaimonein*) with matching wings (*homopterous*, 256e1). Socrates here does not change his overall point in the palinode: the greatest blessing cannot be brought out by anything other than divine eros: instead of accepting moral exhortation alone, the beloved must turn into a lover himself. Halperin manages to appreciate this point, and he consciously distinguishes his interpretation from those of which Griswold's is an instance,<sup>101</sup> when he says the following: 'If Plato's erotic theory escapes---as I believe it does---the charge of promoting the exploitation of desired persons and objects, it does so not because *erōs* aims, in Plato's view, at the moral improvement of the *erōmenos* (although such improvement is bound to be an *incidental* result of the Platonic lover's manic activity) but because both lover and beloved, aroused alike by their visions of an incidental beauty emanating (apparently) from each other and driven by the intensity of their separate desires to new labors of visionary creativity, make *simultaneous* and *reciprocal*, through independent, progress towards the contemplation of the Forms'.

Towards the end of our assessment of Socrates' recantation, I would like to call

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<sup>100</sup> Halperin, I believes, goes a little too far when he claims that 'the Platonic approach all but erases the distinction between the lover and the beloved, between the active and the passive partner---or, to put it better, the genius of Plato's analysis is that it eliminates passivity altogether'. The distinction remains after all: the beloved is not possessed by the god, and (or thus) his desire is milder. Halperin is nonetheless right to say that 'according to Socrates, both members of the relationship become active, desiring lovers; neither remains sole passive object of desire'. See Halperin 1986, 68.

<sup>101</sup> It is unfair to say that Griswold does not note the fact that Socrates ascribes a counter desire to the beloved. He actually has appreciated that the beloved is aroused, his wings starting to grow, and he is absolutely right to assert, which I think captures the gist of Socrates' account perfectly, that 'the lover reproduces in the beloved the experience the lover is undergoing' (1986, 126), yet he fails to link this to the benefit to the beloved of the lover's companionship.

attention to one particular argument (or a group of arguments) in the previous speeches on account of which eros is condemned. This argument is worthy of particular attention because Socrates does not recant it in his second speech. We ought to consider whether he has a good reason to do so.

This argument asserts that *philia* with a lover would make the beloved left in solitude. The speaker of Lysias' speech warns the boy whom he is addressing that when breaking up with a lover, which is supposed to be inevitable, his loss will be even greater than the lover's, since he has given up too much for him (232c4-d4):

For a lover is easily annoyed, and whatever happens, he'll think it was designed to hurt him. That is why a lover prevents the boy he loves from spending time with other people. He's afraid that wealthy men will outshine him with their money, while men of education will turn out to have the advantage of greater intelligence. And he watches like a hawk everyone who may have any other advantage over him! Once he's persuaded you to turn those people away, he'll have you completely isolated from friends; and if you show more sense than he does in looking after your own interests, you'll come to quarrel with him.

Out of excessive sensitivity and insecurity, the lover would fend off other people as a threat to his exclusive association with the boy. The boy therefore would either lose his other friends if giving in, or quarrel with his lover if resisting.

The friends (in the Greek sense) on whom the boy can count on most, we are led to think, is his family. The lover, one might say, will snatch the beloved away from his family. Near the beginning of the dialogue (229b4-5), a myth is alluded to in which Oreithuia, daughter of Erechtheus, is carried away by Boreas who is in love with her (229b4-5). That the lover may snatch the boy away from his family is not mentioned in Lysias' speech. This oversight is amended in Socrates' first speech. The lover is supposed to ward off not only friends but also family and relatives (239d8-240a8):

Our next topic is the benefit or harm to your possessions (*tēn ktēsīn*) that will come from a lover's care and company. Everyone knows the answer, especially a lover: His first wish will be for a boy who has lost his dearest (*philtatōn*), kindest and godliest possessions (*ktēmatōn*)—his mother and father and relatives and friends.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> For 'πατρός γὰρ καὶ μητρὸς καὶ συγγενῶν καὶ φίλων', Nehamas & Woodruff take *philōn* as adjective and translate the phrase as 'his mother and father and other close relatives'; both Hackforth and Rowe however translate it as 'father, mother, kinsmen/relations and

He would be happy to see the boy deprived of them, since he would expect them either to block him from the sweet pleasure of the boy's company or to criticize him severely for taking it. ... Furthermore, he will wish for the boy to stay wifeless, childless, and homeless for as long as possible, since that's how long he desires to go on plucking his sweet fruit.

Neither argument quoted above is recanted in Socrates' second speech. Strikingly, Socrates describes the life of the lover, even the divine lover, as follows (252a1-b1):

This it is not at all willing to give up, and no one is more important to it than the beautiful boy. It forgets mother and brothers and friends entirely and doesn't care at all if it loses its wealth through neglect. And as for proper and decorous behavior, in which it used to take pride, the soul despises the whole business. Why, it is even willing to sleep like a slave, anywhere, as near to the object of its longing as it is allowed to get! That is because in addition to its reverence for one who has such beauty, the soul has discovered that the boy is the only doctor for all that terrible pain.<sup>103</sup>

This experience of the lover will happen also to the beloved, as the beloved, according to Socrates' account, if accepting the lover, will undergo a weaker but similar experience (255d6-e2):

So when the lover is near, the boy's pain is relieved just as the lover's is, and when they are apart he yearns as much as he is yearned for, because he has a mirror image of love in him—'backlove' (*anterōs*)—though he neither speaks nor thinks of it as love, but as friendship.

The beloved, now unconsciously in love, yearns for his lover as much as his lover for him. Both parties of the couple share the same experience that compels them to regard each other more highly than anything, including family, friends, and other things valuable in light of worldly concerns.

This failure of recantation does not imply the failure of Socrates' proof, which asserts that eros is most beneficial but never that eros delivers all possible benefits. In the

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friends'. In spite of the discrepancy, it is clear that the text is meant to say that strong, steadfast *philia* relationships are demolished by being with a lover.

<sup>103</sup> Pace Hackforth, this description cannot be understated as a 'transitional stage' distinct from divine madness (1952, 98), since immediately following the description Socrates declares 'this experience (*touto de to pathos*), my beautiful boy, men term eros' (252b1-3).

previous speeches, loss of friends is reckoned to be something which one is supposed to resist if he is in his right mind. For Lysias' speaker, that is because loss of friends is against the boy's own interest, which in turn is because, as implied in the text, friends are sources of goods, such as wealth and intelligence. Loss of friends means loss of expectation to receive friends' aid in need.<sup>104</sup> The real loss, Lysias' speaker suggests, is of the advantage of possessing wealth or intelligence, and so on. Friends, in this line of reasoning, are cherished only for their ability to provide such good things.<sup>105</sup> However, the benefits in the mind of Lysias' speaker have now been considered in Socrates' second speech as benefits of lower rank, if beneficial at all. The well-being of the couple now consists in nothing but the condition of their souls. Socrates in light of his new account of the soul does not have to recant this very Lysian argument, on the grounds that the loss of resourceful friends is now not considered to be a significant loss since they are incapable of providing the boy with the real benefit.

The parallel argument in Socrates' first speech is more complicated. When it comes to parents and family, although they are usually our most reliable source of good, the loss of them is considered to be a huge loss not only because of that, and, I venture to say, not primarily because of that. Losing family itself is an evil, and having them itself is a good, regardless of their capacity to provide resources. Family is considered to be a treasure, simply because it is one's dearest. That is most evident in one's cherishing of one's own children (cf. 240a6), who are not advantageous to have in the way in which to have a resourceful friend is, but require constant care and service and even sacrifice. Parents, one might say, delight in their children. But it is not for the delight that parents cherish their children. Even the most unpleasant children who hate their parents are cherished by them,<sup>106</sup> and no matter how pleasant other people's children are, we are never going to cherish them more than our own children. One's preference and priority are attached to

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<sup>104</sup> Some scholars suggest that in classical Greece *philia* 'is not, at root, a subjective bond of affection and emotional warmth, but the entirely objective bond of reciprocal obligation; one's *philos* is the man one is obliged to help, and on whom one can (or ought to be able to) rely for help when oneself is in need' (Heath 1987, 73-4).

<sup>105</sup> By the same token, Lysias' non-lover exhorts the boy to make friends with those capable of greatest return, not those most in need (233d5-e7). Those friends without such advantages thus are not in concern; precisely because of their lack of advantage they are probably not regarded as threats by the lover in the first place.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. *Lysis* 213a, 'Babies, for example, who are too young to show love but not too young to hate, when they are disciplined by their mother or father, are at that moment, even though they hate their parents then, their very dearest friends'.

those of one's own.<sup>107</sup>

What is one's own, however, has been redefined in Socrates' second speech. What is considered as one's own is actually not one's own, since the human soul is embodied. 'A soul that sheds its wings,' Socrates says, 'wanders until it lights on something solid, where it settles (*katoikistheisa*) and takes on an earthly body' (246c1-3). The home of the human soul is its earthy body. Our body is believed to be our own most of all. Other things believed to be our own are so defined in relation to our body. Parents belong to us, because it is they who gave us this body. Our family is our own simply because our body happens to be born into it; so is our city. But from the perspective of the soul, they are no more than our temporary residence, since our soul does not come from our parents, but is planted into this body from heaven or transmigrated into this body in the cycles of reincarnation (248c8-e2; 249a5-b5). What is commonly believed to belong to us is simply arbitrarily defined. What really belongs to us is not our body or anything related to body, hence not our parents or children, but our lover/beloved, precisely speaking, the soul of our lover/beloved, since when our soul was back in heaven, the soul of our lover/beloved was in the same train with us (247a6-7, 252e1 ff.). The soul of the lover and that of the beloved belong to each other by nature, so to speak.<sup>108</sup> Parents and children, which are supposed to belong to each other most of all people, now compared to lover/beloved turn out, as Phaedrus says in the *Symposium*, to be related to each other only in name (179b-c).<sup>109</sup>

It is a human condition to live with body. To take care of things related to the body thus is necessary for the human life, and, fairly speaking, requires virtue and wisdom. Be that as it may, the fact that Socrates does not recant in his recantation the harms supposedly inflicted in neglecting the necessities of the human life suggests that, on the one hand, things related to the body do not belong to one's true self, on the other hand,

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<sup>107</sup> Cf. Aristotle *N.E.* 1161b18. 'parents love their children as being something of their own (*hōs heautōn ti onta*), and children their parents as being something originating from them (*hōs ap' ekeinōn ti onta*)'.

<sup>108</sup> In the very first conversation with Lysis Socrates questions his faith that Lysis' own parents are necessarily his friends or belonging (*oikeioi*) to him (*Lysis* 210d); in the last argument where *philia* is ascribed to desire (*epithumein*) or eros (221d-e), Socrates makes a speculation that receives strong assents from Lysis and his close friend Menexenus, that friends belong to one another by nature (*phusei oikeioi*, 221e), and its implication, that the beloved is bound to love his lover, is wholeheartedly welcomed by Lysis' lover Hippothales (222a-b).

<sup>109</sup> Phaedrus refers to the story in which Alcestis sacrifices herself for her husband, whereas his parents are not willing to do the same for their son. Phaedrus remarks that 'Because of her love, he went so far beyond his parents in *philia* that she made them alien (*allogtrious*) to their son, as if they belonged (*prosēkontas*) to him in name only' (179b8-c3).

mere necessity is denied of real value. In light of this, one's well-being is conceived as consisting in a flight from the human condition.<sup>110</sup> In what way and to what extent the flight idea explains the madness of eros, let us find out in the next chapter.

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<sup>110</sup> See 1.4.

## Chapter 3 Madness

### 3.1 Madness and the Non-lover

In 2.5 we examined how eros is supposed to work out harmfully or beneficially to the beloved in his relationship with the lover. But we did not focus on an essential element in Socrates' account, which we are about to focus in this chapter, namely, madness. The central task of Socrates' second speech in the *Phaedrus* is to demonstrate that the most blessed state of the soul is achieved through the god-sent *madness* of eros (245b7-c1). This demonstration in turn is related to the task of recantation, in which Socrates takes back the position of his first speech, which is derived from Lysias speech, that 'it is a simple truth that madness is an evil' (244a5-6). If that were the case, Socrates says, his first speech would have been finely said (244a6). The recantation thus stands or falls with the reevaluation of madness.

Socrates, technically, never conducts this reevaluation of madness. I mean that Socrates never gives a general account of madness *per se*, let alone a definition of madness, and contends that madness is not a simple evil on the basis of that definition.<sup>1</sup> He goes straightforwardly to the particular kinds of madness, those supposed to be sent by god; he first lists three kinds of divine madness that are widely recognized as beneficial, and then goes to the fourth kind, the madness of love, demonstrating that the greatest blessing of the soul comes through this kind of divine madness. This strategy requires explanation, because (a) if Socrates is able to demonstrate the benefit of love simply by looking at love by itself, without connecting it with a general account of madness, he need not take a detour to touch upon the question of madness. This move, one might respond, could be explained by rhetorical considerations, since the recognized fact of other kinds of madness being beneficial can soften the universal hostility towards madness in general. Even if we accept this explanation, Socrates' strategy is still perplexing, because (b) in the first two speeches, which Socrates is supposed to recant, love is not treated explicitly as a kind of madness in the first place. Lysias' speech does not even mention madness, and *mania* occurs in Socrates' first speech only once (241a4) where love (*eros*) and madness (*mania*) is contrasted with *nous* and *sōphrosunē*. Eros in

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<sup>1</sup> This is supposed to be a typical Socratic process of conducting evaluation: to judge whether or how something is good must be followed by defining what it is in the first place. Cf. *Rep.* 354b-c; *Prt.* 361c; etc.

Socrates' first speech, which starts with a formal definition and proceeds in a highly organized way, is treated as a species first under the genus of desire (*epithumia*) and then under the genus of wantonness (*hubris*).<sup>2</sup> That love is a kind of madness is no more than implied in the previous speeches, that is to say, the madness of love is implied by being an opposite of *sōphrosunē*.

The stress on madness, I believe, can be explained by this, that at the core of the previous condemnation of eros, as Socrates understands, is not a condemnation of eros in general, but particularly of its madness by implication, even though madness was not mentioned directly there. His recantation, accordingly, consists not only in the claim that eros can be most beneficial, but particularly in the claim that eros as a kind of madness can be most beneficial.

Our reflection begins with the problem of the non-lover. The scope of Socrates' first speech is determined by Lysias' speech, in which the comparison is made between the lover and the non-lover. The first question would be, as I understand, why the non-lover (*ho mē erōn*), who by definition is not subject to eros, would make a sexual advance to anyone. It is of no doubt for the Greeks that sexual desire is a manifestation, if not the primary manifestation of eros.<sup>3</sup> It is rather paradoxical for whoever is or claims to be without eros to have eros nonetheless.<sup>4</sup> Whatever distinguishes the non-lover with sexual desire from the lover,<sup>5</sup> they are indistinguishable in terms of their sexual desire towards the boy. This, I believe, explains (as I am about to show) the beginning of Socrates' first speech and its somehow awkward definition of eros, namely, it is at first said to be a kind of desire, and then is defined as a kind of *hubris*.

Socrates' first speech<sup>6</sup> starts with an argument for the necessity of definition (237b7-

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<sup>2</sup> Hackforth points out this fact (1952, 40). I shall explain it later.

<sup>3</sup> Originally (in Homer) eros (with a short o) does not refer to sexual desire or desire towards another human being in particular, but generally to desire for food, drink, as in the formula 'But when they put aside the desire (eros) for drinking and eating', and even for war (e.g. Iliad 13.636-9), see Ludwig 2002, 124-26. But it is clear, as is shown in Socrates' first speech, that eros at the time of Socrates and Plato refers primarily, if not exclusively, to passionate love for another human being.

<sup>4</sup> I believe that the modern notion of romantic love somehow stands in the way of appreciating this paradox, as for our mind, simply having sexual desire towards another person does not mean loving that person, since for us 'love' surely means more than sexual desire.

<sup>5</sup> Although it is not said explicitly here, surely one difference is that (in our ordinary understanding) being in love with X targets the particular person X; one cannot just find a substitute, whereas with the sexual appetite alone this is possible.

<sup>6</sup> When I refer to Socrates' first speech, as I did, I refer to the actual speech (237b7 ff.)

d2). After that the definition of eros opens with an acknowledgement of the question, if not a paradox, which we stated above. On the one hand, 'that love is a kind of desire is clear to everyone' (237d3-4), on the other hand, 'we know that men desire the beautiful (i.e. beautiful boys given the context) even if they are not in love' (237d4-5). The speaker is naturally led to ask, as we did, 'by what shall we distinguish the lover and the non-lover?' (237d5). In other words, the lover and the non-lover cannot be distinguished by their sexual desire. In the following definition, accordingly, love must be defined in terms of something other than (sexual) desire so as to be distinct from non-love or a non-loving sexual appetite. And that distinction turns out lies in the difference between *hubris* and *sōphrosunē* (237d6-238a2). Desire (*epithumia*) turns out not to be the genus of which eros is a species, but something common to both the *hubristēs* and the *sōphrōn*, both the lover and the non-lover. What distinguishes the lover from the non-lover is his lack of *sōphrosunē*. The general picture is: (a) In the first two speeches (Lysias' and Socrates' first) both lover and non-loving suitor of the boy have sexual desire. (b) eros/love is supposed to be a kind of *hubris*. (c) *hubris* is contrary to *sōphrosunē*. So sexual desire that exists without eros is supposed not to be hubristic but be *sōphrōn*, as it is in the non-loving suitor.

'The story is not true' (244a3), says the speaker of Socrates' second speech, following Stesichorus of Himera. The story here referred to is the story in 'the previous speech' (244a1), that is, Socrates' first speech, and it is that eros is a simple evil because it lacks *sōphrosunē*. Specifically, the story which eventually turns out untrue is based on this syllogism: (a) Whatever is *aphrōn* is evil; (b) eros is *aphrōn*; therefore (c) eros is evil. If this story is not true, it is because either (a) is not true or (b) is not true. That is to say, either it is not true that whatever lacks *sōphrosunē* is simply an evil, or it is not true that love necessarily lacks *sōphrosunē*. Clearly, in declaring that madness is not a simple evil but in some cases is the greatest blessing, Socrates' second speech means to claim the former, namely, that (a) is not true. The core of the defense or praise of eros against non-love in Socrates' second speech is the defense or praise of madness against *sōphrosunē*. This antithesis later receives qualifications as one between divine madness against human or mortal *sōphrosunē*, and is emphasized in its conclusion (256e3-257a2).

Now that Socrates is rejecting (a), he must declare, somewhat oddly, that *sōphrosunē* is somehow inferior to its opposite. But is *sōphrosunē* not a virtue that Socrates recommends in many Platonic dialogues? 'There are striking resemblances,' as

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excluding the setting where the speaker is revealed to be a lover in disguise of a non-lover (237b1-6), which I shall come back to explain later.

Nussbaum says, ‘between the doctrine of Socrates’ first speech and certain views seriously defended by Socrates in middle-period dialogues’.<sup>7</sup> It is thus understandable for her to contend in her influential (also much debated) interpretation of the *Phaedrus* that Socrates’ recantation is not only a recantation of the previous speeches, but also of the views that Plato used to endorse seriously (for Nussbaum primarily the views in the *Republic*).<sup>8</sup> I shall argue, however, that despite Nussbaum’s arguments,<sup>9</sup> it is wrong to attribute the story being recanted in Socrates’ second speech to the Plato of an earlier period of his career, because the *sōphrosunē* in the mouths of Lysias’ or Socrates’ non-lover is not genuine virtue, however much it resembles the latter. It is rather an expression of ordinary morality which is in a way self-contradictory, and Plato is aware of the incoherence of ordinary morality and this awareness constitutes one of his moral insights even in the supposed earlier dialogues. The incoherence of ordinary morality is reflected in the *Phaedrus* in the problematic figure of the non-lover.

Let us first examine Socrates’ first speech itself. The speech enumerates two motivations within the soul: desire for pleasure, and judgment aiming at good. Thus judgment alone is the guide for one’s well-being; desire merely asks for pleasure, lacking any concern for the good. They are at one point in accord, at another point at odds (237d9-e1). When they are at odds, according to the speech, a man is in love (or in any hubristic state of mind) if desire overcomes judgment (238b7-8); if the other way around, accordingly, a man is *sōphrōn*.

Now let us raise the question about the figure of non-loving suitor of Lysias’ speech and of Socrates’ first speech. Why is the non-lover, who according to this theory is *sōphrōn*, that is, his desire is supposed to be under control and his good sense in control, pursuing the beautiful boy whom he is addressing? The non-lover, as he admits, also

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<sup>7</sup> Nussbaum 1986, 202.

<sup>8</sup> Nussbaum 1986, 202.

<sup>9</sup> Nussbaum gives three reasons why the views in the previous speeches should be attributed to the earlier Plato (202-03). The first is that the views cannot be evidently worthless; the second is that the fact that the divine sign (*daimōnion*) warns Socrates implies that Socrates was committed to the views; the third is that the setting of Socrates’ first speech may suggest that its speaker is a lover *par excellence* such as Socrates himself. The first is not sufficient, since Plato’s or Socrates’ views are not the only worthy views (but I agree with her that the commentators like Hackforth understated the significance of the previous speeches); the setting of Socrates’ first speech I shall discuss later in this section. Here I only respond to the second. The divine interference does not necessarily indicate, as Nussbaum believes, the sincerity of Socrates. The divine interference is for the possible blasphemy (242b8-c3, d9-e4), which is indifferent to whether Socrates sincerely endorsed the views or simply utters it playfully.

desires (*epithumousi*) the beautiful (237d4-5). In this case, his desire and good sense must be in accordance rather than at odds (cf. 237d9-e1). Thus a non-lover led by good sense, when desiring the beautiful, desires the beautiful as far as it is good. But desire (*epithumia*), by definition, is simply for pleasure. So there is in the beautiful the pleasant as well as the good. When it comes to the non-lover's desire, the motivations in Socrates' first speech can be illustrated in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2 The courting non-lover

The overlapping area in Figure 2, zone 2, which is good as well as pleasant, indicates the state of mind when desire and good sense are in accordance. The non-lover who courts the boy, who the speaker claims to be, desires the beautiful when it is both good and pleasant. The lover, corresponds to zone 3, desires the beautiful when it is pleasant and not good. Zone 1, which corresponds to the non-lover who does not desire the pleasant in the beautiful, is left idle in this schematic diagram. Anyway, this scheme gives the premises of the syllogism in Socrates first speech. In so far as the *sōphrōn* is directed by the good, which falls into zones 1 and 2, whereas the *aphrōn* falls out of the circle of 'the good' (zones 1 and 2), the major premise arises that whatever is *aphrōn* is not good or is evil; in so far as the lover is defined to fall into zone 3 excluding zone 2, the minor premise arises that eros is *aphrōn*. The lover, by definition, completely falls out the circle of 'the good' (zone 1 and 2).

Since the figure is symmetrical, a man who falls into the circle of the good but also desires the pleasant is no less a man who falls into the circle of the pleasant but also is guided by the good. If we expand the definition of the lover to whoever falls into the circle of the pleasant (zone 2 and 3), the overlapping area would correspond to the lover

who is in his right mind as much as the non-lover who is delighted in beauty. When a non-lover desires (which makes him fall in zone 2), what he desires is the pleasant---in this respect he is not different from a lover who falls in zone 3---, and what distinguishes him from hubristic lovers is that he imposes upon himself or his desire such a restriction that he desires the pleasant in the beautiful that is also good in light of his judgment; from another perspective, that courting non-lover is no less a lover who is not hubristic but guided by good sense. It is clear, then, the philosophical implication of the overlapping area is that according to the scheme of the speaker of Socrates' first speech the courting non-lover is nothing but a *sōphrōn* lover. He has the same desire as a lover is supposed to have, only with more caution.

This is also confirmed by the dramatic setting that precedes the body of the speech (237b2-6):

There once was a boy, a youth rather, and he was very beautiful, and had very many lovers. One of them was wily and had persuaded him that he was not in love, though he loved the lad no less than the others. And once in pressing his suit to him, he tried to persuade him that he ought to give his favors to a man who did not love him rather than to one who did.<sup>10</sup>

By claiming to be a non-lover, the speaker disclaims the vices attributed to the lover in the following speech. More importantly, by adding this setting, Socrates makes the concealed lover enact his *sōphrosunē* (as the virtue that the concealed lover himself praises) in deed. It is shown by the strategic deception of the speaker that not every lover is like what he describes in the speech; rather, there are lovers, among whom he is, who are *sōphrōn*. He is not out of his mind, but is able to control himself and uses his judgment to take the best course of action.

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<sup>10</sup> Hackforth suggests that this setting is put forth by Socrates because it would be unconvincing to attribute the concern for the moral welfare of the boy that is expressed in the speech to 'a genuine cold-blooded sensualist' (1952, 40). This explanation is, *pace* Hackforth, simple-minded, since nothing prevents a 'cold-blooded sensualist' from designing a speech that makes him sound nothing like a sensualist. Another explanation for this setting is that it reveals the nature of the Lysias' speaker, that is to say, the paradoxical nature of Lysias' non-lover is nothing but a concealed lover, see Griswold 1986, 57. I agree with this explanation to a certain extent, in so far as the courting non-lover will be revealed to be not different from the *sōphrōn* lover. But I doubt if any textual evidence suggests that the speaker of Lysias' speech actually understands himself as a concealed lover, since we are not given a dramatic setting of Lysias' speech, corresponding to that of Socrates' first speech, but only given a speech in which he claims to be a non-lover.

This sheds new light on the structure of the whole speech, which proposes to answer the question ‘What benefit or harm is likely to come from the lover or the non-lover to the boy who gives him favors?’ (238e1-2), but ends up with showing one side of the promised story, what harm is likely to come from the lover, without touching on the other side of it, namely, what benefit is likely to come from the non-lover. This is detected and pointed out by Phaedrus immediately (241d4-7), and Socrates replies that the benefits that come from the non-lover are nothing but the opposites of the harms that come from the lover, that is, the benefits that come from *sōphrosunē*. This missing half, if supplied, would be a praise of the *sōphrōn* lover, who the speaker himself is, no less than of the courting non-lover, who he claims to be.

Socrates’ first speech, therefore, is in a way self-refuted due to the incoherence between its doctrine and what is implied in the presentation of the doctrine. Its denouncement of eros is based on the definition of eros which implies that the lover must lack *sōphrosunē*, but that is undermined by the speaker himself who shows that there is such a thing as the *sōphrōn* lover.

This incoherence seems to be avoidable within the existing scheme, if the lover confesses his love, making an extended definition of eros so as to include both zone 2 and zone 3. The logical equivalent of this change is withdrawing the minor premise that eros is necessarily *aphrōn* but keeping the major premise (the scheme). This, as has been pointed out, is not Socrates’ move in his second speech. That is because, as I shall argue, the scheme itself is problematic; with a simple change of the definition of love, the original incoherence will be avoided merely at surface but will return in another form.

For understanding that, the *Symposium* provides a handy case. In the speech of Pausanias we can find the very way of defending eros that Socrates does not take in the *Phaedrus*, that is to include both the *aphrōn* and the *sōphrōn* into the category of the lover. Pausanias therefore introduces a distinction between a good kind of eros and a bad kind in such a way that the good kind of eros is *sōphrōn* and the bad kind is *aphrōn*. Pausanias’ praise of good eros (‘heavenly’ eros, 180d) is made on the grounds of his understanding of the Athenian *nomos*. Pederasty, Pausanias says, is considered to be simply shameful in some places, like Ionia, and it is considered to be simply noble in other places, like Elis and Boeotia. But in Athens and Sparta, the law (*nomos*) is complicated. The law on the one hand considers pederasty to be shameful, discouraging the beloved to grant their favour (183c-d); on the other hand the law considers it to be noble, encouraging bold pursuit on the lover’s part (182d-183c). The apparent inconsistency of public opinion

regarding eros reflects the duality of eros. The bad eros, that of sensual pleasure, should be discouraged; the good eros, that of wisdom and virtue, should be encouraged. On basis of this understanding, Pausanias proposes to reform the law, so as to conform better to its supposed spirit. On the one hand, since the bad eros should be discouraged, pederasty, or love of boys, should be prohibited, just as it is prohibited to love freeborn matrons (181d-182a). The good lover should rather love the boy who starts to grow his beard,<sup>11</sup> since that is when the boy starts to have sense (*noun iskhein*, 181d2), and his virtue (*aretē*) and vice (*kakia*) of soul has developed as well as those of body (181e2). On the other hand, since the good eros should be encouraged, the beloved should be encouraged to gratify his lover as he wishes, in so far as the beloved does that in the belief that he himself would be improved in wisdom or in virtue in general (184c).

According to Pausanias' understanding, the spirit of the Athenian law is that wisdom and virtue is what truly is worth pursuing, thus no restriction should be made in pursuit of them. It is therefore only reasonable to encourage the beloved to devote himself to the lover for the sake of wisdom and virtue. If that is true, one might wonder what makes the lover, like Pausanias himself, who is supposed to have and be able to provide wisdom and virtue, enter a relationship with a relatively younger and immature beloved. Whereas the beloved is motivated by a certain kind of 'love of wisdom and the rest of virtue' (184d1), the lover, who has wisdom and virtue to offer, is motivated by love of sensual pleasure.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, what does he expect to get from the boy other than pleasure in a beautiful body? Pausanias' first proposal, that the lover ought to love relatively older boys,<sup>13</sup> can be seen as a remedial attempt to fix the love on to intelligence and virtue. But that does not help him much, since no one should love boys in the first place if intelligence and virtue are truly lovable.

The difficulty of Socrates' first *Phaedrus* speech reappears in Pausanias' speech in a different form. The difficulty of Socrates' first speech, to repeat, consists in the incoherence between what the speaker says and what he does: what he says implies that all lover is *aphrōn*; what he does suggests that he himself, a lover, is *sōphrōn*. Now the difficulty of Pausanias' speech is that the good lover himself does not love what he

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<sup>11</sup> This is radically revolutionary since the traditional custom is that the pederastic relationship will end when the boy starts to grow beard; see Dover 1989, 86; cf. *Prt.* 309a.

<sup>12</sup> Strauss notices 'a fundamental defect' of Pausanias' account is that 'the motivations of the lover and the beloved do not agree' (2001, 86).

<sup>13</sup> It is noteworthy that in Socrates' first speech the beloved is said to be older than boy (*meirakiskos*, 237b2).

recommends to the beloved: he loves a beautiful body whereas he recommends love of wisdom and virtue. The one who fits the depiction of the Pausanian good lover is nobody but the good beloved rather than the lover himself, since it is the good beloved who loves what one ought to love; he is supposed to be a philosopher (and a philaretus, a lover of virtue, 184d1). The lover himself, however, has nothing to do with philosophy, except for his claim of wisdom hence to be the perfect match of a philosophic beloved.<sup>14</sup> His advocating of wisdom and virtue serves his purpose of self-interest of the most vulgar kind, that is, the procuring of sensual pleasure. In spite of their different definition of eros and the lover, both the speaker of Socrates' first speech and that of Pausanias' speech are caught in the same sort of incoherence between words and deeds: whereas the speaker declares that what one ought to desire (or be directed to) is not what a lover desires, what the speaker himself desires is precisely what a lover desires.

Lysias' speech, the very first speech in the *Phaedrus*, reveals the implication of this incoherence. It is clear that the speaker of Lysias' speech regards *philia* as no more than a mutually beneficial relationship. He does not even conceal his self-interest (231a4-6). It is a merit, rather than a vice, to look after one's own interest, for it helps to build a stable relationship of mutual benefit, which is not a result of full-hearted dedication to another, but of reciprocity, namely, exchange of services. The lover, who on the other hand totally disregards his own interest, is deemed mentally sick and an untrustworthy partner (231c7-d7, 234b1-5).<sup>15</sup> In this respect Lysias' speaker shares with Lysias' father in the

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<sup>14</sup> This empty glorification of philosophy (also see 183a) appears in Socrates' first speech as well: the beloved is said to be deprived of philosophy if he is associated with the lover, and, by implication, would gain access to it if he is associated with the non-lover (239b4). As Ferrari points out, 'the Socratic persona's high-minded allusions to the 'training of the soul' and to 'divine philosophy' seem to put him on a rather more exalted level than the average, although still lacking in philosophic sophistication' (1987, 101).

<sup>15</sup> It is worth noting that the point made in Lysias' speech is closely related to Phaedrus' speech in the *Symposium* (178a-180b). What is wondrous in eros, to Phaedrus, is its power to make one neglect his own interest and serve for another's. Eros, thus, is able to inspire self-forgetting and overcome self-interest. That is exactly one of the central reasons held by Lysias why one should get away from the lover. In Phaedrus' speech, the well-being of the lover depends entirely on divine reward, for he himself does not care for his own good; so if we set aside divine interference, what remains is nothing but mental sickness and bad deliberation, which according to Lysias stands in the way of mutual benefit. To put it in another way, the similarity is that in both speeches the lover ignores his own interest. The difference is that in Phaedrus' speech in the *Symposium* this is taken to be heroic generosity for the sake of the beloved; in Lysias', on the other hand, it is coupled with foolishness about the beloved's interest too.

prudence of a businessman.<sup>16</sup> With the spirit of a businessman, the speaker proposes a deal that is supposed to be most beneficial for both parties, attacking his rival to be inefficient to maximize their mutual benefit. In the proposed deal, ‘the boy will get what he wants from love, which is friendship and patronage, and it will be a friendship that lasts rather than foundering on the fickleness of infatuation (234a1-b1); and the non-lover in his turn will get what he wants from the boy, namely his sexual favours---which he will enjoy unhampered by problems of jealousy and possessiveness’.<sup>17</sup> The non-lover promises to provide ‘trouble-free friendship’, as Ferrari puts it,<sup>18</sup> in exchange for sensual pleasure. He is able to provide what he promises, according to himself, because he, unlike the lover, is in sound mind, or is *sōphrōn* rather than its opposite, but *sōphrosunē* is merely the warranty of a good business partner. Lysias’ speech thus speaks out what Socrates’ first speech and Pausanias’ speech keep in disguise. The incoherence between words and deeds on the part of the speaker of Socrates’ first speech and Pausanias’ speech is due to this truth revealed in Lysias’ speech, that despite the moral disguise, what they really intend is a transaction, in which what one offers and what one wants must not agree. Therefore his speech and his desire must not agree. The concrete setting of Socrates’ first speech reveals a universal truth. It is not merely an incidental strategy for the lover to conceal his love, but a necessary ruse of ordinary morality, or mortal *sōphrosunē* as Socrates calls it.

This insight is anything but unknown to Plato when he composed the so called middle-period dialogues. For those who have ‘simple-minded moderation’ (*euēthēs sōphrosunē*, 68e5), Socrates says in the *Phaedo*, ‘it is a kind of licentiousness that has made them moderate’, since he controls some pleasure because he is controlled by others, just as the courageous face death for fear of greater evils (68e-69a).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See 1.2. Some scholars, e.g. Ferrari, Yunis and Rosen, point out the relation between Lysias and Cephalus, who plays a significant role at the beginning of the *Republic*, but only Nussbaum attempts to explore the possible kinship between Lysias’ speech and his father’s discourse in the *Republic*. She makes a conjecture which lacks any direct evidence in the text: ‘It would not be hard to imagine Cephalus offering his son similar advice’ (1986, 208). Nonetheless, the kinship between Cephalus’ character and the point made in Lysias’ speech is obvious.

<sup>17</sup> Ferrari 1987, 91.

<sup>18</sup> Ferrari 1987, 92.

<sup>19</sup> Ferrari rightly connects ordinary morality exemplified in Socrates’ concealed lover with the ‘timocratic’ figure in the *Republic*. Those controlling themselves simply by custom without knowing why (which requires philosophy) have their desire disavowed in public but the desire burns secretly deep in the soul. See Ferrari 1987, 101. It can be added to Ferrari’s remark that such a man will choose a tyrannical life in reincarnation, as a manifestation of

In a transaction the point is to secure one's own interest. To achieve this end a man must look after his benefit in the long run, even when that would cost him some short-term benefit (233b6-c2):

I will, first of all, associate with you with an eye not to immediate pleasure; I will plan instead for the benefits that are to come, since I am master of myself and have not been overwhelmed by love.

Looking after one's long-term interest requires calculation or deliberation, which in turn requires distraction from immediate feeling. Detachment rather than spontaneous indulgence is required for a good businessman. Sanity (*sōphrosunē*) and having sense (*noun ekhein*) among others are the vocabulary of ordinary morality for this detachment. In light of this the failure of the required detachment and giving in to immediate experience is reproached as insanity and sickness of mind. The non-lover claims to distinguish himself from the lover by his refraining from love, but to refrain from sensual pleasure is for the prospect of more pleasure to come; what really distinguishes him from the lover is his detachment. The only way to justify his claim to be a non-lover, as Rosen points out, is the fact that the object of the non-lover's desire is objectified as a commodity.<sup>20</sup>

Then we must consider what the detachment of the non-lover means philosophically. The answer to this question will shed light on the philosophical implication of Socrates' recantation in the *Phaedrus*. The necessity of detachment is bound to arise in an understanding of human nature according to which the human good and the human's innate desire diverge. One must distance himself from his innate desire, since if he let himself be led by it, he would not be directed towards the good. This is not saying that the innate desire according to this understanding must not be good, but that in so far as he is led by desire, the object of his desire is something other than the good *per se*, whether it may coincide with the good or not. This has been spelled out by the scheme of motivations in the human in Socrates' first speech. According to the scheme, the judgment that aims at the best is acquired (*epiktētos*), whereas the desire for pleasure is inborn (*emphutos*) or innate (237d7-9). Socrates' recantation in his second speech consists in the rejection of this scheme as a whole. Its implication, as has been said, is that Socrates does not withdraw the minor premise of the non-lover's syllogism and keeps the

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his true desire (619b-e).

<sup>20</sup> Rosen 1969, 432.

major premise, but withdraws the major premise once and for all, the syllogism being 'whatever is *aphrōn* is evil (major premise); eros is *aphrōn* (minor premise); therefore eros is evil'. According to Socratic understanding, on the other hand, the human good and the innate desire of the human can go together, that is to say, the human good can be the object of the innate desire of the human soul. Surely there are also other innate desires of the human that are not of the good; for example, sexual desire. However, in Socrates' second speech, the innate desire for the good turns out to be natural, while the innate desire for sensual pleasure now turns out to be unnatural, or even contrary to nature (*para phusin*, 251a1). Given this new understanding, the detachment from the truly natural desire for the good, the desire for the vision of truth or wisdom, becomes unnecessary and inferior to the indulgence of that same natural desire, that is to say, *sōphrosunē* is inferior to madness.

### 3.2 Madness and Art

Socrates starts his recantation with an account of three recognized kinds of divine madness that are supposed to be more accomplished (*polla dē kai kala... ērgasanto*) than their counterparts of sound mind (244a8-245a8). The three kinds of divine madness are prophetic madness (245a8-d5), telestic madness (244d5-245a1), and poetic madness (245a1-8). The examples of prophetic madness are the prophets or prophetesses in Delphi and Dodona, and the Sibyl, who achieve great things when mad, but accomplish little or nothing when they are sane (*sōphronousai*, 244b2). It might initially seem that Delphic prophets accomplish nothing when sane because they have nothing else by which they are able to make prophecy. Madness is all that they have. They are, for example, not trained to prophesy. If they were equipped with an expertise or art of prophecy, they would be able to accomplish something equal or even better. This is not what Socrates implies. As the following account shows, Socrates means to argue precisely against that view, namely, that a sane practitioner of an art is able to achieve what divine madness accomplishes. He contrives an etymological scheme to explain that mantic is much superior to oionistic (244b6-d5). Mantic (*mantikē*), says he, was originally manic (*manikē*), which derives its power from madness or *mania*;<sup>21</sup> oionistic (*oiōnistikē*) was originally *oionostikē*, which derives its power from *nous*, *historia*, and *oiēsis*, in a word, from human good sense (*sōphrosunē*). Mantic is superior to oionistic because, as the ancients rightly captures but the modern fails to get, madness is superior to human good sense. Now the sane is not just someone who has sanity but nothing else (as in the case of the Delphic prophets when sane), but someone who has *nous*, *historia*, and *oiēsis*, namely, some kind of human intelligence, or expertise, being able to make prophecy through discerning the codified patterns of the flight of birds. The humanly autonomous art is inferior to the art of madness (*manikē*). Divine madness is superior to secular wisdom, so to speak, by the degree that mantic, the art of madness, is superior to oionistic, a sane pursuit of expertise (244d2-5). An art (*tekhnē*) must be perfected by certain kind of madness.

The contrast between divine madness and secular wisdom is sharpened in the case of the third kind of divine madness, namely, the poetic or musical madness. Now the contrast is identified further between madness and *tekhnē* itself (245a5-8).

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<sup>21</sup> There may be an etymological connection between them, and this connection is resorted to by others before Plato. See Rowe 1986a, 170, quoting from Dodds 1963, 70.

If anyone comes to the gates of poetry without the Muses' madness, persuaded that he will become an adequate poet by expertise (*ek tekhnēs*), he will be unfulfilled, and his poetry, the poetry of the sane (*tou sōphrosountos*) will be eclipsed by that of the mad.

Socrates here clearly adopts a narrower notion of *tekhnē* than he does in the case of prophetic madness. In the account of prophetic madness, madness is not contrasted with *tekhnē per se*, but with a certain kind of *tekhnē*, one relying entirely on secular wisdom, autonomous from the divine. Now Socrates uses the word *tekhnē* to refer to this humanly autonomous *tekhnē* alone. Presumably this notion of *tekhnē*, and accordingly the clear-cut contrast between *tekhnē* and divine inspiration is relatively new. As Morgan points out, 'early Greek literature draws no dichotomy between divine empowerment and individual skill'.<sup>22</sup> As in the case of prophecy, the ancients get it right; the moderns are wrong. Poets cannot produce worthy poems by virtue of their humanly autonomous *tekhnē* alone, but they also need the divine madness sent from Muses.<sup>23</sup>

The modern (as for Socrates and Phaedrus and Plato's first readers) dichotomy between madness and *tekhnē* is presented at the beginning of the dialogue. Just like the non-lover, the expert has his object objectified, that is, keeping his object in a cognitive distance. The most evident characteristic of an expert, apart from the effectiveness of his practice (which is not necessarily due to his expertise), is that he knows what he is doing. He is able to give an account of his own expertise so that he can impart it to another.<sup>24</sup> On these grounds some recognized experts, poets and rhetoricians for example, are denied the title by Socrates.<sup>25</sup> Now Lysias' speech exemplifies in form as well as in content the

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<sup>22</sup> Morgan 2010, 49.

<sup>23</sup> It has received much attention that the poetic and prophetic madness are held in high esteem here but rank relatively lower in the nine kinds of lives later in 248d2-e3. There the prophetic life ranks fifth; the poetic life sixth. Hackforth in his attempt to reconcile the apparent 'inconsistency' claims that the prophetic life (*mantikos bios*) that ranks fifth refers to what are commonly regarded as the practice of mantis, but actually to the practice of orionistic (1952, 58-9). Burnyeat (followed by Rowe 1986a and Ferrari 1987) disagrees with Hackforth, asserting that the prophetic life in the later account includes the practice of divinely inspired mantic art at the beginning of the speech. This life has a lower rank because, as Plato always thinks, 'the marvellous and useful pronouncements they make are no credit to them [i.e. the practitioners of mantic art], but to the god who speaks through them'.

<sup>24</sup> *Phdr.* 268b3-5; cf. *Prt.* 319c-d; *Meno* 90b-e; *Grg.* 453d-454a, 465a.

<sup>25</sup> For example, rhetoric is denied the title of *tekhnē*, because 'it has no account of the nature of whatever things it applies by which it applies them, so that it's unable to state the cause of each thing. And I refuse to call anything that lacks such an account a craft.' (*Grg.* 465a); also

sobriety of the expert without love. As commentators point out, the speech in terms of style is flat and monotonous.<sup>26</sup> But *pace* Hackforth, there is a discernible plan in the speech. The flatness of style is the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric, indicating a disinterested detachment from any devotion that may carry the speaker away.<sup>27</sup> The way in which the non-lover speaks captures the way in which the sober expert acts in general. The detachment of the non-lover goes hand in hand with the practice of expertise. What is contrasted to the detachment of Lysias' non-lover is the enthusiasm of the amateur Phaedrus, who gives full credit to the Lysian art as if that is the only way to secure success: he, Lysias, makes the best speeches because he is professional, an expert, and one of the best (*deinotatos*, 228a1); I, Phaedrus, am incapable of such mastery because I am an amateur (*idiōtēs*, 228a2). Wishing to become as artful as Lysias (more so than having a lot of money, 228a3-4), Phaedrus pretends to be disinterested but cannot escape Socrates' keen eyes (228a6-c3):

I know very well that he did not hear Lysias' speech only once: he asked him to repeat it over and over again, and Lysias was eager to oblige. But not even that was enough for him. In the end, he took the book himself and pored over the parts he liked best. He sat reading all morning long, and when he got tired, he went for a walk, having learned—I am quite sure—the whole speech by heart, unless it was extraordinarily long. So he started for the country, where he could practice reciting it. And running into a man who is sick (*nosounti*) with passion for hearing speeches [i.e. Socrates], seeing him—just seeing him—he [i.e. Phaedrus] was filled with delight: he had found a partner for his frenzied dance (*sunkorubantiōnta*), and he urged him to lead the way. But when that lover of speeches (*tou tōn logōn erastou*) asked him to recite it, he played coy and pretended that he did not want (*epithumōn*) to. In the end, of course, he was going to recite it even if he had to force an unwilling audience to listen.

Now love (in this case of speeches), as it is in Lysias' speech, is said to be a sickness (*nosos*, 228b6, cf. 231d2). Phaedrus and Socrates share in this 'Corybantic' enthusiasm for speeches, but Phaedrus tries to conceal his desire (*epithumia*, 228c2). He is a concealed lover, being an enthusiastic but imitating the disinterestedness of the Lysian non-lover.

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*Ion* 532c.

<sup>26</sup> Hackforth 1952, 31.

<sup>27</sup> Rosen 1969, 432. Compare the end of Socrates' first speech; Socrates admits his divine possession and the failure of mastery over the speech (241e).

The recantation and the praise of madness turn out to be on a par with the rejection of the modern/Lysian notion of art and the restoration of madness back to *tekhnē*, recovering of its ancient notion.

Between the prophetic madness and the poetic madness is the telestic madness. Madness, says Socrates, will fall upon members of certain families that suffer from maladies caused by divine anger, giving clues for the rites of purification that relieve the family from their suffering. This notion, as Yunis says, is welcomed by common beliefs, but lacks obvious reference.<sup>28</sup> When it comes to prophetic madness, one is immediately reminded of the Delphic prophets and so on; when it comes to poetic madness, Homer and Hesiod, who appeal to Muses or even attribute their poetry to Muses, are called to mind.<sup>29</sup> But when it comes to telestic madness, no handy examples are available. Be that as it may, we do have the case familiar to the Greeks that exemplifies the failure of attempts (or an attempt) to avoid family disasters that rely only on human contrivance alone, heedless of the divine. That is the story of Oedipus. Oedipus attempts to relieve his family from the predicted patricide and incest and to relieve his city from the plague, solely by his own intelligence. His endeavor only pushes him to the disaster faster. At the end Oedipus blinds himself. If sight stands for human knowledge or intelligence, its removal is due, and a proper punishment for Oedipus' blind trust on his own intelligence. Human wisdom is an insufficient guide. Oedipus should have listened to the blind prophet Tiresias.

If the story of Oedipus is what is in Plato's mind when he makes his Socrates speak of telestic madness, does it make some twist in his account since the loss of sight seems to be something that Socrates wishes to avoid? In the account of Homer and Stesichorus (243a2-b7), both poets are deprived of their sight because of their false accounts of Helen; whereas Stesichorus purifies himself with his palinode and has his sight back, Homer does not know the purification and thus loses his sight forever. Socrates wants to follow Stesichorus rather than Homer, perhaps doing even better than Stesichorus since he is going to recant his blasphemous account before he loses his sight. Actually, this account of Stesichorus and Homer conveys the same lesson. They erred in telling stories in which Helen was in Troy, but the truth is, as Stesichorus' palinode tells us, she was actually in

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<sup>28</sup> Yunis 2011, 133.

<sup>29</sup> It is true, as Hackforth points out, that Homer and Hesiod are inspired in a way not the same as that in which the prophets are inspired (1952, 60, 84). Be that as it may, readers, as Hackforth himself displays, are supposed to be thinking of Homer and Hesiod (and other inspired poets) when Socrates speaks of poetic madness.

Egypt and in Troy was merely a phantom of her. The poet's sight is taken away when he is blind to the truth; his sight is given back when he sees the truth. But why does he fail to see the truth in the first place? The errors of the poets, Socrates suggests, are due to their taking phantoms as realities. Eyesight is bound to be misled by phantoms. The poets are blind because they tried to perceive the truth with poor human wisdom.<sup>30</sup> Relying on human knowledge, he is blind; when his eyes are blind, he acquires the vision of truth. So eyesight can be restored to him only when it can no longer lead him astray. The transcendence of the horizons of human knowledge foreshadows the climax of Socrates' second speech about the superheavenly region (247c3-e2), and finally finds its ontological grounds in that account.

Before we come back to this metaphysical crux of Socrates' account and its relation to the divine madness of eros, it is worth a while pointing out that Socrates enacts the first three divine madneses in the scene of the dialogue.<sup>31</sup> 'I am a seer (*mantis*)', says Socrates, not a serious one but sufficient to guide himself (242c3-5). He divined what kind of offense he committed and the mystic rites of purification that could cleanse it (243a4). Here Socrates is acting with inspired divination and mysticism. Socrates' two speeches are also products of divine inspiration, in a way, given that Socrates at several points ascribes them not to himself,<sup>32</sup> and that he disclaims the art of speaking (262d5-6), and that the speeches themselves are said to be spoken madly (*manikōs*, 265a5). However, Socrates' inspiration, although it has prophetic, telestic, and poetic forms as well, is different from that in the recognized divine madness. The recognized divine madness, as Morgan points out, is a state of mind of divine possession in all its three kinds. By divine possession she means, which I follow here, that the agent is conceived to be literally possessed, that is, invaded and controlled, by some deity, so as to cease to be an agent responsible for his action.<sup>33</sup> The prophets in Delphi make prophecy when possessed by the deity: it is not the prophets themselves but the god who utters through them. Socrates

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<sup>30</sup> Arguably, the story of losing and regaining sight can be read allegorically. For example, according to Burger, the recovery of sight should not be understood as the prize of the recovery of truth, but the very recovery of truth itself, just as the loss of sight should not be understood as the punishment of the blindness to truth, but the very blindness to the truth (1980, 47).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Burnyeat 2012, 242-43.

<sup>32</sup> As Rowe points out (1986a, 163), Socrates' speeches are ascribed to 'the gods of the place', and the cicadas (259b); his first speech is specifically ascribed to the Muses (237a7 ff.), the place (238c9 ff.), Lysias (257b2), Nymphs and Pan (263d5-6), and to Phaedrus (238d5); his second speech is ascribed, apart from the local gods and the cicadas, to Stesichorus (244a2).

<sup>33</sup> Morgan 2010, 51.

makes it very clear that the prophets have god in them (*entheōi*, 244b4). By the same token, those suffering telestic madness are possessed (*kataskhomenōi*) by the god (244e4); the mad poets compose verses when Muses take control of them and put words in their mouths and the poets are in possession (*katokōkhē*, 245a2). In the cases of recognized divine madness, the divinely mad is divinely possessed, in so far as he is invaded by some (external) divine entity and controlled by it. But when Socrates divines, purifies himself, and composes speeches, he is not said to be invaded and possessed by anything external. His divination and purification is inspired by the divinatory power of the soul (242c7); his speeches, as Rowe points out, are indeed inspired but not through divine possession, namely, not through being taken up and controlled by some deity from outside.<sup>34</sup> Actually, divine possession seems to be an intruding force that carries Socrates away rather than a divine source of speech: Socrates first warns against the possibility of being possessed by local nymphs in the interlude of his first speech (238d1), and concludes it before he is carried away by them (241e1-5); his second speech, as emphasized by Rowe, is said to be ‘the most beautiful and the best palinode that I [i.e. Socrates] am able to make’ (257a3-4). Socrates himself assumes the authority of the speech: he does not present himself as a mouthpiece of some alien deity. Therefore, Socrates’ inspiration does not take the form of divine possession (as is defined earlier) like those in his account of the three kinds of divine madness. He is not practising the Lysian arts, being completely sane, nor is he merely a vehicle of divine voices. What kind of inspiration, then, is the Socratic inspiration?

The Socratic inspiration discloses itself primarily in erotic madness, the fourth kind of divine madness and the theme of Socrates’ second speech. Compared to the other kinds of divine madness, Burnyeat suggests, erotic madness, or its highest form, philosophy, is an inspiration from within, or by one’s own mind, rather than that from without, or by some external deity.<sup>35</sup> By this he means that the philosopher is ‘possessed’ by his own power of reason. One’s own reason, according to Burnyeat, is itself a deity within. To support this claim, Burnyeat examines Socrates’ ontology in the palinode. God owes its divinity to its closeness to the superheavenly Forms (249c6). Divinity, thus, is defined in terms of perfect knowledge of the true objects of knowledge. The human soul, just like the divine soul, shares in the closeness to the Forms in heaven, and is able to regain this closeness through recollection when they are on earth. Here recollection is, as

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<sup>34</sup> Rowe 1986a, 170.

<sup>35</sup> Burnyeat 2012, 242.

it is in other dialogues, a process of recovery of the heavenly memory from within. Since ‘what is recovered from within is knowledge which makes one divine’, the soul in recollection, or precisely speaking, the part of the soul that once saw the truth and now recovers it, is a deity within.<sup>36</sup> Recollection, then, is a state of mind in which this internal deity ‘possesses’ the whole mind.

Morgan points out the textual evidence of the relation between recollection and inspiration or madness. Madness comes into the account right after the introduction of recollection (249b6-d3):

A human being must understand speech in terms of general forms, proceeding to bring many perceptions together into a reasoned unity. That process is the recollection (*anamnēsis*) of the things our soul saw when it was traveling with god, when it disregarded the things we now call real and lifted up its head to what is truly real instead. For just this reason it is fair that only a philosopher’s mind grows wings, since its memory always keeps it as close as possible to those realities by being close to which the gods are divine. A man who uses reminders of these things correctly is always at the highest, most perfect level of initiation, and he is the only one who is perfect as perfect can be. He stands outside human concerns and draws close to the divine; ordinary people think he is disturbed (*parakinōn*) and rebuke him for this, unaware that he is divinely inspired (*enthousiazōn*).

In what immediately follows that passage, Socrates reaffirms their relation (249d4-e3):

Now this takes me to the whole point of my discussion of the fourth kind of madness—that which someone shows when he sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded of (*anamimnēiskomenos*) true beauty; then he takes wing and flutters in his eagerness to rise up, but is unable to do so; and he gazes aloft, like a bird,

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<sup>36</sup> Burnyeat 2012, 245. Meanwhile Burnyeat seems to suggest that the divinity of the mind that is brought by recollection is a state of perfect knowledge, since ‘divinity is a state of perfect knowledge’ (245). This cannot be true, since Socrates has made it fairly clear that recollection does not recover perfect knowledge, since even in heaven the non-divine soul does not have access to full vision of truth. The superheavenly vision of the non-divine soul is bound to be limited and partial (248a1-b1), so is the memory of it through recollection. For our interpretation of 248a1-b1, see 1.5; for our interpretation of recollection, see 2.2. Although recollection does not give us divine knowledge, it does make us lift our eyes upwards and transcend human concern and human knowledge. Hence the soul or its reason in recollection is indeed closer to the Forms than the soul with human good sense.

paying no attention to what is down below—and that is what brings on him the charge that he has gone mad (*manikōs*). This is the best and noblest of all the forms that divine inspiration (*enthousiaseōn*) can take for anyone who has it or is connected to it.

So it is established that recollection is or causes divine inspiration or madness. The soul in question is inspired, not because it is possessed by some deity, but because it is preoccupied with the divine vision. Morgan calls this inspired soul ‘divinely occupied’ in contrast to divine possession.<sup>37</sup> Being inspired or ‘possessed’ by one’s own reason is being occupied with the vision of truth.

Be that as it may, Burnyeat’s interpretation leaves a puzzle. Recollection is comparable to the recognized divine madness, according to him, because in other forms of divine madness one is possessed by an external deity, while in recollection one is ‘possessed’ by an internal deity, that is, one’s own reason. However, divine possession (in the strict sense, e.g. by Muses, etc.) counts as a kind of madness precisely because one in that state of mind gives the control of one’s own mind to something alien (to divine power in the cases of divine madness; in the cases of regular madness, say, erotic madness caused by excessive sexual appetite, one’s mind is under the control of an element of mind that is now alienated from oneself: in this case the sexual appetite will be seen as something in the ‘self’ but something alien, and only reason is identified with one’s self. The sign of this kind of alienation is that sexual appetite or other lower parts of the soul are usually presented as something non-human: in the *Phaedrus* they are presented as horses).<sup>38</sup> Now that one is ‘possessed’ by reason in recollection, that is to say, reason rather than anything conceived as external force is in control, how does that state of mind count as madness? Burnyeat does not raise, let alone answer this question.

That is madness, one might say, because the soul abandons all worldly concerns and looks up to the non-human realm, as the quotations above say. This coincides with probably the most famous (or notorious) image of the philosopher, that of the first philosopher, Thales of Miletus, who fell into a well while studying the stars. Socrates himself alludes to this image in the *Theaetetus* (174a). There Socrates uses this story to exemplify his description of the philosopher, who does not know the way to agora nor court, nor public assembly, and knows nothing about the life in the city, let alone the things that will make him flourish from the ordinary point of view (173c-e). That is

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<sup>37</sup> Morgan 2010, 54.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Annas 1999, 135.

because, although his body lives in the city, his mind is carried away from the concern for his own affairs to the investigation of nature (173e-174a):

His mind, having come to the conclusion that all these things are of little or no account, spurns them and pursues its winged way, as Pindar says, throughout the universe, 'in the deeps beneath the earth' and geometrizing its surfaces, 'in the heights above the heaven', astronomizing, and tracking down by every path the entire nature of each whole among the things that are, never condescending to what lies near at hand.

This is surely part of the picture that Socrates in the *Phaedrus* tries to offer in his account of the mad aspect of love and philosophy. But I do not think that is the whole picture. If it were, the philosopher himself would know clearly what he is doing when experiencing recollection; it is only the ordinary people, or 'the many' (249d3), who do not understand what he is doing. In other words, the philosopher would only seem mad to the many, but he is actually in his right mind all the time.<sup>39</sup> This understanding, I believe, misses an essential flavour in Socrates' account of erotic and philosophic madness.

The soul, when reminded of the superheavenly vision, is clearly said to be in a state of madness (250a5-b1):

Only a few remain whose memory is good enough; and they are driven out of their senses (*ekplēttontai*) when they see an image of what they saw up there. Then they are beside themselves (*ouketh' hautōn gignontai*), and they do not know what has happened to them (*to pathos agnousi*) for lack of sufficient perception.

Whoever is reminded of the superheavenly vision is not controlling himself; he does not know what he is experiencing, let alone what he is doing. He is, as it were, as remote

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<sup>39</sup> This is in a way part of the teaching of the *Symposium*. In Alcibiades' report, Socrates appears erotic, but his inner truth is actually *sōphrosunē*. His eroticism is ironic (216d-e). Socratic hubris is his very *sōphrosunē*, his indifference to Alcibiades' physical beauty (219c), and everything that is valued by the many. In the whole *Symposium*, the philosopher is depicted as the most sober person in an intoxicated atmosphere (cf. 223b-d). Rosen points out (1969, 424) that the *Phaedrus* is set outdoor at high noon, while the *Symposium* in a drinking room at night, thus the circumstance of the *Phaedrus* is in every way more sober than that of the *Symposium*. Socrates is presented to be most sober in an intoxicant circumstance, and his speech is as sober as a report should be; he is presented inspired, in the *Phaedrus* on the other hand, in a relatively sober circumstance, and his speech praises madness. The philosopher is always the oddest (*atopōtatōs*, *Phdr.* 230c6).

as possible from the practitioner of the humanly autonomous art such as Lysias.

The physiology of the erotic experience confirms the madness of divine eros. Socrates' description of the experience that accompanies recollection features heat or warmth (*thermotēs aēthēs*, 251b1; *thermanthentos*, 251b3; *thermainētai*, 251c8) and sweating or a stream (*hidrōs*, 251b1; *epirruisēs* 251b5; *rheonta*, 251c7). Heat and moist are believed by Hippocratic medical art to be the cause of madness.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, in Hippocratic writing, madness or *mania* proper makes the soul move too quickly.<sup>41</sup> In the *Charmides* the first tentative definition of *sōphrosunē* as a sort of quietness (*hēsukiotēs*, 159b) suggests the connection between its opposite and excessive motion. Now here in the physiology of eros the soul is said to be irritated and tickled (*ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται*, 251c5). Besides, Socrates uses *ὁ κεκινημένος* to refer to the man who is excited by *ἔρω*s (245b4), as opposed to the sane, who in a way is in tranquillity. And he makes eros and *pteron* (wing) inseparable in *Pteros* as the divine calls it (252b4-9). In seeing beauty here on earth, Socrates says, the soul is carried back to the memory of the truth, and 'becomes winged (*πτερωῶται*), fluttering (*ἀναπτερούμενος*) with eagerness to fly upward' (249d6-7). The stream of beauty, Socrates says at another point, 'sets the lover all of a flutter' (*ἀναπτερωῶσαν*, 255c7). As Rowe's translation captures elegantly, *ἀναπτερόω* means both 'to furnish with new wings' and 'to excite'.<sup>42</sup> When the soul is sane, it is relatively tranquil; when it is in love, its wings grow through recollection and the soul comes to be moved out of tranquillity. The recollection of the erotic soul in Socrates' description is clearly maddened.

The ultimate explanation of the madness of recollection lies in Socrates' description of the inner conflict of the soul. We analyzed Socrates' description in 2.3 and 2.4, and found that two episodes of account, which are distinct in event rather than in presentation, are offered in the text (253e5-254b1; 254b3-255a1). Recollection is not involved in the second episode of account. The first episode of account (253e5-254b1), as we have elaborated, corresponds to the psychology in the *Republic*. Reason, here the charioteer, deliberates what is best for the whole soul to do, in light of the accepted conceptions of the good. When the beautiful boy comes in sight, the licentious appetite for sex is controlled by the alliance of the charioteer and the white horse, through moral

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<sup>40</sup> See Ahonen 2014, 14, on Hippocratic writings such as the *On Sacred Disease* and the *On Regimen*. Surely Socrates in the relevant passage describes the soul rather than the body, but there the soul is precisely described as if it is a body, cf. Ferrari 1987, 154.

<sup>41</sup> Ahonen 2014, 14 n.10.

<sup>42</sup> *LSJ* s.v. The pun is pointed out by Benardete 1991, 145.

indignation at the ugly and the indecent. In this account, the charioteer or reason holds back not only sexual appetite, but also his or its own desire for the beautiful, as he is clearly said to be attracted to the beauty of the boy (253e6-7). The charioteer, then, is in full control of himself. He knows exactly what he is doing when he reacts to the beauty of the boy. But this picture eventually changes to another. When the lover is close enough to the boy (254b3-5), the sanity of the charioteer gives way to frenzy. With the charioteer made in touch of his memory in recollection, he is no longer in control of himself. Rather, he surrenders to his immediate experience: because of the awe that comes from the vision of Beauty itself and Moderation itself, he stops both horses with violent pulling of the rein (254b7-c3). If the charioteer was in control of himself, or knew what he is doing, he should have compelled the black, licentious horse alone, as the other horse is obedient all along. But the charioteer is acting no more than by a reflex, that is, he is not actively in control of the process.<sup>43</sup> On the one hand, the soul is indeed put in touch with true objects of knowledge or intelligence through recollection, on the other hand, in recollection the lover suffers a state of mind in which he loses control of the course of his action, and he can give no account of his action at least at the very moment of recollection.

As is clear from Socrates' account of the prophetic and poetic madness, there was no dichotomy between art and madness in the ancient conception of art. If an art is ever going to be perfect, it must rely on divine madness at its core. Now erotic madness that is caused by recollection is supposed to be at the core of an erotic art. Erotic art does not enter Socrates' account until the very end, when Socrates prays for his god-sent erotic art not to be taken away from him by the god Eros on account of anger (257a7-8). This prayer contains more information than it first appears to. Arts, by Greek tradition, are gifts of gods. This tradition begins with Hesiod's Prometheus story, in which fire is stolen by this benevolent god and bestowed to human race (*Theogony* 562-70; *Works and Days* 47-58), and it still echoes in Protagoras' speech in Plato's *Protagoras*, in which fire and arts are said to be granted by Prometheus to make it up to the humans for their lack of natural gifts (321c-322a). Although Zeus is said to be angry about the theft of fire, he is not said to take it back from the humans. Why? Presumably, once the humans learn how to use

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<sup>43</sup> Cf. Rowe 1986a, 237, where Rowe characterizes the intellect of the lover's soul to be 'uncertainly in control'. What he means, as I understand, is not incompatible with our interpretation. The intellect, or the charioteer, is in control in so far as it controls the black horse or the licentious sexual appetite: in this sense the soul is in control; it meanwhile subjugates the black horse not by contrivance or deliberation, but by reflex: in this sense it is not in control of itself.

fire, this art cannot be taken away from them, since the application of this art is completely autonomous. However, if art must be completed by divine madness, it cannot be autonomous and accordingly gods can take it away because they can take away the divine madness at its core. Erotic art, then, must be an art that relies on the divine gift of madness.

### 3.3 Madness in Human Life

In the last two sections, we examined the two supposed contrasts that are introduced and recanted in Socrates' second speech in their own way, that between erotic madness and sanity and that between madness and *tekhne*. It turns out that both the notion of non-loving sanity and the dichotomy between madness and art or knowledge are incoherent with Platonic metaphysics: the commendation of the detachment of non-love presupposes the divergence of the human good and the natural desire; the idea that knowledge is autonomous from divine madness is ignorant of the true objects of knowledge and the passage leading to them, namely, recollection accompanied with inspirational madness. In this section we shall examine the value of madness in human life, in light of Socrates' second speech.

The most influential account of the value of madness in Plato's philosophy, to my knowledge, is given in Nussbaum's interpretation of the *Phaedrus*. She gives three theses regarding the question what the non-intellectual elements or passions, as she calls them, in which love and madness are thought to consist, can do in human life, based on her reading of the dialogue. Against Nussbaum's reading, Rowe offers his powerful arguments (as I think) respectively aiming at each thesis of Nussbaum's. Let us begin by looking at Nussbaum's theses and her elaboration of them, and Rowe's counter arguments.

The first thesis that Nussbaum puts forth on the issue is that 'the non-intellectual elements are necessary sources of motivational energy'. Here what she refers to by 'the non-intellectual elements' seems to be the non-intellectual elements or parts of the soul, namely the horses, since her point is that the charioteer, that is the intellect, although he can decide where to go for the whole soul, he cannot get anywhere without the cooperation of the horses, which stand for appetites and emotions. The horses, as essential parts of the soul as well as the intellect (even in the case of the god),<sup>1</sup> contribute

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<sup>1</sup> That the divine soul also has the non-intellectual parts, i.e., the horses, is a fact disturbing to some scholars. Guthrie 1971, which she cites in a long endnote (222 n.44), suggests that Plato means to endorse the view (consistently in the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus*) that the nature of the soul is non-composite and purely intellectual; the non-intellectual parts are developed in certain circumstances (such as incarnation). He then wishes to 'reconcile' this understanding of the soul with the account in the *Phaedrus*. To this end he cannot but underplay the account of the composite structure of the divine soul as nothing but a verbal illusion that comes from the inexactness of an imperfect, human image (237-38, cf. *Phdr.* 246a4-6). This, along with Nussbaum, I cannot accept. My own interpretation of the

to the natural motion of the soul as a whole (natural in the sense that the motion is in accord with the soul's nature).<sup>2</sup> Rowe, however, doubts that the cooperative engagement of the two horses, especially of the black horse, is in any case attainable as Nussbaum alleges it to be. Rowe suggests that the cooperation is only attainable in the case of divine souls, in which the horses are perfectly obedient; even in this case the horses want something other than what the charioteer wants: they want nectar and ambrosia instead of the vision of truth.<sup>3</sup> In the case of the non-divine soul, on the other hand, the horses make trouble. The black horse, especially, will never be willing to obey the charioteer. Even in the heavens, the horses are said to disturb the journey of the soul and eventually cause its fall (cf. 247b3-5, 248a4). The horses, the text suggests, stand in the way of the charioteer's full control, hindering the soul-chariot's ascending toward the gods and the superheavenly beings, rather than being cooperative with the charioteer.<sup>4</sup>

Although Rowe's arguments seem plausible to me, Nussbaum's first thesis can be defended on the following points. First, if we do not take 'the non-intellectual elements' as identical to the horses of the soul-chariot, it can be argued that the motion of the soul towards the good (presented in the picture as towards the vision of the truth) requires a non-deliberated or non-reasoned reaction on the part of the intellect (the charioteer), as has been elaborated at many points in our previous interpretation. The intellect as such has a powerful drive of its own which on occasion can manifest itself in a somewhat 'irrational' reaction, in which the intellect does not react through reason or deliberation, but gives in to experience and passion. This experience and passion of the charioteer, or what Rowe calls 'intellectual excitement', does the job that Nussbaum falsely attributes to the horses of the soul. The intellect in the picture of the *Phaedrus* does more than calculating and deliberating; it is attracted to beauty and suffers experience and passion that it cannot actively control.<sup>5</sup> Second, even if we consider the non-intellectual parts of the soul, the horses, their engagement is not all distracting or trouble making. As a matter of fact, the black horse is presented as playing a critical role along the soul's

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isomorphism of the divine and human soul is given in 1.4, which is set around the ancient Platonic notion of *homoïōsis theōi*, or becoming like god.

<sup>2</sup> Nussbaum 1986, 214.

<sup>3</sup> Rowe is perfectly right on Nussbaum's misinterpretation of 'nectar and ambrosia' at 247e6: Nussbaum takes them as identical to 'the nourishment of opinion' at 248b5. But the nourishment of opinion clearly is the substitute for the true nourishment of the charioteer.

<sup>4</sup> Rowe 1990, 234-35.

<sup>5</sup> This actually anticipates the next point that she makes, as we shall see.

ascending route. As has been demonstrated,<sup>6</sup> Socrates' picture of the subjugation of the black horse is complex. It is divided into two distinct episodes of account, 253e5-254b1 and 254b3-255a1, by the insertion of recollection. In the first episode, the soul restrains itself from sexual advances through moral indignation or ordinary sense of decency; in the second, it restrains itself through the charioteer's sense of true values, so to speak, which is given in recollection. But in between, what links the two episodes together is the temporary victory of the black horse (254b1-5):

At last, however, when they (i.e. the charioteer and the white horse) see no end to their trouble, they are led forward, reluctantly agreeing to do as it (i.e. the black horse) tells them. So they are close to him now, and they are struck by the boy's face as if by a bolt of lightning. ...

If the charioteer and the white horse were holding to their post, and never giving in to the black horse, the soul of the lover would never have been close enough to be struck by the beauty of the boy and then reminded of the superheavenly vision. Ordinary sense of decency stands in the way of recollection, since it rejects the attraction of beauty and passionate love indifferently in the first place, so that recollection would never be triggered. The soul must overcome the ordinary sense of decency to get closer to the beautiful, and that cannot be done by the charioteer himself, since he is himself bound up by decency and gets angry (along with the white horse) at the idea of approaching the boy (254a7-b1). The white horse is not able to do that, either, since it is obedient to the charioteer all along. It is the black horse that overcomes the prejudice of the ordinary morality and leads the soul to encounter the beautiful.<sup>7</sup> It therefore does contribute to recollection and the ascending of the soul. It is noteworthy that the black horse has a characteristic snub nose of Socrates (253e2),<sup>8</sup> which suggests its covert connection to philosophy.

Nussbaum's second thesis is that 'the non-intellectual elements have an important guiding role to play in our aspiration towards understanding'. The 'guiding role' of the non-intellectual elements consists in their leading the soul towards beauty or the good, since, according to Nussbaum, they have a keen natural responsiveness to beauty.

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<sup>6</sup> See 2.3, 2.4.

<sup>7</sup> Ferrari observes that recollection is triggered in a way 'through the agency of the black horse' (1987, 192). Also, as we have said, the overcome of ordinary morality happens in the acceptance of the lover on the boy's part, see 255a4-b1.

<sup>8</sup> Benardete 1991, 150.

Because of this responsiveness, emotion and passion inform the whole soul as to where the beautiful lies. In this sense, Nussbaum claims that the non-intellectual elements have in themselves 'a sense of value'.<sup>9</sup> Rowe rejects the idea that the non-intellectual elements (if the horses in the soul-chariot are referred to here) have either guiding, not to say cognitive role. Rather, he argues, both what guides the soul and what gives the soul a sense of value are nothing but the intellect, or the charioteer, to be specific, his memory of superheavenly vision.

Again, while I agree with Rowe for the most part, Nussbaum's thesis is defensible in so far as the response to beauty is indeed a 'non-intellectual' process, in the sense that the soul does not discover beauty through cognition (although it does so, as Rowe points out, through the activities of the intellect after all). Beauty is spotted through sensation, through sight, to be specific, rather than any intellectual activity such as reasoning (250d3). But this does not mean that Beauty itself is a visible object as well as intelligible. The experience of Beauty cannot be explained in optical terms alone. Through sight, Beauty itself is reminded of in shock and awe (251a7-8, 254b7-8). It is in this shock and awe, of the charioteer and of the whole soul, rather in cognition or understanding, that Beauty reveals itself, so as for the soul to be directed towards what truly is and what truly is good, with the superheavenly horizon recovered.

Surely the stimulus of beauty is not the only way to recover that horizon. As Socrates says in the *Republic*, the co-existence of bigness and smallness, the hardness and the softness, and the opposites of the sort, in a visible object such as a finger, and the understanding of bigness or hardness or their opposites being objects that are thought to be unmixed, can lead us to the awareness of the separation between the visible and the intelligible (523b-524d). The soul can face the intelligible instead of the visible through a turning around, usually with fierce resistance (*Rep.* 515c6, d5, e1, e6, e8, 516a1).<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, the experience of beauty is a far readier passage through which the soul could be fixated onto the intelligible. Nussbaum would be right when she says that Plato means to claim 'that certain sorts of essential and high insights come to us only through the guidance of the passions',<sup>11</sup> if she did not say 'only'. Passions such as shock, awe, and

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<sup>9</sup> Nussbaum 1986, 214-15.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Barney 2008, 367.

<sup>11</sup> Nussbaum 1986, 214. Presumably she is using 'passions' in the Humean way; in Hume passions and reason (the faculty) are outside each other, and reason engages only in 'the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding' (*A Treatise of Human Nature* Book 3, Part 1, Section 1).

natural attraction to beauty certainly are a guide of the soul, and an efficient one.

Therefore, Rowe's claim that our 'appetitive/emotional responses' to beauty are by no means the right guide of the soul, is right only if the 'appetitive/emotional responses' refers to the responses to beauty on the parts of the horses. The right guide of the soul, according to Socrates' account in the *Phaedrus*, is precisely the appetitive/emotional or impulsive responses of the intellect. Rowe acknowledges that the soul is led to understanding through those responses, but he believes that the state of mind characterized by those responses is rather a psychological phase that is to be overcome to give way to a rational mental state as we usually understand it, i.e. a calm engagement of understanding. And only in the latter state, the soul is guided 'for the right reasons', that is, guided by 'a clear sight of true value'.<sup>12</sup> If Rowe's interpretation were correct, the impulsive responses to beauty would be at best a lesser guide of the soul. More importantly, the related elements such as madness would be excluded from the philosophical life proper: philosophy in that case would be nothing but the cure of madness, as Rowe puts it; the impulsive responses to beauty would be no more than a necessary preface of philosophical contemplation. Madness, then, would be denied intrinsic value in the best human life, which is our central concern here in this section. We shall come back to this later.

Nussbaum claims in the third thesis that 'the passions and the actions inspired by them, are intrinsically valuable components of the best human life'. To this point, as above, I can accept her thesis, but not in the sense in which she means it. Nussbaum argues that the best human life, namely the philosophical life, not only involves intellectual activities such as contemplation, but also involves 'ongoing devotion to another individual', that is, 'continued madness and shared appetitive and emotional feelings' as well as 'shared intellectual activity'.<sup>13</sup> Nussbaum compares the *Phaedrus* with the *Symposium*, arguing that in the latter dialogue at the highest stage of the ladder of love the lover-philosopher transcends personal love and engages in pure intellectual activity, whereas in the former dialogue the lover never engages in intellectual activity without being in a personal relationship with another individual, and the non-intellectual activity attached to it.<sup>14</sup> Rowe differs with Nussbaum on her view about the philosophical life. He argues that erotic encounter with another individual, and the

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<sup>12</sup> Rowe 1990, 237.

<sup>13</sup> Nussbaum 1986, 219.

<sup>14</sup> Nussbaum 1986, 220.

relationship with them, is not essential to philosophical life even in the *Phaedrus*, since the great speech says no more than what eros can be and can do, and that does not imply philosophy can only arise in eros.<sup>15</sup>

The central question in the Rowe-Nussbaum debate, as I understand, is marked out by Rowe as follows. His 'most important point of disagreement with Nussbaum',<sup>16</sup> as Rowe labels it, targets Nussbaum's belief that Plato in the *Phaedrus* treats philosophy itself as a kind of madness. However, the philosophical life according to Rowe is not a life of madness, but, if anything, the philosophical life requires madness or the appetitive or emotional responses to beauty being cured and under rational control.<sup>17</sup>

I do agree with Rowe to the following extent. The wings of the soul, which keep the soul aloft, are nourished by nothing but superheavenly vision, which is fitting for the intellect of the soul (248b7-c1). The fate of the soul, after all, stands or falls by its vision of what truly is and what truly is good (248c2ff.). Although the palinode speaks more of sensual and emotional responses of the soul to beauty, Plato nonetheless, as Rowe says, 'sees the best human life as depending on the control of those responses, rather than their enjoyment'.<sup>18</sup>

But Rowe goes further. Madness, which is ascribed solely to those sensual and emotional responses to beauty, is not allowed by Rowe to be a constituent of the philosophical life, but only to be overcome in the soul of the philosopher. Rowe reaches his point in the following way. He acknowledges that the philosophical lover, like any ordinary lover, is bound to behave in a crazy manner when he encounters a beautiful boy, as Socrates describes (252a2-7):

It forgets mother and brothers and friends entirely and doesn't care at all if it loses its wealth through neglect. And as for proper and decorous behavior, in which it used to take pride, the soul despises the whole business. Why, it is even willing to sleep like a slave, anywhere, as near to the object of its longing as it is allowed to get!

However, Rowe believes that all those insane behaviours will cease when reason gains the control of the whole soul, when 'the better elements of their minds get the

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<sup>15</sup> Rowe 1990, 244-45. Rowe addresses this question not in his response to Nussbaum's third thesis, but in his response to Vlastos' view. But I find it suitable to be taken as a response to Nussbaum's claim as much as to Vlastos'. In his response to Nussbaum's third thesis, he refers back to his response to her second thesis. We shall deal with them later in detail.

<sup>16</sup> Rowe 1990, 232.

<sup>17</sup> Rowe 1990, 238.

<sup>18</sup> Rowe 1990, 241.

upper hand by drawing them to a well-ordered (*tetagemē*) way of life, and to philosophy' (256a7-8).<sup>19</sup> Presumably 'the better elements of their minds get the upper hand' means reason being in control. In the soul of the philosopher, reason takes control of the appetitive or emotional responses to beauty. Based on this reading, Rowe concludes that the philosophical life is not a life of madness, but its cure.

It might be inevitable that all those insane behaviours of the lover in his chase of the beloved will eventually cease when the lover 'captures' the beloved. Be that as it may, the text, as Rowe himself admits, does not explicitly say that madness will cease. He argues that although it is not said it is implied, since a life of madness cannot be called 'well-ordered' (*tetagemē*).<sup>20</sup> A well-ordered life, to Rowe, must be a life of rational control. Philosophical life is no doubt for him a life of rational control. However, Rowe has to concede that even in the philosophical life, the lover 'will continue to neglect ordinary concerns... ---because he has a clear sight of true value. Seeing his behavior, Socrates says, the many will call him crazy' (249d2). In order to make sense of his point, Rowe introduces a distinction between madness and inspiration, asserting that the philosopher is inspired rather than maddened. So madness ceases eventually and the philosophical inspiration goes on in the life of the philosopher. But he immediately realized that divine inspiration is no less 'the ultimate cause of his (i.e. the lover's) previous insanity' than the cause of the philosopher's insight.<sup>21</sup> The distinction, then, between madness and inspiration turns out to be artificial. The 'previous insanity' and the philosophical insight are no more than different manifestations of divine inspiration, or, to use Socrates' own words, of divine madness.

The difficulty in Rowe's interpretation, as I understand, is due to his theoretical attempt to oppose madness to rational control, or the victory of 'the better elements of the soul', i.e. the charioteer. As Rowe himself points out, it is divine inspiration, through which the charioteer eventually controls the lower elements, that causes the insane behaviours of the lover as described in 252a2-7. Socrates makes that clear by making his account of the lover's behaviour be preceded by his vivid description of the experience of divine inspiration (251a1-d7). This is explained on the psychological level later in

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<sup>19</sup> It is worth noting that Socrates' description of divine lover's insanity and his later remark on the victory of the charioteer (perhaps along with the white horse, 'the better elements') are in different contexts. The former is in Socrates' description of the divine lover's experience from the perspective of the soul as a whole (251a1-252a1), the latter in the description of his internal conflict.

<sup>20</sup> Rowe 1990, 237n.37.

<sup>21</sup> Rowe 1990, 237-38.

Socrates' account of the inner conflict of the soul. The shudder and reverence and the sequential eccentric manner of behaviour is by no means 'cured' by the victory of the charioteer in his wrestle with the black horse; on the contrary, the victory of the charioteer is the source of all the madness. The whole soul is dominated by the charioteer, acting out the charioteer's bidding: the soul is reminded of the Forms as the charioteer is reminded of the Forms; the soul feels awe as the charioteer feels awe; the soul regards the boy as a god as the charioteer regards him as a god; the soul is excited as the charioteer is excited (cf. 251a1-252a1; 254b1-e8). Since the charioteer, as we have shown, fails to control his own action but surrenders to his immediate experience, the whole soul now is in frenzy. The soul is controlled by reason but reason is not in control of itself. Thus its responses are phenomenologically similar to some responses which arise contrary to reason, even though they are the responses *of reason* (i.e. belonging to the charioteer). Thus it is one thing to say that the philosophical life requires the control by reason, whereas it is another thing to say that the philosophical life cures madness.

If Rowe insists that the philosophical life is primarily characterized by the intellect being in dominance in the soul and the base impulses being in check, the inspirational madness which according to the *Phaedrus* arises from, and perhaps helps to cause, the victory of the intellect must be an essential part of philosophy. Although I do not accept Rowe's views on madness in relation to philosophy, his calling into the question of the idea of philosophy as a kind of madness is (in my opinion) profoundly grounded in the *Phaedrus*. His questioning, if rightly understood, ought to be put as follows. Philosophy, as the dialogue shows, starts with divine inspiration, but philosophy is not identified with divine inspiration. Philosophy, as Socrates makes clear in the speech, is an intellectual gift (the soul that used to see most truth is planted into a philosopher, 248d3), a disposition or character (the follower of Zeus is disposed to the love of wisdom, 252e3), and most importantly a way of life (*diaita*, 256a7), as opposed to the honour-loving life among others (256b7-c1). A way of life, or the activity involved in a way of life, cannot consist in divine inspiration. Inspiration or inspirational madness is an event that fall upon the soul through divine eros (either once in a life time or repeatedly), rather than an activity that somebody customarily engages in. Although inspiration may have altered one's life decisively, the soul will not be excited and feverish forever as it is being inspired. After the soul suffers the ecstatic experience at the moment of recollection, it is bound to 'calm down' afterwards. It is, to be sure, no longer in a state of existence as it used to be

in the episode of his life before recollection; as Rowe himself says,<sup>22</sup> the philosophical life that phases out the initial frenzy can be said to be mad in a certain sense, namely, in the sense that the philosopher abandons worldly concerns and fixes his mind on what is beyond, for example, on contemplation of what truly is beautiful. In other words, the philosophical life consists of two phases; one is the initial phase in which the soul is stimulated by beauty and reminded of the Forms beyond heaven; what follows is the phase in which the soul arranges his life after his inspirational experience. Instead of attempting to exclude the initial phase from the philosophical life as Rowe does, I believe that we ought to inquire into the relation between the two phases. In what relation does the inspirational madness stand to the following life? If inspirational madness is no more than a necessary stimulus that prompts the soul into 'hardcore' philosophy, understood as purely intellectual activity such as disinterested reasoning, it is perfectly reasonable to question, as Rowe does, whether madness is 'an intrinsically valuable component' of the philosophical life, since in that case madness seems to be valued only derivatively from its consequence. If, on the other hand, madness has more than instrumental value, that is, the initial madness is not valuable completely for its luring the soul into the following intellectual activity, then it should be given that the philosophical life itself has an element of madness (which is more than mere lack of interest in worldly concerns).

To settle this question, we need go back and look into the universe of Socrates' great speech. In Socrates' universe, the fate of the soul depends on its closeness to the Forms. The gods' being divine is due to their constant, infallible association with the Forms (249c6). As for the non-divine souls, on the other hand, their association with the Forms is always at risk: they at one point catch a glimpse of the Forms, at another point fail to see them at all (248a1-b1). The failure of that vision is the cause of the non-divine soul's fall (248c2-5). The best possible life for the non-divine soul, given the principle that governs the fate of the soul, is its life in heaven, since there they are closest to the Forms. But this 'life' is not the best human life, since the human life is a life on earth, or an incarnate life, while the heavenly life is a disembodied life. The best human life, then, is the kind of life that most resembles the disembodied life in heaven. This conveys the same idea as the notorious one in the *Phaedo*, namely, that philosophy is a practice of dying or being dead, given that dying is the separation of soul and body (64a-66e), and that body is the prison of soul (cf. *Phdr.* 250c6). Now the key point made in the *Phaedrus* is what kind of life the best human life resembles, what kind of life the heavenly life of

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<sup>22</sup> Rowe 1990, 238.

the non-divine soul (which is not yet, or any longer, a 'human soul' at the time) is. Is it a life of ultimate intellectual tranquillity, consisting in nothing but beholding the Forms? The answer is no. Such life is reserved to the gods alone. The gods rests on the rim of the universe after their ascending (247b6-c2). As long as they stay there the divine souls no longer rely on the wings to keep them aloft; given that the wing is inseparable from eros (252b8-9), the contemplative life of the divine soul is without eros. The non-divine soul, on the other hand, never beholds the Forms as easily as their divine ideal. The non-divine soul beholds the Forms with difficulty not because what falls into his superheavenly horizon is hard to comprehend, but because the superheavenly horizon itself is hard to maintain: as we said above, the non-divine soul is always liable to lose its vision of the Forms. It has to make all effort to keep itself upward, so as to keep the superheavenly vision. Unlike the divine soul, its association with the Forms depends entirely upon its wings, that is, its eros. Therefore, the connection between the non-divine soul and the Forms, the closeness to which determines the fate of the soul, is twofold. The Forms are naturally connected to the wing as well as the intellect (248b7-c2):

This [superheavenly] pasture has the grass that is the right food for the best part of the soul [i.e. the intellect], and it is the nature of the wings that lift up the soul to be nourished by it.

Eros not only makes the soul in touch with the truth, but it itself grows as the intellect develops. The calm gaze on the Forms is not the paradigm activity of the best human life, that is, the philosophical life.

Accordingly, the principle in light of which the best human life should be arranged is the following. On account of the ever-going threats of forgetfulness and vice (248c7), the soul of the philosopher is liable to lose touch with the Forms no less than other non-divine souls (otherwise it would have not failed to see the Forms and fallen in the first place). The best human life must be arranged to fight forgetfulness, as the soul did in heaven. It must, in other words, be arranged to re-open or renew the horizon that the soul is ready to lose. Back to the question of the relation between the phases of the philosophical life: the initial phase of inspiration should not be considered (as by Rowe, for example) as instrumental to the following phase, supposedly consisting in pure contemplation; rather, the following phase of the philosophical life is arranged for the sake of being inspired again, in which the horizon of being is rediscovered.<sup>23</sup> Moreover,

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<sup>23</sup> *Pace* Rowe, who claims that 'the erotic encounter Socrates describes is a single (though

the lover's association with the beloved, or personal relationship, is the focus of Socrates' account of eros in the *Phaedrus*. As has been argued,<sup>24</sup> although the relationship between the philosophical couple is not entirely symmetrical, as in a traditional relationship between an adult male and a boy, the beloved, unlike that in the traditional paradigm, is no longer completely passive. He is not a piece of material that does nothing but accepts the fashioning of the lover when the lover is inspired and sets foot on his philosophical pursuit alone. The beloved is turned into a lover. He experiences in the association with the lover what the lover experiences in the association with him, having had a taste of erotic madness (255d6-e4). He is, admittedly, not yet a lover in full size, as he is not said to be reminded of the superheavenly Forms. But he is on his way. He is dazzled by the beauty of his lover, which he has not realized is only the reflexion of his own beauty, which is in turn the reflexion of what is truly beautiful. But he is indeed dazzled. His soul is moved, excited, and is ready to fly upwards with his lover's soul with matching wings (*homopterous*, 256e1). Their relationship, and the philosophical life in general (no matter in what relation the former stands with the latter), is set around erotic madness that inspires their souls, not the other way around, that erotic madness is only an assistant and a foreplay, as Rowe puts it,<sup>25</sup> of the pure intellectual activity.

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complex) episode in the lover's life, not a perpetually recurring one: with the victory of philosophy, the black horse has had its day, at least until its next chance, in a new life and a new body' (1990, 244). Actually, Socrates does not even suggest that the disturbance of the black horse would be solved once and for all, but rather the opposite: first, the black horse, unlike the white horse, cannot be literally tamed. It is not obedient to reason willingly but acts along only out of fear (254e8); second, Socrates' account of the interaction between the best lover and his beloved suggests that their black horses will become active whenever an opportunity is given (255e5-256a5), and that they are as a matter of fact likely to have their way, as in the case of the honour-loving couple (256b7-c7). Because of this constant risk, it is hard to imagine that Socrates only means the triggering of recollection as a one-in-a-lifetime experience.

<sup>24</sup> See 2.5.

<sup>25</sup> Rowe 1990, 244.

## Conclusion

So far we have argued the thesis of this dissertation, namely, in the *Phaedrus* philosophy as such is presented as a kind of madness, in the sense that the philosopher is defined by a state of mind in which the soul is in a way *not* in control of itself (although it is in control of itself in another way), and that this state of mind is that for whose sake the life of the philosopher is arranged.

For this purpose we have examined Socrates' account of the soul and eros in the *Phaedrus*, especially in the great speech of 'palinode', trying to make clear that the madness of philosophy is highlighted in Socrates' account. It turns out that our thesis rests on several metaphysical and psychological claims and a specific conception of the soul, and Plato's systematic understanding of human life.<sup>1</sup> The soul is conceived to be a cosmological force, which mediates between the physical world and the intelligible world, and being a soul as such does not entail becoming an embodied soul. The nature of the soul entails the teleological structure of its motion, with the end characterized by the presence of intelligence (*nous*), and consisting in the activity in touch with the intelligible beings. The well-being of the soul and that of the body are incompatible, for the former requires the soul to engage in theoretical activity, detached from the body whose well-being depends on the care by the soul. The philosophical life for humankind is a pursuit of the soul's well-being regardless (as far as possible) of the human condition, that is, the necessity arising from embodiment. To be unchained from the human condition requires the recovery of the natural desire of the soul, which is suppressed by the human kind of *sōphrosunē*, which is commonly accepted as a virtue. In this recovery, although the intellect is dominant in the soul, the intellect, hence the soul as a whole, gives in to the passions that it cannot control; this state of mind is in a way in sharp contrast to *sōphrosunē*, and can be fairly called madness.

There are several outstanding issues worth mentioning. Among them the first and foremost is the relation between the theme of eros and that of rhetoric. It is argued in the Introduction that the theoretical discussion of rhetoric in the second half of the dialogue must be understood in light of the interpretation of the first half on eros. In 2.4 we see that moral indignation is invoked in the soul through persuasive *logoi*, whose conviction must be overcome in order to set the natural desire of the soul free; moral indignation

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<sup>1</sup> By 'systematic understanding' I am not presupposing some Platonic 'doctrine' of human life running through all the middle period dialogues.

prevents the soul from the indulgence of desire, natural and unnatural indifferently. Socrates' first speech is designed to invoke moral indignation; Socrates' second speech, on the other hand, is designed to free the natural desire with counter conviction. Both exemplify the art of rhetoric construed as 'the leading of the soul' (*psukhagōgia*) by Socrates later in the dialogue (261a7-8). However, this dissertation does not investigate a more specific correlation between the two themes that is sufficient to explain the structure and plot of the following discussion on the art of rhetoric. Such an investigation is necessary for a systematic and comprehensive interpretation of the *Phaedrus* as a whole.

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