



African Spaghetti Bowl: Assessing State Rationales in African Peacekeeping Operations, 1999-2016.

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African Spaghetti Bowl:
Assessing State Rationales in African Peacekeeping Operations 1999-2016

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Abstract

Within Africa, transnational threats risk eroding the progress made on peace and security efforts during the past two decades. The growing reliance on multi-dimensional stabilization missions to address these complex challenges requires the cooperation and support of the African Union, the regional economic communities, and its member states. Recent literature has explicated state support for peacekeeping through political, economic, security, institutional, and normative rationales. Here I show that a correlation exists between peacekeeping contributions and good governance, trade integration, and participation in regional institutions. I derive a new panel count model, which combines maximum likelihood estimation with Monte Carlo simulation to predict the likelihood for African peacekeeping contributions. I assess the results through three United Nations peacekeeping case studies within Africa. I find support for political, economic, and institutional rationales while security and normative rationales remain inconclusive. Furthermore, I assess the marginal effect of trade integration and find a 40 percent increase in the likelihood for contributions as a state ranges from closed borders to open trade. My results demonstrate that as African states improve good governance, reduce trade barriers, and participate in regional institutions they are more likely to support collective action to address regional security issues and achieve “African solutions to African problems.”

Dedication

To my wife Rose, who accepted the long nights, lost weekends, and missed vacations during these past three years. My success is wholly a result of your patience, encouragement, and love.

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Zachary D. Hadley

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Chapter 1 Introduction

On July 11, 2000, fifty-three African states signed the Constitutive Act of the African Union during the Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lomé, Togo. The establishment of the African Union (AU) provided both the legal and institutional frameworks required to address the growing number of complex challenges on the continent. Under the auspices of the former Organization of African Unity (OAU), principles of national sovereignty and non-interference were upheld – often at the expense of inaction and perceived indifference. For the first time, African states agreed to “the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances including war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity” (African Union, 2000, p. 7). The transition from a policy of non-interference to non-indifference represented a new paradigm for peace and security efforts on the continent.

During the twentieth century, the preponderance of military interventions within Africa centered on interstate conflict. By the early aughts, socio-economic challenges, violent extremism, illicit trafficking, and the intertwining of transnational organized crime with political corruption signaled new sources of instability for the continent (Karlsruud, 2017). The ability of the United Nations (UN), the African Union, and the regional economic communities to address conflicts in Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic requires multidimensional regional solutions. It requires international assistance to train and equip African partner nation militaries for peacekeeping and the African Standby Force. And it requires policy harmonization at the institutional level to leverage the full political, economic, and military capabilities of AU member states. Reducing institutional competition while promoting equitable burden-sharing provides a guiding principle.

In the past decade, African states have shown a growing commitment to African-led peacekeeping. In 2017, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in the Republic of The Gambia demonstrated the regional resolve necessary to lead peace operations in the spirit of the Constitutive Act – often prior to the arrival of “blue helmets”. During this time, economic reforms have flourished as proposals for an African monetary union and common market have cultivated robust debate. However, a well-integrated Africa also carries risks as technology, transportation, and infrastructure increase the potential for spillover. Authoritarian rule in many African states has led to stagnate unemployment rates, political oppression, and systemic corruption while the cross-cutting impacts of climate change, food insecurity, and human migration exacerbate regional tensions. By 2050, Africa will contain nearly one-third of the total world population – an increase of 209 percent in less than two generations (UN DESA, 2017). The convergence of these transnational threats will become the defining challenge for the continent during the twenty-first century. Durable peace requires collective action.

Understanding the state rationales which inform cooperation is therefore essential. With respect to security cooperation, African support for regional peacekeeping provides a path towards potential insights. Yet, the profiles of many African contributors appear anomalous. Token contributions from states with large standing militaries are common. A handful of smaller states reliably deploy significant numbers of peacekeepers each year. Autocratic regimes lead regional interventions while democratic nations decline support. States have deployed peacekeepers to the Horn of Africa without commitments to missions across their border. The variance is wide. The question is simple: why do African states provide peacekeepers and what can we learn of the effect of regional integration on the decision to intervene?

Literature Review

The following section provides a brief survey of peacekeeping literature focused on state rationales for peacekeeping. The recent shift towards “robust” and “partnership” peacekeeping contributes to the limited selection of relevant works.

Defining Peacekeeping

The ambiguity of the term adumbrates its evolution. Traditional peacekeeping centered on separating belligerents with the minimum force required. Perceived impartiality was paramount. In response to new and dynamic challenges on the continent, a growing emphasis on multidimensional stabilization missions has blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Critics highlight the challenges of implementing mandates, the lack of necessary resources, and the appearance of conflictual obligations to canonical principles. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations defines peacekeeping as a “technique designed to preserve the peace, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by peacemakers” (UNDPKO/DFS, 2008). In the literature, the definition appears more opaque. Studies describe peacekeeping as a coordinated effort directed at conflict prevention (Rikye, 1984) or post-conflict peace building (Hillen, 1998). Other works leverage the term in support of conflict management (Walter & Snyder, 1999).

The full spectrum of peacekeeping ranges from traditional verification missions including the Aouzou Strip Observer Group in Western Sahara (UNASOG) to peace enforcement via direct action against armed rebel groups in support of the Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). Recent literature highlights the trend towards “robust” and “partnership” peacekeeping. These efforts demonstrate the resolve to mitigate transnational threats and require pragmatic as-

assessment. Yet, as this work will show, support for UN peacekeeping is often informed by how each African state defines the term. In the broadest sense, peacekeeping “helps countries torn by conflict to create conditions for lasting peace” (UN-PKO, 2018). The subsequent analysis begins from this definition.

Historical Trends

In July 1960, the United Nation Security Council passed UNSCR 143, committing the international body to its first peacekeeping intervention in Africa. In response to the Congo Crisis, the United Nations authorized a force in support of Operation des Nations Unis au Congo (ONUC) that at peak-strength numbered nearly 20,000 troops. The stated goals of the operation included reestablishing the rule of law, containing the crisis within Congolese borders, rebuilding the economy, and restoring political stability. It was a fundamentally different mission than what had come before – a military force armed with a mandate for peace. Troop contributing countries (TCC) represented each of the four corners of the globe. However, initial zeal was soon tempered by operational realities. Challenges persisted throughout the intervention with allegations of human rights violations, political corruption, and significant civilian and military casualties. Ultimately, the UN would claim success in Congo with the evacuation of Belgian nationals and the post-colonial transition. However, the experience suppressed western appetites for future peacekeeping efforts. The UN would not intervene again within Africa for nearly twenty years.

Scholarly interest during this period is dominated by historical case studies. These works tend to focus on the theoretical implications of peacekeeping. Debate over the establishment of a UN Peace Force and its alternatives did not fully unpack state rationales, which would inform needed contributions (Bloomfield, 1964) (Cox, 1967). Sweeping comparative studies focused on improving UN preparedness for future

crises using lessons drawn from the Congo, Palestine, and Cyprus (Wainhouse, 1966) (Fabian, 1971) (Wiseman, 1983). Recommendations to improve the management of peacekeeping missions considered both the domestic and geopolitical preconditions necessary for coordinating effective responses without assessing the profiles of contributors (James, 1969) (Rikyhe, 1984). From a Cold War perspective, a balancing act was required within the UN Security Council where non-aligned nations were often favored in lieu of NATO and Warsaw Pact allies (Bloomfield, 1970). Perhaps as a result, research during this period is tailored to lessons learned. Attempts at causal inference were limited by the statistical tools and biases of the time (Wilkenfeld & Brecher, 1984). Problems in research design often led to contradictory conclusions. Tangential assessments through the pillars of realism and liberalism while plausible were not fully realized (Waltz, 1979) (Waltz, 1983) (Keohane, 1984).

As the Cold War drew to a close, the next phase of interventions across Africa occurred – albeit with reduced force structures and modest mandates. Between 1988 and 1995, the UN initiated ten separate peacekeeping missions. These efforts supported the peaceful transitions of power, mediated border disputes, and restored stability within societies fragmented by civil war. Contributor profiles were largely composed of western nation militaries with a growing representation of developing nations from Asia. Funding then, as now, was largely underwritten by western donor nations with U.S. contributions totaling over thirty percent of the annual UN peacekeeping operating budget. Critical assessments of peacekeeping experiences focused on issues of command and control, constraints on UN resources, and the challenges of peacekeeping in hybrid conflicts (Ramesh & Thayer, 1995) (Weiss, 1994). These works arrived at many of the same substantive conclusions as earlier research. A limited selection of works investigated successful interventions in Central America and South-East Asia (Doyle, 1997). A common thread throughout discusses the importance of defining

success in “advance of deployment and should not be left for ill-equipped contingents to sort out once they arrive in theater” (Krasno, Hayes, & Daniel, 2003).

Somalia looms large during this period as CNN images prodded the Bush Sr. administration to intervene in 1992 in support of UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I). United States support culminated with the decision to pull-out after the deaths of eighteen US service members in Mogadishu in 1995. During this era, the scale of mass atrocities increased exponentially as evidenced by the civil war in Liberia (UNOMIL) and genocide in Rwanda (UNOMOR). UN peacekeeping operations appeared largely ineffective in stemming conflict. The period is defined by a shift in contributor profiles. The reduction in western contributions was buoyed by a significant uptick from the developing world. By 1999, combined Asian and African contributions more than doubled that of Western Europe and North America. The trend would accelerate. By 2010, the number would top 80,000 Asian and African peacekeepers supporting global UN operations.

In the early aughts, peacekeeping experienced a renewal under the leadership of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. International support for peacekeeping has led to the deployment of UN peacekeepers to ten separate missions on the African continent – to include seven peacekeeping missions currently active. The AU has executed a total of six military interventions with two efforts ongoing. Recent scholarship has embraced both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to address fundamental questions concerning the ability of peacekeeping to achieve durable peace. Conclusions are controversial with clearly divergent viewpoints. Institutional factors may constrain the ability of peacekeepers to adequately address tactical realities (Diehl, Reifschneider, & Hensel, 1996). States are often unwilling to contribute peacekeepers without necessary resources, achievable objectives, and clear end-states. Ceasefires may provide space for belligerents to renegotiate the terms of settlement – thereby holding

a mission hostage to shifting goals and political alliances (Werner, 1999) (Fortna, 2005). The challenges of peacekeeping in a post-civil war society appear intractable. Yet, the history of interstate and intrastate conflict suggests no measureable difference with respect to mission success (Heldt, 2001).

An emerging subfield has focused on the role of “selectivity” by regional organizations and member states in choosing which interventions to support. At a domestic level, diversionary theory provides a useful framework for addressing how political calculations are constrained by the need to satisfy their domestic coalitions (Levy, 1989) (Morgan & Bickers, 1992). Leaders may be more willing to use benevolent military force to distract constituents from domestic conditions. This may indicate a correlation between overall governance and the decision to send peacekeepers (Kisangani & Pickering, 2011). The difficulty in ascribing diversionary theory to contributions stems from ambiguity within the empirical evidence. Complimentary approaches analyze the role of political leaders’ conceptual lenses in determining the cost-benefit of intervention (Keller & Foster, 2012). These lenses may be thought of as rationales because they inform contributions. However, a potential pitfall to this approach stems from defining the boundaries of “in and out” groups (Levy, 1989). The ability of interests to inform foreign policy must be assessed against the vacillating levers of power within domestic institutions.

The “peacebuilding triangle,” is a theoretical framework, which argues that there are three key determinants for a successful peacebuilding outcome: (i) a national capacity; (ii) international capacity; and (iii) the depth of hostility among belligerents (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Endogenous factors determine when and where peacekeepers are sent (Gilligan & Stephen, 2003). Economic interests may explain UN-led deployments in civil wars (Stojek & Tir, 2015). Research also suggests a positive correlation between democratic states and the propensity to support peacekeeping

(Andersson, 2000). As a result, the transactional nature of western democratic norms on foreign societies is investigated (Marten, 2006). The question thus arises if regional partners are more suited to respond to regional crises. Lessening the burden on overstretched UN resources may require greater emphasis on “partnership” peacekeeping (Williams, 2005).

Fixing a Hole: Gaps in the Literature

The growing emphasis on “robust” and “partnership” peacekeeping provides new puzzles requiring research. African-led efforts to address regional peace and security issues have not yet received substantial attention. In the twenty-first century, complex and dynamic challenges including violent extremism, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, and climate change are borderless. With the ability to scale exponentially, entire regions can quickly destabilize. As evidenced by the preceding canvas of literature, research has traditionally focused on two modes of instability: interstate (e.g., border disputes) and intrastate conflict (e.g., civil war). Emerging transnational threats require a new model – focused on the ability of regional institutions, economic communities, and member states to circumvent pitfalls on the path towards collective action. Strategic interactions at the regional level to address issues of subsidiarity, facilitate cooperation, and leverage the comparative advantages of member states are essential.¹ The debate on “peacekeeping by whom” will continue (Bellamy & Williams, 2005) (Durch, Berkman, & Woodhouse, 2006) (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008). I begin at the ancillary — peacekeeping by whom and why?

¹“Subsidiarity is a principle founded on the idea that sustainable peace is possible if conflict resolution mechanisms are led by actors who are culturally, geopolitically, and/or strategically close to the crisis in question” (ECCAS-CMI, 2016). The prevailing view is that the AU asserts the principle to a greater extent in UN-AU negotiations than in its AU-REC relationships (Nathan, 2016).

Chapter 2 Theory and Hypotheses

In this chapter, I test the dominant theories that lead states to contribute to peacekeeping operations. The hypotheses are derived from the literature and tested against the empirical evidence. A stylized framework is used to tie together the existing literature. (Bellamy & Williams, 2012) were first to conceptualize state decision-making through political, security, economic, institutional, and normative rationales. The authors argue that these rationales inform preferences for contributions. It useful to delineate the rationales as both “general predispositions towards the UN and peacekeeping and the specific decisions taken by their governments with respect to particular missions” (Bellamy & Williams, 2012, pg. 3). With respect to the following analysis, the differences are parsed out through three case studies and assessed through relevant actors, interests, and institutions. Using the five rationales as a framework, I posit the following five hypotheses.

Economic Rationales

The main variable of interest, regional integration, is categorized as an economic rationale. Although broad regional integration includes socio-economic, political, and security characteristics, I scope regional integration in terms of economic integration indicators.² The linkages between domestic insecurity and economic uncertainty are well-represented within international relations literature despite disagreements over its true effect (Lichbach, 1989) (Horowitz, 2000) (Wood, 2003) (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005). The economic rationale is framed as an argument that contributors receive

²A description of each of the economic integration indicators is available in Appendix B.

both direct and indirect economic benefits from supporting UN peacekeeping missions. Contemporary security models assume that national security is a necessary precondition to sustainable economic development. Recent multidimensional stabilization operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya reinforce this assumption. The AU Constitutive Act states that “. . . conflicts in Africa constitute a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promise peace, security, and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of the development” (African Union, 2000). If we assume that states are rational actors guided by utility maximization, they should pursue security policies which are perceived to maximize their expected payoff relative to their domestic political costs.

During the past two decades, peacekeeping contributions by African states have risen commensurately with international aid. However, troop and police contributions alone do not guarantee equal access to funding and resources. Western donor nations still wield dominant influence over the UN Security Council and its decision-making organs. This has led critics to argue that a tiered UN system relies on developing nations to deploy ever greater numbers of peacekeepers into restive regions with increasing frequency. On average, troop contributions from developing nations are more likely than western militaries to be “less well-trained, under-supplied, and ill-equipped for the missions” (McCauley, 2014). The divergence risks eroding domestic support for UN peacekeeping.

Likewise, the economic benefits of peacekeeping are not equally diffuse among actors, interests, and institutions. Domestic governments, security sectors, corporations, and individuals have myriad economic incentives. The logistics enterprise that provides sustainment, transportation, and life-support to UN missions is particularly lucrative with a lack of transparency in contractual processes leading to allegations of graft and corruption. National militaries stand to gain from significant train and

equip cases with western nations. However, such benefits are typically bestowed upon presidential guards and regime loyalists. The rank and file often subsist at a significant disadvantage. Furthermore, domestic governments are responsible to ensure disbursement of UN salaries to the lowest rank.³ The UN payments system is complex with various actors at military, police, and civilian components that facilitate disbursement. Recently, the African Union instituted a system which pays soldiers directly. A byproduct of this arrangement has led to allegations of patronage systems, which allow domestic leaders to accept bribes to capture desirable deployment billets (Oluka, 2014).

For this work, the economic rationale is operationalized at the nation-state level vis-à-vis regional integration. Domestic economic ties to regional institutions and trading partners provides evidence of regional integration. States respond to crises in ways that maximize their expected benefits while reducing political risks and costs. I assume that greater integration increases the potential for contagion. States with lower levels of regional integration will be less likely to support peace operations because the perceived political costs outweigh potential economic benefits. Economic closure reduces state exposure to the adverse effects of regional instability. *Ceteris paribus*, states which exhibit higher levels of regional integration will view regional stability as fundamental to sustainable economic development. As a result, states will contribute to peacekeeping missions where their economic and national security objectives align. The first hypothesis codifies these assumptions.

H1 : AU member states that exhibit higher levels of regional integration will be more likely to support peacekeeping operations than member states with lower levels.

³Troop contributing countries are reimbursed at a standard UN rate of \$1,028 per soldier per month. Yet, actual take home pay for many peacekeepers is much lower.

Political Rationales

Political rationales are central to our understanding. There is a significant literature dedicated to explicating foreign policy as a result of interdepartmental politics, bureaucratic procedures, and the result of strong political leadership. (Velazquez, 2010) suggests that the decision to support UN operations is the result of both doctrinal policies and bureaucratic infighting. Other critiques argue that foreign policy is largely shaped by the influence of personal characteristics of political leadership (Hermann, 1980). Research on democracies suggest that democratic nations are more willing to support peacekeeping as a result of liberal ideals (Lebovic, 2004). In sum, the relative influence of domestic actors, interests, and institutions shape foreign policy output. This is extended to include strategic interactions with non-state actors, other nation-states, and regional institutions.

Political rationales are formed through the convergence of multifarious factors. States are assumed rational and utilize peacekeeping as a tool for foreign policy where interests align (Meiske & Ruggeri, 2017). States may decide to contribute as a result of political pressure, the desire for international prestige, and access to privileged information or resources. Because these reasons are informed through domestic institutions, I scope the measurement of political rationales to an assessment of bureaucratic effectiveness and political accountability. I assume that states with higher level of good governance and political accountability will demonstrate a more effective foreign policy decision-making process that includes a pluralism of bureaucratic inputs. When regional stability aligns with domestic political interests, states will be more likely to support peacekeeping operations.

H2 : AU member states that exhibit higher levels of overall good governance

and political accountability will be more likely to support peacekeeping operations than member states with lower levels.

Security Rationales

Since Hobbes' political treatise *Leviathan*, it is universally acknowledged that the principle duty of the sovereign to ensure the security of the state. The implicit agreement between the sovereign and its citizenry guarantees protection in exchange for civil liberties. The formation of an effective national military is therefore essential. In recent decades, the United States, European Union, and partner nations have committed significant resources within Africa. The focus on training and equipping capable African militaries is considered paramount to peace and stability. However, African public attitudes towards their national security institutions often lag far behind their western counterparts. The erosion of public trust is attributed to systemic corruption, political oppression, and in certain cases, significant human rights violations. The chronic instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) highlights the challenge of restoring trust after years of chronic abuse.

The UN has placed significant effort on security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs as part of broader stabilization efforts throughout Africa.⁴ As states build their military capacity to ensure territorial integrity, the trend towards "partnership" peacekeeping may provide a means to achieve regional stability. Assuming regional stability is a common national security objective, I expect that a state will support UN peacekeeping where its

⁴The UN-DPKO defines Security Sector Reform as "a process of assessment, review, and implementation...its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its people without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law" (UN-DPKO SSRU, 2012).

comparative advantages are leveraged as part of broader coalition. Furthermore, high levels of militarization may be indicative of significant political influence within military institutions to shape foreign policy. The third hypothesis tests these assumptions.

H3 : AU member states that exhibit higher levels of military capacity and militarization will be more likely to support peacekeeping operations than member states with lower levels.

Institutional Rationales

Institutional rationales parse the role of regional leadership in shaping domestic policy. For many African states, the relationship between the executive branch and military institutions directly informs its foreign policy objectives. I assume that political leaders require the support of the military to commit troops abroad. Domestic leaders must contend with both domestic and foreign interests in shaping their preferred course of action – representing a two-level game of strategic interactions (Putnam, 1988). Selectorate theory provides a compelling argument for the need of many African leaders to reward their core supporters to ensure political survival (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003). Economic incentives, career advancement, and leadership positions to mollify potential rivals and ensure regime support. The history of coup d'états in Africa suggests that the ability of the ruling regime to bestow such benefits is perforce tied to its longevity. As illustrated by the subsequent case studies, insolvency often precipitated coup d'états, which in turn triggered wider conflict.

In recent decades, organs within the UN and AU have recognized the need for greater African representation (Ezulwini Consensus, 2005). Leadership tenures within UN decision-making organs provides opportunities to promote African interests and strategic leadership. Likewise, the member states share the Chairperson of the AU,

the AU Commission, and AU Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) on a rotational basis. Member states are demonstrating a growing willingness to share liaison offices at the regional level with offices in the regional economic communities and at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (AU Liaison, 2016). Policy coordination and harmonization at the regional level is critical to the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016-2020 (APSA, 2016). I will attempt to measure this influence by capturing the frequency and scale of member states tenures within the UN Security Council, African Union, and AU-PSC. States with greater representation are expected to support peacekeeping operations with greater frequency than otherwise. I posit *H4* to assess the effect of institutional rationales on peacekeeper contributions.

H4 : AU member states that exhibit higher levels of institutional leadership will be more likely to support peacekeeping operations than member states with lower levels.

Normative Rationales

Normative rationales argue that states support peacekeeping operations due to a shared set of norms that inform a state's relationship to international institutions. In the post-Cold War era, the shift towards liberalization placed an emphasis on international cooperation and democratic rule. Those states which engaged in international regimes, followed the path towards democratization, and supported peacekeeping efforts stood to gain political leverage and economic benefits. The normative rationale argues that what compels states to contribute peacekeepers is an appeal to liberal ideals — democratic states are more likely to support international efforts that promote democratic values.

The hypothesis is contentious as the literature demonstrates conflicting assessments on the relationship between democratic values and peacekeeping. Proponents cite examples such as Rwanda, which provides robust peacekeeping support, largely in response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. However, critics argue that peacekeeping enables autocratic regimes to ensure their survival by rewarding the military with UN funding and training (Levin, Mackay, & Nasirzadeh, 2015). States may also choose to support peacekeeping operations as a bulwark against western interventionism or hegemony. As of 2018, the top three UN peacekeeping contributing states including Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and India have each spoken critically of western dominated international institutions. Since the mid-aughts, China's growing presence on the continent aims to counterbalance western influence, build its power projection capacity, and to support economic goals associated with its "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (FOI, 2017). Various regime types have demonstrated a willingness to support the UN interventions. A priori, it is not clear that polity type influences contributions.

H5 : AU member states that exhibit higher levels of democratic values will be more likely to support peacekeeping operations than member states with lower levels.

Table 1: Summary of contribution hypotheses.

Hypothesis	Rationale	Argument
<i>H1</i>	Economic	Regional economic integration leads to greater state support for peacekeeping.
<i>H2</i>	Political	Good governance and/or political accountability lead to greater state support for peacekeeping.
<i>H3</i>	Security	Robust military capacity and/or highly militarized states are more likely to provide support for peacekeeping.
<i>H4</i>	Institutional	Tenure in decision-making organs of regional institutions leads to greater state support for peacekeeping.
<i>H5</i>	Normative	Democratic states are more likely to support peacekeeping than autocratic regimes.

Chapter 3 Research and Empirical Design

In order to maintain consistency and clarity throughout the following section, common statistical terms are used to describe the research design, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation. Outcome variable (i.e., dependent variable) describes the observed values that are a product of the social system. Let \mathbf{Y} stand for a $n \times 1$ column vector of all observed outcomes from the social system. Explanatory variables are measurements of the social system. They are the inputs into the statistical “black box.” Let n be the number of total observations and, k , the total number of explanatory variables. \mathbf{X} is defined as a $n \times k$ matrix where each row, $X_i = (x_{i1}, x_{i2}, \dots, x_{ik})$, represents the k observed values for the i th observation. Summary statistics describe features of the data and point estimates are used to learn about the data through inference. These raw estimates are converted into predicted values via simulation to draw substantive conclusions about state rationales (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000).

Empirical domain

The social system is defined spatio-temporally between 1999 and 2016, centered on peace operations within Africa. The social system includes: (i) UN-led missions authorized by the UN and under UN command and control; (ii) UN-authorized missions conducted by other regional organizations; and (iii) non-UN missions that were neither authorized nor conducted by the UN but conducted by regional organizations.

Measurement of Variables

The outcome variable, TCC/PCC contribution, is operationalized as an event count, where ($Y_i = 1, \dots, n$), if a state contributes peacekeepers to a given number of peacekeeping operations, and ($Y_i = 0$), if otherwise. The variable indexes observations as the total number of peacekeeping operations supported during a calendar-year. This is adjudicated by monthly official UN reports. Contributions are defined as troop and civilian police contributions. UN Military Observers and Experts-on-Mission are not considered active contributors to peacekeeping missions due to their small numbers and restrictive legal authorities.⁵ These observations are purged from the event count. The following conditions are assumed generally true: (i) state decisions regarding commitments are independent of decisions regarding actual force contributions; (ii) member states assess other states contributions relative to their own in determining total contributions; and (iii) once member states commit to a peacekeeping operation, they tend stay committed over the duration of an operation.

Publicly available indices are used as measurements for the explanatory variables.⁶ The explanatory variables are anchored to theory frequently encountered within peacekeeping literature. In order to assess the marginal effect of regional integration on TCC/PCC contribution, I control for explanatory variables frequently encountered in the literature. Although parsimony is a desirable property for any model, the selection of covariates is theory-driven to control for potential confounders.

Regional integration: The primary variable of interest is defined as an economic

⁵Experts-on-Mission and UN Military Observers (UNMOG) traditionally serve as observers for the UN and serve as the "eyes and ears" of the Security Council. They do not fill roles and responsibilities in direct support of their respective host nations.

⁶See Appendix B for summary statistics and methodologies.

rationale. I hypothesized that African states which demonstrate stronger economic ties and trade integration will be more likely to support UN peacekeeping operations than states which exhibit greater degrees of economic closure. Regional integration includes a “spaghetti bowl” of potential dimensions including: (i) trade agreements (RTAs); (ii) security partnerships and alliances, (iii) regional infrastructure projects, (iv) financial integration, and (v) the free movement of people across borders.

Five core indicators are selected to build a composite measurement of integration (World Bank, 2013). Due to limited observational data prior to 2013, I approximate the African Regional Integration Index (ARII) by including the following variables: (i) the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) to measure regional infrastructure; (ii) the World Bank Trading-across-Borders index focused on institutional barriers to trade; (iii) intra-regional imports as a percentage of total gross domestic product (GDP); (iv) exports as a percentage of total GDP; and (v) foreign direct investment as a percentage of total GDP. The five interval-level indicators are normalized using min-max scaling. The indicators are assessed separately to extract greater insights from the data.

Militarization: This is considered a security rationale, which measures the weight and importance of a state’s security sector relative to civil society as a whole (BICC-GMI, 2017). High levels of militarization may indicate a politically powerful security sector that leverages influence over foreign policy outcomes. The militarization variable is a non-negative interval measurement. The score is computed as the average of three indicators from the Bonn International Center for Conversion, Global Militarization Index (BICC-GMI).

National capability: National material capabilities is considered as a security rationale. It complements the militarization variable by providing a measure of military strength relative to other African states. Of note, the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC v. 5.0) provides observational data up to the year 2012. Multiple

imputation (MI) is used to deal with missing observations from 2013-2016. The score is calculated as the average for a given state on each of the six indicators, which are equally weighted. The result is a percentage for each African state ranked relative to all other states on an interval scale.

Governance: This variable is used to measure the political rationale for peacekeeping by assessing the relationship between government performance and foreign policy outcomes. The Ibrahim Index for African Governance (IIAG) is calculated as a composite score of four dimensions available per country-year from 2000 to 2016. MI is used to impute missing observations for missing year, $t_i = 1999$. The result is an interval level measurement, which is normalized using min-max scaling.

Political accountability: This variable will assess the political rationale through a measure of political accountability. If peacekeeping is contentious, political will is required to martial bureaucratic and public support for an intervention. Yet because political will is difficult to measure, I assume that political accountability provides a useful proxy. The variable is operationalized as an interval measure using the Varieties of Democracy Accountability Index (V-Dem), which includes three sub-indicators: (i) the presence of credible elections; (ii) institutional checks and balances; and (iii) the influence of civil society and media activity.

Polity: This variable is a measure of the normative rationale. The measurement is subset as two regime types: (i) a democratic polity and (ii) autocratic polity, to capture the unique features of each regime type. The measure is used to assess the propensity for peacekeeping through a set of shared normative values. The polity score is derived from a set of four indicators that are compiled as an interval measurement.

Regional leadership: This variable will measure the institutional rationale through a measurement of the relationship between peacekeeping contributions and state participation in regional institutions including: (i) UN Security Council non-

permanent members, (ii) African Union chairmanships, and (iii) AU Peace and Security Council member states. The variable is an interval measurement that indexes the total number of regional institutions that an African state participates in within a given year.

Foreign military post: This variable will assess the role of bilateral security partnerships with NATO and European Union allies. This measure is operationalized by assessing the presence of enduring foreign military posts present within African states. Bilateral partner nations include: US, UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Germany, Italy, and France. The variable is dummy-coded ($x_{ij} = 1$) if an African state has a foreign military post and ($x_{ij} = 0$), if otherwise.

Generalized Event Count (GEC) Model

Initially, I specified a generalized linear model (GLM) with a Bernoulli distribution and a log link function. I aggregated a state's propensity to support peacekeeping as a simple binary outcome where, ($Y_i = 1$), if a state contributes peacekeepers in a given year and ($Y_i = 0$), if otherwise. Although a valid approach, additional spatio-temporal dynamics became apparent as I compiled the dataset. For example, a state's level of contributions in a given year appears influenced by its contributions in the previous year. The number of supported missions were also conditional on intervention effects (e.g., regime collapse, civil war, or economic shocks). As a result, I re-specified the model using event counts to derive greater information about the underlying data generating process. The outcome variable, Y_i , indexes the number of observed peacekeeping contribution per calendar year. The explanatory variables, X_i , measure continuous processes such as the level of regional integration, military capacity, and overall governance as well as a dichotomous variable to assess the presence of foreign

military posts. Because the processes that produce these variables are unobservable, I make the assumption that discrete event counts provide insights into the unobserved data generating processes.

The Poisson model requires two main assumptions. An independence assumption holds that the probability of an event occurring at time t is independent of all previous history.⁷ The principle of homogeneity holds that the rate of event occurrence λ_t , is constant over period t . If these two assumptions hold then the data can be modeled using a standard Poisson distribution with mean, $E[Y_t] \equiv \lambda_t$.

$$Y_t \sim f_p(y_t|\lambda_t) = \frac{e^{-\lambda_t} \lambda_t^{y_t}}{y_t!} \quad (1)$$

However, these assumptions are tenuous for panel data. First, I assume that a state is more likely to continue supporting a UN mission at time, t , after an initial intervention has occurred – the independence assumption does not hold. Time lags are incorporated into the model to account for serial correlation. Likewise, the assumption of homogeneity is unlikely. In the previous section I assumed that the explanatory variables vary over time, resulting in a heterogeneous probability of event occurrence (King, 1989). The Poisson distribution requires that the decision to contribute peacekeepers has an equal probability of occurrence and is independent where, $\sigma^2 = 1$.

As a result, the Poisson model may be too restrictive for the data. I relax both assumptions by re-specifying the variance of Y_i given X_i as

$$V(Y_i) = \lambda_i \sigma^2. \quad (2)$$

⁷The Markov independence assumption states that the probability of an event occurring at time t , is only dependent upon the previous observation, $t - 1$.

The variance may take any value greater than zero. I derive a probability distribution with parameters λ_i and σ^2 known as the Generalized Event Count (GEC) model (King, 1989).⁸ Three potential dispersions are possible: (i) $0 < \sigma^2 < 1$, where the variance is under-dispersed relative to mean, λ_i ; (ii) $\sigma^2 = 1$, where the variance equals the mean; and (iii) $\sigma^2 > 1$, where the variance is over-dispersed relative to the mean. Without the need for additional assumptions, this single probability distribution accounts for heterogeneity, independence, and contagion.⁹ I am not required to set σ^2 at an arbitrary fixed value.

Maximum likelihood is selected over Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson alternatives. Although Bayesian inference is capable of generating many quantities of interest, a flat prior and lack of justification limits its usefulness here. Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing requires stronger assumptions regarding the distribution of the data than are required of ML. I considered its limitations as a reasonable trade-off. Recognizing the small- n bias of likelihood, the number of observations ($n = 864$) will benefit from asymptotic qualities of MLE including consistent and efficient estimators. As a substitute for inverse probability, likelihood provides a measure of relative uncertainty. It is the probability of the hypothetical model given the observed data, $P(model|data) \equiv P(\theta|y)$. We know that by the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem that the information will be asymptotically normal and a consistent estimator for the variance. With simulation, we can calculate the uncertainty surrounding the estimators (King, 1989).

⁸See Appendix D for a full derivation of the GEC model.

⁹Contagion occurs when the expected number of events at one time is dependent on the realized number of events from a previous observation (King, 1989, pg. 768).

Non-Parametric Pre-Processing

The following section details the non-parametric methods used to prepare the data for regression analysis and simulations. The dataset is pre-processed using multiple imputation to correct imbalances and diagnostics test are performed to assess underlying panel effects.

Missing Data

A total of 804 cell values (8.5 percent) are missing from a dataset composed of 9,504 total values. Multiple imputation (MI) is used to impute m values for each missing observation in the data matrix and create m completed data sets. For my purposes, $m = 5$. Across these completed data sets, the observed values remain unchanged, but the missing cells are filled in with a distribution of imputations that reflect uncertainty about the missing data (Honaker, King, & Blackwell, 2011). MI requires that we assume the missing data is missing at random (MAR) and are not the result of underlying data generating process. An expectation-maximization algorithm which incorporates bootstrapping is used to draw from a posterior multivariate normal distribution (Honaker & King, 2010). All variables in the imputation model are also present in the regression analysis except for `lpi_score` due to the presence of significant collinearity that prohibits convergence.

The imputation model accounts for time effects with the inclusion of a squared polynomial integer. Lags and leads are included on the outcome variable, TCC/PCC contribution, since I assume that current values depend on previous values. Because the outcome is an event count, I take its square root. The model includes a column variable which indicates time series by year and a cross-section variable indicated by `cow_code`. A ridge prior of 0.01 is multiplied by the total number of rows to

Table 2: Comparison of pre and post-imputation datasets.

Variable	Pre-imputation			Post-imputation		
	N	Mean	Median	N	Mean	Median
autoc_polity	818	2.16	1.00	864	2.17	1.00
democ_polity	818	3.69	3.00	864	3.65	3.00
exports_%gdp	810	0.22	0.19	864	0.23	0.19
fdi_%gdp	847	0.11	0.09	864	0.11	0.09
foreign_mil_post	864	0.23	0.00	864	0.23	0.00
governance	816	0.40	0.41	864	0.40	0.40
imports_%gdp	810	0.15	0.13	864	0.15	0.13
militarization	796	0.36	0.35	864	0.36	0.35
national_capability	659	0.14	0.06	864	0.14	0.06
political_accountability	864	0.61	0.62	864	0.61	0.62
trade_across_borders	548	0.53	0.58	864	0.46	0.53
regional_leadership	864	0.37	0.00	864	0.37	0.00

reduce the covariances without affecting the means and variances. A comparison of the original dataset and an imputed dataset is provided in Table 2.

Regressions are run on each imputed dataset. The point estimates and standard errors are pooled using Rubin’s rule to capture the estimation uncertainty surrounding the imputed values (Rubin, 1987). Let us define \bar{q} as the average of the m separate estimates, $q_j (j = 1, \dots, m)$:

$$\bar{q} = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^m q_j. \quad (3)$$

The variance of the point estimates is calculated as the average of the estimated variances from within each completed data set plus the sample variance in the point estimates across all data sets. The standard error of the point estimates is the square root of:

Table 3: Summary of GEC model diagnostics.

Statistic	df	Pr(> t)	Method	Result
73.35		< 2.2e-16	Durbin-Wu-Hausman	Fixed-effect model
282.23	1	< 2.2e-16	Breusch-Pagan (LM)	Time-fixed effects
21.65	17	< 1.2e-54	F-test	Individual effects
2212.00	1	< 2.2e-16	Breusch-Pagan (LM)	Panel effects
-2.52		0.012	Pesaran CD	Cross-sectional dependence
401.30	18	< 2.2e-16	Breusch-Godfrey	Serial correlation
4.30	1	0.038	Likelihood Ratio Test	Poisson (FE)

$$SE(q)^2 = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^m SE(q_j)^2 + S_q^2 \left(1 + \frac{1}{m}\right). \quad (4)$$

The standard errors reflect the uncertainty surrounding the imputed values and the dataset is balanced without a need for ad-hoc corrections such as list-wise deletion or arbitrary best guesses.

Model Fit and Diagnostics

Standard diagnostic tests are used to evaluate the data for fixed and random effects, cross-sectional dependence, serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity. I begin by assessing whether a fixed-effect or random-effect model is more appropriate for the data using a Hausman test. Fixed-effect models control for unobserved, time-invariant characteristics and focus on explanatory variables that vary with time. These may include such as characteristics as religion, language, or cultural values that influence the observed Y_i outcomes. Alternatively, a random-effect model assumes that the observed variation across individual states is random and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The results of the Hausman test suggest that a fixed-effect model is more appropriate for the data.

Time effects are used to control for unexpected variation and interventions

(e.g., polity collapse, war, or epidemics). The results from the Lagrange Multiplier (Breusch-Pagan) test indicate the presence of time-fixed effects, which will be controlled for in the model. Next, an F-test is used to assess the inclusion of an individual-fixed effect. The results suggest the presence of both time and individual effects. As a result, a “two-ways” effect is incorporated into the model. The Breusch-Pagan (LM) is used to test if a pooled OLS regression can be used in lieu of an event count model. Because the variance across observations is greater than zero, a panel effect may exist.

As the dataset consists of $t = 18$, the results of a Pesaran CD test indicate the presence of cross-sectional dependency. Tests for heteroskedasticity include the use of a residuals vs. fitted values plot for the Poisson (FE) model is shown in Appendix I. Overall, heteroskedasticity appears minimal with the GLM smoothing line consistent near zero on the horizontal x-axis. It is possible that the excess number of zero values affects the overall balance. However, overall the dispersion appears relatively balanced.

Serial correlation is assessed with a Breusch-Godfrey test. The results reinforce the assumption that serial correlation is present in the data. The presence of clustered observations, as a result of grouped state observations, suggests significant correlations. Because the fixed-effects model alone cannot correct within-cluster correlation, cluster-robust standard errors are applied to address potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation to increase model robustness (Arellano, 1987).

Finally, I considered the use of zero-inflated models due to the large number of observed zero counts. From a theoretical perspective, I lack the necessary justification for their use. Proceeding from first principles, zero-inflated models posit that the excess zeros are the result of two separate data generating processes. Non-random structural zeros are the result of latent unobserved variables. These are considered separate from random zeros – a product of the social system. As such, zero-inflated models treat excess zeros separate from random zeros. A priori, I assume that African

states do not have structural characteristics that ensure they will never contribute to peacekeeping operations. Observed zero counts are the result of underlying state rationales. As a result, I select a fixed-effect model to control for time-invariant characteristics of individual African states and include cluster-robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.

GEC Model Results

Table 4 provides a comparison of Poisson and negative binomial models. The results are pooled from the imputed datasets ($m = 5$) to reflect the uncertainty surrounding the estimated values.¹⁰

Table 4: Comparison of regression models, $m = 5$.

	Poisson (FE)	Poisson (CL)	NB1 (FE)
governance	4.27 (0.72)***	4.27 (0.91)***	5.26 (1.00)***
militarization	-2.16 (0.74)**	-2.16 (1.25)	-1.96 (0.59)**
pol_accountability	0.52 (0.38)	0.52 (0.48)	
national_capability	-0.25 (1.02)	-0.25 (1.25)	
autoc_polity	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
democ_polity	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
trade_across_borders	0.56 (0.15)***	0.56 (0.23)*	0.59 (0.17)**
imports_%gdp	2.11 (1.06)*	2.11 (1.26)	2.18 (1.05)
exports_%gdp	-0.04 (0.60)	-0.04 (0.65)	0.10 (0.43)
fdi_%gdp	-0.36 (0.61)	-0.36 (0.82)	-0.71 (0.75)
regional_leadership	0.14 (0.04)**	0.14 (0.04)**	0.13 (0.04)*
foreign_mil_post	0.14 (0.35)	0.14 (0.24)	0.29 (0.35)
intercept			15.41 (223.66)
Log-Likelihood	-1034.97	-1034.97	-1035.29
Num. obs	864	864	774

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; FE = fixed effects, CL = cluster-robust, NB1 = negative binomial

The results suggest that the statistical significance of governance, trade across

¹⁰See Appendix C for individual regression results for each imputed dataset.

borders, and regional leadership are consistent across the models. Variables including militarization, imports as a percentage of total GDP, and democratic polity may also be of substantive interest. Variables political accountability and national capability are dropped from the NB1 (FE) model. This is due to lack of concavity in the optimization algorithm. Different methods of optimization were attempted including BFGS and Newton-Raphson, as well as Box-Cox transformations on the variables. It is possible that a numerical solution does not exist for the data. However, dropping the two variables allowed for convergence on the remaining variables. The result is reflected by $n = 774$.

Earlier assumptions regarding the fixed-effect Poisson model appear justified.¹¹ The results of a likelihood ratio test suggests that a conditional Poisson (FE) with robust-standard errors provides a marginally better fit than a NB1 (FE) model. A fixed-effect negative binomial model does not control for all stable covariates, which often leading to inconsistent estimates (Allison & Waterman, 2002). Due to the number of dropped observations and a lack of substantial over-dispersion, I select a Poisson (FE) with cluster-robust standard errors for simulation.

Interpreting the results Poisson model coefficients is difficult without the use of simulation. Covariates in non-linear models depend upon each other. However, a linear approximation is possible using an exponentiated coefficient. Interpreted broadly, given a unit change in x_j ,

$$\hat{y} \approx \hat{y}(e^{\beta_j}). \quad (5)$$

Thus the effect of increasing governance by one unit is to increase $\ln(\hat{y})$ by $\hat{y} (\exp^{4.27}) \approx 11$ events – clearly nonsense. The effect of increasing trade across borders

¹¹For a comparison with a Poisson random-effects model see Appendix C.

by one unit is ≈ 1.5 events and regional leadership is ≈ 0.4 events. However, the key point is that these three variables appear to have a positive effect on the rate of peacekeeping contributions. We can cautiously associate higher levels of governance, trade across borders, and regional leadership with a greater probability of peacekeeping contributions in a given year.

GEC Model Assessment

Revisiting the hypotheses from chapter two, a number of interesting observations emerge. The first hypothesis, *H1*, posited that states with higher levels of regional integration are associated with greater support for peacekeeping. However, as a composite measure of economic indicators, regional integration is too general to provide substantial information about the underlying data generating process. The results suggest that greater nuance is required to assess economic rationales. Trade integration operationalized as trade across borders provides a useful snapshot of a state's overall level of trade openness. Excluding regional trade agreements (RTAs), states with lower costs on imports and exports, documentary and border compliance, and transportation infrastructure provide greater evidence of market openness than low tariffs alone. Market openness leads to increased economic exposure, which may inform the priorities of the state with respect to security. If trade integration is conditional on regional stability, then the economic rationale from a trade perspective provides insight into peacekeeping contributions. Traditional economic indicators that measure the overall health of a domestic economy were not significant. While a trend may exist, large standard errors make interpretation of the gross domestic product (GDP) measures problematic.

The second hypothesis, *H2*, focused on the political rationale, which was operationalized through measures of governance and political accountability. The

results suggest a relationship between good governance and peacekeeping that is robust across models. The provision of public goods, services, and policy is indicative of a healthy civil society and a functional government. Of note, safety and the rule of law as sub-indicators of the IIAG index measure a government's ability to ensure its own national security. I assume that functional bureaucracies are more likely to produce coherent foreign policy. Proceeding further, such states which view regional stability as fundamental to national security may be more likely to provide peacekeepers. Where the two conditions are met, I suspect a greater likelihood for peacekeeping. However, anomalies exist. For example, Nigeria scores low on the IIAG index despite being a reliable partner and regional power. Botswana, which scores consistently high on good governance, has supported few UN peacekeeping missions.

Surprisingly, Political accountability as a measure of horizontal and vertical political accountability does not independently provide support for the model. Governments with limited vertical accountability and greater autonomy may face fewer political costs for providing peacekeepers. The lack of horizontal accountability may streamline foreign policy by centralizing the decision-making apparatus and limiting bureaucratic constraints. However, I suspect a relationship exists between good governance and political accountability. I test for an interaction effect between governance and political accountability.¹² The results suggest that a significant interaction effect exists between the two variables. If a state exhibits both good governance and political accountability, then there is a positive relationship with contributions.

The security rationale was tested by the third hypothesis, *H3*, and partially holds with respect to militarization. The specification of cluster-robust standard errors to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity greatly increases the variance. However, the results are no less interesting. It is important to consider that high

¹²See Appendix C for regression results within inclusion of interaction term.

levels of militarization do not guarantee the regional projection of state power. States with high levels of militarization may focus their security apparatus domestically to ensure regime stability. The top five African states with the highest BICC-GMI values in 2014 included Morocco, Egypt, Angola, Eritrea, and Mauritania. Of those, only Morocco and Egypt are reliable UN contributors. I test the observed values for high leverage and large residuals.¹³ Egypt, Guinea, and Mauritius contain a significant number of potential outliers – greater than half of all observations. The states are dropped and I rerun the Poisson fixed-effect regression model. Although the variance increased with respect to militarization, the coefficient remains statistically significant. The inclusion of cluster-robust standard errors provides similar results to Table 4.

The second security variable national capability measures “hard power” national assets. I tested the assumption that states with significant military capabilities will be more likely to provide contributions. For example, regional powers including Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria have demonstrated consistent support for peacekeeping during the past two decades. Yet across the observations, national capability as a measure of the security rationale is inconclusive. Additionally, there appears to be no significant differences among African states in terms of basing arrangements with EU and NATO partners. However, this result does not negate the possibility for domestic benefits from foreign military basing within Africa. It merely implies that security rationales operationalized through these two variables are not a reliable indicator for potential contributions.

The fourth hypothesis, *H4*, focused on the institutional rationale and was operationalized through a measurement of domestic influence within decision-making organs at the UN, AU, and AU-PSC. Across the models, regional leadership retains

¹³Using Cook’s distances, a total of eighty-three individual observations may contain high leverage or large residuals.

statistical significance. Intuitively, this makes sense. We should expect domestic leaders to have a vested interest in seeing the successful implementation of their domestic policy objectives at the regional level. Access to privileged information, resources, and policy formation provide clear incentives to support regional institutions. Following the logic of the two-level games, decision-makers may be exposed to greater international pressure during their leadership tenure in regional institutions. The case studies will assess this dynamic over time as states rotate through leadership billets. For now, the results suggest support for the fourth hypothesis.

The fifth hypothesis, *H5*, explored the impact of normative rationales on peacekeeping. The argument states that democratic countries are more willing to support peacekeeping because a shared set of normative values. These might include support for international institutions, the promotion of democratic values, and a traditional commitment to peacebuilding and conflict-prevention. The measure was operationalized through an assessment of regime polities. It was assumed that democratic and autocratic polities have specific traits that inform their preferences towards military intervention. As a result, two variables were used to assess the potential for both unidirectional and bidirectional trends towards contributions. The results provide no clear evidence of a trend by regime type. Although normative rationales may inform individual state contributions, at an aggregate level the hypothesis is not supported by a measure of regime types.

Simulation and Quantities of Interest

Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation is used to calculate uncertainty surrounding the coefficients and variance. I derive quantities of interest that account for both estimation uncertainty and fundamental uncertainty that arise from the stochastic

Table 5: Summary of GEC model assessment.

Hypothesis	Rationale	Argument	Model Support
<i>H1</i>	Economic	Increased regional economic integration leads to greater state support for peacekeeping.	Yes
<i>H2</i>	Political	Good governance and/or political accountability leads to greater state support for peacekeeping.	Yes
<i>H3</i>	Security	Robust military capacity and/or militarization leads to greater state support for peacekeeping.	No
<i>H4</i>	Institutional	Leadership tenure in regional institutions leads to greater state support for peacekeeping.	Yes
<i>H5</i>	Normative	Democratic polities are more likely to support peacekeeping than autocratic regimes.	No

component of the GEC model. I begin by testing the Poisson model’s robustness by throwing out the observed data and simulating 10,000 random values ($m = 10,000$) to compare predicted outcomes against observed events. The results show that a given African state with mean values across covariates will support, on average, three UN missions per year with a 0.2 margin of error. The true population average is 2.4 events per year. The probability of contributions increases by approximately 17 percent as states approach the 98th percentile on each of the explanatory variables values. There is a similar downward trend as states move lower on the percentile range.

In order to assess the marginal effect of trade across borders, I vary trade integration over its range of values while holding all other covariates constant. Simulated expected values show that as trade integration increases, the probability that a state contributes to peacekeeping operations also increases. I calculate the first differences for trade across borders to assess the rate of change. The results indicate a 0.975 increase – approximately one additional event – as trade integration varies from the lowest to the highest predicted value, averaged across the population.




Figure 1: Expected number of PKO contributions across trade ($m = 10,000$).

Additional simulations are run on governance and regional leadership.¹⁴ For governance, there is a first difference of five additional events with a standard deviation of 2.65 as it varies across the range of predicted values. The first difference for regional leadership is approximately one additional event with a standard deviation of 1.22. The results of the simulation suggest that increasing scores on good governance provides the highest likelihood for peacekeeping contributions – more so than trade integration or institutional leadership taken together or independently.

Surprisingly, the effects of regime type and military capability are inconclusive. This may lead to the conclusion that political, economic, and institutional rationales wield greater influence on peacekeeping contributions than security or normative rationales. However, statistical significance alone cannot justify causal claims. I used simulation to assess the uncertainty surrounding the parameter estimates and derived predicted values and first differences to assess the marginal effect of regional trade

¹⁴See Appendix A for marginal effects plots for both variables.

integration. The simulation results demonstrated that the GEC model provides an acceptable approximation for the underlying data generating process. The compiled dataset and R code used for the analysis is made available for download.¹⁵

¹⁵R code and dataset are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/african_spaghetti

Chapter 4 UN-PKO Case Studies

The following chapter provides a brief overview of the qualitative methodologies employed within the case studies. Three unique UN-PKO case studies are selected following a most-similar research design to assess the quantitative results from chapter three.

Case Study Comparison

A common critique of qualitative research argues that small-*n* comparative analyses suffer from weak justifications for causal inference due to the inability to account for rival explanations (Lijphart, 1975). Increasing the number of cases is not often possible due to limiting factors including time scarcity, project length, and the availability of data (Collier, 1993). Moreover, techniques such as process-tracing and congruence methods usually require significant amounts of data to investigate all plausible causal mechanisms.

I consider the two types of case study comparisons including most-similar and most-different designs. Although a detailed discussion of each method is beyond the scope of this work, I offer a couple of justifications for selecting a most-similar design. This method requires that case studies are selected on all similar explanatory variables except for one. This strict requirement is aspirational but often infeasible. True experiments are exceedingly rare in international relations (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994) (Bennett & George, 2013) (Tomz, 2007). However, the technique can replicate some of the useful properties of the gold standard. Case comparison on carefully matched studies can produce meaningful results. The argument for a most-different

Table 6: Dimensions for case study comparison

UN-PKO	REC	Regime	UNSCR	Intensity	Conflict Type
MONUSCO	SADC	Autocratic	Stabilization	Major	Int. Internal
MINUSMA	ECOWAS	Hybrid	Stabilization	Major	Intrastate
MINUSCA	ECCAS	Autocratic	Stabilization	Major	Intrastate

design rests on the potentially serious problem of selection bias due to case selection on the outcome variable (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). Random selection well-suited for large- n quantitative analysis is not generally appropriate for small- n qualitative research (King et al., 1994). Each case study represents an on-going UN peacekeeping operation chosen according to the theory-derived explanatory variables. Allowing for variance on the outcome, I limit the potential for selection bias in the inferences.

Dimensions for Comparison

The case studies were chosen based upon a priori knowledge of peacekeeping within Africa. The missions demonstrate similarities on each of the dimensions except for the scale of regional military involvement. In the MONUSCO example, the South African Development Community (SADC) engaged in mediation efforts early in the Congo Wars but did not provide military forces until well after the arrival of UN peacekeepers. This is partly the result of the regional roots of the conflict, which led SADC members to support opposing armed belligerents.

A supplemental measure is used to assess pluralism using the 2017 Democracy Index. UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) codifies the principle mandates for multidimensional stabilization missions. The primary tasks focus on protection of civilians (POC) in addition to state-supporting efforts. Conflict intensity is coded as “minor” for those with less than 1,000 deaths and “major” for those greater than 1,000

deaths. Conflict types include: (i) extra-systemic; (ii) interstate; (iii) intrastate; and (iv) internationalized internal.¹⁶

Within-case analysis

Within-case analysis supplements the case comparisons to fully leverage all available information. Where possible I attempt to address the potential for equifinality and multifinality in the outcomes by considering alternative causal pathways.¹⁷ Likewise, omitted-variable bias can cause significant problems with the causal interpretation. In the previous section, I controlled for unobserved time-invariant variables with a fixed-effect model. However, a large- n analysis alone cannot unpack all intervening causal mechanisms (Bennett & Checkel, 2015). Applying additional tests to the data will strengthen theoretical justifications while ensuring that the narrative is consistent with the historical record (Lake, 2011). I utilize congruence analysis that takes a complimentary theories approach (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).¹⁸

The analysis is centered along three lines of effort – a framework of interests, interactions, and institutions that inform peacekeeper contributions (Frieden, Lake, & Schultz, 2016). I begin by identifying the relevant actors, how their interests are formed, how they chose their actions, and through which institutions they engage in interactions to achieve their desired end-states. I search for evidence of the political, institutional,

¹⁶UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database used for conflict intensity and type.

¹⁷Equifinality describes how different causal pathways can lead to similar observed outcomes and can have a substantial influence on the ability to infer an accurate model of the underlying data generating process. Multifinality describes many outcomes consistent with the same set of covariates.

¹⁸Congruence analysis is a small- n qualitative methods which uses case studies to tie empirical evidence to explanatory variables and to assess the strength of a given model. A high degree of congruence between theoretical suppositions and the empirical evidence is desired.

and economic rationales among the peacekeeping contributors. Publicly available memoranda, press releases, and official government statements are culled where extant. At the regional level, communiqués, press releases, and media reports provide the bulk of primary sources to reconstruct the decision-making processes at the regional economic communities and the African Union. At the international level, United Nations communiqués, press releases, and resolutions are used. Secondary sources includes academic journals, think-tank research, and non-governmental organization reports. I anchor policy within the larger public context by drawing on media reports, which provide historical context to private deliberations (Larsson, 1993).

Chapter 5 UN-MONUSCO

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) is the longest and most costly UN peacekeeping mission to date. The following chapter explores the complicated evolution of UN, AU, and regional efforts to support peace and stabilization within the central region. Empirical evidence drawn from the case study is used to assess the likelihood for peacekeeping. Robust model support is found among the top African contributors — demonstrating that good governance, reduced trade barriers, and participation in regional institutions increases the likelihood for African-led peacekeeping.

Historical Background

“The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has revealed regional roots and developed regional ramifications which confer on it a complexity and an impact on the African continent that are unparalleled in the recent history of Africa,” statement by Cape Verde representative Jose Luis Monteiro to the President the UN Security Council in January 2000 (S/2000/54, 2000). Tracing the roots of the MONUSCO mission requires we begin our investigation in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. On October 1, 1990, the ethnic-Tutsi rebel group, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), launched its first cross-border attack into Rwanda from neighboring Uganda.¹⁹ The reported 5,000-10,000 strong rebel force had initiated planning for the invasion in years prior. Supported by Uganda, the RPF’s objective was to

¹⁹Many RPF commanders served in the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) under current Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni during the Ugandan Bush War, which led to the overthrow of the Obote regime in a coup d’état in July 1985.

restore the Tutsi minority to power, overthrowing decades of Kigali rule by the Hutu majority (“Thousands Invade, Rwanda Reports,” 1990). Despite early attempts by the international community to negotiate a durable peace, ceasefires in 1991 and 1992 were ultimately unsuccessful. In August 1993, a breakthrough in negotiations led to the Arusha Accords, which proposed a power-sharing agreement between the warring factions. In October 1993, UN approved deployment of a military force under the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Tensions remained high as neither side fully trusted the other to respect the conditions of the agreement.

The winter respite from wide-scale conflict was short-lived. On April 6, 1994, an airplane carrying Hutu leader, Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down by two surface-to-air missiles on its approach to Kigali International Airport. The assassination triggered a violent response from the Rwandan Presidential Guard, the Interahamwe militias, and Hutu extremists. Between April and July 1994, an estimated 800,000 ethnic Tutsi were killed within Rwanda led by Hutu nationalists as violence spread from the capitol to the countryside. Official death toll estimates remains debated. Evidence of under-reporting the true scale of the killings stems from inaccurate census data and government of Rwanda reports (Verpoorten, 2005).²⁰ The scale and ferocity of the humanitarian crisis shocked the international community. The restrictive mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) contributed to the UN’s inability to quickly intervene to stop the genocide and had a lasting impact on the institution’s credibility. Likewise, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) policy of non-interference was criticized as a

²⁰Estimates place the total figure between 600,000-800,000 killed – approximately 75-80 percent of the total Tutsi population of Rwanda. An estimated 6,000 to 60,000 Hutu were also killed due to combat and reprisal killings.

contributing factor towards regional inaction.²¹ It was only upon a renewed RPF offensive and the seizure of the capitol that the genocide ended.

Militarization of the Refugee Camps

By the end of the conflict, an estimated two million Hutu refugees fled Rwanda into neighboring Zaire. An additional 300,000 refugees were internally displaced within Rwanda with nominal cross-border flows into neighboring Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi. Perhaps emblematic of the complex multi-dimensional nature of the crisis, internally displaced Hutus moved south to French-controlled safe zones fearing that British sectors were compromised due to its traditional support for Uganda.²² The resulting refugee crisis exacerbated lingering ethnic tension despite the fragile respite from wide-scale conflict. The influx of Hutu refugees into Tutsi regions of eastern Zaire added an additional layer of complexity to an international response that already suffered from severe logistical constraints.

Initial UN reports from within the refugee camps stated that former Hutu political and military officials were reasserting control while the Interahamwe terrorized the civilian refugees (“Terror of Refugees,” 1994). Aid agencies and UN officials were often unable to coordinate relief efforts without the cooperation of the Hutu leadership. In the Bukavu nearly 320,000 refugees faced a growing humanitarian crisis as aid agencies left due to the deteriorating security. UN reports from early August 1994 indicated that the camps were in a state of near war (“Attacks spread,” 1994). Former Hutu political leaders staged a series of elections within the camps in “the spirit of

²¹See the African Union Declaration, which later declared a policy of non-indifference and the ability of the AU to intervene in a member state to stop genocide, largely in response to the scale of the Rwandan Genocide.

²²The French-led Operation Turquoise was criticized as undermining the UNAMIR mandate and was accused of allowing fleeing Hutu genocide co-conspirators to avoid prosecution (“France accused on Rwanda Killings,” 2006).

democratic reforms” in an attempt to legitimize the provisional government. Many of these political figures were implicated in the Rwandan genocide.²³ Despite claims of democratic reform, the elections allowed the former political and military structures to remain intact. By October 1994, reports indicated that Hutu extremists seized one of the largest Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Zaire after UN workers were forced to leave (“Hutu Bandits Seize,” 1994).²⁴ In early 1995, attempts to repatriate Hutu refugees to Rwanda slowed to “virtually to a standstill” as fear of reprisal killings, mass arrests, and judicial corruption was rampant (“Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee,” 1995). Furthermore, intimidation and rumors within the camps benefitted the Hutu leadership who have a vested interest in stalling repatriations. The larger the camps numbers – the greater the perceived legitimacy of the government in exile (Bonner, 1994).

The militarization of the refugee camps strained international support for continued humanitarian aid. Evidence suggests some level of complicity by Zaire officials with respect to Hutu actions within the camps. De facto safe havens for Hutu extremists allowed the rearming of the ex-Rwanda Armed Forces and Hutu militias within Zaire borders. Durable solutions for the repatriation of Hutus were systematically undermined.²⁵ Within Rwanda, the RPF reasserted its control over internally displaced people (IDP) with the forced closure of camps that it deemed as fertile grounds for a resurgent Hutu uprising. The response was devastating. In

²³In Katala camp, a former Hutu mayor of Kigali who facilitated camp election in January 1995 was quoted by the New York Times as stating that “the killings in Rwanda did not actually constitute genocide because some Tutsis survived.”

²⁴Katala was one of five major UN refugee camps in North Kivu province near the border of Rwanda.

²⁵A 1994 Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) report “Breaking the Cycle” estimated that fewer than 10,000 refugees of the 2.1 million total refugees had been repatriated by July 1995. The report attributed the deadlock to both internal and external factors.

April 1995, RPF soldiers massacred at least 4,000 IDPs in Kibeho, Rwanda as UN peacekeepers were accused of complacency. Cross-border incursions by Hutu rebel groups along the Zaire-Rwandan border fueled suspicions in Uganda and Rwanda of a pending Hutu invasion. In particular, a network of twelve UN refugee camps in the vicinity of Goma served as staging area. The camps also housed a number of refugees from neighboring Burundi, which had yet to experience the levels of ethnic violence present in Rwanda despite having similar demographics. Fears of conflict took on a new sense of urgency as Zaire charged that a joint military operation was being planned to invade the camps. They accused Rwanda of rearming Tutsi militias to counter the Hutu-led insurgency. In response, the Mobutu regime moved to rearm the Hutu militias. Furthermore, the steady erosion of political rights for ethnic-Tutsi fostered growing resentment within the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda tribes. Growing ethnic tensions and shifting political alliances provided the preconditions for future conflict.

First Congo War

At the beginning of the First Congo War, the Zairian military's combat readiness was uneven. During the mid-1970s, Mobutu had refocused the military mission towards internal threats. This involved training units in counterinsurgency operations, policing activities, and perhaps most importantly, regime preservation. Funding and resources were directed towards units tasked with upholding the regime including the presidential guard, paramilitary, and airborne units. Infrastructure, force generation, and logistics were centralized resulting in graft, inefficiencies, and reduced readiness. Piecemeal efforts to training and equip the military were facilitated by a variety of foreign powers to include Belgium, Italy, France, and Israel (Cooper, 2013). Combat experiences were mixed with battalion-level deployments to Angola in

1975 and Chad in 1982. Centralized decision-making and inadequate logistical support would hamper the Zairian military's ability to respond effectively as a fighting force in 1996.

Les Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), was established as a home defense unit and trained by Belgian and French militaries in the mid-1960s. By the time of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, the Hutu majority had established a firm grasp on the FAR leadership with funding and resources earmarked for the presidential guard, paramilitary, and specialized infantry units. Many of the perpetrators of the genocide came from these units and would later regenerate a Hutu-led insurgency from within the UN refugee camps. Post-genocide, the renamed Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) proved a capable fighting force against the FAR. However, it exhibited many of the same challenges as other African militaries with an over-reliance on western assistance for logistical support. Although better organized and perhaps better trained, most units were capable of small arms, limited indirect support, and light armored assets. RPF ally, the Ugandan People's Defense Force, was also depleted after years of conflict stemming from the 1980s Uganda Bush War. Efforts to rebuild the military into an effective fighting force was also dependent upon foreign military aid and training. However Uganda's small-scale military industrial complex provided a critical advantage. At least three separate weapon manufactures within Uganda quickly put small arms into the hands of militias across the region.

By 1996, conflict in eastern Zaire appeared inevitable. Post-Cold War, the Mobutu regime could no longer count on western support. The political calculus had changed as result the Rwandan genocide and French-led Operation Turquoise. It was no longer politically expedient for western states to support the regime at the expense of international credibility. Regardless, it became clear that the Mobutu regime was unwilling to stop cross-border Hutu attacks. Furthermore, the regime's

crackdown on Tutsi communities reached a tipping point. The steady erosion of civil rights forced Banyamulenge minorities to coalesce around the anti-regime opposition. In April 1995, the Zairean parliament approved the forced deportation of all Tutsi Banyamulenge to Rwanda on penalty of death – stripping many Congolese Tutsi of their Zairean nationality. The Banyamulenge would serve as an ample recruiting ground for the ADFL ranks. Rwanda, Uganda, and foreign mercenaries provided covert assistance to at least four different Tutsi rebel groups operating within eastern Zaire. One such group, the People’s Revolutionary Party was led by then commander, Laurent Kabila. He was unanimously approved as leader of the newly-formed, Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL). Rwanda’s growing involvement in the rebellion was gradual without an overarching strategy. Rwandan military incursions into Zaire began as early as 1995.

In October 1996, Rwandan forces in coordination with Tutsi militias launched operations against the Zairean military and ex-FAR rebels within the Kivu provinces. The speed and ferocity of coordinated attacks on remote garrisons shocked the Zairean military and many units capitulated quickly. Anti-Mobutu forces were largely unimpeded by the Zaire military during their march towards Kinshasa. Years of neglect and corruption crippled the Mobutu regime’s response to unfolding disaster. Although relatively well-equipped, Zairean units were incapable of mounting a coordinated defense due to a failure of senior military leaders. The terrain, road networks, and logistics supply lines posed a more significant challenge to sustaining the military offensive. In November, the Ugandan military launched its attack into northern Zaire, opening a second front and increasing pressure on overstretched Zairean units.

The fall of Kisangani in February 1997 represented a strategic victory for Rwanda. An important transportation hub and staging ground for the final assault on Kinshasa. After the fall Kisangani, the Zairean military as an effective fighting

force essentially disintegrated. In February, Angola intervened in support of Rwanda and Uganda by commencing operations against Zaire's UNITA ally.²⁶ Mixed Zairean elements offered limited but uncoordinated resistance during the retreat. After failed negotiations, Kinshasa fell on May 15, 1997. Clean-up operations continued as regime officials and FAZ units fled north to the Republic of Congo and south towards Angola. Within seven months, the ADFL rebels supported by regional states had toppled the Mobutu regime. Mobutu fled to Morocco where he would die from prostate cancer in September 1997.

Laurent Kabila Regime

The consequences of the First Congo War altered the regional power structure within the Great Lakes Region. The hope for a new era of political and socio-economic reforms within Zaire was short-lived. With Mobutu gone, new fault lines emerged between former state and rebel allies. In Kinshasa, former AFDL commander, Laurent Kabila installed himself as the leader of the newly declared Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Hailed as a "liberator," Zairians were far less willing to embrace Laurent Kabila as national leader.²⁷ Allegations of human rights violations, political assassinations, and corruption by the victorious rebel army fostered the perception that the war's outcome had simply replaced one despot for another. All political parties except for the ADFL were banned in support of "stabilization" efforts. Despite consolidation efforts, the regime's power extended to only a few major towns within the western provinces.

²⁶The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was an anti-communist paramilitary group that conducted a protracted insurgency against Angola from 1975-2002.

²⁷An April 1997 poll conducted by Kinshasa's Public Opinion Research Institute found that only 20 percent of polled respondents would vote for Kabila in a primary election – 57 percent favored veteran opposition leader, Étienne Tshisekedi (Buckley, 1997).

Promises of economic renewal and national reconciliation were stymied by a sobering reality. Years of autocratic rule coupled with foreign debt, civil war, and systemic corruption contributed to a moribund economy and dilapidated infrastructure. Despite lucrative mineral deposits and an educated urban elite, a government founded on nepotism and political patronage fueled wealth inequality and plundered the state coffers. The Kabila regime's political platform called for the redistribution of wealth and accountability under vague Marxist principles. However, political and socio-economic conditions made such implementation largely implausible. Kabila's use of family members to head important positions within the regime alienated former ADFL allies and fostered new political rivals. The continued presence of foreign troops within eastern DRC provinces was perceived as a direct challenge to the regime's legitimacy. Facing domestic opposition, Kabila called for general elections during his New Year's address to the nation in 1999.

Second Congo War

Former ADFL allies including the Banyamulenge militia withdrew support from Kabila. Without allies in the eastern provinces, the regime chose to suppress opposition. Domestic perceptions that Kabila was a puppet of Rwanda required that he target rival Tutsi groups and seek agreement with former Hutu opponents. The political stalemate weakened the regime's ability to achieve national reconciliation and reduce its reliance on violence to consolidate power.²⁸ Limited efforts were taken to integrate the ex-Zairean military into a new national army (FAC) composed of former ADFL rebels and RPF leadership.

The tenuous hold on the eastern provinces and use of local militias with shifting

²⁸Banyamulenge are a Tutsi minority located within South Kivu province whose militias actively supported the ADFL and perpetrated large-scale reprisal killings on ethnic-Hutu populations (Lemarchand, 2008).

alliances, allowed both Hutu exiles to exploit the open borders to continue attacks within Rwanda. Despite a Rwandan withdrawal from DRC in October 1997, by December of that year Rwandan forces were again patrolling provinces along the border. The failure of the Kabila regime to fully integrate the new national army allowed sympathetic Tutsi to ignore the exploitation of natural resources, agricultural products, and money by the Ugandan and Rwanda militaries (Stapleton, 2013). The use of re-education camps, executions, and wide-scale demobilization contributed to a national army unprepared to deal with regional powers and an insurgency at home. The Congolese military had no operational air or naval assets, few tracked military vehicles, or special operations units. The use of child soldiers was ubiquitous as were former Banyamulenge militiamen with loose allegiances to the regime. Infighting among military leadership fractionalized the force and limited its ability to conduct joint operations. The sum of these challenges would become apparent during the Second Congo War.

The continued presence of foreign militaries with DRC increased political pressure on Kabila to act. The consolidation of Uganda and Rwandan influence over eastern provinces and its natural resources allowed Rwanda to pursue operations against pro-Kabila rebel groups along the border. Shuttle diplomacy to find a diplomatic solution ultimately failed. In July 1998, Kabila ordered all remaining Rwandan and Ugandan military to leave DRC. Although Rwandan President Paul Kagame acquiesced with the departure of Rwandan elements from Kinshasa, it became increasingly clear that conflict was near. Unknown to Kabila, Rwanda had initiated planning for a full-scale invasion beginning in April 1998.

Operation Kitona launched in August 1998 with the seizure of major cities across DRC by Rwandan elements and a Banyamulege uprising in Kivu provinces under the name Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). The unpreparedness of the

Congolese military to quickly coordinate a response incited panic in Kinshasa. Under significant pressure, Kabila petitioned the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for assistance. However, the response was less than favorable as the SADC members could not agree on whether to prop up an unelected government. Uganda committed three battalions to operations in support of the Rwanda invasion – capturing areas within upper Congo. Zimbabwe was first to respond to Kabila’s request with the deployment of Zimbabwean special operations forces to secure DRC airfields in preparation for a major deployment of troops. SADC discussions on how to proceed were indecisive. Namibia followed Zimbabwe’s lead and committed to supporting Kabila’s regime. Likewise, Angola would provide much needed air assets while South Africa and Botswana pursued diplomatic avenues to de-escalate the conflict. State rationales to commit troops centered on competing national interests. Zimbabwe has substantial foreign direct investments within DRC. Angolan and Namibian officials cited security concerns over UNITA. Botswana and South Africa pursued a mediation strategy over concerns of human right abuses by the Kabila regime.

By the end of August, Rwandan elements faced threats on multiple fronts and withdrew towards their strongholds in eastern provinces. The situation on ground stabilized as Kabila’s forces advance into eastern DRC bogged down. Ugandan and Rwandan units continued to defend the eastern provinces and upper Congo as well as major cities including Goma, Bukavu, and Kisangani. The deployment of a Chadian contingent at the behest of Sudan and transported by Libya brought a distinctly continental aspect to the conflict not witnessed during the First Congo War.²⁹ Despite the continued air offensive against Rwandan and Ugandan positions, the arrival of the rainy season in March and a stalemate on most fronts limited major ground operations providing space for diplomacy.

²⁹See (Stapleton, 2013, p. 204) for potential reasons of Chadian, Libya, and Sudanese involvement.

1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement

In May 1999, the Libya-mediated Sirte Accords were the first attempt to find a negotiated solution. Low-scale conflict continued despite the accords, as it appeared that most groups were using the time to refit the approaching fighting season. The conflict had drawn in six regional states including Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda in support of rebel Tutsi elements, and Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola who provided support to the Kabila regime. Deep-seated distrust and the absence of significant international pressure contributed a lack of momentum in ceasefire talks. Kabila's refusal to meet with rebel leaders contributed lack of a progress as he sought direct talks with Rwanda and Uganda, who were seen as key enablers of the rebels. Moreover, he argued that no cease-fire would be signed until it outline a Rwandan and Ugandan withdrawal (McNeil Jr., 1999).

Natural resource extraction in the eastern provinces fueled a growing rift between the Great Lakes alliance and rebel groups. The fault line centered on Kisangani which stood as the headquarters for the Ugandan military within DRC and served as a major transit point for mining operations within the region. The competition over mine ownership fractured the Ugandan and Rwandan allies as well as the anti-Kabila militias including the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). Recognizing the growing acrimony between the Tutsi militias and their state supporters, Kinshasa bolstered its support for anti-Rwandan militias operating in eastern DRC. This forced Rwanda to commit additional troops to combat the rearguard actions – weakening units deployed forward. Suspicions within Uganda that Rwanda was intent on installing a puppet regime in DRC served to fray military and political coordination.

A diplomatic breakthrough occurred in July 1999 led by the chief mediator

and President of Zambia, Frederick Chiluba. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement would commit the African states to a ceasefire to be monitored through the establishment of a Joint Military Commission and Political Committee. The agreement called for a national dialogue to reconcile warring parties, non-armed group, and civil society. Militias were to be disarmed, illicit weapons trafficking controlled, and the allowance of humanitarian assistance. However, the complex nature of the conflict and shifting alliances by rebel groups made implementation of the agreement difficult to achieve.³⁰ Of concern, rebel groups were not signatories to the agreement. Significant political pressure was required to bring both the RCD and Uganda-supported, Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) to support the agreement. However, continued covert state support to rebel groups ensured violations of the ceasefire would continue without adequate international monitoring.

Armed rebel groups acting as spoilers undermined the ceasefire agreement. Rwanda refused to sign ceasefire brokered by Libya with co-signatory Uganda. Disagreements over the representatives of rebel groups in tandem with periodic skirmishes culminated in the defeat of Ugandan forces by the Rwandan military during the “Six-Day War” in June 2000. Enforcement of the ceasefire proved unreliable and Congolese operations against rebel groups continued. In 2001, renewed international pressure mounted on all parties to end the “African World War.”³¹ The incoming Bush administration took a proactive role in seeking a mediated resolution. It was made clear that the US position would no longer favor Rwanda and Uganda and that implementation of the Lusaka Agreement remained more important than ever.

On January 16, 2001, Kabila’s assassination by his bodyguards signaled a new phase in the three-year old conflict. His son, Joseph Kabila, assumed the responsibilities

³⁰More than nine separate armed groups were identified in the Lusaka agreement.

³¹Statement attributed to Assistant Secretary of State, Susan Rice.

of the presidency with the support of SADC. Seeking an opening to resolve the conflict and sensing the exhaustion of warring states, Kabila proposed the removal of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda armies in exchange for Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia doing the same. Kabila expressed a willingness for direct negotiations with major rebel groups. Uganda and Rwanda recognizing the erosion of western support chose to withdraw from eastern DRC. A period of intense shuttle diplomacy between the parties continued at the United Nations and in South Africa. UN-sponsored discussions between foreign ministers from ten Central African states met in DRC to discuss the conflict in Great Lakes region. In early 2002, parties to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue reached an agreement to integrate rebels into a new national army. The Pretoria Agreement set out transition objectives for the end of hostilities, an integrated national army, free elections, new political structures, and national reconciliation. Despite the breakthrough, the eastern provinces were still plagued by violence as rebel groups splintered into rival factions.

UN-MONUC (1999-2010)

United Nations involvement in the DRC post-conflict, can be traced through a series of incremental UN Security Council resolutions and statements.³² Initial statements from the Security Council called for the peaceful resolution to the growing conflict and the withdrawal of foreign forces. The UN acknowledged the importance of maintaining the territorial integrity of DRC while condemning other states in the region that were interfering in “other’s internal affairs” (S/PRST/1998/26, 1998). In support of these goals, the UN recognized the need for a regional mediation process

³²See UNSCR 1234 (1999), UNSCR 1258 (1999), UNSCR 1273 (1999) and statements S/PRST/1998/26, S/PRST/1998/36, and S/PRST/1998/17.

and expressed its support for efforts led the Organization of African Unity and SADC. The deployment of a Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General to DRC provided periodic updates on the progress of conflict resolution. Efforts led by the President of Zambia to establish a committee to reach a settlement were encouraged to continue (S/PRST/1998/36, 1998). Each resolution affirmed international support for the implementation of a ceasefire in accordance with the 1999 Lusaka Agreement. In August 1999, the establishment of a Joint Military Commission composed of the belligerent nations along with an authorized 90 UN military liaison personnel tasked to monitor the ceasefire to ensure security conditions were met for the deployment of a 5,000 strong UN peacekeeping force.

Established as the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) on November 30, 1999 under UNSCR 1279, it was first UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC since the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. An initial 500 military observers were authorized under the resolution to support the MONUC mandate to liaise with the Joint Military Commission, provide technical assistance to the ceasefire implementation, and to plan for the observation of the ceasefire and the disengagement of forces. The phased deployment of additional UN forces was predicated on recommendations of the UN Secretary-General and security conditions. Liaison officers were distributed to the warring states to provide assistance with the implementation of the ceasefire. Later resolutions would broaden the MONUC mandate to include the deployment of UN peacekeepers to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces. UNSCR 1291 (2000) authorized strength of 5,537 peacekeepers with additional observers and civilian experts to facilitate humanitarian assistance, logistical, and administrative support.

In May 2000, the UN Security Council sent a mission composed of representa-

tives from the US, France, Mali, Namibia, Netherland, Tunisia, and UK to discuss the terms of phase two of the MONUC mission. During the four-day engagement in Belgium, DRC, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda, the mission met with the heads of state for each belligerent including the leadership of the two rival RCD factions. Initial discussions with Kabila reinforced the need for his country's full cooperation. Kabila cited earlier mistrust of the perceived double standards of the UN in its responsiveness towards East Timor than it had in Africa (S/2000/416, 2000). Regardless, Kabila committed to providing full cooperation of a UN deployment force and signed a status-of-forces agreement in a ceremony at his presidential palace. Meetings with the Joint Military Commission and Political Committee, and heads of state for Zambia, Uganda, and Rwanda revealed varying viewpoints on the conflict during that time.

Unable to secure Kabila's cooperation during a SADC meeting in Zambia in May 2000, the mission struggled to meet its mandate. A report by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in August 2000 cited continued conflict and a refusal by DRC President Joseph Kabila to permit armed UN peacekeepers within its territory as the primary impediments to deployment of a peacekeeping force. Initial troop contributions provided by a collection of nations were likewise challenged by adequate funding, authorities, and logistical support. Recent experiences from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) demonstrated the risk of deploying peacekeepers into a theater before necessary security conditions had improved.³³ Despite the delay, UN peacekeepers in Kinshasa were met by an outpouring of support from the local populace (Van Woudenberg, 2004). In April 2000, Senegalese Major General Mountago Diallo was appointed military commander of the MONUC mission. It soon became clear that UN peacekeepers were unprepared for the mission ahead.

³³Between May and July 2000, seven UN peacekeepers were killed and an additional five hundred held hostage by rebel group, Revolutionary United Front.

Armed with a limited mandate to record violations of the ceasefire, UN military observers were unable to have an immediate impact on the fighting. By the end of the 2000, there were 224 military personnel on-ground – attempting to cover a total land area two-thirds the size of Western Europe. Implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement would transition from a technical assistant role to active peacekeeping with the implementation of UNSCR 1445 in December 2002, which signaled a new phase for the MONUC mandate. In particular, the mandate provided for the Demobilization, Resettlement, and Reintegration (DRR) of foreign armed groups operating within DRC.

As a result of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement on Transition signed in Pretoria on 16 December 2002, MONUC received a new mandate to assist DRC in preparation for parliamentary elections (UNSCR 1493, 2002). The Pretoria Agreement was the culmination of three years of negotiations that began with the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire in 1999. It codified the inter-Congolese dialogue and political discussions on the peace process and political transition between the DRC central government and rebel groups including the RCD, MLC, political opposition, civil society, RDC/ML, RCD/N and the Mai-Mai.³⁴ The primary objectives included the retraining and integration of the national army, disarming armed groups, withdrawal of foreign troops, and formation of a defense policy. Subsequent UN resolutions strengthened the mandate of MONUC to “prevent attacks on civilians and disrupt the military capacity of illegal armed groups that continue to use violence,” while allowing for mission creep through a growing task list (S/RES/1592, 2005). The ability of

³⁴The agreement stipulated that the current political leadership would remain in power during the transition period. Elections would be held within twenty-four months following the beginning of the transition. Power-sharing with former rebel groups allowed the formation of four vice-president posts to oversee the political committee, economic and finance committee, committee for reconstruction and development, social and cultural committee. A military mechanism was established to begin integrating the former opposition groups into a new national army and defense council.

MONUC mission to meet its mandated tasks was challenged by limited resources and capabilities.

In 2003, violence flared in Ituri province due to internal conflicts between RCD factions, which exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the provincial capital of Bunia. Following continued rebel attacks on an understrength peacekeeping contingents, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan accepted a French proposal to lead Operation Artemis to restore security in Bunia. The effort was undertaken with expressed support of DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. The mission was notable as the first instance of a deployment of an autonomous European Union (EU) military force outside of Europe. The Interim Emergency Multinational Force deployed to northeastern DRC between June and September 2003. The primary objective of the intervention was to stabilize security within Bunia despite reports of continued atrocities in the surrounding countryside. Once Bunia was secured, the EU mission transitioned its security mission back to MONUC peacekeepers. In early 2004, UNSCR 1565 revised the former mandate of MONUC and authorized the increase of UN peacekeepers from 5,537 to 5,900 personnel with 341 UN police personnel, in addition to air assets and logistic enablers. The deployment of additional capabilities provided a renewed push to correct the previous challenges of the MONUC mandate while recognizing the growing conflict in the Kivu provinces between DRC military forces (FARDC) and the rebel group, National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) led by former RCD-Goma commander, General Laurent Nkunda.

Despite the low-intensity conflict in the eastern provinces, the relative stability of DRC allowed for a referendum on a new Congolese constitution by the transitional government in December 2005. The referendum also overturned Mobutu-era amendments by reinstating citizenship rights to all ethnic groups within the country at the time of independence in 1960. In July 2006, DRC witnessed its first free and

fair elections for the National Assembly. In October, President Joseph Kabila won reelection to a second-term in a run-off election. A high-water mark for DRC and the MONUC mission, the success of the referendum and elections was attributed to substantial financial backing by the EU and the capabilities of MONUC mission. Following the elections, MONUC's mandate continued to broaden with the responsibility to implement political, rule-of-law, military, and capacity-building tasks. Optimism proved short-lived as the CNDP staged another revolt in North Kivu in late 2007, the Lord's Resistance Army terrorized the civilian population in northeastern DRC, and renewed fighting between former rebel groups including the FDLR, Mai-Mai, FARDC, and UN peacekeepers threatened to upend the fragile peace. Heavy fighting in 2008 between the CNDP and FARDC forces supported by MONUC triggered a renewed humanitarian crisis with estimates as high as 250,000 IDPs.

Although the CNDP revolt was ultimately unsuccessful, the MONUC mandate did not authorize offensive actions against armed rebel groups. Ultimately, Rwanda applied political pressure on the CNDP rebels, which led to the arrest of Laurent Nkunda. A political solution was reached to integrate the CNDP forces into FARDC. The victory allowed DRC to divert state resources towards another rebel group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Limited MONUC offensive actions against the group in coordination with FARDC stabilized the security situation within the Kivu provinces. In December 2009, the UN Secretary-General called for a strategic review of MONUC's progress – principally, the goal was to establish a roadmap to drawdown. However, fears of a return to earlier instability, UNSCR 1925 proposed the launch of new phase of the UN mission in DRC.

UN-MONUSCO (2010-Present)

On July 1st, 2010, MONUC was superseded by the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). The mission reflected a broad mandate to support the elected government in the completion of operations against armed rebel groups, improve the protection of civilians, and consolidate state authority over its territory (Menodji, 2014). The mandate represented a strategic shift from previous efforts to merely separate belligerents and ensure adherence to conditions of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement. Future efforts would support institution-building and peace enforcement. At the time, MONUSCO was the largest and most costly UN peacekeeping mission force with nearly 19,000 peacekeepers in the field (Stapleton, 2013).

In 2012, former members of the CNDP rebel group defected to form a new militant group, the March 23 Movement (M23), taking refuge in the country side around Goma. Within months, M23 rebels began conducting attacks on FARDC and UN peacekeepers with surprising success. The failure of FARDC forces to contain the rebels in a MONUSCO-supported offensive led to accusations that Rwanda was providing support to the Tutsi rebels. In November 2012, M23 rebels seized the capital of Goma without encountering major resistance from FARDC or UN peacekeepers. UN officials claimed that their mandate only allowed offensive actions in protection of civilians. Fighting the rebels inside of the city could endanger the lives of 500,000 to one million people living in the city (Gettleman and Kron, 2012). In February 2013, the UN-brokered Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region outlined a broader strategy in the DRC. It outlined the deployment of a parallel force intervention brigade (FIB) predicated on passage of the agreement among eleven African member states. The force was first

proposed by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region with the support of the African Union and SADC. It would be composed of South African, Tanzanian, and Malawian troops. Ultimately, the FIB would serve as a deterrent and not a replacement for a political solution.

In March 2013, the UN authorized the stand up the FIB to take limited offensive actions against M23 rebels operating within Kivu provinces for one year (S/RES/2098, 2013). Although the FIB was a regional initiative, its authorization by the UN blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.³⁵ However, support for the parallel force was not unanimous as some states voiced concerns over the appearance of a shifting MONUSCO mission, a vague employment strategy, and rules of engagement. Citing Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council argued that it had the justification to authorize the force.

In August 2013, coordinated actions between FARDC and the FIB dislodged M23 rebels from areas surrounding Goma. It was the first major test for the new unit (Katombe, 2013). In November, the M23 group stated that it would “end its rebellion” in eastern DRC after a prolonged joint FARDC-UN operation was close to overrunning their last remaining stronghold in eastern DRC. In a statement, the M23 leadership stated that they would choose to pursue their goals “through purely political means.” Earlier that year, a UN report made the case that the M23 group was created and supported by Rwanda. International pressure following the report pressured Uganda and Rwanda to suspend support to the group or risk suspension of

³⁵Peacekeeping is defined as “a technique to preserve the peace where fighting has been halted and to assist in the implementing agreements.” Peace enforcement involves the application of “coercive measures, including the use of military force” to restore peace and security (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2010).

aid (French, 2013). With the end of the M23 insurgency, MONUSCO focused on the remaining armed rebel groups.³⁶

Between 2014 and 2017, the UN Security Council passed seven additional resolutions focused on multidimensional stabilization tasks. In December 2014, MONUSCO and the UN country team conducted a strategic review focused on the implementation of the mission's mandate and conditions for a future drawdown. The report found that although the political situation in Kinshasa had improved, further progress was needed for upcoming 2016 national elections, which were viewed as "essential for the country's future peace and stability." Opposition groups called for MONUSCO to play a similar role as MONUC had during the 2006 elections. The implementation of the security sector reform hinged on the ability of MONUSCO and bilateral partners to train, equip, and assist FARDC forces. Similar institution-building efforts focused on the national police required funding and resources to meet the framework's five-year timeline.

The success of the FIB led to the renewal of its authorities through March 2018.³⁷ However, joint operations between MONUSCO and FARDC were challenged by disparate levels of unit readiness. The reliance on the FIB to conduct offensive actions against armed groups led the MONUSCO headquarters to rely on this capability at the neglect of framework brigades, which declined in readiness, discipline, and morale. Despite military successes against rebel groups, anti-MONUSCO sentiments among the population increased as poverty, political corruption, and criminal activity

³⁶A 2014 UN Strategic Review cited on-going threats to DRC peace and security from both Congolese and foreign armed groups including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Forces Democratiques pour la liberation due Rwanda (FDLR), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and Mai-Mai militias that threatened the civilian population in eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region (S/2014/957, 2014).

³⁷The Force Intervention Brigade has been reauthorized annually since March 2013 in UNSCR 2211 (2015), UNSCR 2277 (2016), and UNSCR 2348 (2017).

continued largely unabated. Furthermore, allegations of rape, human rights violations, and corruption implicated some peacekeeping contingents.

Efforts to address the conflict's political dimension in eastern DRC remains key to the success of MONUSCO. The implementation of the Nairobi Declaration works towards that objective. Without a clear exit strategy, moribund international support risks reversing the difficult gains achieved over the past twenty years. The lack of regional commitments to supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework continues to impede the mission. Deepening economic integration and cooperation within the Great Lakes region necessitates the need for greater security cooperation. Economic, security, and political reforms focused on developing credible domestic institutions is essential. However, concerns of a peaceful transition of power following December 2018 presidential elections remain. Ongoing political violence continues to foster tensions within Kinshasa. The myriad challenges facing the DRC provide a significant roadblock to a responsible MONUSCO drawdown. Despite evidence of increased economic cooperation within the region, the ambiguous UN strategy has allowed for diverging objectives among peacekeeping contributors. Furthermore, competing UN missions in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Mali have fueled increased competition for limited UN resources and funding. The lack of progress in DRC has fostered a growing apathy towards the mission and as a result, resources and funding have plateaued. Fears of conflict in the eastern Kivu provinces have returned.

UN-MONUSCO Model Assessment

South Africa as the top contributor achieves upper quartiles scores across each of the explanatory variables. As a regional power and founding SADC member, South

Table 7: UN-MONUSCO Model Assessment (2010-2016).

Rank	TCC/PCC	SADC	Political Rationale		Institutional Rationale	Economic Rationale	Model Support
			Governance	Political Accountability	Regional Leadership	Trade Across Borders	
1	South Africa	Yes	69.9	1.21	13	65.6	Full
2	Egypt	No	47.3	0.16	4	70.0	Partial
3	Morocco	No	56.3	0.75	2	82.5	Partial
4	Tanzania	Yes	56.2	0.79	5	59.1	Partial
5	Malawi	Yes	57.5	0.77	2	31.2	Full
6	Benin	No	58.9	0.94	5	60.4	Full
7	Ghana	No	66.4	1.09	0	64.6	Partial
8	Senegal	No	59.4	1.11	1	74.4	Full
9	Niger	No	49.4	0.63	3	22.0	Partial
10	Tunisia	No	62.9	0.90	1	81.3	Full
	Pop. Mean		50.6	0.49	0.49	50.8	
	Pop. Median		50.1	0.55	0.00	55.0	

Note: Individual state values are averaged across the time period from 2010-2016.

Note 2: Green values represent upper quartile (Q_3) scores across the total population of African states. Red values indicate bottom quartile (Q_1).

Note 3: Full model support is defined as upper quartile scores on at least three measures. Partial model support is defined as two upper quartile scores. Low model support is defined as zero or one upper quartile scores.

Africa took a lead role in early mediation efforts by engaging in high-level dialogue, facilitating the inter-Congolese dialogue, and supporting diplomatic negotiations during the Congo Wars. Despite recent corruption scandals, South Africa's political institutions are largely pluralistic and credible. Its dominant presence within regional institutions is reflected by its large score on the regional leadership measure. As a member of the BRICS economic organization, South Africa has also increased its market openness and maintains robust trade linkages with its regional economic partners. South Africa views its regional integration as consistent with AU objectives and essential for its sustainable economic growth (Walaza, 2014).

South Africa maintains a modern and effective military force, the South African National Defense Forces (SANDF), which has deployed across sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, it maintains a median score on militarization relative to other African states. Post-apartheid, political reforms led to increased civilian oversight of South Africa's military institutions (Roux, 2005). As a result, SANDF influence over foreign policy has waned since the early 1990s. This lends support to the argument that security rationales are on average, less influential on peacekeeping contributions than political, economic, and institutional rationales.

Egyptian involvement provides partial model with upper quartile scores on

trade integration and regional leadership. However, its bottom quartile score on political accountability is emblematic of its history of oppression both under the former Mubarak regime and more recently with the election of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2014. Despite its domestic political challenges, Egypt has remained a consistent contributor since the 1960s and is currently the seventh largest contributor to UN peacekeeping worldwide. In 2013, the AU suspended Egyptian membership in the regional body in response to the ousting of former President Mohamed Morsi by military coup. Upon re-admittance in 2014, President al-Sisi led efforts to promote regional cooperation with the creation of an Egyptian partnership agency for African development. Egypt was among the earliest contributors to MONUSCO and has maintained a significant role in the execution of the mission. In 2017, attempts by some members of the UN Security Council to single out underperforming contingents led Egypt to directly incorporate a paragraph in the renewed MONUSCO mandate that stated that the failure to fully implement its mandate was the result of “a myriad of issues, some of which were not related to contingent performance” (What’s in Blue, 2017). Egypt maintains a large standing military and is a major recipient of U.S. military aid. As a potential outlier, Egypt consistently ranks among the top militarized states within North Africa and the Middle East and achieves upper quartile scores on militarization and national capability.

Morocco and Tunisia fully compliment the model’s results with upper quartile scores on governance, political accountability, regional leadership, and trade. Morocco is considered an “essential” partner to UN peacekeeping efforts and is a top contributor to both MONUSCO and MINUSCA. Morocco has been an active contributor to peace and stability efforts on the continent since the 1960s. Tunisian support in DRC began in 2001 under UN-MONUC authorities through the transition to MONUSCO in 2010. Within UN Security Council deliberations, Tunisia has strongly advocated for the role and relevance of the African Union to lead peacebuilding efforts on the

continent – with continued financial support from international donors (“Security Council Endorses,” 2013). Focused on containing instability due to its shared border with Libya, Tunisia has taken a lead role in promoting regional security cooperation between the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) member states to include Algeria and Morocco. In 2016, Tunisia committed to increasing its military and police contributions to UN peacekeeping missions to support regional stability. Tunisia has sought to increase its access to global markets and considers trade integration with the European Union as key to securing economic future (Waszkewitz, 2018). The examples of Morocco and Tunisia provide support for political, economic, and institutional rationales.

Benin, Ghana, and Senegal also fully support the model with upper quartile scores across political, economic, and institutional rationales. Benin’s contributions to DRC began in 2006 under UN-MONUC authorities and have remained consistent under MONUSCO. Benin is an active partner within ECOWAS and maintains strong economic ties to other regional states. On good governance and political accountability measures, Benin was the first African state to fully transition from a military dictatorship to a pluralistic democracy in 1991. Ghana support for MONUSCO began with the deployment of peacekeepers to DRC in 2001 under MONUC. Ghana is an active contributor to regional security efforts, having supported ECOWAS during the Malian intervention under AU-AFISMA. More recently, Ghana has deployed contingents to support the AU-led AMISOM mission in Somalia. Ghana has also deployed peacekeepers to other regional hotspots including MINUSMA in Mali and UNMISS in South Sudan. Ghana achieves high scores on good governance and political accountability. Despite its security cooperation, trade barriers to intraregional trade impact Ghana’s scores on trade integration. As Ghana and Nigeria combined account for nearly 61 percent of the West African population and 68 percent of gross domestic product for ECOWAS, efforts to remove trade restrictions between Nigeria and Ghana offer an opportunity for diffuse economic and security for the entire community (Aidoo and

Hoppe, 2012). Senegal is a significant contributor to regional efforts having supported ECOWAS, AU, and UN missions for decades. Peace and security efforts are considered central to Senegal's foreign policy objectives. With upper quartile score across the explanatory variables, Senegal provides full support for the model.

Of the top ten contributors, Tanzania and Malawi are the only SADC members besides South Africa currently supporting the MONUSCO mission as a parallel force through the Force Intervention Brigade. This leads to suspicion that the regional roots of the Congo wars has limited the support for contributions from other SADC members. Despite efforts by the SADC Force Intervention Brigade to combat armed rebel groups operating in eastern DRC, allegations of outside state support remain (Sanchez and Morgan, 2017). Moreover, the rocky relationship between MONUSCO and the Kabila administration has stymied stabilization efforts as directed by its UNSCR mandate. As President Kabila seeks a third term in December 2018, fears of renewed conflict have placed the MONUSCO mission in a difficult position. That neighboring countries are reluctant to commit forces to MONUSCO is perhaps expected.

The ultimate success of the mission will depend upon the resolve and commitment by regional powers including South Africa, Egypt, and Morocco to commit significant resources to support and train DRC's security forces while encouraging institutional reforms and power-sharing. The alternative – disengagement from eastern DRC – will likely accelerate a relapse into wider conflict that fuels regional destabilization. The ability of international community to apply pressure on the Kabila administration to ensure free and fair elections in December 2018 will serve a critical test of that resolve. President Joseph Kabila, critical of MONUSCO, has called for the UN to provide Kinshasa a roadmap for withdrawal (Mumbere, 2018). Free of international oversight, the various belligerents may again vie for control of the

country's vast natural resources fueling ever greater levels of political, ethnic, and civil violence.

Chapter 6 UN-MINUSCA

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) is emblematic of the evolving nature of UN peacekeeping with the emphasis on the protection of civilians (POC) as a key component of its mandate. The following chapter traces the transnational roots of CAR's chronic instability and identifies trends that impact the ability of the mission to accomplish its mandated tasks. The case study provides partial support for the model. Yet, clear evidence of a regional response — first, under the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) MICOPAX mission and followed by the African Union deployment under AU-MISCA, demonstrates that “African solutions to African problems” are within reach.

Historical Background

As one of the most impoverished nations in the world, the Central African Republic (CAR) ranks among the highest rates for infant mortality, poverty, and violent conflict. With a land area the approximate size of France, CAR is a landlocked sub-Saharan nation bordered by six different African states.³⁸ Positioned at a strategic junction between north and sub-Saharan Africa, CAR lacks the critical transportation infrastructure required to serve as a conduit for intraregional trade. Combined exports averaged just \$118.5 million U.S. dollars in 2017 centered on diamonds, timber, cotton, and coffee. Despite substantial mineral deposits and a fertile agricultural region, three

³⁸Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Sudan, and Chad.

decades of mismanagement by a succession of autocratic regimes left the nation's economy largely moribund. The recipient of nearly a dozen military interventions since the mid-1990s, CAR has served as “a laboratory for peace interventions – an ‘early adopter’ of various peace initiatives” (Carayannis and Fowlis, 2017, p. 236). Due to its geographic location, the conflict in CAR has been both the product and driver of instability in the central African region. Its porous border has allowed its use as a staging base for rebel groups operating in Sudan, Chad, Cameroon, and the DRC.

A former French colony, CAR was established in 1960 during a period of significant political upheaval across Africa as former colonies claimed new found independence. Less than five years of its formation, the state experienced its first military coup as CAR president, David Dacko was overthrown by his cousin and Central African Armed Forces (FACA) Colonel Jean-Bédél Bokassa during a New Year's Eve military coup in 1965. Emblematic of a complicated civilian-military history, CAR has faced at five successful military coups since 1965. Overthrown with French support in 1979, the Bokassa regime was replaced with former leader Dacko who unsuccessful election in 1981 left CAR in the hands of new military regime. The establishment of a major French base at the Bangui M'Poko International Airport was used as staging point for French interventions throughout the Central African region. French support for democracy led to the formation of the first democratically elected civilian government in 1993 under former opposition leader Ange-Félix Patassé. Despite the relatively peaceful transition of power in Bangui, socio-economic factors and political corruption led to frequent clashes between unpaid members of the CAR military, French forces, and the Patassé government during the 1990s.

Seeking to break the cycle of unrest, the French-sponsored Bangui Accords sought to mediate a political solution between the ruling government and political opposition groups. The agreement required the reintegration of former soldiers into

the national army. In January 1997, the first multinational intervention took place under the Inter-African Commission to Monitor Implementation of the Bangui Accords (MISAB), composed of Senegal, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Chad, and Togo with French support. These forces provided security within Bangui in coordination with French forces. The first UN Mission for the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was mandated to augment security for upcoming elections in late 1999. Upon the reelection of President Patassé, MINURCA and French forces executed a drawdown through the spring of 2000. However, chronic socio-economic challenges persisted. The inability of the Patassé administration to ensure its military was funded led to frequent mutinies. Regional efforts to stabilize the central government limited troop deployments to Bangui by the Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in 2001 and 2002.

François Bozizé Regime

In March 2003, General François Bozizé led a rebellion against the government while President Patassé was in Niger attending a regional conference. The unpaid military offered scant resistance and the coup d'état was relatively bloodless. Bozizé immediately dissolved the government and formed a new "national transition council." He proposed a January 2005 timetable for transition to a democratically-elected government. In September 2003, the Bozizé regime led reconciliation talks between a number of political parties and civil society. Committees provided policy recommendations on political, socio-economic, and security issues (Mixed progress post-coup; OxResearch Daily Brief Service, 2003). Upon conclusion of the reconciliation forum, Bozizé appointed former Patassé advisor, Joseph Tchendo to oversee implementation of the forum's recommendations and lifted a seven month old curfew following the March 15th coup. The Bozizé regime recognized the need for the International Monetary

Fund's support to reduce its significant debt burden. Progress was made to address political and economic reforms. The transition council took steps to prepare for future elections and approved a constitution in December 2004. Furthermore, the government implemented required financial reforms to increase transparency and spur foreign investment. In May 2005, Bozizé' party, National Convergence "Kwa Na Kwa," won the presidential and parliamentary elections.

Despite political progress, the CAR economy remained near collapse with approximately 60 percent of the population living in poverty. Foreign aid and investment did not materialize and large-scale demonstrations against political corruption fueled public acrimony. Unable to mitigate the financial crises, the Bozizé regime faced a growing rebellion in its northern regions. Ex-military and former rebels coalesced into criminal gangs that generated funding through looting, theft, and extortion. The porous border between Sudan, Chad, and CAR allowed the free flow of illicit arms, refugees, and rebel groups, which contributed to the growing perception that CAR's domestic instability was a threat to regional peace and security. In particular, unrest in the northeastern region was having a deleterious effect on the humanitarian crisis in Darfur (S/2006/1019, 2006). A UN report stated that armed criminal groups operating along the borders of Chad, Sudan, and the DRC represented a significant threat to CAR's internal security (S/2006/1019, 2006). Closer cooperation between the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the UN was required to effectively respond to the transnational threats (S/2016/305, 2016). Furthermore, the humanitarian crisis exacerbated conditions as an estimated 3.8 million internally displaced people and refugees from neighboring Chad and Sudan placed additional strain on CAR's resources and infrastructure.

Between 2004 and 2007, the Central African Republic Bush War involved a collection of rebel groups under the banner Union of the Democratic Forces for

Unity (UFDR). Despite the presence of FOMUC and France, the FACA and police units were unable to combat the growing insurgency. In November 2006, President Bozizé requested the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to the northeast during discussions with Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. He expressed concerns that rebels were being supported by Sudan (S/2006/1019, 2016). The two primary rebel groups, the Union of the Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD), were suspected of having Chadian and Sudanese support. In 2007, the UFDR engaged FACA and French forces in heavy fighting during their attempt to capture the town of Birao. FACA units allegedly committed numerous human rights violations including reprisal killings and sexual violence against locals suspected of supporting rebel groups. In April 2007, the French air force bombed the UFDR headquarters, which compelled the rebel group to sign the Birao Peace Agreement. Rebels were given amnesty, the group was recognized as a political party, and its former rebels were integrated into FACA. The following year, the APRD also signed the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the central government ending the three-year-old civil war.

UN-MINURCAT (2007-2010)

A subsequent UN report envisioned a future peacekeeping force composed of approximately 4,000 peacekeepers as part of a multidimensional stabilization mission in Bangui. Recognizing the transnational sources of instability, the report recommended that a UN mission include both Chad and CAR in its area of operations. The deployment of peacekeepers would be conditional on the end of hostilities and an agreement among all groups to not interfere with the peacekeeping mission. The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was established by the UN Security Council in September 2007 with a mandate to

train and advise the national army, gendarmerie, and police units in Chad and CAR to reestablish control over their shared border. The European Union in support of MINURCAT deployed a military force (EUFOR) to provide the bulk of training and assistance. MINURCAT was authorized to provide support for one year to contribute to the protection of civilians, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and protect UN personnel and facilities (S/RES/1778, 2007), subsequent resolutions expanded the original mandate through 2010.³⁹ In its final report to the UN Security Council in 2010, the UN Secretary-General stated that “MINURCAT has been an unusual and unique United Nations peacekeeping operation in that it was devoted solely to contributing to the protection of civilians, without an explicit political mandate.”

Central African Republic Civil War (2012-2014)

In August 2012, the leadership of two rebel groups released a joint communique establishing a military alliance in order to carry out military operations in response to “the legendary contempt of the Bangui power” and their refusal to negotiate political agreement and formed a new alliance, the Séléka CPSK-CPJP (Noureldine, 2012).⁴⁰ By mid-September, Séléka fighters had taken over four towns in the eastern region having encountered little resistance from FACA forces (Séléka CPSK-CPJP, 2012). In December 2012, former UFDR leader Michel Djotodia acknowledged a political-military alliance with the Séléka coalition. A communique released on December 16 demanded the Bozizé regime comply with the Birao Agreement and issued a series of demands to include back payments of former military, release of all political prisoners,

³⁹See S/RES/1834 (2008), S/RES/1861 (2009), and S/RES/1923 (2010).

⁴⁰Séléka translates in Sango dialect as approximately “coalition.”

and an independent commission to investigate alleged war crimes committed by the Presidential Guard during the 2004-2007 Central African Bush War.⁴¹

A summit in N'Djamena, Chad in late December aimed to facilitate a political compromise between the central government and the Séléka coalition. Faced with the recent defeat of FACA forces in Bambari and the capture of diamond mines at Bria, Séléka warned Bozizé that Bangui was in their grasp. Allegations that the Chadian military had supported Bozizé angered the group (Massi, 2012). In January, Chadian president and current ECCAS leader, Idriss Déby issued an ultimatum to Séléka not to cross its “red line” of Damara, 75km east of Bangui or risk MICOPAX engagement (“CEEAC warns,” 2013). Despite the threat, neither MICOPAX troops nor the recently arrived South African National Defense Forces had a mandate to engage Séléka fighters. South African involvement was limited to capacity building and planning support for an eventual disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program for rebel fighters. South African business interests in diamond mining operations and oil deposits may have also influenced their involvement (“SA’s oil and diamond,” 2013). An attack in March 2013 led to the deaths of thirteen South African soldiers. The domestic costs led to the withdrawal of the South African military by April 2013. Despite a significant French military presence within CAR, French support did not include a substantial military augmentation to MICOPAX. France deployed an additional 600 troops to the M’Poko International Airport in Bangui to augment security and to protect French citizens. The rebels made significant progress seizing a number of towns in the eastern regions on the path towards Bangui. Many residents in Bangui fled to the countryside. FACA resistance was limited and uncoordinated.

⁴¹The communiqué specifically cited alleged war crimes committed in the village of Zakoumba and the burning of Muslim homes in Bamingui-Bangoran.

Libreville Agreement (2013)

In January 2013, under significant international pressure, Bozizé and the Séléka coalition signed the Libreville Agreement, which committed the parties to the formation of a national unity government and a ceasefire. Hopeful that he could finish his term in 2016, Bozizé saw the agreement as a last opportunity to hold onto power. Despite international support for the agreement, the ceasefire was short-lived. Within days, the Séléka elements in the south continued to attack villages. The attacks were denounced by the Séléka leadership. MICOPAX units and Séléka fighters conducted joint patrols to de-escalate the continued violence (ROP, 2013). However, their cooperation was brief. On March 11, rebels continued their offensive towards Bangui arguing that the Bozizé regime had failed to live up to conditions of the Libreville Agreement. By March 23, rebels seized the capital of Bangui causing Bozizé to flee with his family to neighboring Cameroon. In the aftermath, former UFDR commander Michel Djotodia unilaterally declared himself president. The collapse of the Bozizé regime triggered a new period of instability as security forces disappeared in the power vacuum. Although security was restored in Bangui, criminal fiefdoms formed in the countryside controlling population centers and usurping the rule of law.

In discussions at the African Union, the CEEAC President Idriss Déby requested an additional five million euros to maintain the MICOPAX force in Bangui. He argued that his mandate did not allow MICOPAX units to conduct offensive actions against Séléka rebels. As a result, it was announced that MICOPAX would continue to support the transitional government – including Séléka to implement the Libreville Agreement. Despite the announcement, ECCAS would not recognize the self-appointed president and Séléka rebel commander, Michel Djotodia as legitimate president of the new unity government without elections. The creation of a National Transition Council (CNT) elected Djotodia in April 2013 to provide a modicum of legitimacy to the new regime.

ECCAS would coordinate regional support to the CNT during the transitional period in preparation for future elections (S/2013/261, 2013).

In February 2013, the UN deployed an interagency team to develop a strategic assessment of the political situation in Bangui. Their report concluded that the “Libreville Agreements... remained the linchpin of any effort to re-establish stability in the Central African Republic” (S/2013/261, 2013). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released a report which warned the humanitarian situation would continue to deteriorate due to chronic insecurity and a growing refugee crisis. In response, ECCAS requested international support for an authorized increase of 2,000 MICOPAX peacekeepers. The organization acknowledged its continued support to the CNT, “took note” of the presidential appointment of Michel Djotodia, and sought a new mandate for a MICOPAX II mission.

During regional summits in April 2013, clear differences arose between the AU Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) and ECCAS regarding the composition of the future transitional government. Principal disagreements emerged over the legitimacy of the CNT and role of Djotodia. ECCAS chose to work with the Séléka leadership while the AU-PSC was quick to condemn the unconstitutional seizure of power. Moreover, the AU-PSC argued that the crisis would have a negative impact on the African Union Regional Task Force mission to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army in eastern CAR, DRC, and South Sudan. Disagreements over the role of Djotodia obfuscated the regional response. At the urging of former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, continued coordination between ECCAS and the AU was considered essential (S/2013/261, 2013).

Despite a statement by Djotodia to disband Séléka in September 2013, many ex-fighters splintered into smaller groups (“CAR’s new president,” 2013). Protests over former payments remained a significant flashpoint. Looting, extortion, and murder was

widespread. In April 2014, violence in the capital and countryside became sectarian. Séléka fighters roamed Bangui pillaging and raiding Christian neighborhoods. In response, heavy fighting broke out between the majority Christian population and the Muslim Séléka elements fueling fears of a potential genocide with the emergence of a Christian militia, “anti-Balaka.”⁴²

AU-MISCA (2013-2014)

Despite efforts to strengthen the resources and mandate of the MICOPAX mission, after a series of technical meetings in Addis Ababa in early July, the AU-PSC with UN assistance developed a joint concept of operations for an AU-led peacekeeping force. Citing regional threats due to presence of foreign fighters, illicit weapons trafficking, and human rights violations, the AU-PSC voted to authorize deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (AU-MISCA) in July 2013. The transition from MICOPAX to AU-MISCA was set for August 1, 2013 with the core of the MICOPAX elements integrating into the force under AU legal authorities. A joint coordination mechanism would facilitate strategic coordination at both ministerial and technical levels between ECCAS and the AU-PSC while operational control would be appointed by the African Union Commission (AUC). Funding and resource requirements were requested of ECCAS, TCC/PCCs, and international donor nations (S/2013/476, 2013). Composed of approximately 3,652 combined military and police personnel, the mission had an initial six-month mandate to restore security within Bangui. At the end of October, a UN technical assessment mission to CAR assessed conditions on ground and determined that more

⁴²The popular interpretation of “anti-Balaka” is “anti-machete.” However, another interpretation considers anti-Balaka as street slang for “*anti-balles a ti laka*,” which signifies a talisman used by Christian militiamen. It was thought to make oneself impervious to bullets.

international assistance was required. Discussions on the potential re-hatting to an UN-led mission continued (S/2013/671, 2013). On December 5, 2013, the UN Security Council authorized the AU-led peacekeeping force with a broad mandate to stabilize the country in the wake of continued violence (S/RES/2127, 2013).

The AU-PSC and ECCAS were unable to successfully transition the MICOPAX mission to AU-MISCA in August 2013. Despite increased international support, a lack of coordination between the AU-PSC and ECCAS hampered transition planning. Disagreements centered on the roles and responsibilities of each organization. The AU-PSC argued that all African troops must be fully integrated into the AU-MISCA command structure and operating under the AU mandate. The African Union Commission took steps to appoint ECCAS leadership to senior positions within AU-MISCA and intensified consultations on a number of legal, logistical, and political items.⁴³ The UN, EU, and western donor states emphasized the need for the organizations to build consensus on their strategic objectives while calling upon “member states and international, regional, and sub-regional organization, to provide financial support and contributions in kind to AU-MISCA” (S/RES/2127, 2013). Disagreements on subsidiarity and resource allocation persisted, hampering public perceptions of non-impartiality. In April 2014, Chad announced it would redeploy its AU-MISCA contingent after allegations of human rights abuses by its troops operating in Bangui (Irish and Nako, 2014).⁴⁴ In response, the Chadian government issued a statement a

⁴³The Implementation Concept of the MISCA Strategic Concepts and its Logistics Support Concept concluded in December 2013 and covered force generation, establishment of the AU-MISCA headquarters, legal frameworks, TCC deployments, coordination mechanisms, and logistical support (AU Progress Report, 2014).

⁴⁴An important ally of France with a sizeable military force, Chad was considered a significant partner to peacekeeping efforts in CAR. A UN report highlighted the targeted killing of Christian civilians by Chadian forces working in concert with Séléka groups in Bangui (Preliminary Findings, 2014).

smear campaign orchestrated by anti-Balaka elements and called for an independent investigation of the UN report (S/2014/250, 2014).

Funding and logistical challenges slowed the deployment of additional peacekeeping contributors. Although the EU expressed willingness to provide financial support to AU-MISCA, the UN called upon the African Union and its member states to secure the resources required to implement their mandate. France and the U.S. provided deployment and logistics support to the troop contributing countries. The French-led Operation Sangaris conducted joint patrols with AU-MISCA forces.⁴⁵ In April 2004, the European Union deployed a contingent of 680 troops and police to augment AU-MISCA and the French military. Concerns over deteriorating security led the UN to authorize the deployment of the EU military force (EUFOR-RCA) to augment the transition to MINUSCA. The unit was tasked to provide temporary support in Bangui for an initial period of six months with a force headquarters in Bangui (“EU military operation,” 2014). However, limited information-sharing hampered cooperation between AU-MISCA, Operation Sangaris, and EUFOR-RCA. Yet, despite coordination challenges and TCC/PCC capability gaps, a UN report argued that “MISCA has made a significant difference in its areas of deployment in and outside Bangui, including with the regarding to the protection of civilians” (S/2014/142, 2014).

Following the forced resignation of Michel Djotodia on January 10, 2014 at an ECCAS summit, the National Transitional Council (CNT) elected its first female head of state, Catherine Samba-Panza, former mayor of Bangui. The formation of a new Transitional Government was viewed as a positive development. However, ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka leaders refused to participate in the new government (S/2014/142,

⁴⁵Operation Sangaris was a French military surge in the Central African Republic between December 5, 2013 and October 30, 2015. An initial surge of 1,600 troops reinforced French forces operating in Bangui and augmented AU-MISCA.

2014). The new administration struggled to implement the second phase of the transition plan. An interim UN report found that from March to May 2014, the exploitation of natural resources, illicit weapons trafficking, and significant human rights violations persisted. Moreover, a lack of accountability by members of the “new Séléka” and anti-Balaka militias undermined the peace, security, and territorial integrity (S/2014/452, 2014). Sectarian conflict had contributed to the humanitarian crisis with an estimated 700,000 internally displaced people within CAR and another 280,000 refugees having fled into Chad and Cameroon.

UN-MINUSCA (2014-Present)

In February 2014, the Chairperson of the African Union stated that the primary purpose behind the AU-MISCA mission was to set the conditions for the deployment of an UN-led peacekeeping mission within six to nine months. A report by the UN Secretary-General cited political progress despite deteriorating security as the key factor in his support for the rapid deployment of UN peacekeepers. Despite the progress made by AU-MISCA and Operation Sangaris, a military intervention could not fully address the socio-economic roots of CAR’s instability. It was argued that an UN-led mission was “uniquely positioned to deploy and sustain a multidimensional peacekeeping operation with the full range of capacities” (S/2014/142, 2014).

In a renewed diplomatic push, the Transitional Authority supported a regional initiative to reopen an inclusive dialogue with ex-Séléka, anti-Balaka, and other armed militias. On July 23, 2014 parties signed an agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities and Violence at Brazzaville in the Republic of Congo. The settlement agreed to inclusive political institutions, the reintegration of former rebels into the national

army and the implementation of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was authorized in April 2014 with an initial one year mandate (S/RES/2149, 2014). After a transitional period, MINUSCA superseded AU-MISCA on September 15, 2014. The appointment of the current AU-MISCA commander, Major General Martin Tumenta Chomusa ensured continuity across the chain of command during the transition. The MINUSCA mandate provided broad power for the mission to assist the Transitional Government with preparations for elections no later than February 2015. UN peacekeepers would work with EUFOR-RCA, ECCAS, AU-RTF, and the French military to restore peace and stability to the region. The deployment of MINUSCA troop and police unit was relatively rapid in comparison to previous efforts.

Despite the Brazzaville agreement, armed groups still exerted significant influence across CAR. An estimated 2,000 ex-Séléka fighters and approximately 1,500 anti-Balaka militiamen posed a direct threat and aggravated lingering political tensions (S/2014/762, 2014). Violence flared again in early October 2014 as anti-Balaka elements attempted wrestle control of the KM-5 quarter of Bangui from ex-Séléka fighters. French and MINUSCA forces were called in to restore order after a Muslim taxi-driver was murdered by a mob accused of throwing a grenade into a crowd. The murder triggered sectarian clashes in both Bambari and Bangui. On October 9, 2014, MINUSCA experienced its first casualty when a Pakistani peacekeeper was killed and several injured during an ambush on a UN convoy (Dembassa-Kette, 2014). In the eastern regions, the African Union Regional Joint Taskforce (AU-JTF) led by the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) and U.S. Special Operations continued the hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army with mixed success. Despite

tense security, the Transitional Authority made progress towards holding democratic elections with support by ECCAS representatives including the Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso and President Ali Bongo Ondimbda of Gabon. In March 2015, the UN authorized an additional 750 military personnel, 280 police personnel and 20 correction officers while extending the MINUSCA mandate through April 30, 2016. In addition to continued protection of civilian, the mandate included tasks to assist with national and international judicial proceedings, implement DDR programs and security sector reforms, and counter-illicit trafficking and exploitation of natural resources (S/RES/2217, 2015). Despite the authorization and growing mandate, many African peacekeeping contributors faced significant logistical and deployment-related challenges. Closing the capability gap requires substantial funding and resources from the “Group of five” (G5) including the AU, UN, EU, United States, and France.

In December 2015, a constitutional referendum passed with significant public support – paving the way for general elections on December 30. The lack of a clear presidential winner resulted in run-off elections in February and March 2016. On March 30, 2016, Faustin-Archange Touadéra was sworn into office with a promise to enact reforms and build on the peace efforts undertaken by the Transitional Authority. In his inauguration speech, Touadéra expressed a desire to “quickly approve the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration program” (“Central African Republic’s president vows peace,” 2016).

In July 2016, the UN reauthorized the MINUSCA mandate through November 2017. This was followed by resolution 2387 (2017), which renewed MINUSCA through November 15, 2018. A recent UN report cited signs of political progress towards the end of 2017 (S/2018/125, 2018). Country-wide outreach programs have continued working towards reducing violence through community-level transitional justice initiatives. Increasingly, CAR military and police are working to reassert its authority and rule of

law over its border region while limiting the free flow of illicit weapons and natural resource trafficking. Despite progress, national reconciliation remains uncertain as the cycle of low-intensity sectarian violence plagues communities. Periodic armed clashes between anti-Balaka and ex-Séléka armed groups continue – predominantly over the control of land and resources. The humanitarian situation remains critical with repatriation efforts unable to cope with the large number of refugees and IDPs. The fragile gains achieved are thus reversible without continued commitment of significant UN resources and peacekeepers.

UN-MINUSCA Model Assessment

The results demonstrate partial support for the model across the top African contributors. Only Rwanda meets the defined threshold for full model support. Low scores on political accountability impact many contributors full ascension. However, the majority of states achieve upper quantile scores in at least two explanatory variables including good governance and regional leadership with strong participation in UN and AU decision-making organs. Furthermore, there is a significant regional dynamic within MINUSCA due to the direct involvement of ECCAS and its member states through MICOPAX and later, AU-MISCA. This provides a marked difference from MONUSCO, which largely relies on outside support for contributions. As a result, the MINUSCA case provides robust support for the institutional rationale. The political and trade rationales are mixed due to the wide variance in contributor profiles from Zambia to the Republic of Congo.

Cameroon as the top contributor to MINUSCA is a reliable partner for regional security cooperation, working with neighboring states to contain instability in CAR, counter Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, and coordinating counter-piracy efforts in

Table 8: UN-MINUSCA Model Assessment (2014-2016).

Rank	TCC/PCC	ECCAS	Political Rationale		Institutional Rationale	Economic Rationale		Model Support
			Governance	Political Accountability	Regional Leadership	Trade Across Borders		
1	Cameroon	Yes	46.8	0.29	1		47.7	Partial
2	Rwanda	Yes	63.1	0.37	1		48.3	Full
3	Burundi	Yes	42.1	-0.21	3		39.4	Partial
4	Congo	Yes	43.3	0.18	1		15.6	Low
5	Morocco	No	58.4	0.75	0		83.8	Partial
6	Egypt	No	48.1	0.19	2		71.4	Partial
7	DR Congo	Yes	35.5	0.20	0		29.5	Low
8	Zambia	No	58.6	0.64	0		40.8	Partial
9	Gabon	Yes	51.3	0.30	0		63.6	Partial
10	Mauritania	No	44.2	0.58	2		56.4	Partial
	Pop. Mean		50.8	0.52		0.44	52.9	
	Pop. Median		50.4	0.58		0.00	57.1	

Note: Individual state values are averaged across the time period from 2010-2016.

Note 2: Green values represent upper quartile (Q_3) scores across the total population of African states. Red values indicate bottom quartile (Q_1).

Note 3: Full model support is defined as upper quartile scores on at least three measures. Partial model support is defined as two upper quartile scores. Low model support is defined as zero or one upper quartile scores.

the Gulf of Guinea. In addition to MINUSCA, Cameroon also provides modest police contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in Mali (MINUSMA), DRC (MONUSCO), and Darfur (UNAMID). The foreign policy apparatus is highly centralized within the Biya regime, which has dominated Cameroonian politics since 1982. As a result, Cameroon ranks in the middle quartile on the polity measure as a hybrid regime. In recent years, the Cameroonian Armed Forces have benefitted from significant levels of military aid from western partners including the U.S. and France. Yet, its overall level of militarization is low relative to civil society – providing support for the model. Cameroon actively supports AU peace and security efforts by providing a regional training institution for police units and hosts an AU continental logistics hub. Centrally located at the crossroads of the Great Lakes region, Lake Chad Basin, and the Gulf of Guinea, Cameroon’s ability to contain instability while improving its trade infrastructure is key to its sustainable economic development.

The transnational roots of instability within CAR partly compelled its regional neighbors, Burundi and Rwanda, to support the military intervention under AU-MISCA in 2013. Evidence of growing sectarian violence provided a combustible mixture of religious and tribal tensions that threatened to inflame the region. Although both states provided contingents, their divergent outcomes suggests support for the

hypothesis that credible domestic institutions increase the likelihood for peacekeeping support. Rwanda, which achieves high scores on political, economic, and institutional rationales is considered an important UN contributor. Leveraging its comparative advantages, Rwanda has deployed police units, infantry battalions, and a medical field hospital to CAR. Despite its military capacity, Rwanda's overall militarization score is within the middle quartile across African states. In terms of polity, Rwanda has improved its political institutions post-genocide under the ruling Kagame regime. However, criticisms of its increasingly authoritarian hold on civil society detracts from its preferred pro-reform narrative (Seay, 2016). As a result, its overall polity score remains sequestered to the middle quartile and is assessed as a hybrid regime. Despite these domestic challenges, the results provide support for the model.

In comparison, allegations of corruption and scandal have plagued the Burundian contingent (Moncrieff and Vircoulon, 2017). Low scores on both governance and political accountability reflect its domestic challenges as the ruling regime under current President Pierre Nkurunziza has suppressed potential rivals with allegations of politically motivated killings. Despite his strong-arm tactics, Nkurunziza won reelection for a contentious third term in 2015. In 2017, the UN chose not to replace several Burundian police units after reports of serious human rights violations (Deutsche Welle, 2017). Efforts to shift focus to its domestic challenges while improving Burundi's international image provides support to the institutional rationale for its contributions. Despite unit readiness issues, Burundi's overall level of militarization is high with a score in the upper quartile across African states. In terms of the normative rationale, Burundi's drift towards autocracy challenges the norms based argument for contributions. Efforts to improve Burundi's political institutions and encourage the peaceful transition of power in the upcoming 2020 Burundian presidential elections may lead to a more reliable and effective peacekeeping partner. Recent allegations of purges of Tutsi officers from the reintegrated Burundian military risks exacerbating latent

ethnic tensions (Ross, 2017). Without continued regional pressure on the regime to abide by the 2000 Arusha Accords, Burundi risks a return to former instability.

North African states including Mauritania, Egypt, and Morocco are top contributors to MINUSCA. Despite the lack of regional trade linkages to CAR and having suffered peacekeeper casualties, each state provides robust support to the mission. Each state is well-represented within UN and AU decision-making organs, lending support for the institutional rationale. Morocco has become a vocal supporter for MINUSCA, arguing that greater commitments are required by the international community to limit sectarian violence. However, the growing perception that CAR is a “quagmire” with an intractable set of socio-economic problems has curtailed support for other potential contributors (AFP, 2017). Mauritania is notable for its first significant UN contribution with the deployment of its Formed Police Unit (FPU) in December 2015. Each of the North African states achieve upper quartile scores on militarization and national capability. However, it is not clear that the presence of high levels of militarization in Morocco and Mauritania are indicative of their military institutions having significant influence over foreign policy decisions due to the consolidation of political power within the executive branches. As a potential outlier, Egypt under President al-Sisi continues to trend towards autocracy with the military wielding considerable political clout due to its durable support to the ruling regimes for almost six decades (Barany, 2017).

MINUSCA is unique for contributions from the DRC and Republic of Congo despite low scores across governance, political accountability, regional leadership, and trade. Both states contributed peacekeepers largely to contain spillover due to their shared borders with CAR. However, the effort to address the growing refugee crisis and improve DRC’s international image was soon undermined by UN reports of poor performance and allegations of abuse by western-trained FARDC units. The

DRC withdrew its contingents from MINUSCA in 2016. Low scores on political accountability and trade limit support for political and economic rationales. The decision-making apparatus within the Kabila regime is highly centralized and limited trade with CAR provides few economic incentives beyond natural resource extraction. Security rationales may explicate DRC and the Republic of Congo's interests in CAR due to concerns of potential spillover and the desire to improve the credibility of their security forces. However, their divergence on militarization makes a cursory assessment problematic as the DRC achieves a lower quartile score while the Republic of Congo is firmly in the upper quartile across African states. Recent efforts to increase its trade integration within the Great Lakes region will require DRC to implement needed security sector reforms to secure its borders and provide for its internal security. Ultimately, DRC appears an outlier as no rationale provides a clear fit for its participation in MINUSCA.

The Republic of Congo under President Sassou-Nguesso led mediation efforts during the political transition from the Bozizé administration to the Touadéra administration in 2016. A 2017 UN review of the Congo contingent found “systemic problems in command and control” that contributed to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (Note to correspondents on MINUSCA, 2017). These findings were compounded by substandard readiness levels, overall discipline problems, and a lack of logistical capabilities required to sustain Congolese troops in the field. As a result, Republic of Congo chose to withdrawal its units in late 2017. Like DRC, the Congo has low scores on governance, political accountability, and trade. However in his role as the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC) Chairperson, President Sassou-Nguesso stated that regional peace was a primary motivation for his state's continued support to MINUSCA (Panapress, 2017). The state ranks in the bottom quartile on the polity measure indicating an authoritarian regime. The military lacks modern equipment and has limited resources to conduct sustained operations with

most capabilities focused on domestic security. As a result, neither score provides clear support for normative or security rationales.

In 2018, Gabon announced its intention to withdrawal from MINUSCA citing “the progressive return to peace and stability” in CAR (AFP, 2018). The Gabonese contingent was implicated in the sexual abuse allegations and was challenged by poor discipline, low readiness levels, and lack of necessary equipment. The withdrawal of Guinea was a setback for MINUSCA and has increased pressure on the mission to identify new contributors to sustain the mission. As a founding member of ECCAS, Gabon is well-integrated into the regional economy. It has pushed for greater policy harmonization efforts but the free movement of people remains a stumbling block for many of the richer states including Cameroon, due to migration concerns. Significant wealth inequality and the consolidation of political power within Gabon contributes to low scores on political measures. Regardless, Gabon’s trade linkages and membership in ECCAS provides partial model support. On militarization, national capability Gabon achieves middle quartile scores compared to other African states. Since 2006, Gabon has shown mixed improvement on democratic measures despite a low score on the polity measure. I assess both security and normative rationales as inconclusive.

Chapter 7 UN-MINUSMA

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali is among the deadliest peacekeeping missions in the world. With more than 150 UN peacekeepers killed as of March 2018, durable peace within the restive northern region remains elusive. The following chapter provides a summary of the conflict that began with the Tuareg Rebellion in 2012, through the rise of violent extremist groups, to current challenges surrounding the implementation of the 2015 Bamako Peace Agreement. The case study provides solid support for the model with top African contributors displaying significant values on economic, political, and institutional rationales.

Historical Background

In 1960, Mali gained its independence from France during a wave of decolonization. Determined to counter Soviet influence, western powers often buttressed anti-communist autocratic regimes across the continent. In 1968, a bloodless coup d'état led by Moussa Traoré overthrew President Dioncounda Keita's socialist government leading to military rule for over twenty years. During the next two decades, severe droughts, political machinations, and the Tuareg desire for independence led to at least three unsuccessful coup attempts. Despite opposition, large-scale public protests were largely suppressed. Following the end of the Cold War, the March Revolution in 1991 led by student protestors triggered pro-democracy rallies across the country, culminating in a series of clashes that contributed to the deaths of over 300

civilians. The violent crackdown led to the eventual overthrow and arrest of President Moussa Traoré on March 26, 1991 by the Malian military.

In June 1992, Alpha Oumar Konaré was elected president in Mali's first democratically-held elections in nearly three decades. Between 1992 and 2012, Mali demonstrated exemplary progress in terms of good governance, political accountability, peace and security. Despite these trends, the north of Mali was fertile ground for conflict as ethnic Tuaregs in Azawad demanded greater autonomy after years of marginalization and neglect by Bamako.⁴⁶ In November 2010, Tuaregs founded the National Movement of Azawad (MNA) in Timbuktu in a display of solidarity with Azawadians across the Sahel region. The movement rejected violence and sought ways to achieve autonomy through political compromise with the Malian government.

Despite two decades of relative peace, conditions in Azawad drastically shifted after the death of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. A traditional alliance between the Tuaregs and Libya stretches back to the early 1970s, when Libyan weapons and aid supported Tuareg rebellions within the Sahel (Vogl, 2011). Moreover, in the final days of the Libyan Civil War, Tuareg mercenaries proved resilient, fighting alongside Gaddafi's forces until the final days of the regime ("Tuareg fighters urged to drop Gaddafi," 2011). Tuareg fighters returning to Azawad used traditional Bedouin routes to traffic a significant stockpile of heavy weapons. Illicit trafficking became a significant problem across the trans-Sahel as heavy weapons, money, and trained fighters flowed into northern Nigeria, South Sudan, and Somalia. Despite overtures by the Touré government to address the chronic political and socio-economic challenges within northern Mali, the MNA aligned with more hardline faction to form the

⁴⁶Tuaregs are a semi-nomadic people of Berber descent that have traditionally inhabited the Trans-Sahel region encompassing northern Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya. Demands for autonomy led to frequent uprisings against Mali and Niger including in 1962-1964, 1990-1995, 2007-2009, and 2012.

National Movement for the Liberation Azawad (MNLA) in November 2011. Citing the marginalization of Azawadians in the political process, the MNLA declared that it would adopt political and legal action to recover the rights of the indigenous people living in the territory (*“La déclaration fondatrice Mouvement,”* 2011).

Tuareg Rebellion (2012)

The opening shots of the Tuareg rebellion began on January 18, 2012, with attacks on the Malian Defense Forces (MDF) across northern Mali. Heavily armed MNLA fighters attacked garrisons at Ménaka, Tessalit, and Aguelhoc quickly overwhelming the MDF units. Due to the substantial distances between remote garrisons in the north, the MDF was unable to quickly mount a counter-offensive against the rebel groups. Allegation of the indiscriminate killing of civilians by the MDF fueled western criticism of the Touré administration’s handling of the crisis. On February 1, President Touré appealed for national unity in a state address. Despite MNLA denials, the government suggested Al-Qaeda involvement in the rebellion (*“Mali blames Qaeda,”* 2012). By mid-February, the success of the rebellion had steadily pushed south towards Timbuktu – a strategic and symbolic town at the crossroads of southern and northern Mali. It was feared that Bamako was in reach of the rebels. Heads of state from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) met in Abuja, Nigeria during a regional summit to discuss the situation in Mali. The MNLA rebellion was strongly condemned and ECOWAS called for the immediate and unconditional surrender of all territory held by the rebels (Final communiqué, 2012).

The March 23 coup (2012)

Following the defeats across northern Mali, defense minister Sadio Gassama met with MDF leadership at the Kati military camp near Bamako on March 21, 2012. Angry

soldiers demanded weapons to fight the Tuareg rebels and after discussions “turned sour”, Malian soldiers mutinied in mass (“Angry Mali soldiers demand weapons,” 2012). The following day the mutineers marched on Bamako, overrunning the presidential guard and causing the ousting of President Touré in a coup d’état. Led by a young MDF Captain Amadou Sonogo, the mutineers formed the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR). In a televised speech to the nation on March 22, Captain Sonogo stated that Malian constitution was suspended and declared an immediate curfew (“Renegade Mali soldiers,” 2012). The coup was widely condemned by the international community. The AU and ECOWAS suspended Mali from their regional organizations while the World Bank cut off future aid until the crisis was resolved (“International Condemnation,” 2012). Following negotiations with representative of the UN, AU, and ECOWAS, the CNRDR leadership signed the Framework Agreement on the Implementation of the Solemn Commitment on April 1, 2012, which established a transitional framework for the return to civilian rule. Mounting international pressure forced Captain Amadou Sonogo and his fellow mutineers to cede power just three weeks later.

MNLA and Islamic jihadist movements

In April 2012, MNLA declared its military offensive over having succeeded in liberating the Azawad and proclaimed its independence from Mali. Condemnations from the AU, regional powers and international community were swift (“Tuareg rebels declare,” 2012). Following the coup, the MNLA seized major cities across northern Mali including Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao. Jihadist groups quickly exploited an opening during the ensuing power vacuum. Within weeks of the capture, Al-Qaeda affiliated-groups Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) began implementing a rigid interpretation of Sharia law with public stoning,

veiling of women, and alcohol bans. Local Malians accustomed to a religious and ethnic tolerance were shocked. Nearly 30,000 Christians alone fled Timbuktu following the city's capture. The groups were accused of human rights violations, the destruction of Sufi monuments in Timbuktu, and massacres including nearly 100 Malian military and civilians at Aguelhoc on January 24, 2012 (Raincourt, 2012). On May 26, the secular MNLA signed a pact with Ansar Dine in an effort to "simplify negotiations with the rebels" ("Mali Tuareg and Islamist," 2012). After the signing, the MNLA announced that northern Mali was an independent sovereign state, "The Islamic Republic of Azawad."

The tenuous pact was brief as local anger grew against the new Islamic authorities. By May 2012, an estimated 60,000 ethnic Tuaregs had displaced across the country fearing reprisals in southern Mali and angered by the Islamists controlling the north. As a result of increased ethnic tension, militias coalesced along tribal lines. In June 2012, fighting broke out between former allies MNLA, Ansar Dine, and MOJWA in Gao, which led to a three-day battle for control of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. Ansar Dine and MOJWA defeated the MNLA in the cities while the MNLA still controlled the remote countryside.

ECOWAS consultations with the AU, member states, and France focused on the development of a regional response ("*Les voisins du Mali*," 2012). Negotiations continued through the summer on proposals for an intervention force. Disagreements on the actual need for a military intervention stymied negotiations. Critics argued that a negotiated solution was still possible. Regardless, ECOWAS committed to a dual pronged strategy of applied political and military pressure. In November, ECOWAS announced the deployment of an African intervention force composed of approximately 3,300 troops for one year to restore peace and security in Mali ("ECOWAS agrees to Mali," 2012.) On December 20, 2012, the UN authorized the deployment of the

African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year with a mandate to rebuild the capacity of the Malian Defense Forces, support Malian authorities in the defense of civilian population, and aid stabilization efforts led by Mali to reassert its authority of its territory (S/RES/2085, 2012).

AU-AFISMA (2012-2013)

Deployment of the AU-AFISMA force was swift with advance elements arriving in Bamako on January 12, 2013. The establishment of the force headquarters at Bamako set the conditions for the receipt of initial contributions from ECOWAS member states Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. Concurrent with the deployment of AU-AFISMA forces, the French military acting in coordination with its NATO allies launched Operation Serval on January 11, 2013 as authorized by UNSCR 2085 (2012). At the request of the Malian government and in accordance with UNSC 2085 (2012), the EU also made preparations to establish a European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM-Mali). Efforts to build the capacity of the Malian Defense Forces began in February 2013 under the framework of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Subsequent mandates were approved by the EU to continue providing support through May 2018 (EUTM Mission Factsheet, 2018).

French air operations commenced with offensive actions against Ansar Dine elements in the vicinity of the strategic crossroads of Mopti on the Niger River. The operations were successful in that they halted the advance of rebels into southern Mali while French and AU-AFISMA generated combat power for a ground offensive. In January 2013, ECOWAS delivered a letter to the UN Secretary-General requesting “any urgent and concrete measures” to support the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (S/2013/35, 2013). Despite the willingness

of troop-contributing countries to provide units, significant logistical, funding, and deployment challenges remained. Support from the French, U.S., and EU partners was required to provide the bulk of strategic airlift. In January, the situation on ground deteriorated when Ansar Dine and MOJWA advanced further south leading to the speculation that Bamako was within their reach. The Malian government urgently appealed for a western intervention (Nossiter and Schmitt, 2013).

Ground operations began on January 11, 2013, as Malian and French forces quickly retook Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. In a remarkable announcement, MNLA announced that it would support French and the Malian government against the insurgents. Significant political progress resulted in the adoption of a transition roadmap by the Malian parliament. Greater efforts would be made to include rebel elements in the political process with commitments made for legislative and presidential elections by the end of July 2013 (S/2013/189, 2013). Despite these early political and military successes, it soon became apparent that a protracted insurgency was likely. At a joint AU-ECOWAS planning conference in February 2013, a revised concept of operations increased the required AU-AFISMA troop contributions from 3,300 to 9,620, which was approved by the AU-PSC. In February, heavy fighting between the French Foreign Legion and al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) fighters left one French soldier dead in the remote Adrar de Ifoghas Mountains near the Algerian border. The use of improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings led to increased casualties. Between March and April 2013, multiple suicide bombings killed Malian and Chadian soldiers in Timbuktu and Kidal (“Three Chadian soldiers,” 2013). A low-intensity insurgency would claim its ninth French soldier killed by mid-May 2013. Combined operations effectively reduced Islamist-controlled territory to remote regions in northern Mali. Regardless, the armed groups still proved capable of conducting ambushes and small-scale attacks in the villages and cities. Operation Serval ended on

July 15, 2014 when French efforts to consolidate its counter-terrorism missions across the Sahel region led to the formation of Operation Barkhane.

UN-MINUSMA (2014-Present)

In March 2013, representatives from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations met with members from the AU-PSC, AU-AFISMA, ECOWAS, and the Malian government to discuss options for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. The parties agreed that a multidimensional stabilization mission was best suited to address underlying political, socio-economic, and security factors that contributed to Malian instability. Although Operation Serval had made significant progress, the continued presence of armed groups in northern Mali represented a transnational threat due to porous borders between Mali, Algeria, Libya, and Niger. Moreover, the cross-border flow of human trafficking, narcotics, small arms, and smuggling threatened to destabilize the entire Sahel region (S/2013/189, 2013).

An UN assessment team developed options for a phased approach that allowed for the initial mission to focus on stabilization efforts while a parallel force conducted peace enforcement and counter-terrorism activities (S/2013/189, 2013). UNSCR 2100 (2013) authorized the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on April 25, 2013 for an initial period of 12 months. With an authorized troop strength of 11,200 military and 1,440 police personnel, the broad mandate required the stabilization of key population centers, the reestablishment of state authority over its territories, the implementation of a transitional roadmap, protection of civilians and UN personnel, promotion of human rights and support to humanitarian assistance, cultural preservation, national and international justice (S/RES/2100). The mandate was complex – thrusting UN

peacekeepers into an active theater of conflict. Tasked with the responsibility to protect population centers without a peace enforcement mandate – the MINUSMA mission was reliant on the Operation Serval parallel force to combat armed groups operating in the north (S/2013/318, 2013).

The stand-up of the MINUSMA headquarters in June 2013 set the conditions for receipt of follow-on forces. However, due to challenges with training, equipping, and deployment most incoming units would not arrive in theater until the end of the calendar year (S/2013/318, 2013). AU-AFISMA forces continued to play a significant role during and after the transition. AU-AFISMA officially “re-hatted” to blue helmets during a ceremony in Bamako during which the AU committed its support towards the political process “in a bid to efficiently respond to the multifaceted threat facing this region and the Sahel” (“AFISMA Transfers,” 2013). Approximately 6,000 military personnel of the total authorized strength of 12,600 were on-hand as MINUSMA assumed the peacekeeping mission on July 1, 2013. Citing domestic security concerns, Nigeria withdrew its contingent of 850 troops from the mission. Reports suggest that the government was not satisfied by the command structure and leadership of MINUSMA. Nigerian Major General Shehu Adbulkadir, who previously commanded the ECOWAS and AU-AFISMA force, was replaced by Rwandan Major General Jean Bosco Kazura. The withdrawal of the Nigerian contingent was seen as “a blow for the new UN force” (“Nigeria to withdraw,” 2013).

On June 18, 2013, the Mali transitional government and armed groups including the *Mouvement national our la liberation de l’Azawad* (MNLA) and *Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad* (HCUA) signed a preliminary agreement to hold the presidential election and inclusive peace talks (S/2013/582, 2013). A spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the truce stipulated an immediate ceasefire and provided an opportunity for “sustainable peace in Mali through an inclusive dialogue

that will take place after the election” (“UN Secretary-General Hails Signing,” 2013). Despite the ceasefire, tensions persisted with reports of periodic violations. In the remote north, French-led operations against AQIM and its affiliates continued. The European Union Training Mission in Mali continued to focus on security sector reform and capacity building.

Presidential elections in July and August 2013, reported high voter turnout under generally calm conditions. Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta defeated Soumaila Cissé in a run-off election to become the next president of Mali.⁴⁷ Post-election, the Malian government hosted a series of regional conferences with former rebel groups, community representatives, and experts to develop recommendations for political and economic reforms, social development programs, and national reconciliation efforts in northern Mali. In November 2013, parliamentary elections occurred with a higher voter turnout (39 percent) than in 2007 (33 percent). Elections were observed to be generally free and fair by independent election monitors (S/2014/1, 2014). Despite progress, the security situation had deteriorated since the deployment of MINUSMA forces. Terrorist groups had reconstituted to conduct complex attacks in major urban centers in Kidal, Gao, and Ménaka. The use of car bombs, improvised explosive devices, and rocket attacks provided a significant threat to MINUSMA peacekeepers. On at least four separate occasions, French forces under Operation Serval responded to “imminent and serious” threats to MINUSMA peacekeepers under attack by AQIM and MOJWA elements in northern Mali (S/2014/1, 2014). With train and equip efforts still underway for many peacekeeping contributors – MINUSMA personnel strength had plateaued at 5,539 personnel by the end of 2013. However, more progress was made in the deployment of police personnel due to less complex equipping and deployment related challenges (S/2014/1, 2014).

⁴⁷Previously, Keïta served as the Malian Prime Minister from 1994-2000 and as President of the National Assembly from 2002-2007.

In June 2014, the UN reauthorized the MINUSMA mandate for an additional year. Periodic assessments cited continued political progress despite the fragile security environment. In August 2014, Operation Serval transitioned to Operation Barkhane after a reorganization of French forces across the Sahel region. Illicit trafficking, violent extremism, transnational crime, and human migration required a regional focus to coordinate French-led peace and security efforts. In February 2014, a summit of five Sahel countries including Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Mali agreed to the formation of a new security alliance, the G5 Sahel to address regional security threats. With the support of France, the U.S., and the African Union, the G5 Sahel would establish initiatives to combat violent extremist groups and address the underlying socio-economic factors that give rise to such groups (“African Nations form G5,” 2014). The effort was nested to the AU-PSC’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The concept of employment, funding, and resources was part of a multi-year effort to stand-up a regional counter-terrorism task force. A UN Secretary-General report on the situation in Mali in June 2017 recommended that the UN approve the deployment of the joint force to assist in regional peace and security efforts (S/2017/418, 2017). On June 21, 2017, the UN authorized the effort under UNSRC 2359 (2017).

Subsequent UN resolutions renewed the MINUSMA mandate with the current authorization set at 13,289 military personnel and 1,920 police personnel through June 30, 2018 (S/RES/2164 (2014), S/RES/2227 (2015), S/RES/2295 (2016), and S/RES/2364 (2017). Significant challenges remain as security conditions within northern Mali remains tenuous. Allegations of corruption within the Keita government, human rights violations by the Malian Defense Forces, and renewed fighting in northern Mali between armed groups threatens to erase the difficult gains achieved since 2013. As 90 percent of the Malian economy is derived from commerce, trade, and gold operations in the south, a socio-economic divide along geographical lines risks eroding its national

Table 9: UN-MINUSMA Model Assessment (2013-2016).

Rank	TCC/PCC	ECOWAS	Political Rationale		Institutional Rationale	Economic Rationale	Model Support
			Governance	Political Accountability	Regional Leadership	Trade Across Borders	
1	Burkina Faso	Yes	53.2	1.06	0	29.3	Partial
2	Chad	No	35.0	-0.02	6	11.5	Low
3	Togo	Yes	49.8	0.66	1	68.5	Full
4	Niger	Yes	50.0	0.81	3	21.1	Partial
5	Senegal	Yes	61.0	1.11	1	74.9	Full
6	Guinea	Yes	44.1	0.51	4	59.6	Partial
7	Benin	Yes	58.7	0.96	1	62.5	Full
8	Nigeria	Yes	46.3	0.78	5	50.1	Full
9	Ghana	Yes	65.2	1.01	0	59.6	Full
10	Rwanda	No	62.7	0.37	2	48.6	Partial
	Pop. Mean		50.8	0.52	0.45	52.5	
	Pop. Median		50.2	0.58	0.00	57.3	

Note: Individual state values are averaged across the time period from 2010-2016.

Note 2: Green values represent upper quartile (Q_3) scores across the total population of African states. Red values indicate bottom quartile (Q_1).

Note 3: Full model support is defined as upper quartile scores on at least three measures. Partial model support is defined as two upper quartile scores.

Low model support is defined as zero or one upper quartile scores.

reconciliation efforts. Stalled implementation of the 2015 Bamako Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali risks reigniting conflict between the Tuareg community and the central government. Moreover, the systemic poverty, human migration, and climate change may aggravate the socio-economic factors that give rise to insecurity. At present, more than 118 UN peacekeepers have been killed in Mali leading some to call MINUSMA the “world’s deadliest UN peacekeeping mission” (Sieff, 2017). The G5 Sahel task force may complement the political process in Mali but cannot replace it. Ultimately, future success depends upon the ability of ECOWAS, the regional institutions, and international community to pressure all belligerents to abide by the agreement and achieve the MINUSMA mandate to end the “cycle of violence and chaos” (S/2017/811, 2017).

UN-MINUSMA Model Assessment

Five of the top ten MINUSMA contributors fully support the model’s predictions with upper quartile scores on good governance, political accountability, regional leadership, and trade integration. Three states including Burkina Faso, Niger, and Rwanda are assessed as providing partial support. This is largely the result of low trade

integration scores in comparison to the population average across all African states. However, a closer inspection reveals a gradual improvement on trade within those states over the past decade. Chad stands as an outlier from other top contributors due to its low scores on governance, political accountability, and trade.

Burkina Faso as a founding member of ECOWAS has shown steady improvement on good governance measures since the early aughts. However, its trade integration continues to lag behind other top contributors due to frequent state interventions in its export market and high import duties. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Bank have supported initiatives to accelerate Burkina Faso's regional integration, which has led to limited economic reforms and market diversification. However, a lack of competitive exports and its landlocked status present significant challenges to Burkina Faso's economic development. Due to its shared border with Mali, Burkina Faso likely have significant national security interests for providing support to MINUSMA. Burkina Faso approved a contingent of troops to support the UN mission in July 2013. By 2018, total contributions had tripled in strength. Despite mounting casualties, Burkina Faso has remained a reliable UN partner for peacekeeping. However, the restrictive MINUSMA mandate led Burkina Faso to support the creation of the G5 Sahel to coordinate offensive actions against armed rebel groups operating across the region (Koeta, 2017). The Burkinabe military is principally focused on ensuring its territorial integrity and providing for its internal security. However, it remains dependent upon foreign assistance for training and equipment. The military lacks the ability to self-sustain for long periods abroad. Overall, Burkina Faso has experienced relatively low levels of militarization compared to other African states. After the failed 2015 coup led by members of the Regiment of Presidential Security, the military was influential in restoring the civilian-led transitional government. Since 2012, Burkina Faso has demonstrated progress towards democratic rule and pluralist

institutions with upper quartile scores on polity. These results may indicate possible support for the normative rationale.

Chad was an early contributor to the Malian intervention despite not being an ECOWAS member. Under the ruling authoritarian Déby regime, Chad occupies low quartiles on good governance and political accountability. Political power is highly centralized within the executive branch and the decision to commit peacekeepers mostly resides with the president. Despite the opportunity for Chad to serve as a nexus for commerce and transportation in the Lake Chad Basin, poor infrastructure and mediocre regional integration contributes to its low trade score in comparison to other African states. Systemic corruption remain a significant impediment to sustainable economic growth (Chêne, 2014). Yet, Chad's substantial presence within regional institutions during the Malian crisis suggests support for the institutional rationale. Desires to improve its international image while gaining access to needed resources provides significant benefits to the regime with few domestic political costs. Moreover, Chad provides an important regional hub for counter-terrorism efforts across the Sahel region and the capital of N'Djamena serves as the headquarters for the French-led Operation Barkhane. Despite having self-deployed to Mali in 2013, the Chadian military is minimally equipped to support deployments beyond its contiguous borders. The principle focus of the military is to ensure its territorial integrity and internal security. Chad has experienced high levels of militarization for the past few decades. The durability of Déby regime leads to high scores on the autocratic polity measure. As a result, the normative rationale for contributions does not hold.

Contributors which provide full model support include Togo, Senegal, Benin, Nigeria, and Ghana. Each state is a member of ECOWAS and supported the initial intervention under AU-AFISMA. Togo contributions to MINUSMA began in 2013. Despite its relatively small geographic size and population, Togo is an important partner

for peace and security efforts on the continent with its first significant contribution to UN-MINURCA in 1998. Togo achieves middle quartile scores on governance and political accountability resulting from instability surrounding the Gnassingbé regime following a military coup and contested elections in 2005. Accusations of political repression against regime opponents and the violent crackdown against anti-regime protestors occurred as recently as 2017. Despite its domestic challenges, Togo is well-integrated into the West African economy with an upper quartile score on trade integration. Reforms to Togo's economic and trade policies have led to steady improvement in the domestic economy since the early aughts. However, Togo remains heavily reliant on agricultural and food imports due to a lack of technological and infrastructure investments (AFDB, 2016). Efforts to improve Togo's political stability may spur foreign investments to improve its trade deficits and promote sustainable economic growth. In terms of militarization, Togo scores in the second quartile across African states. Likewise, Togo exhibits approximately median scores across autocratic and democratic polity measures. As such, the results suggest minimal support for security and normative rationales as predicted by the model.

Benin has also proven a reliable support for AU and UN-led peacekeeping on the continent. Benin has deployed peacekeepers to Cote D'Ivoire, Mali, South Sudan, Liberia, Darfur, and the DRC. Despite its relatively small size, investment in the modernization of the Benin military has increased its capacity to reliably deploy and sustain its peacekeeping contingents abroad. However, the state achieves relatively low scores on militarization providing empirical support for the model predictions. Benin also displays strong scores on good governance, political accountability, and democracy measures. It achieves upper quartile scores on democratic polity, which may be indicative of support for the normative rationale. To reduce its reliance on mineral and agricultural exports, Benin has focused on increasing its economic competitiveness with investments in transportation infrastructure and economic reforms.

Benin has supported efforts to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade. However, lagging trade liberalization within ECOWAS – in part, due to Nigerian protectionism – has stalled deeper regional integration (Bensassi, Jarreau, & Mitaritonna, 2017). Despite exogenous constraints on trade, Togo provides robust support for the model.

As a regional power and founding member of ECOWAS, Nigeria scores in the upper quartiles across governance, trade, and regional leadership measures. Nigeria led early coordination efforts to develop a regional response to the crisis in Mali. In December 2012, the UN approved an ECOWAS intervention plan to deploy 3,300 troops under Nigerian command and control. Fears that the fighting in Mali would threaten the entire Sahel region led former President Goodluck Jonathan to commit an initial 1,200 Nigerian troops in January 2013 (Murdock, 2013). However, it soon became clear that Nigeria's overstretched military would be unable to fulfill its initial pledge due to mounting challenges against Boko Haram. As a result, other AU member states were required to increase their burden share to mitigate shortfalls in funding and contributions. Nigeria's goal to demonstrate its regional power is constrained by public perceptions of systemic corruption, socio-economic challenges, and insecurity. Continued improvement on good governance, political accountability, and the promotion of democratic norms are required to improve its international image and credibility. On militarization, Nigeria scores in the bottom quartile across African states. In terms of polity, Nigeria achieves median scores on democratic measures, which again provides support for the conclusions that normative and security rationales are indeterminate in terms of predictive power.

Niger and Rwanda provide partial support for the model. Niger as an active contributor to MINUSMA shares a contiguous border with Mali and has taken a lead role in stability efforts across the trans-Sahel region. Recent efforts to increase its trade integration have led to the promotion of tourism, sustainable development, and

economic reforms. However, its agricultural-based economy and landlocked nature constrains significant economic growth. Ranked as one of the poorest nations in the world, Niger must confront myriad challenges to develop its economy, contain instability at its borders, and mitigate the growing impacts of climate change. The increased focus on security partnerships to address regional instability led Niger to join the G5 Sahel in 2014. On militarization, Niger scores in the bottom quartile despite robust support to regional peace and security efforts. It also scores high on the autocratic polity measure due to limited progress on increasing its pluralist institutions. Taken together, the results reinforce earlier conclusion that security and normative rationales are inconclusive in terms of contributions. Because of its geographic location, Niger's active participation in regional institutions will ensure its continued support for African-led peace and security efforts over the coming decade.

Rwanda displays strong scores on governance and regional leadership providing support for both political and institutional rationales. Rwanda has shown steady progress in trade integration within the Central African region since the end of the Congo wars. However, Rwanda must improve its infrastructure to reduce transportation costs associated with its landlocked status and distance to ports. Rwanda's ability to leverage the East African Community (EAC) intra-regional trade agreements will support economic growth by increasing its export competitiveness. Rwanda stands out as a top contributor to MINUSMA despite its relatively small size and lack of affiliation with ECOWAS. During the past decade, Rwanda has been a reliable contributor citing the lessons-learned from the Rwandan genocide ("Service born of sacrifice," 2018). In June 2013, the UN Secretary General appointed Rwandan Major General Jean Bosco Kazura as commander of the MINUSMA upon transition from AU-AFISMA. Rwandan-native Mbaranga Gasarabwe was appointed as UN Deputy Special Representative for MINUSMA in 2015 after having served as the Assistant Secretary-General for Safety and Security at the UN since 2011. Rwanda's declaration

to support conflict prevention, peace, and stabilization effort within Africa led the state to commit Rwandan troops within Mali.

Chapter 8 Conclusions

The following chapter provides recommendations for future research that exceed the scope of the present work and offers modest policy objectives, which may lend support to “African Solutions to African Problems.” The preceding analysis of top African contributors to three UN peacekeeping missions provides ample evidence to support the model’s predictions. However, the exceedingly brief survey likely necessitates a more expansive case selection to extrapolate the model’s predictions to other forms of regional security cooperation. Likewise, efforts to reduce uncertainty surrounding the parameter estimates may be possible with additional data, new model specifications, and experimentation with state-of-the-art quantitative tools including machine learning algorithms to directly model the myriad interactions across explanatory variables.

Recommendations for future research

This work has attempted to start a conversation regarding the application of modern quantitative tools to frequently encountered hypotheses within peacekeeping literature. The thrust of the argument centers on an assumption that a mixed methodology, which combines quantitative and qualitative techniques, can produce meaningful results from difficult-to-measure concepts such as political will, decision-making rationales, or institutional pressures with transparent measures of uncertainty. The operationalization of such amorphous explanatory variables opens one to criticism. At the conclusion of this work, fundamental questions remain. Did I select the correct variables? Does the model accurately represent the underlying data generating

process? Have I controlled for all potential confounders? Have I adequately justified my results against the empirical evidence? It is my hope that other researchers will replicate the model, test the data, and challenges my arguments to strengthen this small contribution to the literature.⁴⁸

The limitations of time, length, and scope have required an exceedingly brief discussion of peacekeeping contributors. In all, I have accounted for approximately 25 African states within the case studies. To fully account for all potentially omitted variables would require many more chapters than currently feasible. In selecting the three case studies, I attempted to limit potential biases and have refrained from predicting the likelihood for mission success. Although UN peacekeeping efforts share many similarities, in reality, no two missions are identical. While I have controlled for prominent covariates, it is also certain that unobserved factors remain.

Despite the pitfalls of quantitative social science research, numbers still have the innate ability to cut through the noise and unearth patterns within the data. In 2018, the African continent sits on the cusp of the “Big Data” revolution. Yet, its institutions and member states lag far behind other regions in terms of technology, digitalization, and connectivity (UNCTAD, 2017). Across the 54 African states, disparate levels of country-level data on economic and security indicators provide a significant hurdle to quantitative analysis. Novel methods are usually required to overcome missing features. In this work, I’ve demonstrated that multiple imputation can cope with missingness where specific conditions are met (Blackwell, Honaker, & King, 2015). However, caution is required as a blanket approach to non-parametric preprocessing is neither prudent nor consistently valid. Algorithms should never replace first principles.

I augmented the Poisson (CL) regression results with Markov chain Monte

⁴⁸ἐν οἴδᾳ ὅτι οὐδὲν οἴδᾳ “I know nothing except the fact of my own ignorance” – attributed to Socrates. Laërtius, D. 3rd century A.D. *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*.

Carlo (MCMC) simulations to assess the robustness of the model and to derive substantive quantities of interest including predicted values, first differences, and the marginal effects of the statistically significant explanatory variables. As a result, I was able to assess the rate of change for a given state across the spectrum of trade, good governance, and regional leadership. The results provide support for political, economic, and institutional rationales. Additionally, the use of simulation allowed a direct measurement of estimation uncertainty and of the model's generalizability to artificial data.

Recent advancements in machine learning (ML) have generated considerable interest within academic and public spheres. Despite the hype, the deep learning subfield of ML provides a potential avenue to improve the panel count model derived in the present work. It is often prudent to first establish a baseline model to assess the performance of more complicated deep learning models and to demonstrate their advantages. In this work, I utilized an optimization algorithm to find the maximum likelihood estimates using gradient descent. This technique is based on an architecture similar to those found in feedforward neural networks.

Although MLE remains a valid approach, the application of recurrent neural networks (RNN) may provide a pseudo-Bayesian methodology to numerical optimization with the inclusion of a posterior via back-propagation. Long short-term memory (LSTM) and gated recurrent units (GRU) have demonstrated relevance for long-term sequential data, which contain panel characteristics and overcome the problem of vanishing gradients. In practice, this allows the algorithm to update its parameter weights in each successive iteration as it searches for the parameter values that maximize the likelihood function (see Figure 2). Increased efficiency in the loss function (e.g., error term) may lead to more accurate predictions. Exploring the variants of recurrent neural networks may allow one to generate new quantities of interest.




Figure 2: RNN with unrolled LSTM layer over three time steps.

However, fundamental to any RNN model is an assumption that past events are a good predictor of future events (Allaire & Chollet, 2018). In terms of peacekeeping contributions, I've shown that assumption remains valid.

Potential drawbacks to ML include increasingly complex models that are computationally expensive, difficult to interpret, and require significant amounts of data for training and validation. A simple generalized linear model may often provide better performance. We know that in a non-linear model, an explanatory variable's coefficient is dependent upon on all other covariates. Likewise, the case studies have shown that state rationales are dependent upon myriad considerations and exogenous factors. Classical regression analysis assumes linearity and i.i.d. observations. However, the opposite is often more representative of reality. For example, I've shown that a two-way interaction effect exists between good governance and political accountability. Yet, modelling multiple non-linear interactions across k explanatory variables and i th observations is often infeasible using standard regression tools. Having established a default baseline, the next step is to re-specify the model with an optimal number of

recurrent layers to directly model the interactions over repeated iterations. The goal is not to increase model complexity but to improve the overall predictive accuracy for peacekeeping contributions. I must leave this problem to future research.

African Solutions to African Problems?

Empirical evidence drawn from the case studies suggests robust support for the model across political, economic, and institutional rationales. Each of the top ten African contributors to MONUSCO, MINUSCA, and MINUSMA achieved an upper quartile score on at least one measure of good governance, political accountability, trade integration, or regional leadership. On average, African contributors achieved two upper quartile scores. The cumulative number of upper quartiles scores ($Q_3 = 57$) across the all observations well exceeds that of the middle quartile ($Q_2 = 45$) and bottom quartile ($Q_1 = 18$). African contributors consistently scored in the bottom and middle quartiles on militarization, national capability, and democratic polity measures. These results suggest that security and normative rationales are less persuasive for peacekeeping contributions.

In the case of outliers such as Chad with poor governance, political accountability, and trade integration, leadership tenure in regional institutions during the period of intervention provides plausible support for the institutional rationale. Coordinating mechanism within regional institutions provide opportunities for collaboration and bargaining on transnational security issues. Oversight of resource allocation, access to privileged information, and international prestige provide domestic leaders clear incentives to support regional interventions. Leadership tenures provide a significant tool for regional institutions to encourage collective action. However, the targeted use

of such positions must balance the need between greater African representation and functional coordination mechanisms.

The panel count model provides robust results for predicted contributions given a set of explanatory variables derived from the literature. Where we observe high levels of good governance and political accountability the probability for peacekeeping increases. The fixed effect Poisson model with cluster-robust standard errors provides unbiased and consistent parameter estimates for panel data. The results of the simulations demonstrate that as a given African state improves on good governance, deepens its regional trade integration, and actively participates in regional institutions, the probability that it will support peacekeeping also increases. Finally, the results suggest that neither military capability, high levels of militarization, nor democratic values are indicative of peacekeeping potential. Across African states, empirical evidence for security and normative rationales remain inconclusive.

I have shown that there is a correlation between trade integration and contributions. Simulations suggest that the likelihood for contributions increases by approximately one additional event as a state ranges across trade values. Within the case studies, we observed evidence which supports those findings. This suggests that improvements to intraregional trade will have positive second-order impacts for regional security cooperation. Reducing non-tariff barriers to trade will require long-term investment in technology, transportation infrastructure, and reforms to bureaucratic and structural impediments. Time, geographical distance, and logistical constraints can impact trade and economic integration just as meaningfully as tariffs or custom duties (Frieden, Lake, and Broz, 2010).

Divergent economic growth rates within Africa are the result of a complex interaction of international, regional, and domestic factors, which affect access to capital, foreign investment, and trade. This has led to concentrated poverty in a small

group of sub-Saharan African states. Free and open borders do not provide a panacea to endemic socio-economic challenges. Rather, increased exposure to trade allows African states to potentially benefit from their factor endowments of labor and land (Rogowski, 1987). Sub-Saharan Africa must find sustainable solutions to address its growing labor glut. Yet, provisions for freedom of movement remains a significant impediment to pan-African integration with regional powers citing significant concerns. Smaller states with significant populations stand to benefit most. An AU framework which addresses the domestic concerns of its member states while promoting sustainable growth is essential to “unlocking Africa’s economic potential” (Maunganidze, 2018). Recent AU efforts towards the adoption of a phased migration protocol with implementation by 2023 highlights potential progress (Bedzigui, 2018).

Likewise, structural reform initiatives such as the WTO “Aid-for-Trade” have demonstrated success in supporting local and national trade reforms with investment, technical assistance, and trade negotiations (OECD/WTC, 2017). AU and regional initiatives have also demonstrated progress at variable rates. Ultimately, Africa’s regional stability is tied to sustainable economic growth. Political and economic reforms provide the most effective means to promote growth. The AU, regional economics communities, and its member states must balance the benefits gained from globalization against the tradeoffs associated with domestic market exposure. Africa’s drastic rural-urban divide and wealth inequality provides a combustible mixture for social unrest. Yet a retreat towards economic closure risks the alternative – rising trade costs and declining security conditions, which further exacerbate socio-economic challenges and fuel ever greater levels of regional instability. Deepening trade integration will support breaking the cycle.

The model results also show that good governance is the strongest predictor for contributions – regardless of polity. There is a significant literature focused on

the relationship between good governance and democracy. Functional bureaucratic institutions that produce coherent domestic policy, are responsive to civil society, and are bound by the rule of law have been shown to affect sustainable socio-economic development within Africa (Sandbrook, 2000). The relationship between political stability and reduced government intervention in domestic markets is well-documented (Haggard & Kaufman, 1992). The UN Economic Commission for Africa identifies peace, security, stability, and good governance as key pillars of Africa's regional integration. The AU Charter on Democracy lays out the principles to institutionalize good governance through the strengthening of state legislatures, ensuring harmonious civil-military relations, and respecting judiciary independence. World Bank and IMF aid is often contingent on the on the adoption of neo-liberal reforms as democratic government tend to demonstrate better performance on good governance (Stockemer, 2009). However, significant debate remains on if democracy is a necessary and sufficient condition for good governance. Regardless, regional efforts to improve good governance may lead to greater economic integration and as argued here – a higher likelihood for support to peacekeeping.

There is a positive correlation between regional leadership and contributions. In lieu of political and economic reforms that often require significant time, resources, and political will to achieve, tenure in the decision-making organs of regional institutions provides a “quick-win” to increasing the pool of potential contributors. Few domestic political costs are incurred by supporting regional institutions while the ability to capture benefits allow leaders to mollify potential rivals. Likewise, regional institutions benefit by encouraging broader collaboration and negotiation through its mechanisms to overcome coordination problems and develop collection solutions. Repeated interactions will limit short-term opportunism and reduce state incentives to defect (Frieden, Lake, & Shultz, 2016). Furthermore, regional institutions can encourage member states to abide by international norms and laws. Where such efforts

are unsuccessful, suspension from regional organizations has demonstrated the ability to exert significant pressure on member states into compliance (Raphaely, 2014).

I began this work with a question. Why do African states provides peacekeepers and what can we learn of the effects of regional integration? The thrust of the argument has centered on the vacillating influence of five broad state rationales. I've made the case that good governance, trade integration, and regional leadership matter. Although the focus has centered on regional peacekeeping, it is possible that the model may be generalized to other forms of collective action problems. The African continent faces growing transnational threats stemming from violent extremism, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, and climate change. Regional cooperation is essential to address these complex challenges in the promotion of durable peace and sustainable economic development. This work suggests a potential roadmap. "African solutions to African problems" are within reach.

Appendix A: Figures




Figure 3: Residuals vs. fitted values for Poisson (FE) model.




Figure 4: Observed vs. predicted values for Poisson (FE) model.




Figure 5: Expected number of PKO contributions across governance.




Figure 6: Expected number of PKO contributions across regional leadership.

Appendix B: Datasets

Table 10: Summary statistics of original dataset

	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
events	0	0.000	2.000	2.439	4.000	9
governance	0	0.271	0.410	0.408	0.517	1
militarization	0	0.252	0.355	0.368	0.484	1
national_capability	0	0.025	0.063	0.142	0.153	1
pol_accountability	0	0.511	0.628	0.614	0.761	1
trade_across_borders	0	0.322	0.582	0.533	0.714	1
imports_%gdp	0	0.089	0.132	0.151	0.190	1
exports_%gdp	0	0.121	0.197	0.228	0.298	1
fdi_%gdp	0	0.074	0.091	0.113	0.116	1
autoc_polity	0	0.000	1.000	2.169	4.000	7
democ_polity	0	1.000	3.000	3.697	7.000	10
foreign_mil_post	0	0.000	0.000	0.233	0.000	1
regional_leadership	0	0.000	0.000	0.380	1.000	13

Dataset Selection

The African Regional Integration Index (ARII) is used to measure regional integration for each of the regional economic communities and AU members. The ARII is composed of five dimensions focused on the measurement of (i) trade integration; (ii) productive integration; (iii) free-movement of people; (iv) regional infrastructure; and (v) financial integration. Due to the absence of data prior to 2013, the ARII is complimented with a set of indicators pooled from the World Bank, World Trade Organization, and African Development Bank Group.

The Ibrahim Index for African Governance (IIAG) is used to measure good governance, which is defined as the public provision of political, social, and economic rights guaranteed by a government for its citizens. It assesses each African state on four

indicators including: (i) safety and rule of law; (ii) participation and human rights; (iii) sustainable economic opportunity; and (iv) human development.

The Bonn International Center for Conversion, Global Militarization Index (BICC-GMI) is used to measure the level of militarization within a state. Militarization is assessed separate from national material capability to unpack the relationship between civil society and the security sector. It is measured by three indicators including: (i) military spending in relation to GDP and health spending; (ii) relation of military personnel to total population and physicians; and (iii) the number of heavy weapons in relation to the total population.

The Correlates of War (COW) National Material Capabilities dataset focuses on traditional indicators of military capability including: (i) population size; (ii) iron and steel production; (iii) energy consumption; and (iv) military personnel and expenditures. The Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) to assess individual African state capabilities relative to other states.

The Polity IV Project (Polity IV) measures democratic norms, defined as the level of pluralism within a nation-state government. The dataset uses six measures to assess the level of democracy for nation-states including: (i) institutional attributes of executive recruitment; (ii) constraints on executive authority; and (iii) political competition. It ranks African states on an ordinal scale between fully representative democracy and autocracy.

The Variates of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset is used to assess the political accountability of the executive branch. Accountability is regarded as a constraint on leaders' ability to use political power through (i) free and fair elections; (ii) checks and balances between institutions; and (iii) the influence of the media and civil society organizations to ensure democratic norms are respected.

Appendix C: Tables

Table 11: Results of regression analysis, $imp = 1$

	Poisson (FE)	Poisson (RE)	NB1 (FE)
governance	4.42 (0.63) ^{***}	3.79 (0.57) ^{***}	4.80 (0.59) ^{***}
militarization	-2.25 (0.70) ^{**}	-2.14 (0.60) ^{***}	-2.01 (0.01) ^{**}
pol_accountability	0.53 (0.36)	0.61 (0.34)	
national_cap	-1.13 (0.75)	0.36 (0.48)	
autoc_polity	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
democ_polity	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)
trade_across_borders	0.43 (0.11) ^{***}	0.44 (0.11) ^{***}	0.44 (0.11) ^{***}
imports_%gdp	2.29 (0.88) ^{**}	1.63 (0.84)	2.22 (0.87) [*]
exports_%gdp	0.15 (0.48)	0.30 (0.46)	0.18 (0.47)
fdi_%gdp	-0.04 (0.56)	0.03 (0.55)	-0.17 (0.56)
regional_leadership	0.15 (0.04) ^{***}	0.16 (0.04) ^{***}	0.15 (0.04) ^{***}
foreign_mil_post	0.14 (0.34)	0.21 (0.25)	0.17 (0.33)
(Intercept)		-0.81 (0.42)	15.69 (157.86)
sigma		0.82 (0.18) ^{***}	
Log-Likelihood	-1038.72	-1272.48	-1043.048
Num. obs.	864	864	774

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; FE = fixed effects, RE = random effects, NB = negative binomial.

Table 12: Results of regression analysis, $imp = 2$

	Poisson (FE)	Poisson (RE)	NB1 (FE)
governance	3.92 (0.65) ^{***}	3.35 (0.58) ^{***}	4.37 (0.62) ^{***}
militarization	-1.71 (0.71) [*]	-1.68 (0.59) ^{**}	-1.74 (0.67) ^{**}
pol_accountability	0.72 (0.35) [*]	0.76 (0.34) [*]	
national_cap	-0.14 (0.86)	0.81 (0.53)	
autoc_polity	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
democ_polity	-0.08 (0.03) ^{**}	-0.09 (0.03) ^{**}	-0.06 (0.03) [*]
trade_across_borders	0.68 (0.12) ^{***}	0.67 (0.11) ^{***}	0.68 (0.17) ^{***}
imports_%gdp	3.06 (0.84) ^{***}	2.53 (0.81) ^{**}	3.19 (0.84) ^{***}
exports_%gdp	0.08 (0.45)	0.05 (0.43)	-0.01 (0.45)
fdi_%gdp	-0.56 (0.59)	-0.51 (0.57)	-0.76 (0.59)
regional_leadership	0.13 (0.04) ^{**}	0.13 (0.04) ^{***}	0.13 (0.04) ^{**}
foreign_mil_post	0.13 (0.35)	0.27 (0.25)	0.27 (0.34)
(Intercept)		-0.88 (0.41) [*]	16.83 (257.07)
sigma		0.83 (0.18) ^{***}	
Log-Likelihood	-1025.95	-1258.44	-1028.75
Num. obs.	864	864	774

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; FE = fixed effects, RE = random effects, NB = negative binomial.

Table 13: Results of regression analysis, $imp = 3$

	Poisson (FE)	Poisson (RE)	NB1 (FE)
governance	4.10 (0.65) ^{***}	3.52 (0.57) ^{***}	5.39 (0.74) ^{***}
militarization	-2.13 (0.55) ^{***}	-2.18 (0.49) ^{***}	-1.91 (0.52) ^{***}
pol_accountability	0.40 (0.34)	0.42 (0.33)	
national_cap	0.13 (0.78)	0.95 (0.49)	
autoc_polity	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.018 (0.04)
democ_polity	-0.06 (0.03) [*]	-0.07 (0.02) ^{**}	-0.05 (0.02) [*]
trade_across_borders	0.57 (0.10) ^{***}	0.55 (0.10) ^{***}	0.62 (0.10) ^{***}
imports_%gdp	1.89 (0.59) ^{**}	1.67 (0.56) ^{**}	1.97 (0.59) ^{**}
exports_%gdp	-0.08 (0.28)	-0.01 (0.27)	-0.09 (0.28)
fdi_%gdp	-0.52 (0.57)	-0.52 (0.55)	-0.74 (0.58)
regional_leadership	0.12 (0.04) ^{**}	0.12 (0.04) ^{**}	0.11 (0.04) ^{**}
foreign_mil_post	0.14 (0.34)	0.31 (0.24)	0.30 (0.33)
(Intercept)		-0.51 (0.38)	14.88 (225.75)
sigma		0.98 (0.21) ^{***}	
Log-Likelihood	-1032.46	-1260.51	-1033.14
Num. obs.	864	864	774

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; FE = fixed effects, RE = random effects, NB = negative binomial.

Table 14: Results of regression analysis, $imp = 4$

	Poisson (FE)	Poisson (RE)	NB1 (FE)
governance	4.23 (0.64) ^{***}	3.62 (0.57) ^{***}	5.78 (0.74) ^{***}
militarization	-2.27 (0.70) ^{**}	-2.11 (0.59) ^{***}	-2.06 (0.67) ^{**}
pol_accountability	0.54 (0.34)	0.57 (0.33)	
national_cap	0.37 (0.83)	0.99 (0.51)	
autoc_polity	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
democ_polity	-0.05 (0.03) [*]	-0.06 (0.03) [*]	-0.04 (0.03)
trade_across_borders	0.57 (0.10) ^{***}	0.57 (0.10) ^{***}	0.61 (0.10) ^{***}
imports_%gdp	1.35 (0.83)	1.12 (0.79)	1.54 (0.83)
exports_%gdp	0.33 (0.53)	0.31 (0.50)	0.18 (0.53)
fdi_%gdp	-0.28 (0.57)	-0.28 (0.56)	-0.47 (0.58)
regional_leadership	0.15 (0.04) ^{***}	0.15 (0.04) ^{***}	0.15 (0.04) ^{***}
foreign_mil_post	0.24 (0.34)	0.34 (0.25)	0.44 (0.34)
(Intercept)		-0.79 (0.41)	14.85 (227.28)
sigma		0.89 (0.19) ^{***}	
Log-Likelihood	-1034.17	-1264.32	-1034.91
Num. obs.	864	864	774

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; FE = fixed effects, RE = random effects, NB = negative binomial.

Table 15: Results of regression analysis, $imp = 5$

	Poisson (FE)	Poisson (RE)	NB1 (FE)
governance	4.68 (0.63) ^{***}	3.84 (0.57) ^{***}	5.98 (0.72) ^{***}
militarization	-2.42 (0.70) ^{***}	-2.34 (0.59) ^{***}	-2.10 (0.68) ^{**}
pol_accountability	0.42 (0.36)	0.50 (0.35)	
national_cap	-0.47 (0.75)	0.68 (0.48)	
autoc_polity	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
democ_polity	-0.06 (0.03) [*]	-0.07 (0.03) ^{**}	-0.05 (0.02)
trade_across_borders	0.54 (0.12) ^{***}	0.56 (0.11) ^{***}	0.59 (0.17) ^{***}
imports_%gdp	1.99 (0.84) [*]	1.37 (0.81)	1.96 (0.84)
exports_%gdp	-0.67 (0.36)	-0.40 (0.35)	0.24 (0.19)
fdi_%gdp	-0.42 (0.56)	-0.36 (0.54)	-1.42 (0.41) [*]
regional_leadership	0.13 (0.04) ^{**}	0.14 (0.04) ^{***}	0.13 (0.04) ^{**}
foreign_mil_post	0.06 (0.35)	0.25 (0.25)	0.25 (0.33)
(Intercept)		-0.46 (0.40)	14.79 (237.69)
sigma		0.93 (0.21) ^{***}	
Log-Likelihood	-1043.56	-1273.70	-1045.61
Num. obs.	864	864	773

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; FE = fixed effects, RE = random effects, NB = negative binomial.

Table 16: Comparison of regression models with inclusion of interaction term.

	Poisson (FE)	Poisson (CL)	Interaction
governance	4.27 (0.72)***	4.27 (0.91)***	7.90 (1.45)***
militarization	-2.16 (0.74)**	-2.16 (1.25)	-2.16 (1.25)
pol_accountability	0.52 (0.38)	0.52 (0.48)	2.64 (0.86)**
national_cap	-0.25 (1.02)	-0.25 (1.25)	-0.25 (1.25)
autoc_polity	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
democ_polity	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)
trade_across_borders	0.56 (0.15)***	0.56 (0.23)*	0.59 (0.25)*
imports_%gdp	2.11 (1.06)*	2.11 (1.26)	2.11 (1.26)
exports_%gdp	-0.04 (0.60)	-0.04 (0.65)	-0.04 (0.65)
fdi_%gdp	-0.36 (0.61)	-0.36 (0.82)	-0.36 (0.82)
regional_leadership	0.14 (0.04)**	0.14 (0.04)**	0.14 (0.04)**
foreign_mil_post	0.14 (0.35)	0.14 (0.24)	0.14 (0.24)
governance::pol_account			-5.57 (1.89)*
Log-Likelihood	-1034.97	-1043.56	-1043.56
Num. obs	864	864	864

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; FE = fixed effects, CL = cluster robust.

Appendix D: GEC Model

In order to calculate the maximum likelihoods (ML), I first decompose the model into its stochastic and systematic components. The stochastic component is a function of the model where a single event, y_i , is the realization of the parameters, λ_i and σ^2 . The stochastic component is specified as

$$Y_i \sim f_{GEC}(y_i|\lambda_i, \sigma^2). \quad (6)$$

The data generating process that produces the outcome Y_i is modeled as a linear function of the explanatory variables. A log link function and distributed lag with nuisance error term, ϕ , are included within the functional form to ensure a positive outcome value and to model the time effect as

$$E[Y_i] \equiv \lambda_i = \exp(X_i\beta + y_{i-1}\phi), \quad (7)$$

where the functional form is specified as $\exp(X_i\beta + y_{i-1}\phi)$. X_i is a vector of k explanatory variables for observation i and β is a $k \times 1$ parameter vector, which indicates the influence of each explanatory variable on λ_i . The systematic component includes an exponential component because λ_i is bounded by zero and always a positive value. The fully specified model becomes

$$Pr(Y_I = y_i|\lambda_i, \sigma^2) \equiv f_{GEC}(y_i|\lambda_i, \sigma^2) \quad (8)$$

$$= \begin{cases} Pr(y_i = 0 | \lambda_i, \sigma^2) \prod_{j=1}^{y_i} \left[\frac{\lambda_i + (\sigma^2 - 1)(j - 1)}{j\sigma^2} \right] & y_i = 1, 2, 3, \dots, \\ exp(-\lambda)i & y_i = 0, \sigma^2 = 1 \\ (\sigma^2)^{-\lambda_i/(\sigma^2-1)} & y_i = 0, \sigma^2 > 1 \\ (\sigma^2)^{-\lambda_i/(\sigma^2-1)} / D_i & y_i = 0, 0 < \sigma^2 < 1, \end{cases}$$

where D_i is the sum of a binomial distribution from $m = 1$ to $[-\lambda_i/(\sigma^2 - 1)]$. If the data are over-dispersed, the equation reduces to a negative binomial model. Where the data are under-dispersed, the model reduces to continuous parameter binomial. Likewise, setting $\sigma^2 = 1$ produces the standard Poisson distribution.

In order to derive the likelihood, I first apply the likelihood axiom $Pr(Y|\beta, \sigma^2) \propto L(\tilde{\beta}, \tilde{\sigma}^2|y)$. I calculate the log-likelihood by taking the log of the product and substitute the log link function for λ_i

$$\ln \mathcal{L}(\tilde{\beta}, \tilde{\sigma}^2|y) = \sum_{i=1}^n C_i - y_i \ln(\sigma^2) + \sum_{j=1}^{y_i} \ln \left[\exp(x_i\beta + y_{i-1}\phi) + (\sigma^2 - 1)(j - 1) \right] \quad (9)$$

where C_i represents the three dispersion cases

$$C_i = \begin{cases} -\exp[x_i\beta + y_{i-1}\phi] & \text{for } \sigma^2 = 1 \\ -\exp[x_i\beta + y_{i-1}\phi] \ln(\sigma^2)(\sigma^2 - 1)^{-1} & \text{for } \sigma^2 > 1 \\ -\exp[x_i\beta + y_{i-1}\phi] \ln(\sigma^2)(\sigma^2 - 1)^{-1} - \ln(D_i) & \text{for } 0 < \sigma^2 < 1. \end{cases}$$

In order to calculate the variance, the first order derivative of the log-likelihood

function and set it equal to zero to calculate the score function, $S(\theta)$, where j ranges over the coefficients

$$S(\theta_j) = \frac{\partial \ln(\mathcal{L})}{\partial \beta_j} \quad (10)$$

for all

$$j = 0, 1, \dots, k.$$

The result is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). I verify that the maxima of the gradient is concave by calculating the second partial derivatives, which are organized within the Hessian matrix where

$$H(\beta_j, \beta_k) \equiv \frac{\partial^2}{\partial \beta_k} S(\theta_j) = \sum_{I=1}^n -x_{ij} x_{ik} \exp(x_I \beta + y_{I-1} \phi). \quad (11)$$

The expectation of the negative of the Hessian evaluated at the MLE provides the information matrix, $I(\theta)$. It contains the variance of the score function and is used to calculate the standard errors.

$$I(\theta) = E[-H(\beta_j, \beta_k)] \quad (12)$$

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