

CHINA'S EFFORTS TO DOMINATE INFORMATION: DOMESTIC,
INTERNATIONAL, AND GLOBAL APPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION CONTROL

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Abstract:

This thesis explores and analyses China's internal and external information control capabilities, as well as China's quest to influence Internet governance. China's external espionage, IP theft, and network manipulation is researched in parallel to its 'peaceful rise' rhetoric. The paper finds that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses these capabilities to stimulate continued economic growth, and that these actions are based in resentment for past Western behavior. The image of 'peaceful rise' does not completely contradict China's information theft and sabotage. Analysis shows this paradox of action and word is a reflection of disagreement at the highest levels of the CCP. The second chapter studies China's internal information control. Within China's national borders, the CCP carries out pervasive propaganda, censorship, and control efforts, including who has online access; what they can access, and what their personal communications content is. One goal of this information control and propaganda is to nurture a passionate nationalism to increase political and social stability. These methods to influence and their results are explored to determine if these efforts are successful. Chinese nationalism does add legitimacy to the CCP regime, but does not increase social stability. Furthermore, the study discovered a bottom-up nationalism that is committed to improving their motherland, yet does not attract strong CCP support. The third chapter looks at China's current push to influence Internet governance. In light of the Snowden revelations, distrust of US oversight of ICANN has increased, especially due to its present US Department of Commerce oversight. This paper looks at scholarly discussions about Internet governance, specifically the multi-stakeholder model, including the present

culture of the current Internet governance (IG). It compares Internet governance models, including the top-down strong government control model China advocates. This paper finds the Internet must be governed by a technically specialized array of people, business, and organizations to continue innovation and speedy communications. Too much government influence will hamper the Internet's capabilities. IG must focus on retaining a multi-organization, multi-stakeholder model, while seeking to educate developing nations on the economic advantages of an open Internet, and welcoming government influence in specific areas, such as capacity building and information sharing in key areas.

Thesis advisor: Professor Dorothea Wolfson

Thesis reviewers: Professor Ken Masugi and Dr. Yoonho Kim

Preface:

China's lack of transparency makes open source study of its policy and institutions difficult. I have noticed an increased difficulty entering Chinese language government and think tank websites since I began this thesis, emphasizing the fact that the "Great Firewall of China" works both ways.

I would like to thank my JHU professors for memorable classes I will carry with me always, specifically James Lewis, Mike O'Hanlon, Michael Schneider, Dan Guttman, and Frank Jannuzi. I thank Professor Wolfson for her kind words and support, and my thesis reviewers Yoonho Kim and Professor Masugi for their generous insights, recommendations, and comments. I would also like to thank my husband Bill, who throughout his military career, and post-military career, has supported my zany passion for China and languages. Most of all, however, I would like to thank my two children, Erin and Liam. It is their high achievement in all they do, and their passion for life that inspires me. No matter what the circumstance, without complaint, they strive to do what is needed, and they strive to do their best, all with the zeal of youth. When I have faltered, I look no farther than my own kitchen table for encouragement.

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Introduction

This thesis is a study of China's efforts to control information within its national boundaries, on foreign territory, and its aspirations to influence Internet governance to legitimize and further its aims. China has the largest information control apparatus in the world.¹ China's Internet firewall is a well-known instrument of information censorship. Likewise, China's monumental cyber-espionage campaigns to steal billions of dollars of intellectual property (IP) from foreign targets are also well documented. Less understood are China's pervasive domestic and foreign propaganda promotions; efforts to sabotage and manipulate information; and well-funded programs to steer online conversations and mold an "ideologically correct" citizen. Furthermore, China is now using its economic and political influence to impact current Internet governance, which presently advocates a frictionless flow of information. China's overall information strategy, outlined by these actions, is diametrically opposed to the Western values of freedom of expression, information freedom, and rights to privacy. This represents a struggle over basic information ideology, and ultimately over who controls information, who has access to it, and who will reap the benefits of the information age. The expansion of the Internet can lead to worldwide technological innovations in the areas of agricultural output, energy efficiency, medical improvements, and economic development through unprecedented data analysis and communications on all levels. The opposite, however, is also true. The power of information, if held tightly by political

¹ "Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media." 03 October 2013. *Freedom House*. 04 12 2013. <http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013_Full%20Report_0.pdf>.

elites and their families, can also have a repressive effect and lead to an ill-informed public and can thwart innovation and development. Furthermore, a splintering of the Internet would create highly isolated, restricted, and regulated domains, each reflecting the values and culture of those who govern these domains.

The Internet status quo has been and still is beneficial to global economic development. The expansion of the Internet has led to economic expansion in developing nations at the rate of eight percent per year.² This growth is expected to continue to swell with the advent of the Internet of Things. As a result, information is power now more than ever. Information, coupled with ease of access, has the potential to advance humanity through economic, scientific, and technological development. Metadata can be used to enhance this progress, but also can be used to piece together a clear picture of an individual's social, religious, political, sexual, medical, financial, and educational background, enabling identification and the suppression of certain groups. Likewise, cyber espionage enables a quantitative theft of IP information and data that was unimaginable thirty years ago. Who possesses this information, and the means collect it, is important, as this determines the recipients of information power. When information power lies in the hands of the government, government elites benefit. When this power is in the hands of the people, innovation and privacy rights increase, as does the ability for citizens to keep governments accountable.

² Boston Consulting Group. "The Connected World: The Internet Economy in the G-20." *BCG*. March 2012. <http://www.bcg.com/documents/file100409.pdf> (accessed March 23, 2014).

China's efforts to censor and manipulate information internal to China require a massive government apparatus whose roots spread to every aspect of human expression in China. Selective recounting of historical events, and a careful crafting of the accomplishments of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), have contrived a state spawned nationalism aimed at boosting CCP legitimacy and stability. This paper analyzes the origins and repercussions of China's state-led nationalism, while comparing and contrasting it with the more organic citizen-led bottom-up nationalism. While both sets of citizens work for the dream of a strong China, the citizens molded by CCP propaganda are angry and volatile, which is potentially destabilizing for U.S.-China policy as well as for the CCP regime. The bottom-up nationalists have greater access to uncensored global information and are generally a worldlier group. With honesty and justice as their goal, they seek to halt corrosive elements such as domestic environmental degradation and leadership corruption, as well as expose perceived injustices abroad. They pursue both goals with equal passion. It is in the interest of the United States to understand both sides of this phenomenon and recognize the areas of advantage and disadvantage.

The second chapter of this paper brings to light the lack of trust initiated by China's aggressive and massive cyber espionage and sabotage of foreign networks. Although well documented, China has not yet publically acknowledged these digressions.³ These actions are also in opposition to China's 'peaceful rise' policy,

³ Mandiant Intelligence Center Report. *APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units*. 02 23, 2013. <http://intelreport.mandiant.com/?gclid=CJas3dDC3LUCFYqk4AodQXMAAdg> (accessed 02 23, 2013).

erecting yet another wall of mistrust. The recipients of these breaches include businesses, U.S. military and government networks, foreign diplomats, dissidents, members of groups China deems destabilizing, as well as Western newspapers and journalists. The object is to secure the CCP regime through technological gain, asymmetric military capabilities, as well as silencing dissent abroad. The U.S. national security impact is obvious: this is another example of China using control of digital networks to stabilize its regime, at the expense of foreign governments, as well as domestic and foreign businesses and citizens.

The final chapter emphasizes the importance of Internet governance, not only the ideological and values based concepts of information freedom, but the practical and tangible engineering of Internet hardware and software that enables information to flow from end to end. China's attempts to dislodge the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) leadership from its current Western value based leadership are a foreshadowing of the coming battle for the core of the Internet and information freedom. China, by seeking to be a rule maker in the realm of Internet governance, aims to alter the frictionless information culture of the Internet by gaining advantage over engineering functions at the technical core of the Internet's computing hardware and software. This would influence the Internet's global structure, and the very nature of communications and information flow. These actions pry the power of information out of the hands of the people, and place it in the hands of the government. This has dangerous impact on government accountability, the integrity of

the global marketplace, individual freedoms, global cooperation and information sharing, and global trust. U.S. policy makers must understand the historical precedent for China's actions, the influence of information control on China's foreign policy and U.S. national security, as well as the global impact of China's attempts to become a rule maker in this realm.

One could cast this struggle as a clash of values; the democratic value of information freedom versus a long history in China of authoritarian control. With the founding of the digital age, however, much more is at stake. The web of connections inherent in the Internet amplifies both the benefits and the restrictive capabilities of information. Policy makers must understand what is at stake.

Chapter One

How does China Use its Information Control Apparatus to Manipulate Nationalism: Is this an Effective Tool in the Chinese Communist Party's Pursuit of Legitimacy and Stability?

Leading scholars agree that nationalism is a tool used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to rally support during this time of accelerated and unpredictable change in China.⁴ After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the CCP made a concerted effort to encourage pragmatic nationalism as a way to boost faith in a troubled system and to hold the country together during its controversial reforms towards a capitalistic economy. Scholars' opinions deviate on the topic of whether today's nationalistic sentiment is still controlled by the leaders of China through education and media propaganda, or whether it is a grassroots, bottom-up nationalist movement of netizens over which the government has no control, or both. To answer this question, it is important to look at the top-down government controlled nationalism and contrast it with the more emotional and liberal top-down nationalism. Does the party have control over these masses of self-organizing youths, or can they spark chaos and topple the legitimacy of China's ruling elite? Or perhaps of more concern: would the CCP make an unwise, un-pragmatic policy decision with respect to volatile territorial disputes to appease these youths, placing CCP stability before peaceful foreign relations?⁵

This paper studies the origins, as well as the similarities and differences, of the top-down state led nationalism and the bottom-up liberal nationalism. In order to understand the nature of China's nationalism, the mechanics of China's internal

⁴ Wu, Xu. *Understanding China's Angry Youth: What Does the Future Hold?* Paper, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2009.

Zhao, Suisheng. "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" *Journal of Asian Studies*, 2009: 131-144.

Gongxin Xiao, "Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism" *China Security* Vol.5 No.3 (2009)p.53-58

Peter Hayes Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004)p.101

⁵ Recent activities, and strong CCP response, over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea highlights the seriousness of this issue.

information control, one of the largest expenditures of human and financial capital known to man, will be explained. The CCP attempts to control, cajole, and manipulate these simmering sentiments in an attempt to mold public opinion in its favor, even as the role and expansiveness of the Internet continues to grow. Finally, the dangers and the opportunities inherent in this nationalist sentiment will be analyzed.

Chinese nationalism is a product of the mixture of national revolution and social revolution and is always in a state of flux as it responds to political, economic, and social stimuli. According to Suisheng Zhao, executive director of the Center for China- U.S. Cooperation at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, three types of nationalism have competed with each other in the past ninety years of Chinese history: top-down state endorsed nationalism, a grassroots bottom-up liberal nationalism, and ethnic nationalism.⁶ Ethnic nationalism, pride in one's indigenous heritage, pertains to many of China's non-Han minority communities such as Miao, Uyghur, and Tibetan. Tibetan and Uyghur struggles and resistance against CCP suppression are very important topics, and deserve rigorous study. They do not, however, fit the paradigm of state-sponsored and grassroots nationalism supportive of a strong China described in this paper, and are therefore not included in this discussion.

To understand Chinese state-sponsored and the more organic bottom-up nationalism, one must look at its history, and observe its current evolution.

Nationalism, as defined by Peter Hayes Gries, is "that aspect of individuals' self

⁶ Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (Stanford, Stanford University Press)p.21

image that is tied to their nation, together with the value and emotional significance they attach to membership in the national community.”⁷ He points out China’s emphasis, in secondary and university history books, of the “one hundred years of humiliation” at the hands of Japanese and Western Imperialism as the root of victimization and injustice that China’s youth feel today.

State, or top-down nationalism, encourages loyalty to the communist party through education and media. It is carefully balanced to promote identification with the Chinese Communist Party creating an “I am the CCP” belief. Criticism of the CCP is internalized by China’s citizens as a criticism of themselves, which therefore limits their dissent. It is carefully controlled by the CCP to avoid internal instability and temper alienating anti-West rhetoric.⁸

China’s bottom-up, or liberal nationalists are concerned with exposing injustice, whether that injustice is internal or external. They can be righteous and pro-democracy or vehemently anti-West. Their beliefs are formed by a mixture of China’s education system as well as state-run and foreign media, and they can be quite emotional and ill informed.⁹ The protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989 were bottom-up nationalists. They demonstrated for a more open and democratic government and a crackdown on corruption, however, they became very defensive of their motherland and critical of the West when the West imposed sanctions on

⁷Peter Hayes Gries, *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, University of California Press,2004) p.9

⁸ Wu, Xu. *Understanding China’s Angry Youth: What Does the Future Hold?* Paper, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2009.

Brady, Anne Marie and Wang Jintao. "China's Strengthened New Order and the Role of Propaganda." *Journal of Contemporary China* 18, no. 62 (November 2009): 767-788.

Gries, Peter Hayes. *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

⁹ Gries, Peter, *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, University of California Press,2004) p.101

China post 1989.¹⁰ While these youths are liberals on domestic issues, asking for a more transparent government as well as freedom of speech and human rights, they are state nationalists on international issues, constantly accusing China's leaders of being too lenient on the West in foreign policy matters.

Suisheng Zhao speaks of the top-down nationalists when he states that the nationalist fervor, in its origin, is state-led and largely reactive. The Chinese leaders have used nationalism to rally support, but also realize that without limits and restraints, this nationalist sentiment could work against the Communist Party's goals of economic modernization and jeopardize political stability. He feels the government has solid control over the nationalists.¹¹ Stanley Rosen, professor of Political Science from the University of California feels the bottom-up nationalists also pose no danger to China's authoritarian regime. He says they are internationalists "strongly affected by global trends. Likewise, they are pragmatic, materialistic, and largely concerned with living the good life and making money."¹² He says they are desperate to believe in something and are "very willing to make sacrifices if they are persuaded that the cause is just." As long as there is economic growth, these young nationalists firmly support the leaders of China, and will not do anything to destabilize China's strength as a country.¹³

¹⁰ Zhao, Suisheng. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.p. 25

¹¹ Zhao, Suisheng. "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" *Journal of Asian Studies*, 2009: 131-144.

¹² Rosen, Stanley. "Contemporary Chinese Youth and the State." *Journal of Asian Studies* 68, no. 2 (May 2009): 359-369.

¹³ Ibid

Professor Xu Wu of Arizona State University disagrees with Zhao and Rosen's benign characterization of Chinese nationalism. He does not specify what kind of nationalism he speaks of when he likens nationalism to a double-edged sword, but in this case it is "not only a double-edged sword, but there is no handle. Nobody knows when it will hit you, or how damaging it is, that it will hurt you. Even for the CCP itself, it has to find a way to accommodate to this kind of threatening (sic) but also it's a pending danger."¹⁴ Xiao Gongqin of Shanghai Normal University agrees that the enthusiasm of nationalism is unpredictable. He agrees that nationalism is a "political resource" that can be employed to rally support for national causes. "This is useful when the country is threatened or when ideology is waning." However, he warns that when nationalism "gains a hold over the discourse within society, radicals may distort any moderate government position as yielding, capitulating or even treasonous – even if they are objectively in the interest of the people. This could pose a great challenge to the government's authority and threaten the legitimacy of its rule."¹⁵

Peter H. Gries, assistant professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, shares this more ominous view of the continuing emergence of top-down nationalists of China. His book, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy*, gives detailed accounts of several confrontational nationalist uprisings since Tiananmen including the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1999 Belgrade Chinese embassy bombing, the Hainan plane incident of 2001, and the anti-Japan protests of

¹⁴ Wu, Xu. *Understanding China's Angry Youth: What Does the Future Hold?* Paper, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2009.

¹⁵ Gongxin Xiao, "Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism" *China Security* Vol.5 No.3 (2009)p.53-58

2003. His analysis of the Chinese embassy bombing by NATO allies and the 2001 collision of an American EP-3 surveillance aircraft and a Chinese F-8 jet fighter is accompanied with imagery of angry Chinese youth carrying banners with degrading rhetoric towards the United States. In one photo after the 1999 embassy bombing, a youth is shown dripping with fake blood wearing a headband with the Chinese characters for “blood debt” emblazoned in red paint. The language is clear: an eye for an eye. It is a cry to force the United States to return the debt of Chinese life...in blood.¹⁶ The spy plane collision of 2001 also played to the “victim” paradigm in which China is the innocent and The United States is the perpetrator. This evoked strong anti-American sentiment protests, as well as denunciation of China’s leaders for being soft on America.¹⁷

While the United States asserts the bombing was a mistake, the Chinese people overwhelmingly believe the incident was purposefully planned to test the Chinese government’s resolve and to humiliate China. Emails to the *Guangming Daily*, which lost three journalists in the Belgrade bombing, spoke forcefully in favor of military action: “Everyone; contribute money to buy an aircraft carrier”; “When we have a strong and modern military, we’ll see who dares to bully us “; and “The Chinese people cannot be insulted”.¹⁸ The plane collision, likewise, aroused strong anti-American sentiment, protests, as well as denunciation of China’s government for being soft on America (mostly due to Chinese media presentation of the event).

¹⁶ Peter H. Gries, *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, University of California press, 2004) 99

¹⁷ Gries book p.101

¹⁸ Ibid 108

Raised on a steady diet of history books depicting China “victimized” by the West, these two scenarios play to the “victim” paradigm.¹⁹

A recap of bottom-up and top-down nationalist characteristics:

The bottom-up nationalists are patriotic and love China, but are not angry and resentful unless provoked. They seek justice and political reform in China, especially in the areas of political corruption and environmental policy. They are defensive when they feel China has been unfairly criticized and push for strong foreign policy when China’s reputation is a stake. They seem to be influenced by state education as well as their experiences, media from multiple sources worldwide, and traditional Chinese values.

A hardworking, well-educated middle-class Chinese youth in an upwardly mobile country→ seeks information for multiple venues (not always informed by factual sources)→ equally disillusioned by constant U.S. post 1989 criticism and Chinese corruption and environmental degradation→ seeks righteousness wherever injustice is perceived.

The top-down nationalists are larger in number. They are influenced by Chinese propaganda, and they believe in a strong China. They watch state run television and spend more time on the Internet than the more tolerant bottom-up nationalists²⁰. The influence of these nationalists starts with the hawkish leaders of the Communist Chinese Party Propaganda Department (CCPPC), who are responsible for the creation and spread of state propaganda. This includes every imaginable source of human expression in China, to include education, the Internet, movies, publications, art exhibits etc.. This environment of propaganda forms a citizen who is resentful of past humiliations suffered by China, and as a result, they pressure for an aggressive foreign policy. Aggressive nationalist sentiment, in turn, supports the hawkish creators of CCP propaganda, forming a self-supporting circle.

Hawkish CCPPD leaders→ historical victim narrative state propaganda→ top-down nationalists with resentment toward West and Japan→ aggressive foreign policy patronage→ support for hawkish CCP leaders→ support for victim paradigm narrative propaganda→ repeat

¹⁹ Ibid 101

²⁰ Woods, Jackson S and Bruce J Dickson. *Victims and Patriots: Disaggregating Nationalism in China*. presentation. Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2012.

Who are China's nationalists?

China's nationalists are China's post 1989 generation raised on an educational diet of victim narrative. They are young, college educated, bright, and technologically shrewd. They are also the prince and princesses of China's "one child per family" policy. In China's post-Communist ideology economic powerhouse, they are searching for something to believe in and for a way to make their generational mark. They are unified in their desire to hunt down injustices, foreign or domestic, perceived or factual, and expose them. Since the Tiananmen incident, these youths have repeatedly heeded the Chinese Communist Party's warnings and stepped back from the brink of chaos, yet they could still pose a possible danger to the stability of the current governing regime, as well as to China-U.S. relations. The fear is that due to their elevated passion for their causes, ability to organize through the Internet, and sheer mass in numbers, they could cause a mob mentality ideological attack directed toward a foreign or domestic target. The CPP has greatly expanded its internal information control structure, strengthening its ability to block, censor, and manipulate Internet content, to control this group.

In the Chinese media, they are frequently maligned as the spoiled, self-centered "me generation". They are the product of the second generation of the "one child per family" policy, in which one child is the sole focus six adults: two sets of doting grandparents and a pair of devoted parents. Sensitive to global trends, they are largely concerned with living the good life and making money. Many are members of the establishment who have greatly benefitted from China's economic successes. As they struggle for an identity that measures up to the importance given them

growing up, they show rebellion, cynicism, an obsession for equality and a support for the underdog. They are desperate to believe in something and are “very willing to make sacrifices if they are persuaded that the cause is just.”²¹ Their tireless efforts and partnership with Chinese students studying abroad raised huge funds for those affected by the Sichuan earthquake in the spring of 2008. Afterward, they worked to expose the corrupt misappropriation of those funds by local government officials.²² They displayed their passions and extreme anti-American sentiment in the 1999 protests against the NATO allied bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, as well as protested in opposition to the United States stance on the 2001 spy plane collision. More recently, in the nationalist book *Unhappy China* released in the spring of 2009, they call for a more critical foreign policy stance toward the West, and to “incorporate retribution and punishment into our diplomatic strategies” when dealing with the West.²³ The book warns, “America will face a less friendly China in the future”.²⁴

After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, the CCP made a concerted effort to encourage nationalism as a way to boost faith in a troubled political system and to hold the country together during the rapid and uncertain economic reforms. An important aspect of the belief system, supported by the country’s post 1989 history curriculum, is the victim paradigm education model, emphasizing the injustices of

²¹ Stanley Rosen, “Contemporary Chinese Youth and the State”, *Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. 68, No 2 (May) 2009. P.361

²² Kaifu, Lee, “Understanding China’s “Angry Youth”: What Does the Future Hold?” (Paper presented at The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., USA, April 29, 2009) p.13

¹⁸ Qi Fu “Book *Unhappy China* stirs controversy” *Shanghai Daily*, March 27, 2009
(http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/2009/200903/20090327/article_395564.htm)

²⁴ Jason Dean. “Book Stokes Nationalism in China”. *The Wall Street Journal*, March 30, 2009 A18

Western and Japanese Imperialism.²⁵ Many young people feel that not supporting the CCP in righting these past humiliations, and in strengthening economic growth, is opposing their very identity as Chinese.²⁶

It is important to emphasize that these nationalists are not merely brainwashed mouthpieces of the Chinese leadership, but also a grassroots, bottom-up movement.²⁷ They are well informed and cognizant of the limits the CCP tries to place on them. Tang Jie, a 29-year-old Chinese cyber-nationalist living in Shanghai, says he is perplexed by the Western belief that Chinese youth are naïve about their government's censorship. On the contrary, he feels that "Because we are in such a system, we are always asking ourselves whether we are brainwashed, we are always eager to get information from different channels." He adds, "When you are in a so called free system you never think about whether you are being brainwashed."²⁸ These youths are creative free thinkers who have no qualms about creating a way around "The Great Firewall of China" which is viewed more as an irritation than a barrier. They are able to connect to blocked sites through overseas proxy servers as well as receive foreign news clips from overseas Chinese, expanding their ability to receive many viewpoints.²⁹

Tang Jie is a Ph.D. student in Western philosophy at the prominent Fudan University in Shanghai. He has extensive knowledge of and access to Western media, speaks and reads German and English fluently and daily reads a variety of

²⁵ Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004) 101

²⁶ Gongqin Xiao, "Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism" *China Security* Vol.5 No.3 (2009)

Suisheng Zhao, "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" *Washington Quarterly* 29.1 (2005) p.132

²⁷ Xu Wu "Understanding China's "Angry Youth": What Does the Future Hold?" (Paper presented at The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., USA, April 29, 2009) 78

²⁸ Osnos, Evan. "Angry Youth: The New Generation's Neocon Nationalists" *The New Yorker*, July 28, 2008

²⁹ *ibid*

American and European on-line news sources. In April 2008, moved by what he felt was a betrayal by the Western media in its portrayal of human rights violations in Tibet during Beijing's Olympic preparations, Tang Jie used images from Western and domestic news outlets to make a video called "China Stand Up" and posted it on sina.com; it went viral. Tang Jie, well versed in the CCP's manipulation of the news to further party goals, believes Western media does the same. He is certain Western media alters information to spur anti-Chinese sentiment and halt China's climb to world power status. The video details perceived bias in the coverage of Tibetan riots, exposing cropped CNN photos that eliminate the violent Tibetan element in a photo of a beaten monk. In another image, a disabled Chinese athlete clutches the Olympic torch to her body for fear European protesters will rip it from her bosom: a poignant image of the powerful West attempting to subdue the humble, innocent, yet proud China.³⁰

In an effort to understand top-down versus bottom-up nationalism, in 2011 Peter Gries conducted a survey study to determine what, if any, effect state sponsored propaganda had on Chinese nationalism. His study found China's top-down nationalism, which fosters a sense of resentment or superiority and engenders difficult relations with other countries, is connected to state sponsored propaganda. However, state propaganda is not the sole influence on nationalism. The bottom-up liberal nationalism is at its core a feeling of pride in China's accomplishments rather than anger at foreign powers. These youths are moved by

³⁰ Jie, Tang. "2008! ChinaStandUp! 2008." *YouTube*. August 2008.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MSTYhYkSsA> (accessed September 28, 2013).

famous writers like Hanhan, or the artist Ai Weiwei. Like Tang Jie in Osnos' New Yorker article, they look beyond the "Great Firewall of China" and are well informed and worldly. In his surveys, he found these two sentiments do not intersect. They are ideologically and empirically independent of each other.³¹ According to this study, the state propaganda system has little influence on the opinions of these young, cynical liberal nationalists. Those who are influenced by the propaganda state are more likely to resent the power of stronger nations, harbor resentment and anger toward other countries, and believe China is a superior country.³² In America, those who are proud to be American largely overlap with those that believe America has the right to force its policies on other sovereign countries. This is not true in China. In China, a love of one's country and pride in one's culture and country's historical achievements is a separate sentiment from the more volatile and acrimonious state-sponsored nationalism.

Should the Chinese nationalists be of Concern to the United States?

Research has shown bottom-up nationalism, while emotional and unpredictably focused, does not seek aggressive policy. These individuals do not seek to harm the West, but rather seek to right perceived wrongs. The top-down nationalists, however, are grounded in resentment and anger. The Communist Party

³¹ Gries, Peter, Michael Crowson, Huajian Cai, and Qingmin Zhang. "Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National identity." *The China Quarterly*, 2011: 1-17.
Woods, Jackson S, and Bruce J Dickson. *Victims and Patriots: Disaggregating Nationalism in China*. presentation, Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2012.p.27

³²Gries, Peter, Michael Crowson, Huajian Cai, and Qingmin Zhang. "Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National identity." *The China Quarterly*, 2011: 1-17.
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sponsored victim paradigm creates Chinese nationalists who choose stories with heroic victory. They choose bravado over cool-headed discourse. Gries asserts, "It would be a mistake to attribute to the Communist Party complete control over Chinese nationalism today. With the emergence of the Internet, cell phones, and text messaging, popular nationalists in China are increasingly able to act independently of the state."³³ Gries feels that protesting youths limited China's policy options during the spy plane collision and the Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade. Others noted that in negotiating in Beijing, American diplomats "saw a Chinese government acutely sensitive to Chinese public opinion."³⁴ "Such sensitivities are only likely to increase. Western policymakers ignore how this new factor affects Chinese policy at their own peril."³⁵

This perception, of course, is of concern when America's candid and occasionally blundering ways are misconstrued as an attempt to humiliate or attack China. It could also be a danger to the legitimacy of China's leaders. "Let the next nationalist protests spin out of control, and the party could become a target of popular criticism, whether for failing to uphold China's national dignity, or corruption, or social justice. If the party should resort to force to suppress nationalist protesters, it could receive a mortal blow. Either scenario could lead to

³³Gries, Peter. 'Chinese Nationalism: Challenging the State?' *Current History* September 2005. P. 254
Grammaticas, Damian. "China's Rising Nationalism Troubles West." *BBC News*. November 17, 2009.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/8363260.stm> (accessed December 13, 2013).
Interview with China hand and former Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Susan Shirk

³⁴Keefe, John. *Anatomy of the EP-3 Incident*. Alexandria, Va: CNA Corporation, 2002.p. 10

³⁵ Gries book p. 134

regime change. Each seeks to use each other to achieve their goals, but is also fearful of the threat each represents to their own survival.”³⁶

Can the CCP Control the Nationalists?

Top-down nationalism is state-sponsored and is effective in encouraging support for the CCP one party system, or appeals to those who already support the CCP. The primary CCP bureaucracy in charge of disseminating state propaganda is the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department (CCPPD), which organizes a huge and far-reaching system of information propagation and censorship. The CCPPD has been effective in garnering support for CCP policy, especially in the cases of the embassy bombing in Belgrade, and the Hainan island air collision incident. Chinese leaders were able to rally anti-Western sentiment, but were also able to control the size, place, and timing of the anti-West protests. Anne Marie Brady in her book “Marketing Dictatorship” says that after the Belgrade Chinese Embassy bombing by the United States, thousands of Beijing students were bussed to protests in Beijing by CCP buses, and then bussed back for a hot meal on campus.³⁷

When Chinese youths asked for the boycott of French products due to France’s support the Dalai Lama in the pre-Olympic spring of 2008, the Government blocked news videos of the protests. A search for information turned up a blank page explaining that such web pages “do not conform to relevant law and policy”. When people poured into the streets to protest the accidental embassy bombing,

³⁶ Gries, Current History p.256

³⁷ Brady, Anne-Marie. Marketing Dictatorship. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008, p. 54

China tolerated the protests for the first few days, but then feared they would irreparably damage China-US relations. They appealed to the students' patriotism by reporting in the *People's Daily* that the protests were hurting the Chinese economy by keeping tourists home and limiting foreign investment. The protesters went home.³⁸ In 2005 when students were organizing a large May 4th demonstration, the Party inundated cell phone users with messages warning against spreading rumors, believing rumors or illegally protesting.³⁹ Several of the online organizers were arrested by police to keep full control.⁴⁰

The bottom-up nationalists are less influenced by China's propaganda machine, and therefore less malleable. Although not stated, Mike Lampton is probably referring to the bottom-up nationalists when he expressed that the state constructed victim scenario in Chinese nationalism is changing. He feels they are thinking less about past wrongs and more about China's national goals.⁴¹ Lee Kaifu, former vice president of Google in China, sees great potential in the Chinese nationalists. They are bright, passionate and want their voice heard. They stood up against corruption and plagiarism in academics by setting up a website to expose professors who were not writing their own works. After the Sichuan earthquake, the nationalist youths worked with Google to set-up a database of all cities in need and connected donors and supplies with those who needed them. Rightly or

³⁸ Zhao, China Security p.55

³⁹ "China guards Japanese Embassy amid public anger," International Herald Tribune, May 4, 2005, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2005/05/04/asia/web.0504china.php>

⁴⁰ Zhao, China Security p.56

⁴¹ Mike Lampton, "The Political Dynamics of Chinese Nationalism" Carnegie Endowment for Peace symposium, December 7, 2004

wrongly, they also exposed those wealthy individuals who did not donate to the cause.⁴² *The New York Times* calls this growing phenomenon online vigilantism.⁴³

In online vigilantism, lessons in morality are enforced by anonymous online users who are self-proclaimed police, jury, and judge.⁴⁴ The CCP is sensitive to this crowd mentality activity, which draws parallels to the activities of the Cultural Revolution. As a result, the government has blocked Twitter, tightened controls on search engines, and employed text message surveillance technology to scan text messages for “key words”.⁴⁵ The CCP has claimed these measures are to block access to pornography, but has also admitted the measures are to stop destabilizing elements in society.

How Does China Control Information?

One cannot truly comprehend the persistence of and the domination over China’s citizens until one understands the enormity of China’s information control and manipulation abilities. The information control system, which includes propaganda, manipulation, and censorship, is a huge apparatus largely under the control of the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department (CCPPD). Propaganda responsibilities include newspaper offices, radio stations, TV stations, publishing houses, magazines, news and media departments, universities, middle schools, elementary schools, cadre training, musical troupes, theatrical troupes, film

⁴² Lee Kaifu, “Understanding China’s “Angry Youth”: What Does the Future Hold?” (Paper presented at The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., USA, April 29, 2009)

⁴³ Howard French, “Online Throngs Impose a Stern Morality in China” *The New York Times*, June 3, 2006

⁴⁴ NYT Ibid

⁴⁵ Sharon Lafraniere, “Text Messages in China to be Scanned for Illegal Content” *The New York Times* January 19, 2010

production, literature and art troupes, cultural amusement parks, cultural palaces, libraries, remembrance halls, museums and other cultural facilities and commemorative exhibition facilities.⁴⁶

Here is a breakdown of the Central Propaganda Department of China:

- **The State Council Information Office (SCIO)** or Guowuyuan Xinwenban. Monitors news nationwide
- **The Ministry of Culture (MOC)** or Wenhua Bu. Monitors theater, literature, museum activities, and artistic endeavors.
- **The Ministry of Education (MOE)** or Jiaoyu Bu. Monitors primary school, secondary school, and university textbooks and curriculum.
- **The Ministry of Information Industry (MII)** or Xinxi Chanye Bu, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) or Gong'an Bu, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) or Guojia Anquan Bu. These all have joint authority to respectively observe and or block electronic communications into China. The MPS and MSS monitor electronic communications, whereas the MII is responsible for monitoring the actual technical components of the communications infrastructure such as fiber optic cables and telephone lines as well as radio bandwidth and frequencies
- **The People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department** Third and Fourth Departments block satellite communications and shortwave broadcasts.
- **The PLA General Political Department (GPD)** organizes and disseminates military propaganda.
- **The State Council General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP)** or Xinwen Chuban Zongju, monitors the publishing houses.
- **The CCPPD and the State Council Information Office** supervises Xinhua news, which (like most news agencies in China) is a government mouthpiece.⁴⁷

The following CCP document listed the various forms of illegal Internet content:

"The Decision of the National People's Congress Standing Committee on Guarding Internet Security, Regulations on Telecommunications of the People's Republic of China, Measures on the Administration of Internet

⁴⁶Shambaugh, David. "China's Propaganda System, Institutions, Processes and Efficacy." *The China Journal* (The University of Chicago Press), January 2007. P.28

Taken from *The Encyclopedia on the Building of the CCP* (Chengdu:Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1992) p.676

⁴⁷ Shambaugh, David. "China's Propaganda System, Institutions, Processes and Efficacy." *The China Journal* (The University of Chicago Press), January 2007: p.30-31

Information Services, Measures on the Administration of Security Protection of the International Networking of Computer Information Networks, and other laws and regulations clearly prohibit the spread of information that contains contents subverting state power, undermining national unity, infringing upon national honor and interests, inciting ethnic hatred and secession, advocating heresy, pornography, violence, terror and other information that infringes upon the legitimate rights and interests of others. According to these regulations, basic telecommunication business operators and Internet information service providers shall establish Internet security management systems and utilize technical measures to prevent the transmission of all types of illegal information.”⁴⁸

China’s massive propaganda campaign elicits control over all aspects of human creative expression. The above publication shows that China stringently controls all Internet communications as well. According to Freedom on the Net 2013, China is one of the top three most Internet restrictive countries in the world.⁴⁹ China has an elaborate censorship technological apparatus and employs two million humans to wade through millions of messages on social media sites and microblogging sites and police the internet.⁵⁰ Some are trained on multi-million dollar software to aid in problematic comment detection.⁵¹ Final censorship decisions are made not by them, but by officials employed by the state, or by the

⁴⁸ (新媒体蓝皮书<中国新媒体发展报告(2010). Xin Meiti Lanpishu "Zhongguo Xin Meiti Fazhan Baogao (2010)". New Media Blue Book,"China New Media Development Report (2010)")

⁴⁹ "Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media." Freedom House. October 03, 2013. http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013_Full%20Report_0.pdf (accessed 12 04, 2013)p.19

⁵⁰Hunt, Katie, and CY Xu. "China Employs 2 Million to Police Internet." CNN. October 07, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/07/world/asia/china-internet-monitors/?hpt=hp_t2 (accessed December 04, 2013).

新京报. 网络舆情分析师：要做的不是删帖. 03 10 2013. http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013-10/03/content_469152.htm?div=-1. 01 05 2014.

BBC. *China Employs Two Million Microblog Monitors State Media Says*. 04 10 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24396957>. 01 05 2014.

⁵¹ (新媒体蓝皮书<中国新媒体发展报告(2010). Xin Meiti Lanpishu "Zhongguo Xin Meiti Fazhan Baogao (2010)". New Media Blue Book,"China New Media Development Report (2010)")

microblogging and social media sites themselves. These censors or monitors are looking for comments that might incite collective action.⁵²

One can break this Internet control down into three systems. The first is automated technical control systems, more commonly known as the “Great Firewall” of China. The second is forced self-censorship, and the final technique is proactive manipulation.⁵³ The Firewall blocks websites, and engages in “webthrottling”, which slows access to a standstill.⁵⁴ The Firewall blocks are easily administered because there are only eight information gateways in and out of China.⁵⁵ Deep packet inspection technologies are another aspect of the Firewall. These technologies look for keywords, and can find specific pages on a website, or comments on a social media site, and delete them (or sever the connection) while leaving the other content on the site alone. This is the main way China’s largest cell phone providers (China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom) censor content, through automated technical keyword filtering. Frequently, censored material can still be viewed by the author, but no one else, deceiving the author into thinking his post can be read by others.⁵⁶ Knowledge of these methods of information control leads to self-censoring. In an effort to avoid detection, or to find the information

⁵² King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Molly Roberts. "American Political Science Review." How Censorship Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. n.d.

<http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/censored.pdf> (accessed 02 20, 2013). (King, Pan and Roberts n.d.)

⁵³ (Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media)p194, (MacKinnon 2012)p.35-38

⁵⁴ (Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media)p194

⁵⁵ (MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom)p.35

⁵⁶ (Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media)p.197

desired, Chinese netizens think of creative ways to express themselves by use of homophones, sarcasm, and nuance.⁵⁷

The second method is forced self-censorship by service providers to comply with CCP regulations. In this way, the private sector is directly involved in and assists in the censorship of information in China. Service providers must censor banned content or lose their license, and thus are the first line of internal censorship. These companies use software to look for blacklisted keywords, as well as use human censors to sift through posts looking for unwanted content. Baidu is a Chinese search engine used for eighty percent of all searches in China. It uses software to seek out prohibited terms, but also manipulates search results to comply with government protocol. This causes state sanctioned news and information to come up first, while foreign sources are removed or pushed far back.

Foreign companies also comply with these regulations to reap the financial benefits of the huge Chinese market.⁵⁸ The Chinese government expects them to “protect” Chinese citizens through censorship while also revealing online users’ personal information when asked. In 2004, Yahoo, at the request of the CCP, relinquished email content and IP addresses of dissidents, which led to their arrest.⁵⁹ Clearly, an effort to structure a set of norms, or codes of conduct, must begin to protect freedom of speech as well as political and religious expression.

⁵⁷ Link, Perry. "China: Capitulate or Things Will Get Worse." *The New York Review of Books*. October 24, 2013. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/oct/24/china-capitulate-or-things-will-get-worse/> (accessed December 04, 2013).

⁵⁸ (Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media)p.196-197

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch. "How Multinational Internet Companies Assist Government Censorship in China." Human Rights Watch. August 2006. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/5.htm> (accessed December 10, 2013).p.122

Information control is not only achieved through censorship of terms and websites, but also through hardware and software. Technology companies can write code or build networks that determine how information is organized, assessed, or disseminated. US companies such as Websense, Blue Coat, Palo Alto Networks, McAfee, and Smartfilter all create software that is used to block pornography and other inappropriate content for youths. This same software can aid authoritarian governments in general censorship. Cisco promotes products in China, which it knows will be used to thwart human rights. Their routers are used in the construction of China's "Firewall".⁶⁰

The third method of information control is proactive manipulation. The CCP employs Internet monitors to guide conversations online, and post government sanctioned opinion. The "Wumadang", or fiftycent party, are humans paid (fifty Chinese cents per comment; about six US cents) by the CCP to spam comment spaces on social media with CCP propaganda. These comments are easily recognizable for their contrived prose. More nuanced are the trained online propagandists who mold online conversation, and even change news facts to calm online tensions. Although, Rebecca MacKinnon believes most Chinese do not know the extent to which they are censored,⁶¹ some believe the increasingly sophisticated Chinese netizen is aware of this, and these methods may actually be working to decrease confidence in online content.⁶²

⁶⁰ (MacKinnon, *Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom*)p171

⁶¹ (MacKinnon, *Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom*)p.39

⁶²Link, Perry. "China: Capitulate or Things Will Get Worse." *The New York Review of Books*. October 24, 2013.

Since Mao founded the PRC this vast control apparatus, which requires such huge amounts of human and financial capital, has been expanding. The tactics have changed, but the goal is the same: control the masses and stay on top. In the months following Xi Jinping's ascendance to president, news has been rife with examples of information crackdowns. Even though Mao's actions were manipulative, ruthless, and without empathy, to this day, in China, there is little accountability for his actions. In preparation for Mao's 120th birthday, recent Chinese newspapers articles have called the famine during the Great Leap Forward "a rumor".⁶³ Twenty to forty million people are thought to have died during this period, for reasons directly related to Mao's policies. Because China's education system does not present a factual account of modern Chinese history and continues to misrepresent or overlook much evidence, China's leaders are still not accountable for their actions. They are driven by "political imperatives" rather than factual experience.⁶⁴ This manipulation of facts and far reaching propaganda fuels Chinese nationalism, and distracts China's citizens from the chronic problems of corruption, pollution, and inequity. Chinese instead focus their dissatisfaction on the evils of the West, past victimization, or pride in China's increasing military might. Lastly, China spends an exorbitant amount of money on "stability maintenance", to include the millions spent to monitor the Internet, manipulate online content, and censor incoming information from all corners of the world. Internal security spending in China is

⁶³Buckley, Chris. "Milder Accounts of Hardships Under Mao Arise as His Birthday Nears." New York Times. October 16, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/world/asia/advancing-a-milder-version-of-maos-calamities.html?_r=0 (accessed 12 05, 2013).

⁶⁴ Ibid

growing faster than military spending.⁶⁵ In 2013, China's domestic security spending budget expanded to \$124 billion USD, and exceeded military spending for the third year in a row.⁶⁶ According to Chinese state media, there are two million people working to police the Internet. That is more than the published number of 1.5 million active military personnel in China.⁶⁷ In addition to the billions spent to "harmonize" Internet content, one cannot ignore the police and security resources needed to intimidate or imprison those who cross the blurred line of what communications' content is deemed inappropriate.

Fed a diet of CCP propaganda from cradle to grave, the Chinese are oblivious to the omissions in their history curriculum. They do not learn about the 1959 famine brought about by Mao's Great Leap Forward, or the mechanics of globalization. This gilded cage of propaganda all too easily convinces the Chinese population the West is their enemy.⁶⁸

Xi Jinping's regime so far is a disappointment to those who hoped for greater political and social reform. He has tightened free expression and censorship resulting in loss of jobs for outspoken professors, the detention of philanthropists

⁶⁵ Wall Street Journal. "Internal Security Tops Military in China Spending." *China Real Time*. May 05, 2011. <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/03/05/internal-security-tops-military-in-china-spending/> (accessed 12 05, 2013).

⁶⁶ MacLeod, Calum. "China Boosts Military and Domestic Security Spending." *USA Today*. March 05, 2013. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/03/05/china-party-congress-military/1964405/> (accessed December 13, 2013).

⁶⁷ Hunt, Katie, and CY Xu. "China Employs 2 Million to Police Internet." *CNN*. October 07, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/07/world/asia/china-internet-monitors/?hpt=hp_t2 (accessed December 04, 2013).

⁶⁸ Link, Perry. "China: Capitulate or Things Will Get Worse." *The New York Review of Books*. October 24, 2013. <http://www.nybooks.com/archives/2013/oct/24/china-capitulate-or-things-will-get-worse/> (accessed December 04, 2013).

and dissidents, as well as heightened media censorship.⁶⁹ Recent headlines of President Xi's oppressive measures to consolidate power have been numerous. His crusade to crack down on Internet content, wayward scholars, dissidents, and freedom of the press belies a fear of instability, and once again shows the CCP's flexibility and resilience in its fight to stay in power. A return to Mao tactics, this crackdown "Is about controlling the masses effectively by controlling their thinking and ambitions".⁷⁰ These feared youths, who are the object of massive CCP human and monetary resources, have little more than "the power to tell unapproved truths".⁷¹ The media was flooded by such articles in the months of September and October of 2013. In late August numerous popular bloggers were detained or arrested, some under trumped-up charges unrelated to Internet content. Charles Xue is an American businessman of Chinese descent who was arrested for having sex with a prostitute. He is also a very popular micoblogger with over 12 million registered followers who is openly critical of Chinese officials when he sees fit. Microblogs have given people such as Charles Xue a far-reaching and influential position. Many have become famous, making big sums of money from their fame. Obviously, the CCP finds this worrisome.⁷² Likewise, a well-known and wealthy

⁶⁹ Huang, Gary. "Xi Jinping Goes Back to the Future to Strengthen Party Control." *SCMP*. 11 14, 2013. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1310566/xi-jinping-goes-back-future-strengthen-party-control> (accessed 11 14, 2013).

⁷⁰Huang, Cary. "Xi Jinping Goes Back to the Future to Strengthen Party Control." *South China Morning Post*. 09 16, 2013. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1310566/xi-jinping-goes-back-future-strengthen-party-control> (accessed 12 05, 2013).Quoted:Steve Tsang, head of China Policy Institute of the University of Nottingham

⁷¹Link, Perry."How to Deal With the Chinese Police." *The New York Review of Books*. November 07, 2013. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/nov/07/how-deal-chinese-police/> (accessed December 05, 2013).

⁷²Buckley, Chris. "Crackdown on Bloggers Is Mounted by China." *New York Times*. September 10, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/asia/china-cracks-down-on-online-opinion-makers.html?_r=0 (accessed November 11, 2013).

businessman, Mr. Wang Gongquan, was arrested in October 2013. He was unusual in that he used his extreme wealth to champion controversial causes, such as the residential system in cities which restrict immigrant children from attending school in the cities where their parents work. Mr. Wang's arrest is a deterrent to other wealthy people in China who may also want to use their money towards "political" causes.⁷³ As part of the same crackdown, Professor Xia Yeling, an economist at Beijing University, was dismissed because of his support for free markets and democracy.⁷⁴ These are only the high profile cases. Countless other citizens were no doubt detained, "invited to tea" or otherwise intimidated by the Chinese special police. Buddhist monks in China and Tibet have also brought to light increasingly restrictive and intrusive surveillance.⁷⁵

These crackdowns have been coupled with bold economic reforms (Deng Xiaoping did the same thing in the 1990's).⁷⁶ Xi's crackdown on national corruption, or the purge of "tigers and flies", however, is conspicuously one-sided in who it targets. Critics of Xi's policies are arrested, where as his supporters are left in office. Xi's "ideological rectification campaign" harkens back to Mao; the enemy is democracy, freedom, and constitutionalism. According to the Financial Times (and supported by the above New York Times articles), several people were arrested in

⁷³Buckley, Chris. "China Arrests Prominent Businessman Who Backed Rights Causes." New York Times. October 21, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/world/asia/china-arrests-prominent-businessman-who-backed-rights-causes.html> (accessed December 06, 2013).

⁷⁴ The Editorial Board. "Beijing's Assault on Academic Freedom." The New York Times. October 21, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/opinion/beijings-assault-on-academic-freedom.html> (accessed December 06, 2013).

⁷⁵ Levin, Dan. "Tibetan Monks Describe a Web of Unseen Controls." New York Times. October 24, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/world/asia/tibetan-monks-describe-a-web-of-unseen-controls.html> (accessed December 04, 2013).

⁷⁶ Wall Street Journal Opinion. "In Deng Xiaoping's Footsteps." Wall Street Journal. November 18, 2013. <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303985504579205461454963626> (accessed December 06, 2013).

China in September 2013 solely because they were critical of the CCP.⁷⁷ This contradicts Gary King's assertion that China is solely interested in thwarting collective action, not criticism of the government, unless the CCP fears the star power of these famous public figures can draw masses of people. It seems likely, however, that President Xi Jinping is not only interested in suppressing protesters; he is eliminating or intimidating his opponents while sending a firm message to like-minded citizens: Criticize at your own risk.

Chinese leaders' true motives and objectives are opaque; any analysis of recent events requires skilled guesswork. One can be certain, however, that President Xi Jinping is working hard to consolidate power and ease out detractors of all forms. He is the "princeling" son of a former Politburo member and communist veteran Xi Zhongxun, which has given him credibility with the military and increased support in the upper reaches of Chinese leadership. Perhaps Xi feels a need to champion the conservatives in his early days of presidency to avoid a power grab. He may feel the West's constant pressure for civil rights, human rights, and freedom of speech is a form of ideological warfare deployed to bring down one party rule in China.

One can dismiss these efforts to eliminate dissent as extreme cases. The majority of Chinese are not affected. Rebecca MacKinnon disagrees. She is concerned about the sweeping nature of how information is controlled in China.

The firewall blocks unwanted ideas from entering China, but even more insidious is

⁷⁷Dikotter, Frank. "'Tiger hunts' revisit a bloody era in China's history." *Financial Times*. September 13, 2013. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cbf5d72-1614-11e3-a57d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2miuqOnQb> (accessed December 06, 2013).

the management of political discourse within China. Lively online discourse is allowed by the CCP as long as it does not allude to or spark mass protest. The government, now aware of the grievance, addresses the discontent and steers the conversation to highlight positive progress, all while deleting inflammatory comments. The netizens feel satisfied to have contributed to the political sphere, and thus have an increased sense of political freedom. Nothing, however, really changes, apart from the government obtaining more clarity about the grievance of the Chinese people. The CCP then uses this information to manipulate the conversation online.⁷⁸ King, in a detailed report, supports MacKinnon's theory. In capturing social media comments before they were deleted by CCP censors, King found that the censored entries were largely posts that encouraged people to assemble. These posts were both pro-CCP and anti-CCP. He also noted the guidance of online conversation by authorities.⁷⁹ According to MacKinnon, this increase in information manipulation provides a framework for a global loss of information freedom.⁸⁰

These information structures used to mold human expression also aid in creating strong Chinese nationalism, and this can be a danger to peaceful foreign policy. Suisheng Zhao suggests that nationalism rather than communism is the

⁷⁸MacKinnon, Rebecca. *Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2012. P.34

⁷⁹ King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Molly Roberts. "American Political Science Review." *How Censorship Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression*. n.d. <http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/censored.pdf> (accessed 02 20, 2013).

⁸⁰ MacKinnon, Rebecca. *Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2012.p.201

primary ideology of the PRC. At the very founding of the nation in 1949, Mao Zedong addressed China's citizens using the nationalist expression "the Chinese people have stood up ever since". The implication is that the Chinese, in forming the PRC, have stood up to the wrongs of the past to repair the China's pride and restore China's rightful place in the world.⁸¹ After the disintegration of the USSR China's leaders have reopened this wound of deep resentment over past wrongs to increase dedication to the CCP. Although there is no academic research undeniably proving that these top-down nationalists are created by China's tight web of information manipulation and control, it is reasonable to say there is a link. The information control that has nurtured this cynical group also manipulates their opinion by limiting the content of China's news and opinions available. While Chinese leaders can be forceful and arrogant in their rhetoric, they are usually thoughtful in their actions. The CCP has proved to be in control of the nationalist sentiment in the past, aptly reining it in when their actions harm business relations. This CCP constructed pressure cooker of contained emotion serves its purpose until there is a hairline fracture in the structure, which could result in an explosion.

Although economic security is the CCP's primary concern, accidents combined with irrational emotions could trigger an escalation. No one expected a suicide by self-immolation to ignite the Arab Spring. One event can elicit previously ignored pent-up emotions. A news article or CNN photo can arouse feelings of

⁸¹Zhao, Suisheng. *Chinese Nationalism and Its Foreign Policy Implications*. Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 2007.

injustice causing circumstances to escalate. Today's world of high-speed information flow reduces decision-making time adding to the explosive nature.

The recent events in the East China Sea have all the ingredients for an explosive situation. China's creation of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) blurs the lines between offensive and defensive action. By not notifying neighbors beforehand, a new situation has been established without an understanding of China's true objectives, and no time to develop fresh procedures. Because of US-China shared economic interests, a war is unlikely to start intentionally. Rather, it will start because of "reactions to maneuver and perceived threats".⁸² Add to this China's fear of rising masses, and too many unknowns are added to the problem.

At first China declared any incursions into the newly declared ADIZ would be met with "defensive emergency measures", but nothing happened after US military B-52s entered.⁸³ In response to a Chinese online news article about US B-52s flying unannounced into China's ADIZ, Chinese netizens were furious the Chinese Defense Ministry had not taken action against the incursions. While many comments were littered with vulgar language, some were sober in their resolve. One states, "I don't like war, but I don't want the sons and daughters of China to be humiliated. China must use force. With a united population of 1.3 billion, who can face us?" In a twist of thinking, another comment poignantly proffers that the Pentagon's

⁸² Hipple, Matthew. "How War With China Would Start: 99 Red Balloons." War On The Rocks. November 13, 2013. <http://warontherocks.com/2013/11/how-war-with-china-would-start-99-red-balloons/> (accessed December 10, 2013).

⁸³ Page, Jeremy, Jeyup s Kwaak, and Yumi Otagaki. "Concern Mounts in China's Air-Defense Zone." Wall Street Journal. November 18, 2013. <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304017204579226031095207724> (accessed December 10, 2013).

announcement that B-52s entered into ADIZ was a deliberate action to agitate Chinese netizen emotion.⁸⁴ Is it possible the Chinese netizens are being used as pawns by both sides? This interesting question deserves some further study.

China's opaque policy decisions make it difficult to understand what its true intentions are. The declaration of the ADIZ was a regionally poor public relations choice, as it created a situation for South Korea and Japan to find common ground. Furthermore, it left the CCP looking weak to China's citizens. The move was no doubt to consolidate Xi's power, but could also be a reflection of internal strife.

There are many different opposing groups within China's leadership, but the most striking in this conflict is that of the conservatives and the military versus the more liberal minded reformers. Interestingly, these two groups parallel the beliefs of the hawkish top-down nationalists and the more worldly bottom-up nationalists. Receiving the support of the military is crucial for effective leadership in China. In 1989, to the embarrassment of Deng Xiaoping, many military leaders were reluctant to attack students in the square. As a result, the military was purged of those unwilling officers producing a more forceful and aggressive military leadership. China's previous leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao did not seem to have full support of this more hawkish military. Xi, on the other hand, has been able to use his childhood connections and superior standing as the son of a revolutionary leader to consolidate power. This may be one reason why Xi has recently been so hawkish. Xi

⁸⁴NetEase. "法媒:美派B-52挑战中国防空区 中方未拦截." *www.163.com*. November 27, 2013. <http://war.163.com/13/1127/09/9EM831HH0001400G.html> (accessed December 10, 2013).

needs to appear strong and capable in military circles in order to gain their trust.⁸⁵ President Xi has been putting forth his vague “Chinese Dream” policy, to rejuvenate China. It is unclear whether rejuvenating China includes retribution for past harms, or if Xi’s actions are just temporary to placate the military and their hawkish citizen supporters. There have been many indications of a split in policy direction perspective at the top levels of CCP leadership. Some Chinese scholars have admitted, off the record, that Xi has had to take actions that do not reflect his true aspirations.⁸⁶ This could show the power of the burgeoning nationalist influence in China. Because of the opaque nature of the CCP’s decision-making process, however, we cannot know for sure.

The domestic conservative propaganda agenda is mostly supported and disseminated by CCP leaders who are themselves conservative and anti-West.⁸⁷ The system is therefore self-serving. The top-down nationalists are created through public bombardment of the historical victim scenario by media, education, arts, publications, music, theater, and movies etc., and then this same population is used to support the desires of the more conservative Chinese leaders. Currently, the seven member Politburo Standing Committee, the elite center of China’s decision making, is very conservative. Thought to be a result of octogenarian Jiang Zemin’s influence to slow reform, five of the seven members are conservatives. This old-

⁸⁵ Dreyer, June Teufel. "China's Xi Jinping: Hawk or Reformer?" Foreign Policy Research Institute. December 2013. <http://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/12/chinas-xi-jinping-hawk-or-reformer> (accessed December 10, 2013).

⁸⁶ Anderlini, Jamil. "Blueprint for Reform Targets Corruption." *Financial Times*, November 27, 2013: 1-2 FT Special Report.

⁸⁷ Shambaugh, David. "China's Propaganda System, Institutions, Processes and Efficacy." *The China Journal* (The University of Chicago Press), January 2007. p.10

school guidance will be short term, however, as all five of these elderly members will be forced to retire by law in 2017.⁸⁸ The recent calls for stability and peace coupled with aggressive action either reveal a hypocrisy in Xi's leadership agenda, or a disagreement at the highest levels.⁸⁹

Conclusion

Understanding the issue of Chinese nationalism is greater than understanding its nature and its inspiration. Although containment of Chinese nationalism is not one hundred percent certain, it is clear that the CCP seeks to create and motivate, manipulate and control them. By erecting the world's greatest propaganda and information control apparatus, they are largely successful. The CCP feels it must control its population's opinion, as they are fearful that factions with dissenting opinion and collective action will undermine CCP stability and legitimacy. By limiting expression and access to certain ideas, China's leaders increase their ability to stay in power, and therefore stability. China's propagandized education system and censorship mold a xenophobic citizen ready to work hard for their motherland. They dream of a strong China and retribution for past humiliations. This paradigm supports the conservative agenda for firm government control and a strong military. There is, however, also the bottom-up nationalist who, for the most

⁸⁸ Blanchard, Ben and Wee, Sui-Lee. "China Names Conservative, Older Leadership." *Reuters*. November 15, 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/us-china-congress-idUSBRE8AD1GF20121115> (accessed December 10, 2013).

⁸⁹ Baker, Peter, and Jane Perlez. "Airlines Urged by U.S. to Give Notice to China." *The New York Times*. November 29, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/30/world/asia/china-scrambles-jets-for-first-time-in-new-air-zone.html?_r=0 (accessed December 10, 2013).

part, is a free thinker. They may be unpredictable, emotional, and irresponsible, but they seek to change the world for the better. While the CCP champions the dogmatic top-down loyalists and fears the erratic behavior of the bottom-up justice seekers, research has shown the latter group is less concerning. The liberal nationalists are better informed, more tolerant of criticism, and less resentment driven than the top-down group.⁹⁰ They are also more willing to use information and collective action to expose injustice, even at the expense of the leaders of China. This sort of dissent worries the CCP.

No matter whom controls the nationalists, their emotional reactions, and potential for instability are real, and their actions are hard to predict. So far, China's rulers, like puppet masters, have been able to loosen the reins, and tighten them back up to serve their purposes. Yet, analysis of this subject is not a matter of assembling factual pieces, but rather, it requires knowing the Chinese experience, understanding leadership decision-making processes and predicting China's spirit and vigor. It is impossible to anticipate how dangerous this manipulation of passion could be to constructive relations and negotiations during a time of tension. The United States, understanding this threat, must carefully pick its battles, and mindfully choose its words to avoid needlessly alienating this group, especially when engaging China in historically sensitive matters such as disputes in the East China Sea.

⁹⁰ Gries, Peter, Michael Crowson, Huajian Cai, and Qingmin Zhang. "Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National identity." *The China Quarterly*, 2011.p.17

Simultaneously, the US must seek methods to appeal to the less xenophobic bottom-up patriots. They seek to make their mark by helping build a just China. Aiding them in this venture by providing information and structure for social services in China could be mutually beneficial. Involving them in the development of and organizational dispersal of smart phone apps to aid in health issues or water safety is one example. Providing infrastructure through NGOs to help migrant workers with healthcare and child education issues is another possibility. These efforts would show the values of American democracy in a positive light. Positive action is more influential than words. These are gestures that will remain in the hearts of those served for a generation and will engender gratitude toward those who provide assistance.

The most important tool in supporting information freedom is the model of the United States as an innovative, flexible, dynamic nation. While information control in China increases stability, it clearly benefits the ruling elite. Through propaganda programs, censors and information manipulation China creates a political body whose opinion is not based in fact. These citizens are unable to freely participate in the marketplace of ideas. The expansion of the Internet has created a struggle over the very nature of information dissemination, who controls it, and who has access to it. Those who control information determine who will reap the benefits of it, and who will be left behind. It is evident that the future of liberty and freedom rest in free access to information, and the United States must strive to uphold these basic human rights.

Chapter Two

Can China Rise Peacefully While Engaging in Global Information Control?

China's penchant for cyber espionage and intellectual property (IP) theft has recently been in the news again,⁹¹ leading Americans to question the veracity of China's 'peaceful rise'. Although outwardly advocating national sovereignty, China's internal and external information control have a negative effect on global information freedom and encroach on U.S. information sovereignty and US national security. For this reason China's peaceful rise rhetoric, which advocates a respect for state sovereignty and underscores China's role as a responsible leader, is in direct opposition to its cyber activity.⁹² Likewise, the calculated pillaging of U.S. intellectual property, while not a bloody confrontation, certainly is not the action of a peaceful world leader. China, for its part, claims the development of internal and external information control is needed to preserve political stability and strengthen Chinese Communist Party (CCP) legitimacy as China reaches its goal of becoming a middle class society.⁹³ This paper will explore China's manipulation, exploitation, and censorship of information through the lens of China's 'peaceful rise' to understand the contradictions in how China presents itself to the world.

This paper will discuss the history of China's peaceful rise policy, as well as inner CCP conflict over the meaning of this term and very possibility of such a rise. These

⁹¹ Mandiant Intelligence Center Report. *APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units*. 02 23, 2013. <http://intelreport.mandiant.com/?gclid=CJas3dDC3LUCFYqk4AodQXMAg>

⁹² Wortzel, Dr. Larry M. *A Rising China and East Asian Security: Implications for the United States*. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011.

⁹³ Xinhuanet. "China White Paper, Full Text: The Internet in China." *Xinhuanet.com*. 06 08, 2010. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-06/08/c_13339232.htm

disagreements are couched in a political atmosphere deeply influenced by China's past, and fueled by fear of American hegemony. Interestingly, these same fears and historical memories contribute to China's incentive to control information. This paper will then define information control and outline the many ways China manipulates information to serve the CCP. An explanation of the historical context to China's internal information control, cultural factors, as well as citizen support for this lack of freedom will be given. While this paper is a study of China's external information control and its threat to global information freedom as well as its threat to China's peaceful rise, it is difficult to do this without analyzing how and why China controls information internally, which will briefly be touched upon.

Primarily, the conflicting positions of the United States and China on the topic of information control will be explored. Certainly, there are many different views of Internet sovereignty worldwide, which leave ample scholarship opportunities for future papers, but for the sake of brevity, the discussion will be confined to the fundamental disagreement between America and China. This paper ends with insights and possible actions to mitigate the increasingly tense U.S. – China dialogue about information freedom and Internet sovereignty, and simultaneously create an environment conducive to China's peaceful rise.

For this paper, information control is defined as material and indicators conveyed, denied, manipulated or sabotaged to invoke estimates that result in actions

or information advantageous to the 'controllers' interests and objectives.⁹⁴ The Chinese approach this capability in several different ways. One method is the dissemination of propaganda. The 'peaceful rise' campaign includes initiatives to counter negative Western media reports and what some Chinese leaders call American information hegemony.⁹⁵ They encompass heavily funded twenty-four hour English language news shows to inform the world of China's unique story and perspective, as well as hundreds of Confucius Institutes to teach Chinese language in all four corners of the world.⁹⁶ These ventures into soft power have been partially successful.⁹⁷

Other methods of information control employed by the CCP include information manipulation and sabotage, censorship and surveillance. These approaches also seek to overpower the damage done by perceived anti-Chinese media attention or organizations while simultaneously shoring up CCP legitimacy and stability. These

⁹⁴The Free Dictionary. *Information Control*. April 20, 2013.
www.thefreedictionary.com/controlled+information.

I have augmented a definition of information control from the Free Dictionary to form a broader definition.

⁹⁵ Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2011.pp 462-63, Xiao, Gongxin. "Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism." *China Security*, 2009: pp53-58.,Knake, Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. *Cyber War*. New York, NY: Harper-Collins Publisher, 2010.pp47-55

⁹⁶ Brady, Anne Marie and Wang Jintao. "China's Strengthened New Order and the Role of Propaganda." *Journal of Contemporary China* 18, no. 62 (November 2009): pp785

⁹⁷ Paradise, James. "The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power." *Asian Survey* 49,no.4 (2009). pp652

include manipulation of information, domestically and abroad, by censorship, blocking, altering, or theft of private information, intimidation, and espionage.⁹⁸

The last area of consideration consists of methods employed to utilize vulnerabilities in the cyber information network to overcome the US lead in information. These include degradation, mapping, corrupting, stealing, and disabling the “substance” of U.S. cyber systems. This includes IP theft, data surveillance, critical infrastructure, and node sabotage.¹⁰⁰ These cyber infiltrations pinpoint or create vulnerabilities in U.S. government, military and private networks for later exploitation. The effects of this kind of activity are possibly devastating, as they could shut down or sabotage power grids, telecommunications, water filtration plants as well as financial institutions and military command and control centers.¹⁰¹

This paper will look in depth at each of these areas of China’s information control, and seek to examine each case through the lens China’s peaceful rise, present national condition, as well as the historical context.

⁹⁸ Buruma, Ian. "Battling the Information Barbarians." *Wall Street Journal*. January 30, 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704878904575031263063242900.html> , MacKinnon, Rebecca. "Networked Authoritarianism in China and Beyond: Implications for Global Freedom." *Liberation Technology in Authoritarian Regimes*. Palo Alto: Stanford University, 2010.pp.18,26,30

⁹⁹U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. *Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation*. McLean, Virginia: Northrup Grumman Corporation, October 2009.

pp51

¹⁰⁰ Ibid pp7

¹⁰¹Knake, Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. *Cyber War*. New York, NY: Harper-Collins Publisher, 2010. pp.110

Peaceful Rise

The term 'peaceful rise' was first used in 2002 by Zheng Bijian on a trip to the United States with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) research group China Reform Forum. By February 2004, Hu Jintao had made the term the center piece of his foreign policy soft power initiative.¹⁰² Zheng Bijian, in a 2005 *Foreign Affairs* article, underscores China's development difficulties such as poverty, low per capita income, and scarcity of resources, and the necessity of a peaceful rise to overcome these obstacles. According to Zheng Bijian, China harbors no hegemonic tendencies, and abhors the seizing of power and resources characteristic of Western nations post World War I. Furthermore, China policy protects the idea of national sovereignty, thus emphasizing that China will not meddle in the affairs of other nation states.¹⁰³

Despite the appearance of a united front on 'peaceful rise', there was inner party debate on the usefulness and limitations of the 'peaceful rise' policy. CCP leaders have voiced concerns about the policy's inherent limitations. Some fear that the phrase lacks humility, and could incite nationalism in China's proud youths.¹⁰⁴ These young patriots crave retribution for the 100 years of humiliation endured during the nineteenth and early twentieth century at the hands of powerful Western nations and Japan. They long

¹⁰²Glaser, Bonnie, and Evan S Medeiros. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of 'Peaceful Rise'." *The China Quarterly*, 2007pp. 291-310
http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0305741007001208

¹⁰³ Zheng, Bijian. 2005. "China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status." *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5: 18-24.

¹⁰⁴Glaser, Bonnie, and Evan S Medeiros. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of 'Peaceful Rise'." *The China Quarterly*, 2007. pp306

to rise above the West economically and politically and at times call for violent tactics.¹⁰⁵ Managing the criticism of an increasingly educated and middle-class youth, often proud and arrogant, is also of importance to the CCP to preserve stability and legitimacy.¹⁰⁶

The 'peaceful rise' policy also limits opportunities for a forceful re-unification with Taiwan. Hardliners want to keep these options open. They fear Taiwan could construe 'peaceful rise' to mean that China has eliminated the possibility of the use of force to conclude the China-Taiwan issue.¹⁰⁷ This could strengthen Taiwan's independence movement as well as increase U.S. military support to Taiwan. Similarly, there are leaders who fear that the hegemonic United States would seek to contain China's growth and not allow for its peaceful rise.¹⁰⁸ CCP leaders claim that the United States supports organizations that provoke internal instability, which could lead to the fall of the CCP. They also fear U.S. alliances and anti-Chinese factions within the U.S. government seek to thwart China's economic rise.¹⁰⁹ Consideration of these situations

¹⁰⁵ Zhao, Suisheng. "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" *Journal of Asian Studies*, 2009.pp135, Gries, Peter Hayes. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy*. Berkley: University of California Press, 2004.

¹⁰⁶ Zhao, Suisheng. "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" *Journal of Asian Studies*, 2009.pp139, Xiao, Gongxin. "Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism." *China Security*, 2009. pp.57, Gries, Peter Hayes. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy*. Berkley: University of California Press, 2004. pp134

¹⁰⁷ Glaser, Bonnie, and Evan S Medeiros. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of 'Peaceful Rise'." *The China Quarterly*, 2007.pp202

¹⁰⁸ Ibid pp302

¹⁰⁹ Sutter, Robert G. *China's Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia*. Policy Study, Washington D.C.: The East-West Center Washington, 2006.pp36

lead to an opposition to 'peaceful rise' policy, and the support of a policy that allows for conflict if the United States attempts to compromise China's increasing power.¹¹⁰

These opposing voices in Chinese politics make it difficult to understand policy intentions. Increasingly, analysts of Chinese policy use 'uncertain' and 'ambiguous' to describe China's politics. Zheng Wang, a policy scholar and Seton Hall professor, asserts China's leaders are 'insecure and uncertain' and their increasingly 'arrogant and aggressive' military stance just hides their 'ambivalence and weakness'. He states that Chinese leaders disagree about domestic and foreign policy. Instead of dealing with these conflicts, they heighten propaganda and thus nationalism to hide these clashes. While this deflects CCP weakness and increases support for the regime, it also distances the United States.¹¹¹ Nationalist rhetoric in China can be stridently anti-West and thus a rallying point for American distrust of China.

Perhaps, however, 'peaceful rise' is a propaganda campaign, and the conflicting CCP voices are staged to enable a more flexible and evolving policy to meet uncertain threats.¹¹² The United States has found the 'strategic ambiguity' policy toward Taiwan to be quite advantageous as it allows maximum flexibility. Perhaps China is constructing an overall ambiguous policy to deter the United States from aggressive action in China's

¹¹⁰Glaser, Bonnie, and Evan S Medeiros. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of 'Peaceful Rise'." *The China Quarterly*, 2007 pp304

¹¹¹ Wang, Zheng. "Does China Have a Foreign Policy?" *New York Times*. March 18, 2013. www.nytimes.com/2013/13/19/opinion/does-china-have-a-foreign-policy.html?pagewanted=all

¹¹²Stern, Rachel E, and Kevin J O'Brian. "Politics at the Boundary: Mixed Signals and the Chinese State." *Berkley Law*. 2012. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/1786_pp13

neighborhood. If America is unsure what China's reaction will be, or is fearful of escalation by hawkish rogues, the United States is more apt to stay calm and seek to smooth tensions.

It is more likely, however, that there is a chasm between the Chinese military and civilian leaders. The Chinese military is inherently more distrustful of the United States (and more hawkish) than China's civilian leaders.¹¹³ Perhaps PLA leadership is not entirely controlled by China's civilian leaders. In the fall of 2012, there were rumors of a military coup. While this is unlikely, it reflects the Chinese people's perception of increasing military power.¹¹⁴ In the news, reports of increasingly outspoken and provocative PLA generals contrast in comparison to China's careful civilian leaders who demurely tote the party line.¹¹⁵

These militant views and rumors speak directly to the more conservative anti-China camp in the United States, eliciting a response and feeding suspicions. Alastair Johnstone states it is precisely this view that swells mutual China- U.S. distrust.¹¹⁶ To view every move as adversarial, and develop a 'tit for tat' behavior toward each other will certainly turn China and the United States into enemies. In light of China's dramatic economic development and continuing adherence to economic norms, Johnstone feels

¹¹³ Scobell, Andrew. "Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China's Peaceful Rise?" *Parameters*, 2009. pp8

¹¹⁴ Chang, Gordon G. "China's New Militancy." *The Diplomat*. January 31, 2013. <http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/31/chinas-new-militancy/comment-page-1/>

¹¹⁵ Lague, David. "China's Military Hawks Take the Offensive." *Reuters*. 01 17, 2013. www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/17/us-china-hawks-idusbre90g0020130117

¹¹⁶ Johnstone, Alastair John. "China, A Status Quo Power." *International Security*, Spring 2003. pp51

the path of distrust can be avoided.¹¹⁷ Concentrating on common ground and mutual understanding rather than seeking differences and forcing change is widely advocated by many of America's current China policy analysts.¹¹⁸

These internal CCP debates about 'peaceful rise' are reflected in China's information control policies. CCP leaders with PLA ties would be supportive of a strong military, and more likely to tighten internal control to increase regime stability. They would see 'peaceful rise' as a weak foreign policy not suited for China's increased power. In the present system, where China's large state-owned enterprises are government supported, and create dual use technology, one can say the Chinese system is primed to focus every sector on procuring advanced technology in order to build advanced weaponry.¹¹⁹ Cyber theft delivers the advanced technology needed. These actions create global suspicion of China and negate the 'peaceful rise' dogma.¹²⁰

Explorations of these discussions are important. At the core of this debate lies the heart of what kind of country China will become, the nature of its global leadership, and how the United States will react to this leadership. The United States must now focus on how to influence this debate and its outcome in a positive manner.

¹¹⁷ Ibid pp56

¹¹⁸ Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Strategic Vision*. New York City: Perseus Distribution, 2012. pp138, Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2011. pp530, Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Jisi Wang. *Addressing U.S.- China Strategic Distrust*. Washington D.C.: The John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, 2012. pp40

¹¹⁹ Luttwak, Edward N. *The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012. pp241

¹²⁰ Ibid pp257

China's Information Control

As the fears of internal instability and CCP loss of legitimacy, as well as a desire for greater military strength fuel China's zeal for information control, it is important to understand the method and reasoning behind this policy. A study focused on China's social media censorship methodology revealed that the kind of information China deems to be destabilizing is not necessarily criticism of the government. Rather, what is constrained, and thereby feared by the CCP, are those posts that might provoke collective action or protests. The study also showed an increase of management and manipulation of information for CCP use rather than decisive censorship. The governing hierarchy censors those with destabilizing ideas, and also monitors and molds online discourse for its own purposes.¹²¹ This allows Chinese citizens the illusion of deliberative government.¹²² China, using these same methods, controls information beyond its sovereign boundaries. China has broadened its information control to external internet areas through state sponsored information campaigns, intimidation, legal action, and network attacks.

China's global attempt to control information simultaneously reveals fears of destabilizing elements and of the superior communications technology of the West. Chinese leaders and citizens are deeply suspicious of the internet and its new

¹²¹ MacKinnon, Rebecca. "China's "Networked Authoritarianism"." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 2 (2011)32-46

¹²² King, Gary, Pan, Jennifer, and Roberts, Molly. In Press. How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. *American Political Science Review*.
<http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/censored.pdf> pp.29

technologies. They regard the Internet as a U.S. military invention, created to enable the West to achieve worldwide information hegemony. The 1990 US military operation Desert Storm exposed China to the huge US lead in information technology. Alarmed Chinese military leaders advocated finding vulnerabilities in the U.S. cyber-information network to overcome this imbalance of power.¹²³ Just as information technology is not limited to military use, this strategy of offensively using U.S. reliance on cyber networks to weaken the United States is not limited to the battlefield. It is not bound by traditional constraints of physical national borders, Rule of Law, contemporary views of success and defeat, peacetime and wartime activities, or taboo. According to the militant authors of *Unrestricted Warfare*, an iconic Chinese publication about asymmetric warfare, Chinese strategists seek to apply these tactics to as many areas as possible. This publication provides a detailed list of possible targets, including the arenas of politics, economics, religion, culture, networks, geography, environment, outer space, cyberspace, terrorism, subversive activities, and international crime.¹²⁴ The goal is to use "all means whatsoever...to force the enemy to serve one's own interests".¹²⁵

An example of a program to capture and manipulate US economic, government, and military information is recounted in a Project 2049 Institute report about the PLA's

¹²³ Mulvenon, James. *The PLA and Information Warfare*. Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, 1999. pp.176

¹²⁴ Qiao, Liang, and Xiangsui Wang. "Unrestricted Warfare." *cryptome.org*. February 1999. pp.25-29,62 <http://cryptome.org/cuw.htm>

¹²⁵ Ibid pp29

Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure. It details the structure of the PLA General Staff Department's (GSD) First "Information Support (Assurance) Base". This is part of a development strategy to 'informationize' its civilian and military infrastructure to sustain its economic growth, to compete in the information and communication technology field, and ensure national security.¹²⁶ The authors of this report state that information dominance, for economic, political, or military purposes, necessitates great skill in both the electromagnetic and global cyber sphere. The GSD Third Department is huge in size and objective. It is responsible for observing foreign communications and assuring security of the PLA computer communications networks. It also carries out surveillance via computer networks on targets of interest worldwide. They possess some of the most highly trained linguists in the world with additional specialties in banking, financial transactions, military activities, energy, and diplomatic exchanges. Through phone call monitoring, email retrieval, voice and word recognition technology, encryption-breaking capabilities and huge computing power, a targeted organization's plans and capabilities can be known as events develop.¹²⁷ The authors also indicate that China seeks, through a combination of psychological warfare and computer network operations, to oppose and negate ideas deemed to be harmful to political and economic instability. This may include the

¹²⁶ Stokes, Mark A, Jenny Lin, and Russell L.C. Hsiao. "The Chinese People's Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure." *Project 2049*. 11 11, 2011. pg2. Quoted from the PRC Embassy in Washington's website "China Maps Out Development Strategy," May 11, 2006. <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t251756.htm>.

¹²⁷ Stokes, Mark A, Jenny Lin, and Russell L.C. Hsiao. "The Chinese People's Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure." *Project 2049*. 11 11, 2011. pp.15

mapping and analysis of social networks to identify friends and enemies among American's lawmakers and leaders.¹²⁸ This information could also be used to study leader's decision-making patterns, or to form an algorithm to predict their behavior in various situations.

Examples of China's efforts to influence other sovereign nation's foreign policy are analyzed in the U.S.-China Security and Review Commission 2010 report. It gives detailed insight into Operation Aurora, Titan Rain, as well as Ghostnet; three China sponsored programs to censor and intimidate foreign and Chinese activists, journalists, and government workers outside of China.¹²⁹ Groups such as the Falun Gong, followers of the Dalai Lama, or individuals such as the famous artist Ai Weiwei and Nobel Peace Prize winning Liu Xiaobo fall into this category. When they are not imprisoned, their emails are routinely hacked into; personal information is deleted or blocked.¹³⁰ In 2009, GhostNet infiltrated at least 1,295 computers in 130 countries compromising the Dalai Lama's government in exile and its contacts. "Whaling" for particular targets within the Dalai Lama's organization, it focused on specific correspondence and gained control of key computers. Due to these penetrations, Tibetan activists were detained in China and told to stop what were perceived to be anti-CCP activities. Likewise, the Chinese government meddled in other nation's affairs by pressing diplomats, whose correspondence was accessed by GhostNet, to decline their email invitations to meet

¹²⁸ Ibid pp.17

¹²⁹ Gutmann, Ethan. 2010. "Hacker Nation." *World Affairs* 173, no. 1.pp.71

¹³⁰ Ibid pp.78

with the Dalai Lama.¹³¹ . These campaigns, attacks, and intimidation techniques have negative implications for global Internet freedom.¹³²

Some of China's information campaigns, however, show China's efforts in a positive light. In establishing Confucius Institutes worldwide China hopes to promote Chinese language and culture globally and boost exchange between Chinese and foreign universities to assist in creating business activity.¹³³ Most Confucius Institutes are formed through collaboration between a local foreign university and a Chinese university. At present most are located in Southeast Asia.¹³⁴ The Office of the Chinese Language Council International (Hanban) supplies the funds to set up the program, and provides the teachers and teaching materials. There is a nominal cost to attend the classes. James Paradise in his paper entitled "The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power" broaches the question of whether these institutes are "Trojan Horses". Do the Chinese have an ulterior motive in creating this global language program, especially when those funds could be used to educate the millions of citizens in China who do not have access to secondary schooling? Is the application of the CCP

¹³¹ Markoff, John. "Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103 Countries." 29 03 2009. *New York Times*, 28 11 2011 www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/technology/29spy.html.

¹³² MacKinnon, Rebecca. "Networked Authoritarianism in China and Beyond: Implications for Global Freedom." *Liberation Technology in Authoritarian Regimes*. Palo Alto: Stanford University, 2010. pp.30

¹³³ Paradise, James. "The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power." *Asian Survey* 49, no. 4 (2009). pp6 51

¹³⁴ In the Washington DC area, there is a Confucius Institute affiliated with the University of Maryland located on campus in College Park, Maryland. This Confucius Institute Center is involved in almost every Chinese language program in Montgomery County public schools in Maryland. They partially fund these programs, provide assistant teachers in the classroom, and pay for Montgomery County students to study in China over the summer.

propaganda curriculum worldwide detrimental to freedom of speech and other core liberal beliefs? Mr. Paradise thinks not. While the CCP puts forth a rigid program of study, with highly censored study material, the actual day-to-day workings of the programs, which are far from Beijing's oversight, are flexible. Depending on their partner university and clientele the curriculum focus is flexible enough to include such diverse subjects as business, medical and health issues, and research orientation. According to interviews conducted by Paradise with several heads of Confucius Institutes, teachers are unlikely to restrict conversation flow to CCP sanctioned topics.¹³⁵ Here Mr. Paradise sees a rift between CCP expectations and the desires of the Chinese academics that run the programs. The CCP sees the language schools as a means to craft and tell its story as well as a way to bolster business activity and trade; the academics see the institutes as a way to increase exchanges with foreign scholars and thereby bolster Chinese innovation.

The operation of the Confucius Institutes in Southeast Asia provides an insight into how China seeks to advance its interests in the area. The Institutes are influential in that they teach 'Beijing' Mandarin Chinese in the mainland simplified character style rather than the traditional characters that are taught in Taiwan and used in Taiwan-based newspapers. This diminishes the exposure to Taiwan's opinion, and potentially limits its foreign policy influence.¹³⁶ In this way Beijing Chinese is becoming the business

¹³⁵ Paradise, James. "The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power." *Asian Survey* 49, no. 4 (2009). pp652

¹³⁶ Gill, Bates and Huang, Yanzhong. "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'." *Survival* 48, no. 2 (Summer 2006). pp18

and diplomatic language of the region, a soft power in its own right. The Confucius Institutes perform a regional service as well. The program educates tens-of-thousands of students in South East Asia and provides free or subsidized Chinese language study in a private primary school environment for students in poor nations like Cambodia.¹³⁷ The Confucius Institutes are therefore a classic example of Nye's soft power: a credible public diplomacy program that creates a large audience for its 'story' and attracts favorable opinion.¹³⁸

Another area in which China seeks to advance its influence is in media dissemination. In 2009, China set in motion a seven billion dollar expansion of its overseas media. This expansion includes a 24-hour all news English language channel, and the addition of French, Spanish, Arabic and Russian news channels. Xinhua news agency is also almost doubling the number of overseas bureaus from 100 to 186, and many Chinese newspapers are now publishing English language versions (whose content is completely different from the Chinese version). While this may seem benign, and a natural extension of China's soft power due to its growing importance as a world power, one must remember, one fundamental fact is unchanged: China Central Television (CCTV) is self-described as the "mouthpiece of the Party and government".¹³⁹ On the CCTV Chinese language website, the new foreign language TV channel ventures are

¹³⁷ Kurlantzick, Joshua. "China's Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia." *Current History*, September 2006. pp273

¹³⁸ Nye, Joseph. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008). pp99

¹³⁹ Bequelin, Nicholas. "China's New Propaganda Machine." *wsj.com*. Wall Street Journal Asia. January 30, 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123326012456829891.html>

portrayed as “reaching a new level in external propaganda.”¹⁴⁰ China has modernized and refocused its media objectives from old-fashioned Maoist propaganda to a more sophisticated goal; to persuade and convince its audience of the CCP’s legitimacy and its peaceful intentions.¹⁴¹ Bequelin states “English language news from China is not about informing the foreign public, it is about channeling a specific view of China to the rest of the world.”¹⁴² Given the biased and suspicious nature of China’s media, can this effort lead to soft power, enhancing China’s story of a peaceful rise?

A study by Zhang and Cameron provide analysis that any gain in positive media coverage due to a CCP funded propaganda campaign is ephemeral at best. Zhang and Cameron evaluated the success of a well-publicized September 2000 Chinese public relations campaign focused on the United States. This included a CBS *60 Minutes* interview of China’s President Jiang Zemin, a “2000 US Tour of Chinese Culture” visit to nine American cities, as well as a visit to Hawaii by the Northern Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy. Zhang and Cameron studied articles in the *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Washington Post* four months prior to the campaign and found articles about China to be predominately negative (24% were about severe crisis, 70% about conflict and 32% about violence).¹⁴³ The newspaper coverage became slightly more positive

¹⁴⁰ Ibid

¹⁴¹ Brady, Anne Marie. *Making the Foreign Serve China*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2003. pp200

¹⁴² Bequelin, Nicholas. "China's New Propaganda Machine." *wsj.com*. Wall Street Journal Asia. January 30, 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123326012456829891.html>

¹⁴³ Interestingly, Zhang and Cameron found US media coverage about all third world countries to be predominately negative.

after the media blitz, but four months after the campaign, the papers resumed their pre-campaign levels of negativity, thus the public relations effort had no lasting effect. Economic and political relations were stable during this time. This led Zhang and Cameron to believe that China's public diplomacy surge has little long-term effect on Western media coverage.¹⁴⁴

Zhang and Cameron's findings, while thought provoking, are already a decade old, a decade that has seen great change. This analysis would be more beneficial if it were current and with a corresponding solicitation of US public opinion. The article also does not attempt to discern exactly why the influence of the media campaign was fleeting. Was it due to the campaign's lack of credibility? Or do the Western media still view China through the biased and undeserved lens of communism? Or is much of the social news that comes out of China somewhat disheartening, or threatening to the United States, and therefore negative by nature? The results of Zhang and Cameron's paper are limited to proving that during a 9-month period, one Chinese public relations campaign had little or no long-term effect on the negative depiction of China in three major US newspapers. Although this study leads one to believe that China's short-term media campaigns are ineffective, more research must be done on the influence of China's current temporary and sustained media drives.

¹⁴⁴ Zhang, Juyang and Cameron, Glen T. "China's Agenda Building and Image Polishing in the US: Assessing an International Public Relations Campaign." *Public Relations Review* 29 (2003)

Historical Context of Information Control

According to the theory of constructivism, language, culture, history, collective values, and philosophy play an integral part in how a country behaves. Certainly, knowledge of China's history and study of China's predominant thinkers aids one's understanding of their domestic and foreign policy. In China, it is still common to view their country as occupying a central position, with other countries on the peripheral paying tribute to China's greatness.¹⁴⁵ Historically, Chinese have assimilated their enemies into their traditional hierarchical Confucian social structure. The nomadic Mongols and the more recent Manchurians conquered China, yet still assimilated and accepted China's leadership and social structure even as they ruled.¹⁴⁶ There are many examples of China prying into other country's affairs, mandating that foreign media, universities, and textbook companies change their tone to present China in a more positive light. Diplomats, world leaders, and journalists have been manipulated by China to alter their plans and not meet with the Dalai Lama. This may reflect a Chinese belief that Chinese leaders should have control over how China is depicted by others, or that it is within China's prerogative to restrict Western media or mandate whom a state head can meet with. Control over the world's discourse about China seems to be a strategic objective based in the Sinocentric conviction that the world will assimilate to China's set of values.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ 中国 Zhongguo, which are the Chinese characters for China, mean central country.

¹⁴⁶ Luttwak, Edward N. *The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012. P.27

¹⁴⁷ Ford, Dr. Christopher. "Sinocentrism for the Information Age: Comments on the 4th Xiangshan Forum." 15 November 2012. *New Paradigms Forum*. <http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=1498>. 05 04 2014.

From the perspective of propaganda and soft power, China's 'peaceful rise' is part of this push to control the global narrative about China and to assimilate the world. The good deeds (free education in Chinese) of the Confucius Institutes have given China influence and respect. China's media campaigns, however, have been met with suspicion, as the broadcasts are not always based on fact. China's vast espionage ventures to steal IP, as well as influence communications between foreign entities and the Dalai Lama and Falun Gong, have been successful in that they have met their goal (acquisition of billions of dollars of IP and intimidation of foreign leaders into bend to China's will). These actions, however, have also provoked global anger and distrust. PLA activity in espionage and sabotage is widespread and frequent. Because of the dangers, this area of Chinese information control requires the urgent attention of U.S. government leaders. This area least conforms to China's peaceful rise policy. General Alexander, the director of the U.S. National Security Agency, states this theft of huge amounts of IP constitutes one of the largest shifts of wealth in the history of man.¹⁴⁸ This negates China's claim that it would never resort to 'resource grabs' to build wealth. Constant cyber intrusions and sabotage of U.S. government, military and civilian information networks are not a 'peaceful' action. They are aimed at building a superior military, which arouses global suspicion.

What drives China to commit these acts? China's history of upheaval and subordination to powerful Western nations has awakened in China a desire to surpass

¹⁴⁸ American Enterprise Institute. *Cyber Security and American Power*. July 09, 2012. <http://www.aei.org/events/2012/07/09/cybersecurity-and-american-power/> . General Alexander states this at the 15:54 minute mark.

the U.S. economically and resume its rightful global position. China's late Qing dynasty history is marked by foreign invasion, domination, and civil war, marring China's proud history of notable cultural and scientific innovations. Its relationship with the West is impaired by a century of humiliations enforced on China by the advanced military technology of the West and Japan from the First Opium War in 1839, to the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. In the tension filled post 1989 Tiananmen crackdown atmosphere, U.S. military information dominance in Desert Storm stoked the fear of another round of Western domination of China. The Chinese Communist Party, fearful of a repetition of history, and understanding the advantages of quick modernization, began a program of acquisition of high-level technology by any means necessary.¹⁴⁹

In 1990, Deng Xiaoping had already started his policy of "gaige kaifang", "to reform, and open up to the world". The result, through agricultural and market reform, was a GDP growth of 8-10% per year, which has continued to this day.¹⁵⁰ This has increased China's standard of living, political stability and citizen's confidence in the CCP. To sustain this extraordinary growth, and create a balance of power with the United States, China must continue to thrust forward in technology. At present, China's

¹⁴⁹ Spence, Jonathan D. *The Search For Modern China*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990.pp.139-333, Lieberthal, Kenneth. *Governing China; From Revolution Through Reform*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004.pp19-53, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. *Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation*. McLean, Virginia: Northrup Grumman Corporation, October 2009.

¹⁵⁰ Hu, Angang. *China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011.
pp.23

lack of innovative ability makes this impossible without technology theft. China's feelings of injustice, rooted in its past with the West, allow China to commit this theft without remorse.¹⁵¹

This strong sense of injustice and suspicion of the West leads to strong support of the CCP among the Chinese people. In addition, Confucian values advocate trust in the government as a source of stability and guardian of morals, a foundational quality of the Chinese people.¹⁵² Historically, Confucianism connects the economic strength of the state to legitimate rule, and advocates censorship as a tool to regulate moral and political life.¹⁵³ Thus, censorship in China is a common theme throughout its history of dynastic rule.¹⁵⁴ Not surprisingly, 84% of Chinese citizens approve of Internet regulation and control.¹⁵⁵

Many in China fear the strong influence of American culture and values, which also increases support for censorship and information control. China doubts America's true motives in advocating for human rights, freedom of speech and democracy, and

¹⁵¹Gries, Peter Hayes. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy*. Berkley: University of California Press, 2004. pp.101

¹⁵² Jiang, Min. "Authoritarian Informationalism: China's Approach to Internet Sovereignty." *SAIS Review*, Summer-Fall 2010: pp.76

¹⁵³ Ibid pp.77

¹⁵⁴ The emperor of the Qin dynasty, unifier of China, in 200BC burned books that were deemed threatening to that government. Even Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Kuomintang, manipulated high school textbook information and censored media, newspapers, books, movies to sway Chinese to the Kuomintang side. (Spence, Jonathan D. *The Search For Modern China*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990.pp.414) Chiang Kai-shek continued his censorship campaign in Taiwan.

¹⁵⁵ Fallows, Deborah. "Few in China Complain About Internet Controls." *Pew Internet & American Life Project*. March 28, 2008. <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/776/china-internet>

regards this resolve as an effort to sabotage Chinese political stability.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, the Chinese people see the Internet as a U.S. military invention, and therefore an instrument of foreign infiltration and possible oppression.¹⁵⁷ New media is similarly regarded as a tool of the West to further its hegemonic strategy. According to Liu Ruisheng, a researcher for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the goal of the United States is to push for network freedom in an attempt to spread democracy. He emphasizes the need for “ideological security” to guard against American values on the internet.¹⁵⁸

As an example of the power of the seemingly benign new media, Chinese leaders cite the recent revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East. They have been called “twitter” revolutions because of the use of social media to organize protesters. China worries how much US domination of new media played a part in these citizen uprisings, and what the ramifications will be in China. China considers US support of the Dalai Lama, Falun Gong and Chinese dissidents Chen Guangcheng, Rebiya Kadeer and Liu Xiaobo as provocative efforts to divide China and even plant seeds of democratic revolution.¹⁵⁹ Regardless, China also understands the usefulness of new media. China’s

¹⁵⁶ Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Jisi Wang. *Addressing U.S.- China Strategic Distrust*. Washington D.C.: The John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, 2012. pp.12

¹⁵⁷ Jiang, Min. "Authoritarian Informationalism: China's Approach to Internet Sovereignty." *SAIS Review*, Summer-Fall 2010. pp.79

¹⁵⁸ Markoff, John. "Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103 Countries." *New York Times*. 03 29, 2009. www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/technology/29spy.html

¹⁵⁹ Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Jisi Wang. *Addressing U.S.- China Strategic Distrust*. Washington D.C.: The John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, 2012. pp.13

“New Media Development Report (2011)” stresses new media’s importance for economic development, but also stresses the “need to uphold national security by ensuring social media as serving the people, socialism, and peaceful development.”¹⁶⁰ Similarly, a Chinese Internet white paper states that China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, and encourages openness and innovation in the field of Internet technology to fuel China’s economic engine¹⁶¹. This brings to light that element in China’s government that understands that unrestrained information control will hurt China’s economy and espouses the need for more freedom of speech as well cooperation on cyber problems.¹⁶² Elizabeth Economy calls this a kind of “schizophrenia”; the Chinese know freedom of information is needed for innovation, but simultaneously fear the instability of uncontrolled ideas.¹⁶³

Understanding China’s different approaches to controlling information, as well as the impact of divergent CCP views on the matter, are crucial to finding solutions. Internet and information freedom are core to the deliberative nature of the U.S.

¹⁶⁰ 中国社会科学院 China Academy of Social Sciences. ""China's New Media Development Report" 《中国新媒体发展报告》 Zhongguo Xinmeiti Fazhan Baogao." *Social Sciences Academic Press 社会科学文献出版社 Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe*. 07 12,2011.
<http://www.ssap.com.cn/WebSites/ChinaInternet/ChannelManager/ShouYe/WangShangZhiBo/lanzhibo/8L2QxT8F0TFIhbowv1a2Gf9ZLjDpINrtijOa%20gbhcmsbhcms.htm>

¹⁶¹ Information Office of the State Council. "China's Peaceful Development." *China Embassy*. 09 06, 2011.
<http://fi.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t855931.htm>

¹⁶² Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2011., Dobbins, Gompert and Shlapak, *Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequenses and Strategies for Deterrence*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. pg3

¹⁶³ Bennet, Isabella. *Media Censorship in China*. Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013.

economic and political systems. Likewise, China's systematic cyber-espionage and theft of billions of dollars of US intellectual property (IP) hurts the U.S. economy and hinders U.S.-China cooperation. If, however, Joseph Nye's statements are correct and China's fears of information freedom are partially based in a belief that the United States uses information freedom to increase instability in China, the United States must counter this belief and calm its forceful rhetoric when possible. Cold War language used in the US media and policy circles when referring to cyber difficulties with China heightens tensions and defensive measures on both sides and intensifies distrust. Policy makers and the media frequently use "wartime as the paradigm case", such as David Sanger's headline "A New Cold War in Cyberspace" in his NYT article. Language such as this only serves to escalate suspicions.¹⁶⁴

How Can the United States Safeguard China's Peaceful Rise in the Age of the Internet?

The crux of the 'peaceful rise' dilemma lies in China's hopes for harmony and prosperity juxtaposed against fears of internal instability and Western hegemony. Because of this duality, the CCP recognizes the advantages and disadvantages of declaring a peaceful foreign policy to the world. China itself does not yet know what

¹⁶⁴ Penny, Jon. "Internet Censorship and the Rememberance of Infowars Past." *Berkman Center, Harvard*. 02 25, 2013. <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2013/01/penney> at 55 minute mark. This was a comment by Joseph Nye, who was in the audience.

kind of power it wants to be.¹⁶⁵ China's leaders do not agree on how to proceed.

Military leaders and CCP hawks see the United States as a block to superpower status.

Therefore, 'all peaceful strategies that would prevent China's rise must be excluded'.¹⁶⁶

Others say the true threat to China's stability is not external, but internal. China's political culture is hardly "harmonious" as China's top leaders disagree on domestic and foreign policy.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, the show of uncertainty surrounding 'peaceful rise' and other Chinese policies could be a strategy of ambiguity to provide Chinese leadership with maximum flexibility. Perhaps the more threatening voices in Chinese politics are given the stage to intimidate and deter U.S. action.

Regardless of the veracity of 'peaceful rise', China's actions in cyberspace have not been peaceful. It has been proven that Chinese political and military leaders actively seek to exploit, manipulate, disable and corrupt information in U.S. cyber networks as well as interrupt and manipulate the flow of information. This is a serious issue; it places U.S. political, military, and diplomatic social processes at risk and, therefore, must be addressed.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵Economy, Elizabeth. "The End of Peaceful Rise? Even China's Elites Don't Know Where it's Headed." *Foreign Policy*. December 29, 2010. www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/the_end_of_the_peaceful_rise

¹⁶⁶Bonnie S Glaser and Evan S Medeiros (2007). "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of 'Peaceful Rise' ". *The China Quarterly*, http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0305741007001208 pp.204. Yan Xuetong, head of the Institute of International Studies at Qinghua argued this.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid pp.208

¹⁶⁸ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. *Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation*. McLean, Virginia: Northrup Grumman Corporation, October 2009.

In light of the U.S. –China mutual distrust, there are many areas of potential misunderstanding. The United States must engage China. As the balance of CCP opinion tips from economic partnership and ‘peaceful rise’ to aggressive militaristic suspicion, the United States must pursue policies that add weight to those CCP opinions that favor collaboration. China’s economy also relies on the Internet as its lifeline. Negotiations with China about the free flow of information should highlight the economic advantages for all, the global consequences to unimpeded cyber theft, and the benefits of global norms, standards, guidelines, and regulation in cyberspace. China and the United States must initiate high-level talks with an emphasis on commitment, seeking common areas of concern and working together to calm tensions and reduce risk of conflict.¹⁶⁹ Whether China’s rise is peaceful or not partially depends on the ability of the United States and China to bely mutual fears and cooperate on areas of common concern. China fears the U.S. commitment to information freedom and sees it as a weapon. The United States fears information control. Given such a wide divergence of opinion, it is important to find common issues to in order to open dialogue.

The United States and China have worked together to ensure peace in Asia for over thirty years. Nixon and Zhou Enlai sought common ground and set aside differences in opinion to ally against our common threats to national security. Kissinger

Thomas, Timothy L. "Like Adding Wings to the Tiger: Chinese Information War Theory and Practice." *Foreign Military Studies Office*. July-September 2003.
<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/chinaiw.htm>

¹⁶⁹ Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2011. pp.523

would ask the United States and China to do the same today.¹⁷⁰ Dai Bingguo, former State Counselor of the PRC, in light of rapid globalization, also urges the need for mutually beneficial cooperation.¹⁷¹ Candid exchanges and a development of rapport with Chinese leadership may lead to mutually beneficial practical solutions. Cyber-crime through bank fraud and identity theft is a problem the United States shares with China. China also voices its concerns about cyber maliciousness. Their systems are under constant attack. Because much of China's software is pirated, and is therefore not updated and patched, China's cyber apparatus is even more vulnerable than those in the United States. A collaborative effort to fight crime, overcome the problems of attribution to identify hackers, and prevent these attacks would benefit both countries and increase transparency and trust. A discussion to establish common terms, norms, and thresholds is mutually beneficial. Terms such as cyber war, critical infrastructure, freedom of speech and information, and cyber terrorism have different connotations in China and America. Likewise, leaders of both countries need to have a frank discussion about the ramifications of a powerful cyber-attack. Given the interconnectedness of the world's systems, the targeted nation would not be the only one harmed.¹⁷²

Including China in worldwide debates on internet governance, considering their suspicions, may assist us in finding common ground. To invigorate deliberation amongst

¹⁷⁰ Ibid pg526

¹⁷¹ Ibid pp.509

¹⁷² Dobbins, James, David C Gompert, David A Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell. *Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. pp.3

our peoples, and create innovative solutions, American and Chinese companies and government agencies can form a collaborative effort to educate citizens of both countries in cyber security and cyber-terms. This effort can be taken on by media (TV and internet news shows or newspaper columns) or at educational centers. To further mutual understanding, an increase in funds to train U.S. scientists and technology specialists in Chinese language skills is also beneficial. Similarly, a joint effort to build smart phone applications to aid in education, promote health and encourage ecologically sound habits could highlight the positive aspects of information freedom.

Furthermore, while the U.S. and China may never agree on what kinds of free speech are lawful,¹⁷³ discussions can begin with topics that both countries can agree are harmful to society, such as child pornography and human trafficking. Working together on shared interests can lead to understanding in other areas, such as word definitions and mutually agreed upon terminology.

The complicated and non-transparent nature of both countries' cyber defense structures causes communications difficulties. China's system is opaque, while America's is divided among several agencies. To facilitate clearer cooperation between the two countries, streamlined communications on the topic of cyber security must be initiated. The communications paradigm presently used is based upon arms control negotiations, a comparison that is not entirely useful. The arms control model is convenient as a cyber-deterrent, but also emphasizes competition. A negotiation

¹⁷³ The U.S. cannot even agree on this point with its NATO allies. Many forms of hate speech, such as Nazi rhetoric and holocaust denial, are illegal in Europe but legal in the United States.

standard based on health issues, on the other hand, would emphasize information sharing and defensive measures. The example of negotiations used in environmental talks should also be considered. Looking at cyberspace as a “global commons” to be nurtured and protected would enhance cyber security in both countries.¹⁷⁴

Conclusion

While it is not known if a spirit of U.S.-China collaboration will guarantee China’s peaceful rise, aggressive measures will only add to mutual distrust. Robert Kagan believes the U.S. policies of free trade and information freedom must be imposed on ‘reluctant partners’.¹⁷⁵ He states the best and most logical policies do not necessarily win, rather, the policies of the strongest win. Kagan states that because the United States has suppressed its power, China has expanded its ambitions and recalculated what is off limits.¹⁷⁶ World politics in this view is win-lose. He feels if the United States loses its hegemonic position, chaos will ensue.¹⁷⁷

Kagan’s world is West-oriented without flexibility to include outside possibilities. Given China’s present internal disagreement, Kagan’s doctrine could tip the balance of CCP appraisal towards aggressive policies. The fact is; China is rising. Millions have

¹⁷⁴Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Peter W Singer. *Cybersecurity and U.S.- China Relations*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2012.pp26

¹⁷⁵ Kagan, Robert. *The World America Made*. New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012.pp43

¹⁷⁶ Ibid pp86

¹⁷⁷ Ibid pp99

been lifted out of poverty. U.S. information freedom policy aims to give these people a voice in global affairs. The future that includes these Chinese, and millions of other worldwide, will be politically (and religiously, culturally, socially) diverse, and it may not be possible to confine them to a Western concept of governance. Frankly, the United States does not have the finances to bend the entire world to its will. Alternatively, the United States must work with our global neighbors to build framework for cooperation and continued economic growth. Success is not assured, but it may be the most promising route.

China does not yet know what kind of power it wants to be. It is unlikely that the indecision and ambivalence seen in China's foreign policy is a mastermind strategy to confuse the United States into inaction. The disharmony in Zhonghainan (the Chinese leadership compound) has provided too much embarrassing fodder for worldwide media to be staged.¹⁷⁸ The split between moderate CCP leaders and their nationalistic and hawkish colleagues is evident. This split is evident in the United States as well. America has China policy analysts who distrust China (Scobell, Mulvenon, Perry Link, Anne-Marie Brady, and Larry Wortzel) as well as those who believe China is not a threat (Kissinger, Jeffery Bader, Lieberthal). Inherent in China's dialogue about 'peaceful rise' are fears similar to the ambivalence surrounding the issues of information control and information freedom. Fears of American hegemonic power constraining China's rise, supported by Western history, fuel China's aggressively defensive posture and

¹⁷⁸ The 2011 murder of Englishman Neil Haywood and the subsequent downfall of Bo Xilai and jailing of his wife Gu Kailai is but one example of the tense power grabs that are indicative of today's Chinese politics.

threatening rhetoric. The threatening rhetoric, in kind, leads to American distrust of China's true intentions. Tit-for-tat situations easily escalate.

A Cold War stance toward China will lead to disharmony and possible aggression. Our two countries have too much in common, too much to lose, to go down that path. The United States and China have partnered in securing peace in East Asia for over thirty years, mainly by finding common ground. The two countries should continue to face their problems in this same spirit. This paper has shown that mutual distrust is partially born out of ignorance, and reliance on subjective history. Mutual understanding, through education of the two country's citizens and exchange programs for our military and political leaders, must become the status quo. The big picture shows both China and the United States succeed in the current world system. The current system includes a peacefully rising China, and an economic system based on information freedom.

It must be made clear to China; information control will hurt China's and America's economic security. In a 2010 Cisco, report researchers look at five possible future scenarios for the internet based on ease of connectivity, technological progress, and user behavior. In one scenario, relentless cyber-attacks undermine user trust. Sophisticated internet security makes it too expensive for the average user. In another, protectionist policy and strong regulation slows economic activity and restrains the internet's potential. The most successful scenario depicts a world in which information flows freely, connection is global, and fierce competition leads to affordable and highly

useful communication hardware and software.¹⁷⁹ In order to guarantee this outcome, China's peaceful rise, and ensure a prosperous collective future, the United States must persuade China to stay on this path.

¹⁷⁹ Cisco and Global Business Network. "The Evolving Internet: Driving Forces, Uncertainties, and Four Scenarios to 2025." August 2010.
http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2010/ekits/Evolving_Internet_GBN_Cisco_2010_Aug.pdf

Chapter Three

ICANN as the New Battleground for Information Control: What is at Stake?

A struggle for the future of the Internet is currently being played out on the global stage. The number of organizational acronyms, business contracts, technical innovations, human rights issues, governance disagreements, and hidden agendas make this a complex issue with complex solutions. Recent news about NSA surveillance and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers' (ICANN) restructuring of oversight (cutting its ties with the US Department of Commerce) has highlighted global fears about information control, state sovereignty, human rights, and the future of Internet governance (IG). At the heart of this topic are the foundational Western values upon which the Internet was built: unhindered free flow of information, freedom of assembly online, right to privacy, and the transparency and accountability of the Internet's governing bodies to those citizens who use the networks. The powers that threaten these values are authoritarian governments like the Communist Chinese Party (CCP). Chinese leaders fear the bottom-up nature of the current IG hinders their ability to control politically and socially destabilizing information. Increasing the scope of this struggle is the fact that information is power. In the future, who will wield this power? Those who control information and those who are able to eliminate obstacles to information will determine who benefits from the information revolution, and who is left behind. Thus, the conversation about Internet governance is punctuated by fear and distrust. Fear that the digital sphere, network content, and network technology will be used to exclude certain countries, or groups of people from the economic promises of the information revolution. "The Internet's architecture is now ground zero for

geopolitical conflict, rising state power, and the future of what counts as basic liberties in the digital era”¹⁸⁰

At the center of China’s concern over U.S. oversight of ICANN, is US information technology supremacy. China is fearful the United States will employ its information domination, and spread subversive ideas, with the intent to cause the downfall of the CCP. As a result, China seeks to pry the Internet from US control.

The United States seeks to keep the power of information in the hands of the world’s citizens through multi-stakeholder (MSH) Internet governance (IG). Government information control in Syria, China, and Iran (as well as cybercrime attacks to Target and Neiman Marcus) have shown that the same technology that brings a world of information to the palm of one’s hand can be manipulated and become harmful to the world’s netizens.

This paper will explore MSH governance through a study of ICANN, its history, its governance structure, and its future. The term “multi-stakeholder” will be studied in its many forms. Although China’s IG policies are not transparent, this paper will study China’s actions. China is a vocal advocate for UN oversight of ICANN as an alternative to the current U.S. Department of Commerce oversight, which would place the heart of the

¹⁸⁰¹⁸⁰ DeNardis, Laura. "The Cyber-Espionage X-Files." 18 10 2013. *Science Magazine*. 25 03 2014. <http://blackcodebook.com/docs/sciencemag.pdf>>.

Internet in the control of governments rather than Internet engineers, business, and netizens. It is important to understand why.

Lastly, I will discuss the importance of the MSHG model as the Internet spreads to all areas of the globe, connecting to evermore people and things. China is zealously researching and developing new Internet technologies such as the Internet of Things (IOT), a technology that will expand the Internet multifold. I will conclude this paper with an analysis of the importance of MSH input for technical standards and IG legitimacy as the digital networks explode with possibilities.

Why China Seeks to Influence Internet Governance

In the mid-twenty first century, China is expected to surpass the United States as the world's largest economy. China's miraculous economic rise is the result of hard work, focused policy, and its embrace of the global economy and the free marketplace. China's tight grip on the political and social agenda, coupled with loosening of economic policy has strengthened its rise to a middleclass society. China's authoritarian form of capitalism has made it the envy of many developing countries, broadening its soft power appeal. This combination of growing appeal and rising economic status has spurred China to seek influence on the global stage. One such area is Internet governance.

China's vibrant Internet society is the largest in the world with 618 million netizens yet, it ranks at the bottom in terms of Internet freedom.¹⁸¹ This is due to its heavy restriction, censorship, and online manipulation of information. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not only blocks and changes information that enters into their network, it also changes, blocks, and censors their citizen's expressed content. As the world becomes increasingly connected, these restrictions become increasingly difficult to control. To facilitate effective and speedy information exchange, the basic private-sector architecture of the Internet is based on information freedom and unquestioned connections between users. The Chinese government finds this Internet construction to be too unconstrained and under the spell of U.S. information hegemony. China seeks Internet sovereignty and multilateral government control of the Internet rather than the current MSH model comprised of software and hardware technicians, private sector, business, and governments.

Control of the Internet's core technical architecture would help China eradicate many challenges to maintaining and enforcing cyber control. The challenges are: "The need for Internet operators to be globally coordinated and compatible; the ability of domestic actors to grasp the communicative opportunities of the Internet; the greater

¹⁸¹ Peterson, Andrea. "China has Almost Twice as Many Internet users as the U.S. has People." 31 01 2014. *The Washington Post*. 31 03 2014. <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/31/china-has-almost-twice-as-many-internet-users-as-the-u-s-has-people/>>. "Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media." 03 October 2013. *Freedom House*. 04 12 2013. <http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013_Full%20Report_0.pdf>.

transparency fostered by the Internet communications; and China's need to maintain trade relations with the rest of the world."¹⁸²

The Chinese leadership's desire for control over society and information originates in Confucian thought in 600B.C.E.. In China, scholars tend to reach back to a highly structured social paradise depicted in ancient Chinese texts to find the wisdom and strategy to move forward.¹⁸³ Ancient Chinese scholars Confucius, Xunzi, and Mencius all believe that peace can be achieved if human behavior is restricted by those above them in the Confucian hierarchy. The Confucian 'rectification of names' is an ancient Chinese ritual which names different elements in the social structure, and determines their appropriate spot in the rigid hierarchy. By this naming, the role, and future conduct of the element are decided by those who have the power to name. Xunzi said that increasing material wealth will not lead to a harmonious society.¹⁸⁴ Instead, establishing rites and rituals for societal structure creates clear distinctions and enables all to understand their role in society.¹⁸⁵ This is an interesting lens through which to view China's recent activities in Internet governance. If China does the naming, it then will have the power to mandate the hierarchical placement, the role and the behavioral expectations of the element named. The West views this as problematic, because the success of the Confucian social structure hinges on the leadership of an

¹⁸² Mueller, Milton. "China and Global Internet Governance: A Tiger By the Tail." Deibert, Ronald, et al. *Access Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012. 177-194. P.186

¹⁸³ Luttwalk P.260

Yan, Xuetong. *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton university Press, 2011. P..36

¹⁸⁴ Yan, Xuetong P.175

¹⁸⁵ Ibid P.37

omnipotent, wise, and benevolent dictator. If the emperor dictator's morals fail, heaven will support a people's revolution to overthrow him, and will seat a new leader. This explains the CCP's obsession with regime legitimacy and stability. It also elucidated the West's ideological split with China. The West is suspicious of unchecked government authority, and prefers the use of systematic checks and balances to prevent the misuse of power.

A History of Internet Governance

The Internet started as an Advanced Research Projects (ARPA) development in the 1950's, and was thus called ARPANET. ARPA was a Department of Defense agency initiated by President Eisenhower to develop technology to compete with the USSR's space initiatives such as Sputnik. ARPA later became DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects). ARPANET was strictly controlled by DOD until the early 1980's, and while many US academics from MIT, Harvard, Stanford and Berkley were involved in its pioneering days, the system was tightly restricted, only connecting computer to computer. Eventually, internal networks, run by the National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET), were formed to support research communication, and a web of networks formed.¹⁸⁶ An outgrowth of private Internet service providers (ISP) developed

¹⁸⁶ Powell, Alvin. "Happy Birthday Web." 11 03 2014. *Harvard*. 11 03 2014. <http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2014/03/happy-birthday-eb/?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=03.12.daily%2520%281%29>.

to connect networks to serve the commercial Internet traffic, which was prohibited on NSFNET and ARPANET.¹⁸⁷

As the Internet grew, Internet protocol (IP) addresses became an area in need of standards and oversight. Each IP address had to be unique in order for each name or sequence of numbers to serve a single party. Furthermore, the use of the Internet for commercial purposes was flourishing. A transparent organization was needed to take up the responsibility of assigning the millions of names and numbers needed globally. As a result, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was founded by Jon Postel in 1998, as a multi-stakeholder organization comprised of technology innovators, academics, business, world citizens, and governments.¹⁸⁸ ICANN's motto of "one world one Internet" emphasizes its desire to be a reflection of the global and diverse citizens of the Internet.¹⁸⁹ According to its website, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN):

"coordinates the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, which are key technical services critical to the continued operations of the Internet's underlying address book, the Domain Name System (DNS). The IANA functions include: (1) the coordination of the assignment of technical protocol parameters including the management of the address and routing parameter area (ARPA) top-level domain; (2) the administration of certain responsibilities associated with Internet DNS root zone management such as generic (gTLD) and country code (ccTLD) Top-Level Domains; (3) the allocation of Internet numbering resources; and (4)

¹⁸⁷ Singer, P.W. and Allan Friedman. *Cyber Security and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. P..26

¹⁸⁸ Ibid p.29

¹⁸⁹ ICANN. *Welcome*. n.d. 10 03 2014. <<https://www.icann.org/en/about/welcome>>.

other services. ICANN performs the IANA functions under a U.S. Government contract.”¹⁹⁰

Irrespective of ICANN’s U.S. government affiliation, it is a MSH organization, and seeks perspectives from all corners of the globe and multiple layers of society. Additionally, ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) is open to all national governments that seek participation.

On the Internet, one’s IP address is one’s identity. This gives ICANN a great deal of power, for it decides who receives what top-level domain (TLD) addresses such as .com, or .net, or .edu, (as well as a recent flourish of new TLD addresses, such as .cheese, .apple, .plumbing, to name a few.) and can also decide to reject a request if the address is uncivil or misleading. ICANN’s power over these functions gives it increased visibility and scrutiny. It is, however, only one of many internet governance organizations. ICANN and its brother organization, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), represent just one layer of a multi-layer organism that is IG. It embodies the technical and engineering level of IG. The discussion of Internet content takes place at a different layer.

The present day Internet still lacks basic standards and norms, not to mention laws. While this has benefited entrepreneurs, it has also benefited spies, cybercriminals, and data miners. The threat of cyber-attacks and the theft of personal information and intellectual property have started a global conversation about establishing norms and standards, sharing information on cyber-crime, and even

¹⁹⁰ Ibid

forming regulations. At the heart of this dialogue is fear that an unwitting change in the young and successful architecture of the Internet could have vast and damaging repercussions.

As nations come to the table to address cyber-attacks and cyber-crime, China has aggressively pushed to change the free nature of the Internet structure. Their desire is to hamper the influence of the US value of freedom of expression, and extricate the Internet from its current MSH governance. The goal is to leave Internet governance in the hands of the UN's International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which favors world government consensus rather than business, academia, technology developers, and NGO consensus. The ITU, as an international organization that linked nations, was a new concept at its time of conception in 1865. The ITU, however, reserved the right to "stop any transmission that they considered to be a violation of national laws, public order, or morals." ITU ensured a new era of global communication, but ensured the status quo powerful governments stayed in control.¹⁹¹ This model would not be sufficiently dynamic to be used for Internet governance, and would encourage power politics to be played out in the digital realm.

Because of the Internet architecture and protocol, application for new ways to use the Internet and software can be applied directly onto the underlying network. As a result, today's Internet is an arena teeming with innovation. This is how applications like Skype, Facebook, Twitter, WeChat can be laid over the existing structure with no

¹⁹¹ Singer, P.W. and Allan Friedman. *Cyber Security and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014.P.181

need to ask permission from a governmental body or a communications company. The Internet innovations witnessed by the world have been rapid and unhampered due to this lack of government regulation. Adherence to standards is voluntary; there is no Internet regulation authority. This has worked well for business and information flow. Many countries, however, deeply object to an unregulated Internet, and want to control what citizens can do online; whom they connect to, what their online content is, and their means of expression.¹⁹² This information policy would be harmful to the US economy, but since so much commerce is conducted over the Internet, it would be harmful to the economic development of authoritarian nations as well.

The Internet economy already constitutes over 4% of GDP in G-20 countries, and funds over 8% of GDP in some developing countries. Predictions estimate that there will be 3 billion people online by 2016, and that 80% of broadband connections will be via smartphones and tablets. The fastest growing group of Internet users is in developing G-20 countries such as Brazil.¹⁹³ The growth predictions from the implementation of the Internet of Things (IOT) (or as General Electric calls it “the Industrial Internet”) is even more astounding. General Electric forecasts upward growth of \$15 trillion to the global economy from the IOT, which would add 20% to the world’s economy.¹⁹⁴ This new technology will only succeed with a strong Internet infrastructure, seamless flow of

¹⁹² Powell, Alvin. "Happy Birthday Web." 11 03 2014. *Harvard*. 11 03 2014. <http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2014/03/happy-birthday-web/?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=03.12.daily%2520%281%29>.

¹⁹³ Boston Consulting Group. "The Connected World: The Internet Economy in the G-20." March 2012. *BCG*. 23 March 2014. <<http://www.bcg.com/documents/file100409.pdf>>.

¹⁹⁴ Evans, Peter C. and Marco Annunziata. "Industrial Internet: Pushing the Boundaries of Minds and Machines." 26 November 2012. *General Electric*. 23 March 2014. <http://www.ge.com/docs/chapters/Industrial_Internet.pdf>.p.34

information, support for the huge increase in data-flow, innovative leadership and technical talent, robust Internet security, and an Internet governance culture and leadership that supports these pioneering advances.¹⁹⁵

Multi-Stakeholder Internet Governance

Internet governance decides its accessibility, speed, security, and connectivity. The MSH model is a diverse multi-layered complex network of organizations, each with a different MSH composition. Policy makers fight for equal Internet access for all, “global technical standardization ensures interoperability; cyber security maintains stability and authentication; and centralized coordination ensures that each Internet name and number is globally unique”.¹⁹⁶ Presently, most IG is run by engineers, academics, civil society, business, and governments that can act and react to the speedy growth and technological changes, which are an inherent part of the global Internet. Authoritarian governments such as China find this organic, bottom-up Internet growth and leadership to be problematic. China seeks tighter standards, regulations, and charges for Internet usage, much of the kind that the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) sets for telephone, telegraph, radio, and satellite frequencies. The Chinese fear the present governance model is not sufficiently stable and secure. Furthermore, they feel the present governance model favors U.S. companies and U.S. surveillance

¹⁹⁵ Ibid p.5 & 33

¹⁹⁶ DeNardis, Dr. Laura and Mark Dr. Raymond. *Thinking Clearly about Multistakeholder Internet Governance*. Eighth Annual GigaNet Symposium. Washington, DC: CIGI & American University, 2013.

capabilities, and undermines national sovereignty laws.¹⁹⁷ Many of the changes China seeks will increase government control over the Internet and make government censorship easier to accomplish.

Wang Chen, PRC State Council Chief of Information had this to say about an open Internet: "As long as our country is linked to the global Internet, there will be channels and means for all sorts of harmful foreign information to appear on our domestic Internet. As long as our Internet is open to the public, there will be channels and means for netizens to express all sorts of speech on the Internet. Unavoidably, many actual contradictions and problems in society are reported on the Internet"¹⁹⁸ This fear and desire to control is held back only by China's need to engage in the marketplace to continue their economic development. China sees the US support of a free Internet and freedom of expression as a doctrinal weapon aimed to corrode the values and stability of their nation.

Much of this ideological struggle has focused on the leadership structure of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and its subsidiary, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which is overseen by the U.S. Commerce Department's National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA). ICANN is a non-profit organization that manages the Domain Name System (DNS),

¹⁹⁷ The Economist. "System Error: Governments Squabble Over New Rules for the Internet." 01 December 2012. *The Economist*. 23 March 2014. <<http://www.economist.com/news/21567340-governments-squabble-over-new-rules-internet-system-error>>.

¹⁹⁸ Mueller, Milton. "China and Global Internet Governance: A Tiger By the Tail." Deibert, Ronald, et al. *Access Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012. 177-194.P.180
Wang Chen, PRC State Council Chief of Information. April 29, 2010

which allocates domain names such as www.JHU.edu and translates these letters into numbers understood by computers. “The Internet Domain Name System is a critical component of the Internet infrastructure. The DNS associates user-friendly domain names (e.g., www.ntia.doc.gov) with the numeric network addresses (e.g., 170.110.225.155) required to deliver information on the Internet, making the Internet easier for the public to navigate.”¹⁹⁹ This function has been compared to names and numbers in a phonebook. A name or business corresponds to a specific phone number; if the phone number is mistakenly allocated to two businesses, the system does not work. Because ICANN has control over the DNS, it can decide who receives what address. It also routes requests to the respective .com, .edu, .net, .gov websites. This is a lot of power, which, if misused, could theoretically route Internet users away from certain websites and toward others. ICANN also has control over what written languages can be used in Top-Level Domain Names. Non-Latin written languages such as Chinese, Arabic, and Cyrillic have only been added since 2010. Chinese top-level domains such as .中国 (.China), .公司 (.COM), and .网络 (.NET) are overseen by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), not ICANN, and its registry is maintained by the China Internet Information Center (CNNIC). This exposes them to CCP political manipulation.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ NTIA. *National Telecommunication and Information Administration*. n.d. 23 03 2014. <<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/domain-name-system>>.

²⁰⁰ Newman, Lily Hay. *The US Is Trying to do the Right Thing About Internet Freedom, But it Could Backfire*. 18 03 2014. 23 03 2014. <http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/03/18/the_u_s_isn_t_going_to_run_icann_anymore.html>.

Authoritarian governments balk at the fact that this crucial function is under the oversight of the US government, and see this as a case of US information hegemony. China (in league with countries like Russia, Syria, and Iran) has sought to pry these functions from ICANN and transfer them to the ITU in order for sovereign nations to exert more control on their digital networks. The ITU, as a UN organization, is controlled by governments rather than Internet stakeholders such as citizens, IT coders, commerce, and engineers. Many feel as Rebecca Mackinnon, that the UN lends “legitimacy to dictators”²⁰¹ by giving authoritarian governments a voice over that of their citizens, and this scheme will thwart freedom of information and as well as Internet innovation. In 2012 at the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai, 150 nations gathered to discuss this issue. The negotiations at this conference made abundantly clear the depth of division over this Internet topic. The key issue discussed was whether the International Telecommunications Regulations Treaty would be changed to include the Internet, and thus give this sector of IG to the ITU. This revision would undermine the influence of Internet experts, and citizens. Spam control, widely viewed as a means to censor Internet content in an internationally acceptable manner, was also discussed. The number of countries that signed the treaty is thought to be eighty-nine, sobering proof of the level of dissatisfaction with the status quo.²⁰² Representatives from the United

²⁰¹ MacKinnon, Rebecca. "Networked Authoritarianism in China and Beyond: Implications for Global Freedom." *Liberation Technology in Authoritarian Regimes*. Palo Alto: Stanford University, 2010.P.204

²⁰² Kehl, Danielle and Tim Maurer. "Did the U.N. Internet Governance Summit Actually Accomplish Anything?" 12 August 2012. *Slate*. 23 March 2014.

States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and other likeminded countries walked out of the conference in protest. This ideological divide loosely resembles that of the Cold War, but with so many developing countries just entering into the networked world, and so much at stake for global economies, the results of this vote reveals a depth of distrust in the status quo, and ignorance of the complex workings of the Internet. These proceedings revealed an opportunity to build trust, educate the developing world about the Internet and its layers of expertise, and strengthen capacity building.

The U.S. government actively seeks to maintain the multi-stakeholder Internet governance as its process as “rooted in democratic values, involving the participation of all interested stakeholders, and occurring in a transparent manner”.²⁰³ There are, however, many different views of what this multi-stakeholder Internet governance should look like. The present model embodies the ideals of the California academics that helped create the Internet. They planned this information realm to be trans-governmental, and overseen by a diverse collection of world citizens. This model, however, is not sustainable. The economic health as well as national security of a majority of the world’s nations is aligned with the functionality and security of the Internet. Furthermore, many physical components of the Internet are located in sovereign nations. These include routers, cables, and satellite infrastructure, as well as

<http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/12/14/wcit_2012_has_ended_did_the_u_n_internet_governance_summit_accomplish_anything.html>.

²⁰³ Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. "U.S. Government Submission to NETmundial on Internet Governance." 24 02 2014. *U.S. Department of State*. 23 03 2014. <<http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/prsr/2014/221946.htm>>.

private companies. It is natural for countries to want to ensure the safety of these important economic and political interests.²⁰⁴

The tension between information security and Internet freedom is shared by both sides of the debate. China seeks to eliminate information it deems politically or socially destabilizing. The United States seeks to monitor information it believe is harmful to national security. The technology needed to censor and monitor information, whether the information is terrorist activity or dissident writings, child porn or poetry, criminal spam or legitimate emails, is the same. This is a hotly debated issue with no clear answers. The balance between security and liberty is only recognized as one swings by it, or in hindsight. Transparent and accountable norms and standards that uphold the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) article's 19 and 20, and expand the right to free expression and peaceful assembly to online would reassure global citizens.²⁰⁵

Given the explosive growth of the Internet, especially the incorporation of the Internet of Things (IOT), ubiquitous networks and automated information processing will give those in control of information great power. Governance must reflect these concerns as well; as data privacy, IP protection, content regulation, control of critical Internet resources and security of networks are all at stake. Because of these serious

²⁰⁴ Singer, P.W. and Allan Friedman. *Cyber Security and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014.P.181

²⁰⁵ Fontaine, Richard and Will Rogers. "Internet Freedom: A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age." June 2011. CNAS. 24 03 2014. <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_InternetFreedom_FontaineRogers_0.pdf>. P.9

issues, Laura DeNardis challenges the concept of and definition of multi-stakeholder model. She sees Internet governance as multi-layered, resulting in a need for numerous coordinating and policy making tools. Cybersecurity governance and standards setting, for instance, requires a different set of skills than privacy policy creation.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, the notion of multi-stakeholder governance (MSHG) is misunderstood. The possible actors of MSHG are NGOs (assemblages of engineers, academics, civil society, and other interested groups), business, nation states, and intergovernmental organizations (IGO). MSH definition holds that two or more categories of governance actors must be involved in decision-making. ICANN is the best-known example of MSHG, but just one of many Internet governing groups, each consisting of a different set of participatory actors. Although ICANN's participating members come from business, civil society, and governments, they are criticized for allowing too much US government influence (due to the Department of Commerce oversight), too little foreign government influence, and, at times, too little civil society input.²⁰⁷ There is also the question of whether business or government representation in governance groups is self-serving, and if their influence reflects what is best for the global Internet society. DeNardis emphasizes much of IG is not about content and usage. It is about technology, architecture, management, and about how information actually flows. Content and usage belongs in the world of policy makers.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ DeNardis, Dr. Laura and Mark Dr. Raymond. *Thinking Clearly about Multistakeholder Internet Governance*. Eighth Annual GigaNet Symposium. Washington, DC: CIGI & American University, 2013.P.2

²⁰⁷ Ibid P.10

²⁰⁸ DeNardis, Laura. *The Global War for Internet Governance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.P.23

Laura DeNardis outlines different models of rule setting organizations and procedures already influencing Internet governance. One model is that of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The mission of OECD to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world.²⁰⁹ These principles are aimed at assisting policymakers preserve the fundamental openness of the Internet and protect the free flow of online information, while ensuring that privacy, children, intellectual property, and security are adequately protected.²¹⁰ This ideal depends on a commitment to the rule of law, a restricted view of sovereignty, multilateral cooperation among states, and business self-regulation of technical standards.²¹¹

China's preferred model (as well as other many BRIC nations) would be similar to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

"The SCO is primarily focused on security issues of its members: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Cyber-security and cyber-warfare are prominent items on its agenda. Although civil society engagement with SCO is unlikely, it is worth following its processes. As cyber-security becomes more prominent on the global agenda, civil society will have to be prepared to provide a balanced approach to online security that does not infringe on human rights."²¹²

²⁰⁹ Karsten, Andreas. *The OECD and Internet Governance*. 29 05 2011. 24 03 2014. <<http://weoftomorrow.eu/the-oecd-and-internet-governance/>>.

²¹⁰ OECD. *OECD events at the Internet Governance Forum 2012 (Baku, Azerbaijan)*. n.d. 24 03 2014. <<http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/oecdeventsattheinternetgovernanceforum2012.htm>>.

²¹¹ Ibid P.14

²¹² "Internet governance: Mapping the Battleground." 2013. *Global Partners and Associates*. 24 03 2014. <http://www.gp-digital.org/wp-content/uploads/pubs/Internet-Governance-Mapping-the-Battleground.final_1.pdf>.P.14

This form highlights the superior power of dominant countries in rule setting and a robust understanding of national sovereignty.

The third view is that of the G-77. This organization also holds a strong interpretation of sovereignty. Many of the members are developing countries with a colonial past, as a result, their preference is a one-country one-vote situation where their voice is equal to that of a super power. The ITU is one such organization. A G-77 is currently proposing a “process for organizing a 2015 World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) Summit that would be entirely government-driven, with governments setting the agenda, negotiating outcome texts, and determining whether, and how, other stakeholders (including human rights advocates, industry, and technical experts) get to participate”²¹³

The fourth example is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and their Request for Comments (RFC) process. The IETF is truly MSH; anyone can participate, and deliberation is free and open. It is the best example of the culture of the Internet technical community. All participants are equal (though consist of mainly engineers) and adhere to the organization’s value of “rough consensus and running code”.²¹⁴

The last model is that of a business organization that follows a distinct set of rules and processes based on a need for accountability to their shareholders, the company’s chain of command, and contracts with other external organizations. ICANN,

²¹³ Llanso, Emma and Matthew Shears. "G77 Hitting The Reset Button on Internet Governance?" 16 11 2013. *Center for Democracy and Technology*. 24 03 2014. <<https://www.cdt.org/blogs/1611g77-hitting-reset-button-internet-governance>>.

²¹⁴ Ibid P.15 from the IETF mission statement available at <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3935.txt>.

as an industry regulator, controls the quantity and types of new Top Level Domains (TLD). It has hierarchical regulatory authority over registrars and registries in generic Top Level Domains (gTLD), which is a big money making business. The common view of ICANN as an organization with horizontal leadership is false, as it follows the above hierarchical model.²¹⁵

Milton Mueller is a serious devotee of internet freedom, and believes in as little governmental or organizational control as possible. He believes people should have as few limits as possible concerning whom they interact with online, what information they disseminate, and what information they seek. He agrees with Rebecca MacKinnon that the concept of national sovereignty is breaking down. The idea of a territorial state deciding what individuals can and cannot do on the Internet is being replaced by the sovereign individual deciding how to interact online.²¹⁶ He believes that government centered Internet governance can only lead to economic and human rights regulations. This, in turn, will slow the Internet's technology innovations. He stresses that expressive liberty and economic liberty are linked. Restrict one, and the other is affected. American security fears have impact on civil liberties and privacy, which have led to a monitored flow of information. This harms trust in the Internet and American values, which leads to economic losses. China's fear of destabilizing information influences

²¹⁵ Ibid P.15

²¹⁶ Mueller, Milton L. *Networks and States*. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010.P.268

their economy as well.²¹⁷ For this reason, he advocates a bottom-up consortium of MSH organizations to govern the Internet rather than top-down control by governments.²¹⁸

In March of 2014, the Department of Commerce National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced its intent to end its oversight of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). The actual functions of IANA, the resolver of the “root zone file”, are run by ICANN. The responsibilities of the IANA, as per Jon Postel, its founder, are these: To set policy for and direct allocation of IP number blocks to regional Internet number registries; to Oversee operation of the authoritative Internet root server system; to oversee policy for determining when new TLD’s are added to the root system; and lastly, to coordinate Internet technical parameter assignments to maintain universal connectivity.²¹⁹

Milton Mueller, spurred by this chance to omit government control from ICANN decisions, wrote a blueprint about how to globalize this function. First, separate the IANA technical functions from the ICANN policy process, and integrate IANA functions into Verisign. Verisign serves as a domain name registries for the .com registry (among others) and is vital to Internet governance operations. This combined entity would become a new “DNS Authority” (DNSA). Mueller supports a leadership and oversight consortium of non-profit TLD registries and root server operators to run this new DNSA, he asserts that the technical root zone modification responsibilities of IANA must be

²¹⁷ Ibid P.263

²¹⁸ Ibid P.5

²¹⁹ DeNardis, Laura. *The Global War for Internet Governance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.P.48

separated from the policymaking process of ICANN. IANA functions are purely technical and clerical, assuring that all top level domain names are unique and correlate to one set of IP numbers. They also ensure that all additions and deletions and other changes are carried out. ICANN's policymaking process has say in who receives top-level domain names, what names are acceptable, as well as how many an organization or country should receive. Mueller is clear that the IANA functions should be free of any government oversight, US or multilateral, as they are at the very core of the Internet's technical function. Security of IANA functions should also be left in the hands of specialists who understand the technology and have the commitment and involvement in the system to ensure it runs as efficiently and securely as possible.²²⁰

The crucial nature of the IANA functions is featured in a Guardian article about the key holders of the DNS core. Every three months seven of fourteen key holders convene to create a new master key, which holds the codes needed to alter core functions of the root server. To highlight the diversity of the ICANN leadership, the fourteen primary key holders hail from all four corners of the world. Only seven need be present to form the master card, and in this meeting, they have traveled from Sweden, Russia, Latin America, Portugal, and the United States. This key meeting is

²²⁰ Mueller, Milton and Brenden Kuerbis. "Roadmap for Globalizing IANA: Four Principles and a Proposal for Reform." n.d. *Internet Governance Project*. 25 03 2014. <<http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ICANNreformglobalizingIANAFinal.pdf>>. P.4

aimed at Internet security. A new master card is created to secure the core naming and numbering functions from hackers and intelligence agencies.²²¹

ICANN security vigilance and accountability is paramount, made clearer by the number of actors vying to grasp control of personal information. Likewise, government involvement in Internet governance issues is a proxy for international struggles for economic and political power; governments cannot be the primary decision makers. MSH governance, however, is not a one-model fit all; rather it is an imperfect and constantly evolving mosaic of coordination.²²² For this reason a top-down approach to IG would not work. "The structure and governance of the Internet's underlying infrastructure-comprising code, hardware, protocols, switches, and other virtual and physical resources- is hardly neutral but rather constrains behavior through technical design, direct governance, and private contractual agreements." As state power on the Internet is grows, so does the power of censorship and surveillance to control citizens. There is a dark side of cyberspace infrastructure and a covert domain of nation-state intelligence gathering and warfare in cyberspace.²²³ There are areas where government input is needed, such as in the protection of children, and multilateral agreements to

²²¹ Ball, James. "Meet the Seen People Who Hold the Keys to Worldwide Internet Security." 28 02 2014. *Guardian*. 29 03 2014. <<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/28/seven-people-keys-worldwide-internet-security-web>>.

²²² Pennsylvania, Annenburg School University of. *Milton Mueller Colloquium*. 04 10 2013. 24 03 2014. <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ywf1XJGfyaQ>>4:30 , Internet Society, North America Bureau. *Geopolitics of Internet Governance*. 28 05 2013. 23 03 2014. <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fFwddd7g314>>.52:00

²²³ DeNardis, Laura. "The Cyber-Espionage X-Files." 18 10 2013. *Science Magazine*. 25 03 2014. <<http://blackcodebook.com/docs/sciencemag.pdf>>.

share information on identity theft and cybersecurity.²²⁴ Most of IG, however, is technical architecture and standard setting which needs to stay in the hands of innovative engineers who understand and evolve with the technology. Private business contracts are responsible for much of the actual physical and virtual architectural foundations of the Internet. Civil organizations deliberate over civil liberties. MSH governance is a constantly shifting balance of power of these organizations. To try to define what exactly MSH governance is, or how to fit it, into IG as if it were a puzzle piece, is counterproductive.²²⁵

James Lewis of CSIS is more practical in his approach. The desire for global governments to have input into Internet governance is strong and growing. It cannot be ignored. The best course would find some way to incorporate them, give them a say. Many countries are set on the UN one country, one vote model, especially developing countries with a small voice. We must think about how to include them. It is also important to remember that within a country, not every government bureau has the same outlook and opinion. The Director of Economic Development may have a different view than the Director of Information. It is important to reach out to many different areas of government when informing countries about the internet and internet governance. The CCP, for instance, is not a technologically networked leadership that understands the intricacies of the Internet. James Lewis says that most Chinese officials

²²⁴ DeNardis, Dr. Laura and Mark Dr. Raymond. *Thinking Clearly about Multistakeholder Internet Governance*. Eighth Annual GigaNet Symposium. Washington, DC: CIGI & American University, 2013.P.9

²²⁵ Internet Society, North America Bureau. *Geopolitics of Internet Governance*. 28 05 2013. 23 03 2014. <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fFwddd7g314>>.46:00-52:00

live in a pink bubble and only read the China Daily.²²⁶ Those officials, however, who are engaged in the technology sphere do have an understanding of the Internet and appreciate the complex task of governance.

James Lewis is critical of the MSH IG as it operates right now. He asserts that Internet governance lacks legitimacy in eyes of new users, and legitimacy is essential for security and authority. The source of legitimacy in the past was “technical expertise, but this is being displaced in the political process”.²²⁷ He goes on to say the Internet is a critical global infrastructure and therefore needs adequate governance. The current informal process among technologists and the business community is weakly linked to law enforcement and security. Additionally, many netizens in the developing world, as well as BRIC nations, are skeptical about the true intentions of the United States. The perception is that Internet architecture and processes, as well as the contracts between Internet companies, inequitably benefit US companies. The current model lacks global authority, which is important element for a working governance system. There are dangers in new models, however. Alternatives could lead to less innovation and restricted human rights, but if carefully constructed could also support innovation and security.

²²⁶ (Internet Society, North America Bureau) 1:51:20

²²⁷ Lewis, James A. "Internet Governance: Inevitable Transitions." 2013. *Center for International Governance Innovation*. 06 03 2014. <<http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no4.pdf>>.P.2

Lewis feels the best way to increase legitimacy is to involve governments, and “create a web of relations and commitments among nation states.”²²⁸ His model falls somewhere between Mueller’s concept of a MSH IG with as little government influence as possible, and China’s desire for dominant state control. Lewis is not in favor of extending national sovereignty in the digital realm to include actions that would restrict human rights, but rather seeks areas where government can play a role. Trade, security, human rights, and law enforcement are spaces for international information sharing and coordination by governments. Technology standards, coding and commercial arrangements are best left to the private sector.

Lewis also emphasizes that the current MSH IG fails to address the issue of national sovereignty. Physical cyber infrastructure resides in nation states and is subject to the laws and values of those nations. Countries will implement rules and guidelines to mold the Internet to fit their countries beliefs and morals. This is only natural. He talks of a Southeast Asian country that prohibits pornography, and its leader does not understand why, on the Internet, his country must follow American values rather than their own. This leader wants to change some of the Internet’s 1960s California values to fit his country’s conservative morals. This is where the United States is losing the struggle for the Internet. Present IG portrays the struggle for the internet as black and white, Western liberty loving countries against authoritarian dictatorships. In fact, most countries are somewhere in-between. They are the SE Asian country mentioned above,

²²⁸ Lewis, James A. "Internet Governance: Inevitable Transitions." 2013. *Center for International Governance Innovation*. 06 03 2014. <<http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no4.pdf>>.P.3

alarmed at the influx of American values, but also in need of Internet development and the economic boost it can bring. The United States should be more sensitive to their needs, and support IG, which includes these developing nations by discussing and implementing capacity building.²²⁹ Nations have differing views of laws, cultural values, and regulations on the Internet. Nations should have the right to employ boundaries as long as they do not break universal laws.

Peter Singer of Brookings agrees with Lewis that a borderless realm, where problems are solved with little government involvement, is not realistic. Because economic, political, and national security interests of nations are now dependent on the Internet, it is natural for governments to want to exert more control.²³⁰ Lewis asserts that Internet governance must find “the balance between government and private sector, between U.S. and global, and between sovereignty and human rights.”²³¹ IG, in places, is neither market-based, nor legally constructed. No wonder many question its legitimacy.²³² Furthermore, there is not a clear understanding of how the MSH model works, undermining trust in the system. Citizens naturally want their government to be involved in order to safeguard their future. Dmitry Burkov, a Russian Internet security

²²⁹ Lewis, James A. "Internet Governance: Inevitable Transitions." 2013. *Center for International Governance Innovation*. 06 03 2014. <<http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no4.pdf>>.P.3-6

²³⁰ Singer, P.W. and Allan Friedman. *Cyber Security and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014.P181-2

²³¹ Lewis, James A. "Internet Governance: Inevitable Transitions." 2013. *Center for International Governance Innovation*. 06 03 2014. <<http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no4.pdf>>.

²³² DeNardis, Laura *The Global War for Internet Governance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014. P.46

expert and ICANN key holder states, “The key issue with the Internet is always trust. No matter what the forum, it always comes down to trust.”²³³

Sanctity of the DNS

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a critical Internet resource, foundational to the basic function of the Internet. Every object that communicates via the network (whether it is a smartphone, computer, or with the advent of the Internet of things (IOT), a refrigerator, door, car etc..) has been assigned a distinct Internet Protocol (IP) address. Every website has a unique name. Because this function is the most tangible role of IG, it has become a proxy for the battle over IG. “Control of the Internet names and numbers is considerable power”.²³⁴ These names and numbers have are not freely exchanged in the marketplace, but rather, they are controlled by MSH institutions such as ICANN, IANA, RIR, DNS registries, and domain name registrars. This brings up many questions. Governments, businesses, and world citizens want to know if there are enough to meet global demand, and if they are impartially allocated. Do the unique numerical addresses undermine privacy and anonymity online? Who decides who receives certain high demand website address? People can impersonate other entities online by creating a website similar to trademarked names. How can trademark laws

²³³ Ball, James. "Meet the Seen People Who Hold the Keys to Worldwide Internet Security." 28 02 2014. *Guardian*. 29 03 2014. <<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/28/seven-people-keys-worldwide-internet-security-web>>.

²³⁴ DeNardis, Laura *The Global War for Internet Governance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014. P.46

put an end to this? What is the impact of the DNS being used for copyright enforcement?²³⁵

“The ability of governments to control the flow of information via laws and other mechanisms of traditional authority has shifted battles into the domain of Internet infrastructure governance.”²³⁶ Many forces are working to change the Internet at its core; and have attempted to block entire websites via the DNS.²³⁷ In 2012, the United States Congress proposed the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), and the Protect IP Act (PIPA) to curb copyright infringements and the trafficking of counterfeit goods. They planned to accomplish this by IP blocking. This would require DNS servers to decline requests for IP addresses of those engaged in illegal copyright and counterfeit activities. In short, SOPA/PIPA would give the Justice Department the ability to shut down almost any blog or website at will. This, however, places a burden on the Internet infrastructure, and harms its integrity. Furthermore, censorship at the core of Internet structure is a bad precedent, and in the end would have little impact on IP theft and counterfeiting.²³⁸

China also recognizes the potential power inherent in DNS. China uses the DNS to identify requests for certain words in web names, and misdirects those requests by providing erroneous addresses, thus making such sites inaccessible. If Western Internet

²³⁵ Ibid P.46

²³⁶ DeNardis, Laura *The Global War for Internet Governance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.P.10

²³⁷ Ibid P.10

²³⁸ Broes, Derek. "Why Should You Fear SOPA and PIPA?" 20 01 2012. *Forbes*. 21 03 2014. <<http://www.forbes.com/sites/derekbroses/2012/01/20/why-should-you-fear-sopa-and-pipa/>>.

users' website requests are routed through China, this censorship can apply to their requests as well.²³⁹

China understands the key to censorship and control in the DNS. The IETF has received proposals from China to change the basic architecture of the DNS system, which would effectively segment the Internet into bordered domains separated by firewalls. The implementation of this sort of proposal would add friction to the Internet, reduce computing speed, and could even crash the system. Separate from the engineering difficulties inherent in this proposal is the veiled political agenda to heighten their ability to censor, manipulate, and block DNS and IP addresses.²⁴⁰

In an attempt to meddle with the Internet's technology architecture, in January of 2014, Chinese Internet engineers running the Great Firewall in China tried to block the domains of many companies in the United States that provide tools for evading the "Firewall". Instead, they re-routed a large quantity of traffic to these companies. This resulted in the malfunction of approximately 75% of China's domain name servers. There was an eight-hour loss of services for many of China's 500 million Internet users.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Lowe, Graham, Patrick Winters and Michael L Marcus. "The Great DNS Wall of China." 07 12 2007. *nyu.edu*. 24 03 2014. <<http://cs.nyu.edu/~pcw216/work/nds/final.pdf>>.

²⁴⁰ Diao, Yuping. "Autonomous Extensible Internet with Network Address Multiplexing." 28 01 2014. *IETF*. 29 03 2014. <<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-diao-aeip-nam-02>>.

²⁴¹ Fung, Brian. "How the Chinese Internet Ended up in Cheyenne, Wyoming." 22 01 2014. *The Washington Post*. 23 03 2014. <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/22/that-time-the-chinese-internet-found-itself-at-a-tiny-house-in-cheyenne-wyoming/>>.

Distrustful that all 13 Internet 'root servers' were in America, the West or Japan, China asked ICANN to create another one. "Root servers are the starting point for all the hierarchical resolution process that makes domain names globally unique and matches IP addresses to domains".²⁴² To accommodate China, one was implemented from an existing one in order to maintain compatibility. This has caused problems in international traffic, as information is inadvertently routed through China's root servers, and is mistakenly subjected to the 'firewall'.²⁴³ Furthermore, China created a parallel DNS root for Chinese character domain names such as .中国 (.China), .公司 (.COM) , and .网络 (.NET). These domain names are now compatible (but it is not know exactly how compatible) with the global DNS system, but operated by New.Net, not ICANN.²⁴⁴

There is, therefore, world support for less U.S. control over the governance of the Internet (especially after the Snowden revelations). Even the EU has expresses a desire for more transparency and less US influence over institutions controlling the Internet. The EU also urged leaders to take a robust role in defining the future of the Internet. Lawrence Strickling, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, has welcomed the EU commitment to MSH IG and

²⁴² Mueller, Milton. "China and Global Internet Governance: A Tiger By the Tail." Deibert, Ronald, et al. *Access Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012. 177-194.P.186

²⁴³ Ibid P.187

²⁴⁴ Ibid P.184

emphasized the need for a diverse, inclusive IG that is open to the needs of the developing countries.²⁴⁵

Conclusion

The functions of ICANN are crucial to the efficiency and integrity of the Internet. Although ICANN responsibilities are mostly technical and administrative, decisions made have impact in Internet security, privacy, allocation of profitable business contracts, innovation, and Internet development. The governance of ICANN is vital to the health and sound efficiency of the global Internet. ICANN is not interested in using its capabilities to alter the DNS to censorship or blocking of certain groups, it is largely a technical group interested in an unhindered network.

The ICANN oversight by NTIA has worked since its inception, but many recent activities have caused Internet citizens from Europe as well as developing nations and authoritarian nations, to lose faith in this arrangement. The Snowden revelations, coupled with the Target data breach, exposed the capabilities and vulnerabilities of hidden data miners on the Internet. "Internet governance structures were originally

²⁴⁵ Faiola, Anthony. "Europe Wants Less U.S. Power Over Internet." 14 02 2014. *The Washington Post*. 02 03 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe-wants-less-us-power-over-internet/2014/02/12/7e231bde-9409-11e3-9e13-770265cf4962_story.html>.

based on familiarity, trust and expertise and ‘rough consensus and running code’²⁴⁶

This is not true anymore, and structures must change to meet the new reality.

The question of how these Internet structures should change is at the center of the geo-political struggle for IG. “Internet governance is the simplest most direct and inclusive label for the ongoing disputes and deliberations over how the Internet is coordinated, managed, and shaped to reflect policies”²⁴⁷ IG negotiations will need to incorporate as diverse an assembly as possible in order to gain legitimacy.

Milton Mueller and Rebecca MacKinnon have argued for limited government control. They believe the technical community working in parallel with civil society and business can efficiently react to Internet issues as innovations rapidly expand and alter networks. Security and privacy regulations are implemented to help, but also harm. Technology used to uncover a terrorist is used by authoritarian regimes to reveal dissidents. Likewise, methods used to stop spam or child pornography, and be used to block private communications. Mueller and MacKinnon warn about government usage of these technologies.

Laura DeNardis, a practical engineer, points out that much of IG is very technical and specialized, implemented by engineers and computer scientists. Governments do not have the skills to carry out these tasks with the same ability. However, there are also areas of IG that only governments can carry out, such as capacity building,

²⁴⁶ Denardis, Laura *The Global War for Internet Governance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.P.18

²⁴⁷ Mueller, Milton L. *Networks and States*. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010.P.9

information sharing, and cooperation on cyber-criminal activity, and child protection. Business is needed to implement the many business contracts, such as VeriSign's contract with ICANN to manage the .com registry. Civil society should continue to organize and educate global citizens about their online rights.

Singer and Lewis call for IG to recognize the needs of the developing world. The current IG is not legitimate in the eyes of these countries. International NGOs such as the Internet Society (ISOC) are fanning the globe, educating people and governments about MSH IG and the economic advantages of a free Internet. The ITU can use their abilities to help developing nations capacity build. There is a need to find a role in IG for governments to have impact; network building and citizen education are two such areas. The security of the Internet depends on employing practices that do not increase division among nations, but rather are practical and useful.

The responsibilities of ICANN will only continue to grow. Right now, the IP system is called IPv4. This system allows for about 4.3 billion addresses. With the recent explosion of the Internet due to the IOT, available IP addresses are dwindling. A new IP address system called IPv6 allows for 340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 IP addresses, more than there are known atoms in the universe.²⁴⁸ It is therefore imperative that ICANN governance

²⁴⁸ Internet Governance Forum. "Transcript of Workshop. Internet of Things: Challenges, Policy and Development." 23 10 2013. *Internet Governance Forum Bali*. 23 03 2014. <<http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/2013-bali/igf-2013-transcripts/1393-ws-40-internet-of-things--challenges-policy-and-development>>.

gain the trust of Internet users, and that governance is transparent and reflects their needs.

Egyptian ICANN CEO, Fadi Chehade states “Clearly there is no question the Edward Snowden revelations have stimulated the dialogue” about trust. Leaders at the World Economic Forum, as well as large company CEOs have worried about trust. Trust on the Internet has definitely diminished. The way to combat this lack of trust is to develop global governance networks: not institutions, or regulations, but networks. The Internet needs to become more diverse and visible to new users. Only in this way will it gain legitimacy.

In response to China’s desire to place walls around their Internet, or change the core DNS, Fadi says that national boundaries on the Internet will create Internet friction. The cost will be economic and social. The inability to freely and instantaneously exchange information will thwart innovation, but also influence a citizen’s ability to access resources to aid in their self-education. This will leave citizens in information-controlled environments monetarily and intellectually inferior.²⁴⁹

The IOT will amplify the economic advantages of the Internet, and the struggle for who controls the mega-data collected. This data will allow great advances in many areas including environmental engineering, medicine, energy efficiency, agriculture, and healthcare. It will also define people’s most intimate habits. China has invested heavily

²⁴⁹ Shankland, Stephen. "ICANN CEO Sets Off Explosion of New Internet Names (Q&A)." 28 01 2014. *C/Net*. 17 02 2014. <<http://www.cnet.com/news/icann-ceo-sets-off-explosion-of-new-internet-names-q-a/>>.

in the IOT sector, investing 140.5 billion RMB in 2013 the Wuxi city IOT Park.²⁵⁰

Because every device connected to the Internet must have an IP address, the job of ICANN is growing in size and importance. As the IOT grows, networks will expand, and data in the digital domain will explode, revealing humankind's contacts, values, ideals, habits, communications, and locations. This data should not be under the dominion of a government or a group of governments. Information is power, and must be kept in the hands of citizens through transparent governance. While mega-data in industry will lead to helpful innovations, the core functions of the Internet managed by ICANN should not be used for monitoring or manipulating network communications.

As developing nations build Internet capacity, they will receive the economic benefits of the Internet economy. Countries will also witness an influx of contradictory morals and values. In order to preserve their culture and values, countries will want some sovereign control over their country's Internet. The recent creations of generic top-level domain (gTLD) in non-Latin characters will help countries keep their language relevant, which will help support the survival of the world's languages.²⁵¹

ICANN and other Internet governance organizations strive for diversity. Legitimacy is earned through trust, and trust is earned through transparency, accountability, and faith that one's voice will be heard. The current IG path espoused by ICANN, ISOC, and the IETF seeks for all nations to have a place at the governance table.

²⁵⁰ Wuxi Government China. "Making the Industry of Internet of Things in Wuxi." 27 03 2014. *Wuxi China*. 28 03 2014.

²⁵¹ Chinese, Cyrillic and Arabic so far, but I advocate for as many as possible. Mike Nelson of Microsoft mentioned, in a IG conference, that language translation software will soon solve any web based language difficulties.

Strong American values of free speech and expression stand defiantly in opposition to China's massive information control apparatus. Developing nations stand warily between the two. Internet governance must have the flexibility to reach out to those wavering nations through education, capacity building, and bearing witness to their concerns. The alternative is a fractured, walled network, or worse. An Internet in China's likeness places information power in the hands of government elites, diminishing the liberty of the globe's netizens.

Thesis Conclusion

China has shown its opposition to the present Internet culture of freedom of expression. The authoritarian CCP favors information control, and communications norms and standards that put information and its conduits in the hands of government elites. The United States adheres to liberal Western values, which supports freedom of expression, rights to privacy and government transparency and accountability. This is a fundamental difference of opinion. CCP sponsored programs have actively censored, manipulated, sabotaged, and siphoned information from domestic and foreign digital networks. This activity presents the United States with multiple security issues, as they pose risk to business, personal, military, political, and diplomatic communications, and must be addressed. The issue is multidimensional, however, and therefore deserves a multipronged solution.

The first issue both countries must address is a mutual lack of trust. China fears the Internet, a U.S. military innovation, is an information tool used by the U.S. to cause internal instability in China. Snowden's revelations about NSA surveillance only confirm these fears, as does China's history of humiliation at the hands of Western powers. Understanding these fears and addressing them through political, educational, and military exchanges is a start.

Secondly, as China rises it will naturally want to project its power. The rules that presently govern international institutions were predominantly made by Western powers. Although these rules have supported global economic growth, China argues

they have predominately benefited the West. In China's quest to become a world power, it had shown a desire to become a rule maker, developing and internationalizing rules that will benefit China. This is the basic issue at play in the ICANN governance struggle portrayed in chapter three. China fears the present Internet norms and technical standards benefit U.S. businesses unequally, and seek to undermine CCP authority. Of course, greater government control over Internet architecture will streamline censorship and general control of sovereign Internet function. This will simplify control of communications and human expression within China, and create a stronger barrier to information entering and exiting China. While the present rules have paved the way for global economic development, a blocked and bureaucratic Internet would slow Internet's underlying architecture and thwart innovation. Thus, both the United States and China see Internet governance as a national security issue. The first course is to find areas of common interest. Both countries support capacity building in developing nations, specifically as an ITU multinational endeavor. Both countries experience cybercrime and want to eradicate it. Information sharing and collaboration on norms and standards in this area would be a positive step, and may develop common definitions of Internet terms and a mutual understanding of this new language. In this effort to forge common ground, however, the U.S. must not allow change to the current multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance. A bureaucratic top-down approach to governance over the technical architecture of the Internet would greatly alter the ease of communication now experienced. The United States must ally with like-minded countries, and work to persuade developing nations to block China's attempt to change

Internet governance. The United States still has the power to be a global rule maker, and must use this power now to ensure the future of the Internet. China and Russia will use the example of NSA's metadata collection to illustrate the untrustworthiness of the United States. The United States, in turn, must emphasize U.S. judicial, legislative, and executive oversight of the NSA's collection (not surveillance!) of data. The present debate on this issue in the United States elucidates the comparatively transparent and accountable nature of US politics. This display of checks and balances on the global stage should soothe fears. Nevertheless, this issue does show the need for reforms that reflect the changes brought by the expansion of the Internet.

The U.S. led Internet governance model, however, also must be sensitive to the diversity of cultural and values issues that arise. Nations should have the ability to mold their country's Internet to reflect the citizen's values. These actions, however, must be transparent to a nation's citizens.

Transparency, however, is not a CCP strong suit. China's internal information control mechanisms are secretive and frightening. Propaganda is at every level of society; censorship, communications manipulation, and blocks to freedom of expression are implemented by technical means, policing, and by millions of hired censors. By these means, the CCP uses its powerful information control mechanisms to endorse, control, and nurture nationalism. These nationalistic passions can be unpredictable, and have influenced Chinese foreign policy toward a more hawkish stance to appease them. It is important for U.S. policy makers to be mindful of this precedent before reacting to

Chinese actions, or when analyzing escalating situations. Simultaneously, the United States must work to expose Chinese citizens to alternative viewpoints through professional and educational exchanges, organizations, and alternative media venues. These information outlets can serve to inform the grass-roots nationalist citizenry. While also proud and patriotic, these nationalists are not as aligned with the CCP victim paradigm, and do not view foreign nations with hatred and resentment without provocation. They strive to build a more just and equitable China. While they are worldlier, they are also unpredictable. Nevertheless, they present an opportunity for future US-China collaboration, as well as to the more forward thinking reform minded Chinese leaders.

When evaluating China's conduct in the digital realm, policy makers must question whether China's behavior is peaceful. China's efforts to steal, sabotage, and manipulate information on U.S. networks is clearly contrary to China's 'peaceful rise' tenet of non-interference in the affairs of another country. The technical architecture elements of cyberspace all reside within the boundaries of a sovereign nation. China's massive IP theft campaigns from U.S. business, military, and government networks are by a self-interested CCP to ensure regime legitimacy and stability. These thefts fuel an economy hungry for technology, but low on high-tech innovation. This adds to U.S.-China distrust, as does China's refusal to acknowledge this theft, even in the face of evidence. The United States cannot be passive about this theft and sabotage. This requires a more forceful policy that focuses on China's interests and China's own cyber vulnerabilities.

The United States is presently the most powerful nation on earth. It should use its position to influence cyber policy and Internet governance now. Time is critical. The Internet is still young and growing at an explosive rate. The Internet of Things will expand the digital networks exponentially, capturing massive amounts of useful data as a byproduct. This data can be used to benefit humanity in yet to be imagined ways. Likewise, it can be used by authoritarian governments and repressive regimes to suppress. The United States must continue to be a leader in government transparency and accountability to counter this. Furthermore, the United States must couple with likeminded countries, persuading developing nations that a free and open Internet supports economic development, and furthering the creation of norms and standards that reflect the values of freedom of expression and rights to privacy.

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