

EUROCENTRISM AS NOMOS OF THE WORLD

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ABSTRACT

The project is offered out of a specific claim that the present narratives on Eurocentrism are inadequate for understanding the very notion itself. Beginning with a critical evaluation of present approaches, I will develop a new reading of Eurocentrism by defining it as the *Nomos* of the “world,” or the ordering of the universe.

In doing so, this analysis concentrates on the discipline of International Relations and the formation of limits in its historiography. The discipline will be identified as one of the most crucial narratives through which the very modalities, formations, and reconfigurations of Eurocentrism may be understood. By pursuing an examination of the formative limits of International Relations, a new conceptual framework in readings of Eurocentrism ,or the ordering of the world, will be suggested.

By employing the conceptual tools derived from Carl Schmitt’s discussion of the modern-global order, this project offers to take up the notion of Eurocentrism as an ordering of the universe. The project will offer a deep examination on the history and historiography of Europe, the idea of Europe, and the identity of Europe while also distinguishing itself from certain modes of reading the concept of Eurocentrism. However, while gathering insights from a Schmittian reading of *Nomos*, the project will simultaneously aspire to subvert and transgress Schmitt’s conceptualization by also considering the intersections of geography and the political.

Keywords: Eurocentrism, Europe, *nomos*, the rise of the West, 1492, Westphalian state system, geography, territory, Schmitt, nation-state, International Relations.

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1.0. Eurocentrism as the Nomos of the World

“No sooner had the contours of the earth emerged as a real globe—not just sensed as myth, but apprehensible as fact and measurable as space—than there arose a wholly new and hitherto unimaginable problem: the spatial ordering of the earth in terms of international law. The new global image, resulting from the circumnavigation of the earth and the great discoveries of the 15th and 16th centuries, required a new spatial order. Thus began the epoch of modern international law that lasted until the 20th century.”

(Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, 2003: 86)

“The ‘borders of Europe’: Does the ‘of’ indicate an objective or a subjective genitive? As we shall see, both are necessarily involved, and what is at stake is precisely the “Europeanness” of Europe’s borders [...] borders are no longer the shores of politics, but have indeed become—perhaps by way of the police, given that every border patrol is today an organ of ‘internal security’—objects or, let us say more precisely, things within the space of the political itself.”

(Etienne Balibar, *Politics and Other Scenes*, 2002: 86, 92)

1.1. On the Borders of Europe

Jürgen Habermas, discussing the need for a constitution for the European Union, attempts to answer the question of what Europe *is*. Although Habermas acknowledges the difficulty of providing an answer to such a question—namely, separating the question from the broader issue of the diffusion of the achievements of European culture across the globe (2001: 19)—he nonetheless believes that it is possible to provide a plausible answer.

Moreover, Habermas's framing of the perceived difficulty of answering this question has more profound implications.¹ The question is framed in a way that externalizes the difficulty of a plausible answer, both practically and theoretically, to the *internal* formation of Europe itself. This implies that *histories* of Europe may offer some clues and guidelines for answering a question detached from what is defined as external to Europe: these are the places where European culture has diffused. Once the impact of the constitutive relationship between Europe and non-Europe on what is called "Europe" and "European values" is set aside or simplified, an answer to this question becomes a possibility. The resolution of this difficulty through such a simple task, as Habermas perceives it, is crucial for maintaining the Europeanness of Europe.

Such an understanding gains its power from an essentialist reading of Europe—a subject to be discussed throughout this study. In the Habermasian framework, there is room for *a history* of Europe that is singular and exclusive. This is a history that relies on a "concentric image" of Europe and on an image of European culture that is territorialized and fixed.² Habermas maintains this particular reading of Europe by excluding non-Europeans from the formation of what is called Europe. The "fugitive dimensions" of the formation of Europe are deliberately destroyed to maintain the unity of the Europeanness of Europe.

Additionally, in the Habermasian framework, there is no need for genealogical historiographies of the emergence of Europe. Reflecting the way in which the very question is

¹ Habermas describes the difficulty as follows: "[...] it has been difficult to separate the question 'What is Europe?' from the fact that the achievements of European culture [...] have been diffused across the globe" (2001: 19).

² Here, I follow Connolly's model of reading pluralism and relativism in his study, (2005, Chapter 2). Grasping the destroyed dimensions of pluralism would require a radical philosophy of time and politics that "concentrate[s] on the fugitive dimensions of experiences," just as James, Bergson and Connolly try to achieve (2005: 76), which is exactly what Habermas tries to escape in his reading. According to Connolly, in Nietzsche's attempts to appreciate life, he has always tried to appreciate its "fugitive experiences" (105). In other words, Habermas refrains from appreciating the "Europeanness of Europe" to save Europe as a unified, eccentric culture.

problematized, Europe and its history represents a totality *within itself*, rather than as a possible object of genealogical inquiry or question of a present-day political struggle. Therefore, one cannot find any reference, not even in a footnote, to the uneven “internal” *histories* of Europes, different historical conversations, encounters, and constitutive relationships between a presumed Europe and other presumed “totalities” of present political collectivities, such as non-Europeans.

The particular way of framing this difficulty by Habermas can be read as an instantiation of what Campbell defines as *narrativizing historiography* and the *logic of explanation* (1992: 4). One could object to my symptomatic reading of a single sentence on the grounds that it fails to do justice to Habermas’s broader understanding of Europe’s “specific experiences.” However, the single sentence quoted above is not the only evidence of Habermas’s conception of Europe. Later in the text, Habermas writes:

For Europe has, *more than any other culture faced and overcome* structural conflicts, sharp confrontations and lasting tensions, in the social as well as in the temporal dimension. [...] In the social dimension, modern Europe has developed institutional arrangements for the productive resolution of intellectual, social and political conflicts. [...] In the temporal dimension, modern Europe has institutionalized a comprehensive spectrum of competing conservative, liberal and socialist interpretations of capitalist modernization, in an ideological system of political parties (2001: 20, emphasis added).

In this paragraph, what separates Europe from “Others,” for Habermas, is its *ability* to “face and overcome structural conflicts, sharp confrontations and lasting tensions.” This assertion ultimately points to yet another aspect of the Habermasian framework that supports my reading. There is a tendency to relegate all struggles as naturally *internal/inherent* to European cultures and heritage. Europe can be understood as *Europe*, not due to the various external and internal

struggles shaped and reconfigured by the limits and boundaries of its externality and internality, but because Europe overcome its own internal, *sui generis* contradictions (Guzel 2002).

Here, the *ability* of Europe is the characteristic feature of such a trajectory. Just as the Kantian conception of the subject and Cartesian thinking relies on “an image of thought” as a pre-philosophical series of presuppositions to structure the distinctive perception of “the subject” (Deleuze 1994), Habermas relies on a specific image of Europe (and of its thought), which grounds Europe’s unity. This *ability* is a crucial component for maintaining the unity of Europe against outside forces—i.e. those that are subjected to the diffusion of European Culture—that are hostile to its natural, normal processes. This *ability* enables Europe to overcome struggles that sometimes appear to have stemmed from being represented by Christianity, geography, capitalism or feudalism. In any case, this *ability* relies upon a pre-philosophical set of prerequisites that shelters “Europe,” Habermas’s Europe, from the chaos of life, as well as the reality of multiple histories, differences, and encounters.

Europe needs something to be Europe and to be understood as the origin of all images of Europe. The ability, which Habermas refers to, is that *thing* that forms the image of the thought of Europe. The conceptual persona of Europe, thus, exists by that ability, and this is what enables Europe to “face and overcome structural conflicts, sharp confrontations and lasting tensions” more than any other culture. Europe does not simply represent the realities, presences and legacies of Europe, but Europe itself, remaining beyond doubt and inquiry. Further, this allows Europe to protect its distinctiveness, Europeanness, despite all encounters and struggles. According to Habermas, this is the capacity enabling Europe to remain and endure—to stay Europe. Not a becoming, but a duration.

There remains a second, often overlooked point that demonstrates how Habermas's narrative maintains itself. Habermas deliberately ignores the constitutive influence of the paradoxes of the identity/difference relationship, namely, "the consolidation of identity through the constitution of difference and the self-reassurance of identity through the construction of otherness" (Connolly 1991: 9). Habermas's "success" in neglecting the constitutive relationship between the structural crises of hegemony in non-European societies and the presence of hegemony in European societies, through which a particular European ability to solve the problems has been crystallized (Mutman 2001: 44), is not simply a mistake, nor is it a factual or material ignorance.

Rather, it is the very manifestation that reflects the relationship between knowledge, power, and the normalization of a particular discourse through a narrative of European history that excludes the constitutive role of identity/difference and the externality/internality configuration. Here, Europe becomes its own essential, ahistoric sign, by which all struggles *within* Europe, *about* Europe, *on* Europe, *with* Europe and *against* Europe could simply be defined as the internal struggles of Europe and Europeanness. The most problematic nature of this position can be seen when this formulation is discussed in terms of the spatial/territorial historiography of Europe.

At this point, a discussion of the empirical history of Europe joins the conversation. Are the legacies of the Ottoman Empire³ or of Al-Andalus part of Europe or not? Apart from cultural

³ The relationship between Europe and the Ottoman Empire has always been a contested one and will be discussed later. However, it is enough to say that alongside the role of the constitutive outside, the Empire, in 1856, with the

and social legacies, how can one discuss the relationship between Europe and non-Europe? What is the main criterion to distinguish one from the other? What constitutes the lines between territories internal and external to Europe? What is the difference between a Europe that was territorialized by either the Ottoman Empire or Al-Andalus and present-day Europe, as signifying a particular land in the world? Are Jews, Muslims, or specific territories, such as the Balkans, part of Europe or not?

A particular style of reading history that follows a positivist, homogenous, totalizing discourse could provide answers to these questions by emphasizing the “colonization of European lands,” referring to the different layers in the history of the continent, in which authentic Europe and Europeans remain the core, or by simply overlooking the constitutive relationship between the concurrent formation of Europe and non-Europe and other homogenizing relationships. However, a simple question remains: What is Europe with all its historical baggage?

To be sure, neither the “reality,” which is of neither factual importance or relevance to the above-mentioned arguments, nor the “positive” aspects of the relationship is the subject of my inquiry. Instead, my study attends to the impossibility of constructing any identity in a self-referential style and mode, as well as the absence of an authentic identity and political nature in processes of identity formation, which can be defined through the identity/difference paradox. I begin this inquiry with the above reading precisely because Habermas, by reducing all the different modalities, histories, and relations to a history of an internal struggle, becomes the

Peace of Paris, was officially defined as a member of the “family” of European nations and became a member of the European Concert. The Empire, by this act, was defined and accepted as a “European state.”

paradigm through which this difficulty can be attended. For this reason, I suggest a genealogical examination of European history and limit myself, here, to only one example that demonstrates that perceived internality/externality of Europe. The relationship between Europe and its Other, I argue, has always been a political question and subject to a constant re-construction similar to all other formations.

Richard Clogg, in his groundbreaking study, *A Concise History of Greece* (2002), problematizes the Europeanness of Greece. He argues that before the expansion of Hellenistic nationalism and the emergence of a discourse defining Greece as source of European civilization, Greece was not seen as a part of Europe (6). Europe, as a “sign,” indicated the territories beyond Greece, which relegated Greece to the Orthodox and Ottoman heritages rather than as part of a European legacy. Greeks, Clogg argues, had talked of “traveling to Europe,” meaning all journeys destined toward today’s Italy, as if they were not Europeans and Greece itself was not part of Europe. This example is not a trivial one, as it not only reveals the historical and political re-construction of Europe under different contexts, but also represents the constitutive relationship between geography, politics, and the discursive construction of identities and concepts/signs. There was once a categorical difference between Europe and Greece.

Today, however, it is not “tenable” to make a categorical distinction between Europe and Greece, neither geographically nor politically, with the exception of certain expressions of Aryan racism. Greece, discursively, has become “indispensably” a part of Europe and vice versa.⁴ Both

⁴ This simply refers to the *simultaneous* re-construction of both European and Greece identities in that *conjunction*. Conceptually, a reference to the *completely* distinct formation of two related identities would reproduce position assuming the existence of a self-referential, ahistorical, definable entity independent of all political and cultural struggles.

Europe and Greece are the effects of a discursive formation in which the boundaries, limits, and territories of both Europe and Greece have been reconstructed. Moreover, the inclusion of Greece into Europe is very much related to the need for creating and founding an “originary source” for the whole of Western, as well as European, civilization.

Whereas the experiences of the Ottomans and Al-Andalus are excluded, a particular “choice” has been made to construct Europe as a self-referential sign. It is in this context that Habermas’s question of what Europe is presents itself as a ready-made answer, but not a proper question. Habermas essentializes the formation of European identity by reducing and internalizing the articulations of “European” histories into a self-referential sign and proposes an isolated and homogenous vision of Europe out different encounters and experiences despite his references to historical struggles. Undoubtedly, the Habermasian definition of Europe and its critics necessitate a more detailed and concentrated discussion.

Nevertheless, within the framework of this analysis, this relatively short discussion focuses on two features of the discursive formation of identity and reality. A particular apprehension of reality and history is a political question that legitimizes particular relationships and certain acts of exclusion and inclusion. Hence, it constructs specific political trajectories at the expense of excluding and silencing others to maintain the viability of a specific order—either a material and actual order or an order of the things at a conceptual level. Secondly, the discursive formation of identity and reality is a *performative process* that subjugates both the subjects and objects of the process to an ongoing re-construction. Each encounter or relationship is influenced by and shaped through historical, temporal and spatial dimensions related to the

agents of the encounter. These processes simultaneously reconstruct the relationships and their history in particular ways. Consequently, a focus on performativity and the political leads to the rejection of any ahistorical origins *as a site of truth*.

This particular understanding of discursive formations constitutes one of the core claims of this dissertation:

- Order is the essential question of all politics. All critical readings on politics must begin with a *critique* of order.
- The political is neither a moment nor a state; it is a process defined by conflicts and encounters. It is a discursive creation (i.e. real, material, and symbolic) of subject-positions.⁵
- Order and the political, which cannot exist separately, must be subjected to a genealogical historiography to be distinguished (or destroyed) and to grasp the fugitive dimensions, through the exclusion of which the existence of both is maintained.
- In such a framework, understanding Europe or problematizing the question of “what Europe is” requires a meticulous inquiry into the history and borders of Europe.

⁵ Both claims will be discussed in subsequent sections and chapters.

- The question of border is also one of order. At stake is the question of how the ordering of space takes place and how this discursive practice of delineation continues to behold the imaginary horizon.

In this sense, the very problem of order in International Relations must be understood in relation to the question of the subject and subjectivity. I consider the ways in which this subject is constituted as a manifestation of Eurocentrism. It is important to note that Eurocentrism performs and constitutes this subject *as* the Nomos of Earth. This is where order, politics, the subject, and subjectivity fuse into each other and provides a solid answer to Habermas's question asking what Europe is. The response that guides this dissertation is: Can Europe exist without Eurocentrism?

The fundamental success of Eurocentrism is its ability to maintain a narrative through which non-Western subjectivity becomes invisible. To *make* invisible is both a productive, constitutive act, which is also negative as it denies and negates the Other. Therefore the political history of international politics becomes one of the different "reformulations" of what is known as Western or European politics, morality, and ethics. Therefore, the essential task of developing a critique of the ordering of the universe as Eurocentrism must begin with and through the problematic of the subject and subjectivity. However, before attending to the constitution of these subjects and subjectivity, the performative practice of ordering must be examined.

1.2. Order, Politics, and the Subject

In *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order* (2000), N. J. Rengger offers a detailed examination of the different approaches of International Relations (IR) by concentrating on what he defines as “the problem of order.” Central to his task is distinguishing “traditions/schools of IR on the basis of what they mean by the notion of order and how they ‘counter’/manage and deal with the issue of achieving order and/or living with ‘disorder’” (XI). Dividing the traditions of IR into two broad frameworks and five unique responses, Rengger examines certain constitutive themes that crystallize each approach’s central problematic in dealing with the problem of order. Realism (balance), Liberalism (institutions), and English school (society) represents the first broad framework in which the problem of order is taken up as something to be “managed.” What marks these approaches as part of the same family is their tendency to take the very “nature,” experience, and representation of politics as given: for example, “the problem of order created by and through practices of sovereignty.”

The second broad framework encompasses the critical school and post-structuralism, which begins with a problematic these approaches refrain from: the way of being political in modern politics. “Emancipation” and “limits” are defined as two themes through which they deal with the notion of order. By questioning the modes of being political in the modern order, these approaches, writes Rengger, are essentially concerned with “ending” the problem of order (24).

While assuming that the question of order has been the essential problematic of all politics since “classical/ancient Greece,” Rengger suggests that the same question took a distinctive form in the era of modernity. This is “because of the way that a range of particularly influential readings of ‘modernity as mood’ have been related to certain claims about the

development of modernity as socio-cultural form” (4). While the first way of conceptualizing modernity pertains to the way in which modernity is understood and refers to philosophical, theological, ethical, and ontological questions, the latter treatment of modernity as a socio-cultural form refers to an understanding of modernity on the basis of transformations in material, technological, and/or socio-economic realms (ibid).

In the chapter on the evolution of the problem of order,⁶ drawing from Walker (1992), Bartelson (1995), Pagden (1995), and Kratochwil (1986), Rengger argues that the emergence and consolidation of “sovereignty” is the representative moment of the most radical rupture in the notion of order, which has “instantiated” a particular way of being political and has recast the basic assumptions of the problem of order. In IR, order has been framed through the paradox of inside vs. outside or domestic order vs. anarchy. In this way, the realm of legal regulation (the inside) is distinguished from that characterized by the “absence of legitimacy conferred by sovereignty” (6). The very imagination that makes IR possible maintains it. Furthermore, the imagination of the ways of being political is also sustained through this very distinction.

However, interestingly, from the beginning to the end, Rengger limits his examination to the traditions of thought in IR and how they have addressed the notion of order. Late in Rengger’s analysis, it becomes clear that his problematic is how to maintain a balanced relationship between what he calls modernity as mood and modernity as socio-cultural form.

... the ‘problem of order’ for the twenty-first century should look very different from the way it has been addressed in the twentieth. In the first place it requires a

⁶ Rengger is careful in representing continuity and discontinuity in what he calls the evolution of the problem of order, which he dates to late 12th and 13th century “Europe” (6).

melding of 'political' and 'international' theory and the rewriting of the resulting fusion in ways which are sensitive to 'reasonable' rather than 'rational' ends and thus to particular (and cosmopolitan) circumstances but not universal (and thus timebound) 'truths' (206).

Despite displaying his discontent with the demarcation between inside and outside, as well as its influences on the way in which IR has been constituted, the very essential problematic of order begins to be identified as a matter of awareness to the temporal reality of world politics (such as globalization and difficulty of maintaining inside-outside dichotomy). IR is then reformulated on according to these realities. The questions that has emerged through and is represented by IR become matters awaiting transcendence through a fusion of what has been demarcated only recently.

Rengger, on the one hand, offers a valuable reading of IR by re-framing virtually all major schools of thought in the discipline on the basis of the problem of order. However, I contend that the very "essence" through which the problem of order has been constituted remains unexamined in his reading.

The study, rather than problematizing the question of order, examines the consequences of the ways in which order has been constituted as a problem. This is where the possibility of moving beyond the present formulations of order is externalized. The central problem here is the absence of a concentrated discussion on the question of the subject and subjectivity. This absence is one of the main reasons leading to critical readings that forego an examination of structural continuity in the ordering of the universe on behalf of temporal moments/ruptures or developments that create potential paths of flight/escape from established paradigms. For instance, this is why the assumed decline of the Westphalian state-system, as one of the most

“durable” expressions of Eurocentrism, is easily translated as representing the decline of Eurocentrism. Ferguson and Mansbach's bold assertion is a perfect representation of Rengger's claim: “the Eurocentric world of international politics is giving way to a universe more plainly characterized by diverse and often overlapping polities, and processes of fission and fusion” (2004: 47).

Global politics is undoubtedly characterized by more numerous and diverse polities in contrast to the traditional assumptions of billiard-ball models of neo-realism or state-centric readings of realism. However, the trouble here is historicizing both the reproduction of Eurocentrism and criticism of it. The dynamic ability to rejuvenate the already-established paradigms (the primacy of Western subjectivity) remains unproblematized in both studies due to an absence of focus on the plays of order, politics, borders, and the subject in the construction of Europe and Eurocentrism.

1.3. *West and the Rest vs. West and the West*⁷

Hans J. Morgenthau, in *Politics Among Nations* (1964) , takes the rising political opposition to colonialism and its legacy as a moral challenge. Nonetheless, the challenge in his reading is to point to something that owes its existence to “the West,” rather than representing a specific moment through which a different subject-position is being constructed.

The moral challenge emanating from Asia is in its essence a triumph of the moral ideas of the West.” [...] In the wake of its conquests, the West brought to Asia

⁷ For lack of a better term, I use *the West* (italicized) to refer to the notion of the West as an unfinished project, as something always in the mode of “to come”/becoming.

not only its technology and political institutions, but also its principles of political morality. (1964: 359).

Setting aside the dynamics and principles that fueled anti-colonial struggles, let's suppose that Morgenthau was simply re-iterating a “reality”—that it was the moral principles emanating from the West that enabled non-Western movements to appropriate a grammar and imagination with which to construct a counter-subjectivity against colonialism.

What is first at issue is that it is not clear whether colonialism was a deviation from or an expression of what is referred to as the rise of the West. One might attribute a multiplicity to the very content of what is known as the West. Morgenthau, however, was not such a figure, at least not in the *Politics among Nations*. However, the issue is far more complex, for any assumption of multiplicity attributed to the totality of the West reveals the fragility of Morgenthau's claim—the multiplicity disrupts the very totality itself. Either there is no such totality that can be called the West or a specific struggle against a particular form of Western ordering of world-politics cannot be derived from the principles originated in that same West.

This paradox is resolved by implementing two strategies, which resemble the Habermasian attempt at answering the question of what is Europe. First, the making of the West is treated as a self-referential entity. The story of success, the ability to overcome its inconsistencies, problems, and “mistakes” through internal/natural creativity are reiterated. Second, the West is conceived of as the *West to come*. The stabilized notion of the West or Europe becomes something that is always already postponed. However, the process of postponement differs from that of negation in that it exists through a *distance* maintained

between the reality of Europe and its ideals. Hence the “conflicting” attributes (colonialism vs. moral principles) are relegated to the distance between the two.

The success of both strategies relies on constructing the Western-political-subject as the universal subject, hence, a negation of non-Western political subjectivity. Morgenthau’s reading of a moral challenge to the West or Rennger’s reading of the problem of order are different instantiations of Habermas’s position. There always remains something outside of European history, representing the image of Europe, the essence of Europe, which constitutes the border and the subject of Europe, as well as its order. The question here is how to maintain such a position. In what ways has Eurocentrism played a constitutive role in the framing of inquiries on the question of what Europe is? Here, it is crucial to undertake a focused discussion on the very term Eurocentrism and its relationship to IR.

1.4. Thinking on Eurocentrism and the Discipline of International Relations

Particularly after the rise of anti-colonialist movements and challenges offered by the interventions of postcolonial thinkers, it may seem unnecessary to posit that like others social sciences, International Relations is a Eurocentric discipline (Joseph, Reddy, and Searle-Chatterjee, 1990). The constitutive link between the two has been elucidated, not only in terms of the spatial-originary places of IR (e.g. the knowledge and institutional practices produced in and around Europe), but also in terms of conceptual orientations affirming and reproducing Eurocentrism as a cultural, political, and social imagination/politics. These readings encompass various attempts at revealing and destabilizing the very notions and assumptions that constitute IR, such as sovereignty, territory, the state, the distinction between domestic and international,

and ways and forms of privileging “Western” experiences. One way to summarize these discussions is to say that the discipline has been constructed through a universalization of a post-Westphalian European experience, both in its accounts on history and its conceptual framework.

The discipline is Eurocentric in two ways: first, in terms of having a partial and limited vision/knowledge of history; and, second, in terms of its conceptual framework, which performatively affirms or rewrites Eurocentrism. As a consequence, a specific form of being political (domestic vs. international), a specific form of subjectivity (White, rational, male, and secular), as well as a specific form of political order (with the sovereign state as the primary locus of political authority) have been normalized as the only legitimate forms of social/political existence. The various aspects of these normalizations and critical contestations over the narrative constructed in and through IR have already been subjected to a series of critiques and investigations.⁸ Despite the persistence of Eurocentric readings and tendencies in mainstream IR, these critical interventions managed to open a space through which virtually all constitutive assumptions of the discipline are destabilized. The question to consider, then, is the “use” of another study would be on the relationship between Eurocentrism and IR.

Part of the problem is related to the ways in which the legacies of these interventions are appropriated by the discipline. Rather than being understood as interventions offering conceptual innovations⁹, they are reduced to readings that correct or revise flaws in the discipline’s history.

⁸ See Agathangelou and Ling (1997), Chowdhry and Nair (2002), Darby (1997), Darby and Paolini (1994), Dunn and Shaw (2001), Grovogui (2002, 1998, 1996), Jahn (2000, 1999), Krishna (2001), Ling (2002), Nkiwane (2001), and Slater (1998).

⁹ Here, I follow a Deleuzeian definition of concepts, considered creations and not merely representations. It gives us the power to move beyond what we know and experience. Concepts are offered as problematizations and respond to specific problems; they create their own order and orient forms of thinking. In addition, they produce ruptures and connections, not only in terms of the subject they focus on, but also the entire framework in which the very

This form of appropriation becomes most visible when critical interventions in IR call for witnessing “new realities on the ground” of world politics, as well as in calls for the recognition of new mappings of global politics and post-international thinking.¹⁰ The tendency to diminish readings that contest Eurocentric imaginations reveals not only the continuous reproduction of Eurocentrism, but also the lack of a focused and abstract conceptualization of the notion itself. In other words, what is required is to consider a concept capable of encompassing the historically specific representations of Eurocentrism (such as sovereignty, territory, etc.), but which could simultaneously provide an abstraction encompassing the reproduction of different forms of Eurocentrism without resorting to a simple demonization of Europe.

To accomplish this, my project employs the concept of *Nomos* to construct an abstract conceptualization for understanding the notion of Eurocentrism. The central focus is to achieve a conceptualization that reveals the different historical representations of Eurocentrism, as well as the various forms of its reproduction. I begin with two assumptions. First, the question of “order” is a permanent feature of politics. Here, politics refers to the construction of differences and oppositions, including the ability “to make a distinction between friend and enemy” (Schmitt 1976: 26). The latter, the ability of making a distinction or the moment of the political as claimed, however, must be subjected to a more careful, critical reading. Second, I claim that a productive and critical reading of the notion of order calls for the employment/deployment of the concept of

existence of the examined-subject becomes possible. For instance, a specific contestation of the notion of sovereignty is one on the very nature and form of *all* knowledge produced in IR.

¹⁰See, for instance Ferguson and Mansbach, “The Euro-centric world of international politics is giving way to a universe more plainly characterized by diverse and often overlapping polities, and processes of fission and fusion” (2004:47). It seems that the very reality of Eurocentrism, as well as criticisms of it, is reduced to a criticism and reality pertaining only to a specific and limited history. However, in opposition to this, it must be noted that one of the most discussed themes in postcolonial studies is the meaning of “post” in post-colonial texts. The problematic refers to the question of continuity and reproduction without neglecting the importance of “institutional and organizational” ruptures resulting from the formal independence of colonized states.

Nomos. However, while offering an examination of the notion of Nomos, the spirit of Nietzsche, as offered by Deleuze and Foucault, must be taken into account, so as to prevent the reading from falling into a Schmittian cliché of politics that reproduces the primacy of Europe in treatments of IR.

In the first part of this examination, I focus on the tension between notions of order and the political as a debate, which is revealed as a productive one, enabling IR to exist as a “social science.” I will examine this problematic briefly in the next section.

1.4.1. International Space, Political Space, and the Question of Order

The demarcation between the international and the domestic is one of the most constitutive aspects of IR. Virtually all schools, including the critical ones, rely on such a distinction to maintain the existence of international politics, as well as the discipline itself. Here, while refraining from discussing the implications of this demarcation, as it will be examined in the subsequent chapters of my project, it suffices to say that the disciplinary space of IR exists at the threshold of the domestic and the international. This space produces the paradox between order (inside) and anarchy (outside), which become derivatives of each other. In other words, rather than being located outside or excluded from the inside, IR maintains its existence by occupying at the threshold between the two, creating both the inside and the outside. Here, a short comment on a specific paradox, found in Schmitt’s definition of the political, may be useful.

Moreiras (2004), in his reading of Schmitt, tries to reveal a tension between the *order of the political* and *political order*, which imply two different, incompatible forms of political ontology. For Schmitt, on the one hand, the real political entity is the sovereign. Sovereignty subordinates every other principle. Moreiras writes, “If the political order is sovereign, the political entities that form it are not. [Since] There is no sharing of sovereignty” (78). If this is the case, then the political entities “are nonexistent [...] as they are simply part of an order and subordinate to it” (ibid). However, in order to keep the very dynamics of the notion of the political alive, political entities need to exist since politics cannot/would not exist otherwise.

The paradox reveals the “fact” that it is not simply the sovereign order, but its very dynamics through which the political is constructed that define the trajectory of an order. This means that the sovereign, who is supposed to be “the ultimate principle of orientation as the organizer and distributor,” is subject to continuous contestation. The tension between political entities and political order opens a space that cannot be conflated with each other. In a way, the space created by the sovereign is always subject to contestation—not only from the outside, but also from the inside, which cannot easily be polarized into the exclusive dynamics of the friend-enemy opposition, contrary to what Schmitt claims.

Therefore, the very order of the political as a paradox exceeds the limits of political ontology subscribed to by Schmitt (i.e. the encounter between friend and enemy). Political processes encompass this form of encounter. However, reducing political moments into these oppositions is no more than a sovereign gesture. It can maintain itself only if the political is reduced to sovereignty and a “plurality of forces” is excluded.

The discipline of IR exemplifies a similar gesture by defining itself through a radical and exclusive opposition between the domestic and the international. There is a tension between the order of the international (anarchy) and its derivative, yet simultaneously constitutive agents (sovereign states). The question of order is the problematic that links each of these distinct realms, albeit with different answers (the (im)possibility of a stable order). The very difference between the international and the domestic begins with these answers. It is this centrality of the problematic of order that enables me to argue for a definition of Eurocentrism as *Nomos*.

1.4.2. Historiography and the Future of International Relations

Following a traditional historiography of International Relations, Krippendorf posits that the history of IR “tells us something about its character and function” (1987: 211). Its policy-oriented approach, state-centric position, its “inability” to provide an independent and “scholarly” enterprise is defined through the dynamics that produced the discipline of IR as a “side-product of the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919.” In seeking a new ground for a new vision of IR, Krippendorf calls for a “theory working with historical categories” (214). In his view, what is needed is to codify a conceptualization with a historical understanding of the international system.

In a similar vein, in his analyses of the historiography of IR, Schmidt (1998, 2002) positions the need for a disciplinary history of IR as an indispensable requirement for “fostering critical insights and opening additional space in which to think about the central dilemmas” shaping contemporary international politics. These calls are neither very surprising nor novel,

particularly when considering the plethora of writings on the history of IR in the last two decades (Both 1996; Miles 1997; Olson & Onuf 1985; Smith 1987, 1995, 2002).

Moreover, it seems that calls for a historiography of IR become part and parcel of virtually all readings of the discipline. In many ways, these calls, while emerging out of a demand for more critical disciplinary thinking and revealing the “crisis of the discipline of IR,” have transformed into a means of revitalizing conservative positions after the 1980s (Wæver 1996).¹¹ The problem, in part, is that discussions on the very structure and orientation of IR, as assumed by many unorthodox scholars, have formed through and been reduced to a disciplinary problematic or crisis. For instance, as mentioned by Ashley and Walker (1990), the reference to a crisis in representation has been reduced to a call for “truthful representations,” rather than looking for ways to engage the paradoxes of representation itself.¹²

Similarly, the process through which a specific conflict becomes visible is reduced to a historically-bounded, empirical problematic. For instance, the surfacing of crisis in the notion sovereignty is understood as a simple outcome of globalized dynamics rather than the “displacement of a specific and paradigmatic resolution of the paradox of ‘inside and outside’ (Walker 1993).¹³ In particular, a crisis is understood to signify a broader crisis in the very political-social and conceptual frameworks in which the notion of sovereignty becomes an

¹¹ Wæver’s reading of the inter-paradigm debate may serve as a classical example, displaying how new challenges to IR were transformed into a reproduction of its established boundaries.

¹² By examining the paradox of representation, I refer to the unstable political and historical nature of the process of representation. The relationship between the represented and representation is not a one-dimensional process, but a dual process through which the “given or assumed identity” of “both sides” is reconstructed constantly. The “usual suspect” or perfect example of this dual-dynamic process of representation can be seen in the relationship between national identity, the individual figure, and his/her representation through or by the embodiment of a national state.

¹³ Virtually all realist and liberal readings of challenges to the notion of sovereignty can be defined through this act. Krasner’s study of *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (1999) is an example of these tendencies.

effective resolution to a specific problem. In a way, a crisis in sovereignty is understood as a crisis of modernity in general (Ashley and Walker 1990). Therefore, it is treated not as an isolated problematic but one that puts all other derivative concepts in crisis, including “the very language, concepts, methods and history which constitute traditions of thought” in IR (Derian 1988).¹⁴ Ultimately, there are numerous ways of narrating a historiography for IR and each carries unique political and conceptual implications.

The differences, however, are not derived only from the privileging of different moments or sources in the construction of IR’s historiography.¹⁵ Rather, the mode, form, and consequences of these historiographies becomes more important than the sources themselves. It is in fact the consequences of these differences that lay the ground for future forms of IR. This is why there is a direct and constitutive relationship between the increasing interest in the question of historiography and crisis in IR in terms of constructing and applying effective concepts to understand world politics. Just as the discipline’s influential readings reflect the dynamics of the reconstruction of the world politics after World War I, the post-1990s revisiting(s) of the historiography of IR attempts to resolve a crisis in world politics, i.e., the ordering of world politics.

Yet another understanding of the way in which the (hi)story of IR can be told offers us new ways to think of the very future of world politics. In other words, the interest in the

¹⁴ Here it is possible to observe the seeds or implicit effects of a Deleuzian intervention: what matters is not the answer but the way in which we put and construct our questions and problematizations. Resolutions are treated as historical and temporary interventions rather than final answers to a certain problematic. By concentrating more on the process of problematization, this reading achieves a different understanding of temporality and time in IR.

¹⁵ Apart from the conventional historiography of IR, there are several different approaches that will be summarized and examined in the first chapter of the dissertation through a consideration of IR’s historiography.

historiography of IR is an interest that has implicitly or explicitly formed through a desire and attempt to achieve a more effective, or stable temporality in which past, present, and future of IR is brought together. While poststructuralist positions aim to temporalize this newly achieved temporality (see Walker and Ashley's reading of crisis need reference again), realist, liberal, and traditional approaches tend to create a solid, non-temporal, and ahistorical history for the discipline.

Historiography forces us to scrutinize the past, present, and future of the discipline. My project, in particular, represents a call for revisiting the notion of Eurocentrism and is directly related to my "discontent"/dissatisfaction with present discussions on the history and future of the discipline. My project will follow a specific strategy to analyze the contradictions and tensions which (en)frame IR. In doing so, I posit that without a political reading of the ordering of the universe, it is virtually impossible to move beyond the established perspective. The ordering of the universe cannot be understood through its own terms; rather, it needs to be located within a generalized conceptualization that may reveal the deeper complexity of ordering the universe. It is a social and political practice is related to other issues, such as the spatial imagination and limitation of politics, which simultaneously shapes our imagination, subjectivity, and political positions.

Secondly, I claim that there is a need to contemplate the questions of what politics is and what the essence of politics is since politics exists in the ways that we define it. Therefore, one of the central questions is to reveal the constitutive influence of the constellations shaping the very acts of thinking in world politics. While politicizing our way of thinking about politics, I hope to

provide a methodological framework that reveals, in critical forms, the dependency between past, present, and future.

1.5. Eurocentrism as the Ordering of the Universe: Basic Assumptions

It is often forgotten that IR is a recent invention and finds its predecessors not only in Thucydides, but also in Pufendorf, Vitoria, Gentili, etc. Morgenthau, who is claimed as the founding father of the discipline, was trained as a legal scholar, not of IR. IR, then, cannot be divorced from its predecessors. The notion of International Law itself, in which “relations” were first conceived, is called “international” and finds its origins in European interstate law. But what is law? How does law arise?

Schmitt points to 1492 as the moment when “the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people becomes *spatially* visible” (2003: 70, emphasis added). This brief tracing of the origin of the discipline, one that purports to explain international *relations*, suggests that the way in which space, law, and relationality are conceived are inseparable from each other. An analysis of Eurocentrism as Nomos of Earth must reflect upon this very history of thinking of the international and the political. It is in this context that my project posits two central claims. First, Eurocentrism must be understood as a question of world order. Further/Second, IR reflects certain paradoxes that enable examination of the very notion of Eurocentrism.

In my reading of Eurocentrism, I engage with the oeuvre of Carl Schmitt to problematize the forms and conceptualizations offered in his attempt to define the “first truly global order”, represented through Eurocentric international law. I find Schmitt’s conceptualization of Nomos quite effective in achieving a concept that could encompass different dynamics (political, social, and economic) in the construction of a world order.

Schmitt does offer a “founding concept of a world order” by linking the process of order with orientation. In his reading, the concept of Nomos refers to the foundational act (land appropriation) that creates the unity of order and orientation (2003: 68, 80). This is one of the most crucial aspects legitimizing an “application” of the notion of Nomos to explain the very dynamics shaping the discipline of IR at a conceptual level. This enables us to achieve a unity of process (orientation) and structure (order). In other words, it allows us to observe the constitutive relationship between the *pre-* and *post-* of a specific present without reducing the relationship to a causal one. This is crucial for it offers us a strikingly different sense of temporality in IR. Rather than understanding the past, present, and future of IR in consequential terms, it relies on a fusion of them without erasing their characteristic differences.¹⁶

Schmitt’s reading of International Law, as referred by Odysseos and Petito (2007: 5, 8), is more than a history. It is a “historical account of international relations, of the genesis” of the Westphalian system. In certain ways, Schmitt’s account of International Law is “missing classics of International Relations,” and a “corrective of its ahistoricity of the discipline and its blindness

¹⁶ For instance, IR as a policy-oriented, problem-solving social science was “virtually impossible” before the advent or domination of scientific-positivist approaches to thinking of international politics. In other words, the unity of process and structure, and a temporality achieved through the notion of nomos is not liberated from a sense of history and contextuality.

to the ways in which spatiality, law and politics constitute world order” (ibid: 2). Looking through this prism, Schmitt’s reading of the (genesis of) the Westphalian system is radically different than the realist, liberal, and neo-realist schools of thought in IR. While the latter approaches rely on an ahistoric definition of the international, Schmitt’s reading provides a historical-political formation of the international.

However, with this reading, Schmitt tends to de-politicize and de-historicize the very *process* of the construction of nomos (in its spatial formulations). Schmitt, an unflinching Eurocentric, subordinates the political moment maintaining Eurocentrism as the Nomos of the earth to the concept of geography as a given fact. To challenge Schmitt’s reading of Nomos and to employ it as a creative-political term, rather than as a concept directed at de-politicizing order, I will employ the conceptual framework offered by the literature of “critical geopolitics” (Tuathil 1996, 1998). My reading will also offer a brief contextualization of the problem of Eurocentrism and undertake a critical conceptual reformulation of Schmitt’s conceptualization.

1.5.1. Contextualizing the Problematic of Eurocentrism

Despite its hegemony, there has always been a certain discontent with Eurocentrism and scholarship in almost every field of the social sciences at one time or another. Since the rise of critical schools in the mid 1960s, and the consolidation of post-structuralist arguments in the mid-1990s, there has been an abundance of direct and indirect studies on Eurocentrism. In his examination of Eurocentrism, Dirlik argues that discussions of the concept create the sense that “[...] the problems of the world would be solved if somehow we got rid of Euro-centrism” (1999: 2). He continues, “This, of course, is silly. It not only misses much about Euro-centrism, it

ignores even more about the rest of the world” (ibid). However, I argue that the more problematic aspect of these forms of critiques is their tendency to reduce political problems to matters of empirical correction or to erase the historical specificity of Eurocentrism and its reproductions. In a way, Dirlik’s analysis also suffers from this reduction.

Moreover, Dirlik criticizes what he calls the culturalist-reductionist approaches (postcolonial and liberal-globalist positions) of the notion of Eurocentrism. Rather than concentrating on the notion itself or the way in which it constructs its narrative, these readings, he contends, reduce Eurocentrism to a misreading of world history (both in terms of the past and the future). As such, these examinations become attempts at revealing Eurocentric expressions or instances in different spheres, ranging from various social sciences (economy, mathematic, sociology, and anthropology) to daily practices. Instead, Dirlik suggests that we may better understand the concept of Eurocentrism by linking it with certain structures of power in world history (e.g. capitalism and political economy). However, Eurocentrism, at this moment, begins to lose its conceptuality and becomes a derivative of certain structures of power.

Similarly, Wallerstein, in his reading of Eurocentrism in the social sciences, offers us an understanding of Eurocentrism as a “constitutive geo-culture” of the modern world (1997: 93). As a constitutive geo-culture, Eurocentrism in Wallerstein’s formulation becomes an “all embracing epochal Weltanschauung” (McLennan 1998: 153). However, it is simultaneously defined as a specific form of ideology, “dominant, but optional” (ibid). Wallerstein’s examination offers us five different ways in which the Eurocentric tendencies of social science become visible: its historiography, the parochial nature of its universalism, its assumptions about

(Western) civilization, its Orientalism, and its attempts to impose the theory of progress (Wallerstein 1997: 94). In addition, Wallerstein's preference to divide Eurocentrism into two mainstream forms (a constitutive *Weltanschauung* and its expression as ideological distortion) is another symptomatic tendency in examining the notion of Eurocentrism. This tendency gained strength, in part, due to the generalized view in which Eurocentrism is understood as a form of ethnocentrism. However, it is also conceived of as a *special form* of ethnocentrism, which, via capitalism, the expansion of Westernization, colonization, imperialism, etc., expanded and gained a specifically world-wide power (Joseph, Reddy, and Chatterjee 1990: 1). Both Dirlik's and Wallerstein's accounts are representative of the dominant method of examining Eurocentrism as a type of ethnocentrism.

One of the central claims of this study is to challenge readings presenting Eurocentrism as a specific type of ethnocentrism. By countering such an approach, I will read Eurocentrism not as a type of ethnocentrism nor as a globalized ethnocentrism, but as the appropriation of the earth itself—in other words, the creation of the world as a globe. Appropriation here refers not only to an expanding sphere of influence or ability to conquer the world, but also to the creation of a peculiar discourse that produces a self-referential, de-politicized narrative. Eurocentrism is imagined as a creative, formative political project, which relies on certain forms of imagining and constituting *the earth*. In this reading, Eurocentrism will be conceived of as a globalized regime of truth, while also codifying the very meaning of the globe and the global. In that sense, rather than concentrating on “Europe and its others,” my analysis aims to confront the hegemony of Eurocentrism.

The story begins in 1492 with the “discovery” of the New World, the unification of “Spain,” and the beginning of capitalism. The decision to begin with 1492 must first be qualified in several aspects. First, as Abu-Lughod (1989) writes, the story cannot be understood without its “before”—the century between 1250 and 1350, when there was a non-European global system in place. Second, the post-1492 period is a formative period, with 1492 marking the consolidation of capitalism, as well as the emergence and consolidation of the European state system, the Westphalian narrative, the industrial revolution, colonialism, imperialism, “The rise of the West,” etc. Third, there are certain problems associated with Eurocentrism’s historiography: how might we narrate history from 1492 until today? By directing our focus to the miracle of the West, Europe and its Other, exclusions and inclusions, Orientalism, colonialism, modernity, postmodernity, and etc. I will examine these aforementioned histories through a discussion on the formative themes of IR.

This preference is due to quite specific conceptual reasons and derives its legitimacy from them. First, following Schmitt, Foucault and Deleuze, the political will be identified as the formative ontological dimension of human life. This will direct me to concentrate on the “immediate forms in which orders and associated notions” become possible through political investments. Life, with its all vitality, becomes a matter of creation, an encounter of forces, territorialization, and de-territorialization. It is in this context, in terms of ordering the universe (the world as composed of the international and states), that our discipline and its vocabulary both grasp and reflect the very dynamics of the story of Eurocentrism. As a discipline dedicated to the study of the “inter-national,” IR reflects the determinative, formative dynamics and

tendencies of world history after 1492, while also crystallizing and reflecting the very paradoxes of this history.

Second, following Schmitt's notion of *nomos*, Eurocentrism is not simply a cultural or ideological "distortion," but the most effective modality of ordering the universe. Its successes and abilities, along with all its costs, are what matters, not the distortion, as the latter relies on the existence of a non-Eurocentric world order. For Schmitt, who proudly supported and watched its decline with disappointment, the Eurocentric *nomos* is an expression of *jus publicum Europaeum*. Taking it as a replacement (victory) to the true political nature of European *Nomos*, Schmitt criticized its decline and condemned the rise of liberal American hegemony after the Second World War.

Here, Schmitt's reading relies on a radical opposition between a European ordering of the universe and the "American" version. Schmitt, in a way, betrays his own conceptualization of *Nomos* and submits his political reading to a geopolitical preference, leading him to set aside an examination of the West and its implications on the conceptualization of Eurocentrism. By scrutinizing IR, including Anglo-American experiences, I argue that Eurocentrism has been deployed and re-deployed in various iterations since 1492. In particular, the post-1919 official history of the discipline carries with it a different set of assumptions associated attempts at ordering the universe from a Eurocentric position. In each of its conceptual innovations, there is a reproduction of Eurocentric assumptions.

Third, the project, which borrows insights from Walker's study (1993), will take international relations as a form of political theory that reflects the paradoxes of modernity in its most "complete" forms. The very principle of sovereignty, for instance, reflects the way in which the spatial configuration of world politics has been inscribed into the imaginations of the very notion of politics. In a way, it is inadequate to say IR is Eurocentric or that there are certain reflections of Eurocentrism on the discipline of IR. Rather, I argue that the discipline cannot exist without positing or reproducing Eurocentrism as *nomos* of the world. This is one of the most crucial reasons for me to prefer an investigation of Eurocentrism by way of IR.

It is in this context that I claim a re-reading of global history since 1492 is necessary to achieve a truly critical IR. This needs to be done via an *abstraction* capable of encompassing and explaining both the temporalities and (dis)continuities in the ordering of the world since then. While the study is presented as an extension of non-traditional readings on IR, it will be posited that virtually all-present approaches, despite their tremendous contributions, are inadequate in terms of offering such an abstraction.

The notion of Eurocentrism and a critical reading of it, in that sense, is one of the most promising means of delving deeper into an examination on the ordering of the universe. However, the term must first be "invented" in a new conceptual form—it cannot be reduced to ethnocentrism and must be more than an *expansion* of knowledge and power practices grounded in European traditions. As such, the "inclusion" of the Other into the "system" (through decolonization and the rise of critical approaches in IR) does not necessarily mean the decline of Eurocentrism; instead, it connotes the rise of new forms of Eurocentrism. This dissertation aims

to move beyond such a path and suggests a new trajectory towards the creation of a new conceptualization of the term Eurocentrism.

1.5.2. Contextualizing the Dissertation and Methodology

A reading of Eurocentrism through the prism of International Relations requires clearing the ground for an altogether different conceptualization of the discipline. The second chapter of the dissertation will provide the first step to achieving this and will offer a detailed examination of the paths suggested through certain foundational texts, which will clear the ground for my own study.

The path presented in the second chapter will pursue a closer examination of Schmitt's analysis of the concept of Nomos in the third chapter, which presents a critical evaluation of the Schmittian Nomos. First, it will be argued that Eurocentrism, as a term, must be treated as a question of Nomos (ordering of the universe). Thereafter, Schmitt's own conceptualization will be contextualized within the historiography of IR. His reading will then be countered with a set of concepts suggested by G. Tuathail (geo-politics), W. Connolly (sovereignty, time, and the political), and M. Foucault (genealogy). The chapter, while providing the conceptual framework for the dissertation, Eurocentrism as Nomos, will argue that Schmitt's perception of Europe suffers from an inadequate attempt at depoliticizing geography. As such, the term "Europe" and the formation of Europe itself will be attended to as the core questions that any examination of Eurocentrism necessarily requires.

Chapter 4, a detailed examination of the history of Europe and Chapter 5, a close reading of the idea of Europe and the concept of Eurocentrism, will follow. It will be shown that the idea of Europe, the term “Europe,” as well as their attendant discussions, must be examined in detail and problematized for a proper introduction to the study of the concept of Eurocentrism. The fourth chapter of the dissertation covers the emergence of Europe—as a continent, an idea, and as the reality (or, the discursive formation of Europe). It begins with a critical reading of the historiography of Europe, its relationship to the Greeks, and post-Roman history, and then moves to investigating the coterminous relationship between Christianity and Europe before moving to the idea of Europe as civilization.

The sixth chapter continues to treat the notion of Europe; however, it focuses on the post-1492 context, in which the discursive formation of Europe re-articulates itself. Here, I discuss the relationship between Europe and modernity, Europe and the West, as well as Europe and the global space to show how Eurocentrism acted as *Nomos* of the earth. In other words, Chapter 6 will link the historiographic discussions presented in the fourth and fifth chapters with the conceptual framework suggested in the third.

From beginning to the end of the dissertation, my examination will follow the genealogical method offered by Nietzsche/Foucault or Foucault’s Nietzsche. Genealogy, as defined, is directed at a rejection of the quest to uncover originary acts (Foucault 1984: 77). It aims at historicizing the truth without reifying it. In genealogical examinations, there is no space for essences; rather, there are histories of the creation of essences out of political encounters and struggles. Such a perspective will enable me to move beyond the radical opposition between

distortion and truth, which is offered through an examination on the formation of concepts, the struggles over the meaning of concepts, and the way in which concept-reality is created. Rather than assuming an “unbroken continuity,” it aims to reveal heterogeneity and the regime of truth associated with established images.

The emergence of any subject or concept in a genealogical examination is always a matter of encounter between conflicting forces and their entry to the sphere in which “reality” has been constructed. In this project, I will employ this method in the examination of the formative aspects of IR, as well as in my critical reading of Schmitt’s notion of Nomos. Moreover, a discursive examination will enable me to reveal the links between the formative notions of the discipline and its regime of truth.

In such a reading, the structuring of Europe, which is the advent and emergence of Europe as reality, discourse and historical “fact”—which can be distinguished neither conceptually nor empirically—will necessarily be engaged as a political act, rather than as a neutral process or outcome of either a particular or universal historical-political-economic backdrop. The majority of readings on the histories of Europe are often content with simply accounting for the heterogeneous nature of this background to reveal the truth of Europe and of its identity as an alternative to homogenizing readings on the history and reality of Europe. Put even more simply, such readings also claim to refrain from Eurocentric readings of Europe.¹⁷ It will be argued that despite these moves, there remains a need for a renewed conceptualization

¹⁷ See G. Delanty’s *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (1995) and Norman Davies’s *Europe: A History* (1988). While the literature is with full of such examples, these are the two most prominent iterations of these positions and both will be examined, in subsequent chapters, to demonstrate the problematic nature of such a position.

that attends to the concepts of both Europe and Eurocentrism—a reading that refrains from either demonizing or celebrating Europe as an abstract concept.

This dissertation is the product of such a search. It investigates different ways of structuring and de-structuring Europe, which yields different political-conceptual consequences and renders certain positions possible or impossible. Attempts at the fixing and un-fixing of Europes, which must be cautiously engaged with at different conceptual levels, may lead to pluralist readings while others may trap us in anti-pluralist positions. Such readings are considered as disputes and struggles that sustain the hegemony of the name of Europe. Europe as Nomos is an answer to this and represents a position that moves beyond the celebration and demonization of Europe, aiming at cultivating a pluralist position through an examination of the concept of Europe.

2.0. Narrating International Relations Through Essays

2.1. Dominant Narratives of Eurocentrism: Attempts and Absorption

Critiques of Eurocentrism, International Relations (IR), and of Eurocentric tendencies and bias in international relations are far from novel. The literature, particularly since the early 1980s, displays an abundance of perspectives, ranging from methodological, political, and sociological criticisms to new historiographies of IR as a discipline. Likewise, there has been growing interest in considerations of Eurocentrism as a concept and Eurocentrism in IR. However, whether these critiques have been successful, i.e. effective, is another matter.

This chapter will provide/attempt/encompass a preliminary intervention to the first one, an analysis/analyses on the limits of IR as a discipline, as well as background for the forthcoming investigation on the main variants of Eurocentrism as a concept, particular those with direct implications for IR as a discipline (see Chapter 3). The examination of texts representing different dimensions of IR will pave the way for my reading of Eurocentrism as Nomos.

In order to elucidate the need for a critical re-reading of International Relations as a *disciplining practice*, as well as the implications of IR as a disciplinary practice, this chapter will be guided by several questions: How are the exclusionary boundaries of the discipline formed? How is contemplation on the international realm reduced to a particular jargon of technical orientation? What are the main strategies that induce an absolute, unquestionable framework for

the discipline? How is the discipline of IR both excluded and secured from transformations, changes, and ruptures that are detectable/present in other social sciences?

These questions, I believe, will provide an explanatory framework for my analytical concern of how IR is being limited by its focus/concentration on global order. These boundaries are related to a restrictive, inadequate comprehension of the political, a reductionist, positivist mode of analysis, a homogenous, linear vision of history, exclusivist political imaginations, an isolation of the discipline from cultural identification, non-contextual and non-historical perceptions of domestic and international realms, as well as mechanical comparisons between these realms, etc. Consequently, IR will be claimed as a discipline confined by a presumed intellectual poverty and that offers a reductionist, homogenous reading of international relations. Rather than offering a discussion of how particular arguments construct boundaries for IR, such a focus on global order(ing) is intended to provide background both for examining the problems of International Theory and thinking on the international/global order. In that sense it is not an examination of the discipline, but a symptomatic reading on its limitations in dealing with/addressing both Eurocentrism and global order.

In this chapter I will present my arguments through a discussion of four interrelated themes: the reproduction of classical metaphors, the reductionist view of politics and ideology, the belief in the transparency of representation, and the question of the relationship between space and the formation of IR.

One way to accomplish this task is to undertake a systematic reading of texts considered as representative of the main discussions in the discipline, including groundbreaking works by Steve Smith (1995, 1996), Ole Wæver (1996), Stanley Hoffmann (1995), Barry Buzan (1996), and Martin Wight (1995). Each has been selected due to their relevance to studies on certain themes and the focus of the dissertation: IR as a discipline, the question of order, methodology, the concept of the political, the formation of “international,” and the concepts of Europe and Eurocentrism.

Beginning with a critical reading of Smith’s two essays provides a fruitful context for my examination. These essays offer a general picture of the discipline through discussions on epistemology and self-images of international theory. I then move to Wæver’s article, which offers radical critiques on the conditions of the discipline while also considering the rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate. After that, I will pursue a comparison between Smith’s and Wæver’s articles to clarify my arguments. These discussions comprise the first subsection of the chapter in which I present a contextualization and formulation of my critiques.

In the second subsection of this chapter, I will discuss three important essays written by Buzan (1996), Wight (1995), and Hoffmann (1995). The discussion on Buzan’s article will help guide my arguments through a questioning of the reproduction of International Theory with classical metaphors. In my analysis, I will concentrate on Buzan’s insistence on the so-called “timeless wisdom of realism,” his reductionist definition of ideology, and value preference will serve as the main to demonstrate the limits he places/puts on International Theory. I then move to Wight’s article and focus on the opposition between Political Theory and International Theory,

his examination of history and language, as well as his belief in the possibility to represent the temporal, through which he limits International Theory. In addition, Hoffmann's article will provide a background for me to think about the relationship between space and the formation of International Theory as a scientific discipline, and the discipline's relationship with/to politics.

2.2. Engaging with the Historiography of International Relations

2.2.1. One text, three shifts: Reading the self-images of IR

This section provides a two-fold discussion of Smith's (1995) genealogical examination on the self-images of International Theory. The article is an influential piece that has served as a turning point for subsequent discussions on the limits of IR and self-reflections on IR as a discipline. Moreover, it provides us with a comprehensive framework for contextualizing and framing virtually all discussions of IR. The article pursues a genealogical examination of IR to provide a comprehensive reading on the self-images of IR. My discussion on Smith's genealogical readings aims to illuminate three modes of writing in his article, which prevent him from conducting a coherent genealogical examination. In other words, despite Smith's success in offering a reading of the self-images of IR and providing a comprehensive picture of the state of IR, he fails to provide a genealogical examination. This difficulty indicates a need to look for new means of genealogical examination in the images of IR.

Smith's preference for a Foucauldian genealogy derives from his intention to deconstruct the sense of continuity, linear progress, and unity that inheres within IR through an examination of self-images. This approach, according to Smith, concentrates on how and through what kinds

of articulations, exclusions, inclusions or strategies a particular discourse or image is codified (1995: 5). Through a discussions of these self-images and its critiques, Smith believes he can clarify the “hidden assumptions in the way that the history of the discipline presented, silenced, marginalized voices, and power-political practices that infuse the self-images of international theory” (1995: 7). However, rather than providing a genealogical reading, the article merely presents an examination of ten self-images¹⁸, which includes most of the main discussions in International Theory, and provides a detailed context for an analysis of the discipline by showing how they are shaped through a series of fallacies, misunderstandings, narrowness and/or incompetence.

I argue that there are three modes of writing in Smith’s examination that lead to this difficulty: Critical examination and rejection (provided through readings on the self-images of 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6); descriptive analysis (provided through reading on the self-images of 8, 9, and 10); and critical examination with a genealogical reading (provided through a reading of the fourth image). These are consequences of the *forms* of critique presented by the article in the examination of each self-image.¹⁹

¹⁸ 1) International theory versus political theory; 2) Communitarian versus cosmopolitan thought; 3) The three Rs (realists, rationalist, and revolutionists); 4) The three waves or the “Great Debates”; 5) The inter-paradigm debate; 6) State-centrism versus transnationalism; 7) Neo-realism and neo-liberalism; 8) The post-positivist debate; 9) Constitutive versus explanatory theory; 10) Foundationalist versus anti-foundationalist international theory (Smith 1995: 7-30).

¹⁹ The examination of the fifth self-image is in between the first move and the second move since his analysis of this image, while presenting a critical reading and rejection, also implies what is forced out, such as the exclusion of issues except those related to actors, images of the world system, and the causes of war. Moreover he refers to the influence of political visions in shaping the limits of the debate (Smith 1995: 19). However, he situates these critiques within the question of incompetence rather than in the discursive formation of the debate. Therefore, I put the examination of this self-image into the first mode of writing.

In the first mode, Smith concentrates on the failures of the self-images he analyzes. The false dichotomy between political and international theory, the reduction of political community to a state-centric vision, the marginalization of morality, the restrictive visions of the state and transnationalism, the excessive focus on quantitative measures, the narrow definitions of central issues in international studies, and the possibility of different models of dividing theories constitute the main lines of Smith's critiques in this part. The problem is not whether his arguments are persuasive or not, but whether the form of his critiques contextualize the problematical features of these approaches into a question of lack, narrowness or incompleteness. Although he repeatedly refers to the influence of these images in limiting the visions of International Theory, his assessment of the images focuses on how explanatory they are and the power of their conceptual framework. There is no substantial genealogical reading that shows how and through what kinds of strategies, conceptualization and structuring that different voices have been silenced and excluded. Additionally, Smith does not investigate the types of relationships that have been legitimized and de-legitimized. Genealogy has suddenly turned into a chronological reading of the historiography of certain images attributed by Smith. In this context, I argue that this part of Smith's article fails at providing a genealogical reading to reveal the hidden assumptions or how established visions come to be so.

Though with an alternative form of examination, which is mainly descriptive, a similar problem is evident in Smith's discussion of self-images 8 through 10. I define this descriptive analysis as the second mode of writing found in a single text. In this part, he begins with a discussion of the different 'wings' of post-positivist visions in IR, such as feminism, historical sociology, Critical Theory and postmodernism. Smith concentrates primarily on the self-images

of the constitutive theories versus explanatory ones, as well as foundationalist versus anti-foundationalist readings. In this section, Smith's discussions comprise introductory presentations rather than a critical reading. What Smith does is to demonstrate the potentiality of the productive/positive/enhancing features of these self-images while also expressing his sympathy with the last two self-images (30).

It is only in his discussion of the fourth self-image that Smith presents a genealogical reading, the third mode of his writing. Here, the problem for Smith is the act of defining the scope and history of International Theory through the successive periods between idealism, realism, and behavioralism.²⁰ He concentrates on the implications of transition, progress, homogenization, and a particular type of politics. A transitive, progressive vision conceals ruptures, reconstructions, and transformations in favor of established visions (16). Similarly, unitary, successive visions of history present a linear image that excludes alternative voices and silences all other debates. While gender, class, and ethnicity are excluded, "a Western/white/male/conservative" vision is naturalized (17). Moreover, Smith argues that these debates are nothing more than a "series of statements of faith, with political or sociological factors determining which voice was heard" (ibid.).

Through an examination of ten different images attributed to IR, Smith provides a genealogical reading here by focusing on and investigating the play of inclusion and exclusion. By elucidating what is included and excluded, as well as the consequences of these processes,

²⁰ The first debate was between idealism, dominant in the 1920s and early 1930s, and realism, which hegemonized IR in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The so-called second debate was between realism and behavioralism in the late 1950s and 1960s. Smith, in this part, also mentions the various articulations and definitions of the participants of the so-called third debate, such as state-centric versus transnationalist or positivism versus post-positivism (Smith 1995: 14).

Smith provides a genealogical examination that generates a space for a critical reading that begins to surpass the limits of IR.

Apart from the three modes of writings by Smith, two crucial points demand further explication. His examination of self-images 1 through 8 demonstrates that the main discussions of International Theory reproduce distinctive images with similar problems, such as limiting IR within a restrictive and exclusive realm of inquiry, promoting a reductionist view of politics and ideology, and maintaining the exclusion of different voices through unification and sustaining narrow definitions of the central concerns of IR. These arguments will shape the context of my subsequent discussions on the condition of IR. Secondly, Smith's preference for the ninth and tenth self-images is due to their potential to challenge the relationship between reality and theorization (ninth self-image), as well as to confront the very idea of the transparent reality itself (tenth self-image). This effective moment shows how a substantial critical vision might be established. Additionally, these images provide radical arguments about/critiques of the notion of reality, representation, and translation (as "mirroring social facts"), which challenge the whole vision of IR.

Smith's second article, "Positivism and Beyond" (1996), provides a comprehensive framework for readings on the methodology of IR. In this article, after a short examination of the history of positivism in reference to A. Comte, the Vienna Circle/logical empiricism, and the deductive-nomological model, Smith examines three alternatives to positivist epistemology.

By revealing/exposing the problems of these approaches, Smith attempts to move beyond positivism without reproducing any of the implications of foundationalism. He criticizes the narrowness of empiricism's epistemology, the indivisible relationship between theory and observation, the impossibility of pure observation, the partial analysis of reality due to its reliance on observation, as well as the reduction of causality into a simple correlation. Rationalism, in Smith's readings, is an inadequate framework through which to clarify preference for one intuition instead of another. He argues that, "something other than intuition is needed if we are going to be able to decide between rival intuitions" (22). Within such a framework, both rationalism and empiricism depend on the idea that "there is a real world to explain," which leads them to ignore the constructive relationship between the agent and the real world. Both epistemologies are deemed foundationalist to Smith, who regards pragmatism as an intermediate epistemology, falling between empiricism and rationalism and combining reason, theory and experience.

This epistemology, while assuming an active mind in interpreting experience, assumes a link between the revisions of belief and experience. The adjustment to truth, which is unfolded by experience, is the main framework of pragmatism. However, in Smith's reading, the problem with pragmatism lies in that it does not allow any room for statements about the possibility for "truth." Epistemology becomes a question of ethics since truth is defined according to what "the community think should be the case" (18-24). This argumentation enables Smith to reveal the continuity of epistemological problems even in alternative epistemologies. After that, Smith concentrates on the resilience of positivism and explores how to go beyond the limits of positivism in International Theory.

Although positivism has been very influential in IR, critical involvement with the epistemological discussions within the history of IR went largely unnoticed until the 1980s due to unawareness of the implicit, positivist assumptions (32). To problematize this, Smith situates his examination of positivism within debates of constitutive/explanatory and foundationalist/anti-foundationalist discussions. Here, Smith's focus shifts from an analysis of the continuity of the problems to how to challenge the dominant positions. The main reason for this is related to the three different usages of positivism in IR, which are understood as epistemology, methodology and the behaviorist reliance on quantitative data, the first of which is the prevailing tendency (31-32). Though the rejection of positivism in methodology does not guarantee an escape from it in ontology and epistemology (such as Bull's critics of scientism), Smith concentrates on debates that problematize both.

I began with Smith's analysis of alternative epistemologies and presented his treatment of them followed by a discussion of his move beyond positivism in IR. Smith's arguments will form the context of my discussion/argument in two ways.

First, his reading of the resilience of positivism explicates the implicit continuity shaping discussions of epistemology in International Theory. Moreover, Smith's discussion of critical theories and three alternatives refers to the reproduction of foundationalism, thereby enhancing a critical vision. Secondly, pursuing the same line of thought, his reference to anti-foundationalist perspectives sheds light on the strongest avenues to follow and move beyond positivist epistemology.

Consequently, Smith's examination of the methodology of IR presents a comprehensive representation of both continuity and the reproduction of positivist epistemology, fostering a productive conversation on new visions. While Smith's discussion of the self-images provide a helpful context through which the discipline of IR formed, his analysis of positivism presents a useful framework for epistemological discussions.

2.2.2 Radicalizing the Discussions: Inter-Paradigm Debates

Wæver (1996) presents a discussion of IR through an examination of the inter-paradigm debate. On the one hand, he detects an emancipatory potentiality in the debate, unlike Smith's reading of that debate,²¹ while also showing how International Theory reproduces similar problems through an examination of the debate's various articulations. That said, Wæver provides profound insights on how to formulate questions for discussion in International Theory. In this section, I will concentrate on the ways in which he examines the inter-paradigm debate itself and its articulations in International Relations.

Wæver's essay attempts to grasp and show the peculiarity and importance of the inter-paradigm debate as a particular alternative. He then examines the transformation of the inter-paradigm debate into a reproduction of existing boundaries. In the final section of the essay, Wæver continues his search for new challenges to International Theory. Wæver's article thus represents a continuous attempt at pushing the limits of given languages and representations

²¹ Smith and Wæver define the difference of the inter-paradigm debate as accepting the absence of the dominant-hegemonic paradigm for IR, unlike two other debates (Smith 1995: 18; Wæver 1996: 155). Nevertheless, despite similarities between their examinations, Wæver differentiates himself from Smith by demonstrating an "emancipatory" potentiality for the debate. For Smith, the debate has a limited vision of International Theory and hides the realist dominance in international studies (Smith 1995: 18-21).

through his refusal to restrict/block the potentialities of alternative visions through diverse articulations.

Wæver assumes the possibility of coherent categorizations of IR paradigms,²² which leads him to concentrate on the *form* of the inter-paradigm, leading to a crucial and transformative debate. This inter-paradigm debate is shaped by an operative logic of “incommensurability” through which the three paradigms are accepted as having *different, coherent but competing* paradigms for IR studies (158). In this framework, the existence of IR is very nearly equated with the continuous discussions and disagreements between the various paradigms.

The debate itself diverges from others in three significant ways: “its self-conception as ‘incommensurable paradigms’; its area for locating differences: ontologically as different conceptions of the nature, units and content of international relations; and its ‘participants’ as three schools” (157). These are the consequences to the argument of incommensurability, which negates the rejection of one paradigm due to a difference in language. The impact of such a position is clear/obvious: IR is compelled to be more “diverse” by the very existence of the discussions. The possibility is not only the result of the reality or persuasiveness of the arguments, but due to the presence of competing, incommensurable positions. Wæver’s insistence on contextualizing the discussions into specific historical moments enables him to

²² Categorization depends on the differences between key levels of analysis, including treatments of the state/non-state or the political/non-political, as well as concepts of time. Realism depends on a state-centric political vision, which offers a static-recycling model of time. Liberalism offers multi-centric, non-political (i.e. economic interdependence will change the ‘political set-up of states and conflicts’) reading with an evolutionary vision of time. Marxism/radicalism offers a global-systemic analysis that depends on political conflicts between the oppressors and the oppressed with a revolutionary comprehension of time (Wæver 1996: 151-154).

display the links between the structuring of conceptual frameworks with that of realities. He locates these discussions in the period characterized by a weakening of the center, shaped by the self-doubt of mainstream American IR after the Vietnam War, student revolts, and the oil crisis (158). The second aspect forming Wæver's critiques is his unique treatment/explication of the usage of "paradigm" as a concept in International Theory.

Contrary to Smith (1995: 15-16), who defines the application of the concept of paradigm in IR as one of misuse and misunderstanding, Wæver concentrates on the practical consequences of the usage as "an inter-disciplinary borrowing [...] useful for reconstructing a more decentralized but stabilized image of the discipline in a time of troubles" (Wæver 1996: 158). For Wæver, the problems created by the concept do not derive from misuse, but from missing the arguments by Kuhn on sociology and the history of science. According to Wæver, Kuhn deemed paradigms as "intrinsic to the social functioning of a scientific community" (159). Despite the positive consequences of the debate, Wæver argues, the issue of incommensurability has led to a reduced appearance of paradigms, as though/if they are offering three dimensions of reality. In that sense, the inter-paradigm debate was an artificially constructed "debate," which was invented for the purposes of presentation and teaching, as well as promoting self-reflection within the discipline (161).

Here he discusses the elimination of the inter-paradigm debate's potentialities by replacing of incommensurability with commensurability in the mid-1980s. At this time, the rapprochement between paradigms had become the dominant tendency. The discussions included several central themes defined as neo-neo divergence, scientific "prejudices," a shared rationalist

research program, a conception of science, and a shared willingness to operate on the premise of anarchy. These acts of limitation brought a new constellation of controversy: rationalists versus reflectivists and postmodernists/poststructuralists.

While the former approach represents the new mainstream, the latter is a challenge to the basic premises of IR, including the third debate. Wæver, thus, defines this controversy as the fourth debate (157, 164).

In the form of poststructuralist strategies, Wæver contends that the latter approach is philosophically much more radical than other challenges and questioned IR in regards to subjectivity, objectivity, language, politics, representation, and Western metaphysics. However, he adds, in the 1990s, poststructuralist approaches were incorporated as part of the hegemonic discourse that weakened its challenging power (the last instance of limitation). The pursuit of a middle ground between rationalists and reflectivists began a new debate defined by Wæver as post-radical reflection (167). Here we observe a withdrawal from the radical questioning of the discipline and a tendency towards more ‘concrete’ examinations in poststructuralist IR (168-169).

The importance of these discussions derives from Wæver’s tendency to push the limits of the present discussions to deconstruct attempts at limiting IR while recognizing a conceptual source for extending its limits within the history of the discipline.

Following the same line of thought, Wæver criticizes the implications of absolute, transparent communication within the paradigm by arguing for the impossibility of transparency

of language within or outside a particular paradigm (171). His aim is to enhance the vision of incommensurability by insisting upon incomplete and partial communication, as well as to escape from reducing incommensurability to a division of labor. Moreover, Wæver adds that each paradigm or reading of International Theory necessarily refers to and expresses a particular normative program and politics—conservative, radical or liberal. This argument not only reveals the indivisibility of political visions and the act of theorization, but also situates the possibility of interaction within the realm of the politics.

In this part, I discuss Wæver's presentation of the inter-paradigm debate. I argue that Wæver's examination undertakes to reveal the potentialities of particular approaches and criticizes the possible/real transformations limiting the expressions of these potentialities, providing vital insights for a critical reading of IR. This strategy, I argue, is important since it neither alienates itself or its language from IR. Moreover, it does not compromise with any established vision that may lead to a reductionist interpretation/one.

The text by Wæver informs us of how to consider/treat the concept of Eurocentrism and deal with the notion of Europe through a reading of IR as a discipline. Alongside its claims and arguments, the article's pedagogic use is more effective at suggesting a path toward a more efficient reading on the concept of Europe. In the next part, by comparing Smith's and Wæver's articles, I will explore the kinds of insights gained/acquired through such an approach.

2.2.3. The Question of Ruptures: Continuity or Abundance?

Previous sections and discussions demonstrated that there is a striking similarity between Smith's and Wæver's readings, with both directing the possibility of challenging the limits of International Theory into new visions, particularly those derived from and through the challenges of poststructuralist positions. However, there is a decisive difference in their approaches to these possibilities.

For Smith, the most promising self-images of IR will arise from two sets of discussions, namely constitutive versus explanatory theory and foundationalism versus anti-foundationalism (Smith 1995: 30, 1996: 35). The former challenges the very foundation of the dialogue/debate on the relationship between reality and theorization, whereas the latter questions the very idea of reality.

In a similar vein, Wæver focuses on the notion of incommensurability and applies the arguments of poststructuralist visions, such as the impossibility of transparent language and communication, to construct a more inclusive International Theory (Wæver 1996: 172). Moreover, both are generally in agreement when expressing their discomfort with traditional forms of International Theory and claiming that IR theories have been exclusivist, both limiting and silencing the discipline, which speaks through a positivist epistemology. Such a reading and discomfort with IR is evident in Smith's discussion of the first eight self-images and Wæver's examination of the transformation of the inter-paradigm debate, especially when explaining what sets it apart from/its variations/distinctions from previous debates. Both Smith and Wæver attempt/seek to cultivate a possibility for moving beyond the traditional limits of IR through new

approaches discussed in the discipline. However, in doing so, a striking difference emerges from their various modes of writing.

While both are critical, Smith's two essays are directed towards presenting the main threads of debates in the history of International Theory. However, as discussed above, he did not present a consistent genealogical analysis. Smith's first article provides a comprehensive examination of the discipline, which offers a context for discussing IR in terms of self-images. The article and its images are a perfect means of scrutinizing the state of IR as a discipline. In that sense, I revealed three modes of analysis in Smith's article that contribute to his critical vision and apply this reading to his article for a more comprehensive contextualization. Smith's discussion of positivism performed a similar function in the discussion of epistemology in IR. Smith's examination, despite its difficulties, in other words, provides a solid context for my discussion. Wæver's examination, on the other hand, is presented and serves as an important resource to formulate my own arguments.

For instance, Wæver's essay consistently displays a specific intention from start to finish. In each discussion, he pushed the limits to find new metaphors with which to enhance self-reflections on IR. Unlike Smith's tendency to insert the possibility for a "better" theory into the discussions themselves, implying the search of an intermediate position between new radical approaches and the prevailing languages of IR, Wæver defines the problematic consequences of these attempts as 'compromise-rapprochement,' between radical interpretive or deconstructive approaches and the dominant languages of IR. Moreover, through his insistence on the political aspects of the discussions and through contextual analysis, Wæver avoids suggesting an

unceasing, continuous moment of *total rupture* from previous constellations. Even the most radical approaches might lose their emancipatory forms, as in the case of post-structuralism's withdrawal from 'guerilla strategies' (Wæver 1996: 167).

In contrast to this position, Smith's article represents an optimistic vision invested with disciplinary logic, despite his critical stance towards IR theory. Although he is quite sharp when referring to the transitions between different self-images through ruptures, Smith's overall tendency is to define these ruptures as *successive* moments of relationships that form a cumulative background in IR for a "better theory." Here, the problem lies in his implicit assumption of a teleological continuity between ruptures. This may seem quite paradoxical, especially in a text promising to offer a genealogical reading of IR. Nevertheless, I believe Smith's position is more closely aligned with a position that defines the consequences of rupture as replacement of one theory with a better one/an alternative. In addition, it appears as though Smith ignores how each radical rupture also reproduces and revisits all previous histories from a different vision/position/context. I thus argue that what is instead needed is to refer to the abundance of both spatial and historical ruptures rather than a sense of continuity. Contrary to Smith, Wæver concentrates on the problematic, homogenizing tendency of discussions in various historical moments through an analysis of transformations. This requires a constant search, on the part of Smith, for increasing the density of the ruptures without assuming continuity between them. Consequently, Smith's reading creates/generates/fashions space for a critical, pluralist examination.

Following the context offered by Smith and the mode of thinking exemplified by Wæver, I will discuss the last three articles in reference to some basic themes. This section will start/begin with a discussion of Buzan's article, which exemplifies the salient, recurring problems of International Theory that both Smith and Wæver refer to. My examination of Buzan's article will be guided by references to various themes, including ideology, value preference, politics, and the question of diversity. When analyzing Wight's essay, I will focus on the opposition between political theory and international theory, the question of transparency and language, and the issue of continuity. Lastly, I will examine Hoffmann's claim that certain paths need to be questioned to shed light beyond the traditional problematization and problems of IR. In particular, I will examine the relationship between politics and IR, as well as the formation of the space in the discipline. In each discussion, I will reach to Smith's contextualization, as well as the the arguments provided by both Wæver and Smith as background for my own reading.

2.3. Generalizing Realist Wisdom

In this section, I will discuss and contextualize Buzan's article (1996) on the resilience of realism through themes explored by Smith (1996: 16, 1995: 10) as the implicit reproduction of positivist epistemology and attempts at homogenizing IR by establishing a "false," exclusive vision of a continuous unity. Also, following Wæver (1996), I will discuss Buzan's reductionist view of ideology and politics to examine the issue of incommensurability, as well as his vision of rapprochement between different "theories." Moreover, I will examine Buzan's analysis of the logic of power politics and the implications of the distinction between facts and value. My aim is

to show how Buzan limits International Theory and the possible context contributing to his restrictive reading.

Buzan articulates the reasons behind the resilience of realism in its adjustment to different contexts, the extension of its vision, and ability to provide a unified theoretical framework. To solidify his argument on the power of realism, Buzan proffers three reasons: “its continued relevance, its flexibility in coming to terms with many ideas from other approaches, and its value as a starting point for inquiry” (47). In order to demonstrate the timeless wisdom of realism, Buzan offers to move beyond the restricted and isolated definitions of realism by criticizing particular “obsessions” with some concepts (e.g., the state in Morgenthau’s theory), and defining them as historical, contextual expressions of that tradition.

However, Buzan’s intent is not to extend the limits of International Theory but those of realism. Nevertheless, Buzan does not identify any conflict between these attempts because he equates the discipline of IR with what is defined as the timeless wisdom of realism. For Buzan, “International Relations is a multi disciplinary enterprise and so is realism” (51). Though acknowledging the differences between competing traditions of International Theory, Buzan cautions over emphasizing the contrasts between them. In this context, realism represents a tradition that takes different forms highlighting the continuity of human conditions and which necessitates intellectual coherence (50-51). However, Smith’s examination (1995: 24) reveals that the context of IR is enriched by including different images rather than representing a single wisdom alone. This vision of unity cannot be sustained since IR is shaped by ruptures, discontinuities, and transformations. Moreover, as Wæver (1996) concludes, the reduction of

different interventions into a single approach is a violent political transformation that produces new lines of constellations between rival claims with each iteration. Therefore, in contrast to Buzan (1996: 59), who is open to merging postmodernism into realism, Wæver (1996: 169) criticizes this kind of rapprochement as losing a critical vision and negating radical assumptions.

The second crucial/significant theme in Buzan's essay is his definition of the logic of power politics as a technical expression of governance. This logic, Buzan argues, is simply about monitoring the changes in the distribution of power: assessing the threats and defining policy within the limits of resources for survival and the enhancement of power (1996: 55). The problem lies in Buzan's equation of *strategies* of the logic of power politics with the logic of this politics itself. First, the question and capacity of the logic of power cannot be limited to a particular realm of life or political structure; rather, it is embedded within all realms of social and political life. Moreover, it cannot be reduced to different strategies of adjustment since power is an overall constitutive and determining characteristic of human relationships. Therefore, Buzan's intention to limit power politics with strategies cannot be sustained. Secondly, Buzan ignores the relationship between the representation/image of the world and theorization as Smith and Wæver have both shown (Smith 1995: 2; Wæver 1996: 171). Buzan's treatment of positivism, then, is limited to methodology. In this context, Smith pointed to the implicit reproduction of positivism, which is not simply about methodology, but also the assumptions of fixed regularities and the distinction between facts and values (1996: 16).

For Buzan, moreover, realism is not an ideological position unlike other paradigms referring to normative predispositions, as it "does not necessarily represent a value preference"

(1996: 54). This argument relates to a sharp distinction between facts and values, which implies a positivist epistemology and reductionist definition of ideology. I believe this reductionism to have resulted in a limitation on realism despite Buzan's attempts at generalization. Buzan equates ideology with particular, programmatic (e.g., charters of political movements), limited, and normative frameworks. I argue that this humanist-naturalism²³ ignores the infusion of "ideology" into all realms of social and political life, the construction of common sense as political acts (Smith 1996: 13), and the sedimentation of different values as an inherently ideological-political intervention. Buzan thus reduces value-preference only to explicit biases, ignoring how value constitutes our manner of existence and individuality. Although perhaps differing in, intensity, all realms of social and political life are determined by means of political and ideological interventions. The difference is not about securing a non-ideological mode, but rather about the degree in the sedimentation of particular values and visions. In this context, Buzan's attempt at defining realism as a non-ideological position without compelling a value preference is both a political and ideological definition. This is possible only within a positivist epistemology since, as Wæver (1996: 172) argues, there can be no position without a normative program.

The final issue that I will pursue is Buzan's definition of realism as supportive of ideological and cultural diversity, political independence, self-reliance, and economic decentralization (Buzan 1996: 62). For Buzan, realism's insistence on differences and conflicts inherently implies a political vision capable of securing diversity. However, there are two basic

²³ I employ humanist-naturalism to refer to a position creating a sharp distinction between the individual's existence, his life, and his political standing. Humanism offers a non-historical definition of the human subject outside of all relationships and naturalism, in that context, homogenizes this mode of existence as the unique possibility of existence.

problems with this vision of diversity due to the complex relationship between conflicts and the question of security. Just as differences are discussed (and assimilated) through the dilemma of security and insecurity in the realist framework, they are treated as sources of potential threats rather than offered conditions to be cultivated through political intervention. Consequently, all possible relationships between diverse groups, states, or identities are reduced to a one-dimensional relationship of domination. Securitization is an expected and seemingly natural outcome of a realist perspective of international relations. Therefore, what is defined as a positive implication of realism by Buzan is quite actually quite problematic and little more than a source of securitization. As stated by Walker, in the modern Westphalian political system, “security is so closely tied to the principle of state sovereignty (1990: 6),” and the system is a simultaneous expression of fragmentation (diversity) and centralization (homogenization), the latter of which requires a certain degree of eliminating diversity. Hence, securitization or “security policy is not simply a matter of defense against external threat” (12), but also is a constant possibility of “dissolving the claims of democracy, openness, and legitimate authority into claims about *realpolitik*, *raison d’état* and the necessity of violence” (ibid).

Buzan’s argument is further destabilized when we consider the realist vision of diversity in reference to differences within a particular group, state, or community. Wæver’s discussion of incommensurability may be helpful to understand this problem (1996: 171-172). The classical vision of incommensurability in IR implies absolute commensurability and communication within the group, which leads to/results in the homogenization of differences within it. This vision externalizes differences and diversities. What we see is the play of homogenizing attempts internally, and an exclusionary acceptance of the heterogeneous externally. Realism, in such a

context, nearly produces these effects due to its concentration on survival, the enhancement of power, and the maximization of interest in a conflictual world. Indeed, Buzan's reading can be contextualized as/thought of/considered as an example of a discourse "concerned with possibilities and necessities within the sovereign state" (Walker 2006).

To conclude, Buzan's article restricts the contemplation of International Theory with its assumption of continuity, equation of the logic of power politics with the techniques of governance, reductionist definition of ideology, distinction between facts and value, and exclusionary comprehension of diversity (examined above). These problems, at the same time, restrict his vision within the context of classical self-images of IR. His effort to generalize realism in order to push the limits of International Theory is restricted by the reproductions of these themes.

2.4. The Reality of Temporal Representation

Martin Wight's article (1995) is one of the most influential and provocative examinations of the state and limits of International Theory. Through a series of arguments, Wight offers a speculative reasoning for the study of international relations, which reproduces the demarcation between the inside and outside of political orders, as well as the distinction between Political Theory and International Theory. In order to express the limits Wight places on International Theory, I will consider Wight's article by first analyzing his treatment of the concepts of politics, international politics, and theory, and, secondly, through an exploration of the implications of his examination of history.

Political theory, Wight states, can be summarized and defined as tradition of speculations about the state. International Theory may likewise denote traditions of speculation about the relations between states. However, Wight argues, International Theory in that sense does not exist (1995: 15). Wight's examination of history, which aims to detect classical texts that may function as constitutive sources for International Theory, ultimately locates scattered examples that are insufficient as historical sources for IR. Here, Wight concentrates on two internal problems that make a theory of IR impossible: 1) the intellectual prejudices imposed by the sovereign state; and, 2) the belief in progress (19). In the case of the former, the experience of sovereignty consummates all political experience and determines the limits of relationships and visions since the sixteenth century. In such a context, International Theory could be possible only by subordinating it to Political Theory and then searching for the prospect of a world state. Nevertheless, the assumption of an unalterable structure of the international realm negates this possibility (21-22).

The second problem arises out of the relative isolation of International Theory from political events in contrast to Political Theory, which makes progressive interpretations impossible. Consequently, the sphere of international politics is defined as the realm of recurrence and repetition (23-25). In the context of complex relationships between order, theory and appropriate language, which present the possibility of being influenced by historical events and enhancing cumulative progress, Wight provides his most radical arguments. Without the existence of a "proper order" in international politics to match this language of control, there is no International Theory, which is confined by a language of survival. Ultimately/In the end, Wight clarifies his main argument: "there is no International Theory except the kind of

rumination about human destiny to which we give the unsatisfactory name of philosophy of history” (33).

Having elucidated Wight’s central points/arguments, I will begin by examining his definition of politics and its implications. In this discussion, I will explicate Wright’s reproduction of a particular image. As Smith’s argues (1995: 9-10), Wight’s examination of International Theory depends/rests on a false dichotomy between Political Theory and International Theory. Wight’s description of the realm of International Theory as one of recurrence and repetition reproduces one of the most enduring images of the discipline. Wight builds his entire discussion of a possibility of theory on such a distinction. Moreover, Wight neither problematizes the creation of a particular mode of order nor does he focus on the questioning of the aforementioned imagining of International Theory. The absence of this discussion is telling, for it implies that Wight treats the particular, historical modes of order as unquestionable, given realities. Consequently, he not only accepts the given framework, but reproduces it. Through these modes of analysis, Wight’s approach becomes an expression of one of the problematic limits of International Theory, defined by Smith as ahistorical definitions of the international realm.

I argue that these represent consequences of Wight’s limited vision of the concepts of politics and theory. Although he refers to the questions of Political Theory as elaborations on the good life, practically, Wight’s definition of politics reduces politics to a state-centric vision. For Wight, it seems that politics is not the primary means through which humans *construct, form* and *express* their visions, ways of existence, and interests, but only entails speculations on

governance. For this reason, Wight discusses politics through its expressive modes, but not its constitutive aspects. This is also evident in Wight's reduction of the language of theorizing into the realms that man has control over, and his reduction of theory as merely providing "maps of experience or systems of action within the realm of normal relationships and calculable results" (1995: 32). In this frame, Political Theory is reduced to an expression of speculations on the state. This background forces Wight to define International Theory as a theory of survival, due to his neglect of the expressive, constructive aspects of theorization, and relegation of theory to a limited language. Theory and politics, shaped as they are by these restrictions, would ultimately find it difficult to provide a vision capable of questioning the established, dominant perspectives. They would also enhance these perspectives due to their treatment of realities as given, as well as their self-limitation within this expression. Consequently, Wight's imagination of politics prevents meditation on new metaphors that might express and reconstitute International Theory.²⁴

On the one hand, Wight's negation of *progress* in the international realm could, paradoxically, function as a source for developing a critical vision since his negation is the negation of a concept designating positivist reductionism and the cosmology of modernity. However, his approach is limited by a vision that assumes a historical, yet accurate, representation of truths. This, in turn, prevents Wight from developing a comprehensive critical vision, which is related to his usage of history and treatment of language and representation.

²⁴ It must be noted that Wight's discussion of the spatial construction of politics, in some moments, provides clues for critical readings, such as stimulation to consider the reasons for the consummation of political experience through nation-state sovereignties or to concentrate on the issue of the world-state or empires beyond nation-states. Nevertheless, he does not push some of his implicit assumptions to their logical ends, but limits himself by discussing IR through the given conceptual framework. Here, again, it is clear that he thinks through the expressive features of politics and theory.

Wight's position relegates the "*accurate representation* of international theory within the temporal discourse of historical interrelationship [emphasis added]" (Weber 1998: 451). Although spatial distinctions are crucial for Wight to help define the differences between the two disciplines, the division cannot guarantee a particular language for the proper study of IR. One possible alternative might be International Law, since it represents an "inverse movement to that of international politics" (Wight 1995: 28). Consequently, Wight needs a proper conceptual tool that can *reflect* IR's realities. However, for Wight, only the language of historical interpretation can reflect these realities *as they really are* (Weber 1998: 461). This suggests that he assumes a transparent relationship between language, temporality, and representation. Historical interpretation could thus represent realities in their *real nature*. Consequently, he offers a *historical* correspondence theory of truth.²⁵ As Weber argues (453), Wight's questioning of the spatial construct of international studies leaves the temporal representation unquestioned and does not go far enough in opening new alternatives. In this context, it is necessary to recall Wæver's arguments on representation. Similar to the impossibility of having a final, accurate, and fixed meaning for any concept or representation, including historical representations, an ultimate, fixed, and impartial representation cannot exist (Wæver 1996: 171). Therefore, Wight's examination of representation homogenizes and generalizes a momentary and always partial, limited representation. Consequently, Wight excludes the possibility of thinking about new metaphors since he assumes we have already grasped the most possible and probable of representations through historical examinations.

²⁵ Correspondence theory of truth is a phrase that defines one of the features of positivist epistemology. It assumes a correspondence between so-called "realities" and "facts" of social life, as well as the representation of them through theories. In order to clarify the insistence of Wight on the historical-temporal aspects of representation, I add historical to the beginning of that phrase.

To conclude, in this section I show that Wight's essay places limitations on the contemplation of International Theory through a radical opposition between Political Theory and International Theory, as well as a reductionist imagination of politics and theory. These aspects compel his approach to represent an expression of the self-images that Smith criticizes in his first article, examined before. I also discussed how his treatment of history enhances the limits of International Theory through belief in the possibility of accurate representation.

Both Buzan's article and Wight's examinations provide crucial background for my reading on the concept of Europe. The reality of temporality and its impact on the formation of IR and its limits, alongside the difficulty of creating a "timeless wisdom" through realism provides a critical conceptual framing for a critical reading of IR. I contend that an effective critical reading on the concept of Europe requires a focus on the temporal representation of Europe and challenging the timeless nature of the concept itself.

2.5. American Social Science and the Spatiality of the Discipline

In this part I will provide a discussion on Hoffmann's classical essay (1995) in which he examines why and how International Relations has developed as an American social science. Hoffman's article is itself an attempt at describing the limits of International Theory; however, my discussion will move towards a radicalization of his approach. To accomplish this, I will first concentrate on the ways in which he discusses the relationship between the spatial sources of IR and the discipline itself; and, secondly, I will focus on an analysis of the propositions he offers to move beyond the present limits. Through both discussions, I will show that his attempt, although

containing productive insights, encounters a number of difficulties in adequately pushing the limits.

Hoffmann argues that since its inception, international studies and its practices have functioned as particular *techniques of governance* towards external states and groups (1995: 214). It has been an activity of diplomacy and soldiers. Contrary to Wight (1995: 18-19), who defines the absence of powerful philosophical texts as an external problem, Hoffmann explicates this problem by concentrating on the articulation of international studies through the state. This articulation is so powerful that even in the modern age, shaped by democratization and a great deal of interrelationship between state and its population, International Relations remains a realm of practices that necessitates a proper knowledge of both power and its techniques.

Hoffmann argues that the United States, in contrast to other countries, is the first in which “foreign policy was put under the domestic checks and balances” (213-214). Although Hoffman discussed the placement/assignment of foreign policy under domestic checks to show that it constructs a historical background for the establishment of IR, the analytical function of this argument remains unclear. This reference results from/arises out of an intention to establish a linear, progressive history for the discipline, which puts a substantial limitation on International Theory, as Smith (1995) shows through his examination of self-images. Hoffmann then situates the emergence of the discipline as a scientific inquiry within the context of the US’s transformation into a world power in the post-1930s period and the demands thereof. The increased need for collective security after the tragic consequences of World War I condensed the search for a proper “science” able to detect and elucidate the reasons for possible conflicts, in

addition to offering techniques for solving and escaping from such catastrophic results. Utopian and idealist principles have been subjected to criticisms due to their inability to represent a scientific vision. The growth of the discipline was thus defined by the role and politics of the US in international affairs (Hoffmann 1995: 216-220). Interestingly, Hoffmann does not push this argument to its logical ends, which may have revealed the normative, but hidden implications of the idea of “collective security.” Not merely a worldwide *responsibility* of providing security for all, the notion of collective security is instead related to a particular mode of ordering the globe. Instead of pursuing/investigating these questions through an archeological examination,²⁶ Hoffmann concentrates on the convergence of “intellectual predispositions, political circumstances and institutional opportunities” (218) in the US to explain the acceleration of the discipline’s growth.²⁷

I argue that this background leads Hoffmann to radicalize the distinction between the nature of the field versus the principal residence of the discipline. He contends that the problem of theory in terms of formulating laws “that account for the behavior of states, theories that would explain those laws and allow for prediction,” the question of a science without a theory but with a paradigm, the issue of fragmentation, and methodology are issues related to the nature of the field (229-232). On the other hand, the quest for certainty, the concentration on present time without a sense of history, and instrumental questions instead of other possible questions

²⁶ Archeological examination is a mode of analysis that concentrates on what kinds of power relations make a particular type of knowledge or questions possible in a particular context.

²⁷ The complex combination of a practical, pragmatic vision of studying world politics, the necessity of “unbiased” methods to solve conflicts, the influence of immigrated scholars as “conceptualizers,” the convergence between the needs of policymakers, and scholars’ performance, the system of government that puts academics and researchers in the kitchens of power, and the network of foundations that accelerated the development of IR study as a science in the US (Hoffmann 1995: 218-226).

(e.g., what should we do against present and possible ‘enemies’ or rivals?) arise from IR’s articulations within a principal place of residence, the US (236-239).

Following Hoffman, I believe it is possible to make an analytical distinction between the features and questions of a particular social science and those it gains through articulations in different historical and political contexts. This attempt may be useful for explaining the different relationships and transformations of this particular science. Nevertheless, the radicalization of this distinction leads to a homogenized, naturalized, and ahistorical image of the discipline. Although a critical outlook shapes Hoffmann’s vision, his position carries some resonances of positivism, which are evident in his implication of the existence of a non-contextual, non-historical, and hygienic image of science possible only within a positivist epistemology. At this point, it may be useful to refer to the distinctions between emancipatory theories and problem-solving one. As Smith shows (1995: 28), this approach is sustainable only by ignoring the discursive formation of knowledge, science and power, which implies the impossibility of impartial, non-political readings to assume a particular, privileged ground for judging between rival claims. As such, Smith proceeds by radicalizing the analytical distinction between the nature of the science and its articulations.

To move beyond the limits of International Theory, Hoffmann argues that IR requires a triple distance to “move away from the contemporary to past; from the perspective of a superpower toward that of the weak and the revolutionary; away from the impossible quest for stability; from the glide into policy science back to steep ascent toward the peaks with the questions raised by traditional political philosophy represent” (Hoffman 1995: 240). These

propositions are quite radical and provocative since they provide new languages and metaphors to IR for improving its vision. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Hoffmann's intention to solve the crises of International Relations goes hand-in-hand with his belief to secure the discipline as a distinct realm of social science. This position, practically, follows a tendency towards the homogenization of a particular context to protect the disciplinary borders/boundaries of International Theory. This would, however, be difficult to sustain because applying Hoffman's propositions necessitates a radical transformation of the basic premises of IR and its languages; it entails a strong constitutive rupture from previous traditions. Moreover, this is a staunch "political act," which implies a particular normative vision and political program, that would act as a partial counter-movement in the history of International Relations against the mainstream's normative program and politics. In that context, as Wæver argues (1996: 175), the discipline of IR will remain in a constant oscillation between debates with intermediate periods in which previous contestants meet. Therefore, there will be no safe and secure premises from different challenges as Hoffmann assumes.

In this section, I discussed Hoffmann's article in reference to the distinction between nature and the articulations of the discipline, as well as the problematical implications of his propositions. I also mentioned the consequences of the absence of an archeological discussion and its implications of a linear-progressive assumption in IR's history. Through a discussion of these issues, I tried to show that Hoffman creates a limited scope and vision for International Theory despite his critical vision/approach. These limitations can be summarized as the exclusion of the possibility of detecting transformations and ruptures within the history of IR, the absence of the discursive formation of knowledge and power, and ignorance of the continuous

attempts at reframing International Theory, as well as the impossibility of homogenized, non-historical existence of the discipline's nature.

2.6. The (B)Ordering of International Relations

Deliberation on International Theory is a vitally significant act because of the paradoxical relationship of existing debates in the discipline with/to its present limitations. Why and how? While different discussions on the constitutive fathers of international studies, the coherence of the discipline, methodology, and paradigms are constantly re-visited, the discipline continues to function as a proper and influential guide for international politics. Consequently, the merit, power, and depth of a particular approach or IR as a discipline are generally reduced to and defined as proper, rational and useful means in politics. It is therefore possible to argue that the continuity of discussions does not represent an abundance of different approaches dominating the discipline, but instead reveals the traces of continuous questioning, which produces a problem of self-legitimacy for the existence and functions of the discipline. Here, the discussion on the condition of International Theory may have a crucial function since this self-legitimacy dilemma cannot be thought of without discussing the self-legitimacy of the social sciences in general.²⁸

In this context, the peculiarity and importance of International Theory emerges from its essential feature: providing the strongest, most intimate and detailed relationship between science, politics, order, and governance. What has been discussed as genesis, order and hierarchy

²⁸ The self-legitimacy problem of the social sciences refers to the consequences of discussions on the social sciences that force them to provide methodologies similar to those of the natural sciences, questions their relationship with politics, and the problem of objectivity in these disciplines. The dominant tendency has been to reduce the social sciences to a secondary level based on the assumption that the natural sciences are able to grasp objective truths, unlike the social sciences.

in the formation of international law by Grovogui (1996)²⁹ is indeed little more than an alternative historical account of International Relations. While focusing on the ordering language of international law as an affirmation of Western hegemony, its modes of operation (perceptions, interpretations, and values), and functions (the reproduction of international order) Grovogui (18-21) provides a reading of the formation of the Eurocentric order(ing) of the earth. In other words, discussing IR and its limits consists of exploring the question of order and global politics, namely Eurocentrism. The discipline, thus, presents the ‘*negative*’ *limits* of existence for a social science. Moreover, through its traditional expressions, IR refrains from providing any contemplation on the *human condition*, but acts as the most powerful means for expressing the reduction of politics into an act of control and distortion. Therefore, a critical dialogue on the conditions of International Theory would be a discussion not only on the discipline, but also on the modes of politics, the forms of social sciences, as well as the context of the state’s relationship and its existence: hence, the question of order, making the contemplation on International Theory vital. These discussions may shed light on new paths to deliberate on politics, the social sciences and, more broadly, alternative expressions of the human condition. The first, and perhaps most feasible, mode of analysis for this form of contemplation is to consider limits and the production of boundaries which address the problem of established visions and how to deal with different arguments and assumptions.

As discussed in the previous chapter (Section 1.2), what is at stake for a critical examination of the discipline of International Relations is the question of space and its relation to law and order. In this chapter, I attempted a critical reading of this issue through six significant

²⁹ Alongside Grovogui’s reading and Walker’s examination (1993) for some readings that display the links between order of the universe/politics and international relations see George (1994), Grovogui (1996, chapter 1), Salter (2002), Rengger (2000), Hobson (2012).

articles. The first three articles (Smith and Wæver's studies) provided a critical framework with which to identify the contexts in which International Theory is being limited/restricted. These articles also guided my reading and helped to formulate my criticisms. Moreover, I provided an engaged reading of Smith's analysis on self-images to enhance his critical position. By analyzing the arguments of each article, I showed what types of arguments help codify/construct the limits of International Theory. In addition, I defined the implicit usage of positivist epistemology, an exclusive vision of unity, and a reductionist view of ideology and belief into the possibility of value-free science (Buzan), and elucidated the inadequate, problematical distinction between International Theory and Political Theory, the restrictive conceptualization of politics and theory and belief into a possibility for accurate historical representation (Wight), the radicalization of the distinction between nature and articulations of the discipline and the limited visions of challenging that aim to secure disciplinary boundaries and a linear, progressive vision of history, as well as the absence of discursive examination (Hoffmann) as the main arguments that construct or reflect the boundaries of International Theory.

On the one hand, these problems create unquestionable barriers that prevent attempts at detecting different metaphors to explain international politics. However, on the other hand, they are representations and expressions of the barriers themselves. Any social "science" that takes its forms through these types of arguments would find it difficult to enhance its visions by exploring different approaches, gaining depth, and enriching its conceptual framework.³⁰ Therefore, these arguments construct boundaries and reproduce them. What is required is a questioning of each of these arguments through an archeological and genealogical reading instead of excessive attention

³⁰ It should be noted that my arguments do not imply that these articles are the main sources for constructing limits in International Relations. Instead, my analysis considers these works as representative of diverse, prevailing modes of thought in International Theory.

to its secondary role and place in politics and academia (e.g., as technicians of international politics).

As part of a context in which a contemplation on International Theory should concentrate as a means of pushing its limits and opening new horizons, such an examination will challenge not only the discipline, but the entire framework of social science. Only then will International Theory move beyond its “intellectual and moral poverty” (Wight 1995, 19) and become a “real” social science rather than a technique of governance.

This is where “Europe” begins as the story of International Relations as a discipline, of the world as a political space and international relations as a form of politics distinguished from the domestic politics. Discussing the play of order, politics, borders, subjectivity(?), identity, and the political in the construction of Europe and Eurocentrism is a crucial moment in/element for realizing this task. The first step is to clear the ground for my own reading of the concept of Eurocentrism and distinguish the main trajectories and critiques taken up in readings of Eurocentrism. The task of the next chapter is to realize this aim alongside a critical examination of Schmitt’s concept of Nomos.³¹

³¹ Note of caution: As further discussion on the concept of Eurocentrism will be provided later, the discussion in the next chapter would be a preliminary one.

3.0. Narrating Eurocentrism: Dislocating Carl Schmitt

“In my opinion, the rights of man consist in the authorization to take possession of all that is unoccupied and to defend all that has been so acquired” (J. Moser 1790, qtd. in Meinecke, *Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook*, 1972: 285).

“Just as division precedes production, so appropriation precedes division; it opens the way to apportionment [...] Initially there was no basic norm, but a basic appropriation. No man can give, divide and distribute without taking. Only a god, who created the world from nothing, can give and distribute without taking” (C. Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*, 2003: 345).

“The earth is in effect one world, in which empty, uninhabited spaces virtually do not exist. Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings” (E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 1993: 7).

In the first chapter, I defined the main task of the dissertation as providing a reading on the concept of Eurocentrism as Nomos of the Earth, and I argue that a critical reading on the limits of International Relations (hereafter IR), might open new, critical perspectives. A preliminary conceptual discussion on the borders of Europe, the relationship between order, politics and subjectivity lays the foundation for the central assertion of the dissertation: that Eurocentrism must be understood as an ordering of the universe. In the second chapter, I provided a reading on the narration of IR through essays to reveal the limitations on the discipline, as well as what can be discerned from such an analysis to shed on the concept of Eurocentrism. If IR reflects the strongest and most intimate relationship between order and politics, then Eurocentrism must be understood as a representation of it. In such a reading, international order is viewed as a “relationship among specific states that produces and reinforces a shared understanding of

expectations and behaviors with respect to one another” (Mattern 2005: 22). The question here is how to discuss the sources of this order in terms of its relationship to Eurocentrism and in light of the literature displaying the Eurocentric nature of such order. Moreover, there is a need to examine the ways in which the concept of Eurocentrism has been narrated. In other words, probing the limits of IR requires a simultaneous structuring of Eurocentrism as an ordering of the universe. This framing leads to specific questions that contextualize the task of this chapter.

How has Eurocentrism been narrated? What are the main paths through which Eurocentrism has been discussed? How has Eurocentrism manifested/appeared? What is the relationship between historiography and Eurocentrism? In what ways is Eurocentrism reproduced despite a critical stance against the implications of the term? What are the implications of defining Eurocentrism as *Nomos* of the Earth? In what ways does a Schmittian definition of *Nomos* maintain its relationship to politics, geography, and identity? In what ways does a Schmittian *Nomos* refrain/abstain from the concept of the political? How does Schmitt provide an anti-political conceptualization through the concept of *Nomos*? What needs to be done to resist the temptations of Schmitt’s reading of *Nomos*?

This chapter will take up these vital questions while also providing a conceptual framework to support such an endeavor. Rather than discussing the concept itself, the chapter will focus on how the term has been narrated through a limited selection of readings and does not offer itself as an exhaustive examination.

What is at stake for a critical narration of IR, I contend, is the question of space and its relation to law and order. This leads us to scrutinize what Schmitt calls the “spatial origin” of European law and brings his reading in conversation with critical geography. Such a focus, I believe, performs a dual service/function: first, it enables us to problematize certain foundational themes in the discipline such as territory, geography, order, and politics; and, second, it lays the ground for my own reading of Eurocentrism as *Nomos*. Indeed, Schmitt himself takes the concept of *Nomos* as a “concrete order” that begins with land appropriation. However, what Schmitt neglects is the moment when the question of “geo-geography” arises.

The task of this chapter, then, is to provide preliminary engagement with Carl Schmitt’s writing on *Euro-centrism as Nomos*. Through the engagement with Schmitt, I argue/claim that we must reflect upon the relation between space and politics—thus sounding the call for a critical geopolitics.

This chapter is comprised of two main parts. The first prepares a framework for revealing/highlighting the specificities of a Schmittian reading of *Nomos*. I suggest that, despite the abundance of several different conceptualizations, there are two main paths for analyzing the concept of Euro-centrism: historiography/epistemology and the question of capitalism. Comparing these perspectives, and heeding the call for an abstract definition of Eurocentrism, I suggest that we might deploy the concept of *Nomos* in defining the term. However, I also claim that a Schmittian definition comes only with tremendous difficulty. In particular, due to Schmitt’s understanding of geography and the political, there is a need to examine the relationship between territory, law, geography, identity, and the political. This is the task of the

latter patter of the chapter. This backdrop will lead us to a completely different theme, namely, a chronological history of Europe. I also assert that employing a discussion on Eurocentrism as Nomos requires an extensive and detailed discussion on the history of Europe itself rather than the concept of Eurocentrism, which would be the task of the next chapter.

3.1. Locating the Question: Reading Eurocentrism?

In virtually all readings on Eurocentrism, one finds certain recurring themes: the universality and superiority of European experiences, rationality, uniqueness, and the privileging of these experiences. This line of inquiry is well-represented in the literature and most commentators combine these arguments to construct their readings of the concept. These radings provide an abstract definition of Eurocentrism only by focusing its manifestations. The occurrences or moments of Eurocentric actions, behaviors, and epistemologies are treated as an exhaustive examination of the concept itself. The discussion on the concept per se suddenly turns into a series of empirical representations of the “distorting” telos of Eurocentric stances.

What is required is to lay the foundation for a conceptual study that directs us to an abstraction of the various approaches in which certain generalizable themes can be discussed. I suggest two main paths upon which an investigation of the concept can be summarized (without committing an injustice to the richness of the discussion). The next two sections will examine these paths in details.

3.1.1. Eurocentrism in the Crude Form or as a Matter of Historiography

The first path through which Eurocentrism has been discussed and manifested is in its crude form and, in this reading, is essentially a matter of chronological time and claims of superiority. The crude form does not negate the complexity of Eurocentrism, but simply refers to the visibility of Eurocentrism in these moments. Indeed, such a path both displays how Eurocentrism is deployed and employed, as well as how it has been examined simultaneously. In these readings, focusing on the manifestations of Eurocentrism has been the main form of structuring an analysis of the concept.

In this form, Eurocentrism maintains its vision through a constant reproduction of certain beliefs, particularly, the inherited superiority of the white race, the naturally superior environment of Europe, and the progressive and innovative culture of Europeans. In this sense, it simply refers to a dominant and naturalized belief in the superiority of Europe and Europeans. Through an isolationist reading, the history of the last five hundred years is taken as a confirmation of this superiority (Blaut 2000: 1-5).³² The history of modernization and modernity are moments/is a period of such manifestations, excluding critical readings. Nevertheless, such Eurocentrism does not limit itself to the history of “modern time.” Eurocentrism, in such a reading, constructs a particular genealogy through which the historical roots of the superiority of Europe is narrated through a linear-teleological and progressive vision of history. This genealogy links Europe’s present features to a particular, but shining origin (often Greece). It defines the non-Western world through the play of presences and absences while simultaneously examining

³² For the most comprehensive lists of such an analysis and examples, see John M. Hobson (2004, 2012), Eric Wolf (1982), and A. G. Frank (1998).

“the problems” of non-European cultures and traditions in relation to ontological, ahistorical features in contradistinction to framings of similar problems of Europeans in reference to technical, historical and resolvable questions (Amin,1989: 90, 107).³³

While the history and presence of the non-Western world is defined by either constant chaos and anarchy or authoritarianism, the Western part of the world is defined by a progressive and constant search for better governance. The violent history of Europe, as an empirical fact, is thus retrospectively defined as a historical experience oriented towards a more pluralist, democratic form of life/governance. This retrospective reading is enhanced by exclusion and “ignorance” of the mutual, historical relationships between non-Western and Western worlds. Within the logic of Eurocentrism, the (*hi*)story of Westernity or Europe is the true, successful, unique and most important (*hi*)story of the world. The rest should follow either imitation or guidance from Europeans.

Despite the appearance and reproduction of Eurocentric assumptions, the traditional language of Western supremacy has lost its power and reliance/legitimacy. However, recognizing the crude form enables us to perceive the logic and political imagination of Eurocentrism. It not only privileges Europe through a series of false assumptions, but also excludes different experiences, relationships, as well as the plurality of human history. It presents a distorted image of the world while isolating and eliminating the histories of non-Western communities. It works through the dichotomy of “the West and the Rest” and leaves “people without history” (Wolf 1982).

³³ The play of presence/absence refers to modes of thinking that relegate certain positive things, such as human rights, women’s rights, tolerance, and democracy to Western traditions and defines the non-Western world by their absence

Within the literature of anti-Orientalists and anti-colonialist readings, there is a vast and strong critique revealing the difficulties of such manifestations of Eurocentrism. In other words, Eurocentrism, in its crude form, has been subjected to much criticism. However, dealing with Eurocentrism in its crude forms has had certain strategic-pragmatic uses. Specifically, it enables us to consider alternative histories and the ways in which they have been dissolved into/appropriated by Eurocentric imaginations. However, such forms of readings provide little more than empirical “corrections,” which are incapable of subverting Eurocentric political imaginations. Rather, the centrality of these exclusive imaginations remains conceptually unchallenged while the plurality of subject-positions is treated as a supplement to given forms rather than offering new forms of political imaginations. In its most complex formulations, world-history is reduced to the stories of hybrid formations in which the structural political hierarchy between the West and the Rest retains its primacy. In addition, post-1492 historiography remains locked in this narrative opposition between the West and Rest. The “relationship,” however, is much more complex and requires a conceptual intervention rather than an empirical one. Samir Amin’s reading of Eurocentrism and world-system theorists seems to be suggesting a conceptual intervention, which is the subject of the second path in which Eurocentrism has been discussed.

3.1.2. World-System: Capitalism, Universalism and Eurocentrism

Amin (1989) is perhaps one of the first to suggest an abstract account of the emergence of Eurocentrism. He locates Eurocentrism among the differences between a pre-capitalist social system and a capitalist one. Whereas in the former politico-ideological authority dominates the

socio-political system over economic relationships, in the latter, the relationship is inverted and economics is situated at the center. Eurocentrism in this framework refers to the cultural level due to its insistence on essential cultural differences and capitalism's "real objective need for universalism" (XII-XIII, 1-9, 1993: 250). In this context, it is not something limited to the banal manifestation of "Eurocentric arrogance," but instead "implies a theory of world history and departing from a global political project" (1989: 75).

Amin's insistence on the qualitative break represented through and by capitalism and his attempt to distinguish Eurocentrism from the recognition of that break (1995: 247, 250-251) is quite crucial. However, the basic problem with Amin's conceptual framework is its privileging of the economic sphere over the political and locating Eurocentrism as a matter of ideological distortion. The ordering of the universe, in Amin's language, loses its political relevance and becomes a representation of "fake universality."

Despite these difficulties, world-system theorists (specifically Wallerstein, Arrighi, Abu-Lughod and Frank) are among the first to problematize the question of world history and the ordering of the universe since the late fifteenth century. This calls for an examination of the frameworks suggested by these theorists to reveal their perceptions of Eurocentrism. The task, then, is to display the lack of an adequate conceptual framework to revive Eurocentrism, despite the critical stance against it.

3.1.2.1. Wallerstein: Speaking Within Eurocentrism?

Wallerstein (1979) contends that there has been an identifiable social system, which extends beyond the ‘boundaries of individual societies or nations.’ It is constructed around “a single worldwide division of labor that unifies the multiple cultural systems of the world’s peoples into a single, integrated economic system” (1979: 5, quoted from Shanon 1996: 23-24). Wallerstein locates the emergence of the modern world-system out of the decline of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a period “marked by war, disease, and economic hardship” (1974: 21). This background constitutes the prelude of the expansion of Europe, and its economic transformation. The modern world-system arose from the “long sixteenth century,” 1450-1620 (68). The overseas, geographic expansion of Europe (47), a geographically constructed new division of labor (three zones) (87, 162), and the construction of the interstate system (32, 67, 162) are the three major developments that offered a solution to the crises of Western feudalism (33). While Wallerstein defines a “‘world’-wide division of labor and bureaucratic state machineries in certain areas” as two key institutions contributing to the rise of a capitalist world-economy, he is quite clear that it “was in Europe but not elsewhere” (63) that it could emerge. Here, two important/crucial points deserve/merit mentioned.

Firstly, Wallerstein does not attribute “the success of Europe” to any essential, cultural superiority of the West. Instead, he refers to the differences between the feudal system and a bureaucratically based world empire, imperial political structures, Europe’s need to expand geographically, and statism when explaining the reigning ideology at the time of Europe’s takeoff (63, 67). The second example is a reference to the importance of the “transference” of New World gold and silver to Europe as one of the most “striking things” of the sixteenth

century and the rise of Europe (128).³⁴ Until this point, Wallerstein refrains from Eurocentrism in either form and does not privilege any claim to ahistorical, non-material, cultural superiority.

However, once the rise of Europe is contextualized within world history, the Eurocentric tendencies of Wallerstein become visible.³⁵ Wallerstein locates Eurocentrism within the internal dynamics of “Europe,” which is not coincidental but points to a conceptual preference. More precisely, for Wallerstein, “[...] the dynamics of [a social system’s] development are largely internal” (347). The real question here is not whether such a priority on/privileging of internal dynamics is sustainable, but what determines the boundaries between internal and external? The relationship, in terms geographic locations is a political question and, in many cases, if we avoid critical geopolitics, our understanding of geographical distinction is shaped through retrospective readings. Nevertheless, this is not the only problem. Locating the explanation of the Rise of Europe strictly within the internal dynamics of Europe simultaneously privileges Europe and attributes it with an exceptional role in the history of the world. By “provincializing,” reducing and ignoring the role and importance of “other parts” of the world, Europe is de-marginalized and centralized. Each of these assumptions is only reminiscent of the arguments on Eurocentrism and European exceptionalism. Why is this so?

Wallerstein legitimizes his readings by noting the differences between his understanding of the modern world-system (with a hyphen) and Frank and Gill’s conceptualization of the world system (1993: 294). Furthermore, Wallerstein refers to the peculiarity/*differentia specifica* of

³⁴ Compared to Frank (1998: 278-283), Wallerstein attributes less importance on this appropriation. In Wallerstein’s analysis of the rise of Europe, despite agreeing upon its importance, it is not *determinative by itself* he claims (128).

³⁵ As Wallerstein himself states, “The West, capitalism, and the modern world-system are inextricably linked together—historically, systemically, intellectually” (1992: 561). Hence, when I refer to “the rise of the West,” it simultaneously refers to arguments on the “origin of capitalism” or the emergence of the modern world-system.

capitalism (the ceaseless accumulation of capital), differences between world empires and the world-system, the “axial division of labor involving integrated production process,” and the incapability of trade to create/make a system (293-295, 1992: 567). Frank and Gill challenge Wallerstein’s argument for the *differentia specifica* of capitalism (2000: 8), as visible to a different degree preceding capitalism. Secondly, Wallerstein’s reading of the rise of the West isolates the history of capitalism, Europe, and the modern world-system from previous non-Western dynamics and world systems (e.g., in Abu-Lughod’s formulation of Frank and Gill’s conceptualization). This first problem, then, is not *essentially* about the peculiar features of capitalism or the question of a break, but related to isolationism and exceptionalism.

This reading is inevitably Eurocentric, as Abu-Lughod (1989) has very astutely shown that the rise of the West cannot be understood without the decline of the East. Furthermore, from her study, it is clear that trade crucial to the world system preceding European hegemony. During that time, Europe was an upstart peripheral to an ongoing operation, with the roots of the world-system embedded in the thirteenth-century Eurasian world system. As there was no *historical necessity* for the shift of hegemony to the West, the rise of the West was facilitated by the structure of the preexisting world economy (1989: 4, 12, 361). Each of these arguments show that any reading privileging Europe and isolating its history from previous contexts is inevitably Eurocentric.

Secondly, without dealing with the distinction between world systems and the world-system (with a hyphen), we can characterize Wallerstein’s Eurocentrism by referring to discussions on the marginality of Europe until 1800 in an *existing world economy*. Asia,

particularly China and India, were more dominant hegemons themselves before the appropriation of hegemony by the West. The rise of the West “was part of a much wider and older historical process in a largely Asian-based world economy, which had the same essential characteristics that [Braudel and] Wallerstein attribute to their European based “world economy/system” (Frank 1995: 163). In that context, the “transition to capitalism” is defined in reference to the changes in the long pre-existing world systems and changes in the system outside Europe, but not in reference to changes within Europe (Frank 1993: 207). In light of these arguments, as well as Frank and Gills’s reading of world economy,³⁶ Wallerstein’s insistence on explaining the rise of the West in reference to the internal dynamics of West, locating its construction of hegemony within sixteenth-century Europe, is neither conceptually nor empirically sustainable without a Eurocentric imagination. The lack of an adequate, effective conceptualization of Eurocentrism ultimately reproduces a Eurocentric reading despite his critical stance.

In response to criticism, Wallerstein argues that though he maintains the distinctiveness of capitalism, he does not define it as a “highly positive or progressive happening in world history,” but rather as an “irrational adventure” (Wallerstein 1993: 292; 1992: 616). Furthermore, he declines the charges of Eurocentrism and claims that his analysis “exoticizes” Europe, which is defined, by him, as “historically aberrant” (295). Wallerstein also expresses agreement with Frank’s rejection of Eurocentrism (Wallerstein 1995: 244). However, Wallerstein ultimately reduces Frank’s insistence on the “beginning” of the world-system to the question of pragmatism (ibid). In these readings, he further equates Eurocentrism with a normative stance, such as being in favor of the world-system or attributing any progressive, rationalist feature to it. Being critical

³⁶ This approach rejects locating the origin of the world system in Europe, European exceptionalism, and the incorporation of the rest of the world into capitalism after 1500 (Frank and Gills: 2000: 13-14).

to world-system does not negate being Eurocentric. The critical vision, in this context, may produce a critical stance against capitalism and the modern world-system, but not a non-Eurocentric imagination. Hence, despite his attempt to “condemn” Eurocentrism, he proceeds within the same framework.

3.1.2.2. Abu-Lughod: Speaking beyond Eurocentrism?

Abu-Lughod’s study (1989) is the first systematic attempt to move beyond Eurocentrism within the literature on the World System. Her study shows that the major problem with World System analyses is that it is not *essentially* related to the substantial lack or ignorance of an empirical basis to these examinations. This is similar to Frank’s argument (1998: 29), which in the case of Braudel (and Marx), isolates the basic problem as one of how to *incorporate* empirical findings “into the model and theory.” Whereas a particular reading could easily fall within Eurocentric imaginations, still others could include and refer to similar empirical realities that may avoid such a shortcoming. While Frank preferred to offer a holistic approach, Abu-Lughod “limits” her attempt to a pre-European world system to guard herself from Eurocentrism.

In one sense, Abu-Lughod’s study (1989) is a response to the Eurocentric vision of Wallerstein. She criticizes his “overemphasis” on the *discontinuity* between a Euro-centered world economy and previous world-economies, his relegation of the world-system to the definition of capitalist structure, his acceptance of the main lines of Western historical scholarship (in which the West is privileged and prioritized), and his reduction of the importance of *global* patterns of trade before European hegemony (Abu-Lughod 1993: 278).

The most important challenge of Abu-Lughod to Eurocentric readings of World Systems analysis is her conceptualization of the world-system. Without privileging a Euro-centered world-system, Abu-Lughod argues that there have been *several successive world-systems*, each with a changing structure and its own set of hegemons (279, emphasis in original). The thirteenth-century world-system was structured around dense integration through commercial ties/interests between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Europe was the least “successful” part of this system. Abu Lughod contextualizes and historicizes the rise of the West into that system and defines it as a historical possibility, but not a *historical necessity* (1989: 33, 352-354). In that sense, the rise of the West is not an example of an innovative rupture that *constitutes a completely new system*, but a transformation at the very heart/center of hegemony. However, Abu-Lughod’s success “cannot be used to argue [...] that *only* the institutions and culture of the West *could have succeeded*” (354). What matters here is not the uniqueness of the European capitalist world-system, but its relationship to the previous system. This is a radical challenge to the Eurocentric vision of the world-system, as it avoids attributing/granting Europe an exceptional role in the construction of the world economy and the story of world history, which is “interesting only with the rise of the West after 1450,” as Wallerstein did (1993: 278).

Nevertheless, for Frank and Gills, despite their appreciation, Abu-Lughod’s reading is still limited, as she does not accept “a single world system and its continuous cyclical development” (1995: 143; Frank 1998: XIX; Frank 1993: 209). Frank and Gills concentrate on the sameness of the system and generate their criticism of Eurocentrism out of this holistic vision. However, as we can see from the study by Abu-Lughod, the *differentia specifica* of presenting a non-Eurocentric reading is about how one locates the rise of the West within world history and

previous systems; the rest is empirical discussion. Exceptionalism and isolationism lead to a Eurocentric reading, but contextualization and historicization do not. Abu-Lughod achieves this in her study, and it is the primary component enabling her to move beyond the language of Eurocentrism. The pedagogic use of Abu-Lughod's study is that there is a need for abstraction and an insistence on the relationship between continuity and discontinuities when focusing on the impact of contextualization and historicization.

3.1.2.3 Arrighi: On /At the Threshold of Eurocentrism?

Arrighi's studies (1994, 1999) are constructed from a Braudelian reading of the nature of capitalism combined with a Gramscian concept of hegemony. In the *Long Twentieth Century*, Arrighi examines the structure and processes of the capitalist world system through the concept of *systemic cycles of accumulation*, which represents periods of four different hegemonies and explains the "formation, consolidation and disintegration of [the] successive regimes" (1994: X-XI, 6-10, 28). Without taking the state as his main unit of analysis, which represents the "uniqueness of his approach" (Chase-Dunn 1995), Arrighi utilizes his framework by focusing on the differences between territorialist and capitalist logics of state-formation (Arrighi 1994: 34-37) and paying due attention to economic, political, and military organization. While presenting two related, but distinct genealogies of modern capitalism (84), Arrighi's study is oriented towards presenting a conceptual and empirical framework that explains the possible "developments of the global economy *after* the US regimes of rule" (2003a: 9, emphasis in original). On the other hand, in *Chaos and Governance* (edited with B. Silver), the central concern is with "the role that social conflict and systemic chaos [...] have played in the transition from one world order/hegemony to

another” (ibid, 1999b: 275). The discussion is directed at the modes of encounter between Western hegemony and non-Western civilizations, as well as the decline of a particular (US) hegemony. In my own discussion, the crucial point is the constant reference to the problem of “domination without hegemony” (1999a: 217-218), which characterized the hegemonic relationship of the Dutch and British to Asia and that of the US’s to the rest of the world in subsequent periods (2003a: 35). Here, the discussion is more concentrated on the form of the relationship, which is where I will begin to present my reading of Arrighi’s studies. Nevertheless, I shall first briefly consider the theme of the origins of the world-system.

On the one hand, similar to Abu-Lughod and, to some extent, Frank, Arrighi is quite certain of the importance of Asia in setting the historical backdrop for the rise of the West.³⁷ Furthermore, as Frank mentions (1998: 289), Arrighi refers to the centrality of the structure and dynamics of the world economy in generating “differential comparative costs, advantages, and rational responses to the same all around the world” when clarifying England’s relationship to the world economy (1994: 209). This framework enables him to avoid the deficiencies of Eurocentric visions that isolate and exceptionalize the rise of the West from the rest of the world. Arrighi’s studies, therefore, cannot be defined within the languages of Eurocentrism in either the first or the second forms. This is only part of the story and at each moment of recognition,

³⁷ This importance is related to the privileged access of Western hegemonies to Asian resources, the significance of long-distance trade with the non-Western world for the accumulation of capital in Italian city-states, the central importance of the Mongol Empire in laying foundations of high finance (especially in terms of promotion and organization), and the success and prosperity of the Chinese before the “extended” sixteenth century (1999a: 217; 1994: 39, 88, 96; 2003b: 20-22). In another study, Arrighi concentrates on the question: “Why did industrial capitalism develop in Western Europe rather than East Asia?” (2003b: 5). Three reasons are offered: 1) distinct interstate systems; 2) differences in state-and-national-economy-making; and 3) the combination of imperialism and capitalism with the historical background of Great Divergence (18). Due to limitations of space, I will not concentrate on these arguments. Similar to my discussion of Wallerstein, this form of thinking is important as a means of clarifying Arrighi’s maintenance of the distinction of the language of essential, ahistorical superiority. Secondly, in the context of the question of Eurocentrism, the problem is related more to the form of discussing the *relationship between* the rise of the West and the non-Western world.

Arrighi mentions a specific point: the financial expansion that “took off at the *end* of the trade expansion of the 13th and early 14th centuries,” as well as the establishment of the foundations of high finance after that expansion (1994: 88, 96, emphasis in original). Here I return to Frank’s criticisms of Arrighi.

First, Frank contends that there is a *limited* recognition of the constitutive influence of the world economy over the formation of Europe in Arrighi’s readings (1998: 209). Secondly, Arrighi, according to Frank, avoids a holistic perspective, defined by Frank as the peculiar mode of thinking that enables one to move beyond Eurocentrism (46-48). Thirdly, due to these deficiencies and despite his recognition of the importance of the non-Western world, Arrighi privileges Europe (Italian city-states) and *strictly* depends on European financial institutions in his explanation of the development of a/the capitalist world economy (ibid, 224). It is here that we observe the beginnings of exceptionalism as a form of imagination in terms of Eurocentrism. Nonetheless, this is quite distinct from the Eurocentric logic of Wallerstein since Arrighi’s examination could not be located within the language of Eurocentrism, but at the threshold of Eurocentrism and non-Eurocentrism. For this reason, Frank defines Arrighi’s examination as *limited* recognition rather than disavowing him completely for reproducing a Eurocentric vision/imagining. This is more clearly evident in Arrighi’s discussion on the responses of the non-Western world to Western dominance and their influence on the trajectory of the West

The first theme is related with the *absence* of Ottoman Empire from Arrighi’s analysis. Given the great political, economic, and historical relevance of Ottoman Empire, its influence on the *trajectory* of Europe (Frank 1998: 78-82; Wolf 1982: 129, 204), the absence of a focused

discussion on the Ottoman Empire appears quite problematic. In Arrighi's studies, non-Western responses, challenges, and their influence on the European world-system, both in construction and trajectory, are attributed only to the Asian world.³⁸ This is a *limited reading*, which ignores the influences of the non-Western world on the West's trajectory. Likewise, in Arrighi's reading, because there is no conceptual distinction between modernization and "Westernization," the whole potential of his argument presenting a non-Eurocentric reading of the process of modernization is suppressed into a generic *sign* of Westernization. This essentially becomes a problem of *naming and conceptualizing* appropriation rather than one of defining natural, non-historical, and non-political difference. There is still a need, then, for an abstract definition of Eurocentrism.

3.2. Eurocentrism as the Nomos of the Earth

The question remains: how do we define and narrate Eurocentrism? In the first form, the crude-form, Eurocentrism has been both examined and manifested as a matter of historiography. While Eurocentric tendencies manifested themselves according to claims of superiority and universality, their critiques focused on "revealing" the truth behind the veil. This aim has been characterized as providing comprehensive historical realities. In the second form, capitalism and world-system discussions, the concept has been taken up as a notion that needs to be dealt with, but the impact of which has been reduced to a cultural-economic level. Therefore, despite the empirical and

38 This preference and limitation is explained by their constructive influence on the trajectory of the modern world-system (1999b: 217). Furthermore, the demographic size, economic expansion, political influence, varying developmental paths, the historical background flows of capital/accumulation, and position as a financial center, etc., are other central reasons for this preference (2003b: 2-4, 19-21; 1994: 336-341). Nevertheless, these points are still unable to de-value the vast influence of the Ottoman Empire on trade routes, as well as the political and economic trajectory of Europe—both preceding and succeeding its rise to a hegemonic position/as a hegemon.

conceptual challenges presented by Wallerstein, Amin, and Arrighi, their readings oscillate between normative examinations of Eurocentrism and the de-politicization of Eurocentrism (as discussed in previous sections).

What is instead required is to treat Eurocentrism as a discourse(?) through which a specific regime of truth (a world) has been constructed and reconstructed. Through such a perspective, the discursive creation of truth and history becomes more significant than the claim of ideological distortion. Here, again, the focus is on the *success* of Eurocentrism rather than dealing with its “failure.” Overall, I pursue a methodology that divides conceptual frameworks on the basis of their effectiveness, rather than a “corresponding theory of truth.” The central focus, I claim, must be on creation rather than distortion.

An appropriate, effective critique of Eurocentrism, therefore, must not be limited by considering only the distortion of reality, but must also include efforts at understanding the structuring of the world. Thus, in my reading, the center/focus of the examination is not on the *inability* or *impossibility* of Eurocentrism to grasp the complex realities of the world, but to consider/treat the modalities of Eurocentrism’s “success.” In both the first and second forms, the possibility of a non-Eurocentric reading is defined through comprehensive and inclusive readings of world-history, or as Amin argues, the replacement of the “truncated universalism” of capitalism with the authentic universalism of socialism (1989: 250).

In my analysis, both forms of examination are critiques of what I define as weak Eurocentrism.³⁹ These forms assume that Eurocentric logic works through the concealment of historical realities. Critiques of this form, then, are usually confined to revealing historical “facts” presenting different historiographies. The principal task is to reveal the functions of historiographies in constructing a particular power/knowledge authority.

What is required, I suggest, is to move beyond such a relationship and recognize Eurocentrism as *the form* of situating and *examining* world history (including the creation of history itself) rather than as an expression of ethnocentric or capitalist tendencies to distort empirical realities. Otherwise, as stated by Dainotto, “writing a history of Europe, or of the idea of Europe, means, then, tautologically, to write a history of the European idea of history” (2007:13). Here, I begin to employ the notion of Nomos.

Carl Schmitt defines the world-order in the global age through the concept of Nomos.⁴⁰ Nomos, Schmitt writes, means to take/appropriate, to divide/distribute and to produce (1993: 54-55). For Schmitt, appropriation, distribution, and production are part of every legal and social order, which precede its consolidation and construction (56) and “Nomos is the immediate form in which the political and social order of people becomes [...] visible” (2003: 70). In that sense, Eurocentrism as Nomos must be understood as a concept providing genesis, order and a hierarchy of international order, not only as a particular distortion of human history, but also as

³⁹ Here I rely on Bobby S. Sayyid’s critical reading of E. Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) in which he makes a distinction between weak Orientalism and strong Orientalism (1997: 31-51).

⁴⁰ Ulmen suggests/points out that Schmitt deployed the term for the first time in 1934 (2003: 19). Similar to Schmitt’s discussion of the political, in which he privileges concrete opposition between enemy and friend and of sovereign, in which the decision took priority against any established rule, the concept of nomos is deployed to grasp the process of “concrete order thinking” in the formation of jurisprudence and formation of any order—domestic or international.

the dominant form of appropriating Earth in the modern era. Moreover, it embodies the grammar of the modern nomos represented by classical European powers. From the “invention of America” to the epoch-making *reconquista* of al-Andalus in 1492, or to the classical, present, and enduring forms of colonization, the language that we observe represents the effects of the discursive space produced and provided by and through Eurocentrism. In this context, the unique possibility of presenting a non-Eurocentric reading is to concentrate on the different ways of ordering the universe, to examine the forms of excluding “alternatives” or assessing the “winner’s” relationship with dominated alternatives, as well as to investigate the forms taken by analyses of the historical-material context in which Europe was constructed as Europe. In the next section, I will consider Nomos, in detail, to lay the ground/foundation for my examination/study.

3.2.1. What is Nomos?

Setting aside the philological reasons, there is an interesting obsession with grasping the real meaning of Nomos as a concept.⁴¹ According to Schmitt, “the word Nomos has undergone many changes in its more than three-thousand-year history, and it is often difficult to retain the big picture given the etymological and semantic assessments at any particular time” (341). Beginning with Schmitt himself, this is why virtually all readings of nomos begin with certain notes of caution on its “wider meaning,” “original implication,” “connotation,” and its linking effect between order and orientation (Burgess 2007: 187; Dean 2007: 243; Ulmen 2003: 9; Schmitt 2003: 67, 336-350).

⁴¹ It is crucial to note that this obsession is quite similar to that focusing on the “real” meaning of Europe, as will become clear in what follows.

Schmitt structures his reading of order and the order of the Earth through this concept and focuses on the appropriation, dividing/distributing, and production. Burgess calls attention to the ancient Greek meaning of Nomos as, “that which is in habitual practice, use or possession” and has usually been translated as “law” in general, as well as “ordinance,” “custom,” a derivative of customary behavior, received from the law of God or authority of established deities, or as a simple public ordinance” (Liddel and Schott 1940; quoted from Burgess 2007: 187). However, Burgess adds, Nomos also means law,⁴² “understood in the sense of rationality, the ‘reigning’ order of things or what we would today call ‘discourse.’ It is derived from the verb *neimō*, which means ‘to deal out,’ ‘to distribute’ or ‘to dispense.’” Citing the broader meaning of Nomos in Greek, as well, Ulmen asserts that it “was the objectification of the *polis*,” referring to its relationship with “*paideia*” (education) and the order of the polis (2003: 9).

Nomos implies “the distribution of rationality, both physical and metaphysical, the logical organization of things in space and time” and refers to the “spatialization of rational order” (Burgess 2007: 187). Hence, we perceive a reference to the “territory and rationality of the order” that it organizes. *Nomos* “designates the order established through an appropriation of land, a land seizure (*Nahme*), which orders the Earth and the relationship between subjectivity and power, ownership and action on and around it” (ibid-188). For Schmitt, the transition from nomadic age to fixed households has been defined as one of the most crucial moments in the changing meaning of nomos (2003: 341). The transition became possible only by land

⁴² It must be noted that Schmitt begins his reading of Nomos by warning against translating Nomos as “law, regulation, norm, tradition or custom” since it erodes the crucial link between order and orientation while also ignoring the foundational impact of land appropriation. Instead, Schmitt contends that Nomos comes from the word *nemein* (a Greek word) that means “both to divide and to pasture” (2003: 70). *Nemein* is “a *nomen actionis*, indicating an action and process whose content is defined by the verb.” Here, Schmitt ascribes three meanings for *nehmen*: to take or to appropriate to divide or to distribute and pasturage—appropriation, distribution and production. (326-327).

appropriation, which resulted in a stable order premised on the division of land. However, Schmitt adds that Nomos acquired a new meaning that encompassed the new reality of territorial order (342). In other words, “[the] territoriality of the territory arises with its Nomos. It is an ordering of reality, but one which orders reality by constructing it” (Burgess 2007: 188). This is because land appropriation is constituted “only if the appropriator is able to give the land a name,” which enables the orientation of power, such as the tendency to visibility, publicity and ceremony (Schmitt 2003: 348-349).

[...] after the land-appropriation and land-division have been completed, when the problems of founding anew and of transition have been surpassed, and some degree of calculability and security have been achieved, the word Nomos acquires another meaning. The epoch of constituting quickly forgotten or, more often, becomes a semi-conscious matter. The *situation établie* of those constituted dominates all customs, as well as all thought and speech (Schmitt, 2003: 341).

The meanings of Nomos simultaneously draw attention to the processes for maintaining any order: appropriate, divide, distribute, and pasture. Appropriation, distribution, and production have been defined as “the primal processes of human history” (Schmitt: 345, 348). According to Ulmen, for Schmitt, “the Nomos of the Earth is the community of political entities united by common rules. It is the spatial, political and juridical system considered to be mutually binding in the conduct of international affairs, a system that has obtained over time and has become a matter of tradition and custom” (10). Land appropriation is the first act in this process and Nomos becomes the foundational act creating a concrete territorial order as the unity of (legal) order and (spatial) orientation. It is a “matter of structure-determining convergence of order and orientation” (Schmitt 2003: 67–79). Therefore, every legal order begins, first and foremost, as a spatial order by a foundational act of force. Land appropriation and the rest follow from this

moment within dynamic processes of distribution, division, and law-making. Hence, “Nomos of the earth is the order of the earth” (Ulmen 2003: 10).

For Schmitt, who invests in the primacy of order, there has always been “some kind of *nomos* of the earth” (2003: 351). However, it is the “age of discoveries” that has been the most decisive moment in radically transforming the Nomos of the Earth. Before, in the first stage, there was a purely terrestrial and “limited” Nomos as “humankind had no global concept of the world and [the] oceans of the world were inaccessible to human power.” It was partial, limited and war, barbarism, and chaos were believed to reign beyond European “borders.”

This Nomos was destroyed with the discovery of America, “a completely new, unknown, not even suspected continent.” As the discoverers were Europeans, Schmitt contends that it was a “Euro-centric nomos” and Europeans who were the creators of this new Nomos. “Having discovered the world as a globe, Europeans also developed the Law of Nations” (Ulmen 17). Alongside this distinctive characteristic, for the first time in the history of humankind, Nomos began to “encompass the oceans.” It was now a global Nomos, even though divided between land and sea. The former “was divided into states, colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence” and later dominated by the maritime power, England. This Eurocentric Nomos, based on a dual balance, persisted until World War I. England was dominating the sea without allowing for any balance. On land, however, there a European balance of powers was still in place. In Schmitt’s reading, World War I arose from a confrontation due to competing perceptions of war, enemy, and booty for land and sea powers (Schmitt 2003: 351-353). The second Nomos, i.e. the first global Nomos, was destroyed and left the world order in shambles.

European jurisprudence and civilization, as appropriated by America, had created a global Nomos that “came gradually into being in the sixteenth century from the ashes of the *Respublica Christiana*, the pre-global *nomos* of the Middle Ages. In the twentieth century, the disintegration of the *jus publicum Europaeum* becomes clear and the question of a new *Nomos* of the earth arises” (Odysseos and Petito 2007: 3).

Jus publicum Europaeum, European jurisprudence—or the cumulative effect of a Eurocentric Nomos—has not only brought but also structured itself on certain “original, European” formulations and achievements: the creation of a Westphalian system (balance of power in and of Europe), the globalization of land appropriation, the rise and consolidation of the modern state as a “historical agency of de-theologization and rationalization,” the secularization of politics, the emergence and consolidation of modernity, the structuring of a new, modern institutional and legal basis of politics, a new spatial ordering of the universe “upsetting the axis of the spatial order of the *Respublica Christiana* of the Middle Ages”, the bracketing of war, balance and the recognition of the state system (Schmitt 2003: 126-127, 140-159, 246).⁴³

On the other hand, the universalization of international law, the structuring of a new order of international law without explicit spatial grounding, the institutionalization of the League of Nations, the transformation of the meaning of war, as well as the rise of United States led to the demise of the system, which witnessed the end of Europe as center of the world—or the dissolution of a/the Eurocentric Nomos (227-237, 249-293, 309-320). Having discussed the

⁴³ Odysseos and Petito, relying on these aspects of Schmitt’s analysis, contend that Schmitt’s *The Nomos of the Earth* must be treated as a heterodox, missing classic in the historiography of International Relations, which is “corrective of [the] ahistoricity of the discipline and its blindness to the ways in which spatiality, law and politics constitute world order” (2007: 7).

concept of Nomos and the ways in which it has been employed by Schmitt, I will examine the use of Nomos as a concept in defining Eurocentrism.

3.2.2. The Use of Nomos

Nomos as a concept maintains an essential relationship between the political act of appropriation (beginning), the legal act of defining and naming (jurisprudence, legality, dividing), and the economic act of distribution. Additionally, Nomos entails an explanation of the formation of spatial order, the structuring of law and politics simultaneously and as constitutive of each other. In other words, it suggests a framework enabling us to grasp both the temporal and spatial coordinates of the formation of any order.

According to Schmitt, Nomos is both measure and form. It is “the *measure* by which the land in a particular order is divided and situated; it is also the *form* of political, social, and religious order determined by this process. Here, measure, order and form constitute a spatially concrete unity” (2003: 71, emphasis added). The link maintained between order and orientation in the conceptual framework of Nomos enables us to focus on temporality, spatiality, and the constructed structure arising from the complex relationship between the three (temporality, spatiality, and structuring). In other words, as mentioned/discussed in the first chapter, Nomos enables us to achieve a unity of both process (orientation) and structure (order). The constitutive relationship between the *pre-* and *post-* of a “specific present” alongside the reciprocal re-constitutive impact of the given present can be discussed without reducing the relationship to a causal one. For instance, by employing the concept of Nomos when discussing the manifestation of a Eurocentric claim on the history of Europe or European identity, it is possible to focus not

only on the genesis of the claim and its consequences, but also its formative impact on the structuring of such a claim. This is quite crucial since it posits a radically different sense of the relationship between spatiality, politics, and subjectivity. Rather than understanding the past, present, and future of a claim in consequential terms, it relies on the formative and constitutive effects of them on each other without erasing their characteristic peculiarities and differences. Such a perspective can provide a reading of Eurocentrism without digressing into moralizing, criminalizing, or normalizing examinations.

The term enables us to consider the genesis, order, and hierarchy of the modern world as a whole. The impact of “discoveries,” the formation of the nation-state, the Westphalian system, or the primacy of Europeanness in these processes can be examined. The term *Nomos* promises to encompass history, economy, and politics alongside a specific reference to the formation of a political subject or the daily life of individuals and citizens. *Nomos*, therefore, refers to the order of a community and state, as well as law and property on the abstract level, but is “the chicken every peasant living under a good king has in his pot every Sunday; the piece of land he cultivates as his property; the car every worker in the US has parked in front of his house” (Schmitt 2003: 327). Therefore, at the abstract level and *only* after rescuing the term from Schmitt’s Eurocentrism, may we be able to challenge the Eurocentric bias in historiography, as well as criticize the formation of a Eurocentric order (via capitalism or its culture) and the impact of Eurocentrism in and through epistemology. In other words, *Nomos*, by providing a conceptual framework that relies on a critical ontology of order and ordering, enables us to treat Eurocentrism as a matter of ontological inquiry, an inquiry examining the creation of the world via knowledge, politics, and power. Since Eurocentrism has been an ontological problem in the

formation of the global, modern world-order since its very inception, it cannot be dealt with through the criminalization of Europeanness or Europe, a critique of ethnocentrism, the provincialization of a “specific story of success: the rise of Europe,” or by revealing the truth of history behind the veil. Rather, it is an ontological problem of the ordering of the universe, which requires an abstraction that speaks from and through an ontological framing. Nomos is nothing more than such a concept.

Whatever its use, Schmitt’s unfalteringly Eurocentric stance is most evident in *The Nomos of the Earth*, in which he tells/relates/narrates the story of the last five centuries of European and world history. Nomos stands as the term through which to tell the story—even a cursory glance at Schmitt’s treatment of the history of the world is enough to show that Eurocentrism is not simply a matter of distortion, manifestation of a world-wide economic system, and a lack of adequate comprehensive historical knowledge, but represents the whole order of the Earth since the late fifteenth century. Eurocentric Nomos is the structuring of the world from the Earth and Schmitt’s reading stands as verification of such a claim.

3.2.3. The Problematic Nature of Nomos

The term Nomos is suggested by Carl Schmitt and speaks for itself. Ulmen rightly points out that Schmitt’s *The Concept of the Political* (1996) was a response to the dissolution of the sovereign state and his *Nomos of the Earth* (2003) was a response to the dissolution of the world order (2003: 30). In both studies lies a sense of tragedy, loss, and a pride borrowed from the “useless” past. In his foreword to *Nomos*, Schmitt notes that “the traditional Eurocentric order of international law is foundering today, as is the old *nomos* of the earth” (2003: 39). “Everything

European is on the defensive [...] What still remains of the classical ideas of international law has its origins in a purely Euro-centric spatial order,” Schmitt adds elsewhere when criticizing anti-colonialism as “oriented solely backwards, to the past [...] and does not have the capacity to forge the beginning of a new spatial order in a positive way” (quoted from Ulmen 2003: 31).

Schmitt’s conservative affection is evident when examining the transition of nomads to settled communities. Nomadism, as pointed out by Dean, is not a “figure in Schmitt’s mythology except as a prelude to territoriality” (2007: 244). References to the “nomadic age” are neither historical nor anthropological, but point to a classical Greek conception of it and the age of the shepherd or *nomeus*. This provides us with a major indication of Schmitt’s own orientation, perspective, and mentality. This reference is crucial for Schmitt’s structuring of his reading that concentrates not on movement or action, but a moment of settling down and forgetting the past. For this reason, Schmitt’s reading of law is understood “as geographically situated and situating” (Dean 2007: 244). Likewise, his reading of the political is subordinated to spatial coordinates with the political condition reduced to a moment of encounter between territorial entities (Luoma-Aho 2007: 38). In both moments, on a temporal dimension, Schmitt’s contextualization of Nomos suffers from a privileging of the moment of being, over and above becoming. Hence/Thus, Nomos becomes a rejection of difference or, at least, a deliberate exclusion of difference that leads to its securitization.

As noted by Odysseos and Petito, the distinguishing feature of Schmitt’s use of Nomos and his reading of the history of Europe and the Westphalian system is “his conviction that this political-legal European order was *global from its very genesis* and could not have been possible

without the unrepeatable historical event of the discovery of the New World at the end of the 15th century” (2007: 4).

This is, undoubtedly, an expression of Schmitt’s unflinching Eurocentric vision. Once an ontological relationship was maintained between spatiality, law and politics (in a way that excludes the political structuring of the relationship between geography, territory and law), the only questions that remain are on the scope, impact and effect of land appropriation. If the land appropriation of the Americas had a global impact on the order of the Earth, then the European success of constructing a global-universal ordering of the universe is simply a reflection of such a process. The European ordering of the universe must be treated as the first global *Nomos* from its genesis. In this reading, analyzing its trajectories, including the way in which Europeanness has been structured and deployed, or the way in which Europe has emerged, becomes useless inquires.

In this part, I examined the problematic nature of the concept of *Nomos* to maintain a critical distance to Schmitt’s appropriation and deployment of it. Despite its usage, *Nomos* is a problematic term that needs to be politicized and rescued from a Schmittian cry for Eurocentrism. In the following section, I examine the concept of territory to reveal crucial insights that may cultivate a critical stance against Schmitt.

As discussed earlier, spatial imagination and the primacy of territory play vital roles in Schmitt’s reading. However he goes even further by recognizing his “debt” to geographers and calls for a return to the “elemental order of human’s terrestrial being” through human thinking

(2003: 37, 39). For Schmitt, “Man is terrestrial, a groundling [...] His world outlook conditioned by [a firmly grounded-Earth] [...] Nonetheless man is not a creature wholly conditioned by his medium [...] Man can [...] change himself into a new form of his historical existence, in virtue of which he readjusts and reorganizes himself” (Schmitt 1997: 1, 5).

Here, the relationship between terrestrial being and the ability to change this conditioning through individual action summarizes Schmitt’s reading of the relationship between territory, geography and politics. While man’s historical existence is conditioned and determined by the way he constructs the relationship with land, a different dimension of being human as a political act enters the relationship. The next part will specifically focus on the relationship between territory, identity, and geography, which, in doing so, will consider the conceptual tools employed by critical geopolitics to deepen my critique/criticism of Schmitt.

3.3. Territory, Identity, and Geography

Territories can be defined as spatializing already existing social and cultural phenomena (Kaplan and Herb 1999: 1) and functioning as a representative aspect of identity. Nevertheless, in the modern context, the question of the vitality of territory is raised through its articulation with the particular expression of a political organization: the sovereign, territorial nation-state. In this historical context, and in conjunction with nationalism, territories became representations of national identity and will in contradistinction to the power of the sovereign, which came to be understood as resting with the nation (Murphy 1996: 97). In this way, the territorial definition of power has emerged (Herb, 1999: 10). Here, the effects and configurations of state power are

defined essentially through the ability to construct a clearly defined territory and establish rule over it. This power, or the spatial dimensions of the state, is constructed, functionalized, and implemented through the “jurisdictional aspects of the state, the maintenance of internal order, the symbols of government as they exist on the ground, and vigorous demarcation and control of the border” (Kaplan 1999: 35). Territory, then, represents a “map of effective authority” (Murphy 1996: 87) while also representing/symbolizing the mark of internal cohesion and external differentiation (Herb 1999: 18). Whereas the state represents the provider of security and order in this context, territory signifies the boundaries through which citizens of nations enjoy security and protection from anarchy and strangers. Boundaries, then, represent the limit and legitimacy of a political identity, as well as the founding of the state as a national community unto itself as a foundational geopolitical act (Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 3).

In light of these arguments, one may argue that it is not a mere coincidence that the most dynamic and effective acts of homogenization, exclusion/inclusion, and governing only became possible in the historical context of the territorial construction of the state. Here, sovereignty not only refers to the governance of people and things, but primarily to that of people and things *within* a particular territory. Therefore, territory is an inevitable, constitutive component of the very logic of governmentality (Tuathail 1996: 8-9). In this complex configuration of the relationship between state territory and power, the construction and normalization of spatial limits determines the grammar of new political subjectivities.⁴⁴ As space/territory turns into a

⁴⁴ This implies that there was no relationship between identity and territory before the emergence of the nation-state. However, it is only in modern times that we witness the substantial construction of political identities through its relationship with and through political space/territory. Space and territory have occupied the core of identification processes. Even political identities that negate a strong attachment to space have been defined in terms of this negativity. Therefore, spatiality constitutes the very basis of *the political grammar* of the modern language of the political and its practice. It must also be noted that it is the “citizen” who is the subject(?) of modern political

master-ground or *the sign* that configures the structural limits of the possibilities for identification (both in terms of enabling and disabling), identity cannot be thought of outside its relationship to territory. This is related to the construction of space/land as both the subject and object of politicization. This, however, does not simply imply that the constitutive relationship between space and politics emerged *only* in the modern context. Rather, the political has always been linked to the spatial dimension of human subjectivity. Nevertheless, it is only in modern times that space/land/territory emerged at the center of the formation of (dominant) political subjectivities due to the processes outlined above.

Territory, in modern politics, represents an almost unique “medium” of domestication or exclusion of particular identities. Boundaries between states, geographic depictions, and cartographic boundaries carry not only the implications and representations of the limits of identities, but also become the central grounds upon which the conditions of the possibility of identity are defined and constructed. That said, I would now like to concentrate specifically on *the mutually embedded* relationships between territory, identification processes, and the question of geography as an object of inquiry.⁴⁵

The *intensification* of the politicization of space, with all its peculiarity in the modern context, can be demonstrated through two examples: first, the emergence of geography as a social science/an examination on the studies of the founding figures of political geography; and,

processes. The citizen’s identity has been either spatially embedded or necessitates a certain degree of spatial connections.

⁴⁵ The relationships are considered mutually embedded because it is not “easy” to answer the question of which comes before the other. This is not only an empirical problem, but also a conceptual one because the question of priority assumes the presence of an ahistorical origin prior to the discursive formation. Therefore, this is not a relevant question for a genealogical reading.

two, the peculiarity of the “invention” of the New World as an act heralding the beginning of modern era. As Murphy (1996: 98-99) and Tuathail (1996: 24-55) have shown, studies on the figures of geopolitics are primarily concerned with the relationship between the earth’s surface and state power. Today, politics/power and political subjectivities cannot be thought of without a substantial discussion, examination and “discovery/learning” of geography, whether practically or theoretically. These studies represent the emergence of a particular discourse of the “power to organize, occupy and administer space,” which consist of practices of inventing and writing spaces in favor of particular/specific political positions, geographic constructions of politics, ways of envisioning the world, and, most importantly, the de-politicization of geopolitics (1, 2, 11, 15, 53-54). These represent strategies of dealing with the construction of new political orders alongside the application of a particular vision of politics. They, therefore, do not represent the logic of modern politics crystallized in the construction of the modern, territorial nation-state, but simultaneously aid in the crystallization of a new grammar of politics. This is why Tuathail studies geography “in terms of its embeddedness in the general text” (65-66) and defines geopolitics as a summation of the totality of international politics. Therefore, we may consider the role of geography as supplementing modern politics, subjectivity, and the formation of modern identification.⁴⁶

The second example refers to a historical moment in which we observe the invention of the “New World,” marking the beginning of the modern era (Campbell 1998: 92-95). The “discovery” is not a timeless, universal, and normative concept, but has its own particular history

⁴⁶ Supplement is understood as an inessential extra, added to something that is itself complete. However, is also added to compensate for a perceived lack in what was supposed to be complete. Through these double characters, a supplement is both outside (an extra that enriches and strengthens) and inside (an extra that compensates for a lack) the system. In the former case, a supplement performs a strengthening function, but in the latter it refers to a constitutive one (Derrida 1976:144-167).

and context. For Schmitt, both history and context are characterized by and emerge through occidental rationalism (2003: 131-132). For a moment, we might ignore the implications of a teleological, progressive understanding of the historical moments made implicit in this sentence.

The invention of the New World, according to both Campbell (1998: 96) and Hall (1996: 190-191), represents a clash between modern and medieval frames of reference. Not only did it become possible in that conjunction, but the invention of the New World challenged the traditional understanding of time and space, as well as sustained the framework that reconstructed the idea of the West. In the context of my discussion, this invention is quite significant and represents the invention of this new space more than any other act guiding the trajectories of subsequent political formations. More precisely, it is both the discursive space that creates the possibility of the invention of America and the act of invention itself that brings about a discursive framework constituting new horizons for political imagination. This is a discourse that reads history through spatialization and specifies time in terms of space (Tuathail 1996: 27).

In this section, I have elucidated the constitutive relationship between territory and identity, as well as the centrality of geography, in the formation of political imaginations and subjectivities in the modern context. My discussion of Schmitt will be contextualized within such a framework. Next, I will clarify a distinctive manner of dealing with the relationship between geography and politics through an examination of Tuathail's project of critical geopolitics.

3.3.1. Geography as Discursive Practice

The importance of Tuathail's discussion of critical geopolitics lies in his reading of geography and geopolitics: it is this framework that enables us to problematize the different aspects of a Schmittian concept of Nomos. Geography, in Tuathail (1998), is situated within a general discursive framework through a historical and contextual analysis (59, 17) that allows/enables him to reveal both the embeddedness of geopolitical knowledge and the constitutive relationship between power, order, and geography (61, 66). This mode of reading enables him to provide a new way of dealing with geography, "a tactical form of knowledge," which is defined as *critical geopolitics*.

Critical geopolitics problematizes the politics of the production of global political space, and "the logocentric infrastructures that make geopolitics or any spatialization of the global political scene possible" (Tuathail: 10, 68, 185). Hence, the focus of critical geopolitics is to question, analyze and examine the "conditions of possibility of geographical truth, knowledge and power" (Tuathail 1998: 142; Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 7). It is offered as both a strategy and a question (Tuathail 1996: 67) to reveal the modes of analysis in geography, its political nature, and to examine the very construction of boundaries (Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 4).

In this framework, geography, defined as critical geopolitics, is nothing but a matter of power and remains a political question. It is not a noun, which refers to something already possessed by the earth, but an active verb, an active writing of the Earth (Tuathail 1996: 1-2). Situating geography in such a way is both significant and radical, as it provides a conceptual

framework enabling us to question the presumed neutrality of geography and cartography. The foundational act of land appropriation, in Schmitt, is thus contextualized, framed, and treated—not simply as a matter that needs to be forgotten, as Schmitt suggests, but as matter that needs to be negotiated by Tuathail.

Geography, cartography and geopolitics (as a mode of theorizing geography), therefore, become both the subject (as an active agent/verb) and object (shaped through) of a specific, selective, political gaze that emerges through/from a Cartesian perspective (Tuathail 1996: 23). Each moment of representing a geographic entity consists of/entails a political intervention, which demands systematic forgetting, a selective reading and partial construction (52-53).

Ultimately, Tuathail's project sustains a framework that problematizes both the epistemological (neutrality, objectivity, etc.) and the ontological (the possibility of an impartial gaze) claims of geography and geopolitics. While Tuathail recognizes the foundational impact of land-appropriation, he departs from Schmitt and suggests that the act of appropriation always begins and functions through both a political subject and political position. Schmitt, previously discussed, treats this process as a moment in which neither the subject nor political investment exist, with the exception of the discovery of the Americas (as it was the one founded through a modern Nomos, and only "Europeans can manage to realize this task." The absence of the subject and political investment in foundational moments can be best observed in Schmitt's reading of the political, which will be the focus of the next section.

3.3.2. Sovereign and the Nomos: The Distinction and the Political

The transformation of the state and the international sphere, as well as their destructive influence on the political are the basic concerns of Schmitt's discussions. As Ulmen argues, Schmitt's examination of the concept of the political confronts the dissolution of the sovereign state while exploration of the nomos of the world concentrates on the disintegration of world order (2003: 30). Schmitt considers the sovereign state, as exemplified by the experience of the European international order, as providing the concrete order through which the basic distinction that makes the political possible was secured without any moralization or demonization of the enemy (2003: 141-143).

Schmitt's discussion on the concept of the political, and its relationship to the state can be studied at two related levels: the answer to the question of the sovereign and an examination of the ontology of politics. Both examinations, in terms of their relationship to the state's territory, resulted in a particular attitude towards territory, which is defined by Tuathail as "the attempt to produce international politics geographically" (1996: 11, 185).

In addition, Schmitt formulates his conceptualization of the sovereign in opposition to constitutional liberalism (1995: 18-19, 21). He states, "The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: it confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives not from the exception" (15). In this context, Schmitt defines the sovereign through the decision that establishes/codifies the rule: "[The] Sovereign is he who decides on the exception" (5). It is only through the power and ability to decide on the exception that the rule of law and order become

possible—it precedes everything. By incorporating the question of the exception Schmitt's definition of the sovereign does not exclude it from the normal, legal, regular order, but carries it to the very center of their conditions of possibility. As Rasch argues, it is a “supplement that attaches itself to the system as if from the outside” (2000: 8). In this framework, the state becomes the embodiment, representation and realization of the decision.

Schmitt's definition of the ontology of politics produces a similar effect when considering the role of the state. Schmitt opens *The Concept of the Political* with the idea that, “[the] state presupposes the concept of the political” (1976: 19). Nevertheless, immediately following this statement, he proceeds with a critique of the position defining the state as the “political status of an organized people in an *enclosed territorial unit*” (ibid., emphasis added). This definition clearly rejects any ahistorical equation between state and political for Schmitt (22), whose aim is to privilege the specificity of the political itself and assumes a qualitative distinction between the state and society. Though this may have emancipated Schmitt from a state-centric spatialization of politics, the terms of the discussion would remain different/distinct. However, his critique of the dissolution of the territorial definition of the state is more closely related to the dissolution of *jus publicum Europaeum*, which historically resulted in the neutralization and de-politicization of the state. Here, the problem is similar to that with considering land appropriation as a foundational act, which Schmitt deliberately ignores and excludes from the plurality of forces in the process of the Sovereign act. As stated by Connolly, “Sovereign is *that* which decided an exception exists and how to decide it, with the *that* composed of a plurality of forces circulating through and under the positional sovereignty of the official arbitrating body” (2005: 145, emphasis in the original?). In order to de-politicize the

encounter and composition of different forces, Schmitt privileges a given and concrete territorialist perception of the Sovereign negating or declining the political moment of decision. In order to re-inscribe the primacy of the sovereign, the story is told in a way to maintain a specific political agenda: to make the state the only constitutive agent in politics, as well as to reduce the different dimensions and possibilities in the political space that may escape the Sovereign's monopoly. This reading of sovereignty is constructed around a political agenda to silence "fugitive experiences" and the "plurality of forces" in politics.

The relationship (or the paradox) between the order of the political and political order can be recalled here: "What does the notion of an order of the political mean" (Moreiras 2004: 79)? The question enables Moreiras to reveal a tension in Schmitt's definition of the political between "a political ontology implied in the notion of order and political ontology ciphered in the friend-enemy distinction" (80), revealing them to be mutually incompatible. For Schmitt, on the one hand, the real political entity is the sovereign, "otherwise the political entity is non-existent" (78). Sovereignty subordinates every other principle. "If the political order is sovereign, the political entities that form it are not. There is no sharing of sovereignty" (Page). If this is the case, then political entities "are nonexistent ... as they are simply part of an order and subordinate to it" (ibid). However, in order to keep the very dynamics of the notion of the political alive (friend-enemy), they need to exist.

Read in this way, it is not simply the sovereign order, but the very dynamics through which the political is being constructed that defines the trajectory of the order and creates its own political space. This framework treats the sovereign "act as the ultimate principle of orientation

as the organizer and distributor” is always subject to contestation. This tension between political entities and political order opens a space that prevents the conflation of the two. Moreover, this space is open to contestation and it is in this space that political encounters are transformed into their most intense forms. In a way, the space created by the sovereign is always subject to contestation, not only from the outside, but also from the inside—which prevents easy polarization into the friend-enemy opposition.⁴⁷ The paradox of the order of the political carries with it the possibility of contesting the order of the political itself. Additionally, the Schmittian investment here, through the concept of the sovereign, is to fight against the political or to expel it from the domestic realm. Just as Schmitt reduces the contingent and uncertain potentialities of political processes to the act of land appropriation, he does the same to the “layered character of being” (Connolly 2005) and to the paradox of sovereignty in political life. Likewise, Schmitt’s reading of the concept of the political suffers from a similar gesture.

In defining the political, Schmitt seeks an *autonomous and ultimate* criterion, which is the decision and ability to make a division between friend and enemy (Schmitt 1976: 26). The distinction of the political is autonomous and separate from other realms (e.g. economy, morality, or aesthetics)(27). Defining a political enemy is a public question, with any group transforming themselves into a political one if organized through this distinction (37). Here, the state once again occupies the center of Schmitt’s imagination. Criticizing pluralist theories of state (44-47), Schmitt treats the state as the unique and most important decisive political entity, which holds

⁴⁷ This suggests that the very order of the political as a paradox exceeds the limits of political ontology, as subscribed to by Schmitt, which he takes as an encounter between friend and enemy. This possibility is not negated by the order of the political; however, its reduction of the ontology of the political to this opposition is itself a sovereign gesture. Moreover, it can maintain itself only if the political is reduced to sovereignty and the “plurality of forces” is excluded, not as the ontology of the political, but the ontology of politics as informed through the sovereign gesture.

the ability and power to decide for itself on friend-enemy distinction (29-30, 46). In this context, for Schmitt, the state represents a homogenous unity (by eliminating its internal enemies).⁴⁸

The state, representing sovereignty and with the ability and power to decide the friend-enemy distinction for itself, has led Schmitt to relegate politics to the realm of the international (Rasch 2000: 2, 11). The absence of a sovereign authority in the international realm constructs this possibility. In addition, from Schmitt's critiques of the equation between the state and the political, as well as his particular understanding of the state that carries the distinctions of the political and is considered as superior to other organizations, we might argue that the state and its spatial implications are secondary to the construction of the political.⁴⁹ However, his attempt is itself a political intervention intended to elevate the state and re-organize the political sphere around that entity. In this way, Schmitt's discussion of the political produces a political geography through the territorial ideal of the sovereign state.

Consider this discussion, we might not impute Schmitt, *pace* Tuathail, for the production of the Cartesian impartial gaze or an objectivist perspectivism (23-24; Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 5) because he acknowledges the partiality and the political nature of the construction. Moreover, Schmitt also refers to the historical, partial, and polemical implications of all the concepts,

⁴⁸ However, Schmitt still recognizes plurality in political life—a pluralism (of states) that does not destroy either the state or the political (45). Here, Schmitt produces and legitimizes a particular international politics through the spatial construction of politics, which is a specific conceptualization of pluralism. For him, the political necessitates coexistence with another political entity, as the political is possible only if there is an enemy. In that sense, no political group or entity can embrace or represent all of humanity. Moreover, the claim of embracing and representing humanity itself destroy the humanness of the enemy and brings about/incites/instigates the most inhuman practices. Therefore, this claim is a political intervention, which aims to “usurp a universal concept against its opponent” (53-54). Schmitt here offers an understanding of the political world as a “pluriverse not a universe” (53).

⁴⁹ Only the *form* of the relationship (friend-enemy) is related to the ontology of the political. For Schmitt, all other aspects, such as the dimensions of constructing enemies/friends, the content, etc., are historical (26-27, 34-35).

images, and terms raised while also defining them as bound to a concrete situation (30, 32, 35). For these reasons, the relationship to territory, in the case of Schmitt, produces a clear *political gaze* that is unique from the other geopolitical gazes that Tuathail examines in terms of the founding figures of geography. Nevertheless, Schmitt reduces the multiplicity of the possible political constructions of space to the sovereign state's territory. As Tuathail and Dalby argue, it is the very construction of the state and its boundaries that represents a geopolitical act (1998: 3,4; 1996: 4). Guided by his preference for a sovereign state, Schmitt masters and disciplines space by transforming it into a legible, ordered territory. Moreover, he “depluralizes” the surface of the earth by reducing the struggles over territory into the state's territory. As Tuathail suggests, this is a particular discursive practice that scripts global space through the state and its institutions (67).

3.3.3. Geography and the Nomos

In Schmitt's reading, abstracting the concrete order connotes impartiality. However, Schmitt's deployment of the concept of Nomos as a foundational act of land appropriation, and its associated functions/meanings (distribution and division), results in/produces a depoliticization, while his abstraction suffers from a partial investment into a not-so-abstract privilege attributed to Europeanness. Here, critical geography becomes most relevant.

For Schmitt, ever the jurist, order refers to the “unity of space and law, of order and orientation” (2003: 42). Indeed, it is for this reason that in the pre-global division of the earth, shaped by the absence of great sea empires, mythical representations of the sea were dominant.

The sea, in these depictions, had no “character”⁵⁰ and was free. Nevertheless, when sea-appropriations became a part of history, the Nomos of the world “rest[ed] on the particular *relation* between firm land and free sea” (48). For Schmitt:

All pre-global orders were essentially *terrestrial*, even if they encompassed sea-powers [...] [This world] was altered in the Age of Discovery, when the earth first was encompassed and measured by the global consciousness of European peoples. This resulted in the first *nomos* of the earth. It was based on a particular relation between the spatial order of firm land and the spatial order of free sea and for 400 years it supported a Eurocentric international law: the *jus publicum Europaeum* (49).

This is quite significant, for it represents “the threshold of a new stage of human spatial consciousness and global order” (48). Before the Age of Discovery, there was no global linear thinking or consciousness. Also, at that time, the interconnectedness between the different parts of the world could not provide a global relationship because, as Schmitt claims, each empire considered itself to be the world and/or the center of the world (50-51). Very interestingly, Schmitt then argues that the purpose of boundaries in the pre-global era is to separate “a pacified order from a quarrelsome disorder, a cosmos from chaos, a house from a non-house, an enclosure from the wilderness” (52). Schmitt then contradicts this statement by arguing that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, “[...] the border between two territorial states of modern European international law did not constitute an exclusion but rather mutual recognition, above all of the fact that neighboring soil beyond the border was sovereign territory” (ibid.).⁵¹

⁵⁰ This, for Schmitt, means to engrave, scratch and imprint. Without order, these are not possible. The sea gained its character only with the rise of the great sea empires and the establishment of “security” and order in the sea (43-44). It seems to me that in Schmitt no being can exist and no becoming can emerge without order. Hence, what is foundational is order, not the act of land appropriation.

⁵¹ Recognition does not simply mean the absence of war or violence. Here, it refers to customs and contracts based on consensus, the unity of the European spatial order, a culturally and morally homogenous Europe, and the equality of all its members (Ulmen 2003: 13).

The date that ushered in the new Nomos was 1492, which transformed the structure of all traditional concepts and replaced the Old World with the New. The division and distribution of the earth and the first stage of a new planetary consciousness of space began with the drawing of lines between geometric surfaces. Later, through the assimilation of the cartographic and statistical details of the planet by a newfound historical and scientific consciousness, claims Schmitt, it was necessary to establish a new spatial order. Earth now emerged as a real globe and became a world *apprehensible as fact and measurable as space* (86-87). Both the discovery (which is neither timeless nor universal, but a historically and intellectually bounded concept) and the possibility of establishing an order were achievements of European-occidental rationalism (131-132). The European sovereign state was the political-spatial entity residing at the core/center of this new order while the law between European states determined the nomos of the rest of the globe (126, 129). This is both the context of *jus publicum Europaeum* and that in which Europeans set the standard for the rest of the world: *civilization was synonymous with European civilization and Europe was the center of the earth* (86).

Here, the question that remains is clear/obvious: What was the imagination of the land of non-Europeans in/through the perspective of *jus publicum Europaeum*. This is the first point at which I would like to recall Tuathail's examination of ?.

In the perspective of *jus publicum Europaeum*, writes Schmitt, "all the *land* on the earth belonged to either European states or those of equal standing, or it was a land free to be occupied: i.e. potential state territory or potential colony" (172). The New World did not appear as a new enemy, but as a *free space* for European expansion and occupation. The appearance of

“vast free spaces,” and the land appropriation of the New World made the new *nomos* of the earth possible (87, 140). Furthermore, it could be argued that Schmitt provides a simple, descriptive explanation for the history of *jus publicum Europaeum*. However, he accomplishes/achieves far more than that by providing a particular/distinct/unique historiography through his concept of *Nomos*. First of all, the production of blank spaces on the globe, in which the globe appeared as a system of closed space, as Tuathail argues, is itself a political question. This represents a specific genre of geo-power, implying the exercise of power across the globe (Tuathail 1996: 15). Further, if *the spatial visibility* of an order and space is possible only through the *Nomos*, as Schmitt argues (70), then the comprehension of non-Europeans’ space as free, blank spaces implies that their possibility of existence is reduced to and defined through the moment of appropriation by the European *Nomos*. Outside of the European *Nomos*, these spaces are not merely absent and invisible, they do not exist. They become present and visible only through conquest by European powers. This is certainly a political intervention, which, as Tuathail argues, results in/carries its own geopolitical and political consequences: it “seeks to secure the claim of particular Western places and powers to write the history and geography of all” (1996: 70). They do not have their own history outside Eurocentric invasion: they are people without history.

A Schmittian writing of geography, however, differs from classical geopolitical examinations. As a non-apologist, Eurocentric Schmitt would have countered these critiques (writing the history of Others and rejecting the existence of a geographic “space”) by referring to the success of occidental rationalism or to the “inability and weakness” of “reactionary” anti-colonial critiques of the production of order (Schmitt 2003: 132; Ulmen 2003: 30-31). However,

what Schmitt disregards is the possibility of an alternative historiography, such as an encounter between Europeans and “Others.” Schmitt also ignores the impact of the “enigma of Otherness,” assumes the ownership of a “master code” on behalf of the “initiating side” (the Europeans), rejects the possibility of multiple readings, prefers to ignore the coming of “unexpected play in the metaphors,” and fights against the ambiguity of the “discovery” itself through layered aspects “filtered through” several dimensions (Connolly 1991: 36-40). By focusing on land appropriation, Schmitt does not suggest an encounter or the success of maintaining order. Instead, he employs a “regulative ideal,” reflecting a given priority and privilege of subjectivity, as well as the ability to maintain an order based on what is called “European” and “Europeanness.” For this reason, the perception of Others has no impact on the creation of the Self in Schmitt and, hence, the appropriation results in an ontological closure. Here, we might return to Tuathail’s insistence on the production of *global space*.

As I have argued, the relationship of European space to that of non-Europeans is not only a matter of Nomos, as Schmitt defines and attributes it to Europeanness, but a *particular* manner of creating and producing space: both by rejecting their existence and defining the spaces and free—making them available for appropriation, distribution and production. However, because the Nomos itself (which was extended/established in the New World) has *its own history*, what is produced is not simply and only non-European free spaces. It cannot be reduced to or defined as an originary act. Indeed, the idea and pursuit of an origin or originary act is quite problematic because it represents an attempt to “capture the essence of things, their purest possibilities.” The search for an originary act and origin assumes “the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession.” This is a replication of the “primordial image of

truth” and a search “that is directed to which was already there’ (Foucault 1984: 78). Here, we return to (Foucault’s) Nietzsche rather than Schmitt, for it is Nietzsche that offers a genealogical mode of reading/investigation that moves against any search for origins or “originary acts” (77). A genealogical reading refuses “to extend a faith in metaphysics,” and instead “lets us listen to history” and see “something altogether different.” These revelations are not timeless and essential secrets, but that have their own genealogies and essences fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms” (78).

Despite Schmitt’s constant references to the political and historical contextual formation of *jus publicum Europaeum*, his emphasis on the idea of Nomos as an originary act led him to produce a discourse of truth. The idea of origin, for Foucault, “lies at the point where [the] truth of things corresponded to a truthful discourse,” which represents itself as the site of truth (79). In this way, Schmitt’s insistence on the nomos as an originary act, eliminates, destroys, and neglects/disregards the histories and lives of Others, as well as the *appropriation* of their land.

One of the primary aims of critical geopolitics is to reveal “the moments in the writing of a truth around ‘geopolitics’ and about geo-politics” (Tuathail 1996: 142). Thus, it is undoubtedly the moment at which Schmitt establishes the truths of his historiography that it is produced through his writing of geography.

Considering these arguments, what would be the implications of searching for “something altogether different” behind the things? Following Tuathail, we would discover an altogether unique historiography of *jus publicum Europaeum* when defining the relationship of

Europeans to the New World through the production of space. Moreover, instead of referring to it as a historical, yet self-referential inner-identity that marks the success of Eurocentric visions, we may situate it within the context of the identity-difference paradox. In so doing, the definition of the Age of Discovery, and particularly the discovery of the New World, would be defined, following Campbell, as an invention rather than a discovery (Campbell 1998: 93).⁵² Although Schmitt defines this “discovery” in terms of its historicity, he ignores its constitutive role in the formation of the identity-difference of Europe and treats it as a success of the Europe’s scientific legacy. Following Campbell’s discussion on the invention of America, it seems that Schmitt privileges the spatial over the temporal and historical (97).

Therefore, what was “discovered” and re-invented was not only “free” spaces for occupation and colonization, but the identity of Europe as a colonizer and master of space and history with the right (knowledge, science, ability, etc.) over other “free spaces.” By reproducing this particular historiography, Schmitt not only “re-constructs” non-European territories geographically, as free-spaces, but also “writes” Europe geo-graphically. However, Schmitt proceeds as if this writing is not *structuring* but merely *describing* the ontological relationship between the law and order. Nomos, despite Schmitt’s attempts at a particularization and provoncialization of the term (i.e. the Europeanization of Nomos), is a concept that tells us what is ontological, not the land appropriation, but the structuring process of land appropriation. In other words, discussed on the ontological level, land appropriation represents a foundational act, not of any order, but with how to appropriate land and with whom one appropriates the land.

⁵² Discovery implies both the intention of discovering somewhere called America and the intrinsic existence of the somewhere that is called America. Campbell borrows the idea of invention from Edmundo O’German and discusses geographical and theological “impossibilities” to prove that it was not a discovery, but an invention (93-96). The merit of this approach is its tendency to reveal the historical and temporal aspects of the “construction of America” against any ahistorical approach, which subjugates itself to an unquestioned spatiality.

There also remains the question of historiography and subject-positions within the complex relationship between law, politics, and order.

The second part of my critique is related to Schmitt's understanding of geography as a science. When discussing the emergence of global thinking, Schmitt refers to the nature of geographical discoveries.

The question was political from the start; it could not be dismissed as 'purely geographical.' As scientific, mathematical, or technical disciplines geography and cartography are certainly *neutral*. However as every geographer knows they can be *instrumentalized* in ways both immediately relevant and *highly political*. Despite the neutrality of geography as a science *purely* geographical concepts can *generate* a political struggle: if they fall within the sphere of the political: [...] the intense friend-enemy distinction (88, emphasis added).

Ulmen argues that Schmitt accepts the impossibility of separating politics and mapping, but he would not readily agree with the idea assuming that there is no unchallenged or obvious basis for a map's objectivity (2003: 31-32). Schmitt explains this in terms of instrumentalization. Similar to the idea that Schmitt offers in the above quotation, the question of instrumentalization is related to the very distinction of the political. For both Schmitt and Ulmen, geography or geographical representations may become political only if they carry or generate the distinction between friend and enemy. Here, both Schmitt and Ulmen seem to imply the presence of a realm outside the political, in which geography is and can be neutral. The neutrality of this realm provides an objective basis for representation in maps.

The problem is that the form and content of geographical knowledge (or maps) is strongly related to and even embedded in the social basis of production and the use of that knowledge and a particular ideology (Harvey 1996: 96-97). Moreover, cartography, as a

particular representation of geographic knowledge, is a discursive practice shaped by both the power external to the map (political, social, etc.) and internal to it through the manufacturing of power and the creation of a spatial panopticon (Harley 1996: 438-439). It is these aspects that Schmitt apparently ignores. Furthermore, it is not simply a coincidence or historical accident that the generation of geographic knowledge, geopolitical imaginations and representations have been developed hand-in-hand with “the imperialist expansion and centralization of [the] modern European state system across the globe from the 16th century” (Tuathail, 1996:10).

In regard to geopolitics, the most important problem in arguing for the neutrality of geography and reducing its political character to instrumentalization is Schmitt’s tendency to ignore the conditioning of geopolitics by geography and politics. As Tuathail argues, both geography and politics are conditioned by other predicates in an unstable and indeterminate way (65). Therefore, the concepts and imaginations of geography are always inscribed within conceptual chains. In this way, a particular preference of objectivity and neutrality in that context simply refers to a particular political preference rather than neutrality itself. Moreover, by assuming neutrality, Schmitt practically and theoretically suppresses the political nature of geography and land appropriation, even though it is contrary to his own understanding of *Nomos* as a political problem.

The last point that requires mentioning is related to Tuathail’s arguments on the transparency of geopolitical objects (rivers, mountains), attributes (size, nature) and patterns (East-West, New World-Old World). For Schmitt, they do not represent a transparent entity, but a socially constructed sign within a system of signification (52). Therefore, the visualization of

geopolitics and geography is itself “dependent upon an unrecognized and unacknowledged textuality,” which all depend on the “rhetorical dimensions of these objects/attributes and patterns.” Despite his careful consideration of the constitutive role of the political and the concept of Nomos, Schmitt, by believing in the neutrality of geography, situates himself within a particular narrative of Western thought that is a objectivist, ahistorical and depoliticizing mode of thinking. Indeed, this is a greater irony than the one Tuathail refers to in classical geography due to Schmitt’s insistence on the centrality and priority of the political (53). Similar to the previous discussion, the Schmittian writing of geography, as well as his discourse, produces the same effect: the suppression of the political, the reduction of the plurality of geographic imaginations into a Eurocentric vision, and the hiding of the struggle over geography.

This is a rather ‘unexpected’ conclusion because it is Schmitt who devotes his examination of the political, the sovereign, and Nomos to a resistance of positivist, legalist and ahistorical understandings of those concepts. Nevertheless, as I have attempted to show, Schmitt’s writing of geography and his discussion of Nomos ultimately suppress and diminish the political. In essence, it is possible that this “unexpected” conclusion is not that surprising, given Schmitt’s “tragedy,” including displays of power and the constitutive influence of *geography* and his given Europeanness over the formation and transformation of his political horizons. Despite his attempts to secure the priority of the temporal and historical,⁵³ it is instead the spatial, as well as European subjectivity which are privileged in Schmitt’s discussion. Further, Schmitt’s manner of writing geography neutralizes the struggles embedded within the

⁵³ After all, Nomos is a temporal, political and historical question. Schmitt utilizes the concept to escape from a positivist and ahistorical understanding of politics.

production of the spatial forms and outcomes, which, in turn, create political dynamics/effects that de-politicize and de-historicize the existence of the political.

3.4. Turning Back to Europe

This chapter, comprised of two parts, begins with an examination of certain forms of narrating Eurocentrism. It suggests that, due to the lack of adequate abstraction and the difficulties in moving beyond a manifestation of Eurocentrism, a Schmittian formulation of Nomos can be deployed to maintain an abstract definition of Eurocentrism. The main rationale behind this is to inquire into both the temporal and spatial formations of Eurocentrism and Europe alongside the order created since the “rise” of Europe.

However, Nomos, as claimed by/within a Schmittian formulation, lacks two important dimensions (subjectivity and the founding impact of encounters) and is loaded with Europeanness. The absence of a subject, an encounter, and the ahistorical presence of a European subject prevented Schmitt from structuring a comprehensive ontological term. To demonstrate these difficulties, in the second part of the chapter, I have focused on the literature of critical geo-politics to deconstruct a Schmittian understanding of the political, territory, and geography. The journey, since the very outset, has been to develop a term with Schmitt, but to deploy against his readings. Here, inspired by Connolly’s identity-difference paradox, as well as his intervention into Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign exception, I suggest a new formulation of Nomos. In the alternative formulation, it is not land appropriation per se, but the formation process of land appropriation (i.e., the process and becoming of land appropriation), which occupies the core of

Nomos. While recognizing the foundational impact of Nomos (appropriation, division, and distribution) in the structuring of any order, it has also been suggested that the dimensions of who and how (subject/subjectivity and process/becoming) be included in the core formulation of the concept of Nomos. This compels us to return to the question of the historiography of Europe and subject positions from within the complex relationship between law, politics, and order. The next chapter will provide an extensive and detailed discussion on the history of Europe rather than the concept of Eurocentrism. As we do not know which comes first (Europe or Eurocentrism), any claim that they are mutually constitutive does not grasp either the real dynamics behind the rise of Europe or the formation of Eurocentrism and the counter-arguments against Europe and Eurocentrism.

4.0. Europe and Europes: The Name, the History, and the Idea

“We certainly hold that our subject can be understood only in historical perspective, and that without an awareness of the past that generated it, the universal international society of the present can have no meaning”

(H. Bull and A. Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*, 1984: 9).

“The writing of European history could not proceed until the concept of Europe had stabilized and the historian’s art had assumed an analytical turn” (N. Davies, *Europe: A History*, 1998:15).

In the first two chapters, I have focused on the discipline of International Relations (IR) and its limits, as well as the ways in which Eurocentrism has been contextualized. I proposed a genealogical reading to examine the subject of inquiry. In the third chapter, while suggesting a discussion on certain pathways of analysis on the concept of Eurocentrism, I deployed the term *Nomos* to undertake an abstract conceptualization of it. Referring to the complex relationship between appropriation, distribution, and division, *Nomos* as a concept suggests that, in order to grasp the diverse articulations of Europe and its historiography, i.e. the genesis and structuring of Europe, or its trajectories, there is a need to focus on the history of Europe. The task of this chapter is to achieve this through an examination of Europe and its history, as a name, and as an idea.

This chapter is comprised of two parts. In the first part, I focus on the notion of Europe as myth, its genesis, its trajectory, and the way in which it has maintained a relationship to an idea and ensemble. The second part focuses on the becoming of Europe, particularly in terms of the relationship maintained between the fate of the continent, its inhabitants, and the fate of

Christianity. In these discussions, rather than telling a new story of Europe and Europeans, I focus on the ways in which these stories have been told and examine European ways of presenting themselves. How Europe has emerged is the central question of this chapter, particularly until the early fifteenth century.

4.1. How to Tell the Story of Europe, of Eurocentrism

One way to tell the story of Eurocentrism is to focus on various aspects of the rise of Europe after the fifteenth century, particularly from the mid-17th century (beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia [1648] as heralding in the European state system) until the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The dissolution of the colonial world order and the subsequent period are of crucial importance.

Such a reading has a strong historical background: Europe, as an idea, was consolidated after the late fifteenth century and what is known as global history (after 1492) has been defined, articulated, and consolidated through direct or indirect relationships with Europeans, Europe, and its modes of governing the global order. In this history, the ascendancy of Europe and Europeans is visible not only in “factual” terms, such as the balance of power, the subjugation of other territories to European, colonial rule, and the institutions erected to maintain control, but also in the writing and telling of history.

The ordering mechanisms of a Christian-inspired universe, the disposition and maintenance of international order after 1492, and the philosophical foundations derived from its previous

cosmology for the economic, cultural, political and legal systems of knowledge sustaining Western hegemony, institutions, norms and principles of the new global order were derived from the experience defined as the rise of Europe (Grosvogui 1996: 8-9). Modern history, in this sense, is the history of the rise of Europe (both as its affirmation and negation). What is called Eurocentrism has emerged in such a framework and has been contextualized and analyzed through different/various/numerous modes of examination, ranging from essentialist readings to postcolonial and poststructuralist ones.⁵⁴

However, I follow a different path. This is not because I agree with essentialist definitions of Europe that locate the “seeds of subsequent success” in the pre-1492 history of Europe or assume the presence of an unbroken tradition from the fifteenth century to the present. Similarly, I do not assume an ahistorical continuity between the two, such as taking post-1492 Europe as merely a reflection or simple “universalization” of a naturalized, parochial experience of Europeans. The links between the modalities of a Christian-inspired universe, and its subsequent expansion does not imply the continuity of the same.

Rather, I follow arguments that claim something significant happened after 1492 that *re-contextualized* the previously established order of things, which represents a qualitative difference between previous eras and the post-1492 period (Grosvogui 1996). In particular, this search is not aimed at establishing/locating a teleological origin of Europe, which *necessarily* led to Eurocentrism; rather, it is to reveal the contextualization and re-contextualization of the terms Europe and Eurocentrism via historiography.

⁵⁴ For an analysis reading of the various aspects of this argument see J. M. Roberts (1985, 1996: 41), N. Davies (1998), P. T. Levin (2011), M. B. Salter (2002), E. Wolf (1982), J. Abu-Lughod (1989), J.M. Blaut (2000), M. G. S. Hodgson (1993), and J. M. Hobson (2004, 2012).

To achieve this, I focus attention on investigating the pre-15th century period of “Europe” even though I rely on the arguments that Europe (as the embodiment of universality) did not exist during these eras, and *the known earth* was filled with different holders of power, “each guided by a belief in the self as the center of the entire universe” (18) and with temporal or “limited” relationships between different parts of the world, ranging from China to Middle East, North Africa and Europe (Abu-Lughod 1989).

My reason for pursuing this line of inquiry is a pragmatic one: The literature on Eurocentrism, including the critique presented by *Orientalism* and the many variants of post-colonial literature, has already produced a vast corpus by making untenable the assumption of European history as embodying universal human history, either because of the conceptual difficulties of maintaining such a position (Grosvogui 1996; Asad 2002) or due to the empirical interventions challenging the primacy of Europe in global history (Wolf 1982; Abu-Lughod 1989; Hodgson 1993; Hobson 2004; Blaut 2000) or political correctness.

Likewise, the strategies, modes, and modalities of maintaining Eurocentrism, the discursive deployments in its reproduction, as well as its reflections in diverse spheres, ranging from mathematics to social sciences, media and daily life have been oft discussed (Shohat and Stam 1994; Ferguson and Mansbach 2004). However, my focus on the pre-1492 era does not represent a claim that this aspect of the history of the Europe is less examined; rather, the opposite seems to be the case. Much of the aforementioned discussions refer to certain aspects of this history, but do encompass/comprise a substantial literature on the era (Davies, 1998; Roberts 1996; Herrin 1987; Le Goff 2005; Fontana 2003). The question then becomes: how does a focus

on the previous configurations/imaginings of Europe contribute to an understanding of the problematic of Eurocentrism?

The aim of this chapter is to answer this question by tracing the emergence of Europe and the formation of the idea of Europe through a historiography of it. By relying on/reaching to the existing literature, the *intention* is to pluralize the reading of *Europe* itself (as a notion, imagination, and discourse).

The *project* is to begin from a post-Roman history to reveal the Christianization of Europe and the Europeanization of Christianity, as well as to investigate the political investments for and trajectories of the idea of Europe, explore the dynamics of East vs. West, and elucidate the role of “Asiatic-imports” in the history of Europe. The *result* would undoubtedly be considered a *failure*, not because there can be no plural Europes, but because Europe as such existed only after the modern age (Hall 1996; Heller 1992; Sayyid 2004). However, the notion of failure is quite useful because it subverts several myths sustaining the Eurocentric order of the universe, as well as readings that legitimize Eurocentrism. The result, then, is not a failure, but a vicious circle created by and out of Eurocentrism (Sayyid 2004.).

In writing the chapter, I seldom discuss the political-conceptual components of post-1492. This is not because I treat Eurocentrism as a unified, unchanging discursive space or locate it only as part and parcel of a pre-1492 history, but because I take history-writing/history after 1492 as a Eurocentric ordering of universe. This trajectory is certainly not a unified one, but is characterized by various modes and strategies. Assuming such a unified trajectory would be

characteristically/undoubtedly Eurocentric, as with maintaining a vision of History as marching from “Plato to NATO” (Gress 1998).

Europe as a discourse, like all discursive formations, has been associated with several themes, developed through several articulations, and has found many unique expressions and crystallizations (e.g., Christendom, civilization, the West, imperialism, racism, fascism, modernity, primitive vs. civilized, universal vs. particular, culture vs. nature, democracy vs. totalitarianism, etc.). A multiplicity of discourses articulated and influenced the very idea of Europe, spanning the early centuries of its emergence to the post-2000 political context and beyond.

4.2. Clearing the Ground or “Modulating the Tone”

The historiography of Europe and the relationship of the rise of Europe to the formation of the modern-global era is a subject of fierce/persistent contestation and inquires result in a great number of publications. Apart from stylistic differences and the empirical dimensions of these texts, the content (Europe as a continent vs. Europe as part of Afro-Euroasian entity or “isolation” vs. interconnectedness), scope (Europe as part of world history vs. Europe as history), and methodological framing (civilizational history vs. social-economic history or thematic vs. genealogical history) of the literature makes it virtually impossible to offer an exhaustive summary. However, in relation to the question of Eurocentrism, excluding critical approaches (such as Wolf 1982; Frank 1998; Hodgson 1993), there are certain themes that appear more or less regularly, or as regularities in dispersion (Foucault 1982). These themes enable us to

illuminate the discursive economy by which the very notion of Europe and the centrality of Europe are maintained.

Complementing earlier discussions of these themes above, I will limit myself to two examples. The first, referred to here as “facts vs. value,” has been quite successfully studied by J. M. Roberts (1985: 131). While discussing the emergence and consolidation of European confidence at a “moral and mythical level,” the attachment to place and people to Europe and Europeans in the early seventeenth century (130), and despite attempting to avoid a Eurocentric mode of writing, Roberts writes that:

Nowadays, people have to come use a specifically minted word to summarise this state of mind [referring to the privileging of Europe]: Eurocentrism. It means ‘putting Europe at the centre of things’ and its usual implication is that to do so is wrong. But of course if we are *merely talking about the facts, about what happened and not about the value we place on them, then it is quite correct to put Europe at the center of the story in modern times.* [...] It was from Europe that [...] they created a world of which Europe was the centre the Americas and Asia the periphery (131, emphasis added).

Roberts then adds that Eurocentrism “went revealingly” beyond the mere facts of power and influence and turned into a subject of maintaining qualitative superiority (131-135). Roberts is not alone in attempting to speak from such a position.

Likewise, Davies takes Eurocentrism to be a matter of “attitude not content,” referring to the “*traditional tendency of European authors* to regard their civilization as superior and self-contained, and to neglect the need for taking non-European viewpoints into consideration” (1996: 16, emphasis added). Throughout his magnum opus, *Europe: A History*, Davies is careful to include interconnectedness with other parts of the world; however, he prefers to focus on what is

specifically considered to be “European affairs.” It must be acknowledged that both Roberts and Davies are critical of claims to natural superiority or the generalization or universality of their models.⁵⁵ Furthermore, Davies attempts to ease the impact of Eurocentrism by suggesting more attention be paid to the interaction between Europeans and non-Europeans, to increase the use of non-European sources, to look for “honest comparisons” between the two, and, above, “it is essential to modulate the tone” (19).⁵⁶

What is striking in both Davies’s and Roberts’s readings is that there is an explicit position, albeit reluctant, of taking the centrality of Europe or the problem of Eurocentrism in historiography as a question of moral responsibility, as a matter of tone, and a question of value. These are undoubtedly crucial aspects of the issue; however, from counter-readings on the history of Europe or world-global history, including texts by Wolf (1982), Abu-Lughod (1989), Hodgson (1993), as well as McNeill (1992) and Bentley (1993) to a certain extent, these themes have rarely occupied the *central focus* when discussing the question of Eurocentrism in historiography. This seemingly minor difference is actually quite crucial/significant.

First, it cannot be explained by referring to the conceptual differences of Eurocentrism. However, limiting the question of Eurocentrism to one of tone and moral responsibility, rather

⁵⁵ For Davies, opposition to Eurocentrism has four main sources: In North America he states, Black political movements rebelling against an educational system allegedly dominated by “white supremacist values,” in other words, by the “glorification of European culture.” In the world, Islam by Muslims, particularly Iranian fundamentalists, “who see the West as the domain of Satan.” In the Third World, Marxist intellectuals who see Eurocentrism as part and parcel of capitalism. In Europe, by a European generation that, “when they paused to think, have been thoroughly ashamed of many of their elders’ attitudes” (1996: 18-19).

⁵⁶ Davies quotes the opinion of one Frenchman, who strikes an optimistic note: “After all, crime and Western history are not the same thing. Whatever [the West] has given to the world by far exceeds that which it has done against various societies and individuals” (19). Davies then qualifies this statement by adding: “Not everyone would agree.” I believe criminalization is an effect of the moralization of politics and represents the way in which Davies approaches the study of history.

than as representative of Eurocentrism defined as an expression of European ethnocentrism, “normalizes” Eurocentrism and conceals its specificity and relies on the assumption that Europe as an agent could exist without a Eurocentric constellation or ordering of the universe.

With all due fairness to both Davies and Roberts, it should be noted that both are careful in demonstrating how “Europe” emerges gradually, either beginning from the late Roman Empire up to the fifteenth century or after the tenth century. However, limiting Eurocentrism, as Davies and Roberts do, is directed at “saving”/guarding the pioneering and central constitutive role of Europe (either internally or externally) as an agent of human history. It is no coincidence that both refer to a need for securing the ground of facts to explain their reading of Europe. What is here implied is that, “it is correct (morally, politically and historically) to put Europe at the center of modern history.”

Nonetheless, this does not seem to be contested through counter-historiographies, as virtually all of them begin with the assumption that Europe has played a definitive, transformative, and ground-breaking role throughout modern history. However, the difference is derived from the way in which the relationship between Europe, as an agent of history, and Eurocentrism, as an expression of such agency, is discussed. Are they mutually constituting? Can we think of Europe without Eurocentrism? What is the status of Europe, as geography, as an entity, idea, or discourse, in relation to the question of Eurocentrism?

These questions are crucial components for understanding the relationship between Europe and modernity, Europe and Eurocentrism, Europe and the world after the rise of Europe,

as well as Europe as an idea, reality, and discourse. For now, suffice it to say that counter-readings on the history of Europe privilege various aspects, including the interconnectedness of world history (Wolf 1982; Frank 1998), the primacy of the Afro-Eurasian continent, the Great Western Transmutation and its impact (Hodgson 1993), and cross-cultural contacts (Bentley 1993).

While adhering to unique strategies and concentrating on different themes, these scholars do not deny the successes of Europe and its impact on shaping modern history, but contextualize Europe within human history and cross-cultural/political encounters. The difference does not stem from the “ability” to offer “comparative readings,” but from not attributing a *given privilege* to Europe as an already given or potentially there subject.

Hodgson, for instance, still treats the rise of Europe in modern history as an unprecedented “world-wide event,” both qualitatively and quantitatively. In this sense, Hodgson does not negate the “facts” (1993: 44). What he instead does is to contextualize the rise of Europe as the “outcome of the breakdown of the common historical conditions on which rested the pre-Modern Afro-Eurasian historical complex as a whole”(27). Likewise, Abu-Lughod (1989) focuses on the formation of a distinctive world system (between 1100-1245), whose decline laid the ground for the rise of European hegemony. Moreover, Wolf (1982) focuses on “interconnectedness” to historicize the history of the Rise of Europe and *spatialize* Europe in world history.

It seems that there is also a need to consider the notion of Europe (as a geography, idea, and discourse) to understand both Eurocentrism and what is defined as *the Rise of Europe*. The remainder of this chapter will pursue this task.

To accomplish this task, I begin with a history of the emergence of Europe. However, *apart from additional sources*, I choose to rely primarily on three texts, by Davies (1998) and Roberts (1985 and 1996), which narrate the story of Europe and are undertake critical evaluations of the notion of Eurocentrism. Partially due to their reliance on a well-established structure, their works provide a basic chronological order, show the geographical grid, and illuminate various aspects of European history. In addition, they offer valuable sources for understanding the history of Europe. Partially, and more importantly, such a preference reiterates one of the central claims of this dissertation: rather than a question of history and historiography, Eurocentrism is a matter of political theory. Even a text that perhaps speaks from a Eurocentric perspective could be exploited for telling the same story from a non-Eurocentric position. The point is that Eurocentrism can be examined effectively only through an abstraction, as it is not a matter of empirical discussion.⁵⁷ Perhaps it is not a coincidence that many texts claim to diverge from a Eurocentric historiography and have an almost obsessive relationship with creating concepts while telling the story.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ It is crucial to note that such a gesture only became possible after the consolidation of criticisms against Eurocentric forms of writing the history of Europe. Subversion, in this sense, necessitates the grounds for engagement with these texts, either in positive or negative forms, and criticisms of Eurocentrism. A text that relies on the absolute isolation of Europe or complete “exclusion” of interconnectedness can be defined, not simply as Eurocentric, but as a weak history or poor analysis.

⁵⁸ Abu-Lughod (1989) re-formulates world-system theory and embarks upon an original, creative approach, Wolf (1982) invents a different style of history-writing, of people without history, Hodgson (1993) had an obsessive relationship with concept-creation, and his text is full of suggestions, such as Islamicate and great transmutation. Hodgson suggests multiplying and pluralizing terms to define historical-political entities, a *technicalization*.

4.3. Europe as Myth or the Myth of Europe

European history is not linear, nor is the idea of Europe static (Levin 2011: 163; Pagden 2002: 1; Delanty 1995).⁵⁹ Likewise, the trajectory of becoming a self-defined continent is subject to contestation and cannot be thought of without the formation of Europe as an idea (Davies 1998; Roberts, 1985; and Hodgson, 1993). Hence, the space of Europe, its limits, constitutive aspects, attributes, features, and legacies are also subject to intense discussions. In addition, it is important to consider who is able to define themselves and who others recognize as Europeans. In a similar vein, its trajectory constructs a thing that can be defined as Europe as an idea. It was particularly through the Age of Europe, in which much of the world was appropriated by the European powers; its triumph symbolized the only means of success in the modern world. These complexities complicate the already troubled history, which covers not only Europe's past, but also articulates "its history" with the present and future of both Europe and the world. So it seems that what we have is an entity with three dimensions: a reality, an identity, and an idea (Delanty 1995: 3).

These aspects may be summarized with the first referring to Europe as a geographic space or as a historical-political-social entity, and the second encompassing all discussions of identities, either individual, communal/parochial, or universal in their relation to modernity, and the third referring to images of Europe and its articulations throughout history.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ It is crucial to note that almost all conceptual studies on the history of Europe, in one way or another, refer to this aspect: the idea of Europe and the history of Europe. For prominent examples, see Hay (1957), Wilson and Dussen (1993), and Heater (1992).

⁶⁰ Delanty's first chapter is dedicated to showing how Europe is composed of three components, which must all be taken together as a discourse, to treat Europe as a discourse (3). But, for reasons to be elaborated later, Delanty structures his argument by insisting on the distinction between the idea of Europe and the identity of Europe from the thing that he calls Europe as discourse and attributes a constitutive role to them—though through articulations

However, when telling the story of Europe, what is apparent is that it took several centuries for the word “Europe” to become a concept denoting a continent, first, and a civilization, second (Pocock 2002: 56). By relying only on the different historiographies of Europe, one may argue that there are not only different ideas of Europe, but diverse histories of Europe and distinct Europes, which may or may not be compatible each other. Through the abstraction of events (encounters, relationships, implementations of power, and the formation of political structures), one may follow the example offered by Fontana (2003). Namely, to consider Europe as a collective name for multiple mirrors, but which await “re-interpretation.”

One of the difficulties, we may encounter in such experiments would be the “conflation” of the idea of a thing (the idea of Europe) with the thing itself (Europe).⁶¹ One may say such a difficulty is present in virtually any attempts at telling the histories of socio-political entities. However, the idea of Europe, by its success and its history, almost completely submerges and absorbs the history of the space defined as Europe and the people defined as Europeans.

At certain points, it feels that Europe is itself not a space, but a space that exists only after it finds a name, after it is founded as a name with a space to match the idea.⁶² Talal Asad

with the forces of history. Part of the trouble is that he relies on a conceptual framework offered by Habermas to synthesize what he calls pluralism and universalism (11-13). Such a conflation may be understood as a reflection of a mechanistic understanding of discourse as a term, though with tremendous repercussions, which I will examine later. Delanty’s difficulty is that Habermas’s political vision is not a fruitful source for a position interested in pluralism, particularly when it comes to Europe and Europeanness.

⁶¹ I consider this difference for heuristic reasons, not because I agree with such a distinction. In my reading, the problem is that it leads to the conflation of the history of Europe with the idea of Europe. This may lead to a mediocre analysis, which provides a solid base for a teleological reading of the history of Europe, weak historiography, partial readings of the history of Europe in conceptual discussions on the Europe, which, ultimately, lead to Eurocentric imaginations.

⁶² The dynamic and constitutive relationship between geography and politics, encompassing the very process of naming an entity, may be recalled here. However, the relationship between Europe as a territory, as an idea, and as an identity is more complex than that. It is a matter that can only be understood through a consideration of

contends that European history is not simply “the narrative about the inhabitants of the European continent” (2002: 216). It is more a narrative formed through a constructed idea of Europe, framing both the past and the future. Asad, moreover, claims that the modes of dealing with certain themes in and of European history have to do with such a dynamic framing of European identity. Asad asks:

....why there is nothing in his book (Trevor-Roper) about Byzantium and Eastern Europe, or about North-Western Europe (other than brief references to the Vikings’ destructiveness), or about Jews (other than as victims), or about Muslim Spain (other than as an intrusive presence). ‘European history’ is the narration of an identity many still derive from ‘European (or Western) civilization’—a narrative that seeks to represent homogeneous space and linear time (216).

Asad presents his argument through a close reading of Hugh Trevor-Roper’s *The Rise of Christian Europe*, which takes European civilization and identity as a narrative. While the arguments presented are focused on Trevor-Roper’s study, such a position is well-represented in the historiography of Europe⁶³ (Mikkeli 1998; Wilson and Dussen 1993; Duroselle 1990; Hay 1957).

One may claim that this does not present a serious obstacle to understanding and conceptualizing the history of Europe. For instance, it is acceptable to ask whether a history of a national(ized) territory could be written without articulating the process of “imagining” the nation as a communal identity. Likewise, it is often asked whether the story of a territory or land (sacred or secular) could be written without an associated idea of it. Relying on the literature of nationalism, particularly Anderson (2006 [1983]), the answer is no. However, my intention is not

Eurocentrism. It may also help to state that the normalization of geography and geopolitics has also been part and parcel of the rise of Europe. (See previous chapter for details.)

⁶³ This does not mean they all collaboratively exclude similar subjects. It refers to the “conflation” of the idea of Europe and the history of Europe. For a detailed discussion, see Blaut (2000).

to resolve the “paradox,” rather it is to discuss its implications (Connolly 1991), consequences, and articulations with other themes. One way of dealing with this conflation is to locate it within a broader framework for the idea of Europe and the history of Europe.

I argue that it is this relationship, which I take as a matter of successful articulation and hegemony, not “as a crime” (Davies 1998: 19), which produces certain difficulties in understanding, e.g. locating Europe in history and the broader history of Europe. Hegel’s insistence to take Europe as both the center and the end of History (Pagden 2002: 34-36) is a perfect example of this “conflation.” In addition, the narrative of the “journey of civilizations” as passing the “torch of civilization from the East to the West,” diffusionism, the slow perfection of reason, laws and culture beginning from the East and then moving to the West, finding its perfect shape, and becoming the universal model are all examples of such trouble. This offers an interesting point of departure, but I will return to the focus of this chapter: the emergence of Europe.

“As usual,”⁶⁴ the founding suspects are Greeks and their mythology.

⁶⁴ I use quotes here to draw attention to the inclusion of Greeks as “usual suspects” of all founding moments of “European” successes. It took several centuries, and it was not until the mid 19th century that such a vision was consolidated. It was already established that Greek civilization should be seen as the “mother of philosophy, science, literature and art,” whereas its political heritage, which was definitive in codifying the meaning and idea of Europe, had been ignored. Europe was understood in relation to the decline of the Roman Empire, and the Christianization of the region was considered to be the initial phase of the emergence of Europe. This reading is shared not only by Conservative Catholics, but others as well, including some Protestants and liberals. George Grote’s (1794-1871) *History of Greece* (published in 1846) transformed the historical perspective of Europe, which then began to, treat Athenian democracy as “the cradle of European civilization” (Wilson and Dussen 1993: 74).

4.3.1 Europa: Ambivalence and the Abducted Princess

There is a charming, mythical legend for the initial usages of the name Europa. A Phoenician princess (what is today Lebanon), Europa was abducted by the Cretan god Zeus, who appeared in the form of a white bull and carried her off to Crete, where their union produced Minos, a civilizing king and lawgiver (le Goff 2005; Munoz 1999 8; Mikkeli 1998: 3-5; Pagden 2002). “The Greeks bestowed the name of Europeans upon the inhabitants of the extreme western tip of the continent of Asia”. Pagden repeats this story, albeit in different words: “Zeus deposited her, and ravished her, on the shore of the continent that would bear their offspring and her name” (34).⁶⁵

Alongside this mythological background, geographically, Europe distinguished a specific area apart from Asia and Libya (Africa). This division was consolidated and coincided with the famous distinction of barbarian (the inability to speak Greek/intelligibly) as opposed to Greeks, the difference of which is maintained in reference to climate and disposition, but also race. All

⁶⁵ There are different, “mundane,” versions of the same story, each form of which reveals a different aspect of the narrative on the history of Europe. Homer refers to Europa passingly, but in *Europa and the Bull* (by Moschus of Syracuse) and *Metamorphoses* (by Ovid), the story of Europa is presented in detail. For Herodotus, it was rather an incident of wars over “women stealing” (Davies, XVII-XVIII). The story related by Herodotus was appropriated by early Christian theology and used as an explanation for the enduring conflict between Persians and Europeans, or more properly, Asian enmity toward Greeks. In another version (*metamorphoses*), we see the reference to Aeneas, fleeing from the ruins of Troy and landing on the shores of Latium to found the city and state of Rome, another vision of Europa. However, in the first century CE, Virgil tells the story in a way to “efface all traces of Trojan identity.” The struggle between the invading Trojans and Latins brought to end by Juno, who supported the Latins, and agreed to “allow the two peoples to intermarry and thereby create a new race [...] who will look like the Latins, will dress like the Latins, will speak like the Latins, and their customs—their mores—will be Latin.” In almost all versions, we see the reproduction of the tension between Asians and Europeans while Asia is treated as implying historical origins (Mikkeli 1998; Pagden 2002; Le Goff 2003; Munoz 1999). Pagden articulates the story through Hegel’s treatment of Europe, as the center and end of History, which originated in Asia (35-36).

other attributes (freedom, skill, intelligence, political structure, etc.) were peripheral to this distinction (Mikkeli 1998; Pagden 2002).⁶⁶

However, it is with Isocrates (died 338 BC) that *Europa* (referring to Greece) begins to have direct political implications in meaning, as well as a spatial representation in contrast to Asia (referring to Persians) (Mikkeli 1998: 9; Hay 1957; Herrin 1987). The transition from *Europa* to Europe has more to do with how the borders between Asia and Europe transformed through the historical period between the formation and dissolution of the Roman Empire up to Charlemagne (Davies 1998: 7-10).

Given the origin of the name, its journey throughout history and the subsequent impact of Christianity (originating in Asia) and the political implications of the divisions within Christianity on the formation of Europe and a European identity, Pagden argues that Europe has been characterized by a double ambiguity (fashioning itself against its own origin):

This sense of double ambiguity survives even the collapse of the political structures of the Graeco-Roman world and the dominance of Graeco-Roman origin myths. Christianity was to provide Europe with much of its subsequent sense of both internal cohesion and its relationship with the rest of the world, and Christianity began as an Asian religion [...] Thus an abducted Asian woman gave Europe her name; a vagrant Asian exile gave Europe its political and finally its cultural identity; and an Asian prophet gave Europe its religion (2002: 35).

This suggests that Asia gave Europe both a name and a religion. Each will determine, through its articulations and subsequent history, that Europe will be haunted by the ghosts of

⁶⁶ Aristotle, however, in Chapter 7 of *Politics*, refers to an opposition between Europeans and Asians in terms of spirit, intelligence, and skills while locating Greeks in between as the medium carrying three of them together. Mikkeli mentions that, for Aristotle, the usage of Europe here mostly refers to the northern regions of Greece, especially the area round the Caspian Sea (1998: 9). In addition, see Brague (2002: 9).

Asia—as Asiatic imports (Jews, Muslims, Slavs, etc), *Easternized* Christianity (Orthodox Church), or by its attributed features (barbaric and savage).⁶⁷

Considering its subsequent history and implications, the relationship between Greek history and Europe is more than a matter of legends and stories. In one sense, it has turned into a myth itself (Wolf 1982; Bernal 1991). The very *image* of the Greek world, with its characteristics (of freedom, pluralism, courage, civilization, etc.) have helped create the image of Europe, from time-to-time, but particularly beginning in the late eighteenth century.

The relationship between Greek history, with its all facts, concepts, themes, etc, and Europe is a well-discussed subject in many fields. Likewise, there have been several attempts to reveal the “real sources” of Europe, other than Greek history (Bernal 1991). Setting aside the empirical aspects of the relationship with those attempts at homogenizing Greek history, we know it has been treated as the beginning, real, and authentic Europe that each generation of Europeans aspire to revive. Further, it has become a standard that lays the ground for evaluating all subsequent human history. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is time to give pause and discuss the relationship between the Greeks and Europe, which is particularly crucial for subsequent discussions on the idea of Europe.

⁶⁷ These aspects will be discussed in subsequent sections, but suffice it to say that, for the time being, the Europeanization of Europe encompasses numerous struggles for negotiating these differences.

4.3.2. Europe and Greek History: Beginnings or the End

Is it possible to write the history of Greece after criticizing the attributed link between Greece and Europe? Is it a “perfect murder” of historical facts?

Criticizing the impact of Eurocentrism on the historiography of Greece, Vlassopoulos asks these questions with the aim of challenging grand narratives treating Europe, “without making the past into a fragmenting into a *histoire en miettes*” (Vlassopoulos 2011: 9-10).

To accomplish this task, Vlassopoulos offers a fascinating reading that treats the subject in a unique manner. The concern is to examine the narratives of Greek history to elaborate how they are constituted (6). By tracing diverse narratives of Greek history, Vlassopoulos divides these discourses and the available texts into six major periods (15): 1) texts written by ancient Greeks themselves, which constitute accounts of their own history; 2) texts spanning the Renaissance to the French Revolution; 3) texts from the French Revolution to the 1860s; 4) texts from the mid-19th century to the Second World War; 5) the formation of modern orthodoxy in the post-war period; and, 6) alternative approaches in the 1980s.

Vlassopoulos is primarily concerned with “these wider discourses formulated the study of ancient Greek history and the content of that history, before the polis became the organizing principle of the study of ancient history” (13). While examining each period and its associated texts in detail, Vlassopoulos contends that in each of these periods, *excluding the first and the last*, Europe occupies a central place—in varying degrees—in the writing of the history of Greece.

To challenge such a vision, rather than focusing on the impact and role of Greek history in producing a Eurocentric agenda, Vlassopoulos focuses on the impact of the Eurocentric agenda on the historiography of Greece. He contends that the modern study of Greek history has been shaped and hampered by a Eurocentric vision (1-3). In Vlassopoulos's reading, it is the image of Europe as the West or treatment of Europe through Western Europe's political images that has enabled a Eurocentric reading of Greece that is completely detached from the continuous history of Mediterranean settings. It is, moreover, reduced to a temporary situation rather than as one with a more structural impact on Greece itself. Once the Mediterranean linkage is withdrawn from the picture, then the chain of Europe becomes possible: the chain begins in the Near East, moving to Greece via Rome, which is interrupted in the Middle Ages and is followed by the rise of modern, Western Europe. In this context, Greek history transforms into a "segregated and autonomous entity," which feeds the images of a self-fulfilling subject waiting to realize itself. Detaching it from the wider Mediterranean history enables Vlassopoulos to treat Greece as the sole comparison for Europe. The reverse is also true and helps detached Europe from the rest of the world.

In his analyses, Vlassopoulos claims that most the discussions on Greek history impose a "quasi-national framework on Greek history, but in reality there was no centre or institution around which their history could be organized" (3). Greeks, he claims, "were scattered all over the Mediterranean and they never achieved political, economic or social unity; while their cultural unity was not centred on a dominant institution, such as a church or a temple [...] Greek

history could not be written in the way that Roman or Jewish history could, centred on the Roman state or the Jewish temple” (ibid).

To create an image of a standardized, compact Greek history detached from the rest of the world was needed for a Eurocentric “account of historical evolution.” The “Nationalism and racialism” of nineteenth century Europe required “a clear story of beginning.” The polis, according to Vlassopoulos, was offered as a “handy means for homogenization,” which began receiving the attention of scholars in the mid-19th century. Vlassopoulos offers another concept, *kononai*, as constitutive of the polis to offer a more conducive framework and to gauge the plurality (otherwise treated as scattered) of the Greek politico-historical context (4, 9). In such an interpretation, this political context and framework is freed from the chains of Eurocentrism and becomes part of a wider Mediterranean legacy in which Europe is *one of the nodes*, rather than the origin.

Disconnecting Europe and Greece and locating Europe within a greater history of world politics is not a new claim; rather it had already been argued and persuasively displayed by a number of scholars (Pirenne 1958; Braudel 1984; Wolf 1982). Vlassopoulos’s reading, however, goes beyond this and displays how Eurocentric horizons invest into the past and challenge it to reveal a different understanding of both the past and the future. It completely destroys the *circle*, which is maintained by and for the idea of Europe, particularly from the late mid-19th century (Wilson and Dussen 1993: 74-75). This intervention suggests that a proper reading of the idea of Europe first requires an engagement with the history of Europe, a chronological one. I pursue this investigation in the next section.

4.3.3. Europe: Trajectory and Ensemble

Despite the complexity and multiplicity of agents, agendas, themes, and dynamics in the history of Europe, it is possible to offer a cogent summary of the history of Europe. Europe began to emerge as a distinct entity throughout the decline of Rome and detached itself from the wider Mediterranean region. It gradually replaced an earlier concept of Christendom, enabling Europe to have a distinct identity in a complex political, intellectual, and historical trajectory.

The process had already begun by about the end of the fifth century, including the completion of the Christianization of the Roman Empire and Europe between the ninth and thirteenth centuries. Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, the term “Europe” gradually replaced Christendom.

Beginning in the late fifteenth century, the history of Europe was shaped by an ambitious expansion and generations of religious conflict, lasting nearly two centuries. Such a transition is symbolized by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), which was the last major treaty of the *Respublica Christiana*. This era was full of references to Europe, Europeans, and ambitious plans for the unity of Europe. In addition, this era was replete with attempts to reorder the universe, resulting in imperialism, racism, and colonialism that not only reflected the different aspects of the idea of Europe, but also had a definitive impact on its own self-perception.

For centuries, Europe’s borders, constituents, scope, and center have been subject to contestations and each expansion (1492) and retreat (1453) had a definitive impact on how each

was codified. There has always been a tension between geographical formulations of Europe, Europe as a cultural community, and how Europe as an idea and its history have been formed by attempts at unification (Davies 1998; Mikkeli 1998).

While Christianity has deeply impacted the history, identity, and culture of Europe, the political, sociological, and historical influence of non-Christians (including Pagans, Jews, Muslims, heretics, etc.) has always affected its trajectory. Alongside attempts at “homogenization” (either secular or religious), Europe’s cultural legacy has been contextualized as embodying a multi-faceted one, as encompassing “overlapping, interlocking” legacies. In addition, Europe as such has been enmeshed in a seemingly perpetual search for “some kind of unity,” and the development of a distinctive European identity owes its emergence and consolidation to the formation of modern-states, the process of secularization, and the dynamic relation among European states and between Europeans and non-Europeans.

The writing of Europe’s history, like all historiography, went hand-in-hand with the emergence, configuration, and articulation of the very concept of Europe. According to Davies, “[...] thanks to the problems of definition, most historians would agree that the subject-matter of European history must concentrate *on the shared experiences which are to be found in each of the great epochs of Europe’s past*” (1998: 15, emphasis added). Davies further adds: “No two lists of the main constituents of European civilization would ever coincide. But many items have always featured prominently: from the roots of the Christian world in Greece, Rome, and Judaism to modern phenomena such as the Enlightenment, modernization, romanticism, nationalism, liberalism, imperialism, totalitarianism” (ibid). Similar to the gesture of many, such

as Braudel, who states, “Europe is the diversity itself, the essential disunity of the middle ages” (1990: 90), Davies suggests to take Europe as an orchestra.

Europe [...] has been likened to an orchestra. There are certain moments when certain of the instruments play a minor role, or even fall silent altogether. But the ensemble exists (16).

However, when analyzing and writing of the trajectory of the entity known as Europe, or the histories of those known as Europeans, two crucial issues must be considered: How do we arrive at such a framing of Europe? And, what is such a framing productive of?

For the sake of clarity, we may supplement the investigation with additional questions: Does such a history of Europe or the history of Europeans encompass events and dynamics whose culmination led to what is known as *the Rise of Europe*? Does it offer a history of the “ensemble”? Does it offer any insights on how the ensemble is assembled? How does it differentiate itself from the histories of Others, non-Europeans or the history of “people without history”? If not, what makes the history of Europe and its attributed idea unique?⁶⁸ If so, what makes the history of Europe distinct? Can it be deduced from the trajectory? Is its trajectory, in terms of chronology and of maintaining an entity called Europe and its defining attributes, subject to a given idea of Europe?

Indeed, one may claim, given the substantial differences attributed to the impact of “non-Europeans” on the formation of Europe, even the chronological order and formation of the content may have been influenced by such a problem. Suggesting a chronology for Europe

⁶⁸ This question relies on the factual history of Europe. The history of Europe matters, as we are led to assume.

through a series of references to Jewish, Saracen-Moorish, or Muslim, and heretic-pagan influences would incite a radically different chronology of the formation of Europe.⁶⁹ It seems that the narrative of Europe, which attributes an “ensemble nature,” somehow compels us to assume that there is a link between the nature and trajectory of Europe and the consequences of Europe as such. The essential question here is: how is this link maintained, and how can we define it since the entity defined as Europe and its history requires a certain field of discursivity?⁷⁰

At this point we may utilize Josep Fontana’s reading of Europe. In *The Distorted Past: Reinterpretation of Europe* (2003), he offers a reading on the history of Europe formulated via the metaphor of *mirrors*. Even though he does not spend much time discussing the metaphor, he refers to them as “passages” that not only constitute certain aspects of European history and identity, but create altogether distorted images and assumptions of unity, “a vista of mirrors that our [European] culture have [sic] been pressed and stuck in” (157).

These mirrors, offered as chapters of the book, are as follows: the Barbarian, the Christian, the Feudal, the Devil’s, the Rural, the Courtly, the Savage, the Mirror of Progress and the Mirror of the Mob. In each mirror of Europe, Fontana reveals how a certain understanding of

⁶⁹ See my discussion on Wallerstein, Arrighi and Abu-Lughod in the previous chapter, section 3.1.2, for example. Depending on the ways in which they contextualize Europe in world history, their chronology of European history varies. For a different chronological order of European history, see M. Hodgson (1993) and Fontana (2003). The “Army of Europeans” was the army led by C. Martel in the battle of Tours (Poitiers) as having non-Christians, most probably barbarians, among its ranks. The battle was commemorated for halting of Muslims’ advance in Europe. Despite the impact of Christianity, the relationship between Eastern and Western Christendoms has always been a tenuous one. However, the relationship between “barbarians attackers” and Europeans cannot be reduced simply to one of exclusion, as many different forms of contact were typical (le Goff 2005; Fontana 2003).

⁷⁰ Assuming that there is a space between the two that requires articulation may entail the danger of the randomization of history and politics. However, here I rely on Husserl’s conceptualization of sedimentation. Society and history is contained by and emerges through historical, social, and political regularities: they are not given, they are relational, historical, and are consequences of articulations, hence, subject to change.

Europe excludes the different aspects of each “stage,” laying the ground for a Eurocentric vision of Europe (as unity and origin), as well as maintaining the claim for political, cultural and historical superiority. The Barbarian mirror has been utilized to help sustain an exclusive opposition between Greek and Barbarian, which became an integral part of Greek self-definition and subsequent discourses of Western freedom as opposed to Asian despotism (3). However, Fontana also adds that the continuous reproduction of the same mirror enables the masking of the hybrid nature of the relationships throughout Mediterranean culture. It is, he contends, directed at reducing the impact of deep cultural and political exchanges (positive and negative) into a negative relationship (6-15). The mirror of Christianity (19-21) refers to the age of the Christianization of Europe, and its diverse modes of dealing with “differences.” Fontana then suggests that the Feudal, the Devil’s, the Rural, and the Courtly mirrors entail different phases and impacts of Christianization, as well as the later secularization of Europe and its consequences, through which a “truly European culture emerged that does not owe its existence either to Rome or Greece” (43).

These mirrors, treating diverse historical periods/moments, refer to the exclusion of non-Christians’ (heretics, pagans, immorals, Muslims, Jews, etc.) contribution to the image and foundation of Europe (33-105). The mirror of the Savage, the mirror of Progress and the mirror of the Mob refer to the history of witnessing secularization, colonization, imperialism, or, in other words, the post-1492 history of Europe through which the idea of superiority maintained a global characteristic. In each mirror, while displaying the formation of Europe and the idea of Europe, Fontana consistently refers to different, excluded paths in the formation of Europe, such

as the implications of the differences between Bartolome de Las Casas and Gines de Sepulveda⁷¹ or “facts,” such as the presence of non-Europeans in various parts of the world preceding their discovery by European explorers, a Tunisian Muslim speaking Spanish in Calcutta at the arrival of Vasco da Gama, or the Strait of Malaca, a “bazaar” inhabited by speakers of 84 different languages were spoken before the arrival of Portuguese in 1511 (107, 127).

Though Fontana’s text examines the trajectory of Europe, it is not a uniformist reading and his focus is drawn to moments of ambivalence, encounters, exchanges.⁷² Fontana’s method of narrating Europe’s story is prone to a pluralizing language and imagination—not only on behalf of Europe, but of what he calls the broader world, whose members must “look [at] history through multiple dimensions” by recognizing pluralism, cross-cultural exchanges, and multiculturalism (158).

In light of earlier discussions, we may locate Fontana’s reading within the growing literature criticizing Eurocentric readings of history via a conceptual framework directed at weak Eurocentrism.⁷³ Such a reading offers an empirical framework for subverting Eurocentrism in writing the history of Europe and the world. However, the text does not exert much effort in revealing the effect of “distortions” on the creation of the idea of Europe. Rather, the author limits himself to only demonstrating the consequences of what he calls “distortion,” rather than its impact on the formation and articulation of the idea of Europe (both as a reflection of these

⁷¹ See Connolly (1991: 42-46).

⁷² Virtually all historians of Europe, more or less, refer to exchanges, ambivalences, paradoxes, and cross-cultural borrowings. However, only some of them, such as Fontana, relocate these aspects to the formation of the entity known as Europe, and the majority of them, such as Roberts and Davies, relocate them as aspects of European history. For Fontana, these are not mere events that fall within the history of Europe, but formative of what Europe is and should be.

⁷³ See Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1.

articulations and their reconstruction or reproduction).⁷⁴ This is perhaps why he pretends that there could be a position outside the mirrors, which may be grounds for a *true* understanding of Europe.⁷⁵

“Distortions,” which ignore the impact of Fontana’s mirrors on the formation of Europe, must be understood not as a matter of empirical correction, but as part and parcel of the idea of Europe itself. Not because the idea of Europe has been built on distortions, but due to the constitutive relations between the two. The essential question is to discuss the impact of these “distortions” and their constitutive role on the idea of Europe or how the idea of Europe compels one to be persuaded with these exclusions and omissions. In other words, what is needed is to discuss the ontology of the idea of Europe, not its ontic attributes and realizations.

Therefore, what is distorted, if there is such a thing, is not the history of Europe and the formation of European identity, but Europe, hence, the world (other than Europe) due to Europe’s historical success in ordering the universe. Because of the absence (weakness) of such a focus on Fontana’s study, *the re-interpretation of Europe* (sub-title of the study) becomes a series of empirical corrections, interventions, and intrusions to the established narrative. Without a doubt, thinking of intrusion and intervention is helpful, but more work is needed to study subversion.

⁷⁴ Here, I rely on a formative relationship between truth, politics, and the social, in short, a discursive formation of reality.

⁷⁵ A fair reading of his text would perhaps require one to be more “moderate.” Specifically, Fontana calls for an understanding of history that privileges “connections, disjunctions and encounters over old history” (157) and such a call is legitimized on the basis of investing and cultivating into the “great book of life” or the “great book of [the] world.” Hence, his understanding is more prone to a pragmatic conceptualization that privileges “a better understanding” (158-159), meaning pluralist, multiple, rather than a search for truth. But, at certain times, Fontana deploys the metaphor of “wall” as exchangeable with the metaphor or mirror and does not delve very deeply into the consequences of articulations and distortions in the idea of Europe.

Doing so requires an engagement with the ways in which the history of Europe has turned into a narrative. This is where we have to deal with the Idea of Europe. However, I will first deal extensively with the trajectory of Europe, as if there could be no distinction between the idea of Europe, Europe as an entity and Europe as reality (combining identity and facts.).

4.3.4. Europe: Remnants and Origin, Messianic and Yet to Arrive

Like every other concept and naming, the concept of Europe has formed through a conglomeration of diverse discourses, some of which are more authoritative than others at various times. Such a reading may resemble that of *Europe as ensemble*, but distinguishes itself by suggesting that the shuffling of articulations and dislocations between “authoritative” discourses is representative of a transition and constitutive of the notion and idea of Europe, in terms of framing and defining its past and future.⁷⁶ It is, then, the type and mode of the relationship between these discourses that is significant. Additionally, the articulation of these discourses in particular ways leads to the emergence of an entity called Europe.

Every age, declares G. Delanty, “reinvented the idea of Europe in the mirror of its own identity” (1995: 1). The reinvention process goes hand-in-hand with the production and reproduction of certain concepts, discourses, and categories: Christendom, Europe, Modernity, the East, Europeans, humanity, progress, and so on. In the complex formation and articulations

⁷⁶ See Connolly (1991) and Grovogui (2006) for the impact of articulations and the relational formation of identities. The ensemble of Europe, or Europe as ensemble, masks the contingency of its formation (inscription if you want) and constructs itself as a necessary outcome of its attributed trajectory. It founds its own regularity, which is subsequently deployed to explain its emergence, but regularities exist only after its foundation. Therefore, the assumption of chronology itself is highly problematic, unless it encompasses virtually all events that have some impact, which is logically impossible.

of these categories, however, there are certain moments that merit reevaluation to comprehend the formation of Europe. These moments can be defined as nodal points in the formation of Europe as a discourse.

In this part, I will provide a preliminary examination on the different phases in and by which Europe has emerged. The task is to display the crucial moments of the formation of Europe, which may enable us to challenge teleological, uniformist readings of Europe. In other words, this will help isolate the link between the idea of Europe and history of Europe to expose the ambivalence inherent within the concept itself. The idea is to divide and discuss the culmination of events that brought about the post-1492 political-historical ensemble through which the idea of Europe emerged as a matter of continent-history (Attali 1999: 17).

Given the legacy of religious wars, the present “cultural wars,” and the impact of conservative Christianity (embodied in European Catholicism), the “concerns” raised around defining the identity of Europe in reference to Christianity is “understandable.” In particular, the double impact of Christianity (deployed as a tool of expansion through conversion and in maintaining a distinct Europeanness) led many scholars to problematize the relationship between Christianity and Europe. It has been treated as a myth, as an attempt of subjugating the “rich and diverse” legacy of Europe to a “parochial” religion (parochial in the sense of opposition to the broader world of humanity). Further, its impact is either reduced to or defined through the cultural aspects of the formation of Europe, which does not reveal much about the political identification process of Europe, except in certain cases treated as negative examples of the march of Europe, such as the Crusades or anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic investments and

involvements. They are treated “as fragments that enter and then leave the dominant discourse on Europe at various historical stages” (Wilson and Dussen 1993: 10). For some, particularly those who invest into secularist politics and the imagination of Europe, this discourse emerges as either transgressing or countering Christianity, and its impact is defined through series of empirical misfortunes that must be suppressed—much like its concomitant idea of secularity.

However, the relationship is much more complex and deserves a more detailed analysis, enabling us to re-present it in its Christianity that “... provide[d] Europe with much of its subsequent sense of both internal cohesion and its relationship with the rest of the world” (Pagden 2002: 35). This does not necessarily negate the articulations of “other discourses” in the formation of the idea and reality of Europe, the process of transformation and transgression, or the re-articulation of certain “European priorities” inscribed into Christianity, which is reproduced in and through a different discursive space and with diverse positions emerging out of various Christian sects.⁷⁷ However, the relationship between Christianity and Europe are so deep and definitive that the idea of becoming “Europe,” both as entity (geographical) and as an idea, cannot be discussed without treating the articulations between the two.

Historically, the concept of Europe originally applied to Thrace, Macedonia, Illyria, and what is today Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia—those territories considered by Byzantine emperors as European “themes” or provinces of Europe, which referred to the mainland area of Greece and

⁷⁷ It must be noted that there is a marked difference between disparate Christian positions, which prevents the use of “Christian discourse” as encompassing all positions. The difference is not simply an expression of mainstream positions among Catholics (e.g. Pope Pius II) vs. Protestants (e.g. M. Luther). The most representative examples are writings by Penn and Belles, significant figures among the Quakers. Their imagination of Europe, which is more “tolerant, pluralist and liberal,” is substantially different from other attempts at maintaining a particular vision of Europe.

its surroundings and only later came to include the Aegean islands (Yapp 1992: 137-138). As a geographical concept, Europe designated the wider Greek world of Asia Minor, including northern Asia, but not its western territories, most of which was unknown and only later came to be identified with it (Delanty 1995: 17). Similarly, during the early Christian era, to be a Christian meant to be Roman, not European. Therefore, there is “little historical congruity between the modern notion of Europe as the West and the ancient idea of Europe” (21) and that disparity encompassed the spatial dimension too: the ancient idea of Europe signified a vaguely defined space. For instance, in Greece, Europeans were known as Franks and in the parts of North Africa, Europeans are still called Romans (21) while Greeks have declined to be part of Europe and Europeans for quite a while (Mikkeli 1998; Wilson and Dussen 1993, 1990; Hay 1957; Herrin 1987).

Alongside the articulations, transitions, and different perceptions of Europe as a spatial reality throughout the Greek era, Europe, as it is understood today, was not consolidated until the time of the Carolingians (Davies 1998; Herrin 1987: 7-16.). Europe migrated, not only through expansion, but retreat, relocation and extension to the north, south and west of today’s Europe and became an entity referring to the political and religious culture arising in the distant western, Latin-speaking provinces of the former Roman Empire. This expansive territory comprises what we mean by Europe today (Davies 1998; Delanty 1995: 70). While ancient Europe refers to what is today’s Balkan Peninsula, the peninsula later became a frontier dividing the East and Europe rather than constituting its center (Roberts 1996). Furthermore, Europe’s relationship to Russia has always been subject to reshufflings and was varyingly referred to as part of Europe (either

via religion or via geography), as a border of Europe, or the point at which Europe ends (politically and geographically)(Neumann 1991; Mikkeli 1998; Davies 1998).

One way to grasp the fluid dynamics of the emergence of Europe as a spatial reality is to follow traditional readings and relocate Europe as part of the decline of classical Greek civilization and the dissolution of the Roman Empire (Delanty 1995: 19; Roberts 1998; Davies 1998; Wilson and Dussen 1993). Such a reading enables an inquiry into the emergence of Europe, as well as its subsequent transformations and articulations. Europe could not emerge as a specific territory as distinguished from other parts of the world—as a “vast space” awaiting and deserving to be united—until the decline of Rome.⁷⁸ Europe, in this sense, must be treated as a post-Roman syndrome.

While Marc Bloch takes this position by stating that “Europe arose when the Roman Empire crumbled.” Lucien Febvre attributes the very possibility of its emergence to the disintegration of the Empire (qtd. in Le Goff 2005: 2). Therefore, the belief that Europe, as geography and as space, was waiting to be united (along with all its connotations) is a medieval creation.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ There have always been references to a tripartite division of the world within the Greek spatial imagination (Mikkeli 1998). However, in them, Europe was either referred to as part and parcel of the Afro-Eurasian mass or to a highly limited area surrounding the Aegean islands. The Roman Empire, by its extension and scope, made such a “distinctive” distinction meaningless and for Europe to emerge (as a distinct entity), it had to await the decline of Rome. Most readings that aim to create a “highway” between Greek experience and the idea of Europe portends to reduce the impact of the Roman Empire in terms of its effective articulation on the imagination of space in its relationship to the idea of Europe (See Vlassopoulos 2011).

⁷⁹ Dainotto (2007) refers to the Roman vs. Germanist-Frankist readings and their divergent impact on the perception of Europe. Romanist are more prone to treat Europe’s emergence as a matter of multiplicity and the plurality of an imperial vision while the Germanist-Frankist approach focuses more on the ability of Europeans to move beyond the obstacles. My position begins with a Romanist reading while treating the very centrality of Romanism as a matter of confrontation between different perceptions of Europe.

Europe is a medieval thing not only in that sense, but also politically as the rest of the history of Europe accompanied different projects and attempts at unification. The formation was not a seamless process, but took nearly ten centuries for Europe to become Europe, enabling it to mask “its *medieval-founding moment*” among many other things. As the decline of the Mediterranean-based Roman civilization fed the emergence of Europe up to 1492, the multiple histories of articulations, which laid the ground for subsequent articulations and became a source of new ones: encounters, consolidation attempts, cleanings, religious warfare, “persevering” against Asiatic roots, founding itself as an idea and civilization while also distinguishing itself as the West embarking on the ordering of the universe.

In addition, four prominent aspects of the legacy of antiquity have contributed to the formation of Europe (le Goff 2005: 10-12). The first was Greek heritage and its connotations, implied in binary oppositions of East vs. West and barbarian vs. civilized. While the borders between East and West, both imaginative and geographical, have displayed highly political and dynamic reconfigurations, the latter opposition has continuously been deployed through a similar template, but with varying content: barbarian as pagans, Saracens, or villagers vs. Christians; Barbarians as savages vs. civilized Christians, barbarians as Turks vs. secular Europe, the despotic East vs. freedom-loving Europe (Mikkeli 1998: 6-7; Levin 2011: 121; le Goff 2005).

The second aspect is more material, referring to Roman heritage as language, military skills, architectural legacy, etc. The third is conceptualized as the “ideology of the trifunctional social-political organization, incorporating priests (*oratores*, those who pray), warriors

(*bellatores*, those who fight), and workers (*laboratores*, those who work),” which found its reproductions throughout the medieval history of Europe (le Goff 2005: 11-12).

The final and most constitutive one was the vital importance of the Bible, framing, successfully or not, all encounters, exchanges, and the identity-formation of Europe for several centuries (le Goff 2005: 10-12; Roberts 1998: 80-203; Davies 1998: 291-383).

C. Dawson’s (1932) study of the emergence of Europe is traditional, yet subversive in its treatment of “barbarian invasions” and is quite representative of established positions on the foundation of Europe. In Dawson’s reading, Europe owes its political existence to the Roman Empire, spiritual unity to the Catholic Church, and intellectual culture to the classical traditions of Hellenism (52-53), which are the “elements of [the] true foundations of European unity.” However, Dawson then adds:

... but they do not themselves constitute Europe. They are the formative influences, which have shaped the material of our civilization, but the material itself is to be found elsewhere, in the obscure chaos of the barbarian world. For it is the barbarians who provided human material out of which Europe has been fashioned; they are the *gentes* as against the *imperium* and the *ecclesia*- the source of the national element in European life (68).

However, Dawson is also quite clear on the elements and materials of Europe and European civilization. He adds that being accustomed “to [a] base view of the world and the conception of history on the idea of Europe” makes it difficult to realize “what the nature of that idea is” (15). Dawson then continues to reveal certain differentiations.

Europe, “unlike Australia and Africa,” is not a natural unity and, geographically, it is nothing but a northwestern prolongation of Asia. Instead, Dawson stresses, Europe emerged as part of a long process of *historical evolution and spiritual development*. In culture, its unity is not a “foundation and starting point” of history, but “the ultimate and unattained goal, towards which it has striven for more than a thousand years” (15). The emergence, or in his words, the movement of European civilization, “had its starting-point in the Aegan, as early as the third millennium B.C.” and on the foundation of an earlier development “arose the classical civilization of Ancient Greece, which is the true source of European tradition” (16). The source given all creations (science, philosophy, art, political thought, law and free political institutions, etc) of European civilization enabled a distinct sense of European ideals from Asiatic ideals. Without such a legacy of Hellenism, “European civilization and the European idea of man would be inconceivable” (16). It was the Roman Empire, in Dawson’s reading, that incorporated and transmitted the legacy and it was Romanization that laid the ground for the later development of European civilization (20, 32).

However, the problem is that, as mentioned by Dawson himself, “this cosmopolitan civilization (Hellenization of the Roman West and Romanization of the Hellenic East) was not yet European [...] and Rome was [a] Mediterranean Power” (17). Further, “Greek civilization itself was far from being European in the geographical sense” (ibid)—it was largely confined to the Eastern Mediterranean, whereas Continental Europe and parts of Greece were considered beyond its zone of influence. Likewise, Asia Minor played a great role in its initial development and the “chief movement of expansion was eastward into Asia, as Hellenism had its first beginnings in Ionia, and its ends in Alexandria, Antioch and Byzantium” (16). Europe had not

yet come into existence in the first century B.C., and the incorporation of Continental Europe as part of a Mediterranean cultural unity had to wait until Julius Caesar, who “managed to identify his interests and ambitions with the fulfillment of a universal purpose” and later with Augustus (17).

Europe, in Dawson’s analysis, is identified with certain ideas, despite having certain concrete geographical implications. The idea of Europe owes its existence to the act incorporated by and through the Romanization of the Hellenic East and the Hellenization of the Roman West. Apparently it was the Romans, not European or a Mediterranean Power, who laid the ground for the continuation of European ideals and the idea of Europe, *which did not exist as a concrete reality*. However, Roman political space and territory, both represented the unity of Europe while also serving as a Mediterranean Empire, which negated the distinctiveness of the idea of Europe and Europe as geography. The trouble of unity was resolved by referring to it, after the Roman Empire, as “*an ultimate and unattained goal*” rather than as a foundation and starting point of Europe. However, it was the *unity* and *ability* of the Roman Empire⁸⁰ that enabled the continuation of the ideals of Europe by the work of Caesar and later Augustus. The Empire ultimately “saved European civilization [from] being absorbed by the Ancient East or overwhelmed by the Western barbarians” (20). For this reason, Augustus, in the eyes of his supporters, represented “the victory of European ideals of order and liberty over oriental despotism” (19).

⁸⁰ For a comparison, see the first section of the first chapter, (1.1.): In particular, Habermas and his focus on the “ability” of Europeans. Dawson claims “there is no inevitable law of progress that must force the barbarians of the West to create a civilisation for themselves. Without any strong external influence, a simple tribal culture will remain unchanged for centuries, as we see in Morocco or in Albania. The creation of a new civilization cannot be accomplished without a great deal of hard work, as Virgil himself says in the famous line [...] it was *such a toil* to found the Roman people” (19).

While the post-Roman political, intellectual, and cultural history of Europe have been characterized by dreams of “re-founding” the unity achieved by the Roman Empire, the Empire actually provided “the continent of Europe little in the way of unity” (Heater 1992: 1).⁸¹ As a Mediterranean-based empire, it encompassed much of African and Asian territory excluding “much that was European.” Moreover, the distinction between Latin and Greek characterized its supposed “cultural unity,” which was later institutionalized as Eastern and Western empires alongside the deep tensions between the two (Roberts 1996; Davies 1998; le Goff 2005). Therefore, the affirmed and supposed relationship between the Roman Empire and Greek “civilization,” believed to have enabled the survival of Europe is not as straightforward as it appears; rather, it is quite complex.

However, this complexity exists not because it was necessarily complex, but because such a reading represents and relies on at least two acts: the incorporation of already-existing ideals (Hellenism, Europe, and the idea of Europe) in a way to produce the idea of Europe anew and to lay the ground for what is incorporated (European civilization and its ideals), as it did not exist distinctively (being European and Europe).

Such a reading does not imply the articulations of different positions or a synthesis of different strands; rather, it relies on the embodiment of an already-created entity and ideals by

⁸¹ However, as le Goff (2005) has persuasively shown, the “‘Middle Ages’ was the decisive time of the birth, infancy, and youth of Europe, even though the people living in those medieval centuries never dreamed of constructing a united Europe nor desired to do so” (1). Dawson’s deliberate exaggeration seems to be more of an attributed aspect of dreams of unity for Europe rather than a discussion of the historical backdrop. However, the claim and attribution itself suggests something important: the history of Europe is never simply a history, it is about presence and future of Europe.

transmitting force believed to lay the foundation for the realization of such an entity and ideals. Such a tautology is quite “rational” in terms of its effects on the structuring of Europe, Europeanness, and European identity. This is perhaps one of the clearest expressions of a vicious, but productive cycle of a Eurocentric vision of world history.

As implicitly done by Dawson, this reading must begin by prioritizing the idea of Europe, whose existence is attributed to the *ability* of distinguishing itself from Asia through certain ideas embodied in a given territory that *did not exist before* the idea of Europe. Europe, then, becomes *an origin and expression, a founding agent, and a realization simultaneously*: in short a self-referential entity outside historico-political and geographical contexts. Regardless of its articulations, it sustains and creates itself by being itself, because it is Europe and has this “*ability*.”

One option to distance oneself from such a reading is to rely on historiographies of Europe and incorporating its emergence and formation within a broader framework of Afro-Eurasian continental and world history, as done by Wolf (1982), Hodgson (1993), Abu-Lughod (1989) and Frank (1998). A second option is to engage with the “internal” history of Europe and consider transformations (continuity and discontinuity) in the discourse of Europe. Investigating how Europe became Europe may provide some clues for understanding the transition. This will be the task of the next section.

4.4. *Becoming Europe: All the Way Down*

4.4.1. The Fate of Europe, the Fate of Christians

In 1458, Pope Pius II (Aenea Silvius Piccolomini, Pope from 1458 to 1464) had a very clear vision of “Europe” and authored the only medieval treatise with a title containing the word “*Europa*.” This treatise was followed by another in 1461, “Asia,” which suggests the importance of maintaining the opposition between the two (le Goff 2005; Hay 1957).

Representing one of the last calls for a Crusade (France 2005: 302), what distinguishes Pius II’s position is that the Crusades were no longer considered a project directed at conquering Jerusalem, but a defense of Europe (Wilson and Dussen 1993: 35). “*Respublica Christiana*” and Europe were used interchangeably, with the Pope frequently using phrases such as, “Our Europe, Our Christian Europe” (ibid., le Goff 2005; Hay 1957). As referred to by Hay (1957) and several other scholars (Yapp 1992: 141; Wilson and Dussen 1993: 35; Delanty 1995: 37-38), Pius II was one of the first to employ the adjective *europeus*, derived from the Latin noun *Europa*, which indicated an inhabitant of Europe. Europeans, in Pius II’s lexicon, were those “who are called Christians” (Levin 2011: 88).

Pope Pius II applied the same language in a letter to Nicholas of Cusa, right after the 1453 fall of Constantinople. In the letter, he wrote, “[...] the Turkish sword is now suspended over our heads, yet meanwhile we are engaging in internal wars, harassing our own brothers, and leaving enemies of the Cross to unleash their forces against us” (quoted from Le Goff 2005: 186). On September 25 of the same year, in a letter to Leonardo Benvoglianti, the Sienese ambassador

to Venice, Pope Pius II wrote of the domestic unrest and chaos plaguing Christendom and, when referring to Europe, “he pointedly used the word ‘Europe’: “Such is the face of Europe and such is the situation of the Christian religion” (ibid).

Though the fifteenth century witnessed a decisive increase in the use of the word “Europe,” it was mostly in connection to the Turkish advance and in identification with Christendom (Levin 2001: 11-28; Wilson and Dussen 1993: 34; Hay 1957: 86-87; Bisaha 2004: 7-10). The popularization of this usage was also accompanied by certain “empirical facts,” such as the impact of depression, the mortality crisis, depression, the halting of urbanization, the rise of the Ottomans (defined as Turks in European texts), the impact of the Great Schism on Western Christianity⁸², the success of the full Christianization of Europe from the end of the fourteenth century, and all the developments affecting “Europe” from the mid-fourteenth century to the end of the fifteenth century (Yapp 1992: Levin 2011: 88; Wilson and Dussel 1993: 34-35; Hay 1957). In such a context, it was not only all Europeans who were Christian, but all *true* Christians were Europeans in the imagination of Latin Christendom, representing an expression of its self-imposed distancing from Eastern Christianity (Levin 2011: 88; Delanty 1995: 36 -44; Yapp 1992: 137).

The first crucial feature of Pope Pius II’s position is his unflinching position in equating

⁸² This refers to the 1378 election of two popes, one in Rome and the other in Avignon. The Schism came to an end 40 years later at the Council of Constance (1414-1418). The disputes over the proper location of the Pope involved an interesting discussion on the geographical imagination of Latin Christendom, as there had been concrete references that “Christians live in Europe, and there was no Christian rulers outside of the continent,” and “Vicar of the Christ ought to reside at the centre of the Christian world. Rome, previously had been chosen as the seat of the Papacy since at that time it was central, but now, Marseilles should be seen as the centre because it was the centre of Europe—as “calculating the whole dimensions of Christian world, it turned out to be the centre”—but such as requires to exclude Greece, and meaning—meaning Avignon must be the seat of Pope” (Hay 1968: 75; Wilson and Dussen 1993: 35).

Christendom with Europe and Europe with Christendom, which simultaneously maintains the territorialization of Christianity. It was Europe that became the home of true Christians and Christianity.

The second is the consolidation of an entity known as Europe: though divided politically, geographically, culturally, and as an idea, it begins to emerge as a reality. Taken together, both represented one of the most crucial nodal points in the formation of the discourse of and on Europe.

The subsequent history would be different, in terms of both scope and vision, with the beginning of the Atlantic exploration. In Hulme's reading, Pius II's identification of Europe with Christendom as "an ideal match of the geography, the political and the religious" represents a symbolic end to the consolidation of Europe as an "ideological entity through the testing of Eastern frontiers prior to the adventure of Atlantic exploration" (Hulme 1986: 84). Such an equation owes its existence, or at least its *emergence*, to the central regulating mechanism of colonial discourse. Such an equation was realized through a series of investments into massacres, exclusion, and the destruction of different identities, including heretics, Jews, Muslims, pagans, etc., particularly from the mid-thirteenth century through the end of the fifteenth (85). Pius II's position, then, was not the beginning of a process, but a crucial sign or endpoint of an existing one, which would simply be a rearticulation of his own reading of Europe.

However, assuming a direct teleological relationship between Pius II's reading of Europe and the political history of the entity called Europe or articulations between Christianity and

Europe would be a simplification of the political richness of European history. There are several points that need to be mentioned here to properly frame the relationship.

First, as discussed earlier, the unity of the Roman Empire can be characterized as a dream haunting Europeans and suggesting that “medieval centuries all along had been characterized by the search of unity of Europe” is not accurate (le Goff 2005: 1). Europe as such did not exist. Instead, it emerged through specific historico-political struggles. Moreover, the very presence of the Empire, in itself, negated the emergence of such an entity. In essence, the unity of the Roman Empire and its associated vision negates the existence of Europe as an entity.

Second, such a search for the unity of Europe or the unification of Europe was articulated along with concerns raised about the political map of Europe gaining a “patch-work quality” and was ready to be united by the end of eighth century (Heater 1992: 1) and through the Carolingians’ re-spatializing of Europe after the ninth century (Robert 1997: 109-110; Herrin 1987). Even in this context, the search for unity or the very meaning of it was characterized by and through the struggles between different “European” dynamics. It was not something that could be defined as a perfect extension of a trans-European “sensibility” or vision.

Third, while Charlemagne’s coronation in 800 represented the revival of the Western Roman Empire and unification of Europe and Christians, it was mostly the investments made by the Holy Roman Empire that consolidated a vision and force for “unity in central Europe [...] from the mid-tenth to the mid-fourteenth century (Heater 1992: 2).

Therefore, it is clear that while the origins of Europe could be traced back to earlier periods, such as that of the Greeks, the idea and discourse of uniting Europe as such, or Europe as subject and object of unification debates and attempts began only after it gained its features as a distinct entity, both as a geography and as an idea. This era can be dated back to the Carolingians. However, despite the implementation of policies towards unification, the early (known) plans for uniting *Europe* as such dates to the late-thirteenth century and includes several structures of power, including Papal supremacy, Christian federalism overseen by councils or under French leadership, which were deployed for three decades (Heater 1992). If the history of Europe after the dissolution of Roman Empire has been characterized by the quest for unification (a claim characteristic of the majority of texts on European history), then the claim must still be treated as an expression of taking Europe per se as a discourse or reality that can exist outside historico-political domains. What is meant is not simply a desire of a king or prince to appropriate more land. Instead, it is to unite *Europe*, which *does not actually exist*. That sense and vision has a history: one cannot unite something that does not exist.

With the exception of the Carolingians, the word *Europe* is rarely referred in debates on the unity of Europe until the late thirteenth century. Such popularization and references to Europe as an entity had to wait for a relatively effective and more successful Christianization of Europe and/or the Europeanization of Christianity. There is also a coterminous existence of Europe and Christendom, which takes place along with the decisive transformations in European terrain, through which Europe emerged as a Christian entity, becoming Christendom, becoming Europe. Just as neither Europe nor European identity existed as such, Europeans did not conceive of themselves as interconnected people, bounded by a common history, culture, and fate.

4.4.2. Formation of the Trajectory: Borders and Inside

“*Europe* is separated from *Asia* only at one point, Bosphorus, (İstanbul, Turkey) by a small stretch of water. The *continent* has been penetrated by three world-religions all are originated in the Near East” (Goody 2004: 14). These two sentences summarize the ambivalence of Europe, as geography and as an idea related to Christianity, in terms of its “perception of geography and history.” Intensifying this ambivalence, we may add further discussions on Russia or the Muscovites’ relationship with Europe, which has been an integral piece of nearly all discussions on the meaning and scope of Europe. At times, we see the treatment of Russia as a radical negation of Europe as the West (141), while at others as the expansion of Christendom (44, 181) or expression of a Christian but alien civilization (182-183), united to Europe via Christianity (151), representing the limit of European civilization (158), as a geographical antithesis to Europe, or as the savior of Europe (69). In each of these diverse representations, we notice the discourse of Europe not merely as ambivalent, but differentiated in its perception of Europe as geography and as idea.

Historically, the eastern front of Europe, *the Asian part*, has always been treated as a frontier of defense in opposition to the frontier of expansion in Western Europe (Delanty 1995: 7). Roberts states this fact:

Europeans have long been unsure about where Europe ‘ends’ in the East. In the West and to the south, the sea provides a splendid marker [...] but to the east the plains roll on and on and the horizon is awfully remote (1985: 149).

Such complications have intensified and pluralized with the consolidation of the history of Europe and European culture as an idea in itself, particularly from the late eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries (Wilson and Dussen 1993: 13). The pluralization of the ambivalences of the notion and idea of Europe, interestingly, is more visible in the history of Europe after 1492.

Alongside the ambivalences over the borders of Europe, including its related themes (such as Eastern and African Christianities and heretics in and out of Europe), the second theme of ambivalence comes directly from the “inside” of Europe: Europe, particularly in its coterminous existence with Christendom, carried a great burden. Jews, Muslims, Pagans, non-Christians, heretics, etc., all played their “roles”—either as the embodiment of a threat, representing Asiatic roots, or as pathological to the formation of the Europe. Their role and impact can be discussed in detail, but it is important to point out that the emergence of Europe as such is due to its ability to negotiate these ambivalences (the East and the inside), which laid the ground for the subsequent realization and configurations of the idea of Europe.

The most effective rupture, in terms of ending the Eastern ambivalence, was the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottomans (who were consistently defined as Turks in the European imaginary). The internal division of Christianity ended with the complete termination of the Byzantium Empire and was a decisive event in the formation of European identity and, by the act of 1453, the “middle ages of Europe came to an end” (Yapp 1992; Delanty 1995: 36).

Europe, suffering from being an unknowable entity, due to “internal” divisions, is released from the burden. The rupture consolidated the Europeanization of Christianity and the Christianization of Europe. This double inscription paved the way for the consolidation of the idea of Europe as West (not the West of Christianity but the World). From this, there emerged

the consolidation of the discourse of the West as “a determinant factor in shaping the idea of Europe as the West” (Delanty 1995: 3).

While the end of confusion between Christianity and Europe was relatively temporary (le Goff 2005: 187), taking the ambiguity of Russia into consideration, the end was structural in the sense of paving the way for the rise of the idea of the West as Europe. In addition, it saved Europe from the presence of a double center of political and religious powers, as well as the confusion it created—to wit, an actual obstacle to a united Europe was removed.

Then there is “the discovery of a ‘new world’ marking a turning point in alterity and ordering of the universe” (Grovogui 1996: 7). What has been defined as *the Genesis, the Order and the Hierarchy* (stages) of the process of (the formation of) alterity and the structures of discourses encompassing non-European alterity (11-42) are explications of the “march of Europe” from 1492. Discussing the discursive canons of the formation of Europeanness, Grovogui contends that:

This process of non-European alterity was represented in three genres of discourse that depended for their forms on three different historical periods. The first genre arose in the ecclesiastical context of the discovery of the New World in the fifteenth century. The second genre emerged during the era of the Enlightenment and owed its form to a hierarchy of peoples and civilizations. The third genre, also the colonial discourse, was a product of nineteenth-century natural history and imperialism (21).

These processes are synonymous with the formation of Europe as such and display the re-articulations through which *Europe as Nomos* emerged and was consolidated beginning in 1492. What the three prominent genres of discourses of non-European alterity reveal is the

“march” of Europe ordering the universe. Just as the formation of Europe and Christendom, this ordering had to release itself from certain burdens (such as the East, Asiatic roots, Jews, and Muslims), the complexity and intensifying (i.e. terrifying) effect of encountering the Other in a more intense manner compelled Europe to release itself from another burden, Christianity, throughout these moments.

What matters is not the “reproduction” of the discourse via the references made to ecclesiastical sources, which is no doubt crucial and effective, but the ways in which Europe releases itself from these burdens. In that sense, 1648 (Westphalia) and 1713 (Treaty of Utrecht) represent further moments of release as part of its own *internal* history, which leaves behind the coterminous existence of Europe and Christendom.

In Europe, writes Grovogui, “The church was compelled to relinquish political power to temporal rulers,” however, in other parts of the world it proclaimed sovereignty (1996: 19). While the discussion itself pertains to an earlier history (1302, *unam sanctum*), its realization and the struggles over it continued for several decades, paving the way for the consolidation of the idea of Europe as a secularized civilization and the consolidation of certain attributes, such as humanity, progress, and modernity, which are taken to be synonymous with Europe and European identity, particularly beginning in the late eighteenth century.

Europe as an idea had been grounded into such a framework. Its formation (of a subject and a homeland) went hand-in-hand with “a retrospective invention of history as well as a moralization of geography” (Delanty 1995: 8) as West or *Western but universal, universal but*

uniquely European, hence universal civilization. Such a framing of the idea of Europe enabled it to become a kind of legitimation for the politics of the secular and territorial state (10). The nineteenth century, the age of systematic colonialism and imperialism, simultaneously witnessed a perception consolidating “the notion of the history of European culture as an idea in itself” (13-14), which enabled the Nomos of Europe to become visible in its most concrete forms.⁸³

For heuristic reasons, we might add that these processes did not go smoothly. Rather, the formation of Europe, the Christianization of Europe, and the Europeanization of Christianity was part and parcel of the struggles, limitations, and reshuffling of constitutive themes.

What is known as Europe, as an entity, was formed through the articulation of several discourses: Empire, Christendom, civilization, Enlightenment, racism, colonialism, imperialism and, it could be suggested, the Cold War and the post-Cold War period. In these historical transformations, certain moments refer to a retreat and reconfiguration (1453) and certain moments refer to an expansion and reconfiguration (1492 and 1648), which can be taken as moments of restructuring the Eurocentric world order. The idea of Europe has been redefined through these moments, which simultaneously show how Eurocentrism frames the “march” of Europe *in relation to alterity or with the Other/non-European*. “Modern alterity—after 1492—more than geography, has provided the structure of the colonial discourse” (Grovgui 1996: 7). In that sense, the question of Eurocentrism is more than a matter of ethnocentrism or creation of a sense of a guilt, it must be seen as a matter of modalities of the state, society and economy, in short, a question of the ordering of the universe as the Nomos of the world.

⁸³ Following this, Grovgui’s critique of European International Law, as reproducing its own Eurocentric order by its structure and ways of dealing with “Africa,” demonstrates that Schmitt’s reading on the dissolution of the Eurocentric international order (international law) in the late nineteenth century does not seem to work.

4.4.3. Interregnum: Summarizing Europe and the Idea of Europe

In this chapter, I engaged with the history of Europe as a reading of Europe as an idea, as a continent and as name—a task that required a focus on European historiography. Such a focus involves creating certain limitations and differentiations on and within that historiography to “filter” certain aspects of European history. What has been done up to this point includes the assumption of peculiarity, the relationship between the Roman Empire and the idea of Europe, the relationship between Greece and Europe, as well as the relationship between the geography of Europe and Europe as an idea. I deliberately refrained from deconstructing and criticizing these assumptions, i.e. refrained from positing factual counter-arguments, so as to saturate my own readings with certain Eurocentric assumptions.

I have argued that Europe was conceived only by and through the dissolution of the Roman Empire. Through this dissolution and the subsequent history up to the late eighth century, the territory or entity called Europe was characterized by attempts at Christianizing the Post-Roman *remnants* of Europe. In that sense it is claimed that the ambivalent nature of Europe, referring to a distinct geography, must be seen as a later development. Therefore, the positions that either refer to these ambivalences or resolve them by attributing “the idea” of the nature of Europe ignores the historicity of the idea of Europe, as well as the historical genesis of Europe as a continent. Rather, I argue that these readings must be seen as a retrospective projection of an idea of Europe that only became possible after the eighteenth century. This projection is obviously neither a deficit nor a problem if one does not attribute an ahistorical subject position to the notion and idea of Europe and Europeans. But, Eurocentrism does so. A similar paradox becomes visible with the emergence and consolidation of Europe as geography too.

Between the fifth and ninth centuries, European terrain has been affected and transformed by certain crucial events: “barbarian” invasions and their relationship to Christians, including their conversion, the rise of Islam, the re-articulation of the center of gravity of Europe to the North-Westward movement and distancing itself from the Mediterranean basin by being superseded by the Baltic, etc.. Only after these processes did Europe emerge as a distinct continent or entity. As stated earlier, we may go back to find Europe in Greek literature, although at certain times Europe, Europeans, and Greeks are differentiated in the sense of identifying Europe with liberty. Nevertheless, Europe emerged as a distinct entity only after the Carolingians’ investments.

Beginning from the ninth century through the late fifteenth century, the political, social, and cultural history of Europe and Christianity converged and a coterminous existence of the two both express a double transformation: the Christianization of Europe and the Europeanization of Christianity, which I consider as an epoch-making transformation.

The challenges, difficulties, and politics from the late fifteenth century up until the eighteenth century led to the consolidation of *the idea of Europe* and European civilization, followed by the reshuffling of discussions on the very notion of Europe itself through the consolidation of the idea of Europe, particularly in the nineteenth century through colonial and imperial practices.

In essence, the emergence of Europe as a distinct entity (or as a reality) did not have to wait until the mid-eighteenth century. By 1453, there was already a consolidated idea of Europe

coterminous with Christendom, or, in other words, a decisive territorialization of Christianity. This is verified by Pope Pius II's explicit equation between the "powers of the Christian people" and Europe when he enlisting princes from France, Germany, Britain, Poland, Hungary, and Italy (not merely Christians, but Europeans) in his letter to Mehmet II, the Ottoman Sultan who conquered Constantinople in 1453 (Hay 1957: 83). For the Pope, non-European Christians were not "true Christians," a claim reinforcing the Christianity of Europe and Europeans as constitutive of Christendom (84). As part of such a transition, the exclusion of the figure of the Turk⁸⁴ functioned as an integrative strategy for Europe and European powers (Neumann and Wellsh 1991: 327).

This exclusion in certain contexts, in which Christianity dominated the core of European discourses, was implemented through references to being an infidel and enemy of Christianity, and, in the course of secularization, it was implemented by a reference to being the enemy of civilization.⁸⁵ In both, particularly from the end of the fifteenth century and until the late eighteenth century, the struggle against the Turk was codified as an opposition between Asia and Europe (Cederman 2001: 158). Furthermore, a cultural definition of Europe was attributed to it

⁸⁴ Inclusion was conditioned by converting to Christianity, for an example see the letter attributed to Pius II to Mehmet II of the Ottoman Empire (Soykut 2001).

⁸⁵ A similar source of anxiety was the question of Russia and Slavs. The difficulty of maintaining its territorial unity and theological disputes between Eastern Christians and Latin Christendom continued throughout the secularization of Europe. This realized itself as the failure of effectively integrating Slavs into the Euro-Christian framework. Europe as an idea "drove a wedge through the Slavs, separating the west Slavs (the Poles and Czechs) from the east Slavs (Russians)" (Delanty 1995:48). Meanwhile the Balkans remained a dividing line between Europe and Asia, a territorial space in which the encounter between Sunni Islam, Roman Christianity and Christian orthodoxy emerged. The Slavs were treated as "Christian but alien" and had become the scapegoats of European expansion, just as the Jews before. Slavs were seen as an Asiatic import and semi-Oriental (52-56). In this framework, the conventional border of Europe on the eastern side (Ural) was unknown until the 16th and 17th century and it was ignored in most of the 18th century maps. Russia, in this sense, has been called a German invention with the intention to replace the old constitutive dynamic of European self-definition (South-North) with the exclusive polar of East and West (58-60). In addition, after the fall of Constantinople, the Russian church claimed to represent the third Rome, enabling Russia to be involved with "European affairs." However, such a position entails a rejection of the new vision of Europe, which insists on appropriating both its secular and Christian legacy through an approach defined on the basis of civilized vs. barbarian, East vs. West, which could not be effective.

in the early 18th century, which referred to a centuries-old opposition to “alien others,” such as Vikings and Magyars (Slack and Innes 1992: 4). The notion of *Europe* as embodying or crystallizing certain civilizational traits and degrees took place during Charlemagne’s Empire, when the attacks of Vikings (northern barbarians) were defined as attacks against “goods and values” of superior a Christian civilization, i.e. Europe of Christians or of Charlemagne (Leyser 1992: 41).

To conclude, the notion of Europe as referring to a particular community, territory, and identity, or Europe as cultural-political-territorial entity, had already emerged by the end of the fifteenth century. The year 1453 turned out to be one of the most critical turning points, as well as a constitutive moment to the emergence of Europe as such. What is defined as a transition period between Christendom and Europe is indeed the peak of the coterminous existence between Europe and Christianity. It was the figure of the Turk, as enemy of “culture and faith” or “enemy of Plato and Christ,” who sustained the transition (Levin 2011: 95).

After 1453, the retreat of Europe from the East is marked by the finalization of the Christianization of Europe and Europe’s turning into itself to maintain its unity. The acts of 1492 (the conquest of al-Andalus, the expulsion of Jews and Muslims and the “discovery” of the Americas) can be seen as responses to this retreat.

This chapter dealt with the emergence of Europe before 1492. It was argued that its adventure began as a myth during the time of the Greeks and turned into an identifiable entity (as geography) throughout the Post-Roman socio-political context via the agency of Latin

Christendom. Europe then became associated with certain “values and goods,” beginning with Charlemagne’s Empire.

Europe and Christianity maintained a politico-territorial *attachment*, which was consolidated by the Holy Roman Empire and the Crusades. In other words, from the moment at which Europe emerged as an entity it became Christendom. However, the forms of the relationship maintained with non-European Christians, the attempts at cleansing Europe of heretics and non-Europeans, the impact of 1453 on Christian perceptions of itself and the world, as well as the invention of the Turk as an enemy compelled Europe and Latin Christendom to recede into a defensive position: Europe was to become the home of true Christians, which enabled the double process of the Europeanization of Christendom and the Christianization of Europe. The consolidation of the nation-state system, the Reformation, and the claim of superiority further maintained a global outlook and was supplemented by the acts of 1492, enabling Europe to invent not only itself, but also the globe.

One of the reasons compelling such a deep historiographical and genealogical reading of Europe and its emergence is to clear the ground for a more dynamic perception of the discourse of Europe. Without such a deep study, both the chronology of Europe and, hence, the idea of Europe represent a successful teleology or sudden rupture in human history that verifies European genius, an entity waiting to realize itself, an identity-task to be explicated by the European subject, etc. In short, it becomes a self-referential, ahistorical entity.

The second reason is to construct a foundation for distinguishing the idea of Europe, the reality of Europe, and the continent/name of Europe from each other. However, I apply this distinction only for heuristic reasons to explain the trajectory of Europe. As will be discussed later, such distinctions cannot be maintained, as they are neither categorically distinct aspects of a European trajectory nor categorical constituents of Europeanness. Rather, these distinctions simultaneously constitute a *terrain* upon which the discourse of Europe is founded and is constituted by them.⁸⁶

Then, what we have is actually a vicious circle, albeit a productive one. If not a vicious cycle, then what more is Eurocentrism?

To explicate both these arguments and to further consider the formation of Europe, the next chapter will focus directly on the story of the Christianization of Europe, which I believe will reveal three dynamics: the Christianization of Europe and the Europeanization of Christianity and more effectively, as well as the Europeanization of Europe through the subsequent shaping of the history of Europe.

⁸⁶ As is evident in what has been summarized here, I have discussed minor and significant aspects of what has been said and requires further elaboration. The summarizing theme is not intended to lay the ground for subsequent discussions. Therefore, the choice is related to a concern to form the structure that goes hand-in-hand, as a gesture, to the formation of the idea of Europe and Eurocentrism, including its circular nature.

5.0. “Origo”: Founding Europe

In the previous chapter, I examined Europe through a focus on its name and its history to reveal the circular nature of the relationship between the idea, reality, and history of Europe. It has been claimed that the complex historical relationship between these three themes constitute the core of the discursive space of Europe and Europeanness and deal with the historiography of Europe to elucidate the emergence of Europe as a (discursive) reality.

The task of this chapter, beginning with Europe’s relationship to the Roman Empire (the “Empire”) is to delve further into discussions on the historiography of Europe. My attention will be focused on the Christianization of Europe, which simultaneously speaks to the Europeanization of Christianity and the Europeanization of Europe. I will argue that the territorialization of Christianity has left a deep impact on the trajectory of the emergence of Europe, as a continent, as a reality and later on, coupled with the formation of the Westphalian system, as an identity. Territorialization was a response to the retreat from the East (in 1453), as an act of defense, as even the “histories of Europe [...] whose origins can be found in the defense of Christian Europe [...] against the threat of Muslim Ottoman expansion” (Woolf 2003: 23). In this context, the relationship between Europeanness and the beginning of European events will be situated in the long journey from the post-Roman historical context until the late fifteenth century. Alongside recurrent themes of the use of internal and external Others, I will specifically focus on the figure of the “Turk” as the constitutive Other of Europe and Europeanness throughout this process of the territorialization of Christianity and the secularization of Europe

and Europeanness.⁸⁷ The geographical proximity of the “Turk” (living in Anatolia, next to the European continent), the expansion of the Ottomans towards European terrain, and the position of the Turk as representing a threat to both the Christian and secular heritages of Europe are the reasons for my choice.⁸⁸ The discussion begins, as usual, with the Romanity of Europe.

Remi Brague, in *Eccentric Culture: A theory of Western Civilization* (2002), offers a challenging reading of *Europe*. “Just what is this we are talking about—when we speak of Europe?” he asks (1). The answer is given through an engagement with several constituent divisions and dichotomies (the opposition between the Mediterranean basin and the rest of the world, the opposition between the Christian North and the Muslim South, the Greek Orthodox East vs. the Latin Catholic West, the Protestant North vs. the Catholic South) as well as the various meanings of Europe (a direction, space, whole, or matter of consciousness), which Brague contends had enabled an entity and, more than that, an idea of Europe to emerge (2-23). In his reading, what is proper to Europe is its *Romanity*, more specifically her *Latinity* (22).

The challenging part of the reading is presented in two forms. First, Brague relies on the differentiations and “Europe’s otherness in relation to each of its different others does not appear on the same level,” as for instance, “as Christendom Europe is the ‘other’ of the Muslim world. Yet it shares this otherness with the Orthodox world with which it has Christianity in common,”

⁸⁷ It must be noted that despite the effective role of the Turks in the formation of Europe as the constitutive Other of Europe, such a claim does not mean that it was the only external, constitutive figure in the history of Europe. Alongside internal Others, including the Saracens, the Russian Other, or Slavs, after 1453, non-European Christians could be counted among the prominent encounters (See Neumann 1999). The post-1492 era, on the other hand, is one from which Europe embarked into a structurally different journey, as it was a worldwide epoch-making event, creating a new Nomos of the earth, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

⁸⁸ For extensive discussions on the relationship between the figure of the Turk and Europe see Levin (2011), Bisaha, (2004), Yapp (1992), Schwoebel (1969), Soykut (2001), Goofmann (2004), Burke (1998), Matar (1999), Tekin (2010).

which enables Europe to be a variable notion: “one is more or less European” (16-17). However, Brague argues that without being Roman, there could be no possibility for being European. He attributes this to an attitude defined as a Roman one, “appropriating an origin in relation to which one feels foreign even alienated,” (122) which locates itself in the principle of *secondarity*: Europe, he says, is always “*heir* to something” preventing it from considering itself to be its own source “unlike Islam,” for instance, which is characterized by an “attitude of absorption” (110-112). Brague explains this by attributing the sources of Europe as civilization as external to it, just as its profane culture originates from Greece, its religion emerges from Jewish roots. In addition, both Athens and Jerusalem trace their roots to a space historically outside of *Europe*. For this reason, “European culture must look elsewhere for what defines it” (148).

Through this discussion, Brague arrives at two conclusions: first, the call to Europe is a “call to the absent,” for “one cannot be born European, but one can work to become one” (148-149). Europeanness, for Brague, is not a possession, but something to conquer, not a guaranteed income, but an adventure, not a particularity, but a universal vocation (150). In effect, Brague tells Europeans and non-Europeans: “You don’t exist” (148-149). The analysis is aimed at revealing what is proper to Europe and European identity, so that it can be differentiated from non-Europeans without falling into parochialism or essentialist universalism while “saving” the eccentric civilization—the West, according to Brague. Furthermore, Brague’s second conclusion, Europeanization, is a task to be realized rather a model to be applied or followed elsewhere. Europe, in such a reading, does not pre-exist Europeanization, but is a result of it and not its cause. It is a constant movement internal to Europe and the movement that constitutes Europe as such (147). In addition, defining Europe as an act resulting from secondarity, Brague is generous

enough to say that “non-Europeans” are more advantageous and “better able to take on the Roman attitude, *that has been Europe’s good fortune*, and to become more European than those who believe themselves already to be European” (151, emphasis added).

According to Brague, the idea of Europe leaves the domain of geography and becomes part and parcel of history (4). Being a European is to be “one who is conscious of belonging to a whole” (5). He is again generous enough to state that the absence of such a consciousness—not being European—does not necessarily mean to be a barbarian, he arrives at (or more properly begins with) the traditional perception of the frontiers of Europe⁸⁹: unlike American space, European space has no natural frontiers, except in the West, where they are not always perceived as such. As Brague very astutely states, “The frontiers of Europe are solely cultural” (6). Given Brague’s sensitivity towards dichotomies in the formation of Europe and European identity, as well as perceptions of the continual re-constitution of Europe as movement, Brague is able to distance himself from essentialist readings of Europe.

In his study, Brague suggests a new reading of Europe without essentialism, without making universality as a *European* property, and without falling into the attitude of absorption. One expectation would be to explore a more focused discussion on the question of Eurocentrism. Brague, however, refers to the question only once and, interestingly, follows the position that considers Eurocentrism to be a matter of ethnocentrism.

⁸⁹ The question of the frontier is a haunting consideration in discussions on Europe. Perhaps the obsession has more to do with insisting on defining Europe as a continent. The spatiality of cultural frontiers, i.e. the relationship between culture and geography, is another aspect that needs to be recalled here, as before the rise of Europe, spatial framings were definitive at cultural frontiers (see chapter 3.3).

It is now fashionable to hurl at European culture the adjective 'Euro-centric'. To be sure, every culture, like every living being, can't help looking at the other ones from its own vantage point, and Europe is no exception. Yet, no culture was ever so little centered on itself and so interested in the other ones as Europe. China saw itself as the Middle Kingdom". Europe never did. "Eurocentrism is a misnomer. Worse: it is the contrary of the truth (133-134).

The first difficulty emerges with such a definition of Eurocentrism. Even in the case of defining Eurocentrism as an expression of ethnocentric affections, one may need to pay attention to the qualitative differences. As stated by Grovogui, before and during the early Middle Ages, different civilizations "lived in self-centered universes, each guided by a belief in the self as the center of the entire universe (1996: 18)." In certain cases, the long distance trade system was maintained between diverse civilizations and spaces, and the relationship is characterized by an absence of hegemonic powers (Abu-Lughod 1989: 19; Bentley 1993). Contrary to such a constellation of the universe, the proper difference of Eurocentric ethnocentrism, after 1492, exists with its theological or later naturalized claim for "reconfiguring European authority throughout the world" and proclaiming sovereignty (Grovogui 1996: 19). Through such an ethnocentrism, we observe a series of claims, ideas and emotions: self-centrism, the myth of European destiny, "a pathos of self-centeredness requiring the denial of coexistence and the validity of contending selves," naturalized cultural and racial superiority, inventing others and spaces as objects of European discourse, claiming the destiny of the human race (19-27), claiming to have the right of ordering, assuming the duty of maintaining order, as well as attributing an obligation on to others to adhere to the order (42). This ethnocentrism turned into an authoritative discourse that emerges through narratives on the role and place of non-Europeans in the order of the universe (Asad 2002: 28).

Ethnocentrism, no doubt, relies on self-centeredness, but Eurocentrism relies on even more, such as stating that the hierarchy of order and ordering the universe pertains more to culture. The decisive changes in the genres of discourse on Europe's relationship with non-European alterity after 1492, demonstrates this difference quite well and negates the principle of secondarity assumed by Brague: the ecclesiastical context of the fifteenth century, the genre of Enlightenment formed a hierarchy of peoples and civilizations, and the genre of colonial discourse representing nineteenth century natural history and imperialism were the three dominant discourses with alterity defined in each through a different form (21-42). In other words, what had been done through Eurocentric ordering was more than an act of "seeing yourself" as the Middle Kingdom.

The second difficulty with Brague's reading is that from beginning to end, his focus remains almost solely on European history, geography, and culture, with both the title of the study and the narratives describing *Western* civilization without treating the transition from Europe to the West after 1492 and the subsequent developments in the history of Europe. Treating these processes as coterminous may be a viable choice. Indeed, from the very destruction of Eastern Christendom after 1453 to the exclusion of Asiatic roots from European space, the formation of Europe and Europeanness could be counted as historical and conceptual verifications of such a stance: the West and Europe become coterminous with each other. However, if a "European is one who is conscious of belonging to a whole," then the whole of the West is awaiting elaboration. Brague refrains from this, and his abstention may be related to the recognition that the idea of the West is more decisive than that of Europe, given its articulations after the sixteenth century in a way that produces a radically original ordering of the universe,

especially in regards to its representation of hierarchy and imperialism towards non-Europeans. Brague continues to tell the story of Europe under the label of the West, codified as a more comprehensive whole in terms of geography and its content, such as America's ordering of the universe, not only of European identity, but also in terms of its internal history. Following a similar trajectory, despite his success in elaborating the dichotomies and meanings of Europe, Brague refrains from discussing the effects of the emergence of "the notion of the *history* of European culture as an idea itself" in the nineteenth century". It is in this particular context that the idea of Europe maintained its most systematic Eurocentric ordering of the universe and came to represent the principle of absorption.

The third difficulty derives from an implicit act. Despite the fact that Brague deduces Europe and Europeanness through a "code of paradoxes" (dichotomies and meanings of Europe), he relies on these notions as expressions of a "code of coherence." The idea of Europe that relies on Athens or Jerusalem as its sources is different than that after 1492 or one invested in the promises of Enlightenment. Without assuming broader notions of European heritage and the discursive narrative of Europe, the assumption of externality cannot be generalized in the way that Brague did so. To put it more clearly, the Europe of Christendom's relationship to Jerusalem is radically different from the Europe articulated after the eighteenth century. Without a given assumption of Europe beyond all dichotomies and differential meanings, as discussed in his own text, the Europe that could exist as a self-differential entity uniting different Europes, as well as the generalization of externality-internality cannot be maintained. Brague appealed, implicitly, to a third term to resolve the paradoxes between the different Europes. Europe, external to itself in

terms of sources, exists through and after a self-referential Europe. Therefore, Europe is not only a variable notion in terms of degree, but also in kind.⁹⁰

This engagement with Brague's claim to define Romanity as the core of eccentric European (i.e. Western) civilization is necessary for re-visiting the argument that locates the emergence of Europe out of the dissolution of Roman Empire and Romanity as an attitude. Europe, both as a continent and an idea, became possible only after the dissolution of the Roman Empire. In addition to that, it simultaneously intended to demonstrate that Europe (as a continent and later as an idea) owed its formation to the Christianization of the Roman Empire and its remnants. The Roman Empire carries an element of the formation of Europe, but it is Christianity that formed Europe. As stated earlier, the creation of Europe required the destruction of Mediterranean cultural unity (Pocock 2002: 59). Neither its expansion nor its decline was understood as the decline or expansion of Europe and Europeanness (19). Rather, the Empire by its existence as a "global power" and conquests *delayed* the emergence of Europe by shifting the balance of Europe further west, via the Mediterranean and becoming the center of the world other than Athens. As a maritime Empire, including parts of Europe, Asia and Africa, and depending on the control of trade routes around the *Mare Nostrum*, the Empire was centered in Rome, hence a broader vision of ethnocentrism centered on Rome, not a united Europe or the idea of Europe.

In terms of a "civilizational perspective," the Empire's idea of community was codified

⁹⁰ Such a claim must not be confused with the plurality of Europe as negating Europe as a discursive space in which different Europes could be knitted together. As long as historical articulation and temporal embodiment are recognized, without an assumption of ahistorical presence, such a discursive claim cannot necessarily be defined as Eurocentric. However, Romanity, in Brague's discussion, implies more than that.

through an “ecumenical” vision, the unity of all mankind, and the lessening the importance of geographical borders (Mikkeli 1998: 9-13). Europe, either as a geographical concept or as an idea, was nothing but a parochialization of the Roman Empire, including its later articulation with “cosmopolitanism,” particularly in versions assuming Europeanization as its condition.⁹¹ The emergence of Europe, therefore, must be located within the multidimensional process of the Christianization of the Roman Empire, more properly into its subsequent dissolution, which will be the subject of the next part.

5.1 Appropriating an Empire: The Roman Empire and Christianity

The relationship between the Roman Empire and Christianity is a transformative one, displaying unique forms in diverse contexts. The religious life of the Roman Empire, for instance, was “eclectic” and cosmopolitan. Throughout the expansion, Romans “came across to all the gods of [the] Mediterranean, each of whose cult they added to their collection” (Davies 1998: 160; Roberts 1996: 64). The Empire ultimately embraced a multitude of religions (Rietbergen 1998: 57).

Christianity emerged in this context and was treated by the Roman Empire as “an obscure and local phenomenon.” Even when Christians became numerous and were repressed for refusing to participate in the imperial cult, they were hardly seen as a general “menace” (Davies 1998:193). Rather, *the Pax Romana*, in practice, facilitated the spread of Christianity.

⁹¹ The unity of the Mediterranean maintained by the Roman Empire continued for at least two centuries, until it was broken in the late seventh century by the Muslim expansion. Rather than being a broken unity, what has happened must be defined as the rise of a new dislocation of the previous order, as it was not a patch, but maintained a new sense of Mediterranean unity. By this act, the center of Europe was challenged and transferred north of the Mediterranean. See Wolf (1982), Hodgson (1993), le Goff (2005).

Throughout the Empire's expansion, space would be available for the establishment of Christian communities (195). The conflict was more between Judaism and Christianity, rather than between the Empire, which treated "Christians as just another Jewish sect" (Roberts 1996: 63). However, the growth of Gentile Christians enabled Christians to distinguish themselves and, by the end of the first century AD, there were Christian congregations all over the Roman world. Until the early years of the second century AD, apart from "local and occasional" persecutions, Christianity enjoyed "official toleration." The century witnessed a significant advance of the Church, both in terms of laying the foundations of Christian theology and, by the end of the second century, most Christians were no longer converted Jews. By the end of the third century, about a tenth of the Empire's population was already converted to Christianity.

Roberts contends that persecutions against Christians was directed at their status as Christians, but at their refusal to "sacrifice to the emperor and the Roman deities as the law commanded" (64). However, the relationship between imperial law and Christianity is not clear, since the relationship itself, by obliging the sacrifice, becomes a negation of Christianity in the eyes of Christians because they demanded recognition as a "distinct people with customs to be respected." The last general persecution of Christians was ordered by Diocletian in 303 and lasted more than a decade. During this time, Christian churches were destroyed and Bibles were burned. Despite the consequences, this period was followed by a general toleration proclaimed in the following reign. The fourth century, particularly after the edict of Milan (313), witnessed the official Christianization of the Empire, even though Christianity was "still little more than a minority sect in the early stages of institutional growth (Davies 1998: 209).

The timeframe between the Edict of Milan, by which Emperor Constantine recognized the Christian religion, and the adoption of Christianity as the official state religion by Theodosius I (d. 395), the last sole ruler of the Roman Empire, saw the Christianization of the Empire. Alongside this Christianization, Theodosius I's division of the Empire into two (giving the West to Honorius and the East to Arcadius) marked the subsequent history of Europe. The Europe that became the object of all discussions, transformations, evolutions, as well as the subject of the historical trajectory creating Europe is that which evolved from the Western Empire (Davies 1998; Roberts 1996; le Goff 2005). However, this evolution went hand-in-hand with its relationship to the Eastern Empire, the dynamics of which will be discussed below.

5.2. The Nova Roma: Founding Constantinople

“Origo: The Birth of Europe: 330-800” is the title of Davies's (1998) chapter examining the historical formation and consolidation of Europe. The year 330 refers to the founding of Constantinople and the year 800 refers to the coronation of Charlemagne. While Davies is critical to treating the year 330 as a clear-cut event, he highlights the changing character of the Roman Empire from 330 onwards. Nonetheless, many others treated 330 as the line separating the ancient and the medieval periods.

Several crucial developments made the year 330 a decisive time. Though the Roman Empire was suffering from both political and social troubles, the state of the Empire was ameliorated under the reign of Constantine. Under Constantine, the Empire was once again more robust, the East and West were reunited in 324, and the general peace held. The increasing

toleration of Christians was further aided when Constantine himself was baptized, even though on his deathbed at the time, which may have raised suspicion on the nature of his relationship to Christianity (Davies 1998: 208-210). Despite the claim by Davies and other scholars that Constantine may be considered a tolerant pagan rather than a pious Christian, in 325 he presided over the first ecumenical council of the Church, whose task was the condemnation of the teaching of Arius from Alexandria as heretical (Roberts 1996: 69). It was attended by every bishop across the Christian world, but interestingly *only a few of them were from Latin-Western Christianity, and the majority of the attendees were from non-Western parts of Christian world*, mainly the Middle East and Africa. The Christian world was far from being reduced to European space, even in terms of its leading figures. By presiding over the Council, Constantine laid the foundation of a tradition endowing Emperors with a special religious authority, which helped consolidate the Christianization of the Empire as a political-territorial power (83-84).⁹² Such a relationship enabled the Empire to cultivate an exclusively Christian culture and civilization—Christendom—rather than a Greco-Roman one (Davies 212).

By changing its characteristics, the *Romanitas* feature of the Empire was not only reduced, but its political-territorial priorities shifted. The new heartland of the Empire, says Davies (238), was not Italy/Rome or the traditional European space, but the Balkans and Asia Minor. The transition witnessed the weakening of the link and intensification of the struggle between the East and the Western Roman Empire that became one of the most constitutive

⁹² This feature claimed to differentiate Eastern Christendom from its Western counterpart. In Latin Christendom, despite the close relationship (in positive or negative terms), it was more a matter of a balance of power between the Church and earthly rulers. However, it must be noted that the Eastern Empire and its relationship with Christianity was polycentric because of the existence of Patriarchs in Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople, unlike in Rome. In 1073, Pope Gregory VII prohibited the use of the title of Pope for any other bishop in Rome. In that sense, the resistance of the Eastern Church was one against the universality of Latin Christendom. The universal primacy of the bishop of Rome was denied. All these processes enabled the emergence of a distinctively Western Christendom to crystallize between 500-1000 (Roberts 1996: 97; Davies 1998).

components in the formation of Europe.

The West had two Christian communities within it: Latin-speaking West Christians and African. Both diverged from the distinct churches of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, which were more receptive to “Oriental influences and more influenced by the Hellenic tradition.” A radical break from the Roman past came with the decision of Emperor Theodosius, in 380, to completely forbid the worship of the old pagan gods, which ultimately saw the adoption of Christianity as the official state religion and the backing of Christianity with the full force of the Empire.⁹³ The transition and rift between the East and the West grew even more intense during the Justinian period, in which Byzantium became a truly distinctive political culture (85). While the rulers and officers of the Byzantine insisted on calling them Romans, the people in the West continued to call themselves Greeks and to speak of a Greek Emperor (81).

Thinking through such a rift between different halves of the Empire, one may claim that the emergence of Europe was more than a process on working on a remnant or residue of the Roman Empire. Latin Christendom transforming into Europe was a defensive act against the “East” and Eastern Christianity. The Christianization of the Empire intensified the struggle, as both halves diverged from each other on the meaning and scope of Christianity. The Christianization of Europe, in that sense, was distinguished by the emergence of a space to resist Christianization in an Eastern form. The object of the struggle was Jerusalem’s legacy with Rome and Constantinople its primary, opposing actors. For a decisive end to the struggle, they

⁹³ However, it took nearly a century to depose the last pagan teacher from the academy of Athens when he was expelled at the end of the fifth century (Roberts 1985: 48). In addition, even by the twelfth century, almost all of Europe was formally Christian, but paganism persisted in the countryside.

had to wait until 1453 and 1492 when the Europe of Christendom articulated a radically new vision of itself.

Although Constantinople was founded on an ancient Byzantium city, it was officially named *Roma Nova* (Davies 1998: 206), representing an attempt to become an essential constituent of European history (Davies 206-212; Roberts 1996: 69). The old Rome, while neglecting the geopolitical struggles and barbarian attacks, was considered “sullied” by pagan tendencies. Either practically or intentionally, the new Rome more or less represented the cultural and political pluralism of the earlier Empire (Davies 1998: 212). The founding of Constantinople was an expression of a new beginning, a new city, “one unsullied by pagan religion” (Roberts 1996: 69). The city remained an imperial capital for one thousand years, a focus of European diplomacy until the rise of the Holy Roman Empire in 800 and a constant source of concern for Latin Christendom. The act of founding Constantinople strengthened the cultural, political, and economic tensions between the East and the West, despite the use and consolidation of Christendom as covering all territories under Christian control.

Economically, while the West grew poorer, the East became more powerful in virtually every sense. The decline of the West forced the establishment to rely on barbarian recruits for its defense (70). Concessions to barbarians grew and fed the socio-political transformation of the Europe. The Barbarian attacks further increased and in 376, the Visigoths were allowed to “cross the Danube to settle as a distinct people, bringing with them their own laws” (72). Over the next century, until 476, a series of events intensified the role, function, and effect of the “barbarians” in the Western Roman Empire. The Roman army, for instance, was made up of Visigoths, Franks,

Celts, Burgundians, and was commanded by a Visigothic king near the end of the Empire. The process culminated with the deposition of the last Roman Emperor in 476, after which the Western Roman Empire was replaced by a number of Germanic kingdoms (73). What happened was not the sudden transformation of a society, but the disappearance of the Roman state as a machine (71).

The Christianization of the Roman Empire was particularly despised by Enlightenment thinkers, including Voltaire, who considered it “ridiculous” and later by Edward Gibbon, who defined it “as the victory of barbarism and superstition” (Robert 1996: 70; Davies 1998: 214). Moreover, the transition from antiquity to the medieval period was considered a sign of decline. However, what had actually occurred was the intensification of interactions between the worlds of the former barbarians and Romans. It was these interactions and interdependence that “gave birth to the entity called Christendom, a foundation of Europe” (ibid.)⁹⁴

The transition from the Roman Empire to Christian Europe took place over “half a millennium” (Davies 1998: 238-239) and encompassed several historical processes: “The westward drive of the barbarian peoples from Asia into Europe, the growing rift between the Western and the Eastern halves of the Roman world, the steady export of Christianity to pagan peoples, and the rise and expansion of Islam after 622, which set the limits of Europe both from the East and from the South (214). In addition, despite the continuity of the Eastern Roman Empire as a center of power, that power was also reduced by the influx of Bulgars and Slavs, which overwhelmed the Latin-speaking population, leaving Byzantium entirely Greek. In the

⁹⁴ By the 12th century, for the first time since antiquity, Christendom had a definition corresponding to political reality. All of Europe, from the East to the West was, at least, formally Christian.

seventh century, the Eastern provinces came under the control of the Arabs and the territorial base of the Empire shrank to something remarkably akin to that of the ancient Greek world.

There are several peculiar features to this transition. First, the most prominent acts that intensified the Christianization of the Roman Empire came from the Eastern half of the Empire. Second, the dissolution of the Western half did not negatively impact the expansion of Christianity. Though monasteries and churches remained outside the official structure of the Empire, they benefited from the new political and social context by increasing the impact of the Roman Church. Third, the growing rift between the two halves opened a space in which the Europe could be transformed into Christendom. Fourth, this historical trajectory verifies Roberts's claim that "Much of the way in which Europe came to be a recognizable entity is a story of things done by non-Europeans, often outside of Europe" (81). This process of becoming a recognizable entity encompasses a spatialization of Europe by and through the impact of the rise of Islam, the consequences of the Great Schism between Western and Eastern Christianity, and the impacts of barbarian invasions. The process deepened the rise of Europe as a distinct entity and an increasingly integrated the world dominated by Christians who call themselves Europeans by the end of the fifteenth century. In that sense, *the early and intermediate Middle Ages* were more than "the victory of superstition," but a process of maintaining and realizing "differentiation" to arrive at Europe.

5.3. The Beginning of European Events

This differentiation was mostly characterized by two facts: the rise of Islam and the “newcomers” (Scandinavians, Hungarians, and Slavs) to Christianity. The threats posed by Greek Orthodox Christianity, the rise of Islam to Latin Christendom, and the continued invasions of barbarians from the North, led to a re-mapping/re-consideration of Mediterranean geopolitics. In the three decades since its emergence in the early seventh century, Islam and its followers conquered most of the Middle East and North Africa. By the early years of the eighth century, Islam became part of Europe, geographically speaking. Aside from the conquest of most of the Iberian Peninsula between 711-719, Muslims gained control of the whole of North Africa, the Levant, as well as the borders of Anatolia, and was on the cusp of absorbing Sicily. Simultaneously, the Eastern Roman Empire and the Greek Orthodox Church came under the pressure of the Slavs by the eighth century. The Christianization of the Slavs, which began in the early fifth century, gained a crucial success by the end of ninth century with the impact of “newcomers” in the historiography of European Christianity, as they solidified the Christianity of Europe and helped form the future Europe through their conversion.

Whereas the impact of the rise of Islam was “external” to European Christianity, the impact of newcomers and Eastern Christianity was “internal” to the constellation of the Christian world. Together, both developments enabled a relocation of the center of Europe and shifted it from Rome to the North, a shift from the Mediterranean to the “valley of the Rhine” (106). “Rome was no longer the center of Europe either geographically or politically”. These developments also saved Latin Christians from certain heretical threats, such as Donatism from North Africa via the expansion of Islam.

The years between 500 and 1000 witnessed the establishment of a “structured and distinctive Western Christendom,” in other words, the foundation of an entity called Europe (Davies 1998: 163). This consolidation process enabled “Europeans” to use certain phrases, such as the “success of Europeans” or the notion of Europe beginning in the mid-eighth century. The next five centuries, between 1000-1500, entailed the consolidation of an already-ongoing process by which Christianity gave a larger sense of community to Europeans (164) while Europe offered a sense of territoriality to (Latin) Christians.

By the twelfth century, for the first time since antiquity, Christendom had a definition corresponding to the political reality. Outside the Iberian Peninsula, all of Europe was formally Christian. The idea of Europe, if it existed before, was first “subjugated” to Christianity and then became coterminous to Christendom through articulations between Europe as territory and Christianity as a communal identity. Under pressure by the Vikings from the North, Muslims from the South and Magyars from the East helped the notion and identity of Europe emerge as a kind of “bulwark” against the expansion of non-Christians, Muslims, barbarians, and Persians (Delanty 1995: 26; Leyser 1992: 40-41).

It is in this context that we find a proliferation of references attributed to the notion of Europe. In the index of several events, the Battle of Poitiers is of special importance in understanding the double inscription of Christianity and Europeanism.

5.3.1. Poitiers: Europeanness and Territoriality

While its scope and content has been the subject of many speculations, the Battle of Poitiers in 732 was a symbolic moment in the changing perceptions of Europe and Christianity—both for maintaining its external border and internal content. The Battle of Poitiers became the last Muslim attempt at penetrating the territory north of the Pyrenees (le Goff 2005; Roberts 1996; Davies 1998).

However, it was a defeat for the Muslims and was further defined as a “victory of *Europeans*” over the Saracens. The battle was also characterized as one in which “Europeans saved Europe and Christianity” from being wiped out by the Muslims (Delanty 1995: 23). In one chronicle (*Continuatio hispana* by Isidore of Seville), it was also defined as a *European* event.

By simultaneously embracing the “barbarian lands of the North-West” and losing the Mediterranean basin to Muslims, references to “European events” were further augmented (Delanty 1995: 25). As stated, the Baltic superseded the Mediterranean in the imagination of Europe. The transition became even more effective through investments made by the Carolingian’s Empire, specifically by Charlemagne, who invested in the first systematic attempt to “unite” Europe and maintain a European political space and became the “Father of Europe” (Roberts 1996; Delanty 1995; Davies 1998). Roman Christianity set the limits of Europe and “Christian” became synonymous with “European” (Ullman 1969: 70). Charlemagne’s imperial coronation in 800 by the papacy gave him “the right” to claim the unity of Europeans, namely Christians. In practice, the Carolingian project for the unity of Europe was meant to be an attempt at “resurrecting the Roman Empire” or return to and revival of the past (Roberts 1996:

33), which negates the claims of Eastern-Greek Orthodox Christianity. In other words, the rise of the Carolingians was nothing more than a negation of Eastern Christianity. Just as the founding of Nova Roma was intended to rescue Christianity from the “sullied” effects of paganism, the Carolingians were attempting to rescue both Christianity and their properly Christian territory, Europe, from the “bad habits” and “sullied” nature of Eastern Christianity (32).

The Carolingians’ investment was an act of defending Europe against the Greek Orthodox Byzantine Empire. *Al Chapple* stood in defiance of Nova Roma. Despite representing an act of turning its face to the past, the legacy of Charlemagne materialized in his attempts at unification—including legal and monastic, as well as of currency—throughout his empire. Charlemagne sought to replace legal diversity, symbolized by the recognition of Barbarians having their own customs, with a single law of the land applying to all residents within the empire’s territory. Despite the inefficiency in maintaining legal and monetary unification, monastic unification became effective and strengthened the social impact of Christianity, furthering the Christianization of Europe. The dream of a united Europe resurfaced with the Holy-German Roman Empire after the tenth century, which incorporated virtually all aspects of European unity during this period: a sacred empire, a successor to the Roman tradition, and the preeminent role of the relatively new Europeans and Christians (Germans) *who had no connection with the Mediterranean legacy representing the new center of Europe*. This coincided with the Slavic entry and *newcomers*, who brought a decisive expansion of Christian Europe through virtually all of Western and Central Europe, excluding the Prussians and Lithuanians until the end of the eleventh century.

The territorial expansion and consolidation of Western Christianity went hand-in-hand with its growing schism with Eastern Christianity. The difference between the two, beyond theological disputes, is crucial as it pertains to the Europeanization of Christianity. While Latin Christianity *persevered* and monopolized the notion of Europe, the Byzantium Empire refrained from such a position, particularly because of its constitutive relationship with Eastern churches (such as Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor). In contrast, both the Carolingians and the Ottonians sought to monopolize the notion of Europe, laying the foundations of Europe through a moralization of geography. Just as the division between Latin Christendom and Eastern Greek Christianity was solidified after “the burning of Papal bull issued to excommunicate the Eastern Church at Constantinople in 1054,” the further orientalizing of the Greek Church began. Europe came to frame Christianity and offered a sense of territorial unity—becoming the space of defense against the Orient and Oriental influences (Delanty 1995).

Though an empirical gesture by Davies (1998: 292), Christendom was never actually coterminous with the Peninsula of Europe. However, the delimited territorial imagination of Christianity was supported by certain developments. Beginning in the ninth century, “Christendom” was frequently used to refer to Europe, which became a bedrock of tension and ambiguity between the territoriality and universality of Christian identity. This ambiguity would later be resolved by a complete Europeanization of Christianity and orientalizing of the Greek Church (Delanty, 1995).

Three developments, by the end of the fourteenth century, had become effective in such a transition: By the end of the century, almost all of Europe was cleared from the troublemakers

and Europe became a Christian “garden.” The Christianization of pagans (in northern Europe, as well as in the far Western and Eastern corners of Europe) expanded the spheres of Christian influence over Europe. Second, the limited military capacity of the Europeans against the non-Europeans and the rise of Muslims (particularly the Ottomans) put Latin Christians on the defensive. Third, there was a further intensification of the division between Latin and Orthodox Christianities (Levin 2011: 88). These developments enabled Europe to Christianize and led Christianity to become a specifically European matter. By the early years of the fifteenth century, “Europe alone” was said to be Christian (excluding “Christian but alien Greek Orthodox”). Almost all Latin/Christians were Europeans or vice versa and all real Christians were supposed to be European. Christendom became Europe and Europe became Christendom while also becoming the West (Levin 2011:88).

This transition, in part, emerges by and through the elasticity of the concept of Christendom. However, the emergence or creation of a coterminous relationship between Christianity and Europe, in other words the “Christianization/Europeanization” of Europe, owed much to the policies implemented against Europe’s internal Others, which is the subject of the next section. By considering these acts together, I will discuss the transformation of Christendom as a concept.

5.3.2. Heretics and All Others: The Europe of Persecution

In dealing with the “certain kinds of difference” Latin Christendom developed specific policies that relying on the exclusion and purification of Europe. Taken together, these policies constitute

the basis of Le Goff's suggestion to define Europe as the Europe of Persecution (2005: 81) and Fontana's mirror of the Devil's Europe (2003).

Throughout the consolidation of Christianity and European space, the term Europe became popular throughout the ninth century and came to signify a certain sense of community. However, as the process went through Christianization, whose more concrete achievements were felt beginning in the eleventh century, a relatively new framework, referring to a communal identity, was deployed: Christendom (48). The political structure of the time was encouraging for such a vision of "communal identity" as Europe was divided into monarchies led by kings and under a Pope and Emperor, who each supported a Christendom referring to the communal identity of all in European space (67).

In this context, the double Christianization of Europe and Europeanization of Christianity became directly involved with the relatively more systematic elimination of differences on European space. To create a Christian Europe and Europe's Christianity there was an urge to undergo an internal purification process to marginalize, exclude, and destroy those "who sowed seeds of dissent and impurity" (81). Though the targets, intensity, and scope varied, since the early consolidation of Christian theology, heretics, Jews, homosexuals, lepers, and Saracens were subjected to such operations. The Jews were particularly excluded and persecuted through public visibility. Jews were compelled in 1215, by the Fourth Lutheran Council, to wear a red disk sewn onto their clothes (le Goff 2005: 85). The efforts at persecuting these groups were quite effective and often included massive expulsions, including those from England in 1290, from France in 1306 and 1394, and the most systematic one from Spain in 1492 (Fontana 2003: 88).

Each expulsion was legitimized through a sense of fabricated fear by poisoning wells or blaming Jews and Muslims for the Black Death. The particularly enmity towards Jews and Muslims (and up to a certain degree the Slavs) was quite effective, as they were seen as “Asiatic imports,” remnants of the “Eastern sources” of Europe (Delanty 1996: 56, 88). “Throughout Christian Europe, the idea of kind of contagion was spreading” (88) as defining the Other either as a moral (homosexuals) or actual threat (using Muslims or anti-Semitic prototypes). During these operations, the consolidation of European Christianity, its historical consciousness, and the formation of an internal front was framed through these “cleansing” operations whose victims were non-Europeans/non-Christians, whether religiously or morally (56).

5.3.3. The Use of Others and Europe

Looking through the history of Europe, one may easily contend that the relationship with the Other has been homogenous and straightforward, as there is almost a progressive expansion and systematic increase toward non-European/non-Christian elements in and out of Europe. Rather than a straightforward relationship, depending on the formulation of the idea of Europe, the meaning and scope of Christianity and the way in which “the Other” has been defined has had a definitive impact on the relationship.⁹⁵ One way to elaborate on this is to focus on the image of the Saracens, Muslims, and later the Turks as the external Other.

⁹⁵ After the 1492 discovery of the New World, Europe/Christianity was compelled to invent new mechanisms for dealing with “new peoples.” While the regulations and mechanisms of colonial discourse (Hulme 1986) continued to be effective and were reproduced according to the new demands, the post-1492 period witnessed the development of distinctive political authorities applicable to these new infidels (Grovogui 1996: 19-20).

Historically, throughout the formation of Christian Europe, during which Christianity and Europe were more concerned with defining “its internal content,” the relationship with the Muslim Other has been quite defensive and exclusive. Such a relationship has been the main trend until the early fifteenth century, with the exception of the early Crusades. From the mid-fifteenth century onwards, there was a further socio-political and economic consolidation and unification of Europe and Christendom. Through this consolidation, the idea of Europe and its constitutive relationship with Christianity was virtually completed and the type of the relationship with the Other became a more “aggressive” one (Levin 2011: 24; Bisaha 2004).⁹⁶

Roughly between the late seventh and early eleventh century, the image of the Muslim Other was either one of the “Other as chastisement” (41), in which the image of the Muslim is deployed as tools “used by God to discipline the Faithful” (42), or as signifying danger, “Muslims as anti-Christ” (47). In such a framework, the rise of Islam and its expansion toward the inner circle of Europe has been taken as a punishment for the “weak creed of Christians” (39). These images were deployed through a defensive vision and “introspective in nature, directing the gaze of the Christians toward their own sins” (51). They were further deployed to draw attention to the weakness of internal opponents. In both images, the Other was imagined as both a devastator and destroyer.

Consistent with the consolidation of Europe and Christianity and their symbiotic construction, referring roughly to the mid-eleventh century and the late fourteenth century, Latin

⁹⁶ It must be noted that the relationship of Europe to the Turks and their perception in Europe is more complex and layered than presented here. For instance, Bisaha suggests a tripartite division (before and after 1453 and after the eighteenth century)(2004: 136-170) and presents a detailed account of the “positive” readings of certain figures, such as George of Trebizond and Nicholas Cusa on the Turks.

Christendom began to also occupy additional territory? with the expansion. Pagans, heretics, Jews, and Muslims were at the center of the image of the Other (50-55). As discussed earlier, this era refers to the militarization of Christianity, as well as the further legitimization of the use of force against both hostile Christian monarchies and Muslims. The idea of a just war became a holy war beginning in the tenth century, particularly due to the impact of the Crusades. During this era, the image of Muslims became particularly synonymous with that of Pagans. Further consolidation required the unification of Christianity within Europe, which empowered a more orthodox framing of Christianity and brought more violent politics towards internal groups defined as heretics and non-Christians living within European territories (55-60). In this sense, it was no coincidence that the most systematic expulsions of the Jewish community emerged between these centuries (1050-1350). The further the consolidation moved, the greater the calls for expulsions and the destructions of Others, which, in turn, enhanced the consolidation process. Just as attempts at the monopolization of Christianity intensified, so did perceptions on the “proliferation of heresies in Europe amongst the Christians” (66).

One way to decrease the impact of this division and the calls for unification was to deploy the image of Islam, as a threatening fact. Taking a stance against Islam helped unify the Christians and was utilized to solidify Christian self-identity and secure its self-certainty. This era witnessed a growing literature in which the Muslim and Islam appeared as pagan and pagan belief, a conflation of the term Saracen with pagan (70). What matters was not the factuality of these discussions, but the effects of discourses of the Other to maintain the unity of Europe in itself and as Christendom. The crucial point is that in the context in which Europe and the idea of

Europe was defined by subjugation to Christendom, the Other was decisively defined through such a vision. The enemy was the Saracen/Muslim.

Throughout the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, rather than the general image of Saracens or Muslim, the figure of the Turk, via the threat presented by the Ottoman Empire, became the dominant Muslim Other. The Turk had become an external enemy, the enemy of all Christians/Europeans (86). On the one hand, such a transition in the image of the Other owed much to the rise of the Ottoman Empire. However, the updated image of the Other involves more than such a transformation. This period (as discussed above and will be further elaborated upon below) witnessed the further territorialization of Christianity, in other words, the Europeanization of Christianity. The rise of the figure of the Turk as the enemy is another sign, which could be taken as the consolidation of Europe and the idea of Europe. The constitutive impact as effective, particularly due to the loss of Constantinople to the Ottomans, simply completed the process of Europeanization of Christianity by relieving Latin Christendom from the East.

The relationship to the Other had two additional functions. First, it was a much-reached to tool for deployment within the struggles between different Christian groups, Protestant and Catholics. Second, the use of the image was more significant than the actual or empirical “facts” associated with the Other. This became quite visible when referring to the relationship between the image of the Turk and the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, until the mid-twelfth century, the Qur’an was not translated into any European language (Roberts 1996: 161). Despite the presence

of Muslims in Europe and direct contact with Muslims since the early eighth century, there was little knowledge of them (160-161; le Goff 2005: 160).

Secondly, just as the fight against the barbarians was part and parcel of a project of internal self-identification, the definition of the Turks and Muslim Others as representing “God’s scourge, [the] antichrist, pagan[s], heretics, chivalrous and lustful” (Levin 2011: 90), “the othering of Turks and orientation on war against the barbarian Turk (*exhortatio ad bellum contra barbaros*) became a standard component of virtually all public and political gatherings in Europe, from the congresses to the reception of ambassadors, the elevation of pope, the marriage of a prince and so on particularly from the late 15th century and onwards”. Despite the exclusionary relationship between the rise of new groups in Latin Christendom, the Reformation’s leading to radical divisions, and the wars of religion in Europe, the significance and function of the Muslim Turk remained the same (97, 119-120).

In this relationship, as part of this new context, the Turks considered as an external enemy was not only deployed to generate unity, but rather as a link of their “faults” to internal enemies as well. This usage reveals the dynamics of the struggle on new meanings of Europe and the process of identification and function of the discourse of the Other. In M. Luther’s writing, the comparison between Papists and Turks, which was never “interpreted as God’s scour for the sins of the Turks and always the other way around” (Levin 2011: 120), was useful in delegitimizing the former. What was crucial, however, was not the sinfulness of the Turks, but its use as a theoretical tool to shame “sinful Christians, Papists” (ibid). This era was witnessed an

intense struggle for the meaning of Europe/Christendom, with the image of the Turk deployed as a tool.

While criticizing the political leadership of the church and paving the way for secularism, leading reformists, such as M. Luther, were quite clear in arguing for the defense of Europe and Christianity to be done under the legitimate leadership of a “secular” ruler (97). According to Luther:

The antichrist is the pope and the Turk together. A beast full of life must have a body and soul, the spirit or soul of antichrist is the pope and his flesh or body the Turk. The latter wastes and assails and persecutes God’s church corporally; the former spiritually and corporally too, with hanging, burning and murdering, etc [...]” (quoted from Levin 2011: 107).

The Turk, the external enemy, was an instrument against the Catholic Church (114). This contestation was not an image of the Other, but rather a deployment and contribution to struggling over how to define Christendom, which ultimately turned out to be a struggle defining Europe.

While keeping to its “universalistic tenets,” Europe became not only a territory in which Christianity is dominant, referring to the lands of Christians, but its success in maintaining a defensive front against non-Christians, in monopolizing the meaning and scope of Christianity, and to further its potentiality (awaiting to realize itself) has come to embody Christian civilization. Christendom meant Europe and Europe meant Christendom. This was a decisive departure from the earlier Christian use of spatiality. Rather than identifying the religion with spatiality, it was “limited” to symbols of faith. However, throughout the process in which

spatiality became a constitutive dynamic in maintaining the vitality of (Western) Christianity as distinct, the Christian collective in turn became a European collectivity and identity (120-121).

This dichotomy persisted even after the secularization process. During the Renaissance, the trope of Christian Europe vs. the Ottoman Turks was likewise deployed as a civilizational battle—another incarnation of the struggle between civilization and barbarians (Levin 2011). The use of the word Europe had become more frequent, particularly in relation to the Turkish advance (Hay 1957: 86-87). However, in this reading, the Turk remained the primary threat, but not only to Christianity, but also to the heritage of secularism, which came to be counted as part of Europe's identity: the Turks are said to be those who are “the bloodthirsty foe of *Christ* and *Plato*” (Levin 2011: 95). In that sense, the secular discourses of Enlightenment, in its definition of Europe and European identity owed much to earlier Christian discourses outlining the relationship to Islam.

To conclude, the Christianization of Europe and Europeanization of Christianity went hand-in-hand and relied extensively on certain practices: internally, the practices became visible through the use of purification policies against Asiatic remnants (Jews and Muslims in Europe and Slavs), as well as other non-Christians, homosexuals, lepers, and pagans or through the conversion of non-Christians. Externally, the process became visible only by relocating the center of Europe (moving to the North and West), as well as undertaking the exclusion of non-European Christianity. This process enabled Europe and Christendom to be coterminous. Through such a co-habitation, the image of Others and the transitions in their perceptions have been quite dynamic. This transformation expresses an important shift in the perception of Europe

and Christianity or Europe and Christendom. In the case of Muslims/Turks, the transformation, as discussed, is concomitant with the consolidation of Europe, the territorialization of Christianity and, thus, the Europeanization of Christianity and the codification of secular Europe. This enmity, including in subsequent periods, simultaneously reveals a transformation in the identity of Europe, which began to deploy the Turks as the enemy of both the religious identity (Christ) of Europeans, but also its perceived secular heritage (Plato) (Levin 2011: 120-123).

This transformation, including the withdrawal from the East (1453), focus on the internal dynamics of Europe (1492, al-Andalus), and search for “other options” (1492, discovery), has been decisive to the formation of a distinct European identity and search for “unsullied” lands. Next, I will examine the territorialization of Christianity to help shed light on the background of such a transition.

5.3.4. Before Pope Pius II comes Pope Urban

Christianity has always carried with it a universalistic mission.⁹⁷ It was through St. Paul’s declaration that all newcomers would be accepted to Christianity, which distinguished it from Judaism (Davies 1998: 197). In the absence of an ahistorical territorial attachment, Christianity identified itself with wherever Christians or potential Christians lived. The pope, in such a reading, has “rightful jurisdiction over all human beings, faithful and nonbeliever alike.” In addition, Christianity is fed by a missionary desire to convert infidels (Neumann 1999: 42). The

⁹⁷ The unity of the Christian community, with Jerusalem as its center, as well as the obligation to protect the community and belief in Christians as one people, regardless of territorial attachment, are certain features of this claim, according to Mikkeli (1998: 24).

attachment with lands was either framed by certain places mentioned in the Bible (such as Jerusalem) or which were occupied by sacred places (Roberts 1996).

Despite the growing inter-constitutive relationship between the notion of Europe and Christianity, a sense of Catholic perception (as implying universality) maintained itself even after and through the Christianization of the Roman Empire, even though to be a Christian was also to be Roman. The vision of Empire did not hamper the claim to the universal, but enhanced it. However, the increasing conversion of the pagans, the dissolution of the Empire, the growing tension between the eastern and western halves of the Empire, as well as the rise of Islam complicated the relationship between territorial affiliations and Christianity's universalist aspirations.

The Crusades, in terms of their consequences, intensify the double inscription of Europe and Christianity, which also consolidates spatiality in Christianity. The Crusades, which left a deep impact on both the notion of Europe and Christendom, were fed by the militarization of Christianity, the sudden demographic and economic growth beginning in the tenth century, as well as growing references to the image of Jerusalem (Delanty 1995: 96). Growing as a response to the political and social turmoil of the ninth century, Christendom witnessed a strong peace movement, which facilitated its consolidation of power. Channeling rising dynamics and energy toward external territories were useful in maintaining the leadership of the Papacy and were additional reasons for the rush into the Crusades.

The Crusades, on the one hand, signified an attempt to maintain control over the non-European parts of Christendom, one of the last attempts to bridge European and non-European

space into Christendom. However, the campaign resulted in a decisive Europeanization of Christianity. The most effective impact was a practical end to the idea of *Jerusalem as the capital of Christendom*. European Christianity lost one of its most crucial, constitutive images and the sensibility of linking Europe and Christianity to non-European territories: the end of a symbolic, political, motivational and ideological relationship than expanded the horizon of Christendom over and above the limited territory of Europe (97). The parochialization (Europeanization) intensified through the already weakened links between Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Latin Christianity after the sack of Constantinople in the 1204 Crusade. Europeanization was a practical answer, a culmination of the question of the Pope's "rightful jurisdiction over all human beings," "whether the infidel had rightful domain over his land at all, or whether Christians had an explicit duty to conquer" (Neumann 1999:42) The tension between universalism and territorialization was resolved on behalf of Europeanization, as all the military plans for uniting and expanding that Christians offered was to nationalist political projects in Europe (43; Rodinson 1987: 29) .

The tension between territorial (Europe as the home of Christians, Christendom) and universalist ambitions could be seen in the speeches delivered by Pope Urban, which are said to have initiated the Crusades (France 2005), and became the central problem facing Europeans-Christians in defining themselves for the next five centuries (Neumann 1999: 43). D. Hay (1957) focuses on the speeches delivered by Pope Urban and their themes to examine the tensions between the universality and territoriality of (Latin) Christianity, as it is upon this tension in that the new Europe is grounded.

Hay first identifies a decisively universalist element, calling upon all Christians, regardless of territory. The Pope reiterates an ecumenical perspective and includes the Greek Church within Christendom. In such a reading, Christendom cannot be reduced to Europe. It was the loss of territory in Asia and Africa, and particularly Jerusalem, that compelled Christianity to remain limited to Europe: this was a consequence, not a properly Christian condition. However, the constitutive relationship between Europe and Christianity is recognized, albeit with disappointment by Pope Urban: “There remains Europe, the third continent. How small is the part of it inhabited by us Christians!” (qtd. from Hay 1957: 32).

In the same speech, despising such a limitation Pope Urban displays one of the strongest non-territorial visions for Christianity and the Christian individual.:

Rid the sanctuary of God of the unbelievers, expel the thieves and lead back the faithful. Let no loyalty to kinfolk hold you back; man’s loyalty lies in the first place to God. No love of native heath should delay you, for in one sense the whole world is your exile for a Christian, and in another the whole world is his country; *so exile is your fatherland, our fatherland is exile* (quoted in Hay 1957: 33.).

Despite such a universalist position, there are certain signs revealing the tension between the Europeanization of Christendom as a practical condition, and the universalism of Christendom. The first sign was detected in the difficulties and variations of the translations of Latin terms, referring to the faith (*christianismus*) and the faithful (*christianitas*) from the late medieval era (22). In vernacular translations, variations included not only the faith and the faithful, but also the lands inhabited by the faithful (meaning Christendom)(Levin 83-86). Both Hay (ibid) and Levin (2011: 87) take such a “conflation” of meaning as the tension between “the conception of Christendom

as the areas inhabited by the Christians and threatened by pagans and Christianity as a faith that aims for the salvation of all mankind.”

Alongside linguistic variations, as previously discussed, the period between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries witnessed the conversion of pagans in Europe, the rise of the Ottoman Empire, and the intensification of the tension between Eastern and Western Christianities. These internal consolidations and external retreats created a politico-historical context that transformed both Christianity and Europe to be coterminous with each other. In this transition, the first, most decisive, impact was the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453 (Roberts 1996; Levin 2011; Attali 1999; le Goff 2005).

The difference between the positions represented by the two Popes is nothing more than an embodiment of the transition in the perception of Europe, Christianity, territoriality, and universality. Unlike Pope Urban, Pope Pius II, in his texts and speeches, uses Europe and *Respublica Christiana* and Europeans and Christians interchangeably while also defining the political conditions in Europe as the conditions of the Christian religion. Pope Pius II also equates Christendom with Europe and Europe with Christendom. His texts and speeches represent the consequences of the whole political, social, and cultural transformation developed between the tenth and fifteenth centuries (Wilson and Dussen 1993: 34-35; le Goff 2005: 186; Yapp 1992: 141; Levin 2011: 88; Hay 1957: 86; Hobson 2004: 186).

The territorialization of Christianity, in its relationship to non-European Asia and Eastern Christianity was not a simple retreat or a complete forgetting of universalism. Rather, it was an

update or articulation of the Christian self and Christian body to the changing conditions and territorial extensions of Christendom and Europe. The result was the final cutting of ties with the East, the Eastern origin of Christianity, and Eastern Christianity (defined as alien but still Christian). Such a consequence represents a virtual completion of the Europeanization of Christianity and an update in the perception of Christendom. In such a context, not only were all Europeans Christians, but in the imagination of Latin Christendom, all *true* Christians were Europeans (Levin 2011: 88). Pope Pius II, when discussing the advent of the Turks and its impact on Christendom, harshly condemned all Turks, he stated, “Neither those that in Asia whom one calls Christians are real Christians, since they do not walk towards the truth of the Gospel [...] It is all too much that Christ lost in Asia” (Soykut 2001: 21-22).

The conquest of Constantinople led to the complete closure of the Eastern front of Christianity as a center of power and accelerated the Europeanization of Christendom (Delanty 1995: 3). Through such a release of Christendom from the burdens of the East, Europe enabled itself, subsumed under the Christendom, to become an autonomous discourse by defining the limits of the East and West. Once it became associated with the West, alongside the historical legacy maintained through the opposition between barbarism and civility, it also became a system of civilizational values. The fear of mass conversion, particularly in the Balkans, the Ottoman’s success in occupying about a quarter of the territory of Europe, and the loss of Constantinople enabled Latin Christianity to become the only protector, representation and identification of both the West, Europe, and the Christians. This explains why there was a proliferation of the use of the word, *Europe*, particularly against the Ottomans’ advance (Hay

1957: 86-87). Europe became the only home for Christians and Christianity as Christendom became coterminous with Europe.

In short, the tension between the territorial and universal elements of Christianity were resolved in favor of the former, making Europe home. At that time, too little was known about Muscovy to take it seriously, which legitimized readings that equated Europe with Christianity: “Europe alone is now Christian,” voiced at the Council of Constance (1414-1417). What took place in 1453 was the finishing touch to release Europe from the East, a process that began with the Christianization of Europe and intensified with the consequences of the Crusades.

5.4. Europe Between 1453 to 1492 and the Turks

One of the most consistent aspects of European history (and themes in discussions on the emergence of Europe) is the parallelism between the patchwork quality of European space and the increase in the calls for and rhetoric of unity (Mikkeli 1998; Heater 1992: 5-7). The calls for unity functioned as “sources of division as much as unity” (Slack and Innes 1992: 6) and both cries for unity and factual “diversity” remained a “constant of European history” (Eliott 1992: 71). For some, such tensions exactly define what Europe is (Braudel 1990: 90-42; Davies 1998), and refers to “virtues of inconsistency” (Calhoun 2001: 37-38). Its inconsistency is derived from its feature of “being internally heterogeneous and conflictual settings” that brings creativity, “never being add up to single integrated whole” that enabled/transformed Europe, “not as an unitary singular identity on the model of the integral nation-state),” but to exist “as [an]

institutional arena within which diversity and multiple connections among people and organizations can flourish” (38).

The assumption of a *peculiarly European diversity* is enhanced by reference to the tension between unity and disunity featured on European terrain. Therefore, I contend that despite “the continuity in the pretensions of Christianity to remain universal” (Yapp 1992: 138) and continuity in calls for the establishment of a unified Christendom by the Roman Church, the whole dynamic of post-fourteenth century Europe witnessed a consolidation process via what is called “a competitive system of sovereign, territorial, nation states” (Elliott 1992: 48). Universal empire became a dream, and the Roman Church “had to admit that the defense of the individual state took precedence over the liberties of the Church or the claims of the Christian commonwealth” (J. Strayer, quoted from Elliott, 1992: 48). The church could not found a universal Empire, despite its temporal successes, and all subsequent attempts at achieving European and/or Christian unity via one or two agencies in Europe (the Church or the Empire) failed to maintain such a unity. While the Papacy, the Carolingians Empire, and Holy Roman Empire gave a sense of meaning to the overarching unity (Europe as Christendom and vice versa) and to the actual powers of Europe, the Empire, the states, and the Catholic Church were always limited or framed by the interplay of the complex power structure between the three (Held 1992: 80-81). Towards the late fifteenth century, European space was composed of around five hundred independent political units (Held 1992: 75; Tilly 1975: 15; Elliott 1992: 49). In this context, the Catholic Calls for unity and resistance to it had constituted a central theme of European history, particularly beginning in the late fifteenth century, which continued for three centuries in its essentially religious forms and was then revived in secular forms (Yapp 1992:

140). Throughout this and the subsequent history of Europe, loyalty to the states and newly emerging territorial entities have become stronger than any other. Both the formation and consolidation of International Law, in its classical Westphalian form (1648-1945), and a distinctive European identity developed in such a context, beginning in sixteenth century Europe (Held 1992: 72; Bull 1977: 22).

Within such a context and period of transition, the fall of Constantinople was quite decisive in intensifying Catholic calls for unity. However, it turned out to become more than such a call: it constituted a distinctive turning point in the history of Europe and idea of Europe, suggesting an altogether new vision (Mikkeli 1998: 32). In doing so, the Turk as the embodiment of the non-European enemy came to the center: “The filthy Turks conquering Constantinople, the most beautiful part of the world” (Ariosto), “Turks as the embodiment of Asia against Europe (Tasso), displaying the chaos of not uniting Europe which could be stronger than Asia if united (Vives), Europeans being beaten by Turks “in Europe, in our own country, at home” (Pope Pius II), “the grand Turk was the beast rising out of the sea described in the Apocalypse” (King Christian I of Denmark).⁹⁸ The feelings against the Turks became so strong that they “almost become an article of faith” (Soykut 2001: 24). In short, there was an intensive increase to references of “intrusion” and the search for unity and solidarity against the Turkish threat, an outsider, for saving the Europe, which begins “to acquire more and more emotional charge” (33), feeding the consolidation of European identity.

⁹⁸ (Quoted from Schwoebel 1967: 4). For further examples see Mikkeli (1998: 32-33), Bisaha (2004) and Levin (2011). As discussed, “European” were used as an adjective for the first time by Pope Pius II. Dante previously used Africans and Asians, but he called the people of Europe as inhabitants of Europe rather than Europeans (Mikkeli 1998: 33).

While the appeals were directed mostly at the Catholic powers of Europe, the Orthodox and Protestants were excluded in practice, and the idea of maintaining the unity of Europe against the Turks had been repeated by non-Catholic powers as well (Yapp 1992: 141). This partially explains the proliferation of the suggested strategies for maintaining European unity by Catholics, as well as figures who were counted as “heretics” by the Catholic Church. Podebrad (ibid) who with Marini in 1464 (*De unione Christianorum contra Turcas*), for instance, offered such a project whose central task was to “ward off the threat of Turkey” (35). The increase in the embodiment of the enemy as the Turk, as discussed previously, has persisted for centuries. While connected to the image of Islam in Europe, the Turk “represented the Other of Europe *par excellence*” (Soykut 2001: 5)

To the Protestant, it represented the evilness of the Catholic; to the Catholic, the heresy of the Protestant; the man of the Renaissance identified the Turk with the Persians as enemies of the Greek civilisation, and of the European civilisation per se; to the Church in Rome, they were the arch-enemies of Christendom to wage war at all costs; and to Venice, an indelible ‘infidel’ commercial partner, with whom amicable relations were of vital importance for its very existence (ibid).

The multiple uses of the figure of the Turk was a culmination of several sensibilities and, in that sense, 1453 signified a decisive end to an era, a hope. After the fall, it became impossible to believe that the Turkish invasion and expansion was a temporary rise (Goffmann 2004: 13), and the idea of *defending* Europe, *defending* Christianity came to the front. In such a transition, there are two crucial themes that shed light on the subsequent trajectory of Europe.

The first one, referred to most consistently by Pope Pius II is a direct analogy between the Turks and the Persian “vis-à-vis the Greeks.” Just as the Greeks represented civilization

against the Persians, Europeans/Christendom was representing the civilized world against the Turks (Soykut 2001: 19). Such a perception deployed new calls for the unity of Europeans/Christians because barbarians were considered “naturally” inferior to civilized Europe and Europeans. It was only the disunity of Europe that could explain the rise of a “pernicious force sent by God to scourge Christendom for its sins” (Schwoebel 1969: 19; Neumann 1999: 45).

The second theme, revived again with the Fall, was the Christianity of the Greeks in the writings of Pius II. In *La Discritione de l'Asia et Europa di Papa Pio II* (published in 1544 but written in sometime between 1453-1461), the Fall is framed through the return of “the old and filthy brutality,” referring to the idol-worshipping of the Romans “who [was] saved by the Holy Gospel but corrupted by the advents of the Turks’ (Soykut 2001). Reiterating the traditional exclusivist position, Pius II claims that:

...Neither those that in Asia whom one calls Christians are real Christians, since they do not walk towards the truth of the Gospel; although there are many Greeks, who are raised with Christian rites, nevertheless, they separated themselves from the rules of the old holy fathers; nor do they deign to hear the Roman Church, mother of all the faithful. *It is all too much that Christ lost in Asia.*⁹⁹

“*It is all too much that Christ lost in Asia.*” This sentence alone helps explain the subsequent gaze focused on European terrain, excluding *the Asian* part of Christendom. This does not mean there was an abrupt rupture from the East. Rather, the calls for Crusades against the Ottoman Empire and the Turks continued until the mid-eighteenth century. The figure of the Turk remained an opportunity to call for Christian unity; however, priority was given to enhance the

⁹⁹ Enea Silvio Piccolomini), *La Discritione de l'Asia et Eurupa di Papa Pia II*, (Vinegia: Appresso Vincenzo Vaugris a 'I segno d'Erasimo, 1544), p.175 (quoted from Soykun 2001:22).

authority of the Catholic Church over Europe against the increasing powers of Protestants, and to divert attention from the religious and political divisions in Europe (46, 148). This is where the meaning of Crusades shifted from “solely religious rhetoric to the political level [...] and [...] as a means to the end of liberating Christian Europe from the infidels” (47, 49). The Crusades turned toward the defense of Europe, as discussed earlier (Wilson and Dussen, 1993: 35), which explains the popularization of the idea of the *lega contra il Turco* [league or alliance against the Turk] towards the end of the sixteenth century over the explicitly identified pacts of Crusades (49). Pope Nicholas V’s and Pope Pius II’s attempts to embark on a new Crusade after 1453 ended with the acceptance of a Crusade limited to “driving Turks out of Europe,” rather than recapturing Jerusalem. The Christians of Asia, moreover, were considered a reserve power to divert the Ottomans’ power rather than groups awaiting rescue from the Turkish infidels (Hay 1957: 85).

The increasing role of the Turks is strongly tied to the formation of a *new Europe*, one that maintains its relationship to Christendom, albeit retracted from Europe and European identity, carrying the impacts of the growing “internal” struggles between reformists and the Church and the consolidation of a new state system. The impact of “the Turk” have been so constitutive that it led Neumann to define the Turk as the dominant Other in the history of the European state system due to the proximity of the threat, the presence of a military might unlike the New World’s Others, and the lingering effects of the clash between Christendom and the Ottoman Empire (Neumann 1999: 39-40). Further, the emergence and consolidation of (European) international society, the rise of Europe, and the conversion of Christendom to Europe witnessed the territorial presence of the Empire throughout a quarter of European

territory (from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries)(40).

What was essentially meant by the Turks was the Ottoman Empire. The dynasty was referred to as either the “Turkish Empire” or Turks by virtually all corners and positions in Europe from the fourteenth century onwards, and it remained so (Quataert 2005: 1-3). Consistent usage in the naming of the Ottoman Empire is crucial. While the dynasty is of Turkic origin, beginning from its immediate emergence, the dynasty “lost its Turkish quality” through intermarriage with many different ethnicities and [...] state power relied on a similarly heterogeneous mix of people,” enabling the Empire to transcend its Turkic origin (2). Further, the Empire consolidated a socio-political organization defined as the millet system, founded on the multitude of identities, communities and groups under the hegemony of the Muslim state, which enabled further incorporation of non-Muslims into administrative positions (Quataert 2005). The self-depiction was formed through an explicit allegiance to being an Empire of Muslims and via the caliphate. In its own depiction, the Empire did not use the term as a constitutive part of its identity and perception. However, after the conquest of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmet II declared himself to be *the new Roman Empire* and the name of the city (as *Konstantiniyye*) were in use until the late nineteenth centuries on coins and official letters, demonstrating other ways of transcending being named as the “Turk” (Hale 1993).

Defining the Ottoman Empire as a threat summarized as “the Turks” was invented and popularized by the *Europeans* rather than the Empire. In such a context, “the Turk meant to mean Muslim and to turn Turk meant converting to Islam” (Quartert 2005: 2). Quite contrary to that, the Turk, in Ottoman usage, referred to nomadic Turkic communities mostly seen through a

“negative” lens and implied negative connotations, such as referring to “villager, rude, villain.” A primacy attributed to the Turk as part of the identification process in the Empire came with the modernization, secularization and, hence, the nationalization of the Empire, which was consolidated after the early twentieth century.

The use of the Turk was more than a “factual misunderstanding” or lack of knowledge on the Ottomans. Turk, as distinct from the Saracens, but still referring to Muslims, was deployed as a unifying theme for secular Europeans and Christian Europeans to maintain the unity of Europe. In other words, it was a counter-equivalent to emerging as *New Europe*, encompassing both secular and Christian traditions, albeit in a continuous struggle. “The Saracens” were the Other of Christendom, a religious Other, but the Turk was that of Europe and Territorialized Christianity. Saracens, in that sense, were the other of the Carolingians’ Europe, but the Turk was essentially the creation of Europe’s modern state system (Neumann 1999: 43).¹⁰⁰ Europe was in the process of configuring itself via the struggles between the Church, reformist groups, and modern absolutist states. Eastern Christianity, which had been the source of ambiguity and a “trouble” for maintaining a stable, unified Christendom and Europe was gone by 1453. Moreover, the Turks became part of the internal struggles between Christians and an externally constitutive enemy of Europe simultaneously.

¹⁰⁰ Neumann limits his reading to Otherness rather than focusing on the emergence of Europe out of Christendom and the role of the Turk in such a transition. “Whereas ‘the Saracen’ was a religious Other to Christendom, ‘the Ottoman Turk’ may perhaps be seen as the generalized challenger, on par with the European self as to the ‘codification of a monotheistic religion, the efficiency of political organization, and military prowess.’ (49). I add to this argument by pointing out that the figure of the Turk is the anti-Europe, displaying and enabling a transition from Christendom to Europe.

In the new context of Europe, the Muslim became an abstract figure who could not provide the function of a generalized, external figure for maintaining the unity of Europe and Europeans. An old enemy of faith, says Bisaha (2004: 5), by humanist writings has turned into a political and cultural threat to the new Europe. The Turk as a figure responded to the function of being the enemy of “not only of Christ but also of Plato,” in other words, the Christian legacy (faith) and secular heritage (culture) of Europe (Levin 2011). For this reason, the rise of the Turks/Ottomans was defined as “the second death of Homer and a second destruction of Plato” by Pius II (Bisaha 2004: 68). The Turk was such a figure, despite the treatment of “the Turk more a secular/cultural menace” and the lack of interest on behalf of European rulers via Christian values from the early 1500s, their representations were drawn from medieval representations of the Saracens (Neumann 1999: 46). As such, “even though a significant portion of the Ottoman Empire was based in Europe, it could not be said to have been of Europe” (40; Naff 1985: 143), as its presence was seen as an “incidental one” that European ideals such as “nation, government, law, sovereign, subject, do not apply to them” (Neumann 1999: 39).¹⁰¹

Such a relationship to “the Turk” as the external Other, first as maintaining a coterminous relationship between Christendom and Europe and then, second, as facilitating the forging of Europe out of Christendom continued as the mode of relationship crystallized by “the Turks” and the “agreed role of cultural and social values” in the maintenance of a European international order in subsequent years (Neumann 1999: 41; Levin, 2011). The decline in the vision of unity

¹⁰¹ “It was specifically denied on both sides that the European powers and Turkey possessed any common interests or values [...] and there were no common institutions, such as united the European powers, in whose working they co-operated” (Bull 1977: 14; Watson 1987). This changed with the Treaty of Paris in 1856 when the Empire was recognized as a permanent member of the European balance of power, whose existence was treated as vital to the Peace of Europe and gave the “right to take part in the benefits of international law and the Concert of Europe” (Gong 1984: 113; also Wight 1977: 116). This status was codified at the Hague Conference in 1899, in which Turkey was included as one of the participants, and was confirmed again by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

via Christendom, the increasing vision of Europe as a balance of power, and its fragmentation into states from the second half of the sixteenth century (Wilson and Dussen 1993: 38) led Europe to become “the standard framework for political thinking” and by the end of the eighteenth century, the coterminous, synonymous existence between Europe and Christendom was replaced with Europe as a secular entity and Enlightenment (38, 43-45, 58).

In 1776, for the first time, the term European civilization was coined by Abbe Baudeau, who stated that “converting Indians to Christianity was not enough. They need to be converted into European *civilization* in order to make real Frenchman of them” (93). Europe was now defined as civilization. While the statement was made in reference to the Native Americans, the proximity of Turks was more effective in delineating the features of Europeanness. The Turk, in that sense, was an effective, constitutive Other of Europe after the eighteenth century. In addition, the Turk, even after the decline of the Ottoman military threat, remained a cultural threat to Europeanness. The lessening of references to Christendom contra the Turk or the secularization process of the Westphalian system after the early eighteenth century (Utrecht Treaty) witnessed the increasing use of the term barbarian to describe the Turk rather than infidel or nonbeliever (Jones 1971). The frequent uses of “humanity, law and social laws” which replaced earlier religious differentiation were reproduced through cultural differentiations between the Turk and Europe as civilization vs. barbarism (Levin 2011; Bisaha 2004; Gong 1985: 7; Neumann 1999; Neuman and Welsh 1991; Delanty 1995). As discussed by Levin (2011), Neumann (1999), Yapp (1992) and others, the majority of texts treating the meaning and scope of Europe and Europeanness after the late eighteenth century excluded the Turk, in one way or another, through certain references to a common ground of culture. The Turks were “wholly Asiatic, despised and

condemned all Christian princes, as infidels [...] worse than savages” (Burke, qtd. in Neumann and Welsh 1991: 341). The relationship to the Turk and the effective continuity of religion as a marker of differentiation led Bull to state that in nineteenth century, “the idea of international society was a privileged association of Christian, European, civilized states” (1990: 82).

“The standard of civilization” was characterized in opposition to the figure of the Turk as a Muslim barbarian. Therefore, the acceptance of the Ottoman Empire with the Paris Treaty (1856) was not the inclusion of the Turks into Europe, but into the system as the system “demarcates between states which were full members of the 'civilized' international society from those which were merely part of the European international system” (Gong 1984: 10-13). James Lorimer’s distinction between civilized and barbarous humanity, in which political recognition was extended to European states, European settlements, and partial political recognition was also extended to the Turks (along with Persia, China and Japan) (Neumann and Welsh 1991: 344). This was, to the Turks, nothing but “the bitter experience” of the European standard of civilization.¹⁰² The Turk was part of interstate relations, not the European community (Neumann 1999: 59). In short, the figure of the Turk was at the center of both the coterminous existence of Europe as Christendom, Europe as civilization and Europe as the balance of power, and the processes that laid the ground for the emergence of Europe as such.

¹⁰² “In the case of the Turks, we have had [a] bitter experience of the consequences of extending the rights of civilisation to barbarians who have proved to be incapable of performing its duties, and who possibly do not even belong to the progressive races of mankind” (Lorimer, qtd in Wight 1977: 12).

5.5. Europe: Movement and Consolidation

Yapp (1992), following and suggesting such a framework, implies that the emergence of Europe as such, as a politically and culturally distinct entity, must be located in the mid-eighteenth century. In doing so, Yapp joins several others by identifying the breakup of Mediterranean unity as laying, via the Roman Church and Papacy, the ground for the emergence of Europe as an entity and the Carolingians' era as giving a political and territorial definition to Latin Christendom (136-137). In his reading, the trinity of the constituents of the definition of Europe (Greek Thought, Roman Law, and Christianity) was seen as a retrospective attribution formulated only in the nineteenth century; they had been not peculiar to Europe but "part and parcel of the Near East and Mediterranean as common ingredients" (ibid).

Europe being formed by what it is not varied historically, but "the nearest, the most obvious and the most threatening has been the Islamic Near East, represented from the fourteenth century onwards by the menace of the Ottoman empire" (135). Yapp then examines the relationship between the two to detect the emergence of Europe to show that the emergence of Europe required a "waning of the power of the idea of Christendom," its abandonment as describing a cultural-political community (138, 134).

Yapp further identifies several moments and aspects in the formation of Europe out of Christendom: The Schism of 1054, which identified Latin Christendom with Europe and ended the possibility of maintaining a single cultural (as Europe) entity by dividing the East from Western Europe; the lack of a perfect coincidence between Europe and Christendom by the Muslim presence in southeastern Europe, even after 1492; the universalist pretensions of

Christianity acting “as a brake on the elaboration of the concept, Crusades being a Catholic call not a Christian per se vocation or crusading message as not being couched in European terms, (135-140). In that reading, 1453 constitutes a definitive rupture, but is still seen as “another sad stage in the retreat of Christendom” and as a “religious duty” that was responded to by heretics as well. For Europe as such to emerge required the figure of the Turk to be “the enemy of culture and faith.” However, the Christian image prevailed until the end of the seventeenth century, as observed in the Vienna siege (1683), and the calls for the Holy League as the defense of Christendom, against the Ottoman Empire, which is defined as “the last major representation of Europe as Christendom” (143-146).

To display the shift from Christendom to Europe, Yapp focuses on the instructions to “European” ambassadors and the exchanges between them. Throughout the mid-seventeenth century, references to Christendom prevail and Europe is referred to in geographical terms, though priority is given to Christendom, Christian princes and Christian nations. Beginning at the end of the seventeenth century, there is a decisive shift from Christendom to Europe and the terms used: “the affairs of Europe,” “the general affairs of Europe,” “all the forces of Europe joined together,” “the principal powers of Europe,” “the general good of Europe,” “the general well-being of Europe,” and “the balance of Europe” (143-146). In his reading, the transition took place between the second half of the seventeenth century and first part of the eighteenth century (145). Yapp, then, compares two figures (Leibniz and Montesquieu) to trace the intellectual transition from Christendom to Europe as such.

Leibniz is treated as a transitional figure whose views are “essentially medieval” (146), but accommodates the new configuration of European states. As a staunch supporter of the ideal of *Respublica Christiana* and the image of the Holy Roman Empire, a vocal critique of dis-unified Christian princes and states, in 1672 and 1677, Leibniz suggested that a “War Against Turk” would unify Christians and enable the Christian Emperor to emerge as “the avenger of outraged justice, the head of Christendom, the delight of Europe and of mankind.” While the infusion between Christianity and Europe could be detected earlier, by 1683 and 1701, the infusion gained further strength: “the foundations of peace in Europe,” “to make Europe peaceable and happy,” and “keeping the Turks out of Europe,” as they are not Europeans (145-146). On the other hand, Montesquieu is treated as a founding figure of Europe who treats the priorities, definitions of religion, and different attributes of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. In Montesquieu, religion is treated as a matter of social utility, not of a truth, and through such a perception, he substitutes secular themes (size, climate, and the role of women in society) for religious distinctions, enabling him to release Europe from drowning into Christendom. Europe “for the first time, as a geographical, cultural, political and intellectual entity with its own history and its own distinctive features” is invented by Montesquieu (147). Europe is identified with law, morality, aristocracy, monarchy, liberty, and the Ottoman Empire (Asia and Non-Europeans) is identified with a series of lacks or misbehavior, by which Oriental despotism is “irrevocably and peculiarly located in Asia” (151). Similar to Montesquieu, Voltaire also cultivates a distinct view of Europe having its own peculiarities of development, habits and genius different from the Turks (152).

In Yapp's reading, Europe seemed to be an answer developed in response to or through engagement with the Turks, as he contextualizes the traits attributed to Europe, which enabled it to emerge as a distinct entity in conjunction with its relationship to the Ottoman Empire. However, Yapp states:

The emergence of the notion of Europe as a cultural and political entity out of the medieval ideal of Christendom was not [...] the product of contemplation of the Turks. It was the culmination of a process which began with the breakup of Mediterranean unity and continued with the emergence of the Carolingian state, the split between Orthodox and Latin Christendom, the breakdown of Catholic unity in western Europe, the decline in the role of religion in politics and the development of the scientific revolution. It owed something to the decline of Ottoman military prowess and the removal of Christian fears of Muslim conquest. *The process reached its fruition in that process of secularization of thought which we call the Enlightenment. It was especially at this last stage that the Turks became the mirror of Europe. For when the old religious marker had lost its power to put men into categories, new secular markers were needed to establish cultural and political identity* (152, emphasis added).

In Yapp's reading, Europe as such is identified with secular markers. It is only through these markings that Europe emerged as a distinct entity. For this reason, he claims that "Christianity acted as a brake on the consolidation of Europe," and "the power of Islam was a factor in prolonging the domination of Christendom as a political as well as a cultural concept" (138).

One of the problems with such a reading is to read the ruptures, articulations, re-deployments and transitions to a specific stage in "European history" through a term that emerged as *a culmination of* several events spanning more than a millennium (from the dissolution of Mediterranean unity until the eighteenth century): "Europe as distinct cultural entity" was frequently referred to by him (137-141). If the term is a culmination of several events, then it cannot be the sole standard through which to judge its own existence before "its

emergence,” without attributing a given, ahistorical twist to the term. It instead turned out to be a self-referential entity, not the culmination of a standard, end-point, or trajectory, but a telos that owns its own beginning in itself.

Second, the majority of reservations leveled against Christianity by Yapp and others to contextualize the emergence of Europe via secular markers, as not being able to maintain a distinctive European entity (as a cultural-political entity), could be leveled against the notion of Europe as a cultural entity: the case of Eastern and Western Europe, or the case of Russia and the Balkans in the imagination of Europe and European cultural unity has always been subject to contestation.

Contestation is a not only a matter of truth, but of social-political use, as it displays varying visions of “Europe as a distinctive entity,” which negates the homogeneity that is attributed to the standard of Europe as a cultural entity. Yapp himself refers to certain readings that criticize the exclusion of the Turk and Russian from Europe as a distinct entity, albeit a weak strand. In such a case, is it viable to assume that Europe began to lose its distinctiveness as an entity, or not? If not,, then why is it subsumed under the label of Europe? If so, how could it maintain its supposedly universal (secular and not-religious) features? Just as Christendom did not coincide with all Christians, Europe did not coincide with “the Europeans.” However, Yapp and others, either explicitly or implicitly, assume that the former could not act as the founder of Europe, but the latter does without specifying the reasons.

The third point is related to Yapp's *repeated* use of the adjective "Europeans," invented by Pius II as a response to 1453, when he discusses the instructions given to "European ambassadors" and their responses when examining the transition, which pre-dates the emergence of Europe and the reign of Christendom over Europe. As adjectives (Europeans) describe, limit, and qualify a noun and a pronoun, it requires a space, content, subject or thing to describe and limit. A thing that deserves to be called "European" presupposes the existence Europe as such, not only as geography, but with certain qualities as distinct from other potential adjectives. Here, it must be pointed out that Yapp refrains to use terms, such as "Christian ambassadors" (144), other than in reference to figures and texts directly associated with the Catholic Church. One way to resolve such a problematic is not to maintain an exclusivist relationship between Christendom and Europe or Christians and Europeans, but to accept the coterminous existence of the two, particularly after the Fall of Constantinople. But Yapp does not do so.

Another striking aspect of Yapp's reading is the absence of any treatment on the impact of the New World on the consolidation of Europe as such, despite a passing reference to the New World as "challenging the existing old ideas in the Old world and may have helped to forge the idea of Europe" (135). However, Yapp refrains from discussing the articulation between the New and Old world in terms of its impact on the notion of Europe. If Yapp pursued such a thread, his limitation on the emergence of Europe as such with secular markers would be challenged, since, as mentioned previously, the secularization or being compelled to relinquish the political power of the Church in Europe did not extend to the New World, as the Church proclaimed sovereignty over other parts of the world (Grovogui 19). Similarly, the voyage of discovery was a continuation of the expansionist Christendom (286; France 2005). The mission was now

dominated by the state and was “annexed to the newly emerging monarchical states (299). While Pope Pius II calls for crusades did not garner much attention, the crusading enthusiasm towards the New World enabled Europeans, particularly Castile and Portugal, to employ them as instruments of state-building, which helped consolidate European identity, European territory, and the idea of Europe.

At this point, it must be added that the threat posed by the Ottoman Empire was still rising: they gained Otranto (southeast Italy) in 1480, which intensified concerns on the expansion of the Turks (289). This political context reveals the effective impact of 1453 and the importance attributed to the coming fall of Granada. However we approach the distinctiveness of 1492 and its subsequent impact, it is understood simultaneously as a European and a Christian success in defending Europe from both heretics and Asiatic remnants.

These developments suggest that the Christianization of Europe and the Europeanization of Christianity were complementary processes. Two quotes, one from the mid-sixteenth century, revealing perceptions on the unification of Spain and the other from the early seventeenth century, demonstrating a sense of Euro-Christian superiority, may explicate the perception of Christianity in terms of its expansion to the New World:

As Ferdinand and Isabella were granted the mission to extirpate those three diabolical squadrons, perfidious Judaism, false Mohammedanism and blind idolatry, along with the fourth squadron of the heretics whose remedy is the Holy Inquisition, in like manner the business of completing this task has been reserved for their royal successors; so that as Ferdinand and Isabella cleansed Spain of these wicked sects, in like manner their royal descendants will accomplish the universal destruction of these sects throughout the whole world and the final conversion of all the people of the earth to the bosom of the church (Mendiate, qtd from France 2005: 296).¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Gerónimo de Mendiate 1525-1604, quoted, 296). *From the World of Catholic Renewal* by Chisa Hsia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).

The second quote from 1625 is by Purchas, who represents the consolidated view of Europe as Euro-Christian reality:

Europe is taught the way to scale heaven not by mathematical principles, but by divine verity. Jesus Christ is their way, their truth, their life; who hath long been given a bill of divorce to ungrateful Asia, where he was born, and Africa, the place of his flight and refuge, and is become almost wholly and only European. For little do we find of this name in Asia, less in Africa, and nothing at all in America, but later European gleanings (qtd. from Roberts, 1985: 130).

In both quotes, we notice a sense of superior European identity, a confidence and attachment to Europe, Christianity, and Europeans simultaneously. Europe became virtually and wholly interchangeable with Christendom and “even Christ become wholly and only European” (129-130). The next phase in the “movement” of Europe was to translate this experience and the language of Europe into a global landscape by the discovery of 1492. The next chapter will focus on the history of Europe, the idea of Europe, and the reality of Europe after this period.

In this chapter, I have continued to examine the history of Europe through a focus on the Christianization of Europe, the Europeanization of Christianity, and the Europeanization of Europe. The central claim has been that, alongside the dynamic relationship between the internal Others of Europe and Europe, both the Christianization and Europeanization of Europe represent attempts at *appropriating* the landscape on which the “Europeans” were living. In this history of

appropriation, the retreat from the East and attempts at internal consolidation represent two main paths to realize the task, in addition to the changes in the European political landscape.¹⁰⁴

Throughout the Europeanization of Europe and the territorialization of Christianity, the rise of the Ottomans and the figure of the Turk have been extensively exploited in “internal” struggles on the meaning and scope of being European/being Christian. Moreover, it was deployed to solidify a sense of Europeanness beyond religious and ethnic affiliations, and in these processes, the writings of humanists have been effective in their insistence on references to civilization, superiority, and the progress of Europe. Moreover, one may locate the emergence of the structuring of Europe, Europeanness, and the idea of Europe in this historical transformation and the subsequent challenges and encounters, specifically 1492, with its novel impacts on these themes, creating a global effect or even the earth as “globe,” hence, a Eurocentric world order. This is the task of the next chapter in which I return to a conceptual discussion on Europe, Eurocentrism and Nomos of the World.

¹⁰⁴ Held (1992: 72-86) offers a detailed schema displaying the constitutive relationship between European identity and political forms of state organization in Europe after the fall of Rome. As it has been shown, depending on the form of state formation, the idea of European identity takes a different shape or vice versa.

6.0. The Discovery of Europe

In the previous chapter, through a focused discussion on/analysis of the Christianization of Europe and the Europeanization of Christianity, I examined the concomitant Europeanization of Europe. Throughout this process, which never ended and continued to be articulated in different ways, the landmass called Europe, “a small heading of the Asiatic continent [...] Western appendix of Asia,” turned out to be not only a “geographical, factual and natural unity” (Dainotto, 2007: 12), but also (claimed to be) the founder and architect of both the modern world and “modernity.” Focusing on internal dynamics, Robert Bartlett, describes the emergence and consolidation of European ‘unity’:

By 1300 Europe existed as an identifiable cultural entity. It could be described in more than one way, but some common features of its cultural face are the saints, names, coins, charters and educational practices [...] By the late medieval period Europe’s names and cultures were more uniform than they had ever been; Europe’s rulers everywhere minted coins and depended on chanceries: Europe’s bureaucrats shared a common experience of higher education. This is the Europeanization of Europe (1993: 291).

J. Hale refers to the cartographic imagination of Europe to demonstrate the continuation of this transformation (1993: 17-23). For instance, until the late fifteenth century, Jerusalem was placed at the center of virtually all medieval maps. However, beginning in the early sixteenth century, imagining Europe as a unity in and of itself had become a priority and, in 1511, the first map of Europe independent of Jerusalem would be drawn. Europe would be drawn as a whole, playing down the fragmentation of Europe (236). By 1700, Europe would become “the standard framework for political thinking” (Wilson and Dussen, 1993: 43). The identity of Europe and Europeans has been consolidated throughout this process, in spite of and also in concert with the impact of retreat in 1453 (the fall of Constantinople) and attempts at expansion to the New

World (1492). The formation of Europe accompanied and was structured by “the idea of Europe” or Europe as an idea. Europe, more than a continent, is “a reality, an idea and an identity” (Delanty, 1995: 9)

The exploration and expansion begun in 1492 was a momentous event, forging a template upon which the reality, idea and identity of Europe has been articulated for a discourse on the idea of Europe. The encounter with the Native Americans and the challenge presented by the Turks, alongside efforts at secularization and the claim of civilizational superiority with references a “European civilization” (coined in 1766), Europe had become a “universal vocation to be filled.” Beginning in the nineteenth century, the belief in the ‘supremacy’ of European civilization was consolidated through linear histories of civilizational progress and a proliferation of studies on the “history of European culture” (Wilson and Dussen, 1993: 9-14). Through this process, the idea of Europe or Europe as an idea has been effective and refers to a claim or attempt to develop “a European consciousness for European community.” While Delanty (1995: 8) takes this “idea of Europe” to be the condition of possibility for Europe per se, it had essentially been “subordinated” (assuming that it previously existed) to other priorities, such as Christendom or the Mediterranean, and became a dominant driving theme only through and succeeding the post-1492 history of the Europe. In other words, it must be considered/examined in a “global context of world-views and nation-state” (Swedberg 1994: 381).

The task of this chapter is to undertake a discussion of the post-1492 era of Europe and, hence, the world, given the impact of the act, on the concept of Europe, Europeans and Eurocentrism. In the first section, I focus on the meaning and implications of 1492. In the second, I

contextualize the conceptual framework suggested in the dissertation and revisit my central claim of Eurocentrism as the Nomos of the world. I contend that there could be no Europe and no Europe could exist (a Eurocentric one) without the idea of Europe or Europe as an idea. The cyclical nature of the relationship between the idea, the reality and the history of Europe owes not only its existence to Eurocentrism as Nomos of the Earth, but also represents how Eurocentrism maintained and claimed its existence by moving beyond its temporality, ethnocentrism and the particularity of Europe to translate itself into a claim for “universality.”

6.1. Europe, the World and 1492: “Marvelous Whole”

The year 1492 represents the culmination of a long history that had developed beginning with the early tenth century (economic progress, consolidation of power in European states, unification attempts in Europe, Mongol invasions, the Christianization of Europe, population growth, the end of the Byzantine Empire as the center of European/world? Power, the fall of the? Carolingian and Holy Roman Empires, the Europeanization of Europe, etc.) until the late fifteenth century. Symbolically, 1492 represents the concurrent Christianization of Europe and Europeanization of Christianity, as well as the very birth of Europe, even though the act of discovery was not counted among the “prominent events” described in the early chronicles of the sixteenth century (Attali, 1999: 11, 207-212). By the act of 1492, the history of the world has become a “continent-history,” and within the lexicon of the “Europeans,” the world has come to represent a global unity between 1480 and 1510 (109). While the act has had a decisive impact, its meaning varied through the historical transformation of Europe and the West.

In 1892, for instance/example, the quadricentenary celebrated the progress of Western technology, the Christian religion and other Western achievements (democracy, rule of law, etc.). Though viewed as the natural and necessary birth of a great notion of the West (Axtell, 1992: 27), it served as more of a justification of European colonialism.

However, at the quincentenary of 1492 the theme of the celebration was characterized as an *encounter*, implying a reciprocal relationship “without imposing a given value to the nature of the contact or its outcome” (289), encompassing not only an encounter of people, but also of ideas, institutions, habits, values, animals, diseases, etc. Therefore they are temporal and spatially fluid (289). It was seen as/considered a mutuality of “discovery and acculturation during the five hundred years of ongoing encounter” (26).

In addition, three major developments in 1492 would leave their stamp/mark on the future of Europe and the world. The first was the solution to the Muslim and Jewish presence in Europe (by destroying Al-Andalus) and the final appropriation of Europe. The second was the discovery of the Americas and the appropriation of new territories. The third was the beginning of a new world system, one of production and distribution. Together these three “events” represent the codification of the framework in which global history became a possibility in the lingua franca of Europeanness and its perceived superiority. Continuity in the language of “the idea of Europe” was maintained through a decisive discontinuity in terms of a geographical-territorial imagination, as well as notions of identity and political subjectivity. These events have led to a reconceptualization of the vision and scope of both the image of time and that of religion.

The ultimate destruction of the Muslim Empire in Spain, Al-Andalus, came in January 1492 with the fall of Granada, which had been under attack for the last/nearly a decade in response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Though Christianity was symbolically retreating from the East, it served as a unifying force in the West. Christopher Columbus gained the support/patronage of the Catholic monarchs only after the fall of Granada. According to Davies, “Yet it [Columbus’s voyage] could hardly have taken place, still less been exploited, if the Iberian kingdoms had not been freed from their preoccupations with Islam. After all, Ferdinand and Isabella had stubbornly refused to negotiate with Columbus until the fall of Granada was accomplished” (1998: 454).

Within the history and emergence of Europe, the conquest of Granada was more than an effort to regain control of a particular tract of land. In response to the loss of Constantinople, the appropriated territory was already considered part and parcel of what was believed to be Europe as a geographic-topographic space. Therefore, what emerged was not merely control of a piece of land, but an act of creation that united both Catholic Spain and Europe while cleansing it of what was believed to be non-European features. This laid the foundation, both psychologically and politically, for encouraging further “expeditions” to new lands, as symbolized by the Spaniards’ support to the Portuguese adventurer. Latin Christianity had begun to look westward (Levin 2011: 43).

The appropriation of Andalusia was one of the final acts in Europe preceding the modern age. Since the fourteenth century, as previously discussed, most of Europe was already involved in a process of creating a homogenous unity. Andalusia was the last remaining territorial space

that was considered as weakening the construction of a pure Christian Europe. The choice was clear: either Europe or Andalusia, but not coexistence. European persecution reached its zenith in this period (43). The new Europe could not bear to be “sullied” by the Muslim and Jewish presence. In addition, after the loss of Constantinople and the fall of Granada, Europe solidified its Christian identity to represent the whole of Christendom. The process was complete.

Over the centuries, Andalusia came to exemplify the de-naturalization of established dichotomies between Christian, Muslim and Jewish identities. Rather than being considered as naturally given, exclusive dynamics, such as Muslim Other and Christian self, Andalusia verified that the exclusionary relationship must be performed and its superseding/overcoming of these divisions was a practical achievement (76).

Before the destruction of Andalusia and 1492, Europe was identified in opposition to its eastern frontier and internal Others were treated as an extension of the East. The destruction of Andalusia paved the way for the consolidation of the West. Delanty contends that “Columbus was the harbinger of the new replacing Charlemagne” (43), and it was the very destruction of Andalusia that enabled Columbus to become that herald of the West. Moreover, the conquest of Spain ended the long European absence from Mediterranean. However, the Mediterranean was no longer a defining feature or aspect of either the geographic-topographic space called Europe or even part and parcel of its identity. Europe had become the West and the Mediterranean, rather than implying a generalized framework in which Europe was neither the origin nor the center but only a part of it, was subjugated and treated as a border.

However, the increasing secularization of Latin Christendom, its internal struggles, as well as subsequent religious wars, paved the way for a consolidated idea of the West that transformed into an “outward movement” (43). Whereas 1492 consolidated Europe as the West, 1492 saw the re-appropriation of Andalusia as a Christian, Western space. In addition, 1492 saw the discovery of a vast territory, “unsullied by the pagan, heretic, continuously poisoned by Asiatic imports such as Jews, Muslims and Slavs,” which was open/ready for the realization of the meaning and scope of European identity. America, in the eyes of the Europeans became a space for performing and constructing true Christianity, “a new territory available for missionary work, adventure and personal advancement to a European society” (Roberts 1985: 136).

In the imagination of the Europeans, the New World of the Americas was nothing but “unsullied land”—unlike Europe. Despite these “cleansings,” new articulations and shuffling attempts, Europe had a history. That history was “sullied” with Asiatic, eastern diseases, such as the Muslims, the Slavs, and the Jews (Roberts, 1997: 69).¹⁰⁵ Unlike Europe’s troubled history, the Americas were a paradise, a *terra nullis* that had the potential to be the perfect land upon which to cultivate a true and pure Christianity (Attali, 1999: 118).

In that sense, 1492 was not only the discovery of the Americas, it was the invention of Europe as the West. Depicted as an “untouched continent,” America was geographically distant enough from anything resembling eastern origins, including Islam and Judaism. It is crucial to note that 1492 assisted the birth of Europe, not America (233-234). It is no coincidence that the rise of Europe refers to the consolidation and appropriation of the Americas and its impact on the continent of Europe.

¹⁰⁵ See chapter 5 section 5.2.

1492 had also invested into a vision and understanding of time. Geographic distance was evaluated according to temporal rather than spatial measurements, and the old grammar of Europe (primitive vs. civilized, underdeveloped vs. developed, enslaved vs. free, etc.) was redeployed on a global scale (198). The past, present and future were embodied in the idea of Europe, European success and, hence, subjectivity: the past as Christianity in opposition to Islam and Judaism, as well as the rejection of Europe's Eastern origins. The present was the act of creating a new social-political entity in the Americas by the Europeans, along with its morality and rules of engagement. The future lay in the ability of Europeans to discover and mold the New World. In other words, though Europe was a subject of this process, its history was the past of (European) humanity. This explains why the idea of progress had become a unifying theme for many scholars, philosophers and politicians of the time (le Goff 2005: 209). Progress became the only theme that promised a future, out of the past's successes, but only of and for Europe and Europeans.

Rejecting its problematic past, the re-writing of Europe, and the political investment in the Americas were directed towards inventing the New Europe: Europa as the birthfather of the world. However, to accomplish this, it first had to re-articulate its origin. The center of Europe would be no longer be Jerusalem, but Rome (Attali 1999: 259). This time, Europe would be reproduced not through Christianity, but through secularism, wars of religion and the reformation process (Levin 2011; Delanty 1995).

An autonomous discourse of Europe has emerged through these historical developments. What is called Eurocentrism has functioned/operated as the constitutive framework and

mechanism for this autonomous discourse of Europe. This discourse found its first concrete shape in the Christianization of Europe beginning in the fifth century with the interaction between Christians, feudal lords, Muslims, Jews, and heretics. Throughout this transition, varying conceptualizations of Christianity marked the/impressed upon very notion of Europe. It took five centuries to form a concrete vision of Europe to speak of as such. Beginning in/with the tenth/10th century, the notion of Europe became synonymous with Christianity, peaking by the end of the fifteenth/15th century, which was represented by 1453 (the elimination of the Eastern half) and 1492 (the discovery of a new continent, the appropriation of Andalusia and the unity of Europe). However, the rise of Europe and absolute Christianization of Europe was sullied/besmirched by the internal struggle between Protestants and Catholics (Robert 1985; Davies 1998). The language of Christianity, then, was an inadequate vocabulary/vernacular with which to “encompass” the world in its entirety. The 1492 invention of the world, known as discovery, was a complete and decisive breakdown of the “common historical conditions on which rested the pre-modern Afro-EuroAsian historical complex as a whole” (Hodgson 1963: 250). The discovery has been characterized as an encounter, which Europe responded to by attempting to solidify its origin.

From within this process of stabilizing/codifying the idea of Europe came the ability/possibility to construct a discourse or to speak through a discourse that resonates with Europeans. Once it became an autonomous discourse, it relied on an articulation of new values, described as European ones, which were “fully articulated” in the late seventeenth century according to Delanty (1995: 30-32).

6.2. *Europe: Beginnings and the World*

From the outset, the concept of Europe has gained its meaning through what it is not and despite analytical notes of caution, the history of Europe, its historiography and the history of the idea of Europe have been intertwined, which problematizes any sustained, clear divisions between the three (Swedberg 1994: 4; Delanty 1995; Dainotto 2007; Levin 2011; Wilson and Dussen 1993).¹⁰⁶ In writing the story of Europe, whether its beginnings, its journey, or its self-formation, certain terms have taken precedence: disjunction, contrast, contraposition, opposition, antithesis, polarization, other, alterity, and difference (Dainotto 2007: 55).¹⁰⁷ In this way, theories of Europe “have described little but have prepared lots of commonplaces that shapes what we think, say, legislate, and in the end make, of Europe” (7).

As mentioned by Dainotto, theories on the history of Europe and European historiography are simultaneously/concurrently theories and histories that also relate the start/origin of other things (2007: 14-17). For instance, Hale (1993) locates the beginnings between 1450-1623 and narrates the story of Europe through/by using references, images, and symbols that maintain cultural unity in Europe, as well as its process of formation leading to Renaissance culture. Bartlett (1993), as discussed previously, refers to the formation of national identities and customs in Europe by examining the Europeanization of Europe. Dussel (1993), on the other hand, follows Heller (1991) and Hall (1992) by locating the origin of modernity when writing the history of Europe: “Modernity, [the] creation of Europe, itself created Europe” and Europe is an ideological formation centered/premised on the discourse of modernity. In Yapp’s

¹⁰⁶ See chapter 3.

¹⁰⁷ Dainotto (2007) tells a different story of Europe to move beyond these terms; however, he again focuses on the internal divisions between the South and North of Europe to write his story. See *Europe (in Theory)*.

reading (1992), as discussed previously, the history of Europe is both the history of secularism and its beginning. For world system theorists, what we see as the formation of Europe is the realization of new world-system. Held (1992) repeats the same story of Europe when discussing the beginning of the/a modern Westphalian order. These examples could be augmented, but they all verify the claim posited by Dainotto: “Speaking of Europe—implicitly or explicitly, consciously or not—creating a theory not only of Europe itself but of a whole series of other things” (17). Then the questions remains: How do we tell the story of Europe?

The notion of Europe and the European was employed in a systematic way beginning at the end of the seventeenth/17th century, following the territorialization of Christianization, the Christianization of Europe, the Europeanization of Europe, the expulsion of Muslims and Jews in 1492, the appropriation of the Americas in 1492, the secularization of the political grammar of European elites, etc. The concept of Christendom was at the core of “European identity” and it was through the dislocation of this constitutive term, both internally and then externally, which leaves in its place the notion, name, and idea of Europe. As part of this process of transformation, there have been certain constituent themes: progress, superiority, organization, secular cultural tradition, entrepreneurship, liberty against despotism, the balance of power against Oriental despots, civilized manners against savagery, etc..

One way to resolve this difficulty is to draw a categorical distinction between the idea of Europe and the history of Europe. Delanty (1995) has claimed to define the idea of Europe as an “essentially cultural idea based on a geopolitical entity.” In his reading, it is the politicization of such a cultural idea that results in/leads to “a distorted and regressive adversarial system.” To

alleviate this tension, Delanty suggests severing the connection between the idea of Europe and European identity, specifically its ethno-culturalism.

Treating the concept of Europe as an ‘invention,’ Delanty contends that Europe has been a historical projection, a universalizing idea, under threat of fragmentation, becoming a cultural idea first and then a self-conscious political identity (3-5). The politicization of a cultural idea (Europe as an idea or Europeanness) in Delanty’s reading is nothing but the process in which they become ideologies, rather than “references of shared experiences, common goals and a collective horizon but by the negation of the other” (5). In this reading, the state, economy, culture and society are defined as constitutive structures of the idea of Europe. As a discourse, the idea of Europe has been articulated through “Christendom, civilization, the west, imperialism, racism, fascism, and modernity” (9). Such articulations legitimated the consolidation of a secular, territorial state-system that was nothing more than a “reification of ethical postulates” (11). Delanty then suggests a focus on/calls attention to the tension between the two functions of the idea of Europe: Europe as a geo-political name and Europe as a cultural framework.

The difficulty with Delanty’s reading, particularly in his analysis of beginnings, is symptomatic of almost all major readings on the history of Europe and its conceptualization: one cannot have an idea of something that does not exist.

Europe as an idea can operate only as a category if the idea is contextualized within the discourse of Europe (reality, name and history)—claimed to be the result of the idea itself. Such a term constantly eludes re-contextualization because it is both the subject and object of the

formation of European history within historiographies of Europe. The relationship between empirical developments of European history is subjugated to a notion that exists externally to them, yet continues towards a teleological direction defined by progress. Europe as an idea or the idea of Europe must be contextualized to examine the consequences of its articulations. Each European political-geographical encounter, be it one of fragmentation, a lack of unity, or the Muslim threat, or an opportunity vis-à-vis expansion, discovery, appropriation of new lands, leaves its trace on the idea itself. Delanty demonstrates this by referring to a plurality of themes that have participated in the articulation of the concept and idea of Europe, such as modernity, Christendom, progress, etc. However, his use of the term (plurality) shows that “pluralism is not a safeguard against essentialism” (Sayyid 2007).

Delanty undertakes a detailed reading of the transitions from the decline of the Roman Empire to the expansion of Christianity, and then the Christianization of Europe and the secularization process, which he argues created the ground for the formation of “fully articulated” European values. Similarly, the idea of Europe was constructed in terms of oppositions, encounters and processes of articulations with non-Europeans, particularly the Ottoman expansion. According to Delanty, the idea of Europe transformed into a European identity once it managed to refer to a distinctively European civilization (15-30). I believe that what we observe is the conflation of the formation of the discourse of Europe with the idea of Europe, which comes into existence only after the construction of Europe as an origin. The cultural idea of Europe and Europe as geopolitical framework, in Delanty’s reading, is presented as a subject of tension. However, the geopolitical imagination of Europe has always been articulated through various insertions, omissions and supplements to the cultural idea of Europe. In other words,

there is neither Europe as a geopolitical framework nor Europe as a cultural idea without a specific politico-historical context. This tension is itself a space for/site of struggle between varying perceptions of Europe.

The resolution of the difficulty between the cultural ideal and the geopolitical framework, in Delanty's reading, was accomplished through the invention of the notion of West. While it reveals a certain dynamic, such a reading must also be articulated along with/with due attention to the rise of secularism, the emergence of subjectivity, the idea of humanity and the invention of the subject. Delanty refrains from such an articulation and focuses on a given tension rather than discussing the genealogical formation of the tension itself.

For Delanty, "[...] to imagine Europe involved [the] privileging of a particular discourse over others, during the Middle Ages it was Islam vs. Christianity and during the early modern ages it was nature vs. civilization" (31). However, I claim that in order to speak of an imagination of Europe, a discursive formation of Europe must also be considered/taken into consideration. Imagining Europe itself is part and parcel of a Eurocentric formation of Europe. It is not simply an addendum to the process, but comprises/is the structure of the process itself. Such a constitutive link between the imagination of Europe and Eurocentrism is most visible in the persistence of religious wars, the invention of the human, the rise of humanism, the Reformation, universality, and the globe.

6.2.1. The Age of Europe, Eurocentrism, and 1492

The majority of readings on the notion of Eurocentrism situate the discussion in relation to claims of superiority (racial, psychological, political, historical, etc.). It is thus assumed that simply offering counter-examples of such claims to European superiority or tracing interactions between “civilizations” serve as adequate critiques of Eurocentrism.¹⁰⁸ I contend, however, that what we have here is a confusion and conflation of the symptoms of Eurocentrism with the very concept itself. In order to adequately understand either its attributes or symptoms, one must first codify a definition of the concept.

Eurocentrism is much more than a claim of superiority, but the ways in which historical events are treated as the unfolding of a reality, as expansion and the realization of a thing: Europe. Eurocentrism lies not simply in the claim of superiority but in the unfolding itself, as if nothing can detract from the pure essence of Europe. As such, Europe is treated as a concept immune from certain historical experiences—e.g. colonialism, racism, imperialism—in the language of Eurocentrism.

Once a pre-given totality is assumed, the symptoms themselves are subjugated to the pre-given totality, and they lose their distinctive trajectories. Attributes cannot be understood with an assumption to a pre-given totality. Each attempt at shattering the totality through encounters with another reaction from the totality results in fragmentary readings, often reproducing power relations or de-legitimizing counter-positions, which reproduces the totality itself. One way to counter this is to distinguish between Eurocentrism itself and Eurocentrism as an ideology of

¹⁰⁸ See chapter 3.

decline. Such a distinction paves the way to elucidating the difference between the Nomos, which refers to strategies directed at ordering the universe and ideology as a mere display of worldview. In this framework, Eurocentrism is defined as an ideology of decline and Nomos as one of the rise. It is a mechanism providing ontological security to Europeanness and Europe. It is easy to detect as an ideology, but difficult to see it as a Nomos, which is why most criticisms of Eurocentrism limit themselves to the decline.¹⁰⁹

One way to summarize post-1492 global history is to define it as a consolidation of Eurocentrism, which occurred through the equation between the notion of European, European identity, European values and universality (representing the natural, scientific progress, and the final destiny of human history). It was not a matter of assumed “European superiority” in technology, science or material wealth, but rather the ways in which the accumulation of capital helped maintain superiority and its adjective (European), which requires to be inquired (Roberts 1985: 131).

Countering Eurocentric claims, Delanty focuses on moments shaping European identity, which existed by the fifteenth century. According to Delanty, European identity was shaped more by defeat rather than victory and “buttressed by the image of the Orient as its common enemy” (36). European identity undoubtedly emerged from/out of certain articulations, with its “withdrawal” from the Byzantium Empire as integral to the formation of European identity. Both Hay (1957) and Yapp (1992: 86) demonstrate how the notion of Europe became a frequent part

¹⁰⁹ It must be noted that the decline either refers to the degeneration of a status quo or attempts at protecting the immune character of Europe as universal rather than particular. In that sense, for instance, throughout the formation of Europe in the late 16th century, Eurocentrism as an ideology was preoccupied with preventing the decline of the Europeanization of Christianity. The focus on the European nature of Christianity and Christendom were expressions of such a position.

of social and political life through discourses on the rise of the/impending “Turkish threat” to Europe. Furthermore, “European” was first deployed as a counter to Turkish advances after 1453. Erasmus’s call for the unification of “Europeans” was presented as a response to the Turkish threat. In a sense, it was the “retreat” of Christians that found expression in the rearticulation of European identity through resistance to the Turks (Beck 1987; Schwoebel 1967). However, there is a qualitative difference between “defeat” and re-articulation. Once the formation of European identity is located in the context of defeat rather than re-articulation, its ability to re-contextualize the past, present and future cannot be examined. European identity, in such a reading, is viewed as nothing more than a reactionary defense. On the contrary, European identity, I argue, emerges from processes of articulation to define its position through an engagement with geography, history and subjectivity. In each moment there is a specific promise, an expectation, a cultivation and a dream.

This could be seen most noticeably after 1492 and particularly in the late 16th century. As discussed earlier, the formation of Europe was accompanied by two processes. The concurrent processes of the Christianization of Europe and Europeanization of Christianity and, secondly, arising from the Reformation, the religious struggles between Catholics and Protestants, and with the discourse of Europe ultimately replacing Christendom.

This enabled Europe to portend the existence of cultural unity. However, “cultural unification” was accompanied by a multiplicity of centers of power (states, sects, the papacy, monarchs, etc.) within Europe as a continent, which led Braudel to contend that Europe represented diversity itself and the essential disunity of the Middle Ages (1990: 90). Setting

aside any claim to diversity, it is crucial to note that the first *History of Europe* in a modern context appeared in 1566, which demonstrates the ultimate emergence of Europe “as an entity defined in space and time” (Delanty 1995: 44).

Here, the impact of 1492 becomes most salient. While Europe is freeing itself from being conflated with Christendom and cultivating a broader concept of Europe and Europeans, the idea of Christendom and associated terms (such as the universalism of the church and being open to different human positions) were translated into part of a Western Crusade. Moreover, the discourse of Europe grew more autonomous. The infidel was replaced with the savage and civilization replaced Christianity (le Goff 2005; Attali 1999; Delanty 1995: 45).

Europe was now more than itself: it was the world. The expansion was not merely a simple appropriation of land and conversion (whether forced or through assimilation), but a creation of a new world, a new globe. Europe was becoming a limitless/boundless imagination. However, there had to be certain limits due to the constitutive relationship between Europe and the globe. The success was said to be a European one, representing their ability, success and historical legacy.

The result was groundbreaking: the emergence of a new world, a new international order. The limit was set through the circulation/deployment of certain terms and concepts: race, Christianity, secularism, organization, and civility. What the rest of the world was lacking, was the “itness” of Europe. Just as it was only Europeans who were Christians, it was Christians who were Europeans, and now only Europeans who were civilized.

Externally it was not difficult to express/declare the unity of Europe. Mechanisms were easily produced, such as race, civilization, nature, etc. However, a close reading of the idea of Europe reveals that unity has always been of partial interest. Depending on the historical context, the political needs and priorities of the idea of Europe (as implying a European unity) had always been associated with certain “national” interests. It had been attributed to French politics, defined as Austrian necessity, a Protestant investment, a “Teutonic” imagination, or a requirement for maintaining the balance between Habsburgs and Bourbons, etc. (Mikkeli 1998).

The play of “domestic” plurality on the meaning of the idea of Europe, as well as the assumed unity of Europe outside of Europe, resulted in tensions between nationalisms and the idea of Europe. At certain times, such tensions were highlighted as those between nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

6.2.2. Europe and Cosmopolitanism

The tension between particularity (essential features enabling the success of Europe) and cosmopolitanism (a universalist dream) is one that reveals certain contradictions? in the claims of Eurocentrism (Levin 133-136). Voltaire is a crucial example of an Enlightenment philosopher whose narrative “conforms to the standard Enlightenment narrative of progress ... and [was] embraced by a great number of historians and *philosophes*” [emphasis added](134). Voltaire was one of the first figures to articulate enlightenment along with the rise of Europe. Focusing on the tension/anxieties/dichotomy between/of “European progress” and “Oriental despotism,” Voltaire refers to European communalities, the unification of European nations, the republican nature of

Europe, the ability of Europeans, as well as the differences between them in terms of state structure, political traditions, etc., to live “in harmony with each other,” shared principles of public and political law, respecting for the ambassadors of enemies, negotiations, and the balance of power (Levin 2011). This represents both a recognition of differences within Europe, as well as an insistence upon cross-national regularities, traditions, customs, acts and beliefs. Such commonalities have later been defined under the banner of a unified European state system. However, Voltaire consistently refers to “other parts of the world” as lacking such features. For Voltaire, Europe as a whole, both in terms of its diversity and unity, represents progress in stark contrast to the stagnation, barbarity, and cruelty of the rest of the world. The insistence on cross-national communalities, particularly when it is European, is supposed to be enough for being cosmopolitan. The content of cosmopolitanism is filled with certain themes: progress, law, reason, and the end of barbaric cruelty in war, etc..

Though Voltaire’s reading may be considered as moving beyond nationalist positions, cosmopolitanism is not simply a rejection of nationalism (134). Representing the spirit of the cosmopolitanism of his age, Voltaire was Eurocentric, but not cosmopolitan if understood not simply as a cross-national (European) position, but as a transnational position. Rather than a negation of the idea of Europe or the primacy of Europe and Euro-centrism, nationalism in Europe is instead a condition of its possibility (Delanty 1995: 78). All inquiries for the United States of Europe or the European republic, such as the case of V. Hugo and Voltaire (78), represent such a relationship. The assumed sequence of progress (from the East [due to climate] to the West [due to time, commerce, and industry]) enabled Voltaire to imprison the non-

European world in the past while Europe, for its embraced diversity and cross-national cultural unity, represented both the present (time) and the future (progress).

Levin focuses on Voltaire's differentiation of Europe from the rest of the world. While Levin's reading offers a compelling discussion of the link between nationalism and the cosmopolitanism of early European literature, he instead focuses on the similarities in the vocabulary and images of Islam produced before and after 1492. Levin contends that Voltaire relied on Christian depictions of Islam and appropriated much of the vocabulary of previously established discourses of Christianity (146). The employment of older Christian narratives of Islam, Levin adds, was used "as a means of criticizing the counterpart of Christian contemporaries" (154). By emphasizing the similarities between the images of Islam, Christendom, and secularized Europe, Levin limits his reading to the reproduction of similar prejudices and criticizes the "all too-simple genealogy of [...] secular and universal values that [...] constitute the very basis of the European ideal." The secular idea of Europe owes much to the idea of Europe in the Middle Ages (155). Such a reading is effective in shattering the traditional secular narrative of Europe, which assumes a radical exclusion between the old image, attributes of Europe, and post-sixteenth century Europe.

Such a reading, however, relies on/rests upon the confusion between continuity and reproduction. Despite Levin's careful reading of the similarities and his insistence to avoid falling into a homogenous continuity between the two eras, he still insists upon the continuity of European sensibilities when it comes to the primacy of Europe, thus, limiting his reading of Eurocentricity to an instrumentalist vision of continuity. Contrary to the implications of

continuity, reproduction is not simply a matter of similarity, it is always subjugated to a broader vision, as it can exist only via articulations with new demands: a new vision of order and a new order of the things. What is reproduced, then, does not refer to continuity in itself, but instead exhibits something about the order of things. In the modern context, the order of things has been radically transformed as the world had a global Nomos, named Europe.

To understand the similarities between the depiction of Islam in the two eras, before 1492 and after 1492, the primary questions remain/must be: in both eras, how and why did the idea of Europe remain as the “core” of the/primary distinction (whether as Christian-European values against Islam or secular European values against Islam)?

One answer is guided by an essentialist and foundationalist reading of Europe, which insists upon a radical continuity between these two distinctive eras. Eurocentrism remains a unifying vision thought to offer priority or superiority to the European communality. However, the central claim of this dissertation is that Eurocentrism is far more than that. The link between nationalism (European) and the cosmopolitanism of Europe suggests an alternative path to be followed.

The differences within Europe, as geopolitical territory, did not prevent the assumption of a communal identity, a communality that embodied both the representation of European peculiarities and universality (progress, principles of public and political law). This very connection is what I refer to as Eurocentrism, not Voltaire’s insistence on either communality in Europe or his interest in bringing out the peculiar features of Europe.

The connection became possible only with primacy accorded to Europe. Eurocentrism is then not merely an ethnocentric, claim but a mode of reading, connecting and dividing things. It is a mode of ordering beyond ethnic or geographical superiority, though without necessarily excluding them. In the same line, “the idea of Europe or (unified) Europe finds its most cogent expression in imperialism” (Delanty 1995: 84), and it was the encounter with the others in which the identity of Europe as a European unity/union solidified itself. Domestically, the idea of Europe was subordinated to national positions and differences. Only through the global context, which was created by the act of 1492, did it find its reality. In Delanty’s reading, the trouble with Eurocentrism and the idea of Europe is that “it becomes embedded in regressive forms of identity ceased to be a merely cultural model and became regulative idea of universal ethical culture” (PAGE). Delanty criticizes the universalization aspect of the idea of Europe because he believes it stands as a cultural model of reference for the formation of European identity (85). According to Delanty, it is not supposed to be a normative model and any insistence on an association with “a universal ethical claim is an invasion and reification of the moral space” (85). The crux of the issue for Delanty is in its departure from “a cultural model and becoming a regulative idea of universal ethical culture”. Perhaps the problem here is not simply the reification of the moral space, but the reification of politics, political space, and non-European subjectivities.

The central claim posited here is that there could be no idea of Europe as a cultural model without imagined “regulative universal ethical claims.” The very emergence of the idea of Europe as a cultural model is itself is an indication of Eurocentrism, but not Eurocentrism itself. The confusion here pertains is with the very discourse of Eurocentrism, as well as its features. In

short, there could be no Europe without the claim of universality of Europeanness, given the way in which Europe and Europeanness have each been formed. Europe in this sense is a product, not an origin. Europe as a cultural model is a condition of possibility, not a negation of becoming a regulative idea of universal ethical culture.

Here we must consider the relationship between culture, cultural models, and politics as a matter of contestation. Whereas culture and cultural models are part and parcel of political space (not simply a reflection of it), they are also constitutive of it and constituted by it. Culture is a matter of politics and a consequence of political struggle, both as a product and reflection of it. Otherwise, the legalistic expansion of Europe, the growth of Christianity, the spread of European imperialism and the increasing appropriation of land by Europe would be adequate to universalize the European cultural model without contestation. While Europe was “aspiring” for the world, such an equation was in operation, despite the presence of a certain amount of resistance.

However, we know that despite conversion, modernization, and the proliferating discourse of modernity, there had been another crucial element that prevented the emergence of “truly universal non-Europeans”: race. Throughout the secularization of Europe and the consolidation of a secular Europe after Christendom, the unification of Europe was maintained through a sensibility imbued with the idea of race. Conversion did not assume equality (96). As argued by Pieterse it was race in the secular age, not Christendom or language that united Europe (1992). Likewise, if the idea of Europe was simply a matter of cultural models and Eurocentrism attributed a universalist feature to European “material” success, there must be an irresolvable

tension between the hegemony of the nation-state, the European state system and the idea of Europe. This tension calls for an examination of the relationship between 1492, modernity, and Europe.

6.2.3. Europe, Modernity, and 1492

Enrique Dussel (1992) locates 1492 as the constitutive event of modernity in general and is depicted as “the success of Europe.” Contending that modernity is a European phenomenon constituted in a dialectical relation with non-European alterity arises when Europe, both in practice and as part of a conceptual framework, is affirmed as the “center” of world history. This is a problematic rendering for two reasons in particular/for two crucial reasons..

First, the formation of modernity (or Europe), relies on an act of omission: the political-historical context is reduced to a moment of “waiting to be born” on behalf of Europe. 1492, is treated not as one of alternative paths in human history, but a moment inextricably intertwined with the very existence of Europe. Second is the the radical exclusion of non-European alterity. The Europe of post-1492 was one of the images Europe rather than being the Europe. The very idea of Europe relied on the rejection of such a multiplicity, which emerged by impeding the actualization of “minor Europes,” such as the one experienced through the *Convivencia* [the Coexistence] of Andalusia.

In Dussel's reading, "1492 is the date of the "birth" of modernity. The subsequent history of the modern world witnessed the process of gestation. Europe became Europe by posing itself as a unified ego that was able to not only explore, conquer and colonize alterity, but with the *right* to do so. This crucial moment marked "the origin of a process of concealment or misrecognition of the non-European." Dussel contends that not only discovery, but conquest itself was essential to the constitution of the modern ego" not only as subjectivity, but as a subjectivity that is at both the "center" and "end" of history. Dussel summarizes his reading of modernity as following:

(1) Modern (European) civilization understands itself as the most developed, the superior civilization. (2) This sense of superiority obliges it, in the form of a categorical imperative, as it were, to "develop" (civilize, uplift, educate) the more primitive, barbarous, underdeveloped civilizations. (3) The path of such development should be that followed by Europe in its own development out of antiquity and the Middle Ages. (4) Where the barbarian or the primitive opposes the civilizing process, the praxis of modernity must, in the last instance, have recourse to the violence necessary to remove the obstacles to modernization. (5) This violence, which produces, in many different ways, victims, takes on an almost ritualistic character: the civilizing hero invests his victims (the colonized, the slave, the woman, the ecological destruction of the earth, etc.) with the character of being participants in a process of redemptive sacrifice. (6) From the point of view of modernity, the barbarian or primitive is in a state of guilt (for, among other things, opposing the civilizing process). This allows modernity to present itself not only as innocent but also as a force that will emancipate or redeem its victims from their guilt. (7) Given this "civilizing" and redemptive character of modernity, the suffering and sacrifices (the costs) of modernization imposed on "immature" peoples, enslaved races, the "weaker" sex, et cetera, are inevitable and necessary.

Following to Dussel's reading, one may argue that 1492 is the beginning or birth of both modernity and Europe (Attali 1999: 11). The Christianization of Europe, followed by the Europeanization of Christianity, the death of Mediterranean framing of Europe, and the end of the Byzantium Empire enabled Europe to forget its "origins": Eastern religion, Eastern name. The second formative/foundational moment came with at the culmination of efforts to cleanse Europe from the heretics and non-Christians, creating a Garden of Europe—a universal entity,

embodiment of universality, and geopolitical space with the ideological, political and economic power to determine subsequent human history while also monopolizing the Other's history. Attali defines this ability as "Continent-History" (17).

As previously mentioned, it was not out of simple coincidence or a lack of ability that prevented the organization of additional Crusades after the late 1460s. Christian Europe was on track to own/dominate the world, was rid of "Asiatic imports," and had to look elsewhere. To put it more precisely, 1492 was a moment to select and emulate a specific phase of European history, excluding Andalusia and Eastern Christianity, and translating that period/phase/era into a universal model.

1492 was an expression of the event, the birth of Europe, and the birth of continent-history. However, throughout this process, Earth had been translated into a globe, one the Europeans assumed a right over to appropriate and divide among themselves. It was no coincidence that the Treaty of Tordesillas was brokered by the Pope only two years after the discovery of the Americas. The treaty divided the non-Christian world, including the unknown space beyond the Atlantic, between Spain and Portugal (Davies 1998; Schmitt 2003). The line of demarcation ran approximately 1500 miles west of the Cape Verde Islands and the Azores, leaving the East under Portugal's domain and all to the west under Spain's. The unknown world was appropriated with confidence (Roberts 1985: 129). After discovering the Americas, Europe was consolidating the notion of the West, discovering itself and in so doing, it relied on a silencing of Greek, Jewish and Muslim heritages and attributing crucial/vital importance to the figure of Columbus and the act of discovery.

Europe was on the way to become the Nomos as “Europeanization of the World” (“Nation of Europe”). Christianity, throughout the Reformation and the decline in papal power, was subjected to a radical transformation, the impact of which would be visible in the European state system, particularly during and after the 17th and 18th centuries. What took place through this process was not simply de-Christianization; rather, secularization ultimately shuffled the scope and content of Christianity while ceasing to be the driving force in the territorial imagination of Europe. Instead, Christianity became an inextricable component of national identities and survived in “secularized forms” (67). It is in this context that we find a further insistence on the secularized version of certain notions of civilization, race, the superiority of the Europeans, etc. The invention of the human, the invention of humanity, and the universalism of secularism were produced from the conceptual frameworks arising out of this transition. Europe became the West and the West became the only viable, rational and progressive stage of human evolution. It became the end of history while creating its own story, it was writing the past and future of humanity. It became not only the embodiment of human civilization, but also its final stage. It became the standard.

Guided by such a framework, the notion of Europe functioned in several ways: it became a tool to characterize and classify societies, as well as a useful instrument to think with. It became an image embodying the standard for modern society, culture, people and places, as well as a model for comparison. It carried a ranking function, providing the criteria of evaluation against which other societies were ordered (Hall 1992: 277). Europe thus became the Nomos, not only empirically, but conceptually, as modern history was deemed as nothing more than the rise of the West as a global history (Roberts 1985: 41).

Given the historical consolidation of Europe, European identity, and the West with modernity, the link between the two has resulted in the assumption of an “intimate relationship” in most accounts of the rise of Europe (Sayyid 2003: 102-103). European identity has been codified throughout the project of modernity, and the distinction between Europe and non-Europe can be defined as the difference between the modern versus the non-modern. In that framing, European culture, history and experience becomes an “authoritative representation” of modernity (103). In Hall’s reading, “the idea of the West once produced became productive in turn [...] It has become both the organizing factor in a system of global power relations and the organizing concept in a whole way of thinking and speaking” (ibid). Referring to this claim, Sayyid contends that in Hall’s reading, Europe is defined as “an ideological formation centered on the discourse of modernity.” A. Heller reiterates a similar reading of the relationship between Europe and modernity. In her reading, “modernity is the creation of Europe, [which] itself created Europe” and Eurocentrism is the ideology of the formation of European identity (101). Examining the relationship between the discourse of modernity (narrative of exceptionality) and Western identity (explanation of exceptionality), Sayyid refers to the tautological structure of these claims: “the essence of what made modernity possible is the retrospective abstraction of what is supposed to be found in the West: feudalism, benign climate, recovery of Greek philosophy, etc. Modernity positions itself as a ruptural moment, which divides history in two. It is this rupture that gives birth to the West and marks it off as being unique” (103). However, focusing on the claims of post-modernism as an attempt to de-center the West, disarticulating and rearticulating the relationship between the particular and universal, Sayyid defines Eurocentrism as an “attempt to suture the interval between the West and the idea

of a centre (that is a universal template). Euro-centrism is a project to re-centre the West, a project that is only possible when the West and the centre are no longer considered to be synonymous. It is an attempt to sustain the universality of the Western project, in conditions in which its universality can no longer be taken for granted” (128). Therefore, in Sayyid’s reading, Eurocentrism is committed to closing/bridging the gap between universalism and Westernity and is possible only when the relationship between the two is problematized.

By focusing on the relationship between the formation of modernity and that of Europe, Sayyid’s reading deconstructs the problematical aspects of the claims for Eurocentrism. However, for Sayyid, Eurocentrism and its force as a constitutive mechanism of ordering is losing its effect as priority is given to discussions of modernity rather than Eurocentrism itself. What demands mention here is the formative effects of 1492 on the past and future of the entity called Europe. The projection of Europe as representing the success of European history and its concomitant promises of progress is nothing but Eurocentrism with neither temporal nor spatial limitation.

6.3. Nomos and Europe

The task of this chapter has been to display the impact of 1492 on the concept of Europe, its relationship to modernity and how Eurocentrism has been deployed as a constitutive force to normalize the consolidation of Europe as the path for humanity (universalism) while protecting the particular nature of its subject (Europeans and Europe). I have demonstrated this by providing/offering a discussion on theories of Europe as beginnings and by examining the ways in which the primacy of Europe, the idea of Europe and the history of Europe have been retained

in the relationship between Eurocentrism and 1492, the tension between Europe, cosmopolitanism and modernity.

The central claim of this dissertation has been that Eurocentrism must be understood as the Nomos of the modern world. In displaying this, I have elaborated upon two central claims.

The usual forms of analysis on the concept of Eurocentrism rely on either the empirical dimensions of the discussion or the relationship between the concept/identity of Europe, its relationship with non-European worlds (either in the East [South such as Africa or the Orient] or in the West [the Americas]), and the modern historiography of Europe. Focusing on themes of modernity, imperialism, racism and the distorted cultural and political histories and realities of the global political landscape, Eurocentrism has been either reduced to a claim for “superiority,” “ethnocentrism” or a distorted epistemology.

My concern has been characterized by a single inquiry: how to analyze the relationship between the truth (temporal and spatial representation) and politics in terms of their relationship to the question of order. In the first chapter, I presented my readings on these themes to lay the ground for a detailed discussion of Europe, Eurocentrism, and the history of Europe in terms of their relationship with ordering(?) (partial) and a more universal one after 1492. I suggested that Eurocentrism can be best abstracted and understood as a question of ordering the universe. Such an inquiry must begin with a reading of International Relations and its disciplinary practices.

In the second chapter, I examined the myths of International Relations through a directed focus on six major texts that are representative of the discussions and themes found in/driving the discipline. In this analysis, my central concern was with how to represent the formation of limits on the disciplinary imagination, as well as how to examine b(ordering) and international relations. Rather than focusing on different schools or the relationship between Eurocentrism and the discipline, I have examined the historiography of the discipline and its relationship to the modern ordering of the universe, hence Eurocentrism.¹¹⁰

In the third chapter, I presented my core analysis. I examined two central paths of analysis on the concept of Eurocentrism and provided my study as a third alternative, offering a conceptual abstraction in which both the temporal and structural features of the term can be analyzed and examined. In doing so, however, I situated my analysis apart from the troubled aspects of a Schmittian reading of Nomos. Instead, I introduced the theme of geography and the political as a new dimension to the analysis. As presented, the term Nomos, along with its abstract nature, provides an opportunity to examine the concept of Eurocentrism and deal with the historiography of Europe as a means of disrupting the relationship between the idea of Europe, the reality of Europe, and the history of Europe. For this reason, I begin Chapter 4 with an examination of the name, history and idea of Europe to clear the ground for an investigation of the history of Europe. Throughout the chapter, I isolated the different ways of telling the story of Europe to reveal the fugitive dimensions of these studies. Thereafter, in Chapter 5, I delve

¹¹⁰ Hobson's *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics* (2012) provides a systematic reading of the impact of Eurocentrism and how IR and Eurocentrism have been linked from the late 18th century to the present. His study is a result of a meticulous inquiry in virtually all conceptual discussions of the discipline and schools. Hobson presents a detailed formulation of the variants of Eurocentrism, including the numerous figures and schools of the discipline. His central claim is that IR is little else than a Eurocentric discipline, in almost all of its variants. While his study is extremely useful in terms of providing an empirical representation of Eurocentrism, in doing so, he does not provide a systematic discussion of the concept itself. It is simply referred to as a claim of superiority and a presumed universalism of European experience.

further into my analysis of the history of Europe to reveal the way in which the creation of Europe was driven by/ushered in by a Eurocentric perception of global politics. Europe, as both a movement and an idea, has been defined in terms that cannot exist without the constellation assumed by a Eurocentric ordering of the universe, in which European subjectivity, history and politics is presented as the universal path for humanity.

The central aim has been to show that Eurocentrism can be examined without descending into a moralist language that criminalizes European experiences. However, it simultaneously demonstrates that there is a need for a de-articulation of the essential and constructed link between Europe, modernity, as well as the ordering of the universe and the Earth through a notion of international order, at least to tell the story of Europe and non-Europeans in and through a pluralistic perception of world history.

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