

A COUNTRY AT WAR
THE ORIGIN, EVOLUTION, AND FUTURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to study the erosion of civil-military relations in the United States in order to determine whether it affects national security. The overall construct is regarding civil-military relations, not only between civilian and military government officials, but also those relationships with the citizenry in the United States. In order to study this, civil-military relations will be looked at through three different lenses.

First of all, it is important to learn about the origins of civil-military relations in the United States and what the Founding Fathers thought of these relations. In order to do this, a look at the separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches of government will be examined, as well as what the Founding Fathers felt regarding having a standing army in the United States during times of peace.

The second point regarding these relations will be studied by looking at the evolution of civil-military relations with regards to the civil-military gap. Accession numbers provided by the Department of Defense will be analyzed in order to determine if the US military is representative of its citizens. Accession numbers from the post-Vietnam all volunteer force up until recent times will be used. The third point focuses on civil-military relations between senior civilian and military officials during times of Low Intensity Conflict. In order to study this, case studies from the Vietnam War, Operation Urgent Fury, the First Gulf War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom will be used.

The results are that even though the Founding Fathers feared a strong standing army in times of peace, it is needed due to technological advancements that have taken place. The erosion of the separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches has

shifted war-making authorities to the President through the use of authorizations which don't require Congress's approval. Regarding the makeup of the military, the overrepresentation of accessions from the South prevents the military from being representative of society. As for the relations between senior civilians and military members in government, a less micro managerial and more standardized symbiotic relationship needs to be established between the two.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In a 60 Minutes interview with President Donald Trump, the President and current Commander-in-Chief, responded to questions about the current Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, by saying “I think he’s sort of a Democrat, if you want to know the truth.”¹ Of course, during a press conference by the Secretary of Defense, Mattis was asked, “Are you a Democrat?” to which he responded:

You know, we’re all built on formative experiences. When I was 18, I joined the Marine Corps, and in the U.S military we are proudly apolitical. By that, I mean that in our duties, we were brought up to obey the elected commander in chief, whoever that is. And we’ve seen, over those—since I was in the military longer than some of you have been alive, I have seen Republicans and Democrats come and go. Where am I today? I’m a member of the president’s administration.²

The words expressed by Secretary Mattis could not be any truer. As a former General, he understands the reason why the military is and should remain apolitical. Why does it matter if the Secretary of Defense is a Republican or Democrat? Ultimately, the safety of the United States and its citizens should not be a political game. The United States is at a critical time in its history where it is divided. These divisions are political, along party lines, and at a time when the country is like this, one must look toward the military in order to ensure these divisive politics don’t infiltrate it. The United States military is unique in that it is not political, and checks and balances have been established for it to remain that way. While those in the military do have the right to express themselves by voting, they must keep their political leanings private while wearing the uniform. If the military ever gets to a point where it is taking political sides and becomes politicized, that is the moment the United States military institution collapses.

¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/us/politics/trump-mattis-democrat.html>

² <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/10/16/mr-secretary-are-you-a-democrat/>

Regarding politicization, and the use of the military as a political tool, President Donald Trump announced on October 30, 2018 that he had ordered the deployment of 5,200 active duty troops to the border with Mexico as a response to the caravan of immigrants which originated in Guatemala and was over a month away from arriving to the border. At the time of the deployment order, Trump said the number of troops could increase up to 15,000, which is more than double the amount of troops currently in Iraq. Coincidentally, this order was made one week prior to the very contentious midterm elections, in which the Republican Party has been calling for stronger border security. In the past, Presidents George Bush and Barack Obama had sent troops to the border, but they were from the National Guard, not from the active-duty military. According to former U.S. forces commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno, “the military has all of a sudden been placed in a highly politicized environment regarding immigration.” Based on what the Founding Fathers believed, a job like this would be done by the militia (now National Guard), not by the United States’ standing army (active-duty military).

This is one of the reasons I am studying the erosion of civil-military relations and its effect and impact on the United States. This is important in order to understand why civil-military relations are critical and how they are crucial for the safety of the country. In order to study and discuss civil-military relations, a broad scope has to be taken in order to discuss the big topics which affect relationships between civilians and the military, both in government and life. The topics addressed in this thesis are: the Founding Father’s views on a standing army and the erosion of the separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive branches of government, the civil-military gap and whether the military is

representative of society in the United States, and the civil-military relation between senior military and civilian officials during periods of LICs.

The Founding Fathers were instrumental in establishing our current civil-military relations, and they also expressed their views on having a standing army, and the need to maintain the separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches in order for the Executive to not become synonymous with a monarch. They also viewed a standing army as a potential “threat” to democracy, especially coupled with an overgrown executive. The results of the first chapter show that the powers of the executive have become more powerful than intended in the Constitution when it comes to the ability to make war. The Legislative branch has given up much of this power which is evident since the last time Congress authorized war was during World War II. Since then, other authorizations and United Nations Security Resolutions have led the United States to war. When it comes to a standing army, even though the Founding Fathers may not have agreed with one, it is necessary in our time. With all of the threats posed against the United States, both conventional and asymmetric, the lack of a standing army could question the existence of the United States as a country.

In terms of who joins and serves in the military, the question of whether or not the military resembles the makeup of the population was studied. This research is particularly important in the era after the draft ended in the United States in 1973. With the inception of an All-Volunteer Force came also demographic changes within the military. After studying military accession data, the results are that there is an overrepresentation of individuals primarily from the South, but also from the West of the United States. There is an underrepresentation of accessions of those from the Northeast and Midwest when compared

with census projections from those regions. With this, the conclusion is that the military is not representative of the country.

The last chapter focuses on the relationships between civilian and military senior officials during periods of Low Intensity Conflict. This is particularly important due to the political nature of LICs. Case studies of four LICs were used in this chapter in order to study the relationships between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the case studies before 1986 the Secretary of Defense would be the senior civilian official, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be the senior military officials. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act changed military leadership in times of war following Vietnam. It established Combatant Commanders who would be in-charge of the warfighting. In the case studies after 1986, the Combatant Commander would be the senior military official, and the Secretary of Defense the senior civilian official. The result of the third chapter is that a standardized symbiotic relationship needs to be established between senior defense civilian and military officials in order to have an effective relationship during periods of LICs. This is needed in an effort to ensure that politics stop at the level of the Secretary of Defense in an effort to keep the military completely apolitical.

II. THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

The United States military, in today's form, is not what the Founding Fathers had in mind. As the Founding Fathers were writing the Constitution for the United States, they had just finished fighting against the powerful British Empire which had a standing army. Because of this, the Founding Fathers were opposed to a standing army in times of peace and made this well-known through different means.

In the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Madison said,

In times of actual war, great discretionary powers are consistently given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of war has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending.³

If the Founding Fathers were around today, they would not agree with the direction that the United States has taken when it comes to its defense. While the threats posed to the country are exponentially greater than the threats following the American Revolution, a standing army is not something they agreed with. With this, it is important to determine whether today's military in the United States violates the Founding Fathers' ideals of a powerful standing army.

³ James Madison, "The Writings of James Madison," The Journal of the Constitutional Convention, Part I 3 (1787)

At a time when the United States has been at war in Afghanistan since 2001, in Iraq since 2003, and in military actions in Libya, the Philippines, Yemen, Djibouti, Somalia, and other countries, one has to wonder whether the checks and balances placed on the military by the Founding Fathers were enough. The Executive is not supposed to have complete power over the military, but legalities that have been put in place such as the War Powers Resolution of 1973, and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, has shifted much of Congress's power of controlling the military, over to the Executive branch of government.

When looking into civil-military relations, one has to study the mechanisms to which a country can go to war, and the ability to make war. This is important because while civil-military relations are always critical, they are crucial during times of war. If relations are fragile during times of peace, then they will be shattered during conflict. A war can unite, but also destroy a country. Because of this, the power to declare war must be protected by those who hold that power, and denied from those who shouldn't. The two main concerns that were in the minds of the Founding Fathers and that will be discussed in this paper were: the potential of a standing army being a threat to democracy, and the separation of powers and the risk of the Executive becoming too powerful when it came to war-making authorities.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND A STANDING ARMY

The Federalist papers were a series of 85 papers that were published in the New York press under the signature "Publius." These began on October 27, 1787 and were written by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison. The purpose of these papers was to urge

the citizens of New York to ratify the United States Constitution.⁴ Out of the 85 papers, five of them, Federalist 8, 29, 47, 51 and 70 are particularly insightful in order to understand how the Founding Fathers felt about the military and the separation of powers.

In Federalist 8, “The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States”, Alexander Hamilton proposes that states must be united in order to prevent negative consequences. If the states are not united, and are continuously fighting each other, then each state will have a militaristic culture with its own military. “The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country.”⁵ In order to be strong as a country, the states must unite, instead of wasting time fighting each other. If they don't unite, “the continual necessity for their [the military] services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionally degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often in the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiers not only as their protectors, but as their superiors.”⁶ Weaker states would have to keep standing armies in order to protect themselves against stronger states. This could lead to state governments evolving into monarchies due to the need of a strong executive needed for war. In Federalist 8, Hamilton also distinguishes between countries who need a standing army (due to threat of invasion), and countries who don't because they are insulated.

⁴ "Primary Documents in American History," Federalist Papers: Primary Documents of American History (Virtual Programs & Services, Library of Congress), August 25, 2017, <https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html>.

⁵ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist 8: The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States," The Federalist Papers, November 20, 1787.

⁶ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist 8: The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States," The Federalist Papers, November 20, 1787.

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe --our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.⁷

For Hamilton, the most important aspect for defense against another country was the union.

Without the union, the United States would be just like Europe, each country constantly at war trying to dominate the weaker one.

In Federalist 29, "Concerning the Militia", Alexander Hamilton talks about the common defense by regulating the militia. In it, he empowers the Union (federal government) "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the Officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."⁸ Having a militia funded by the federal government, but controlled by the states would prevent the need for a standing army. Also, the militia men would be "properly armed and equipped" and would be necessary "to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year."⁹ In response to critics who mention that a federally funded militia would be able to oppress the citizenry, Hamilton argues that since states "have the sole and exclusive appointments of the officers", those officers would extinguish the oppression.¹⁰

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist 29: Concerning the Militia," The Federalist Papers, January 10, 1788.

⁹ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist 29: Concerning the Militia," The Federalist Papers, January 10, 1788

¹⁰ Ibid

In Federalist 47, “The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts”, James Madison wants to assure the people as to the separation of powers under the new constitution. “One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution is its supposed violation of the political maxim that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct.”¹¹ In the paper, Madison refers to the British model as celebrated by the French political writer, Montesquieu. Montesquieu writes that the British model is the “mirror of political liberty.” Madison breaks down how in the British model, it may appear as to a separation of powers, but the truth is that “we must perceive that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other.”¹² An example Madison uses is that the Executive also forms a part of the Legislative branch in Britain. “He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of legislative acts.”¹³ In the paper, the message Madison wants the readers to infer is that the accumulation of “all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands” would be “the very definition of tyranny.”¹⁴

Federalist 51 by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, “The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments”, discusses how the new government’s structure is set up to ensure liberty. All

¹¹ James Madison, "Federalist 47: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts," The Federalist Papers, February 1, 1788

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ James Madison, "Federalist 47: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts,"

branches must be independent of each other in order to maintain the proper checks and balances.

It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”¹⁵

In order to ensure the above, but in order for power to not be abused, each branch, and the members within the branch, should not be dependent on other branches of government. Regarding factions, the paper warns about not only guarding against the oppression of its rulers, but also “to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”¹⁶ One of the solutions in order to prevent this from occurring is by having a diverse citizenry that will make these factions impracticable. “The society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.”¹⁷

In Federalist 70, Hamilton argues for the “energy” within the Executive power. By arguing for a unitary executive to be in power, Hamilton justifies this in order to ensure flexibility during times of emergency and war. This paper encourages having one executive who is responsible for executing the presidency. In Federalist 70, Hamilton says: “Energy in

¹⁵ James Madison, "Federalist 51: The Structure of the New Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments," *The Federalist Papers*, February 8, 1788

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.”¹⁸

Other than the Federalist papers, there are other documents in which the Founding Fathers expressed their views on the United States having a standing army. In a letter from Samuel Adams to James Warren¹⁹, Adams expresses the dangers posed to the liberties of the people with the formation of a new military. During the Second Continental Congress, Adams wrote to Warren that the militia “should be kept upon the most advantageous Footing.”²⁰ Sam Adams believed that a standing army would lose touch with the people and would form a distinct “body.” “A standing army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always dangerous to the Liberties of the People. Soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of the Citizens.”²¹ In this letter, Adams is not questioning the loyalty of the officers in the Army. What he worries is that if military actions were to continue, the military members who succeed the current ones may be so used to military customs and habits that they “may lose the Spirit and Feeling of Citizens.” The military demands obedience to orders and commands. “They have their Arms always in their hands. Their rules and their Discipline is severe. They soon become attached to their officers and disposed to yield implicit Obedience to their Commands. Such a Power should be watched with a jealous Eye.”²²

Instead of maintaining a standing army, Sam Adams believes a well-regulated militia is the answer. “The Militia is composed of free Citizens. There is therefore no Danger of

¹⁸ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist 70: The Executive Department Further Considered," The Federalist Papers, March 15, 1788

¹⁹ James Warren was a Massachusetts militia General who was born in Plymouth Massachusetts in 1745. A Harvard graduate and active Patriot, he worked with George Washington in Cambridge.

²⁰ "Letter from Sam Adams to James Warren." Samuel Adams to James Warren. 1776.

²¹ Ibid

²² Ibid

their making use of their Power to the destruction of their own Rights, or suffering others to invade them.”²³ The militia must be involved in the country and in everyday life. Since they would be the members protecting their states and homes, they would not oppress themselves. Sam Adams heavily believed that members of the militia had to study “the Principles of free Government” in order to impress the “obligation which every member is under to the whole Society.”²⁴ This, in turn, would prevent the militia from becoming a separate “body” as he predicted would happen to a standing army.

The Constitutional Convention was a meeting which began in May of 1787 in Philadelphia. Originally, the purpose of the convention was to amend the Articles of Confederation, but instead, a new constitution was created.²⁵ James Madison became the “chief recorder of information” during the convention. He was instrumental since he had developed the Virginia Constitution over ten years earlier. In the convention, Madison argued against a standing military force due to history showing a military’s use to oppress the people.

In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of war has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.”²⁶

²³ Ibid

²⁴ "Letter from Sam Adams to James Warren." Samuel Adams to James Warren. 1776.

²⁵ "James Madison's Contribution to the Constitution." America's Story from America's Library. http://www.americaslibrary.gov/aa/madison/aa_madison_father_1.html.

²⁶ James Madison. "Madison Debates June 29." Avalon Project - Madison. June 29, 1787. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_629.asp.

Within the context of Europe, Madison mentions that Britain is an exception in that it is not a European country which oppresses its own people due to the “insular situation” of that country. He ends his portion mentioning that the consequences would be if the states run “into a total separation from each other” or if some “should enter into partial confederacies.”²⁷

When it comes to the United States Constitution, Article I regarding the Legislative branch, Section 8, Clause 11 gives the Legislative branch the power “to declare War.”²⁸ According to Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, the President “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”²⁹ The Constitution places these powers in separate branches in order for one branch to not be able to control the entire military. It is meant to force the Legislative and Executive branches of government to work together when it comes to military matters and making war.

C. DEVIATING FROM THE VIEWS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS

The thoughts and writings provided by the Founding Fathers demonstrate that they strongly believed a standing army would not be beneficial to democracy. While they acknowledged in the Federalist papers that under the new Constitution a standing army would not be illegal, they made sure to stress the importance of the separation of powers and the division of the three branches of government to prevent the Executive from becoming a

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ U.S. Const. art. I, § 8

²⁹ U.S. Const. art. II, § 2

monarch. Since the inception of the US Constitution and the ideals of the Founding Fathers, the war-making power has shifted from the Legislative branch to the Executive one.

During World War I, Congress provided 3 billion dollars to build a million-man army in order to fight in “The Great War.”³⁰ Before the war started, the Army had 127,151 soldiers and 181,620 members in the National Guard. As opposed to the great powers of Europe which already had a standing army (Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary), “Britain and the United States didn’t see the need for a universal service because of the English Channel and the Atlantic Ocean. Those were two pretty good barriers.”³¹ In order to meet the demands needed for the war, the Selective Service Act passed and was able to register 24,234,021 men between the ages of 21-45. At the end of World War I, the total number of military members in the United States was 2,897,167. After the war ended, the United States military drew down to 343,302 by 1920, and remained around 250,000 in the interwar years.³² A similar buildup and drawdown followed suit for World War II. For the Korean War, a buildup occurred, but a full drawdown never did and the numbers remained steady up until the end of the Vietnam War and the Cold War. This model is what the Founding Fathers pictured; a small standing army in times of peace, and a buildup in times of war.

Interestingly, the last time the US Constitution was actually enforced when it comes to authorizing war, was during World War II. All of the wars and conflicts that have occurred since World War II have been executed by the Executive branch, the United States President. According to constitutional scholar Louis Fisher, “President Harry Truman’s commitment of U.S. troops to Korea in June 1950 still stands as the single most important precedent for the

³⁰ Garamone, Jim. "World War I: Building the American Military." US Army. April 3, 2017. https://www.army.mil/article/185229/world_war_i_building_the_american_military.

³¹ Ibid

³² "Population Representation in the Military Services - 1997." Homeland Security and Emergency Management | CNA. 1789-1997.

executive use of military force without congressional authority.”³³ President Truman completely ignored the legalities in place, and illegally entered the war in 1950. Because of this, future administrations followed what President Truman did in order to not seek Congressional approval for conflicts and wars. Louis Fischer states that “the Korean War stands as the most dangerous precedent because of its scope and the acquiescence of Congress. In recognizing the importance of the Korean War and its threat to constitutional democracy, we should not attempt to confer legitimacy on an illegitimate act. Illegal and unconstitutional actions, no matter how often repeated, do not build a lawful foundation.”³⁴

While Truman didn’t seek Congressional approval for the Korean War, it is useful as to why he didn’t, since it set the precedent for future wars. When North Korea invaded South Korea, Truman went to the U.N. Security Council in order to sanction the events occurring on the Korean peninsula. Since the United States was part of the United Nations, and the U.N. recommended member states provide military assistance to South Korea, Truman immediately ordered US forces to Korea. The legalities of the war have been up for debate, since the fact that the US is a UN member implicitly means that it has to support the organization and its resolutions. Nevertheless, “Truman set a precedent that wars could be waged without congressional declarations of war and that other actions—from treaties to resolutions to budgetary authorizations—mooted declarations of war.”³⁵

The Vietnam War was another example of how the US Constitution was not followed regarding military action. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, an incident involving the attack of US

³³Louis Fisher. "The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?" *The American Journal of International Law* 89, no. 1 (January 1995): 21-39

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ Stratfor, "What Happened To The American Declaration Of War?" *Forbes*, August 10, 2011. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/03/30/what-happened-to-the-american-declaration-of-war/#558ed959299e>.

Naval destroyers, Maddox and Turner Joy by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on July 30, 1964, was the catalyst which led to the joint Congressional resolution known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.³⁶ This resolution authorized President Johnson to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.”³⁷ President Johnson took this resolution as a legal means for the Vietnam War. Even though the Vietnam War was not declared by Congress, it led to 17 years of fighting which killed 60,000 members of the US military, 250,000 South Vietnamese troops, and about 1.1 million North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters.³⁸

While the Founding Fathers did not foresee a need for a standing army, the twentieth century bears witness that they may have been wrong. In today’s age it would naïve to think a standing army would not be needed. The country is no longer “insulated” from outside threats as it had been when the Founding Fathers expressed their views on the subject. Technological advances have made war a same day reality that must be acted upon quickly in order to maintain the upper hand. While the Executive is one man, and decisions can happen quickly, the politics and sheer numbers of the Legislative branch make it unrealistic for it to act effectively and decisively in times of crisis in order to declare war. A standing army has many positives, one of them being the professionalization of the force. By having individuals voluntarily join the military; a higher standard can be set in order to recruit at a more appropriate level. Also, morale and retention in a volunteer service is much higher than that in a conscripted military. Many militaries, especially the Russian military have been using the United States as an example for an all-volunteer force. One of their biggest issues was the

³⁶ Patricia Bauer. "Gulf of Tonkin Incident." Encyclopedia Britannica. August 01, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Gulf-of-Tonkin-incident>

³⁷ "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution." History. August 21, 2018. <https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/gulf-of-tonkin-resolution-1>

³⁸ Ibid

lack of non-commissioned officers since conscripts would often exit the military as soon as their mandatory service was up. Unfortunately, in a world war scenario, a draft would be unavoidable.

D. THE SHIFT OF POWER TO THE EXECUTIVE

In an effort to prevent another Vietnam, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973. The main reason behind the resolution was to check the President's power which had been abused during recent wars. The Library of Congress states that "Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in the aftermath of the Vietnam War to address these concerns and provide a set of procedures for both the President and Congress to follow in situations where the introduction of U.S. forces abroad could lead to their involvement in armed conflict."³⁹ The War Powers Resolution has four main parts:

1. The first states the reason behind the resolution as to "ensure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities." The powers of the President as the Commander in Chief are only exercised if there is a declaration of war, authorization from Congress, or a national emergency created by an attack on the United States.⁴⁰
2. The second states that the President needs to consult with Congress before using armed forces into situations where hostilities are imminent.⁴¹
3. The third part focuses on time limit requirements that the President must comply with when using armed forces.
4. The fourth part requires forces to be withdrawn within 60 days of the time a report is submitted under Section 1543(a)(1), unless Congress approves continued military action or can't meet due to an attack on the United States. Also, the President must remove armed forces that are engaged in hostilities "without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization" any time if Congress directs it by Concurrent Resolution.⁴²

³⁹ "War Powers." War Powers | Law Library of Congress | Library of Congress.
<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php>

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Ibid

According to the Library of Congress, “U.S. Presidents have consistently taken the position that the War Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement upon the power of the executive branch.”⁴³ The War Powers Resolution has been used many times and Presidents have submitted over 120 reports to Congress pursuant to the Resolution.⁴⁴ According to a Washington Post article written by Brian Atwood in 1983 regarding the War Powers Resolution, “Congress cannot act effectively after the fact. When our forces are in the field, the president is in the driver’s seat politically and legally.”⁴⁵ He argues that while the act was supposed to correct what occurred in Vietnam, it is now part of the problem. It allows the President to use the armed forces before Congress gets a say in the issue. This article was written in 1983, before both Iraq Wars and the War on Terrorism. If this was a problem then, how can it not be a problem now? In order to fix the resolution, Atwood mentioned involving Congress at the outset as a corrective measure.⁴⁶

Even though many members of Congress publicly criticize the War Powers Act, in a way it also serves as a political cover to protect them by not having to vote for or against war. Lee Hamilton, former Democratic Congressman from Indiana said that the law “has become a political tool that allows members of Congress to dodge taking a position on the intervention itself. As is often the case, they argue the process rather than the substance.”⁴⁷ According to Rep. Hamilton, presidents have never accepted the constitutionality of the War

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ "War Powers." War Powers | Law Library of Congress | Library of Congress.
<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php>

⁴⁵ Brian Atwood. "The War Powers Act Doesn't Work." The Washington Post. October 02, 1983.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1983/10/02/the-war-powers-act-doesnt-work/add14e33-2c2d-4939-bc87-895041482e66/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.833920f05a32.

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Alan Greenblatt, "Why The War Powers Act Doesn't Work," NPR, June 16, 2011,
<https://www.npr.org/2011/06/16/137222043/why-the-war-powers-act-doesnt-work>.

Powers Act and have always viewed it as a violation of the separation of powers and the president's authority as commander in chief.⁴⁸

Another legislative act which has ceded the war making powers from the Legislative to the Executive is the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists. According to the joint resolution passed on September 18, 2001, "the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."⁴⁹ Interestingly, Federalist 70, when in regards to the "energy" in the Executive, was used by the Bush and Obama administrations when dealing with the War on Terror. According to John Yoo, one of the legal advisors during the Bush White House, "the centralization of authority in the President is particularly crucial in matters of national defense, war, and foreign policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other branch."⁵⁰ While Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists resolution was meant to deal with post-9/11 operations, primarily in Afghanistan, its power has been abused by three administrations. It has been used to authorize military action in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Niger, Djibouti, Georgia, Kenya, the Philippines, Somalia,

⁴⁸ Alan Greenblatt, "Why The War Powers Act Doesn't Work,"

⁴⁹ U.S. Congress. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched against the United States. 107th Cong. Cong. Res. Public Law 107-40. Washington, 2001

⁵⁰ Robert J. Delahunty, and John C. Yoo. "President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or Support Them, The." Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y 25 (2001): 487

and Yemen.⁵¹ While some of the groups being targeted in these countries may have ideologies similar to those who carried out the 9/11 attacks, it would be a stretch to say they are associated with those who perpetrated 9/11. Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia stated in 2017 that “for 16 years, Congress has remained largely silent on this issue, allowing administrations to go to war anywhere, anytime” and that “a new AUMF is not only legally necessary, it would also send an important message of resolve to the American public and our troops that we stand behind them in their mission.”⁵²

The War Powers Resolution and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists has ceded over war making power directly to the President. While the President is now able to take unilateral military action, the Legislative branch has not upheld its bargain of the Constitution in order to defend their right of declaring war. While this is not the first time these two resolutions have been challenged, it is important they are recognized due to their effects on the military. The ease for the president to use military force, coupled with an all-volunteer military force further aids in the widening of the civil-military gap which ultimately affects civil-military relations. While an all-volunteer force encourages professionalization and a higher standard within the military, it also excludes certain members of society, primarily in the upper-class, who don't seek to join the military. Because of this, it is easier to make decisions whether or not to go to war. Stanley McChrystal, the former US commander in Afghanistan mentioned, “I think if a nation goes to war, every town, and every city needs to be at risk. You make that decision and everybody

⁵¹Kaitlyn Schallhorn. "AUMF: What to Know about the Debate over Military Authorization." Fox News. April 13, 2018. <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/aumf-what-to-know-about-the-debate-over-military-authorization>

⁵² Kaitlyn Schallhorn. "AUMF: What to Know about the Debate over Military Authorization."

has skin in the game.”⁵³ While this would go in contrast to an all-volunteer and a professional military, it would make the decision to send young men/women into war much more difficult. A compromise would be an all-volunteer force that is able to recruit from all demographics within society in order for the military to more closely resemble the citizenry.

E. CONCLUSION

While resorting to a small standing army and a well-developed militia is not anymore possible, the Legislative branch must make a concerted effort to check presidential powers and must demand reports and explanations regarding military forces in action, instead of that power being relinquished over to the President. The Founding Fathers had two concerns which were the “threat” of a large standing army, and the erosion of Legislative powers leading to the risk of the Executive becoming synonymous with a monarch. While a professional standing army is now needed for the security of the United States, it is evident that the checks and balances placed on the military in the Constitution by the Founding Fathers have eroded over time. The United States is in a precarious spot where the Executive branch controls a powerful military, with little oversight from Congress. If the Founding Fathers were here to witness this shift in power from the Legislative to the Executive, coupled with a large standing army, they would be worried.

The War Powers Resolution should require advanced notification to Congress, and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists should be repealed. It is unrealistic to say that that authorization, meant for those responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks, is being used to target the members of a completely different terror group

⁵³Doug Bandow. "A New Military Draft Would Revive A Very Bad Old Idea." Forbes. July 18, 2012. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2012/07/16/a-new-military-draft-would-revive-a-very-bad-old-idea/>.

located in another continent, such as the targeting of the Al Shabab terror group in Africa.

The American people need to be aware of the powers that have been granted to the president and should challenge the continuous use of military forces around the world with a blank check and little to no Congressional oversight.

III. THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP: IS THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE OF SOCIETY?

A. INTRODUCTION

The US Military has always had the task of carrying out the orders by the President of the United States and its senior leaders. Regardless of political party or affiliation, the members of the military must accept those legal orders and execute them to the best extent possible. Before 1973, and before the draft ended in the United States, the number of active duty men and women was of 2.2 million. Now-a-days, the number sits below 1.29 million.⁵⁴ In the past, the military was seen as an apolitical group that was not politicized and did not involve itself in politics. Samuel Huntington, one of the leading scholars on civil-military relationships observed that contemporary military officers belong to a profession. “They are professional managers of violence. We arm, train, and equip uniformed military officers to do frankly horrific things—killing, maiming, and intimidating people with force—in order to achieve favorable political outcomes.”⁵⁵ The problem comes in when the military becomes a political focus group that can be swayed for votes in the election, which may already be occurring.

The US military has become a separate privileged class within the United States that increasingly does not resemble the population it is supposed to serve and represent in the

⁵⁴ George M. Reynolds and Amanda Shendruk, "Demographics of the U.S. Military," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/article/demographics-us-military>.

⁵⁵ Andrew Exum, "The Dangerous Politicization of the Military," The Atlantic, July 24, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/the-danger-of-turning-the-us-military-into-a-political-actor/534624/>.

country. If the military continues to be placed on a political pedestal and not challenged, it will turn into a military in which “the military officer corps is a political-economic actor that operates not only out of service to the citizenry but also to protect its own craven political and economic interests.”⁵⁶ One of the ways this can be avoided is by ensuring that the military accurately represents the citizenry.

In the United States, more and more of those who join the military to serve do so as members of a family who have served in the past, or know someone who has served themselves. While these “military families” have a legacy of serving, the military needs to recruit from a diverse swatch across the United States in order for it to effectively represent the entire population of the United States. This diversity is what has always made the military very special in this country, but many issues have caused a gap. Some of them are politically motivated as Republicans are more prone to serving than Democrats. Since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, the numbers of recruits from the South has increased, while those from the Northeast have decreased. Having a disproportionate number in the military which does not resemble the public makeup could risk the military into becoming a separate class from society. The important question is whether the military is representative of the society it is sworn to protect.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW: WHAT IS THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP?

The civil-military gap, or the division between the military and civilian population is not new. It has always been present, and throughout the years has increased and decreased.

⁵⁶ Andrew Exum, "The Dangerous Politicization of the Military," *The Atlantic*, July 24, 2017

Understanding why the gap is present is necessary since the military is essential for the survival of the state. Andrew Exum wrote that “The military was hardly blameless in either administration (Obama and Bush), but a better understanding of the mentality and culture of those in uniform and more attention to cultivating harmonious civil-military relationships on the part of both presidents would have reduced tensions and averted some of the errors in Afghanistan and Iraq.”⁵⁷

In *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington wrote that the U.S. military had “the outlook of an estranged minority.”⁵⁸ The strained relationship between both groups has also been described as “the less-than-amicable separation of the military from the financial, business, political, and intellectual elites of this country, particularly from the last two.”⁵⁹ Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz recognized a divide between “an increasingly conservative officer corps and the American public.”⁶⁰ In his book, Huntington underscored the value of the armed forces as a separate society due to their distinct values. In contrast, Janowitz believed that the divergence among military and civilian cultures “could diminish the military’s responsiveness to civilian leadership.”⁶¹ While Huntington’s objective control theory has been used effectively, technological advances and the complexities of warfare mean that members of the military can’t be completely disconnected from politics.

According to Charlie Lewis, “many ideological factors could be to blame on the civilian-military gap; some practical reasons are to blame. These are: a constant state of war,

⁵⁷ Thomas Sheppard, Bryan Groves. 2015. “Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relations Room for Improvement.” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 62-87

⁵⁸ Ricks, “The Widening Gap Between Military and Society,” 66-78.

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon, Emerald M Archer, John Barr, Aaron Belkin, Mario Guerrero, Cameron Hall, & Katie E O Swain. “Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research Note.” *Armed Forces & Society*, 38 (4), 2012. pp. 670-676.

⁶¹ Ibid

an all-volunteer military force, the geographic isolation of military installations, and the lack of political and media elites who have worn the uniform.”⁶² “The current civil-military gap is one of cultural and geographic isolation.”⁶³ The end of the draft in 1973 led the way for the current all-volunteer force. This shift has split the military from civilian society and has caused civilians to see the military as “them”, as opposed to “the rest of us.”⁶⁴ Post-draft officers also see themselves as different, morally and culturally.”⁶⁵ In a 2011 TIME article, it mentions that part of the drift between civilians and the military is the location of U.S. military bases. In order to save money, the Department of Defense has been shutting many bases in the United States, particularly in the North. The DoD has been “concentrating them in military-friendly southern states.”⁶⁶ This places the military in areas of the country with more Conservative views.

The officer corps has also become more politicized, which has contributed to the widening of the gap. “Officers today appear to be not only more conservative than those in the past but also more active in politics—both in how they describe themselves and in how they vote.”⁶⁷ This is striking since in the past, the U.S. military has always avoided involvement in politics. After the Civil War, “not one officer in five hundred, it was estimated, ever cast a ballot.”⁶⁸ The Clinton administration saw a time where a highly

⁶² Charlie Lewis. 2011. "A New Sparta: America's Threatening Civil-Military Gap." Harvard Kennedy School Review 11, 170-175

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon, Emerald M Archer, John Barr, Aaron Belkin, Mario Guerrero, Cameron Hall, & Katie E O Swain. “Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research Note”

⁶⁶ Thompson, Mark. “An Army Apart: The Widening Military-Civilian Gap.” TIME, 2011

⁶⁷ Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon, Emerald M Archer, John Barr, Aaron Belkin, Mario Guerrero, Cameron Hall, & Katie E O Swain. “Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research Note”

⁶⁸ Ibid

politicized military was evolving. When President Clinton was on his way to visit the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt, the Atlantic Fleet Commander had to arrive at the ship beforehand to ensure a proper reception. Also, the Air Force Chief of Staff during that time “had to issue an open demand to his service to respect the President and for proper behavior to be accorded to him.”⁶⁹

Changes in mores and society have also led to the civil-military gap. According to Thomas Ricks, “American society has become more fragmented, more individualistic, and less disciplined, with institutions such as church, family, and school wielding less influence.”⁷⁰ These changes conflict with how the military defines and sees itself regarding the “values of sacrifice, unity, self-discipline, and considering the interests of the group before those of the individual.”⁷¹ The military has also been ahead of their civilian counterparts when it comes to social issues. For example, the military has tackled racial tension and drug abuse in ways that civilians have not been able to.

Some scholars have divided the civil-military gap into four issues. These are: cultural gaps, demographic gaps, policy preference gaps, and institutional gaps.⁷² Thomas Ricks describes these cultural gaps after having interviewed Marines who had just graduated boot camp. He wrote, “Marines return home on leave and experience a “private loathing for public America.”⁷³ The Marines saw a dichotomy between civilian and military life and were

⁶⁹ Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis of Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest* 35 (1994): 3-17

⁷⁰ Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between Military and Society,"

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon, Emerald M Archer, John Barr, Aaron Belkin, Mario Guerrero, Cameron Hall, & Katie E O Swain. "Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research Note"

⁷³ Ibid

repulsed of “the physical unfitness of civilians, by the uncouth behavior they witnessed, and by what they saw as pervasive selfishness and consumerism.”⁷⁴

Demographically, the military often recruits individuals who have fathers who are veterans, and fewer members of the military come from nonmilitary families. As previously mentioned, the closure of military bases in the North and West during the Clinton administration has led to the underrepresentation of social and economic elites.⁷⁵ Policy wise, civilians and military members disagree on many policy decisions. One such decision is that “military elites believe that US military forces should be deployed strictly for reasons of Realpolitik, and that when employed, the use of force should be overwhelming.”⁷⁶ Civilians with no past military experience prefer limited interventionist engagements “centered on humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts.”⁷⁷

The “fourth gap” or institutional gap relates to whether the relationships between civilian and military institutions are characterized with harmony or conflict. Examples of these institutions are the media, the courts, and the education system.⁷⁸ One such example would be the prevalence of ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) programs in college campuses. Regarding the courts, “some scholars have argued that federal judges are increasingly prone to accept and even encourage military interpretations on a range of constitutional questions.”⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon, Emerald M Archer, John Barr, Aaron Belkin, Mario Guerrero, Cameron Hall, & Katie E O Swain. “Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research Note”

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ Ibid

In a RAND report produced for the U.S. Army, RAND concluded that the civilian military gap has the potential of undermining military effectiveness by “reducing support for defense budgets, increasing the difficulties of recruiting quality people to join the military, and dwindling public support for using military force.”⁸⁰ It seems to be that the gap drifts further apart either when there is no conflict, or when conflict has endured for so long that civilians don’t perceive it as pressing anymore. The RAND report also found that during the 1990’s many observers expressed concerns about civil-military relations, but as soon as 9/11 occurred, these concerns were muted.⁸¹

C. METHODOLOGY

In order to best understand the recruiting and accession patterns of the US military, Fiscal Years studies which contain the information of military accessions and current military members will be used. Every year, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness provides the data that is needed to create the Population Representation in the Military Services document. The military data is directly provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). For these reports, population numbers and statistics are provided by the United States Census Bureau.

In order to understand the political voting patterns in the United States, a 2016 Presidential election exit poll provided by CNN will be used. This poll contains the

⁸⁰ Szayna, Thomas, Kevin McCarthy, Jerry Sollinger, Linda Demaine, Jefferson Marquis, Brett Steele. “The Civil-Military Gap in the United States, Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter?” RAND Corporation

⁸¹ Ibid

responses of 24,558 individuals in the United States, and is broken out by many different factors and groups.

D. DATA ON MILITARY ACCESSIONS AND VOTING PATTERNS

Recruits by Region FY 2002

The US military is able to recruit approximately 200,000 enlisted personnel every year. It also commissions between 15,000-20,000 officers between all of the services combined.⁸² According to data from the Defense Management Data Center for Fiscal Year 2002, the following were the percentage of recruits by US region. With all of the services represented 14% came from the Northeast, 21% from the Midwest, 42% from the South, and 23% from the West.⁸³

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, for the same timeframe as the numbers for the Recruits by Region, 17% of those ages 18-24 were from the Northeast, 23% from the Midwest, 35% from the South, and 25% where from the West.⁸⁴

Recruits by Region FY 2016

According to the *Population Representation in the Military Services* report for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the following are the 2016 numbers of enlisted accessions by region. There were 13% from the Northeast, 18% from the Midwest, 45% from the South, and 24% from the West.

⁸² American Military Page 7

⁸³ "Population Representation in the Military Services - 2002." Homeland Security and Emergency Management | CNA. 2002. <https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2002/>.

⁸⁴ Ibid

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, for the same timeframe as the numbers for the Recruits by Region, 18% of those ages 18-24 where from the Northeast, 21% from the Midwest, 37% from the South, and 24% where from the West.⁸⁵

Recruits by Region FY 2002 vs 2016

From 2002 to 2016, the percentage of accessions from the Northeast and Midwest decreased, while those from the West and South increased.⁸⁶




Figure 1

Enlisted Accessions in 2002/2016 vs. 2002/2016 Census Data by Region

As it can be determined in the graph below, military accessions in the South are overrepresented with 42% of the accessions compared to 35% of the 18-24 year old civilian population in 2002. In 2016 military accessions in the South are overrepresented with 45% of the accessions compared to 37% of the 18-24 year old civilian population.

⁸⁵ "Population Representation in the Military Services - 2016." Homeland Security and Emergency Management | CNA. 2016

⁸⁶ "Population Representation in the Military Services - 2002." Homeland Security and Emergency Management | CNA. 2002.




Figure 2

Recruits by Region FY 1973-2016

There has been a big change in the geographical regions regarding enlisted accessions into the US Military. According to the Defense Manpower Data Center, in 1973, there were: 18.1% from the Northeast, 27.2% from the Midwest, 35.3% from the South, 18.7% from the West, and 0.7% other. Over 43 years later, the numbers for 2016 were: 12.65% from the Northeast, 18.12% from the Midwest, 44.04% from the South, 24.04% from the South, and 1.15% other. These numbers are all for an AVF (All-Volunteer Force) which was established post-Vietnam in 1973. As it can be determined in the line graph below, accessions from the Northeast and Midwest have decreased, while accessions from the South, West, and Other have increased.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ "Population Representation in the Military Services - 2016." Homeland Security and Emergency Management | CNA. 2016




Figure 3

Data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)⁸⁸

Race/Ethnicity of Active-Duty Military and Civilians FY 2002

The following race and ethnicity data is from the Population Representation in the Military Services provided by the Department of Defense. When it came to enlisted members on active-duty, the breakdown was: 62% White, 22% Black, 10% Hispanic, and 6.3% other. For civilian numbers age 18-44, 68% were White, 13% Black, 14% Hispanic, and 5% other.

When it came to commissioned officers on active-duty, 82.5% were White, 8.5% Black, 4.1% Hispanic, and 4.9% other.

Race/Ethnicity of Active-Duty Military and Civilians FY 2016

The following race and ethnicity data is from the Population Representation in the Military Services provided by the Department of Defense. When it came to enlisted members

⁸⁸ "Population Representation in the Military Services - 2016." Homeland Security and Emergency Management | CNA. 2016

on active-duty, the breakdown as of FY 2016 was: 67% White, 19% Black, and 14% other. In this category, other includes: Asian, American Indian, Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander. The total number of Hispanics was 17% and non-Hispanics were 80% with 3% unknown. For civilian numbers age 18-44, 77% are White, 13% are Black, and 10% are other. The total number of Hispanics was 19% and non-Hispanics were 81%.

When it comes to commissioned officers on active-duty, 76% were White, 8% Black, and 16% other. 8% were Hispanic and 91% non-Hispanic.⁸⁹

Female Enlisted Accessions FY 2002/2016

Female accessions in the US military were 17.3% for all of the military services combined in 2002. According to US Census Data estimate for 2002, 50.20% of the US population between 18-24 year old civilians was female.

Female accessions in the US military were 18.32% for all of the military services combined in 2016. According to US Census Data estimate for 2016, 49.78% of the US population between 18-24 year old civilians was female.⁹⁰

Female Enlisted Accessions FY 1973-2016

Female accessions in the military have sharply increased. From the inception of the AVF in 1973, female military accessions has increased from 5% of total US military members in 1973 to 18.32% in 2016.⁹¹

⁸⁹ "Population Representation in the Military Services - 2016." Homeland Security and Emergency Management | CNA. 2016

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Ibid




Figure 4

Active Duty Military Presence by State and 2016 Election

According to the Defense Manpower Data Center, as of 30 September 2017, the top ten states with active duty presence are: California, Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Washington, South Carolina, New York, and Colorado. These states contain a total of 973,388 active duty personnel. When looking at the 2016 election results by state, out of the top ten states listed above, the following voted Republican: Texas, North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina. Out of all fifty states during the 2016 presidential election, there were 1,011,036 Active and Reserve duty members in the states that voted Republican. Out of all fifty states during the 2016 presidential election, there were 739,165 Active and Reserve duty members in the states that voted Democrat.

2016 Presidential Election

In the 2016 Presidential Election, the following were the results of a CNN exit poll which had 24,558 respondents. The results were broken out by many factors such as gender,

ethnic groups, age, etc. The results below will be for those that match groups that have been already mentioned regarding military demographics. The group polled will be listed, followed by either Republican or Democrat.

- **Gender** (Male): Republican, (Female): Democrat
- **Race** (White): Republican, (Black): Democrat, (Latino): Democrat, (Asian): Democrat, (Other): Democrat
- **Race and Gender** (White men): Republican, (White women): Republican
- **Education and Race** (White College Graduates): Republican, (Whites No Degree): Republican, (Non-Whites College Graduates): Democrat, (Non-Whites No Degree): Democrat
- **Served in the US Military** (Veterans): Republican, (Non-veterans): Democrats
- **Area Type** (Urban): Democrat, (Suburban): Republicans, (Rural): Republicans⁹²

E. OVERREPRESENTATION OF ENLISTED ACCESSIONS IN THE SOUTH

Based on the data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center, the amount of military accessions from the South has increased since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973. The percent of enlisted accessions from the South has increased from 35.3% to 44.04% in 2016. During this time, the number of accessions from the Northeast and Midwest has significantly decreased as well. From Fiscal Year 2002 to 2016, accessions in the South have increased by 3%. There is a clear over representation of individuals from the

⁹² "Exit Polls." CNN Politics | CNN. 2015. <https://edition.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls>

South when one considers that according to the US Census, 18-24 year olds in the South make up 37% of the population, but the military is able to recruit 45% in the South.

In the Northeast, while the number of eligible 18-24 year olds has increased (18% in 2016); the percent of military accessions has decreased (13% in 2016). In the Midwest, from 2002 to 2016, enlisted accessions have dropped from 21% to 18%. The only location it has remained fairly steady has been in the West in the periods from 2002 to 2016. While many factors play a part as to why more individuals from the South and West join the military over those in the Northeast and Midwest, one of those factors is the number of US military bases in the South and West. According to the Defense Manpower Data Center, as of 30 September 2017, the top ten states with active duty presence were: California, Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Washington, South Carolina, New York, and Colorado. These states comprise 973,388 active duty personnel who are stationed in these top ten Southern or Western bases, except for New York and Colorado.

The link between geographical base location and recruiting could be as simple as wherever there are military installations; the exposure of individuals to that “group” (the military) will make individuals more prone to wanting to join the military. One government program that changed this landscape after the Cold War was the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “BRAC is the congressionally authorized process the Department of Defense has used to reorganize its base structure to more efficiently and effectively support our forces, increase operational readiness and facilitate new ways of

doing business.”⁹³ Unfortunately, due to BRAC, many bases and military facilities were closed in the United States. While locations closed in all geographical parts of the country, those that closed in the Northeast and Midwest had a larger impact due to the fact that there already was a lighter military presence in those regions. The South and West were not affected as much due to the fact that massive military numbers remained in those areas. In the post-9/11 era, the Department of Defense has wanted to continue the shutting down or realignment of bases, but has been stopped by lawmakers. Todd Harrison, the director of the Defense Budget Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes that “the BRAC must consider the need to maintain geographic diversity in major military installations so the military can recruit in regions where it does not have as much of a connection to the local communities, and recruiting the best and the brightest requires casting a broad net.”⁹⁴

F. WHO VOTES REPUBLICAN?

When it comes to the 2016 Presidential Election, the South stuck to its conservative roots and voted for President Trump. Within the United States, the data shows that White men, with and without college education, voted Republican. Also, those living in suburban and rural areas voted Republican. When it comes to past military service, veterans also voted for President Trump. As expected, other ethnic groups such as Black, Latino, and Asian voted Democrat. Also, those living in urban centers, females, and non-Whites with and without college education voted Democrat.

⁹³ Alan Beny, "BRAC Home Page," NMHB2016 - Appendix C: Basic Nuclear Physics and Weapons Effects, , <https://www.acq.osd.mil/brac/>.

⁹⁴ Todd Harrison, "To Cut Waste, It's Time to Close More Military Bases," About Us, June 27, 2017, <https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/06/27/cut-waste-defense-spending-brac-000468>.

G. THE MILITARY AND THE SOUTH

The military and the South have a relationship that began during World War I. All of the Army bases named after Confederate generals are in the South. These are: Fort Bragg in North Carolina, Fort Benning in Georgia, Fort Gordon in Georgia, Fort Polk in Louisiana, Fort Hood in Texas, Fort A.P. Hill in Virginia, Fort Lee in Virginia, and Fort Rucker in Alabama. All of these bases were established during WWI in an attempt to expand the armed forces during the war. During this time, the War Department and the Army had a policy to name military camps in Southern states after commanders of the confederacy. This was meant to show reconciliation between the North and South and “to encourage Southern buy-in to the nation’s new war.”⁹⁵ Because of this, some of these bases have become huge military centers. For example, Fort Bragg in Fayetteville North Carolina “is the largest US Army base by population containing 52,280 active duty Soldiers, 12,624 Reserve Components and Temporary Duty students, 8,757 civilian employees, 3,516 Contractors, and 62,962 active duty family members. There are 98,507 Army retirees and family members in the area.”⁹⁶

Having so many individuals who belong to the same group creates a polarized city due to the military influence in it. Also, since the military has such a big presence in the South, the South is also able to impart its southern culture on to the military. Throughout

⁹⁵ Daniel Brown, “These are the 10 US military bases still named after Confederate soldiers,”

⁹⁶“Fort Bragg, North Carolina”, Military Installations.

http://www.militaryinstallations.dod.mil/MOS/f?p=MI:CONTENT:0::::P4_INST_ID,P4_CONTENT_TITLE,P4_CONTENT_EKMT_ID,P4_CONTENT_DIRECTORY:3760,Installation%20Overview,30.90.30.30.30.0.0.0,1

history, there has been higher military service from individuals in the South, which has been referred by scholars as “Southern military tradition.”⁹⁷ In a study by Adam Maley and Daniel Hawkins, they explain the two possibilities that may contribute to Southern military tradition. The first is that socioeconomic factors are the reason. This would be because the South has a population that would have a higher propensity to serve in the military. “There is a greater proportion of youth and minorities, lower levels of college-educated citizens, a fervent religious base, and a robust military presence.”⁹⁸ The other reason would be historical, rooted within traditions in the South which span back to the Civil War.

Overrepresentation of individuals from the South who have joined the All-Volunteer Force has been attributed to age structure, racial composition, and military-institutional presence.⁹⁹ Religion also plays a role, especially due to the conservative Protestant beliefs in the South. According to the 1997-2000 Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Hamre, “When we shifted...to an all-volunteer force, [the military pulled] increasingly from a segment of society that had strong cultural affinity to the military lifestyle and the values that are enshrined in the military community. So over the last 25 years, the military has become far more evangelical [as well as] more Southern, more rural, more conservative.”¹⁰⁰

According to the study discussed, the strongest predictor of active army enlistment in 2005 was the proportion of veterans that were residing in a county. Having veterans present in an area has links to increased recruitment due to social networks, and they can also tap in

⁹⁷ Adam J. Maley and Daniel N. Hawkins, "The Southern Military Tradition," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, April 11, 2017, , <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0095327X17700851>.

⁹⁸ Ibid

⁹⁹ Adam J. Maley and Daniel N. Hawkins, "The Southern Military Tradition," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, April 11, 2017,

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

to their own personal networks. The study foresees that recruiting may become more difficult in the future due to the decline in the proportion of veterans in the United States.

H. DIVERSITY AND THE OFFICER CORPS

When it comes to the composition in the military, the military is mostly White men. While the shift to the All-Volunteer Force in 1973 has drastically changed the composition, it still does not represent the United States. Female accessions in the military have increased from 5% in 1973, to 18.32% in 2016. A lot of this also has to do with the lifting of restrictions on women regarding specific jobs. In 2016, the breakdown of enlisted members on active duty was: 67% White, 19% Black, and 14% other. At the end of the day, the military is still composed mostly of white men.

The officer corps within the military services is even more alienated from the rest of the United States. First of all, 82.5% of commissioned officers on active duty are White. This change is also due to the fact that in order to receive a commission in the US military, one has to have graduated from a four year institution. Socioeconomically, whites have a higher chance of attaining a four year degree than do other ethnic groups. The officer corps is also comprised of an older group, since officers must join after their time in college. According to a 2009 survey of 4,000 Army officers conducted by Heidi Urban, between 1976 and 1996, “the share of military officers identifying as Republican jumped from one-third to two-thirds.”¹⁰¹ Those claiming to be moderates fell from 46% to 22%. “Urban found that younger

¹⁰¹ Mark Thompson, "Does the Military Vote Really Lean Republican?" Time, November 05, 2012, , <http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/05/does-the-military-vote-really-lean-republican/>.

officers leaving the Army were far more likely to identify themselves as Democrats than those opting to stay, which would tend to make the more senior ranks increasingly Republican.”¹⁰² Urban attributes this to the values and professionalism of the All-Volunteer Force.

I. CONCLUSION

Inherently, the US military will always have a civil-military gap while there is an All-Volunteer Force since it takes specific personal reasons for an individual to join the military. The civil-military gap can widen if factors are in place which alienate the civilian populous from the military that is supposed to serve them. While the military is trying to, it needs to do a better job at recruiting and retaining individuals from all regions of the United States, and not be overrepresented in a particular one. This is especially important at a time where the military is attempting to technologically innovate in order to stay ahead of nation-state peer competitors such as Russia and China. A well rounded military is necessary in order to fill jobs that span the gamut from cyber operators, all the way to infantrymen on the frontlines.

The military needs to move away from the Huntington model in that the military should be “the estranged minority” and belong to a separate society.¹⁰³ As Janowitz mentions, the divergence between civilian and military cultures “could diminish the military’s responsiveness to civilian leadership.”¹⁰⁴ If the only way civilians learn about the military is through family or friends in the service, then the gap will continue to widen. The

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Ricks, “The Widening Gap Between Military and Society,” 66-78.

¹⁰⁴ Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon, Emerald M Archer, John Barr, Aaron Belkin, Mario Guerrero, Cameron Hall, & Katie E O Swain. “Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research Note.” *Armed Forces & Society*, 38 (4), 2012. pp. 670-676.

increase of technology in the military has reduced the amount of active-duty service members. For example, there are currently less than 1% of Americans on active duty, compared to 9% during World War II.¹⁰⁵ The military needs to engage with the civilian sector in both academia and technology in order to create a symbiotic relationship for both. The Army's recent announcement of its Futures Command in Austin Texas is a perfect example of this. This command will be better postured "to be near innovative and agile industrial and academic institutions, and where the command can inculcate the culture needed to develop the innovation and synergy required to lead the Army's modernization efforts."¹⁰⁶ While ventures such as these are necessary in order to propel the military into the future, the best way for the military to close the civil-military gap will be to increase its regional recruiting in areas currently underrepresented, and to be as transparent as possible to the American public since it is those people the military serves.

¹⁰⁵ Carson Frame, "The Widening Gap Between Civilians And The Military," Broad Jurisdiction Of U.S. Border Patrol Raises Concerns About Racial Profiling | WBUR News, January 17, 2017, , <http://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2018/01/17/gap-civilians-military>.

¹⁰⁶ "Army Futures Command Location Announcement," Wwww.army.mil, July 13, 2018, , <https://www.army.mil/standto/2018-07-13>.

IV. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS DURING PERIODS OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

A. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the relationship between the military and civilians in government has been one-directional, with the military acknowledging and carrying out orders. Civil-military relations are inherently complex. The relationship requires a balance between how much civilians should control the military and how much freedom the military should have to act following governmental orders. This chapter seeks to understand if current civil-military relationships impede the United States military from being an effective fighting force during post-modern Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs).¹⁰⁷

In 1916, Major General John Pershing gave advice to 1st Lt. Patton.¹⁰⁸ He said,

[y]ou must remember that when we enter the Army we do so with the full knowledge that our first duty is towards the government, entirely regardless of our own views under any given circumstances. We are at liberty to express our personal views only when called upon to do so or else confidentially to our friends, but always confidentially and with the complete understanding that they are in no sense to govern our actions.¹⁰⁹

Over time, the relationship has shifted. Sometimes, the government has a strong influence on the military and at other times there appears to be less control. The incremental

¹⁰⁷ Low Intensity Conflicts are military conflicts between two or more state or non-state actors which is categorized as below the intensity of conventional war.

¹⁰⁸ Lt Patton's (at the time) father was a Democrat campaigning for the US Senate in California. His father ultimately lost the race, but Lt Patton believed his father had helped President Wilson carry the state of California. When his father offered was offered no consolation prize, such as a cabinet post, he grew even more embittered towards Wilson. Pershing urged Patton to be cautious in his public statements by sending him a letter containing what is written here.

¹⁰⁹ Owens, Mackubin Thomas. *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain*. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011, p. 47.

manner in which LICs emerge creates a lag between the military and political responses.¹¹⁰

In other words, “the ease with which politicians can now dictate the tempo and even substance of action has done nothing to facilitate the calibration of political aims and military means.”¹¹¹ This becomes a problem when a deployed soldier may have more effect than a politician on a given situation. Officers engaged in LICs are becoming soldier-statesmen rather than combat leaders.

The dynamics of the military-civilian relationship is explored through several modern LICs. These include the Vietnam War, Desert Storm, Operation Urgent Fury (US invasion of Grenada), and the war in Iraq. This paper discusses civilian control of the military beginning with the Founding Fathers’ apprehensions about having a strong military force in times of peace by focusing on the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as their relationship is the link between military and civilian. Additionally, this paper also discusses the two major arguments behind civil-military relation in the United States as argued by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz and the use of agency theory and the concordance theory to view American civilian-military relations. Ultimately, the paper attempts to determine whether current civil-military relationships in government impede the military of the United States from being an effective fighting force during the conduct of LICs.

In many respects, the current state of theorizing about civil-military relations brings to mind the story of the three blind men examining an elephant. Since each can only sense what he is touching (the trunk, a leg, and the tail) and has no concept of the elephant as a whole, each concludes that the beast is something different from what it really is. Despite the

¹¹⁰ Cohen, Stuart. “Democracies, Limited War and Psychological Operations.” In *Democracies and Small Wars*. London: Routledge, 2003.

¹¹¹ Ibid

lack of an overarching framework for analyzing civil-military relations the various areas of the field offer many rich “pastures” in which researchers may graze.¹¹²

B. LITERATURE REVIEW: WHAT ARE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS?

According to the Army Field Manual, LICs are political-military confrontations between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states.¹¹³ A combination of means to include employing political, economic, informational and military instruments is used to wage LICs. They are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and security implications.¹¹⁴ The US Army emphasizes it is imperative that when engaged in an LIC, the U.S. politically dominates, shows a unity of effort, is adaptable, has legitimacy, and perseveres.¹¹⁵ Additionally, LIC is distinguished from other warfare by the extent to which politics dictates not merely strategy, but military operations and even tactics.¹¹⁶

In LICs, non-military instrumentalities of national power may have an equal or even greater role to play than military forces. For example, in the reconstruction of the Iraqi government following the dissolution of the Ba’ath Party, effectiveness was a key consideration. As Clausewitz teaches, “all war is the continuation of politics by other means”¹¹⁷ The American national security establishment as a whole is not generally structured in a way that facilitates coordination between the armed forces and other agencies

¹¹² Cohen, Stuart. “Democracies, Limited War and Psychological Operations.” In *Democracies and Small Wars*. London: Routledge, 2003.

¹¹³ Chapter 1, “The Fundamentals of Low-Intensity Conflict.” FM 34-7. US Army

¹¹⁴ Ibid

¹¹⁵ Ibid

¹¹⁶ Coll, Alberto R., James S. Ord, and Stephen A. Rose. “Legal and Moral Constraints On Low-Intensity Conflict.” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1995. <https://shibboleth.jh.edu/idp/profile/SAML2/POST/SSO>

¹¹⁷ Clausewitz, Carl von, and Anatol Rapoport. *On War*. Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1982.

of government. Moral-cultural attitudes in the civilian agencies tend to be more hostile toward the use of force than is the case in many countries.¹¹⁸

In the 1980s, there had been little effort to develop doctrines or mechanisms that would provide a strategic framework for the conduct of small wars. Congress mandated to have a framework established in the White House in its military reform legislation in 1986, but it remained a dead letter. “The Executive branch has consistently opposed institutional reform or other fundamental measures to improve either its strategic competence or its operational capabilities in the LIC area.”¹¹⁹ In 1987, President Reagan signed a legislation that created a unified command for Special Operations and established the “Board for Low Intensity Conflict.” The board was a subcabinet-level coordinating mechanism within the National Security Council that developed and implemented a unified national strategy for low intensity warfare.¹²⁰

LICs have always been problematic due to the many gray areas contained within them. “The main security challenges of contemporary Western democracies are small wars, often called low-intensity conflicts.”¹²¹ The conflicts are asymmetric, due to a gap in the discernable power of the opponents. Such engagements fall into the category of limited war, since at least one side of the armed conflict employs only a part of its total military power.¹²² Generally, the weaker side adopts a military strategy of attrition because it lacks sufficient military muscle to force a battle decision on its stronger opponent. The absence of an easily identifiable front line is one such feature, which hinders the capability of a conventionally

¹¹⁸ Coll, Alberto R., James S. Ord, and Stephen A. Rose. “Legal and Moral Constraints On Low-Intensity Conflict.”

¹¹⁹ Ibid

¹²⁰ Klare, Michael T., and Peter Kornbluh. *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism In the Eighties*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988

¹²¹ Kobar, Avi. “Why do they Quarrel? Civil-Military Tensions in LIC Situations.” In *Democracies and Small Wars* by Inbar, Efraim. London: F. Cass, 2003.

¹²² Ibid

trained army to respond effectively to LICs. As a result, in the change in values in Western democratic societies, the conduct of LICs by Western democracies has become significantly constrained by the need to manage such conflicts morally and in a less costly manner.¹²³

In the past, it made sense to distinguish between conventional, unconventional, and sub-conventional LICs. Nowadays, the capability of terrorists to demoralize entire societies and the availability of WMDs to non-state actors in combination with the salience of personal safety have aggravated the threats stemming from LICs and blurred the traditional border between different types of conflicts and threats.¹²⁴

The most important consequence of LICs is that they emerge rather than erupt and allow for extended situations of ambiguity, in which neither the existence of a threat to national security, nor the consequent need for a radical response, is at all clear cut.¹²⁵ They leave room for conflicting interpretations—as such as to their possible direction as to their underlying causes. In order to be able to defeat these threats “requires participants to overcome institutional affiliations and loyalties to their hierarchies, and identify with and act in the interests of the inter-agency or inter-service network.”¹²⁶

The military views LICs as a political albatross—a high risk enterprise that typically lacks genuine national commitment and jeopardizes the institutional standing of the defense establishment as a whole. Carnes Lord, professor of naval and military strategy at the U.S. Naval War College believes that the United States “is very unlikely ever again to involve itself directly in a Vietnam-like counterinsurgency situation.”¹²⁷ “It is undoubtedly unrealistic to expect today’s military to accept full responsibility for the small wars mission.” Lord believed that improved coordination of the military and non-military instruments of national

¹²³ Ibid

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ Ibid

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ Ibid

power will remain the key to improved American performance in small wars. “The most promising approach is to expand the military’s responsibility in areas usually considered peripheral to its primary war-fighting mission such as intelligence, civil affairs, and security assistance”¹²⁸

C. LITERATURE REVIEW: THE THEORIES BEHIND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The balance between civilian leadership and the military has long been debated. In the United States, this started with the Founding Fathers. “One thing that the Constitution does not do well ... is to provide for effective civilian control of the military or even allow for particularly high military competence and professionalism.”¹²⁹ The Founding Fathers associated standing professional armies with aristocracies and because of this, distrusted them.¹³⁰ They did not envision an army in times of peace, and because of their geographic separation, believed they would not need one. The framers concept of civilian control was to control the uses to which civilians might put military force rather than to control the military themselves.¹³¹

Traditionally, in times of war, the Army would be mobilized and the numbers would grow with either volunteers or draftees. Quickly following the end of the war, the military would downsize to a very small force. In the 18th Century, the idea of a professional Army seemed more of a danger than an instrument of protection. “A standing Army, however

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ Taylor, Edward. “Command in the 21st Century: An Introduction To Civil-Military Relations.” Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1998

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. New York: Belknap Press, 1957, p 164

necessary it may be at some times, is always dangerous to the Liberties of the People.”¹³²

Sam Adams believed that Armies were ideologically separated from civilians, and because of this, they were a risk.

Civil-military relations have changed while conducting post-modern LICs because of the nature of the conflict on the ground. “Objective civilian control” in which civilian control is ensured and security is maximized at the same time is one of the leading theories that falls under the institutional theory. The optimal means of asserting control over the armed forces is to professionalize them.¹³³ Military professionalism thrives as it is far removed from politics. “In practice, officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal.”¹³⁴ The opposite of this is “subjective control” in which civilians would dictate the military and it would be more intrusive. Subjective control revolves around the distribution of power among the civilian elites rather than between civil authority and the military.

Constitutional separation of powers provides a dichotomy in which the Executive is empowered with civilian control and the Legislative branch controls the budget and conducts oversight.¹³⁵ Subjective civilian control would eliminate the possibility of having a unique and independent military sphere.¹³⁶ With “objective control,” civilians would decide the objective of military action and would then let the military decide upon the best way to execute and achieve that objective. The best way to maintain military professionalism in a liberal context is to ensure the military has minimal political power. This makes the military “politically sterile and neutral” while allowing the military to control its own realm. “The

¹³² Adams, Samuel. Letter to James Warren. 1776

¹³³ Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*

¹³⁴ Ibid

¹³⁵ Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. p 81

¹³⁶ Ibid. p 83

fact that war has its own grammar requires that the military professionals be permitted to develop their expertise at this grammar without extraneous influence...The inherent quality of a military body can only be evaluated in terms of independent military standards.”¹³⁷

Some are concerned that civilian control of the military may inhibit its ability to fulfill its state security responsibilities. The convergence theory believes that the institutional theory and creating a military that is apolitical and disconnected from politics is unrealistic. For the convergence theory, it is inevitable that the military will be similar to a political pressure group and as long as it remains “responsible, circumscribes, and responsive to civilian authority”, then it should not be a problem. “It would be unacceptable for the professional military officer to engage in partisan politics. However, it would be equally unacceptable not to acknowledge the fact that the officer corps is strongly linked to the state and the nation’s political system.”¹³⁸

Both institutional theory and convergence theory agree that professional military ethics are at the basis for ensuring control of the military. The convergence theory offers four hypotheses behind the changing political behavior of the American officer corps. First, “the central concern of commanders is no longer the enforcement of rigid discipline, but rather the maintenance of high levels of initiative and morale.”¹³⁹ Second, there was a narrowing difference in the skills required for the military and in the civilian world. Third, a shift to a broader social base in the recruitment of the officer corps because of changing attitudes in American society, and because of the increasing manpower needs. Fourth, there was a change in the significance of an officer’s career path such as straying from the traditionally

¹³⁷ Ibid

¹³⁸ Taylor, Edward. “Command in the 21st Century: An Introduction To Civil-Military Relations.” p 39

¹³⁹ Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier*. p 8

prescribed career progression. This theory observes that military thinking emphasizes initiative and innovation which is why the civil-military relations must evolve.

Some believe that only in the loosest sense can we claim to have overreaching theories of civil-military relations. “What we have instead are limited theories that examine one aspect of the matter and that aspect, most often, is the relation between the government and the military.”¹⁴⁰ The civic republican theory contests the liberal notion that the first priority of the democratic state is to protect individual rights and liberties. The priority should be placed on engaging citizens in the activity of public life, that citizenship is based on participation in the rule and defense of the public. Participation cultivates in individuals a sense of responsibility for the common good and ensures the continuation of the community as a republic.

The civic republican theory is related to convergence theory in that it sees military service as a positive obligation that enhances one’s citizenship and improves democratic life. In essence, the liberal theory, underwritten by the institutional theory is concerned with civil-military relations preserving the military’s ability to protect democratic values by defeating external threats. The civic republican theory is concerned with civil-military relations sustaining democratic values, especially the nature of civic virtue, by bolstering civic participation through the citizen-soldier’s role.¹⁴¹ Burk believes that both Huntington (institutional theory) and Janowitz (convergence theory) are outdated. Burk says that Huntington presumes that there is a clearly delineated military sphere defined by war fighting that is independent of the political and social sphere. “In an era still beset by WMDs, there is

¹⁴⁰ James Burk. 2002. “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations.” *Armed Forces & Society*. 29(1): p 6

¹⁴¹ James Burk. 2002. “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations.” p 6

no clear distinction between the ends and means of war, between the policy decisions of political elites and the operational decisions of military elites.”¹⁴²

While not a theory, some argue that the alienation between the US military and its civilian leadership has grown. The rules that McNamara imposed on the fighting in Vietnam at every level, opened a chasm between military and civilian over the command and control of military operations. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the 1960s, McNamara restored civilian control of the military, but for generations after, in response to his heavy handed efforts and the rending divisions of Vietnam, successive Republican administrations weakened these controls. Since then, military affairs became highly politicized in more partisan ways.¹⁴³ The military must always strive to increase the diversity of its officer corps and that proper civil-military relations must be taught to the officer corps at every level. “Over time, that modicum of trust and confidence between civilian and military that characterized an earlier age must be rekindled. It is not wholly within the power of the President Clinton and this generation of senior leadership to repair the damage and heal the wounds, but they must begin.”¹⁴⁴ This observation tends to fall within “objective control” in the institutional theory and believes the officer corps lost its professionalism during the Clinton administration.

While many believe overall civilian control of the military is the best decision for the country, many are arguing that because of the new asymmetric threat facing the United States, a “shared responsibility” theory regarding civil-military relations is necessary. Instead of placing strong controls on the uniformed military, a “shared responsibility” between senior

¹⁴² Ibid. p 7

¹⁴³ Kohn, Richard H.. 1994. “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-military Relations.” *The National Interest*, no. 35. Center for the National Interest: 3–17.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid

civilian officials and senior military officers is required. “Shared responsibility” maintains that a conflictual relationship is not only normal, but it is positive and healthy, provided it is regulated.¹⁴⁵ Military culture leads to respect and if it is lost, then military leaders will be less likely to speak openly and provide their honest views on critical issues to the political leadership. History shows that if civilians show respect for military culture they have a much better chance of attaining the “shared responsibility.”¹⁴⁶ Militaries that are controlled by civilians would be more efficient if they understood that military personnel come from a different culture. “In respecting the way military officers think and act, they are not lessening civilian control, rather they are making civil-military relations the art of persuasion.”¹⁴⁷

The concordance theory has similarities with the “shared responsibility” theory in that it emphasizes “dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and society.”¹⁴⁸ In contrast to Huntington’s institutional theory, which emphasizes the separation of civil and military institutions, concordance encourages cooperation and involvement among the military, the political institutions, and the society at large. “It does not assume that separate civil and military spheres are required to prevent domestic military intervention, rather, it may be avoided if the military cooperates with the political elites and the citizenry.”¹⁴⁹

The institutional theory challenges the assumption that domestic military intervention is more likely to occur if civilian institutions do not exist or are too weak to control the armed forces. Cultural and institutional factors, focusing on the composition of the officer corps,

¹⁴⁵ Herspring, Dale. *Searching for a More Viable Form of Civil-Military Relations: The Canadian and American Experiences*. Cimbala, Stephen J, Professor. *Civil-Military Relations in Perspective : Strategy, Structure and Policy*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid

¹⁴⁷ Ibid

¹⁴⁸ Schiff, Rebecca L. “Concordance Theory: Response to Recent Criticism.” *Armed Forces & Society* 23 : 277–83. p 6

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. p 6

political decision-making processes, recruitment method, and military style offers a better explanation of civil-military relations. “The relationship between civil and military institutions is not enough to explain the dynamic interactions taking place among the political, military, and social sectors of society. “Policymakers should consider the indigenous conditions and complexities of nations before assuming that a particular civil-military scenario prevents domestic military intervention in all cases.”¹⁵⁰

Agency theory combines the institutional theory and the convergence theory. Agency theory uses the principal-agent model drawn from microeconomics and applies it to civil-military relations. This theory provides a micro-foundational explanation of civil-military relations. It treats relations as comprised of an ongoing series of strategic interactions beginning with civilians seeking to trade off the advantages of specialization against the disadvantages of agency. The civilian executive monitors the actions of military agents, the “armed servants.” Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior.¹⁵¹

According to the agency theory, the friction in the late nineties in American civil-military relations reflected the conflict associated with intrusive monitoring by civilians coupled by military shirking. This is one of the predicted outcomes of the agency model. The model suggests that post-Cold War developments have had a profound effect in reducing the perceived costs of monitoring, reducing the perceived expectation of punishment, and increasing the gap between what civilians ask the military to do and what the military would prefer to do.¹⁵² Essentially, the civilians would monitor the military and the military

¹⁵⁰ Schiff, Rebecca L. “Concordance Theory: Response to Recent Criticism.” p 16

¹⁵¹ Feaver, Peter. “An Agency Theory Explanation of American Civil-Military Relations during the Cold War.” North Carolina, 1997

¹⁵² Ibid

determines how it wants to act, accepting the punishment if caught deviating from what the civilians ordered.

Based on the literature, civil-military relationships appear to be one sided, where the orders flow from civilians to military and are seen to negatively impact the military due to civilian micro-managing and lack of military operational wartime planning. Relationships in which a conversation is encouraged between both parties, and mutual respect is observed, will lead to an effective force on the battlefield.

D. METHODOLOGY

To best understand the civil-military relationship in the United States, case studies are utilized to “test” the literature’s expectations. The case studies chosen represent different relationships between senior military officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior civilian officials, such as the Secretary of Defense and the President. These case studies are the Vietnam War, Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada), the Gulf War, and the Iraq War.

These case studies were chosen because they provide a look at civilian-military relationships across five different presidential administrations. The Vietnam War occurred during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1961-1968), Operation Urgent Fury occurred during the Reagan Administration (1983), the Gulf War (1991) during President H.W. Bush’s administration, and the Iraq War (2001-2004) during President George W. Bush’s administration. Each of these case studies examines a snapshot in time in order to study the relationship between high ranking civilian and military members alike.

The data was collected by using both first and secondhand accounts of the conflicts. These include studies from the Department of Defense and journalistic accounts of the conflicts, which include congressional documents within them. Four case studies, from

different periods of time, were used to study how civil-military relationships throughout the conflicts affected the end result in each.

E. THE VIETNAM WAR CASE STUDY

The Vietnam War did not begin as an all-out war, but rather it gradually escalated over several years. Following the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, President Kennedy lost trust and confidence in the JCS. Consequently, Kennedy recalled General Maxwell Taylor to active duty and appointed him as an intermediary with the JCS.¹⁵³ Eventually, Kennedy appointed General Taylor as the Chairman of the JCS.

Additionally, Kennedy restructured the National Security Council (NSC) apparatus to ensure that he consulted only with his closest civilian advisors, and used larger forums to “validate decisions already made.”¹⁵⁴ Under this system, “the Joint Chiefs lost the direct access to the president, and thus the real influence on decision making, that the Eisenhower NSC structure had provided.”¹⁵⁵

In the same time period as the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy’s conflict with the JCS also emerged in Laos. At the time, the United States was preparing for a possible confrontation in Laos with Communist infiltrators. President Kennedy wanted to use guerilla warfare, but the JCS disagreed, noting that regular forces had previously played a key role in defeating insurgencies.¹⁵⁶ The JCS warned that an estimated 60,000 men would

¹⁵³ Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam, 1960-1968*. Part 1 (1960-1963).

¹⁵⁴ McMaster, H. R., *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*

¹⁵⁵ Ibid

¹⁵⁶ Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam, 1960-1968*. Part 1 (1960-1963).

be needed in Laos for a full military commitment.¹⁵⁷ Kennedy did not like that option and found JCS's thinking to be "outmoded" and "unimaginative."¹⁵⁸ Instead, Kennedy ordered 10,000 Marines already stationed in Japan to prepare for deployment to Laos. This pressured Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, into an agreement to develop a neutral Laos.¹⁵⁹

Following the Laotian crisis, Kennedy ordered a gradual response to Vietnam against the advice of the JCS. General Taylor and President Kennedy's infatuation with the military's "flexible response" doctrine which Taylor had written about in his book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, led to this gradual response. In the book, General Taylor called for "the unqualified renunciation" of the doctrine of massive retaliation."¹⁶⁰ The relationship between Kennedy and the JCS came in 1963 when Kennedy was assassinated. Kennedy had restructured the NSC, and laid the groundwork for President Johnson to take over.

Robert McNamara served as Secretary of Defense for both President Kennedy and President Johnson. During McNamara's tenure, he gained influence with the administration, eventually trumping the JCS on all military decisions about the Vietnam War. For example, in 1964, the JCS wanted to break self-imposed restrictions on the use of military force in Vietnam by recommending a "more aggressive program" be approved in order to positively impact the war.¹⁶¹ Instead, the administration decided only to commit the forces necessary to keep South Vietnam from losing the war.¹⁶² Subsequently, the JCS was relegated to the role of principal military advisor without much influence on administrative war policy.

¹⁵⁷ McMaster, H. R., *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

¹⁵⁹ Ibid p 8

¹⁶⁰ Ibid p 10

¹⁶¹ Ibid p 64

¹⁶² McMaster, H. R., *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* p 64

Several disputes highlight the strained relationship between the JCS and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. First, Rolling Thunder, which was an operation for strategic heavy bombing of North Vietnam, showed the different approaches the military and the civilian leadership took to specific war-related activities. For Rolling Thunder, the JCS recommended the “fast full squeeze” approach in order to gain the maximum effect.¹⁶³ President Johnson and McNamara, however, preferred a gradual buildup of pressure, and eventually cancelled the operation.¹⁶⁴ Secondly, Secretary McNamara recommended a mobilization plan for a 44-battalion reserve reinforcement. He and the JCS were initially on the same page, but President Johnson turned down a joint proposal to call up additional soldiers due to “compelling domestic political and international diplomatic reasons.”¹⁶⁵

McNamara was planning a mission to Saigon due to his extended involvement on the Vietnam strategy. On March 2, 1964, McNamara met with the JCS about his mission to Saigon and promised to provide them with a draft of the policy memo before sending it to Johnson. This memo laid out whether to use incremental pressure against North Vietnam, or to strike them with a “hard blow.”¹⁶⁶ Instead, the JCS was given a copy on March 13, after the memo had already been briefed to President Johnson. Against the JCS recommendation, the strategy of graduated pressure would be applied to Vietnam with the White House’s intention to use South Vietnam as a “laboratory, not only for this war, but for any insurgency.”¹⁶⁷ On March 17, the president had a meeting with the NSC to discuss

¹⁶³ “Fast Full Squeeze” was one of three options for the policy in the South East Pacific. It called for a systematic program of military pressures against North Vietnam at a rapid pace and without interruption until the stated objectives were met. The military actions would then “mesh” with negotiations.

¹⁶⁴ Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam, 1960-1968*. Part 2 (1964-1966). 2011 p 542

¹⁶⁵ Ibid

¹⁶⁶ McMaster, H. R., *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* p 72

¹⁶⁷ Ibid

McNamara's memo in which the only member of the military was General Taylor. General Taylor told the president that the JSC "supported the McNamara report" and when Johnson asked McNamara if the program laid out in the memo would reverse the current trends in Vietnam, he said if the government carried out his proposals energetically; the situation would begin to improve within four to six months. At the end of the meeting, after Taylor and McNamara ignored the JSC pessimistic views, Johnson said that the McNamara plan "would have the maximum effectiveness with the minimum loss."¹⁶⁸

In July 1964, General Earle Wheeler was selected to replace General Taylor based on Taylor's recommendation. Wheeler had been a staff officer who lacked combat experience. He spent most of his time during WWII in the United States and even taught math at West Point which led to him establishing a good relationship with McNamara and the Whiz Kids.¹⁶⁹ General Taylor was given the ambassadorship to Vietnam, and before leaving the country, made sure to have President Johnson sign a memo giving Taylor complete control over the American military effort in South Vietnam.¹⁷⁰

As you take charge of the American effort in South Vietnam, I want you to have this formal expression not only of my confidence, but my desire that you have and exercise full responsibility....Specifically I want it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate....At your convenience, I should be glad to know of the arrangements which you propose for meeting the terms of this instruction, so that appropriate supporting action can be taken in the Defense Department and elsewhere as necessary.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ Ibid p 77

¹⁶⁹ The Whiz Kids were a group of experts from RAND Corporation that Robert McNamara worked with in the Department of Defense in the 1960's when he was trying to re-structure the Pentagon. They were to modernize defense strategy with economic analysis, computing, game theory, and modern management systems.

¹⁷⁰ McMaster, H. R., *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* p 109

¹⁷¹ Ibid p 111

Now that Ambassador Taylor had a direct line to the president, he could bypass the JCS in order to get things approved. Taylor requested an increase in military strength of approximately 22,000 soldiers, which was approved by the President. The JCS did not produce an assessment on the troop increase until three days after the president had approved it because Taylor had skipped the JCS on the issue.¹⁷²

Many of these high-stakes decisions took place during exclusive Tuesday lunches in which the JCS were not invited to. Only the President's most trusted officials would be invited. These included: McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and national security advisers, McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow. These lunches became McNamara's primary forum to manage the Vietnam War in which military targets for Rolling Thunder would be added to the target list.¹⁷³ Senator Goldwater noticed this and charged Johnson with ignoring his military advisors and that the Johnson administration had "weakened the bonds of confidence between civilian leaders and the nation's top military professionals" and "bypassed seasoned military judgement in vital national security issues." Johnson responded that "the bonds of confidence and understanding between this administration's top civilian leaders and the nation's top military leaders have never been stronger."¹⁷⁴

In order to maintain composure among the JCS, Johnson often gave the Chiefs what they wanted on Vietnam. "He thereby kept the generals under the illusion that if they stayed loyal they eventually could move the administration all the way in the direction they favored."¹⁷⁵ By 1966, McNamara was not convinced that ROLLING THUNDER was

¹⁷² Ibid p 113

¹⁷³ Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam, 1960-1968*. Part 3 (1967-1968). 2011 p 3

¹⁷⁴ McMaster, H. R., *Derelection of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* p 116

¹⁷⁵ Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam, 1960-1968*. Part 3 (1967-1968). 2011 p 3

effective. Because of this, he urged President Johnson to consider halting the bombing in order to open negotiations with the North and end the war. The JCS were against these proposals.¹⁷⁶ Following this, the JCS endorsed a proposal to build up the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) to a total strength of 542,500 personnel. McNamara conducted statistical analyses based on the MACV's order of battle and casualty statistics and concluded that an increase in American forces would not produce a proportional increase in enemy losses.¹⁷⁷ The JCS responded to McNamara by asking to mobilize over 600,000 reservists, which was quickly shot down by Johnson. Eventually, McNamara recommended 470,000 men to which Johnson approved. By the end of 1967, realizing the war would not be ending anytime soon, McNamara advocated for a settlement to the war. In contrast, the JCS argued for a larger military effort with more troops deployed to the South, and an increase in bombing in the North.

Senator Stennis, the Chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the US Senate Armed Services Committee was afraid that McNamara would cut back Rolling Thunder. During the Stennis Senate subcommittee hearings¹⁷⁸, McNamara testified on August 25 1967 against any expansion of Rolling Thunder and suggested that the campaign could be reduced without damage to the war effort in South Vietnam.¹⁷⁹ During the hearing, he minimized disagreements between himself and the JCS by declaring that out of the 359 fixed targets in North Vietnam that the JCS recommended for strikes, 302 had been approved. Privately, McNamara stated that he was fighting a battle against "hawks in both

¹⁷⁶ Ibid p 4

¹⁷⁷ Ibid p 4

¹⁷⁸ Senator John Stennis was a Democrat from Mississippi who was the Chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the US Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator Stennis was in favor of the air war in Vietnam, and feared that if McNamara would cut back Rolling Thunder, it would only cause more American casualties on the ground and produce a stalemate. He held closed hearings from 9-29 August 1967 which became a confrontation between the JCS and McNamara over Rolling Thunder.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid p 72

parties—fully supported by the Joint Chiefs.”¹⁸⁰ McNamara told former Secretary of State Dean Acheson that his testimony before the subcommittee was “the truth, but not the whole truth.”¹⁸¹ In the August 31 1967, report of the subcommittee, it unequivocally rejected McNamara’s views.

Since 1965, according to the subcommittee, “civilian authority” consistently had “overruled the unanimous recommendations of military commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a systematic, timely, and hard-hitting integrated air campaign” against North Vietnam. Instead, the civilians had “shackled” American airpower to a “controlled, restricted, and graduated buildup of bombing pressure which discounted the professional judgment of our best military experts and substituted civilian judgment in the details of target selection and the timing of strikes.”¹⁸²

Because of what had occurred between the civilians and the JCS, the senators on the committee agreed the past approach had failed to end the war and that now the United States must make “the hard decision to do whatever is necessary, take the risks that have to be taken, and apply the force that is required to see the job through.”¹⁸³ Because of the Stennis hearings, President Johnson began to look for a replacement for McNamara, and following Gen Wheeler’s recovery after a heart attack, began to include the General in his Tuesday lunches.¹⁸⁴

F. OPERATION URGENT FURY CASE STUDY

The island of Grenada is a sovereign island in the southern Caribbean Sea, north of Venezuela. The island was French and British colony before gaining independence in 1974. In 1979, the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG), headed by Maurice Bishop

¹⁸⁰ Ibid

¹⁸¹ Ibid

¹⁸² Ibid p 74

¹⁸³ Ibid

¹⁸⁴ Ibid p 75

launched a coup and took control of the country. The coup aligned Grenada with other Communist countries, such as Cuba and Nicaragua. In the 1980s, a left-wing faction of the government's Central Committee decided to remove Bishop. Following the creation of a military junta, Bishop was executed by a military firing squad.¹⁸⁵ At the time, the St. George's School of Medicine on the island had about 600 medical school students. Following the military take over a 24 hour curfew was imposed; Washington feared the students were in danger.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, the United States decided to become involved on the island because of increased influence and presence by Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was spreading its influence in other regions and supported the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, and the Communist insurrection in El Salvador. These are all reasons which caused President Reagan to act.¹⁸⁷

On October 20, Reagan charged deputy national security advisor, Rear Admiral Poindexter to set up a crisis preplanning group. The group recommended that the Special Situation Group, a committee chaired by Vice President Bush assume responsibility of managing the crisis. This group directed the JCS to prepare a detailed Operation Plan (OPLAN) for the rescue of the US citizens and also recommended a Marine amphibious unit and the USS Independence be diverted to the region.¹⁸⁸ Due to the presence of nearly six hundred Cubans and two Cuban vessels in Grenada, the Deputy Director of State's Office of Caribbean Affairs, Mr. Brown, advised the JCS that they should plan for the worst scenario, "one in which US military forces would have to evacuate civilians in the face of armed

¹⁸⁵ Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Operation Urgent Fury, Grenada*. 1997

¹⁸⁶ Ibid

¹⁸⁷ Clarke, Jeffrey J. *Operation Urgent Fury, The Invasion Of Grenada, October 1983*. CMH Pub 70-114-1

¹⁸⁸ Ibid

opposition from Grenadian and Cuban forces.”¹⁸⁹ Due to the uncertainty as to the situation on the ground, courses of action were created to cover “permissive” and “hostile” environments. For permissive, the recommendation was to use diplomatic channels to move evacuees via commercial aircraft, and for hostile, the recommendation was to overwhelm the island with Marine Amphibious Ready Group 1-84, the USS Independence battle group, and by one or more airborne battalions.¹⁹⁰

The Special Situation Group supported the contingency planning done by the JCS, and on 20 October, began drafting a National Security Decision Directive expanding the original mission to “include neutralization of enemy forces and the political reconstruction of Grenada.”¹⁹¹ On 22 October, the Special Situation Group became the National Security Planning Group (NSPG). The NSPG eliminated the peaceful evacuation course of action and ordered the JCS to plan a military expedition to seize Grenada from local military forces.¹⁹² On 22 October, with new intelligence that the Grenadians were mobilizing about two thousand reservists, the total number of Cubans and Grenadians would be over four thousand troops. The JCS recommended to the NSPG that a larger force be utilized. On 25 October, the NSPG directed the JCS to send an execute order to Admiral McDonald, Operation Urgent Fury Commander, authorizing him to land “a multi-service force of JSOC, Rangers, Marines and airborne troops on 25 October.”¹⁹³ Following this, the JCS were given autonomy regarding the specifics of the joint task forces that were to be created for the operation. While the approval of the concept of overwhelming the enemy, the JCS stressed the need for strict

¹⁸⁹ Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Operation Urgent Fury, Grenada*. 1997

¹⁹⁰ Ibid

¹⁹¹ Ibid

¹⁹² Ibid

¹⁹³ Ibid

rules of engagement. The United States did not want to jeopardize restoring a popular democratic government by destroying the economic infrastructure of the island”¹⁹⁴

On 24 October, President Reagan met twice with the JCS and asked for their individual views on the operation. “The JCS assured the President that the operation would succeed.”¹⁹⁵ During the second meeting, President Reagan asked General Vessey, the Chairman of the JCS, how did the General plan to spend his final hours before the first landings on Grenada? Vessey responded:

As soon as I send the message to the Pentagon to go ahead, I’m going home to go to bed. We’ve given this mission to an operational commander. He has the forces that he believes he needs. He knows that he has the full support of the Secretary of Defense and of you, the President, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If he needs more help, then he’ll call for it, but otherwise, there is nothing you or I can do until these troops have landed unless you decide to call it off between then and now. I’m going home to go to bed and in the morning, go to the Pentagon, and wait for the first reports to come in. The President replied, “I’m going to do the same thing.”¹⁹⁶

Even though the operation was not as smooth as the military planned it, Operation Urgent Fury has become an example of a well-orchestrated short-notice contingency operation utilizing joint forces under one joint force commander.

G. FIRST GULF WAR CASE STUDY

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded the Emirate of Kuwait. The Iraqi invasion sparked a chain reaction that led to the First Gulf War. Shortly after the invasion, the United States called for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops, the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, and the

¹⁹⁴ Ibid

¹⁹⁵ Ibid

¹⁹⁶ Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Operation Urgent Fury, Grenada*. 1997

termination of arms deliveries to Iraq.¹⁹⁷ On that same day, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 660 which condemned Iraq's invasion and demanded for Iraq to withdraw its forces.¹⁹⁸ Coincidentally, OPLAN 1002-90, which contained options for the deterrence of aggression and protection of U.S. interests in the region, had been distributed to the JCS one month prior to the Iraqi invasion.¹⁹⁹ "OPLAN 1002-90 met all the requirements for an immediate and measured response to the range of contingency situations that might develop."²⁰⁰ The plan demanded complex decisions be made with sufficient lead time to enact since some forces would have to be deployed for up to 180 days. In order for the plan to work, "a bold decision to deploy the complete list of forces had to be made."²⁰¹

After being briefed on the options, President H.W. Bush ordered U.S. forces on August 6, 1990 to commence deployment as part of Operation Desert Shield.²⁰² Operation Desert Shield consisted of four objectives.

1. The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait
2. Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government
3. Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf
4. Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.²⁰³

In order to successfully attain these goals, the JCS translated the four objectives into five military objectives.

1. Develop a defensive capability in the Persian Gulf region
2. Deter Saddam Hussein from further attacks
3. Defend Saudi Arabia effectively if deterrence failed

¹⁹⁷ Holland, Lauren. 1999. "The U.S. Decision to Launch Operation Desert Storm: A Bureaucratic Political Analysis." *Armed Forces & Society*. 25(2)

¹⁹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹⁹ Craft, Douglas W. "An Operational Analysis of The Persian Gulf War." Carlisle Barracks, PA.: U.S. Army War College, 1992.

²⁰⁰ Ibid

²⁰¹ Ibid

²⁰² Conrad, Scott W. "Moving The Force: Desert Storm and Beyond." Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994.

²⁰³ Ibid

4. Build a military effective coalition and integrate coalition forces into operational plans
5. Enforce the economic sanctions prescribed by UN Security Council Resolutions.²⁰⁴

During the National Security Council, civilian leadership at the meeting was leaning towards more of an offensive strategy than what the military felt comfortable with. “The lineup ran counter to what most of the public would have expected. The civilians were looking for a way to roll back the Iraqi gains while the military was urging caution.”²⁰⁵ Then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was considered a hawk who wanted options that would “hurt Iraq.”²⁰⁶ The JCS Chief, General Powell questioned whether “it was worth going to war to liberate Kuwait” at which point Cheney responded: “you’re the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Give military advice.”²⁰⁷

Since the national objectives had been defined so clearly, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Chairman of the JCS General Colin Powell were able to hand over the operation to the CENTCOM combatant commander, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Gen Schwarzkopf and his staff were able to transform the national objectives into two operational end states; restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait and regional stability.²⁰⁸ While the State Department attempted to dissolve the situation diplomatically, CENTCOM designed a military strategy to accomplish the nation’s goals if force was required.²⁰⁹ “The first phase was an air campaign that targeted Iraqi command, control, and communications, air defenses, the cutting off of supplies and reinforcements, and attacking Iraqi ground forces.

²⁰⁴ Ibid

²⁰⁵ Jeffrey W. Donnithorne. “Culture Wars, Air Force Culture and Civil-Military Relations.” Air University, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, August 2013

²⁰⁶ Ibid

²⁰⁷ Ibid

²⁰⁸ Matthews, Richard E. “Defining the Operational End State: Operation Desert Storm.” Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

²⁰⁹ Ibid

The second phase was a ground campaign designed to attack ground forces that were in defensive positions in Kuwait.”²¹⁰ President H.W. Bush left it to the military leaders to plan and conduct the effort by stating, “let the civilians and the president do the diplomacy, do the politics, wrestle with the peers, once the lead up to the fighting has begun, let the politicians get out of the way and let the military fight the war, and let them fight to win.”²¹¹ On August 8, 1990, General Schwarzkopf allowed the US Air Force to create an offensive operational plan for the air war that was to be conducted in Iraq.

Up to this point, the NSC wanted an offensive air only campaign to defeat Hussein, but General Powell believed airstrikes alone would not do the job. Because of this, Powell requested an additional 150,000-200,000 troops to ensure success. On October 30, 1990, the troop increase was briefed to President Bush who agreed and “conformed the US strategy to Powell’s preferred vision.”²¹² On January 16, 1991, the aerial campaign began, and on February 24, 1991 tanks led the ground offensive. By February 27, 1991, General Powell, the JCS chairman, recommended an end to hostilities and the President ended the war on the 28th of February.²¹³ After 43 days of bombing operations involving 2,700 coalition aircraft, the force had defeated the fourth largest standing army in the world in 100 hours.²¹⁴

H. THE IRAQ WAR CASE STUDY

Since the election of G.W. Bush, and before the attacks of 9/11, several administrative officials had discussed the possibility of regime change in Iraq.²¹⁵ On

²¹⁰ Matthews, Richard E. “Defining the Operational End State: Operation Desert Storm.”

²¹¹ Ibid

²¹² Jeffrey W. Donnithorne. “Culture Wars, Air Force Culture and Civil-Military Relations”

²¹³ Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection*. 1997

²¹⁴ Ibid

²¹⁵ “The Iraq War—Part I: The US Prepares for Conflict, 2001,” The National Security Archive, September 22, 2010, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/index.htm>

September 11, 2001, following the attacks in the United States, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the JCS to “look for evidence to justify attacking Saddam Hussein as well as Osama bin Laden.”²¹⁶

On September 12, the CIA determined that al Qaeda was guilty for the attacks. Regardless, many thought a state-sponsor had to be involved and Bush ordered the JCS for plans and a cost estimate for a war in Iraq.²¹⁷ On September 29, 2001, Rumsfeld ordered the JCS to prepare Iraq war options with two objectives: regime change and finding WMD’s. In late November, Rumsfeld was briefed by the JCS regarding the Iraq contingency war plan which called for 500,000 troops with seven months of deployment. “Rumsfeld rejected the force levels as too high and the timing for deployment as too long.”²¹⁸

On June 30, 2002, President Bush signed a National Security Presidential Directive which ordered the JCS to execute the deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf in order to be prepared for the invasion of Iraq.²¹⁹ By this point, British Prime Minister Tony Blair supported the intervention, and increased messaging from the United States and Britain regarding WMD’s in Iraq was being communicated by the administrations.²²⁰ At the time, the JCS had concluded that “knowledge of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program is based largely—perhaps 90%—on analysis of imprecise intelligence.”²²¹ The report also went on to say that “U.S. intelligence was unable to “confirm the identity of any Iraqi sites that produce, test, fill or store biological weapons.”²²²

²¹⁶ Ibid

²¹⁷ Ibid

²¹⁸ Ibid

²¹⁹ “The Iraq War—Part II: Was There Even a Decision?,” The National Security Archive, October 1, 2010, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB328/index.htm>

²²⁰ Ibid

²²¹ John Walcott. “What Donald Rumsfeld Knew We Didn’t know About Iraq,” Politico, January 24, 2016, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/iraq-war-wmds-donald-rumsfeld-new-report-213530>

²²² Ibid

In February 2003, a month before the beginning of the Iraq War, General Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army was called to testify at the Senate Armed Services Committee. During the hearing he mentioned that several hundred thousand troops would be needed for post-war stability in Iraq. When asked about the estimate at a Congressional hearing, Donald Rumsfeld said that “the idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces I think is far off the mark.”²²³ To follow up, Mr. Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time mentioned several reasons why a much smaller peacekeeping force would be sufficient to police and rebuild postwar Iraq. He said that there was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq, that Iraqi civilians would welcome an American-led liberator force, and that many Iraqi expatriates would likely return home to help.”²²⁴ When General Shinseki’s office was asked about his estimate, his spokesman responded that the general stood by his estimate. “He was asked a question and he responded with his best military judgement.”²²⁵

The war games run by the Army and the Pentagon's joint staff had led to very high projected troop levels. The Army's recommendation was for an invasion force 400,000 strong, made up of as many Americans as necessary and as many allied troops as possible. "All the numbers we were coming up with were quite large," Thomas White, a retired general who was the Secretary of the Army during the war, told me recently. But Rumsfeld's idea of the right force size was more like 75,000. The Army and the military's joint leadership moderated their requests in putting together the TPFDD (Time Phased Force Deployment Data), but Rumsfeld began challenging the force numbers in detail. When combat began, slightly more than 200,000 U.S. soldiers were massed around Iraq.²²⁶

On 20 March, 2003, the war in Iraq began with coalition airstrikes and a southern invasion from U.S. and coalition forces pre-deployed in Kuwait. By 12 April, most of the

²²³ Eric Schmitt. “THREATS AND RESPONSES: MILITARY SPENDING; Pentagon Contradicts General On Iraq Occupation Force's Size,” February 28, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/28/us/threats-responses-military-spending-pentagon-contradicts-general-iraq-occupation.html>

²²⁴ Ibid

²²⁵ Ibid

²²⁶ Fallows, James. "BLIND INTO BAGHDAD. (cover story)." *Atlantic* 293, no. 1 (January 2004): 52.

Iraqi forces had given up and there was rampant looting, plundering, and attacks on coalition troops.²²⁷ On 12 May, 2003, Mr. Paul Bremer, a former U.S. diplomat, was appointed by President Bush to lead the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. There, he was tasked with overseeing all U.S. government programs except those under the CENTCOM Commander.²²⁸ “The divided on-scene authority for security and reconstruction in Iraq that had existed since the invasion began was thus set in concrete. With poor coordination between the two authorities, unity of effort suffered.”²²⁹ Mr. Bremer then issued two orders. Order 1 removed all Baath party members from office. Order 2 dissolved the Iraqi military and other state entities.²³⁰ Both of these orders surprised the military chain of command tasked with running operations in Iraq.²³¹ The primary reason why the military wanted a larger force than what the Secretary of Defense approved was for post-war operations. On April 11, when asked why U.S. soldiers were not stopping the looting going on, Rumsfeld responded, “Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things, and that’s what’s going to happen here.”²³²

I. A CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ANALYSIS

Civilian society both empowers and constrains US military forces in evolving norms related to the conduct of war and the composition of military forces. “In a strategic environment that is becoming increasingly complex, military cohesion and effectiveness and proper civil-military relations will be determined by a common bond of service and a sense

²²⁷ Lieutenant General John H. Cushman. “Planning and Early Execution of the War in Iraq: An Assessment of Military Participation,” Program on Information Resources Policy. Harvard University, January 15, 2007, <http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/ForArmyWarCollege.pdf>

²²⁸ Ibid

²²⁹ Ibid

²³⁰ Ibid

²³¹ Ibid

²³² Fallows, James. “BLIND INTO BAGHDAD. (cover story).” *Atlantic* 293, no. 1 (January 2004): 52.

of identification with a society that supports service members.”²³³ Throughout most of American history, even the most dangerous security challenges were fairly straightforward and yielded to primarily military solutions. Although there was no lack of politics in determining what the solutions should be, with the exception of Vietnam, military operations could be conducted with minimal concern on the part of the military about the views of the enemy civilian population.²³⁴

The post 9/11 era is a “hybrid” era, where the emergence of transnational non-state actors clearly now pose a significant threat. This era contains international, transnational, and subnational threats which have complicated the challenges faced by the military, which now have to deal with a full spectrum of operations. Marine Corps General Charles Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, captured this notion well with his concept of the “three block war,” in which high-intensity, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations occur simultaneously in close proximity to one another.

In order to be able to operate in a “three block war,” good strategy has to be created before entering the conflict. This is especially important in LICs since they contain so much political capital; this is where civil-military relationships have clashed in the last fifteen years of war. “Postmodern LICs have in recent years been referred to in the literature from five main angles: political, strategic, technological, sociological, and economical.”²³⁵ The problem of the military’s fighting in LICs is not a lack of professional competence, but a lack of strategic planning. “Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the American military, financed by more money than the entire rest of the world spends on its armed

²³³ Williams, John Allen. *Civil-Military Relations and the American Way of War*. Cimbalá, Stephen J, Professor. *Civil-Military Relations in Perspective : Strategy, Structure and Policy*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013.

²³⁴ Ibid

²³⁵ Kobar, Avi, “Why do they Quarrel? Civil-Military Tensions in LIC Situations.”

forces, failed to defeat insurgencies or fully suppress sectarian civil wars in two crucial countries, each with less than a tenth of the US population, after overthrowing those nations' governments in a matter of weeks”²³⁶ The most important area of professional expertise, the connecting of war to policy, of operations to achieving the objectives of the nation—the American military has been found wanting.²³⁷ The phenomenon manifests in the recent failure to adapt to a changing security environment in which the challenges of global stability are “less from massed armies than from terrorism.”²³⁸

The chief failure of the American defense establishment since 9/11 has been the inability to generate a strategy that links campaigns and operations within a theatre of war to policy. This is attributed to three factors. First, the “normal” theory of civil-military relations has dominated the discussion. The normal theory believes that there is a clear line of demarcation between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the military who then conduct the actual fighting. Second, the influence of the uniformed services’ organizational culture and its inability to quickly adapt and innovate constrains the military’s desire to fight a nonpolitical conventional war, instead of a highly political war in which diplomacy may be more important than military might. The last factor is that if the JCS are marginalized, they are not able to provide the integration of theatre strategy and national policy objectives that the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act dictates they need to do.²³⁹ “The operational level of war appeals to armies: it functions in a politics-free zone and it puts primacy on

²³⁶ Owens, Mackubin Thomas. *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11*

²³⁷ Ibid

²³⁸ Ibid

²³⁹ Ibid

professional skills.”²⁴⁰ Because of this, the military is focused on nonpolitical operational wars which mean that the conduct of war is disconnected from the goals of the war.

In order to fix the problem, the military needs to recover its voice in strategy making while realizing that politics permeates the conduct of war and that civilians have a say, not only concerning the goals of the war but also how it is conducted. Civilians must understand that to implement effective policy and strategy requires the proper military instrument. They must insist that soldiers present their views frankly and forcefully throughout the strategy-making process.²⁴¹

According the description of LICs, Vietnam falls into the category as a LIC. “The War in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the *New York Times* or the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, D.C.”²⁴² The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Act was created to have a bridge between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, but what happens when that bridge is burned? Vietnam is what happens. The disaster in Vietnam was not the result of interpersonal forces but a uniquely human failure, the responsibility for which was shared by President Johnson and his principal military and civilian advisers.²⁴³

The Vietnam War was fought as a conventional war, when it should have been fought as an asymmetric war. “Overlooking the complexities of countering the political and military challenges of defeating an insurgency, military operations were aimed at killing large numbers of the enemy in conventional battles and at “hounding, harassing, and hurting the VC should they elect not to stand up and fight”²⁴⁴ The problem began when McNamara

²⁴⁰ Strachan, Hew, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*.

²⁴¹ Owens, Mackubin Thomas. *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11*

²⁴² McMaster, H. R., *Derelection of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*. New York: HarperCollins, 1997

²⁴³ Ibid

²⁴⁴ Ibid

wouldn't allow the JCS to sit in meetings to discuss specific military actions in Vietnam. The impression became that the Chiefs had become technicians whose principal responsibility was to carry out decisions already made rather than fully participating in the planning and advisory process. Following this, the President and McNamara shifted responsibility for real planning away from the JCS to ad hoc committees composed principally of civilian analysts and attorneys, whose goal was to obtain a consensus consistent with the president's pursuit of the middle ground between disengagement and war.²⁴⁵

Much of these problems stemmed from the professional code of the military officer which prohibits him or her from engaging in political activity. Unfortunately, the "normal" theory of civil-military relations in which the military officer just takes orders doesn't lend itself to a thoughtful grand strategy for the war. When it became clear to the Chiefs that they were to have little influence on the policy-making process, they failed to confront the president with their objections to McNamara's approach to the war; instead they attempted to work within the strategy in order to remove over time the limitations to further action.²⁴⁶ Because of this, the JCS "became accomplices in the president's deception and focused on a tactical task, killing the enemy."²⁴⁷ The moment you take away the military's voice from planning, is the moment everything goes wrong. Many argue that this was not supposed to happen and it was not a "problem" regarding civil-military affairs, it was a problem with the members of the military, the JCS in this case. Many say that at a time such as this, the members of the JCS should have expressed their opinions to the Secretary of Defense and to the President as that is their job. Military officers have a sworn oath to the US Constitution, not to the leader of the country. This is clearly known by them as it is on their commissioning

²⁴⁵ Ibid

²⁴⁶ Ibid

²⁴⁷ Ibid

certificates, and they recite it every time they promote in rank. The failure here is that those members of the military didn't have the courage to stand up and disagree with their civilian counterparts because they wanted to protect their careers.

US deficiencies in regard to grand strategy are the result of the current civil-military relationship.²⁴⁸ The military cannot have a passive officer corps. Military personnel should challenge their civilian superiors intellectually, consistently probing the strategic vision of the latter, and compelling those superiors to confront the potential weaknesses of that vision.²⁴⁹ Military branches emphasize unquestionable obedience to order since combat conditions are not conducive to seminar discussions. The policy process however is a never-ending seminar, one in which firm decisions, good or bad, are sometimes made. "It is legally and ethically unproblematic for military officers to speak up about their concerns and point out potential weaknesses in the strategic logic of their civilian superiors and thus prevent them from embarking on folly or convincing them to abandon an unwise course on which they have already embarked."²⁵⁰ If the JCS during Vietnam had done this or had not been sidelined, one could say that the end result would have been much different than what we know of it. It has proven possible for tough-minded secretaries of defense to utterly dominate the JCS²⁵¹, which happened in Vietnam, and repeated itself in the Iraq War.

Several problems that existed in Vietnam can also be observed in Iraq. This suggests that the lessons potentially learned during the Vietnam War were not implemented prior to the invasion of Iraq. The real problem in Iraq was a pattern of civil-military relations that

²⁴⁸ Walton, Dale. *The War without a Strategy: Presidents, the Pentagon, and Problems in Civil-Military Relations since the 9/11 Attacks*. Cimballa, Stephen J, Professor. *Civil-Military Relations in Perspective : Strategy, Structure and Policy*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013.

²⁴⁹ Ibid

²⁵⁰ Ibid

²⁵¹ Ibid

predated the Iraq War.²⁵² Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald Rumsfeld, relied on military officers who shared his views, and marginalized others who did not, including the service chiefs who also comprised the corporate body of the JCS. Information sharing was not problematic since Rumsfeld was able to monitor and oversee the military. The issue was not poor information sharing, but the selective nature of the information he received or filtered.²⁵³

The processes for strategic coordination were seriously troubled in the DoD in 2002 and early 2003. With the exception of Tommy Franks and those few individuals with whom Rumsfeld saw eye to eye, the military and civilians were alienated and not fully engaging in the evaluative processes. The oversight methods to which Rumsfeld resorted in order to protect the corporate interests had compromised the overall quality of strategic assessment at the civil-military apex.²⁵⁴

Secretary Rumsfeld excluded those who would have been most concerned with postwar stability which included most of the Army leadership.²⁵⁵ “The JCS had been pushed back to the margins of war planning” and “were kept at arm’s length from the planning process.”²⁵⁶ “The structural pattern of civil-military relations and the poor consultative environment turned the Iraq war into a bureaucratic battle between Rumsfeld and his generals.”²⁵⁷ This is one of the problems which led to the failure to plan for the postwar environment which would have prevented a power vacuum in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad. It seems that the exact same problem of communication which led to the disaster in Vietnam

²⁵² Owens, Mackubin Thomas. *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11*

²⁵³ Ibid

²⁵⁴ Brooks, Risa. *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008.

²⁵⁵ Owens, Mackubin Thomas. *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11*

²⁵⁶ Herspring, Dale. *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*. Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2008

²⁵⁷ Owens, Mackubin Thomas. *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11*

mirrored itself to what happened during the Iraq War. Politics got in the way of the war, which hampered military strategy from being effectively created and executed.

The culture in the Pentagon changed when Donald Rumsfeld was replaced with Robert Gates. Gates embraced respect for the military, a key attribute one needs when working with the military.²⁵⁸ One of the most significant changes between Gates' Pentagon and Rumsfeld's is the former's approach to military advice. Unlike Rumsfeld, Gates stressed the need for military officers to provide candid advice to the civilian policy makers.²⁵⁹ He said that instead of publicly disciplining senior military officers like Rumsfeld would, he "always treated senior officers respectfully.... I never shouted. I never belittled. I never intentionally embarrassed anyone."²⁶⁰ "We will still need men and women in uniform to call things as they see them and tell their subordinates and superiors alike what they need to hear... More broadly, if as an officer one does not tell blunt truths or create an environment where candor is encouraged, and then they have done themselves and the institution a disservice."²⁶¹ He argued that when it comes to handling "disagreements with superiors and in particular with civilians vested with control of the armed forces under our Constitution" the duties of an officer are "to provide blunt and candid advice always, to keep disagreements private, and to implement faithfully decisions that go against you"²⁶² "The time will come when a leader in today's military must stand alone and make a difficult, unpopular decision, or challenge the opinion of superiors and tell them you can't get the job done with the time and resources available... These are the moments when your entire career is at risk."²⁶³

²⁵⁸ Herspring, Dale. *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*. Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2008

²⁵⁹ Owens, Mackubin Thomas. *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11*

²⁶⁰ Gates, Robert. *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*. 2014

²⁶¹ Robert Gates, Lecture at West Point, April 21, 2008

²⁶² Owens, Mackubin Thomas. *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11*

²⁶³ Robert Gates, Lecture at West Point, April 21, 2008

The case studies of Operation Urgent Fury and Desert Storm are very different from Vietnam and the Iraq War. First, the scope of the conflict was very different in Urgent Fury and Desert Storm. These were limited conflicts with clear end states. Also, both cases began in reaction to a world event, such as an invasion or rise of instability in a region, rather than pre-emptively by the United States. Operation Urgent Fury was a reaction to the events occurring on the island of Grenada, and Desert Storm occurred because of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Even though operational planning for both operations were limited, they were successful because civilians communicated the political end state goals to the military, which then created military goals to achieve the objectives. In both instances, once the President decided to act militarily, the military was given autonomy to conduct necessary operations.

In both conflicts, senior military leaders were allowed to voice their opinions to senior civilian leadership without the fear of being fired and replaced. The candid advice provided by the JCS and the consideration of that advice taken by the Secretary of Defense and President is part of what made these operations a success. It also seems that the events of Vietnam and Iraq did not unfold favorably because senior policymakers had already made up their minds on what they would execute, before the military even had a chance to provide their input and assessment. Sidelining the military may lead to the policy the President wants executed, but it does not mean that the policy will be successful.

The administrations during the Vietnam War and the Iraq war operated under a construct similar to Huntington's institutional theory of civil military relations. The relationship seems to have begun as "objective civilian control" in which the military is professionalized and as far removed from politics. Due to the length and evolution of both of these conflicts, the relationships turned to "subjective civilian control" in which civilians

dictate the military and are more intrusive. Huntington describes this as the distribution of power among the civilian elites rather than between civil authority and the military. This is epitomized by the Tuesday lunches during the Vietnam War and the appointment of Mr. Berner, a civilian, as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq while combat operations were still being run by the military on the ground.

The operations in Grenada and Desert storm resemble a “shared responsibility” theory as described by Dale Herspring. He argues that conflict in the relationship between the civilian and the military is normal, positive, and healthy as long as it is regulated.²⁶⁴ “The key to healthy relations is to create and maintain a good working relationship between the two sides, one that is constructive and in which both sides respect each other.”²⁶⁵ The key in these relationships comes down to respect. Once respect is lost, historically, the civilians take over and the JCS stops becoming proactive, and naturally becomes a reactive entity in the national security construct. The military respected President Reagan because he respected military culture and there was a “shared responsibility” when it came to military operations such as Grenada. On the other hand, conflict under President Johnson and Robert McNamara was rampant, the same as Donald Rumsfeld, because they would marginalize the military, especially its leaders.²⁶⁶

J. CONCLUSION

Many of the civil-military theories that I have discussed were created in the pre-9/11 era. While many of them were accurate in predicting the need for the military to mold itself to LICs, some of them do not. There is still a gap in when the decision should be made of

²⁶⁴ Herspring, Dale R. *Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four-Nation Study*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.

²⁶⁵ Ibid

²⁶⁶ Ibid

switching military tasks, such as warfighting, into civil tasks such as peacekeeping, and if those peacekeeping tasks should be done by the military. The military has found it difficult in the last 15 years of alternating between destruction and peacebuilding, and the question is whether the military should even be involved in the peacebuilding line of work. Based on the literature and case studies, it is evident that a division between civilian and military leadership is not conducive to war fighting in the 21st Century. The inherent nature of LICs contains political goals beyond just defeating the enemy. Inherently, this will cause the JCS and the military to involve itself politically in discussions with civilian officials in order for both parties to be on the same page at all times. The fast pace of LICs requires a symbiotic relationship between both parties involved which is why a shared responsibility is what is needed in our current era of warfighting. By not having the proper civil-military relations in place, the secondary and tertiary effects make the United States military less lethal, thus prolonging conflicts which shouldn't have to be prolonged.

V. CONCLUSION

Civil-military relations are not one-sided, or simple, but complex and multifaceted. This thesis looked to understand these complex sides to civil-military relations in order to better understand them. This paper outlined some of the basics behind civil-military relations and investigated whether the erosion of some of these relationships will affect the national security of the United States. In the thesis, three sides of civil-military studies were investigated. These were: the Founding Father's views on a standing army and the erosion of the separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive branch, the civil-military gap and whether the military is representative of society in the United States, and the civil-military relation between senior military and civilian officials during periods of LICs.

In the first chapter, regarding the Founding Fathers' concern of a standing army and the erosion of the powers of war-making abilities from the Legislative to the Executive branch were studied. In order to gain an understanding of how the Founding Fathers felt about the issue, documents written, and speeches given by the founding fathers were used. Federalist papers, written by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison provided a great resource, as well as a letter from Sam Adams to James Warren describing the potential dangers of a standing army. The argument was that a standing army with the combination of a strong executive would be similar to a monarch in which the oppression of the citizenry would be inevitable. For the research, the history of the war-making powers in the twentieth and twenty-first century were studied, which showed the gradual erosion of powers from the Legislative to the Executive branch, starting off with the Korean War. More recent resolutions such as the War Powers Act and the Authorization of Military Force Against

Terrorists have made it easier for the Executive to go to war on his own terms with little to no Congressional oversight.

Regarding the “threat” of a large standing army to democracy, the research shows that a standing army is not only inevitable, but it is necessary in our current times. With the technological advances in warfare in the last hundred years, a large army is needed to protect the United States. Militarily, the Founding Fathers would not have imagined how real the threat to the country has become, and how it is no longer insulated by its two large bodies of water as it previously had been. Because of this, a standing army is needed, and will continue to be needed in the United States. This topic, regarding the Founding Fathers, is the first chapter in the thesis because one has to understand how the founders of the United States envisioned civil-military relations in order for us to study those relationships today.

In the second chapter of the thesis, the civil-military gap was investigated by researching whether or not the United States military is representative of society. After the draft ended in 1973, and the United States became an All-Volunteer Force, recruiting efforts had to be stepped up by the military in an effort to attract and retain talent. The civil-military gap is an important aspect that contributes to civil-military relations, and is one that has been widening since the All-Volunteer Force was established. For this chapter, data for military enlisted accessions from the Department of Defense was compared and analyzed to census projection numbers by regions in the United States. This led to the conclusion that there is an overrepresentation of military accessions from the South. An increase of individuals from the South and West join the military, as compared to a decrease of those from the Northeast and the Midwest regions of the United States. While the cause for the overrepresentation in the South was not studied, the large number of military basing in the South post-WWI was

mentioned as a possible contributing factor. The military needs to do a better job at recruiting and retaining talent from all walks of life, and from every demographic pool in the United States. At a time when the United States and its rivals are trying to be the most technologically advanced military, the best need to be recruited from academia and the private sector in order to ensure the United States maintains its superior edge.

The third chapter, focused on the relationships between civilian and military senior officials during periods of Low Intensity Conflict. Because LICs require civilian involvement, and go far beyond just meeting and establishing military objectives, these were the moments where effective relationships would be most beneficial. It focused on whether or not civil-military relationships affect national security. The balance of military and civilian leadership has been long debated. Huntington's theories of objective control, where the military is professionalized and subjective control, where civilians dictate the military on what to do are a bit out of date. The reason why they are out of date is that these theories have the military listed as a separate class, which actually increases the civil-military gap, negatively affecting civil-military relations. More modern theories, such as the convergence theory and the civic republican theory require the military and civilians to be more in touch with one another, instead of becoming two separate classes. Particularly in LICs, the military has to work effectively with civilian leadership and vice-versa.

The four case studies that were used to study these relationships were: the Vietnam War, Operation Urgent Fury, the First Gulf War, and the Iraq War. In studying these four conflicts, the results were that relationships did matter, and those relationships that were not properly established cause the lives of many innocent individuals. The Vietnam War and the Iraq War saw the breakdown of relationships between senior defense and civilian officials.

Essentially, the relationship was one-way, with civilians dictating what the military would do. In Vietnam, it led to hundreds of thousands of dead, and in Iraq it led to instability in the region still being dealt with today. While many relationship theories have been established over time, no one particular theory is the “best” model. The standardization of relationships does have to be established in order to ensure effective leadership in times of crisis. A symbiotic relationship which is open between all parties involved, and allows the military to respectfully challenge civilian officials during critical times is needed. One of the reasons behind the prolonged nature of the Vietnam War was because senior military leadership kept quiet and did not challenge the Secretary of Defense. While I am not calling for these senior military leaders to be insubordinate, they need to have the courage to inform those above them with the facts, instead of saying yes and executing all tasks, whether right or wrong.

The results of this thesis are important in that they affect how effective the military can and will be in the future. The way the United States military is recruited and trained, sent to war, and the decisions being made by leaders during that war encompasses key elements of what makes the military successful. Also, the views of the population about the military may affect the morale of those in uniform. The United States has come a long way from when soldiers returning from Vietnam were being insulted and harassed, because of decisions they did not make, but the leaders in the United States had made.

While this research contained many aspects of civil-military relations, it was varied and broad. For the future, the overrepresentation of recruitment from individuals in different regions of the United States should be studied from a financial opportunity perspective. While one argument is that those in the South join the military because of their “exposure” to

military institutions in the region, the other argument is that there is more financial hardship in the South, which leads to more individuals seeking a job in the military.

Regarding the civil-military gap, the current politicization occurring in the United States when it comes to the Intelligence Community also affects the military and civil-military relations within it. Unbeknownst to many, the Department of Defense has nine intelligence agencies. These are: the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, the US Air Force, US Army, US Coast Guard, US Marine Corps, and the US Navy. While politicians always use their support of the military as a campaign tool, the intelligence community has been sidelined in the past few years, especially with the ongoing probe regarding Russia and the 2016 US Presidential elections. What many forget to realize is that thousands of members of the active-duty military are the analysts and officers coming up with intelligence assessments in these agencies. In a way, when one attacks the intelligence community, the military is also being attacked. The study of this politicization and a way to move away from it is very important. Intelligence assessments can be right or wrong, and that's okay because they are predictions. As soon as they become politicized, the institutions they are meant to protect become very fragile.

Regarding the politicization of the military, the deployment of active-duty troops to the border with Mexico discussed during the Introduction goes against the ideals of the Founding Fathers. While I have concluded that a standing army is needed in our time in order to focus on outside threats, the Founding Fathers were still right that a powerful executive would be able to oppress its citizens with the use of the army. For example, this deployment of troops to the border is still on American soil. They are deploying to Texas, Arizona, and

California, not to Mexico. Also, as opposed to how the National Guard is controlled by each respective governor of the state to which they belong; the active duty is controlled by the President of the United States as Commander-in-Chief. Militarizing the border of the United States for political reasons with the use of active duty troops should not be the goal of any administration. According to former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, the deployment of these troops to the border is a “wasteful deployment of over-stretched Soldiers and Marines.” The reason why the Founding Fathers feared a standing army is that in their eyes, a standing army would feel as a separate body from society, so it would be easier to oppress their own people. In contrast, members of the militia would not oppress their own people since they are from the towns and states where they would serve. A democracy should never mix politics into the military. Retired Lt. Gen. Jim Dubik said that “the real issue is whether the military is being used for partisan political purposes” and that “if that’s the case, then I think such a use represents not just a wasteful deployment but a dangerous one. It’s dangerous because it will politicize the use of force in ways a democracy should avoid.” Regarding civil-military relations, this decision by the President also places Secretary of Defense Mattis in an uncomfortable situation because as a former General he understands the need for the military to remain apolitical.

Having a standing army versus not having one is a tough balance because we have seen the risks above of having one, but what if the United States didn’t have a standing army? In today’s time, the United States would not be able to build up a “new” military every time conflict arose. The reason behind this is that the United States became a hegemon in the post-WWII world, which means it needed a powerful military in order to project its power and maintain its status. One of the ways this hegemony has been ensured is by having

American service members stationed in permanent overseas bases. Examples of these are American bases in: Germany, England, Spain, Italy, Japan, South Korea and other countries. While I acknowledge the risks of a standing army the Founding Fathers feared, and while we should never forget those risks, a standing army is necessary and beneficial in order to not only maintain the United States relevant in the world, but also in order to keep the United States on the map.

Overall, certain changes need to occur in order for the military to be more streamlined and more effective. These changes would also push civil-military relations in a positive direction and would help in closing the civil-military gap. The Legislative branch should step up and repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, and should re-write the War Powers Resolution in order to prevent the Executive from starting a war, and having no Congressional say about it at its inception. From a personnel perspective, the military needs to adjust its recruiting in order to more accurately represent the country. Also, the rise of more highly technological and specialized jobs will require the military to be attractive to those with superior academic abilities. As far as relationships go, senior defense officials within the Pentagon, both civilian and military, need to have a standardized relationship which encourages dialogue in order for the best decisions to be made. The military can't be thought of as a separate group or class within our society. It cannot be set aside and only called upon in times of crisis. The military needs to be interweaved within our society, as this would also be used as a check on the government regarding the use of it. The more involved the military and civilians are in daily life, the harder it will be for the military to be used in matters that do not affect the national security of the United States, but place our young men and women in harm's way.

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