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Automated Video Screening for Unattended Background Monitoring in Dynamic Environments

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Automated Video Screening for Unattended Background Monitoring in Dynamic Environments

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Abstract

This report addresses the development of automated video-screening technology to assist security forces in protecting our homeland against terrorist threats. A threat of specific interest to this project is the covert placement and subsequent remote detonation of bombs (e.g., briefcase bombs) inside crowded public facilities. Different from existing video motion detection systems, the video-screening technology described in this report is capable of detecting changes in the static background of an otherwise, dynamic environment -- environments where motion and human activities are persistent. Our goal was to quickly detect changes in the background -- even under conditions when the background is visible to the camera less than 5% of the time. Instead of subtracting the background to detect movement or changes in a scene, we subtracted the dynamic scene variations to produce an estimate of the static background. Subsequent comparisons of static background estimates are used to detect changes in the background. Detected changes can be used to alert security forces of the presence and location of potential threats. The results of this research are summarized in two MS Power-point presentations included with this report.

Acknowledgements

The following individuals are recognized for their contributions to this project and this report:

Jason Neely, Department 15211, and

Denise Padilla, Department 15211.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	3
Acknowledgements.....	4
Table of Contents	5
Introduction	6
Background.....	6
Technical Approach.....	6
Results.....	7
References.....	25
Distribution.....	26

Introduction

The problem we are addressing is the development of automated video-screening technology to assist security forces in protecting our homeland against terrorist threats. A prevailing threat is the covert placement and subsequent remote detonation of bombs (e.g., briefcase bombs) inside crowded public facilities. These locations are ideal for terrorist attacks because 1) many facilities do not screen people entering or exiting the facility due to high costs and intense manpower requirements, 2) it is relatively easy to place a bomb unnoticed because of all the surrounding activity, 3) there is a high potential for large numbers of casualties, and 4) the idea of someone bombing a crowded public facility strikes fear into the hearts of nearly all Americans.

Background

Although video surveillance systems are increasingly more common in public facilities throughout the U.S., current systems are unable to detect the placement of bombs. The mere presence of surveillance cameras is assumed to provide some degree of deterrence. It is also unlikely that security personnel could detect a bomb or, someone placing a bomb, by observing live video from surveillance cameras. The problems lie in the large number of cameras required to effectively monitor a large area, the limited number of security personnel employed to protect these areas, and the intense diligence required to effectively screen live video from even a single camera. Automated video motion detection and tracking systems currently exist for detecting intrusions into a monitored, or protected, area (e.g., the perimeter surrounding a nuclear facility). One of the basic underlying assumptions used by algorithm designers of these systems is that the background is free of targets, or motion, most of the time. That is, the camera mostly observes a relatively static background. The performance of these systems is poor in extremely dynamic environments where motion and human activity are persistent (e.g., inside a subway station, airport, or bus depot).

Technical Approach

Our approach was to develop an automated video-screening technology that is capable of *quickly* detecting changes in the static background of an otherwise, dynamic environment. Different from existing video-detection systems designed to operate in static environments, the video-screening technology is capable of detecting changes in the static background of a dynamic environment: environments where motion and human activities are *persistent*. Our goal was to quickly detect background changes, even if the background is visible to the camera less than 5% of the time. Our approach employs statistical scene models based on mixture densities. We hypothesized that the static-background component of the mixture has a small variance compared to dynamic components. Our initial experiments show this is true about 90% of the time. We have identified extensions to these models that will enable accurate estimation of the static background over 99.9 % of the time. This requirement is based on manpower estimates for response. We have demonstrated robust-threat-detection capabilities using subsequent comparisons of static-background estimates to detect changes and to alert security to the presence and location of potential threats (e.g., the placement of a briefcase bomb next to a trash can). A guard can then make a visual assessment of any potential threat and plan an appropriate response.

Results

The following power-point slides summarize the results of this research.



Automated Video Screening for Unattended Background Monitoring in Dynamic Environments

PI: Jeff Carlson

Team Members: Jason Neely, Denise Padilla

Funding: \$100K

Duration: 6 months



Objectives

- **Develop automated video screening technology to detect background changes in a dynamic scene environment**
- **Assist security forces in protecting our homeland against terrorist threats**
- **Defeat a prevailing threat: covert placement and subsequent remote detonation of bombs inside crowded public facilities (e.g. airport, subway station, bus depot)**





Crowded Public Facility Vulnerabilities

- Many facilities do not screen incoming and outgoing traffic due to high costs and intense manpower requirements
- Surrounding activity makes it relatively easy to place a bomb unnoticed
- There is a high potential for a large number of casualties
- Ideal location for a terrorist attack because the idea of the bombing of a crowded public facility strikes fear into the hearts of nearly all Americans



Limitations of Existing Video Surveillance Systems

- Current systems are unable to detect the placement of bombs
- Security personnel are unlikely to detect a bomb or the placement of a bomb by observing live video from surveillance cameras because:
 - A large number of cameras are required to effectively monitor a large area
 - There are a limited number of security personnel employed to protect these areas
 - Intense diligence is required to effectively screen live video from even a single camera
- Existing video motion detection and tracking systems used for detecting intrusions into a monitored area assume the background is free of targets, or motion, most of the time





Approach

- Unlike existing video motion detection systems that operate in primarily static environments, the proposed technology will be capable of detecting changes in the static background of a dynamic environment (environments where motion and human activities are commonplace)
- Instead of subtracting the background to detect movement or changes in a scene, we subtract the dynamic scene variations to produce an estimate of the static background
- Subsequent comparisons of static background estimates are used to detect changes in the background (e.g. , the placement of a briefcase bomb next to a trash can)



Approach

- Detected changes will be used to alert security forces of the presence and location of potential threats
- Security forces can then make a visual assessment of any potential threats and plan an appropriate response





Work in FY03

- **Feature Discovery** – We investigated features that are easily extracted from video data and that are useful for background extraction in dynamic scene environments
- **Algorithm Development** – Algorithms were developed using these features to extract the static background of a dynamic scene



Feature Discovery

- The pdf of each pixel can be modeled as a Gaussian mixture:

$$f(x) = P_T \cdot f(x|T) + P_B \cdot f(x|B)$$

Where

$$f(x|B) \sim N(\mu_B, \sigma_B)$$

$$f(x|T) \sim N(\mu_T, \sigma_T)$$

(B = Background, T = Target)

And we assume

$$\sigma_T \gg \sigma_B, \quad P_T \gg P_B$$


- The background estimate is determined from an estimate of μ_B
- The statistic we use for estimating the mean background level is the sample mode of the mixture density





Feature Discovery

- An example mixture showing the sample mode close to the mean background pixel level (μ_B)



Feature Discovery

- Current video motion detection and tracking systems assume the background is free of motion most of the time
- This assumption allows pixel averaging to be a good estimate of μ_B
- Averaging is not a good estimate of μ_B in dynamic scene environments





Constraint

If we calculate

$$P_T \cdot f(x|T) = \frac{P_T}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_T} \cdot e^{-\frac{(x-\mu_T)^2}{2\sigma_T^2}} \quad \text{At} \quad \mu_T : \frac{P_T}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_T}$$

And

$$P_B \cdot f(x|B) = \frac{P_B}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_B} \cdot e^{-\frac{(x-\mu_B)^2}{2\sigma_B^2}} \quad \text{At} \quad \mu_B : \frac{P_B}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_B}$$

A sufficient condition for the sample mode to be a good estimate of μ_B is

$$\frac{P_B}{\sigma_B} > \frac{P_T}{\sigma_T}$$



Constraint

If we substitute $P_T = 1 - P_B$

Then
$$P_B > \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\sigma_T}{\sigma_B}}$$

Let
$$\sigma_T = k \cdot \sigma_B$$

$$P_B > \frac{1}{1 + k}$$

If $k = 10$, we must see the background ~10% of the time in order to be able to estimate it using the sample mode






Algorithm

- The algorithm generates and displays 4 images:
 - Current Input Image
 - Current Background Estimate
 - Previous Background Estimate
 - Discrete Difference Image
- (Current Background Est. – Previous Background Est.)



Algorithm





Performance Metrics

- **Probability of Detection (PD)** - Given a set number of background pixels that have been changed physically, this is a measure of the percentage of those pixels that are detected as a change in the background image
- **Probability of False Alarm (PFA)** - This is the number of false detections
 - Best represented as a rate (avg # false pixel detections/frame OR avg # false detections/day)
 - False detections can be declared as either pixel-by-pixel or frame-by-frame



Performance Metrics

- **Detection Lag (DL)** - Measure of time that elapses between a physical change in the background and the time at which the difference image displays this change
- **Extinguish Lag (EL)** - This is a measure of how quickly the system assumes any new background changes into the “old background”; it is the time that elapses between the point of detection and the earliest point at which no pixels are shown in the difference image
- Both Detection Lag and Extinguish Lag can be determined analytically





Future Work

- Investigate statistics other than the sample mode to estimate μ_B
Ex: Consecutive duration of a particular grey level
- Histogram Updating (Time Weighted Averaging)
 - Histogram values are calculated based on the weighted sum of old values and new values

$$Hist_{new} = (1 - \alpha) \cdot Hist_F + \alpha \cdot Hist_{\alpha \cdot F} \quad (0 \leq \alpha \leq 1)$$

- Histogram Discrete Filtering
 - Used to detect a narrow peak (background) that has less amplitude than the peak attributed to targets (people)
 - Allows background estimation even if

$$P_B < \frac{1}{1+k}$$



Video Background Extraction

Department 15212:
Jeff Carlson
Denise Padilla
Jason Neely





Video Background Extraction

Introduction

- Statistical Modeling
- Method1
 - Analysis
 - Simulation
- Method2
 - Analysis
 - Simulation
- Conclusions



Statistical Modeling

- By recognizing that a video pixel represents either motion or background, we can model its probability density function using a mixture:

$$f_x(x) = P_B f_x(x/B) + P_M f_x(x/M)$$

- By quantizing x into discrete values (e.g., $k = 0, 1, \dots, 255$), we can use histograms to estimate the density function

$$f_k(k) = P_B f_k(k/B) + P_M f_k(k/M)$$

- The task of background extraction is reduced to the following problem:

Determine: $\hat{\mu}_B = E(f_k(k | B))$ from: $f_k(k)$






Statistical Modeling

Empirical Results


For a given pixel:

“Motion” characterized by *Gaussian* distribution with *large sigma* and *centered mean*



Measured



Generated



“Background” characterized by *Gaussian* distribution with *small sigma*



Key Observation: $\sigma_M \gg \sigma_B$




Statistical Modeling


$$f_x(x) = \frac{P_B}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_B} e^{-\frac{(x-\mu_B)^2}{2\sigma_B^2}} + \frac{1-P_B}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_M} e^{-\frac{(x-\mu_M)^2}{2\sigma_M^2}}$$

2 examples of mixture densities generated in MATLAB with $\sigma_M \gg \sigma_B$

$$P_B \gg P_M$$



$$P_M \gg P_B$$





Method 1-Analysis

- Method 1 involves using ‘sample mode’ to extract background
- Sample mode = $\text{mode}(f_k(k))$, $f_k(k)$ = histogram estimate of $f_x(x)$
- We expect: $\text{mode}(f_k(k)) \approx \mu_B$ or $\text{mode}(f_k(k)) \approx \mu_M$
- condition for ‘mode’ to identify background:

$$f_x(\mu_B) > f_x(\mu_M)$$




$$P_B > \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\sigma_M}{\sigma_B} K} \quad \text{where} \quad K = \frac{1 - e^{\frac{-(\mu_M - \mu_B)^2}{2\sigma_B^2}}}{1 - e^{\frac{-(\mu_M - \mu_B)^2}{2\sigma_M^2}}}$$



Method 1-Analysis

- The constant K corrects for overlapping probability densities
- As μ_B approaches μ_M , K becomes large $\lim_{\mu_B \rightarrow \mu_M} K = \left(\frac{\sigma_M}{\sigma_B}\right)^2$ and required P_B becomes small



- For worst case, probability density functions are disjoint, $K=1$
- The sufficient condition is thus:


$$P_B > \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\sigma_M}{\sigma_B}}$$





Method 1-Analysis

How many samples do we need to use the 'sample mode' to estimate μ_B ?





Method 1-Analysis

$$P_B < \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\sigma_M}{\sigma_B} K}$$

$$P_B > \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\sigma_M}{\sigma_B} K}$$

$$\text{mode}(f_k(k)) \approx \mu_M$$

$$\text{mode}(f_k(k)) \approx \mu_B$$





Method 1-Simulation

- Statistical simulation may be used to check the results of analysis


Example System:

$$\mu_B=50, \sigma_B=1, \mu_M=127, \sigma_M=30, 100 \text{ pixels}, N=10,000 \text{ pts}$$

Simulation varies P_B and determines STD, given $error = mode(f_k(k)) - \mu_B$ for each

$$P_B > \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\sigma_M}{\sigma_B} K}$$

$$P_B > 0.0311$$



Method 1-Analysis

Effect of N on the Standard Error (STD):

- The binomial PDF is used to determine the dependency of STD on N
- STD , The standard error is the standard deviation of the error: $error = sample\ mode - \mu_B$

$$P(f_k(\mu_B) = h_B) = \binom{N}{h_B} (P_B f_k(\mu_B | B))^{h_B} (P_M f_k(\mu_B | M))^{N-h_B}$$

$$P(f_k(\mu_M) = h_M) = \binom{N}{h_M} (P_B f_k(\mu_M | B))^{h_M} (P_M f_k(\mu_M | M))^{N-h_M}$$

$$P(f_k(\mu_B) > f_k(\mu_M)) = P(f_k(\mu_B) = f_k(\mu_M) + \alpha) \text{ for all } \alpha \geq 1$$

$$P(f_k(\mu_B) > f_k(\mu_M)) = \sum_{h_m=1}^N \sum_{\alpha=1}^{N-h_m} P(f_k(\mu_B) = h_M + \alpha) P(f_k(\mu_M) = h_M)$$






Method 1-Simulation

Example System: **for variable N**

$\mu_B=50$, $\sigma_B=1$, $\mu_M=127$, $\sigma_M=30$, 100 pixels

N is varied between 200 and 10,000 points





Method 2-Analysis

- Method 2 involves applying a discrete filter to the histogram before using ‘mode’
- Given: $f_k(k) = P_B f_k(k | B) + P_M f_k(k | M)$
- A discrete filter is made by allowing $g_k(k)$ to be the windowed version of $f_k(k/B)$ on an interval centered at μ_B
- Thus, $y_k(k) = g_k(k) \otimes f_k(k)$
- We expect $mode(y_k(k)) = \mu_B$






Method 2-Simulation




Filter window
[-1 -1/6 2/3 1 2/3 -1/6 -1]



Method 2-Simulation

Example System:

$\mu_B=50$, $\sigma_B=1$, $\mu_M=127$, $\sigma_M=30$, 100 pixels, $N=10,000$ pts
Simulation varies P_B and determines the squared error (STD) between
 $mode(y_k(k))$ and μ_B for each






Method 2-Simulation

Example System: **for variable N**

$\mu_B=50$, $\sigma_B=1$, $\mu_M=127$, $\sigma_M=30$, 100 pixels

N is varied between 200 and 10,000 points



Conclusions


- Pixel values may be modeled as a mixture of $P_B f_x(x/B)$ and $P_M f_x(x/M)$ probability density functions
- Empirical evidence suggests $\sigma_M \gg \sigma_B$
- Given a sample of pixel values $f_k(k)$, operations on $f_k(k)$ may be done to determine an estimate of μ_B
- Analysis and simulation suggest that the background may be extracted successfully even when $P_B \ll P_M$





Ancillary

Plot of K vs μ_B



References

1. **Van Trees**, H., Detection, Estimation, and Modulation Theory Part I (J. Wiley and Sons, New York, 1971).
2. Athanasios **Papoullis**, “Probability, Random Variables, and Stochastic Processes”, Third Edition, McGraw Hill.

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