

# Terrorism before and after 9/11 – a more dangerous world?

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## Abstract

Was 9/11 the opening salvo in a new age of terrorism? Some argue that this act ushered in a more chaotic world. Others contend an increased focus on terrorism in the past 15 years is the result of conflating terrorist activity with insurgency. We shed light on these claims by analyzing data on domestic and transnational terrorist incidence from 1989 to 2014. The evidence suggests that the years since 9/11 have been different from those preceding them. Once the prevalence of conflicts is accounted for, the post-9/11 era is a significantly less terror prone period than the years before it. A country not suffering civil conflict was upwards of 60 percent more likely to experience terrorism prior to or during the year 2001 than since. However, the opposite trend holds for those countries with a higher proportion of Muslims. Prior to 2001, countries with higher Muslim populations experienced less domestic terrorism. Since 9/11, these countries have experienced significantly more terrorism – both domestic and international – than they had previously.

## Keywords

Civil war, terrorism, insurgency, 9/11

## Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, policymakers were swift in declaring transnational terrorism the next extreme threat to international security.<sup>1</sup> Some even gave expression to the notion that 9/11 fundamentally changed the world by framing the conflict between the West and Islamist terror as “World War IV” – a perpetual state of conflict between militant Islam and the West.<sup>2</sup> Others have situated the September 2001 attacks within the broader historical context of terrorism. Just as the end of the Cold War heralded a transformation in the phenomenon of terrorism from nationalist, leftist, and often separatist ideologies, 9/11 reflects a shift in the primary motivation for terrorism to the religious and fundamentalist realm.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, these narratives tend to comport with a view that the world is more volatile and unstable than it has been in the past—an interpretation often perpetuated by popular media reports. A 2016 article in the *New York Times* notes that the number of deaths attributed to terrorism in North America and Europe rose markedly in 2015.<sup>4</sup> However, the article also adds that more than three-quarters of all terrorism fatalities over the last five years transpired in six countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen – all places beset with civil strife.

The latter point is in line with a host of research drawing important connections between terrorism and civil wars (Findley and Young, 2012). Weak or failed states are centers for terrorist activity (Bapat, 2007; Piazza, 2008). Terrorism is a tactic often employed by rebels in civil wars for various purposes (Stanton, 2013). Terrorism may additionally serve as a spoiler to peace processes (Findley and Young, 2015). This research program makes clear that any accounting of terrorism should seek to contextualize it, particularly when the setting of much terror is insurgency and civil war.

When one does so, how, if at all, does this impact how we appreciate terrorism since 9/11? In the roughly 15 years since 9/11 and the start of the “global war on terror,” the world experienced more civil and terrorist violence.

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


But is this modern era remarkably different from the one preceding it? Has 9/11 impacted the prevalence of terrorism and its fundamental relationship with civil conflict?<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, is such conflict-related terrorism largely domestic or transnational in nature? We leverage data on worldwide terrorist incidence to address these issues.

Our results suggest that after accounting for the prevalence of terrorism in conflict settings, the post-9/11 era is much less terror-prone than the years preceding it. We also highlight another shift in terrorist activity from predominantly non-Muslim to Muslim majority countries. Prior to 2002, the higher a country's Muslim population, the less domestic terrorism it tended to experience. Since 2002, this trend has strongly reversed. And finally, interventions into civil conflicts by Western countries are highly correlated with domestic terrorism.

## Trends in terrorism

Figure 1 depicts the number of terrorist attacks worldwide by year as reported by the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database (GTD), an open-source collection of information on terrorist events from 1970 through 2014.<sup>6</sup> The data reveal a gradual increase in the frequency of attacks from 1970 until 1992. From here until 2004, a period of decline is evident beginning in the wake of the Cold War's end and lasting roughly a dozen years. For the past decade, however, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of terrorist attacks from just over a thousand in 2004 to almost 17,000 in 2014. The trend remains




**Figure 1.** Terrorist attacks 1970–2014.

consistent even when excluding all events from Iraq and Afghanistan.

The regions most affected by the sharp increase in terrorist attacks are South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. They collectively account for over 70% of the attacks in the last ten years. Sub-Saharan Africa, however, has seen the most dramatic increase in attacks as a percent of global totals. Accounting for just 3% of annual attacks in 2004, this number increased 65-fold by 2014, when 14% of global attacks took place in the region. These volatile regions with the largest growth in terror attacks also represent those most prone to armed conflict.

Table 1 offers evidence of this: it shows that the average number of annual attacks in countries with conflict in the post-2001 period is almost three times that of the years after the end of the Cold War and before the “global war on terror.”<sup>7</sup> At the same time, the number of attacks in countries with no active conflict was halved between the two periods. Differences of means tests suggest both groups of countries exhibit statistically significant mean shifts.

Figure 2 offers a visual interpretation of this dynamic. It shows terrorist attacks per year between 1989 and 2014 in countries with and without active civil wars. A sizable and widening gap between the two curves emerges around 2004.



**Figure 2.** Terrorist attacks 1989–2014 in countries with and without active civil wars.

Note: Civil wars in graphic are those that eventually reached 1000 battle-related deaths.

**Table 1.** Average number of terrorist attacks per year and active conflicts.

	Pre-GWOT	Post-GWOT	Difference of means t-test
Countries with Active Conflict	60.54, n=460	177.28, n=348	−5.25***, se=22.25
Countries without Active Conflict	6.69, n=2058	3.08, n=2195	−6.01***, se=0.60

Note: Global war on terror (GWOT) corresponds to 2001. Post-GWOT begins in 2002.

## Research Design

For our analysis, we use data on terror events from the GTD.<sup>8</sup> The GTD includes approximately 140,000 terrorism events from 1970 to 2014 and is one of the most extensive sources of data on terrorist attacks.<sup>9</sup> The models below specifically examine the years after the Cold War up to 2014. Our unit of analysis is the country-year; and the data include 194 countries.<sup>10</sup> Our dependent variable is a count of terrorist incidents in a given country for each year. We further disaggregate this variable to distinguish *international* or transnational from *domestic* terrorist attacks, as the two types of terrorist phenomena may have differing causes or impacts (Enders et al., 2011).<sup>11</sup>

We employ a negative binomial model rather than the traditional Poisson model. This is because our terrorist events data violate the Poisson assumption that the variance is equal to the expected value. Because the variance far exceeds the expected number of occurrences, the data exhibit considerable overdispersion.<sup>12</sup> Also, to account for potential dependence within countries over time, we cluster standard errors by country.

To reflect the incidence of conflict in a given country, we construct three independent variables from the ACD. The first is a binary indicator reflecting *conflict* within the borders of a given country in a given year. In the supplementary file we also specify a count variable reflecting the *number of conflicts* that may be ongoing within a country for each year. Also, to discriminate between conventional war and minor conflicts, we include a conflict variable consisting only of wars exceeding 1000 battle deaths.<sup>13</sup>

We control for (logged) *GDP per capita* with data from the World Bank.<sup>14</sup> We also control for the (logged) *population* size. We account for regime characteristics with *Polity* indicators, ranging from -10 to 10.<sup>15</sup> Similar to Robinson et al. (2006), we include a non-time-varying,

country covariate for the percent of the Muslim population. Because foreign policy behavior can affect terrorism (Savun and Phillips, 2009) we also control for Western intervention in civil wars. We code a binary measure reflecting military involvement by the USA, the UK, or France on behalf of governments fighting civil conflicts.<sup>16</sup> We also create a binary indicator reflecting whether an observation is before or after 9/11. This *post-GWOT* indicator takes on values of 1 in all years after 2001 and 0 otherwise.<sup>17</sup> Finally, as a robustness check we incorporate a count of the number of attacks from the previous year.<sup>18</sup>

## Results

Table 2 presents the results from various specifications of the negative binomial regression models. We report the incidence rate ratio (IRR), which indicates an increase or decrease in the number of terrorist attacks for a single-unit increase in the respective explanatory covariates. Standard errors are in parentheses. IRR may be more intuitive to interpret than coefficients in these adapted Poisson models such as the negative binomial. The IRR is interpreted relative to 1.0, the precise value signifying no change in the number of terrorist events. Values greater than 1.0 indicate an increase in the anticipated number of attacks, and those less than 1.0 reflect a decrease.

Model 1 includes the full set of controls and the binary indicator for the presence of conflict. Model 2 repeats this model but with Afghanistan and Iraq removed from the data. The effect of an armed conflict overwhelmingly increases the count of terrorist attacks. The IRR for *conflict* in models 1 and 2 suggests a substantial increase that is statistically significant at the 0.01-level. Countries at war are expected to have an incidence rate for terrorist attacks upwards of nine times that of countries without conflict. Remarkably, this result obtains even when we omit

**Table 2.** Negative binomial regression models of terrorist events.

	Model 1	Model 2+	Model 3 Domestic	Model 4 Domestic	Model 5 International	Model 6 International
<b>Conflict</b>	8.563*** (1.563)	8.833*** (1.611)	11.210*** (2.714)		8.251*** (1.516)	
<b>Conflict (BD &gt; 1000)</b>				12.431*** (2.902)		7.311*** (1.585)
<b>GDP</b>	1.142 (0.102)	1.139 (0.103)	1.059 (0.119)	1.025 (0.108)	1.250 (0.101)	1.161 (0.093)
<b>Polity</b>	1.063*** (0.025)	1.062** (0.0252)	1.072** (0.031)	1.071** (0.030)	1.062*** (0.022)	1.056*** (0.021)
<b>Population</b>	1.889*** (0.132)	1.889*** (0.132)	1.868*** (0.151)	1.862*** (0.144)	1.814*** (0.133)	1.872*** (0.145)
<b>Intervention</b>	5.018*** (0.545)	2.361** (0.826)	6.568*** (3.254)	5.027*** (2.456)	2.602 (1.676)	2.162 (1.424)
<b>Muslim</b>	2.094*** (0.597)	2.031** (0.601)	1.974** (0.684)	2.138** (0.710)	2.561*** (0.713)	2.595*** (0.750)
<b>Post GWOT</b>	0.423*** (0.081)	0.410*** (0.078)	0.575*** (0.141)	0.592** (0.136)	0.362*** (0.055)	0.426*** (0.076)
<b>Observations</b>	3940	3908	3791	3791	3791	3791
<b>Countries</b>	165	163	165	165	165	165
	$\chi^2=414.01$	$\chi^2=420.22$	$\chi^2=358.13$	$\chi^2=361.41$	$\chi^2=311.39$	$\chi^2=213.51$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . "BD" stands for battle-related deaths. Intercepts omitted. +Afghanistan & Iraq omitted from this model.

**Table 3.** Negative binomial regression models of terrorist events.

	Model 7 Domestic	Model 8 Domestic	Model 9 International	Model 10 International
<b>Conflict</b>	11.672*** (2.809)		8.113*** (1.555)	
<b>Conflict (BD &gt; 1000)</b>		12.459*** (2.973)		6.989*** (1.586)
<b>GDP</b>	1.027 (0.114)	0.982 (0.102)	1.234*** (0.101)	1.140 (0.093)
<b>Polity</b>	1.072*** (0.029)	1.074*** (0.027)	1.061*** (0.021)	1.056*** (0.021)
<b>Population</b>	1.910*** (0.145)	1.898*** (0.140)	1.841*** (0.136)	1.905*** (0.149)
<b>Intervention</b>	4.438*** (1.819)	3.546*** (1.461)	1.882 (1.052)	1.629 (0.965)
<b>Muslim</b>	0.546* (0.179)	0.701 (0.249)	1.107 (0.309)	1.27 (0.356)
<b>Post GWOT</b>	0.340*** (0.102)	0.366*** (0.101)	0.242*** (0.045)	0.298*** (0.064)
<b>Post x Muslim</b>	8.529*** (4.301)	7.167*** (3.451)	4.560*** (1.666)	3.800*** (1.310)
<b>Observations</b>	3791	3791	3791	3791
<b>Countries</b>	165	165	165	165
	$\chi^2=439.19$	$\chi^2=424.54$	$\chi^2=313.84$	$\chi^2=213.41$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . "BD" stands for battle-related deaths. Intercepts omitted.

Afghanistan and Iraq from the data.<sup>19</sup> Relatedly, we see that Western military intervention raises the expected number of attacks in both of these models. However, the IRR is more than halved when Iraq and Afghanistan are omitted from the estimation (model 2).

In terms of the temporal aspect of the data, the IRR for the *Post-GWOT* indicator in the first two models reveals that the relative rate of terrorist attacks has fallen since 9/11 and that this substantial decrease is statistically significant.<sup>20</sup> The cumulative results suggest that after accounting for conflict and other covariates, a given country was upwards of 60% more likely to experience a terrorism incident prior to or during the year 2001 than after.<sup>21</sup>


Models 3 through 6 separate the dependent variable according to type: *domestic* versus *international* terror attacks.<sup>22</sup> Models 4 and 6 use the higher casualty threshold for the conflict covariate. In these four models the *post-GWOT* covariate *always* points to a statistically significant reduction in terrorist activity. Furthermore, the diminishing effect of the *post-GWOT* variable is more pronounced in the models estimating *international* attacks. Conflict (both minor and major) also remains highly predictive of terror, both domestic and international; the effect is especially strong in the models specifically estimating *domestic* attacks. Additionally, the *Muslim* covariate is a statistically significant predictor of terror in these four models. And *intervention* appears to only significantly affect *domestic* terrorism but not *international* attacks.

In sum, the models of Table 2 strongly suggest that conflict is an important consideration in determining where to anticipate increases in terrorist activity, particularly domestic attacks. They also indicate that once we control for a whole host of potentially confounding factors, the period since 2001 has enjoyed a significant *fall* in terrorism compared to the era preceding it. This is true for domestic and *especially* international terrorism. To probe

the potentially conditional nature of the relationship between the *post-GWOT* era and the explanatory variables, below we employ both interactive models and split-sample models.

The models in Table 3 include an interaction term between *post-GWOT* and *Muslim*. Models 7 and 8 estimate *domestic* attacks, respectively incorporating the lower and higher battle-death thresholds. Interestingly, a unit increase in the *Muslim* covariate (pre-GWOT) in both models suggests a reduction in domestic attacks, but only the first model is (mildly) statistically significant. However, the interaction term (*post x Muslim*) in both models reveals a strong and significant reversal in this trend. Once again, civil *conflict* is hugely predictive of domestic terrorism. And the positive effect of western intervention is largely in line with previous estimates of domestic attacks. Models 9 and 10 similarly estimate *international* attacks. There is no effect from the *Muslim* variable on international attacks prior to 2002 (*Post-GWOT*=0). However, we again see a strongly positive relationship between the percent Muslim and terrorism in the post-GWOT era, as is evident in the interaction terms in both models. *Intervention* does not have the same impact it has in models estimating domestic attacks. Of note, we also see that the *post-GWOT* indicator in model 9 points to a roughly 75% decrease in international attacks.


To estimate the marginal effects of the Muslim variable in the pre- and post-GWOT periods, we employ four split-sample models: one for the sample of *domestic* observations between the years 1989 and 2001 and one for the sample of observations between 2002 and 2014. We repeat this process for the *international* attacks. Figure 3(a) shows the marginal effect on domestic terrorist attacks over the full range of the *Muslim* covariate for the years 1989 to 2001, with all other covariates set to their sample means. Figure 3(b) offers the same results for the years 2002 to 2014. The downward slope in Figure 3(a) indicates that as the percent



**Figure 3.** (a) Predicted domestic terrorist attacks & percent Muslim population 1989–2001 (b) Predicted domestic terrorist attacks & percent Muslim population 2002–2014.

Muslim increases, the predicted number of domestic attacks falls. The decrease is roughly 40% as we move from zero to 99% Muslim. However, Figure 3(b) reveals an opposite pattern in the marginal effect for the post-GWOT years. During this period, an increase in the *Muslim* variable translates to an increase in attacks. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) repeat this analysis with international attacks. There is not a statistically significant relationship between international attacks and the percent Muslim in the pre-GWOT period. However, Figure 4(b) shows a remarkably similar pattern to the domestic data – a steady increase in the predicted number of international attacks as the Muslim percentage rises.

To gauge the fully interactive effect of a shift between the eras on all the covariates, we again split the sample of observations into two periods (1989–2001 and 2002–2014).<sup>23</sup> Models 11 and 12 respectively estimate *domestic* terrorism for the two timeframes; Models 13 and 14 repeat this process for *international* attacks. The results from the first two models (Table 4) indicate that *domestic* terrorism in predominately Muslim countries has expanded considerably since 2001. Civil wars are strongly associated with increased attacks in both periods. And intervention by Western states is highly correlated with domestic terror, but especially in the post-GWOT period. Turning to



**Figure 4.** (a) Predicted international terrorist attacks & percent Muslim population 1989–2001 (b) Predicted international terrorist attacks & percent Muslim population 2002–2014.

international attacks, we note that an increase in the Muslim percentage has no discernable impact prior to 2002, but exhibits positive and significant effects in the subsequent era. Western interventions are largely without effect in both periods. Once again a civil war greatly raises the expected number of international attacks, and the effect roughly doubles as we shift between eras.

## Concluding Discussion

Was 9/11 a watershed moment? We have attempted to gain leverage on this question by inspecting terrorist activity in the years before and after the event. Though we strictly examine correlations here, the analysis indicates some meaningful distinctions between the two periods – although in important respects these differences run counter to the oft-cited narrative about 9/11. And while we cannot say that 9/11 precipitated any of the changes we observe, several points merit highlighting.

First, terrorism primarily exists within the context of insurgency. The strongest predictor of terrorism within the borders of any given state is the presence of armed conflict, especially for domestic attacks. This result lends credence to

**Table 4.** Split-sample models.

	Model 11 Domestic (1989–2001)	Model 12 Domestic (2002–2014)	Model 13 International (1989–2001)	Model 14 International (2002–2014)
<b>Conflict (BD &gt; 1000)</b>	10.081*** (3.165)	16.162*** (4.790)	4.875*** (1.152)	9.446*** (2.753)
<b>GDP</b>	0.894 (0.099)	1.032 (0.133)	1.085 (0.089)	1.170 (0.123)
<b>Polity</b>	1.107*** (0.022)	1.041 (0.038)	1.067*** (0.019)	1.040 (0.033)
<b>Population</b>	1.910*** (0.180)	1.887*** (0.170)	1.823*** (0.140)	1.971*** (0.208)
<b>Muslim</b>	0.812 (0.285)	3.700*** (1.620)	1.356 (0.388)	4.008*** (1.783)
<b>Intervention</b>	2.752* (1.534)	5.018*** (2.559)	0.708 (0.231)	2.902 (2.007)
<b>Observations</b>	1772	2019	1772	2019
<b>Countries</b>	158	163	158	163
	$\chi^2=189.42$	$\chi^2=329.54$	$\chi^2=166.94$	$\chi^2=162.68$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . “BD” stands for battle-related deaths. Intercepts omitted.

the argument that terrorism is primarily a *tactic*. This result is also in line with Mueller and Stewart’s (2011) argument that, “...terrorism’s apparent incidence, and therefore the seeming importance, has been multiplied by effectively conflating it with insurgency.” Second, it is not just that the balance of terrorism inside and outside areas with active conflict remains tilted toward conflict zones, but that terrorism incidents outside of warzones in the post-9/11 era have decreased in absolute terms. The downward effect is particularly strong for transnational terror incidents. It is entirely consistent with the evidence presented here that this reduction is a consequence of counterterrorism measures enacted since September 2001. However, any number of factors might explain this change. Moreover, this result may ultimately reverse as foreign fighters return to their countries of origin (or migrate elsewhere) from current warzones in places such as Iraq and Syria.

Third, we demonstrate a marked shift in terrorism within predominantly Muslim countries. Prior to 2002, states with higher Muslim populations could expect *less* domestic terrorism within their borders. Since then, the opposite is true. There is significantly more terrorism – both domestic and international – in predominantly Muslim nations. Jihadist terrorism looks to have become more enduring and widespread in the past 15 years. One explanation for this may be that Jihadi groups have made a strategic decision to focus their fire on the “near enemy” rather than on foreign powers. Another could be that defensive measures in the West have forced a shift in target set. This swing may also owe as much to domestic upheavals in parts of the Muslim world combined with Western responses to them.

Islamist conflicts have risen since 2001, and our work here is broadly in line with Gleditsch and Rudolfson’s (2016) proposition that the increase in conflicts in Muslim countries after 2001, in absolute but especially relative terms, is reflective of a reaction in the Muslim world to interventions by major powers. It is difficult to parse out the singular effects

that Western interventions into multi-sided insurgencies in Muslim countries may have on terrorism. Doubtless these interventions suffer selection bias, whereby interveners only participate in the most protracted and pernicious wars. However, consistent with our results is the possibility that the counter-terrorism policies of governments in Muslim majority countries and foreign states intervening militarily on their behalf since 9/11 are provoking more terrorism than they are preventing. Our effort suggests that this may be the case for much of the domestic terrorism plaguing many Muslim countries. This is an obvious area for future work.

In sum, this research aims to present a focused and balanced reckoning of the GWOT by comparing it to the era immediately preceding it. The results do not generally comport with popular or mainstream accounts of terrorism. This may be owing to an implicit negative bias in the manner in which terrorist news is reported. Terrorism provokes a pronounced media reaction easily reflected in headlines, often strengthening the public’s sense of threat (Gadarian, 2010). It is not our intention to trivialize the threat of terrorism but to put it in a measured perspective. We hope our effort will spur further analysis and informed debate about an important issue to scholars, the wider public, and those making policy decisions related to terrorism.

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## Supplementary Material

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## Notes

1. Bapat (2014) makes the same observation. See: Flynn (2002). Mueller (2009) offers a counter view.
2. See Eliot Cohen's commentary: <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/19/its-still-world-war-iv/>
3. On ideology shifts, see Blomberg et al. (2011), Rapoport (2004), and Robinson et al. (2006).
4. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/upshot/is-terrorism-getting-worse-in-the-west-yes-in-the-world-no.html>.
5. Relatedly, Enders and Sandler (2005) examine how and if terrorist tactics changed after 9/11.
6. The GTD defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." See the GTD codebook for more information.
7. Conflict data are from the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD), Gleditsch et al. (2002).
8. LaFree and Dugan (2007). We use the 2015 version of the GTD.
9. Crenshaw (2014).
10. Because data from 1993 are missing, we manually added this year's numbers from the GTD codebook.
11. We utilize the GTD variable: *INT\_ANY* to make this distinction.
12. Because of the prevalence of zero-counts in terrorism data, we employ zero-inflated negative binomial models as a robustness check, similar to Findley and Young (2011). See appendix.
13. We use the *intensity variable (Int)* for wars eventually reaching at least 1000 battle-related deaths.
14. This is a poor, but oft-used, proxy for state capacity. See de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2012) for alternative approaches.
15. We use the Polity2 variable, which converts "standardized authority codes" to conventional polity scores.
16. We coded this variable (reflecting the presence of at least 100 military troops) using Cunningham et al. (2013) and various news sources.
17. The appendix contains descriptive statistics.
18. There is a debate on the appropriateness of using lags in time series applications. We present a series of models using a lagged dependent variable in the appendix.
19. Interestingly, the correlation between *Muslim* and *conflict*, while positive, is not large (0.23). In fact, in our data the *Muslim* covariate is more closely correlated (negatively) with the *Polity* score (-0.48) than with percent *Muslim*.
20. In the appendix we specify alternative years (2002, 2003) to distinguish pre- and post-GWOT eras. Results are similar.

21. The raw numbers suggest the shift between the two periods is considerable. In the years between 1989 and 2001 there were 13, 768 attacks outside of countries with active conflicts. From 2002 to 2014 the same number falls to 6,770.
22. If the domestic or international origin of the attack was unknown, we impute a "value" for these observations using national and global averages. The appendix includes several alternative specifications.
23. As Marinov and Goemans (2014) note, split sample models offer an indication of what a fully interactive model on the full sample would look like.

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