Comparing Modern Twitter Campaigns To Traditional Campaigning:

A Comparison of the Frames and Tones of the 2016 and 1975 UK Referendums

Lida Ehteshami

Comparing Modern Twitter Campaigns To Traditional Campaigning:

A Comparison of the Frames and Tones of the 2016 and 1975 UK Referendums

Lida Ehteshami

Twitter has become one of the most popular platforms for political campaigning, and its use in the 2016 UK European Union Referendum was especially notable. The study examines whether this new shift to campaigning on Twitter has changed how politicians campaign in referendums overall. The study uses semantic analysis to compare the tones and frames utilized by the three main campaigns in the 2016 UK European Union Referendum – Stronger In, Vote Leave, and Leave.EU – to the tones and frames utilized by the two campaigns in the 1975 UK European Communities referendum – Yes and No. Overall, the findings show that Twitter has helped shift campaigns towards a more negative tone and has completely switched campaigns to a strategic frame. This implies that Twitter has been heavily used to mobilize supporters and update existing followers on campaign events in the UK.

Keywords: campaigning, Brexit, frame, tone, Twitter, voter mobilization

Introduction

The 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum was the third national referendum held in the UK and was particularly unique due to the substantial element of social media activity present. Every campaigning group and politician involved had a Twitter account. There were over 3.2 million referendum-related tweets from around the world and each major campaign group averaged 78 tweets per week (Llewellyn and Cram 73). This was not only because of the increased ubiquity of social platforms in daily public interactions, but also because of the particular nature of the European debate in the United Kingdom

(UK). The relatively unexpected opportunity to make use of this online space presents a critical element in our understanding of social media's conduct in referendums (Usherwood 381-387).

Coupled with this is the novelty of the 2016 referendum itself. While there have been increasing numbers of votes on European Union (EU)-related topics across the Union since 1990, this is only the second to deal explicitly with the question of membership, the first being the UK's 1975 vote over the European Economic Community (EEC).[1] Moreover, while more referendums have been used in the British political system lately (Reidy and Suiter 137-138), the EU vote is the first national instance to involve a relatively high level of engagement by political actors and a rela-

---

1 It is important to note that the EEC and EU were not the same. Therefore, voters were not being asked to join or leave the same exact entity. The EEC was only an economic union, only about trade and tariffs. It was not about the free trade of people, common passports, common currency, or common labour laws like the European Union was. Accordingly, the 2016 referendum centred on immigration and government issues rather than economic issues. However, the focus of campaign topics in either referendum will not detract from the main focus of the paper since it only attempts to evaluate the campaign style of politicians online.

tively low level of engagement by the British public (Llewellyn and Cram 74). Even more novel, just as the 2015 General Election has been labelled as the first "digital election" in the UK, the 2016 EU Referendum could be labelled as the first "digital referendum". Both the official Leave (Vote Leave and Leave.EU) and Remain (Stronger In) campaigns in the EU debate utilized key aspects of the successful social media model developed by Barack Obama during the 2008 and 2012 US Presidential Elections (more specifically, "big data mining, data analytics, and micro-targeting")[2] to gain, identify, and then mobilize their respective supporters (Mullen 43-44). Prior to such digital spaces, traditional campaigns such as those in the 1975 referendum utilized television and radio advertisements, along with debates, speeches, and mailed pamphlets, to gain supporters. As a result, both the format and the content of online campaigning are relatively unique, allowing for different forms of campaigning to potentially emerge.

This paper considers the question of how the campaigns on the 2016 referendum's Leave and Remain sides differed in their content and framing compared to campaigns on the 1975 referendum's Yes and No sides. A frame is defined as "the emphasis of one particular aspect of a topic over another, providing a means to understand an issue through the way it is constructed and the mobilization of certain values" (de Vreese and Semetko 32). Since political pundits and activists around the world are endeavouring to make these new online spaces, the lessons to be learned from the EU referendum have a widespread interest. Similarly, the increasing use of referendums as devices for deciding on policy decisions in the EU creates a different political space since, as compared to elections, the vote is typically binary and the different political voices and arguments do not necessarily fall into a specific political party (de Vreese and Semetko 34-35). Thus, the 2016 EU referendum allows us to consider if more traditional assumptions about framing and behaviour in referendums (i.e. focusing on discussing the key issues of the referendum and converting voters) still hold true in modern, online campaigns.

Literature Review

Twitter has become one of the most popular social media sites in the political arena today, ranking as the eleventh most popular website in the UK and third most popular social media platform, as measured by the user-base ("Top Websites"). In the run-up to the UK EU membership referendum of 2016, the three primary campaigns, Vote Leave, Stronger In, and Leave.EU, extensively used social media and Twitter in particular. Twitter's incredible popularity can partly be attributed to the way it models "key aspects of human relationships", notably the "asymmetry of dyadic bonds, setting it apart from other social networks" (Grant 581). Although other social media platforms, such as Facebook, have adapted their platforms to mirror this 'human-centric' approach, they still remain a one-way broadcast medium during political campaigns (Williamson et al.). This is also reflected in pundits' different perceptions of the two platforms, "with Twitter perceived as attracting 'political junkies' and Facebook a more diverse community." This can be seen in the extent to which Twitter has become an essential part of 'traditional media' journalists' activities, providing a gateway for setting news agendas and frames. Twitter's open nature leads to the 'asymmetric' modelling of human relationships, meaning that a user can 'follow' another user without reciprocation. Moreover, Twitter is fundamentally based on being public, "modelling the public spaces of squares and marketplaces." Practically this can be seen through Twitter's polls, comments, replies, direct messages, and expanded tweet threads that connect relevant links and tweets (Grant 531). This has the potential to make Twitter an excellent platform for political interaction, possibly revolutionizing campaigns by making them more interactive with voters (Grant 602; Williamson et al.).

Role and purpose of social media in political campaigns

One notion to examine is the perceived value of social media for political campaigning. So far, social

2 See Professor Mullen's "Leave versus Remain: The Digital Battle" for an in-depth explanation of these terms

media's potential for interaction has not been fulfilled. In the 2010 UK general election, 68% of tweets aimed to update voters on campaign events and media appearances (Graham et al. 701). Similarly, in the Scottish parliamentary election of 2011, not only was there little interaction and dialogue on Twitter, the accounts frequently lacked any real policy comments (Baxter and Marcella 196-205). 31.6% of the candidates' tweets were in "broadcast mode, where the accounts provided their own personal views on a range of issues or were related to campaign activities (11.3%)." This supports the broader finding that politicians have not principally used social media to interact with the common voter base and indicates an attempt to "remove the campaign from a personal level" (Kim and Park 124-130). Some may mention that the 140-character limit hinders politicians from substantively discussing issues with the people but results from a tweet analysis of the 2009 German federal election and 2013 Italian general election indicate a number of tweets discussing civil rights, human rights, and net neutrality issues; so despite their brevity, substantive issues *can* be discussed within the character limit, but UK politicians may have failed to do so so far (Tumasjan et al.; Jungherr 107-112). It is therefore questionable that social media has any value in converting voters since it is likely that Twitter has been used more as a public relations tool rather than a means to strengthen interactive democratic processes.

Social media use across the political spectrum

The use of social media also differs across the political spectrum and by party type, with the majority parties, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, generally the most interactive and the Conservatives the least (Graham et al. 703-714). In the 2010 UK general election, studies by Professors Baxter and Marcella and Professor Fisher found that the Liberal Democrats were the most engaging on Twitter, with Labour following. Later in the 2015 UK general election, Professor Anstead (2017) also found that Labour party was the most active and organized online. The results of these studies support the same conclusion but are limited by the fact that only the three main parties (Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat) were

included in the samples, leaving out smaller parties such as the BNP and UKIP.

Gaps in Research

Although the use of Twitter in the political arena is only a recent phenomenon, first appearing in studies around 2008, there is already a growing body of literature discussing it. However, most previous literature on Twitter in politics is data-centered, "focusing on the description of empirics, with only a minority seeking to situate their research within wider theoretical debates" (Jungherr 136). The majority of the literature on this topic reported the political use of social media within the context of a certain election; almost no source expanded its findings into a discussion of the changes brought about by online campaigning. Additionally, almost no literature existed on the role of social media in UK referendums; rather almost all research focused on UK elections. Compared to elections, referendums focus on a specific topic rather than a specific candidate and often display more internal division (de Vreese and Semetko 34). Because of these differences, it is necessary for research to focus specifically on the effect of social media on referendums, which this paper aims to do. This paper seeks to provide not only a novel dataset of the 2016 UK EU membership referendum but also contextualization within a specific political milieu by comparing Twitter campaigning strategies and frames to those of more traditional campaigns, specifically the 1975 UK European Communities membership referendum (the only other referendum questioning EU membership). It will focus on comparing the tones and frames of tweets by the primary campaigns in the 2016 referendum (Stronger In, Leave.EU, and Vote Leave) to the those of speeches and pamphlets by the primary campaigns in the 1975 referendum (Britain In Europe or Yes Campaign and the National Referendum or No Campaign). In doing so, it contributes to the existing literature on the topic of social media in politics by adding data that reveals whether this new shift to online campaigning changed how politicians campaign in referendums overall.

Methodology

Data were extracted from the official Twitter accounts of the three main campaign groups in the 2016 referendum: Stronger In, Vote Leave and Leave.EU.[3] Unlike other social media platforms, Twitter allows for a far more comprehensive public access to its data, allowing the quantity and quality of the extractable data to be better suited for analysis (Usherwood 374). The content of the tweets was taken directly from Twitter using my own coding script (written in Python) since it would be more transparent and replicable than a third-party software, with my entire code hosted on GitHub[4] available for others to replicate.

I initially used the Tweepy client to access the Twitter database and then ran my Python script through the database to gain data, similar to previous researchers who used Twitter to analyze elections (Grant; Graham et. al; Baxter and Marcella; Polonski; Anstead). The script collected tweets from the announcement of the referendum, February 2016, to the end of the referendum, June 2016. The script collected data so that it was separated by date and any momentous events that occurred on that date were noted.[5] Data collected included the tweet text and timestamp at the time of collection. This script was then added to the NVivo software, which found the most frequently used words and phrases in the tweets. I then compared the word frequencies of the Twitter 2016 referendum to the word frequencies of primary documents from the 1975 referendum. I utilized 66 pamphlets, speeches, and debates from the 1975 referendum as primary sources to compare the 2016 referendum tweets to (Miller).[6] I attached the PDFs containing these sources to the NCapture extension, which can automatically create a code for NVivo to find the word frequencies of the documents from. Here, a complication arose in that 15 of the sources were not PDFs with copyable text, so NCapture could not analyze them. To counter this, I typed out the exact content of the same sources on a separate document and allowed NCapture to run through the separate documents instead so that there was a large enough sample size for the 1975 referendum.[7]

I then organized the tweets and documents into two different categories of tones: negative and positive. Negative tones are characterized through the frequency of negative words utilized by the parties, while positive tones are characterized through the frequency of positive words utilized by the parties. The negative campaign typically consists of discussing rival parties and candidates to attack or criticize them, blaming their policy programs or personality traits. Conversely, positive campaigns typically put emphasis on their own qualities or policy proposals and consist of self-promotion advertisements (Ceron and d'Adda 1939). The word's tone will be determined quantitatively through the Pointwise Mutual Information Retrieval (PMI-IR) algorithm, which was generated by Professor Turney of the National Research Council of Canada, and has been used in semantic analysis research papers since 2002. The algorithm consists of a pointwise mutual information (PMI) equation and a semantic orientation equation. The PMI between two words, $word_1$ and $word_2$, is defined as follows:

$$\text{PMI}(word_1, word_2) = \log_2\left[\frac{p(word_1 \& word_2)}{p(word_1)\, p(word_2)}\right] \quad (1)$$

Here, p(word1 & word2) is the probability that word1 and word2 co-occur. The probability that the words co-occur is given by the product of p(word1) p(word2). The ratio between p(word1 & word2) and p(word1) p(word2) is therefore "a measure of the degree of statistical dependence between the words. The log of this ratio is the amount of information that we acquire about the presence of one of the

---

3 Leave.EU was selected because of its large Twitter following of over 174,000 people, more than any other campaign. Despite it being solely an online group, its Twitter following and support from the rising nationalist UKIP party made it comparable to the other two official campaigns.

4 Available for public use on the House of Commons Library website. These were the only primary sources available publicly that I was able to find.

5 https://github.com/lehte/Twitter-Analysis-2016

6 My data collection started on January 15, 2018 and ended on January 17, 2018.

7 This separate document was subsequently checked three times to see if it matched the exact content of the original source.

words when we observe the other" (Turney 420).

The semantic orientation of a given phrase is calculated by comparing its similarity to a series of positive reference words with its similarity to a series of negative reference words (Turney 419). It is defined as follows:

$$SO(phrase) = PMI(phrase, positive\ reference\ word) - PMI(phrase,\ negative\ reference\ word)$$

More specifically, a phrase is assigned a numerical rating by taking the mutual information (PMI) between the given phrase and the positive reference word and subtracting the mutual information (PMI) between the given phrase and the negative reference word. In addition to determining the direction of the phrase's semantic orientation (positive or negative, based on the sign of the number), this numerical value also indicates the strength of the semantic orientation based on the magnitude of the number. The reference words for the algorithm were acquired from Professor Bing Liu's opinion lexicon, which has been used in over a hundred computer science research publications and features a list of around 6800 positive and negative words in the English language (Turney 418).

I then continued to further organize the sources into two main categories of frames: issue frames, which describe the policy being discussed and the party's take on that issue, and strategic frames, which analyze the parties' performance and perception (Ceron and d'Adda 1946; Dekavalla 88). These categories of frames were adapted from Professor Ceron and d'Adda's and Professor Dekavalla's evaluation of the frames used in Twitter campaigns in 2013. In the end, I compared the overall frame and tone of the 1975 and 2016 referendums.

Limitations to Methods

The methodology used does not capture any tweets that have been deleted before the script ran through the Twitter database since it only captures the Tweets still on the accounts at the time of collection. This was only an issue in one instance: when Leave.EU deleted a tweet that linked the 2016 shootings in Florida with a protest rally in the EU on June 13. So, while I do not have a complete collection of every tweet by the campaign groups during the collection period, I do have all the tweets that the campaign saw fit to uphold, which can be taken as a reliable gauge of the group's intent and message. Moreover, although the PMI-based ap-

Figure 1: Positively-toned tweets in the 2016 referendum, per group (%)

proach has been introduced as simple and intuitive, it does have its limitations. The semantic scores are calculated on terms, meaning that "there is no notion of 'entity' or 'concept' or 'event'". For example, 'Cameron,' 'PM,' and 'David Cameron' should all contribute to the semantic orientation of the same entity, but they were listed as separate words (Bonzanini). However, after collecting all the data, the frequencies of words that referred to the same concept were combined.

Results

The data displays several patterns that reveal whether the tones or frames of campaigning were subverted from 1975 to 2016.

In the 2016 referendum, most topics had an overall positive tone, with the percentage of positive tweets rarely dropping below 50% for all three groups (Figure 1).

Yet this overall tone veils a shift over time towards less positive tweets: As shown in figure 2, beginning in the middle of April, there was a spike in the volume of negatively-toned tweets (with most of these tweets attacking other groups). This ties in with the advent of the TV debates, where much more content was devoted to attacking the opponent's speaking style, personal life, or voting history rather than party's own position on the issues. The two biggest debates in 2016 were the ITV debate on June 9 and the BBC debate on June 22, and as shown on Figure 2, it is exactly on these dates exactly where all three groups had the highest percentage of tweets with negative comments.

Additionally, I analyzed the data for word frequencies: Table 1 lists the five[8] most common terms for the 2016 referendum and Table 2 lists the five most common terms for the 1975 referendum.

Most obviously, all three groups frequently mention themselves in the 2016 referendum, with their username referenced as the first or second most common term. All groups also make much use of campaigning and mobilization language, such as 'campaign', 'voting', and 'support', trying to broadcast campaign events, rallies, and speeches. This shows that the priority lies with mobilizing existing supporters rather than converting new ones, indicating a strategic frame. A strategic frame is also evident in the extensive use of debate hashtags by Vote Leave and Stronger In, who use them to mostly comment

8 Only top five most frequent words are shown because the weighted percentages of the rest of the most frequent words are too low to have affected the overall frames and tones of the referendum. The code found the thirty most frequent words from each campaign. The words and their weighted percentages are included in Appendix A for the 2016 referendum and Appendix B for the 1975 referendum

Figure 2: Tweets with negative comments about other groups in the 2016 referendum, per group (%)

Table 1: 5 most frequent terms, by 2016 campaign group

Stronger In		Vote Leave		Leave.EU	
Word	*Weighted %*	*Word*	*Weighted %*	*Word*	*Weighted %*
leaving	2.26	@voteleave	2.99	support	1.51
@strongerin	2.18	voting	1.56	@leaveeu	1.44
#itveuref	1.49	#bbcdebate	1.23	#itveuref	1.32
voting	1.15	leaving	1.23	Cameron	1.27
campaign	1.09	security	.93	leaving	1.07

Table 2: 5 most frequent terms, by 1975 campaign group

YES		NO	
Word	*Weighted %*	*Word*	*Weighted %*
Community	2.13	Common Market	1.43
New Jobs	1.23	NATO	.94
Thatcher	.94	dangerous	.93
Conservative	.91	right	.92
National Press	.87	democracy	.90

on the opposing side's remarks. Despite lasting only a couple of hours respectively, both groups produced a massive number of tweets (about four to five tweets per minute) on each debate date, with a mixture of links to supporting material for their speakers, rebuttals of opponents and retweets commending the own campaign's performance (Usherwood 382-385). Both these qualities show a strategic frame, one where politicians focus on mobilizing supporters and attacking their opponents' personal qualities and performance.

A different rift appears when discussing prominent leaders from each campaign group. While Stronger In has no individual in their top thirty terms, the other two Leave groups contain more than one. By mentioning notable politicians, such as Gove, Farage,

and Johnson, the campaign groups reinforce their images as positive figureheads. In contrast, the frequent mentions of David Cameron were clear indicators of Leave.EU using ad-hominem attacks, with the Prime Minister's words and actions being repeatedly turned against him, mostly to question his competency (Usherwood 388). These attacks further contribute to a strategic frame for the 2016 referendum, with several attacks on the Prime Minister, who supported Remain, by Leave groups.

To effectively answer the research question, it is necessary to compare the tones and frames of the 2016 campaigns to those of more traditional campaigns in the 1975 referendum. Table 2 lists the five most frequent terms in 1975.

Table 3: Semantic orientation of terms in the 2016 referendum

	Stronger In	Vote Leave	Leave.EU
Number of positive words	19	17	24
Number of negative words	11	13	6
Average magnitude for positive words	83.91	84.31	85.15
Average magnitude for negative words	-74.01	-82.12	-90.52

Table 4: Semantic orientation of terms in the 1975 referendum

	YES	NO
Number of positive words	27	24
Number of negative words	3	6
Average magnitude for positive words	63.97	63.21
Average magnitude for negative words	-30.43	-48.12

Overall, not many similarities can be observed when looking at the frequent terms for the two groups. However, both groups made a substantial use of words with the issue frame. 'Community,' 'new jobs,' 'national press,' 'common market,' 'NATO,' and 'right.' are all words that discuss policies and controversial topics at the time. Comparatively, in the 2016 referendum, only two words with an issue frame were used by any of the 3 groups. This suggests a large shift in the framing style of campaigns after Twitter became the primary platform.

After analyzing the PMI values for the thirty most frequent words for each campaign in 2016, the overall tone for each campaign can be noted. Table 3 shows the semantic orientation for each of the campaigns in the 2016 referendum.

In 2016, it is clear that the tones of the campaigns were more negative overall when compared to 1975 (see Table 4), with the average magnitude of the negative words in each campaign being over seventy. Although, there is still a positive tone in each campaign,

there are still a substantial number of negative words, except for in Leave.EU, who instead has the negative PMI value with the highest magnitude. This shows that when Leave.EU did use negative terms, it used highly hostile terms, such as 'failure,' or 'attack,' while the other groups opted for more moderate terms, such as 'back,' or 'challenge.' Overall, the semantic orientation reveals a positive tone for the 2016 referendum, but this positive tone masks the sizable underlying negative tone in the referendum as well.

Table 4 provides the semantic orientation of the thirty most frequent terms utilized in the 1975 referendum.

Tellingly, the overall tone of the 1975 referendum was positive, with few negative terms being used. The magnitude for the negative terms never went over fifty, compared to the 2016 referendum, where the lowest PMI value for negative terms was a 74.01. This shows that even the handful of negative terms utilized were not harsh or divisive ('differences,' and 'split' being examples, whereas in 2016 strident terms such as 'failed,' and 'evil' were utilized). However, it is important to note that the PMI values for the positive terms in 1975 were less than that of those in 2016. This could be because, instead of taking uncompromising positions on specific topics like campaigns in 2016 did, the two groups in 1975 acknowledged the drawbacks to their stances, and added qualifiers to their arguments as well (Usherwood 386). This allowed for more political intercourse on issues, and resulted in milder positive words and lower positive PMI values as well. Overall, the semantic orientation reveals a positive tone for the 1975 referendum.

Discussion

After analyzing the results, a conclusion can be drawn to answer the research question and evaluate the hypotheses. First, I predicted that the results from the 2016 referendum would have a primarily negative tone and strategic frame. Although the 2016 referendum did not have a prevalent negative tone, with more positive over negative words utilized in campaign tweets, it did have a strategic frame, with groups using Twitter to gather supporters and attack their opponents, rather than support their political positions. On the other hand, in the 1975 referendum, I had pre-

dicted that there would be a primarily positive tone and issue frame. My results substantiated this part of my hypothesis, with politicians using practically no negative words in their speeches, and rarely attacking their opponents, instead opting to expand on their political beliefs and promises. Thus, although Twitter has not completely subverted the 'logics' of campaigning that existed beforehand in the UK, it has shifted campaigns towards having a more negative tone, and has allowed politicians to simply increase supporters without continuously expanding on their political positions. This shift away from an issue frame could have profound consequences on the knowledge, turnout, and interest of the voter base. With fewer politicians discussing and debating the issues in a referendum, fewer voters could be aware of the issues, consequently possibly being uninformed about the issues as well. Not knowing that certain issues exist or not knowing enough about certain issues could even lead to political apathy and less popular participation, although it is always important to note that there are many factors besides Twitter determining voter behaviour, as explained in the next section.

These findings reflect those found by other researchers on the topic of social media and politics. In my study, I found that the 2016 referendum, consisting of the Leave and Remain campaigns, had a prevalent strategic frame. Analyzing the different campaigns' strategies in the 2016 referendum, Professor Parker writes for the *Financial Times* that the Leave side strongly used strident strategic frames. The Leave side constantly discredited experts as "self-interested," appealing to the voters' desire for conflict, rather than engaging with issues with substantive arguments. Leave also acted as the agenda setters, calling the Remain campaign 'Project Fear,' stating that Remain's leaders were trying to alarm and unnerve the public into voting against withdrawal from the EU. Their nickname for the 2016 referendum, 'Brexit,' became part of the UK's colloquial dialect, so much so that even the Remain side started using it (Crines 62). However, Stronger In had its fair share of strategic frames as well, contributing to the overall strategic frame I found in the 2016 referendum. Stronger In was more likely to make negative comments about their opponents, reflecting a strategy of ad hominem attacks found in my results as well (with David Cameron being the most commonly criticized). Stronger In was also more likely to utilize mobilization language in-

stead of substantive arguments, simply rallying their established voter base (Usherwood 375-386). In a wider context outside the UK, members of the Swedish Congress were also found to use Twitter for self-promotion, rather than engaging with the voters (Schroeder 4-13). The spread of these strategic frames may indicate a wider trend towards less voter interaction across Europe. Thus Twitter, since it supports reactive commentary and bolsters negative arguments, can prove to be a testing ground for various campaigns' strategic frames.

Limitations

Given these results, it is important to realize that traditional forms of campaigning have not fizzled out yet. The 2016 referendum still had two debates, the leaders of the campaigns still each delivered at least one speech, and the campaigns still had supporter rallies (Usherwood 386-388). Therefore, the referendum, its frames, its tones, and its outcomes and effects on voting behaviour were not solely determined by the tweets sent out by the three major campaigning groups, but through a combination of cultural shifts, traditional campaigning, media campaigning, and online campaigning on different platforms. Thus, since this study only analyzed three Twitter campaigns in the 2016 referendum, it may not provide a full representation of the 2016 campaigns and their strategies offline. Even online, politicians utilized platforms other than Twitter to communicate with the public, including Snapchat, Quora, Facebook Live, Question and Answer sessions, Pinterest, Youtube Live, and Reddit, so this paper may not even provide a full representation of the 2016 campaigns' *online* strategies. Similarly, in the 1975 referendum, speeches and pamphlets were not the only mediums of campaigning; television and radio advertisements, along with news articles and protests all contributed to the campaign, so my results may not provide a full representation of its traditional campaigning strategies either. Further research considering the politicians' tones and frames on these other aforementioned platforms as well could provide a greater insight into politicians' overall social media strategies. The recent 2016 US election also had an extensive use of social media platforms, with the Clinton campaign's use of question and answer sessions on Quora and Reddit and interaction

with younger voters on Snapchat being especially notable. Future research could see if these other forms of social media offer more interaction with political actors than Twitter did, looking actively for clientelist and issue frames (the two frames that connect directly with respective groups and engage the most in policy discussion). Analyzing the frames and tones utilized by politicians on major social media sites could help researchers understand the strategies and levels of interaction brought about by online campaigning.

Implications

Twitter was created in 2006 and most politicians did not have active accounts on it until 2011 (Usherwood 371). Given this relatively new technology, there has been little research done on Twitter's role in politics; therefore, it is important that this study adds more knowledge and data to understand the role of Twitter in politics, the changes brought about by Twitter in campaigns, and the ways politicians utilize Twitter. Politicians and campaigns could also utilize this study to increase their interaction with voters on the issues. As previously stated, Twitter, despite having the potential to be an excellent interactive and transformative platform, has been used mostly to mobilize supporters and update existing followers on campaign events (indicative through the strategic frame found in the 2016 referendum). Recognizing this lost potential, politicians can become aware of their campaign shortcomings and use Twitter to connect and cooperate with new and old voters in the future. Most importantly, this study allows the general public to gain an awareness of the various campaign strategies utilized against them to gain their vote, since it sheds light on the lack of policies and significant issues being discussed. Voters could use such awareness to diversify their news sources and seek more sources that discuss the issues at hand impartially.

Conclusion

Generally, the adaptability of campaigns to new political spaces is emphasized in this study. Social media's ability to connect previously isolated individuals

and give them direct access to politicians reinforces the classification of politics as another arena of social life. In 1975, politicians provided substantiated rebuttals to each other's developed arguments and went on to incorporate those rebuttals into qualifying their own positions. Digital spaces today do offer echo chambers that potentially reinforce divisive political agendas and limit "democratic interaction, compromise, and consensus" (Colleoni et. al 323-324). By better understanding how political pundits use social media, the more opportunities will arise for democracies to defuse these agendas and maintain the interactive political system.

References

Anstead, Nick. "Data-Driven Campaigning In The 2015 United Kingdom General Election". *The International Journal Of Politics*, vol 22, no. 3, 2017, pp. 294-313., doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161217706163. Accessed 27 Feb 2018.

Baxter, Graeme, and Rita Marcella. "Do Online Election Campaigns Sway The Vote? A Study Of The 2011 Scottish Parliamentary Election". *Libri*, vol 63, no. 3, 2013, pp. 190-205., doi:10.1515/libri-2013-0015. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

Bonzanini, Marco. "Mining Twitter Data With Python (Part 6 – Sentiment Analysis Basics)".

Python, Data Science, Text Analytics, 2018, https://marco-bonzanini.com/2015/05/17/mining-twitter-data-with-python-part-6-sentiment-analysis-basics/. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.

Ceron, Andrea, and Giovanna d'Adda. "E-Campaigning On Twitter: The Effectiveness Of

Distributive Promises And Negative Campaign In The 2013 Italian Election". *New Media & Society*, vol 18, no. 9, 2015, pp. 1935-1955., doi:10.1177/1461444815571915. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

Colleoni, Elanor et al. "Echo Chamber Or Public Sphere? Predicting Political Orientation And Measuring Political Homophily In Twitter Using Big Data". *Journal Of Communication*, vol 64, no. 2, 2014, pp. 317-332., doi:10.1111/jcom.12084. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

Crines, Andrew. "The Rhetoric Of The EU Referendum Campaign". EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters And The Campaign, Daniel Jackson et al., *The Centre For The Study Of Journalism, Culture And Community*, Poole, 2016, pp. 61-62, Accessed 19 Mar 2018.

Dekavalla, Marina. "Issue And Game Frames In The News: Frame-Building Factors In Television Coverage Of The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum". *Journalism*, vol 20, no. 3, 2016, pp. 87-110., doi:10.1177/1464884916674231. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

de Vreese, Claes. "The Framing Of Politics As Strategy And Game: A Review Of Concepts, Operationalizations And Key Findings". *Journalism*, vol 13, no. 2, 2006, pp. 162-178., doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884911427799. Accessed 27 Feb 2018.

de Vreese, Claes H, and Holli A Semetko. "Political Campaigning In Referendums". *Media War Conflict*, vol 9, no. 3, 2004, pp. 14-52., doi:10.4324/9780203335031. Accessed 10 Mar 2018.

"EU Referendum Results". BBC News, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

Fisher, Herbert. "Equalization Or Normalization? Voter–Candidate Engagement On Twitter In The 201 U.K. Elections". *Journal Of Information Technology & Politics*, vol 14, no. 3, 2011, pp. 232-247., doi:10.1080/19331681.2017.1338174. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

Graham, Todd et al. "Between Broadcasting Political Messages And Interacting With Voters". *Information, Communication & Society*, vol 16, no. 5, 2013, pp. 692-716., doi:10.1080/1369118x.2013.785581. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

Grant, Will J. "Digital Dialogue? Australian Politicians' Use Of The Social Network Tool Twitter". *Australian Journal Of Political Science*, vol 45, no. 4, 2010, pp. 579-604., doi:10.1080/10361146.2010.517176. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

Jungherr, Andreas. "Twitter In Politics: A Comprehensive Literature Review". *Social Science Research Network Electronic Journal*, 2014, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2402443. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

Kim, Minjeong, and Han Woo Park. "Measuring Twitter-Based Political Participation And Deliberation In The South Korean Context By Using Social Network And Triple Helix Indicators". *Scientometrics*, vol 90, no. 1, 2012, pp. 121-140., doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-011-0508-5. Accessed 20 February 2018.

Liu, Bing. Sentiment Analysis And Opinion Mining. Morgan & Claypool, 2012, pp. 23-47.

Llewellyn, Clare, and Laura Cram. "The Results Are In And The UK Will #Brexit: What Did Social Media Tell Us About The UK'S EU Referendum?". EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters And The Campaign, Daniel Jackson et al., *The Centre For The Study Of Journalism, Culture And Community*, Poole, 2016, pp. 73-74, Accessed 22 Mar 2018.

Miller, V. (2015). *The 1974-75 UK Renegotiation of EEC Membership and Referendum.* [Briefing Paper] House of Commons Library, London.

Mullen, Andrew. "Leave Versus Remain: The Digital Battle". EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters And The Campaign, Daniel Jackson et al., *The Centre For The Study Of Journalism, Culture And Community*, Poole, 2018, pp. 43-45, Accessed 22 Mar 2018.

Parker, George. "EU Referendum: A Fight For Hearts And Wallets". *Financial Times*, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/4f675736-33a0-11e6-ad39-3fee5ffe5b5b. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

Polonski, Vycheslav. "E-Electioneering: Use of New Media in the 2016 EU Referendum." *Open Publications of UTS Scholars*, 2016, pp. 1–21. Accessed 27 February 2018.

Qvortrup, Matt. "Voting On Electoral Reform: A Comparative Perspective On The Alternative Vote Referendum In The United Kingdom". *The Political Quarterly*, vol 83, no. 1, 2012, pp. 108-116., doi:10.1111/j.1467-923X.2012.02270.x. Accessed 27 Feb 2018.

Reidy, Theresa, and Jane Suiter. "New Directions In Referendums, Politics And Campaigns". *Electoral Studies,* vol 38, 2015, pp. 137-138., doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2015.02.006. Accessed 10 Mar 2018.

Schroeder, Ralph. "Media Systems, Digital Media And Politics". Social Theory After The Internet, *UCL Press*, 2018, pp. 28-59, Accessed 24 Mar 2018.

Southern, Rosalynd. "Is Web 2.0 Providing A Voice For Outsiders? A Comparison Of Personal Web Site And Social Media Use By Candidates At The 2010 UK General Election".

Journal Of Information Technology & Politics, vol 12, no. 1, 2014, pp. 1-17., doi:10.1080/19331681.2014.972603. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

"Top Websites In United Kingdom". Similarweb, 2016, https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/united-kingdom. Accessed 17 Feb 2018.

Tumasjan, Andranik et al. "Predicting Elections with Twitter: What 140 Characters Reveal about Political Sentiment." *International Conference on Web and Social Media,* 2010.

Turney, Peter. "Thumbs Up Or Thumbs Down?". *Association For Computational Linguistics*, 2002, pp. 417-424., doi:10.3115/1073083.1073153. Accessed 2 Mar 2018.

Usherwood, Simon. "Sticks And Stones: Comparing Twitter Campaigning Strategies In The European Union Referendum". *The British Journal Of Politics And International Relations*, vol 19, no. 2, 2017, pp. 371-388., doi:10.1177/1369148117700659. Accessed 10 Mar 2018.

Williamson, Andy et al. "Behind The Digital Campaign: An Exploration Of The Use, Impact And Regulation Of Digital Campaigning". *Hansard Society*, 2010, Accessed 23 Feb 2018.

Appendix A
30 Most Frequent Terms, by 2016 Group

Table 5: 30 most frequent terms, by 2016 campaign group

Stronger In		Vote Leave		Leave.EU	
Word	*Weighted %*	*Word*	*Weighted %*	*Word*	*Weighted %*
leaving	2.26	@voteleave	2.99	support	1.51
@strongerin	2.18	voting	1.56	@leaveeu	1.44
#itveuref	1.49	#bbcdebate	1.23	#itveuref	1.32
voting	1.15	leaving	1.23	Cameron	1.27
campaign	1.09	security	.93	leaving	1.07
remain	.91	Gove	.68	national	1.02
#bbcdebate	.87	safer	.68	voting	.78
Britain	.8	#itveuref	.67	grassroots	.73
jobs	.79	campaign	.65	control	.63
today	.61	farmers	.6	EU Ref	.53
support	.55	control	.59	safer	.49
safer	.55	EU	.58	remain	.46
Brexit	.54	immigration	.57	trading	.41
#Europe	.53	support	.56	campaign	.41.39
Self destruction	.5	Cameron	.55	farmers	.38
Need the press	.48	money	.54	Nigel Farage	.37
better	.44	terrorism	.5	Britain	.36
rights	.44	remain	.45	terrorism	.34
economy	.42	Brexit	.43	immigration	.33
thinktank	.41	Labour	.42	people	.33
Cameron	.41	Boris	.42	back	.28
clearly	.41	join	.41	Brexit	.28
money	.41	mobilisation	.41	reform	.24
trading	.4	back	.4	security	.23
International responsibility	.37	before	.4	business	.2
NHS	.37	failure	.38	sovereignty	.2
challenge	.32	EU Politicians	.32	democracy	.2
experts	.3	Personal attack	.3	bombing	.16
obstacles	.28	Locked in the EU	.29	Giving up	.15
reasons	.21	Status quo	.28	failure	.15

Appendix B
30 Most Frequent Terms, by 1975 campaign group

Table 5: 30 most frequent terms, by 1975 campaign group

YES		NO	
Word	*Weighted %*	*Word*	*Weighted %*
Community	2.13	Common Market	1.43
New jobs	1.23	NATO	.94
Thatcher	.94	dangeroua	.92
Conservative	.91	right	.90
National press	.87	democracy	.90
tariff	.83	prices	.88
promise	.80	never	.87
safeguard	.76	trade	.86
negotiate	.75	failed	.86
Wilson	.74	tariff	.86
partnership	.74	jobs	.82
Foreign policy	.74	pro-Marketeers	.80
opporunities	.73	food	.78
supplies	.73	agriculture	.77
welcome	.70	economy	.76
joint	.65	renegotiate	.74
NATO	.62	supplies	.73
world	.60	vote	.70
contribution	.58	security	.68
bureaucracy	.52	imports	.67
reconciliation	.51	Parliament	.66
secuirty	.50	investors	.64
influence	.48	farmers	.64
Internal differences	.47	split	.60
investors	.47	defense	.58
commonsense	.42	miners	.54
gains	.41	industrial	.54
minerse	.38	evil	.51
Labour	.37	unions	.49
defense	.35	Commonwealth	.45