

**A Study of Middle Power Diplomacy**  
**: as a Strategy of Leadership and Influence**

**by**

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### **Author's Declaration**

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis.

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## Abstract

The main goal of this research is to clarify the concept of “middle power” and to employ the idea to understand the diplomatic strategies that allow so called secondary powers, which are countries without substantial national power, to actively exercise remarkable influence in international politics. In general understanding, this diplomacy is called “middle power diplomacy” or “middlepowermanship” which particularly means diplomacy exercising influence and taking international initiative through international co-operation and regimes.<sup>1</sup> This diplomacy is distinguishable in that it is not based on overwhelming national power such as military power, but on persuasion and reconciling with other actors.<sup>2</sup> By such activities, some secondary countries achieved considerable involvement, strong influence, and impressive positive reputation in the world despite their intermediate or small national power. This research examines in what conditions some of these secondary powers can employ this type of active international policies and show remarkable influence in certain international issues.

Research for this project involved three processes of examination in five chapters on the topic of middlepowermanship, presented in five chapters. Part I of the

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<sup>1</sup> The term “middlepowermanship” is suggested by Robert Cox in “Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order.” *International Journal* 44 (1989):823-862.

<sup>2</sup> Andrew F. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (London: Macmillan Press), 1997.

thesis contains history and literature review of the idea “middle power”. Based on the review of history and literature, this research assumes the middle power diplomacy or middlepowermanship in this research has theoretically four main features. Firstly, middlepowermanship means taking leadership employing cooperation with other actors, including other countries and international organizations, and international institutions rather than just its own national power. Secondly, this type of leadership tends to be entrepreneurial or intellectual leadership, which does not always require massive national power and resource input. Thirdly, this diplomatic option is basically available to very wide range of countries, classified as “possible middle powers” in this research, as one of the policy options. Fourthly, the country applying middle power diplomacy does not always describe itself as “middle power”; in addition, the country calling itself “middle power” is not always conducting middle power diplomacy. The political rhetoric “middle power” and middle power diplomacy is not always inter-related. Lastly, only under certain conditions this policy is chosen and successfully practiced. One distinguishable feature of this research is that it is assuming the neither “possible middle powers” nor self-indicated middle powers always apply middle power diplomacy. The “possible middle powers” have middlepowermanship strategy as an available option.

The “possible middle powers” have middlepowermanship strategy as an available option and decide whether middlepowermanship strategy is practicable and effective or not on a case by case basis. This research suggested that if “possible middle powers” seek to show strong influence and leadership, they have to select issues and approaches which their limited diplomatic resource can accomplish. For this selection of issues, firstly, there needs to be domestic agreement. In other words, domestic support and available diplomatic resource have to become available on the right political timing. Particularly for “possible middle powers” the constraints and available resources strongly affect the countries’ approaches to the large scale international policy and new projects. Secondly, “possible middle powers” need to persuade other international actors for support and co-operation to exercise international leadership because of their limited national and diplomatic capability.

In Chapter 5 of this thesis, a case study is presented on Japanese diplomacy on the idea “human security”. Japanese active policies under the name of human security were middlepowermanship because of the three following features. Firstly, Japanese human security policy has been conducted in cooperation with the United Nations and other countries. Secondly, the Japanese government was seeking the entrepreneurial leadership and influence in these policies. Thirdly, the government consistently put

emphasis on the aspect of “freedom from want” of human security and limited its initiative to economy related issues.

This case study focuses on factors underlying the policy decision choosing middlepowermanship. Prime Minister Obuchi’s leadership backed up his intellectual advisors who were supporting the idea of “human security” matched the political timing brought by the Asian financial crisis and the Ottawa Process in 1997. The constraints and available diplomatic resources led the Japanese government to take the middlepowermanship approach.

The government had certain constraints due to the constitutional restraints in military activities and complexity of relationships with neighboring countries. These restrictions on the approaches resulted in Japan pursuing limited initiative only on economy related issues even though the idea of human security contains “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” Combining with the existing Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) policies and upcoming ODA policy reform realized the human security as a large scale international initiative, such as the Trust Fund for Human Security. In the international sphere, support from other countries and the UN made it possible for Japan to conduct such large scale international policy conducted by Japan.

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## Introduction

The main goal of this research is to clarify the concept of “middle power” and to employ the idea to understand the diplomatic strategies that allow so-called secondary powers, which are countries without substantial national power, to actively exercise remarkable influence in international politics. In general understanding, this type of diplomacy is often referred to as “middle power diplomacy” or “middlepowermanship” which particularly means diplomacy to exercise influence and take international initiative through international co-operation and regimes in certain issues.<sup>3</sup> This diplomacy is distinguishable in that it is not based on overwhelming power such as military power, but on persuasion and reconciling with other actors.<sup>4</sup> Such diplomatic style is often employed by so-called “middle powers” which consists of a relatively powerful group of secondary powers. This research examines why some of these secondary powers can employ active international policies and show remarkable influence in certain international issues.

In world politics, there are cases in which secondary countries show massive involvement, strong influence and have impressive positive reputation in the world

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<sup>3</sup> The term “middlepowermanship” is suggested by Robert Cox. Robert Cox, “Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order,” *International Journal* 44 (1989):823-862.

<sup>4</sup> Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy*.

despite their intermediate or small national power. For example, in the area of arms control, Canada and Norway took initiative in the Ottawa Process in 1997 and Norway again showed strong leadership in the negotiation process for the treaty to limit the usage of cluster bombs in 2008. Such cases are quickly increasing especially after the Cold War because more diplomatic strategies of each country stress influence and co-operation with other actors rather than physical national power such as military strength. Thus, the importance to understand such diplomacy is increasing in these decades of uncertain global politics after the Cold War. By examining such middlepowermanship, factors promoting international co-operation and conditions for secondary powers to exercise international influence will be clarified.

The limited number of remarkably powerful countries can no longer be assumed to be the determining actors in world politics. Traditionally, international relation studies (IR) have been focusing on such powerful countries. For a more practical understanding of changing international relations, we have to comprehend the international behaviors of other countries. In the modern world of interdependence, even powerful countries cannot always push through their interests any more. In addition, the sources of power and influence in international relations are changing. Joseph Nye's argument over "Soft Power" demonstrates that the sources and methods to exercise

power are becoming more diverse.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, there are much more secondary and small countries than great powers in the world. Considering the increasing number of cases where secondary countries have had significant impact and the changing nature of power, systematic analysis to find the general characteristic of secondary countries' diplomatic strategies to exercise influence is necessary to understand modern international relations.

This research examines how some of the secondary or intermediate powers, so-called "middle powers," demonstrate strong influence in certain cases despite their intermediate national power. In international relations studies middle power diplomacy has not been receiving fair attention because, traditionally, most of the theoretical studies of IR focus on politics among great powers such as the larger European countries, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. Also, the idea of "middle power" is still vague and unstable in IR. Cases of middle power diplomacy were discussed separately in each issue. For example, middle power diplomacy in the realm of arms control is studied as a case of arms control rather than a case of middle power diplomacy.

Middle power studies also have been attempting to answer this question, how

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<sup>5</sup> Joseph Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs), 2005.

some of the secondary or intermediate powers, so-called “middle powers,” demonstrate strong influence in certain cases despite their intermediate national power. However, existing middle power studies do not always share the basis of analysis because of the ambiguous definition of the concept of “middle power.”<sup>6</sup> The unclear analytical framework also impedes case-comparison and theoretical development. Furthermore, because most of the case studies in middle power literature are on diplomacies surrounding Canada and Australia, the applicability of the idea of middle power in international relations studies is still limited<sup>7</sup>.

Therefore, this research suggests a modified framework to understand middle power diplomacy. Examining the Japanese case with the improved framework clarifies the motivations and conditions in choosing middle power diplomacy.

## **Analytical Process**

The main aim of this research is to present conditions that allow intermediate powers to exercise strong influence and take initiative in certain issues through international co-operation, regimes, or organizations. This research is conducted with the following three analytical processes in five chapters; chapter 1 and 2 review the history and literature relating to “middle power”, theoretical examinations are contained

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<sup>6</sup> Adam Chapnick, “The Middle Power.” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 7 (1999):73-82.

<sup>7</sup> Michaels F. Hawes, *Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite?* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984), 3-4.

in chapter 3 and 4, and the case study of Japanese diplomacy promoting the idea of human security in set out in chapter 5.

In Part I, chapter 1 and chapter 2 review political usages of the term “middle power” and middle power studies. This review indicates there are doubled confusions and preconceptions in middle power studies and images, and, also, examine the underlying historically. There is confusion surrounding the political term and the academic analytical tool because of the origin and beginning of middle power studies. The term of “middle power” received attention from academia after the World War II because this term was frequently used in political contexts by mainly Canada and Australia to obtain international recognition as an influential actor in international politics and also to identify themselves as bigger contributors than other minor countries in international society, organizations or alliances. In particular, middle power studies in the post war period were motivated by the political usages and diplomatic reputation of Canada, also, even some of publication at the time was a part of political advocacy claiming Canada’s role and right as a “middle power”.

In Part II, chapter 3 and chapter 4 is a theoretical examination and presentation of a modified analytical framework. Chapter3 locates middle power studies in IR from a theoretical perspective and shows that middle power studies are overlapping with IR’s

attempts to classify countries. However, IR research projects attempted to classify and label countries in a hierarchical order and hardly move to examine the characteristics of diplomatic strategies of each category. In addition, any of major approaches to classify countries shared in IR cannot categorize countries objectively due to the problems of each approach. Therefore, this research assumes classifications of states are flexible and changing along with issues and time periods. Considering the aim of this research to understand the middlepowermanship, this research focuses on this behavioral approach as the basis of analysis. Also, this research assumes that the behavioral approach in middle power studies holds the possibility of original academic contribution based on the comparison of middle power studies and other IR work.

A modified theoretical framework is suggested based on the investigation of both international relations literature and middle power studies in chapter 4. With bigger capabilities, countries generally become more inclined to act unilaterally and less likely to compromise because they do not always need other actors' support in international issues. On the other hand, once powerful countries attempt to take leadership, it usually proved to be a wider scale and stronger leadership. On the contrary to these powerful countries, if intermediate powers seek to show strong influence and leadership, they have to select issues and approaches with which their limited diplomatic resource can

accomplish.

Intermediate powers need certain basic national power and domestic and international support to take leadership in the world issues. This research categorizes countries with certain power as “possible middle powers.” One distinguishable feature of this research is that it is assuming the “possible middle powers” do not always apply middle power diplomacy. The “possible middle powers” have middlepowermanship strategy as an available option and deciding whether middlepowermanship strategy is practicable and effective or not in each case. These “possible middle powers” have two levels of requirements for successful implements of international leadership and influence oriented policies. Firstly, domestic agreement and available diplomatic resource must be combines with the perfect political timing in the domestic agenda setting process. Particularly for “possible middle powers” the constraints and available resources strongly affect the approaches to the large scale international policy and new projects. Secondly, because of their limited capability, intermediate states need to persuade other international actors for support and co-operation in order to exercise international leadership.

Part III, and chapter 5 presents the case study on the Japanese policy on human security. The case study involves Japanese diplomacy accepting and exporting the new

concept of “human security” as an effective diplomatic tool in the 1990s. The case study focuses on factors underlying the policy decision. Domestic leadership by policy practitioners advocated the new concept of “human security” and domestic conditions and available diplomatic resources realized the advocated idea in practice. In the international political sphere, support from other countries and organizations made practicable the large scale international policy conducted by Japan.

In conclusion, by integrating the three parts of examination above, this research clarifies the factors that lead secondary powers middle power diplomacy in certain issues, which is to exercise strong influence and take initiative through international co-operation, regimes, or organizations. This conclusion has implications for factors that facilitate political actors’ active commitment along with other actors to international society.

## **Chapter 1**

### **The Discourse of “Middle Power” in International Politics**

The term and idea of “middle power” has been frequently employed in political contexts after the First World War. The political images and meanings of the term were socially constructed through continual political usages. In the beginning, the term was employed by self-professed middle powers to distinguish themselves from other minor states and claim more powerful and influential positions in the international society. Politicians and diplomats of self-professed middle powers had desired to obtain recognition as major contributors and particular positions in international organizations. As for the political usages, the Canadian Government is one of the main political advocates of the idea of “middle power.” The continuous political usages of the term and Canadian diplomatic achievements constructed certain positive images of “middle power” in political contexts. Once positive images of the political term were widely accepted, several countries started to employ the phrase to utilize its positive images. These countries applied the term not only to claim the rights and positions of bigger international actors as opposed to other minor countries but also to acquire the positive

images and status of the “middle power.”

## **1. The “Middle Power” in the League of Nations and the United Nations**

The political usages of “middle power” are found in the negotiation process to establish the League of Nations and the United Nations. This term was frequently employed by self-professed middle powers to claim powerful and influential positions in the new world systems after the two world wars.

### **1.1 The Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations**

The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was the first global attempt to assess the relative status of states in real world politics<sup>8</sup>. In the context of the League of Nations, the idea of middle power meant intermediate powers between the five great powers and minor states or secondary powers next to the great powers.

At the beginning of the Conference, the assumed relative positions of the states involved were clearly represented by the number of allocated delegates. Only five countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan, were allowed to send five delegates each to the Conference. Belgium, Brazil, and Serbia were allowed three representatives. Twelve countries, China, India, Canada, Australia, South

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<sup>8</sup> Jonathan Ping, *Middle Power State Craft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), 34.

Africa, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, and Romania, had two seats each. Only one delegate was allocated for each of the remaining twelve participant countries. These allocations were proportionate to the war effort of each country and their levels of power and influence<sup>9</sup>.

From the beginning of the negotiation process, it was clear that the five great powers would have exclusive statuses and the permanent seats on the executive committee of the League of Nations. One major concern involved devising a method to assess appropriate status in the League of Nations for lesser powers. Possible secondary powers, such as Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Poland, and Brazil, received attention from the five great powers at the Conference.

The British Government's proposal suggested adding rotational seats. These extra members in the executive committee would be selected from each of the intermediate countries, which were introduced with the terms "middle power" and "minor states"<sup>10</sup>. The United States, especially President Wilson, supported this idea and recognized the existence of intermediate-rank states in his country's draft<sup>11</sup>. However, these concessional attitudes of the great powers were part of their strategies to ensure their own control over the new international organization. In fact, the United Kingdom's

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<sup>9</sup> Ping, *Middle Power State Craft*, 34

<sup>10</sup> Carsten Halbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics* (London: McMillan, 1984), 48.

<sup>11</sup> Halbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, 49; C. Howard-Ellis, *The Origin, Structure, and Working of the League of Nations*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1928), 82.

proposal for the additional seats for lesser powers explained the benefits of having such seats: “the intermediate and minor states receive a very substantial representation on the league, and [can] not complain that they are at the mercy of the Great Powers<sup>12</sup>”.

As a result of discussions among the five great powers, other member countries were assigned four rotational seats in the Council of the League. This system of rotational seats caused contention between states that describing themselves as middle powers.

Four countries, Spain, Brazil, Belgium, and China, received the first four seats at the first Assembly in 1920. In this Assembly, attending countries had numerous arguments over the selection guidelines of four non-permanent members. Various countries suggested that population, size, economic potential, geographic location, and regional or cultural representation should be deciding factors. Many countries insisted themselves as the appropriate non-permanent members.

Some countries claimed the right to be considered middle powers right next to the great powers. China and Brazil put emphasis mainly on their size and populations. Spain and Persia stressed their leadership in the Latin American area and Islamic countries. According to these self-indicated middle powers, middle powers deserve

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<sup>12</sup> Halbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*,48.

treatment almost equal to that of great powers in the League of Nations<sup>13</sup>.

Other smaller members opposed these claims and the creation of distinctions between middle powers and small powers. Smaller countries explained that there should not be any essential differences between themselves and middle-powers member of the League of Nations<sup>14</sup>.

The use of the term middle power and the recognition of the existence of such group of countries in the League of Nations affected academic work. Researchers in Europe and North America primarily, such as C. Howard-Ellis, C. K. Webster, S. Herbert, and Waldo E. Stephens, examined the idea and the term of middle power. However, these scholars in the 1920s and 1930s were interested mostly in middle powers in the system of the League of Nations. Holbraad concluded his analysis of middle power studies in the 1920s and 1930s by noting that “they [researchers/writers of the period] rarely ventured into generalizations and speculations about typical conduct and natural functions of such powers in international politics”.<sup>15</sup>

## **1.2 The San Francisco Conference and the United Nations**

After the Second World War, international society sought a new world order through the United Nations. The negotiations and preparations for establishing the new

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 54.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 55.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 56

international organization began in 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks with the attendance of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China. This initial meeting was succeeded by the San Francisco Conference in 1945, at which the discussion was open to 50 countries.

At the San Francisco Conference, the term and the idea of middle power in international relations received attention, again. At this time, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and some other countries claimed the roles and rights of middle powers in the United Nations. In the quest for a new international order after the war, the idea of middle power once again appeared to be useful to policy practitioners of particular countries. Representatives of self-professed middle powers employed the concept to distinguish their own countries from other small countries, considering themselves as more powerful and influential participants in world politics.

As is well-known, the United Nations of today also grants exclusive positions on the Security Council to the five great countries: China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The institutionalization of international hierarchy in the United Nations was one of the key issues in the San Francisco Conference, as well as in the Paris Peace Conference. In the San Francisco Conference, non-permanent seats on the Security Council and some special seats in the specialized councils, such as

the Economic Council in the United Nations, were discussed.

In the negotiation process of establishing the United Nations, some countries, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, and New Zealand, professed themselves to be middle powers that were more influential and powerful players than other small member states<sup>16</sup>. They tried to make a distinction between themselves and other small countries because they hoped to ensure official positions with more power and influence than other typical small countries in the United Nations.<sup>17</sup> These self-professed middle powers described themselves as having the capability and will to play as significant roles as great powers in different ways in world politics on particular issues, even though middle powers could not compare with big countries in total national power.

Among these would-be middle powers, Australia and Canada showed remarkable desire to occupy special seats next to the great powers in the United Nations. The Australian government was yearning for middle power status as a representative and a regional leader of the Pacific region and suggested adopting a regional principle of representation. In addition, as an elected member of the Executive Committee of the Conference, Australia attempted to reduce the veto rights of the great powers and

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 59; G.P. Glazebrook, "The Middle Powers in the United Nations System" *International Organization* 1 (1947): 307-315

<sup>17</sup> G.P. Glazebrook, "The Middle Powers in the United Nations System," 312-315.

enlarge the roles and rights of lesser powers in the United Nations<sup>18</sup>.

Dr. H. V. Evatt, the Australian Minister for External Affairs at that time, argued at the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations the importance of a regional representative principle to accommodate additional members of the Security Council. In his words:

One important point is that the representatives of the smaller powers on the executive authority should be adequate to ensure a balanced outlook on world affairs and so increase confidence in all executive decisions [of the Security Council]. Further the executive should be so constituted that no distinct region of the globe and no important group of nations should be left unrepresented on it.<sup>19</sup>

The Canadian government also invoked functional principles of representation in the United Nations on many occasions. According to its explanation, the representation in the Security Council and councils in particular areas in the United Nations should be determined “on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries large or small which have the greatest contribution to make the particular object in question”<sup>20</sup>.

According to the Canadian Government, Hume Wrong and Lester Pearson, who were Canadian diplomats at that time, first introduced the idea of the functional

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<sup>18</sup> Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, 61

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 60

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 57; F.H. Soward and E. McInnis, *Canada and the United Nations* (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1956), 10.

principle to distinguish Canada as a middle power from other minor powers<sup>21</sup>. Then, in 1943, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, in the Canadian Parliament, presented the functional principle to the Canadian people. Externally, in 1943, King and the Canadian Government promoted the functional idea to the great powers at conversations during the Dumbarton Oaks meeting.<sup>22</sup>

The Canadian government's understanding of the functional principle had fundamental similarities to the "functionalism" proposed by David Mitrany in international relations studies in 1943. However, the Canadian government suggested the functional principle for different political goals. Much academic work agreed that Mitrany's functionalism had affected Canadian diplomats' and political leaders' thought; however, it was modified in accordance with Canadian diplomatic goals at that time<sup>23</sup>.

The functionalism was presented in Canada's amendment proposals for regulations on the United Nations' council representation. Canada stressed that influential positions in international organizations had to be based not only on the overall size or power of each country, but on functions and contributions in each issue.

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<sup>21</sup> John F. Hilliker, Introduction to *Documents on Canadian External Relation*, 9, 1942-1943, by John F. Hilliker (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1980), xiii; John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs Vol. I: the Early Years, 1909-1946* (Montreal and Kingston: The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1990), 304-5.

<sup>22</sup> Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, 58-9

<sup>23</sup> As for the difference between the "functionalism" in the understanding of the Canadian government at the time and the "functionalism" David Mitrany suggested, see John W. Holmes, "Canadian External Policies Since 1945," *International Journal* 58 (1963): 137-139. Currently, these interpretations are distinguished as "Mitranyan functionalism" and "Liberal functionalism." John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 41.

Although the idea of sharing roles internationally was common to Mitrany, Canadian functionalism aimed to formalize international hierarchy in each area based on contributions of countries in that area. Conversely, Mitrany argued that international organizations could share in particular states' functions in world affairs with states and international organizations<sup>24</sup>.

The wish of Canadian and Australian policy practitioners was prompted by their pride as two of the biggest suppliers to the allied forces in World War II and their concerns for their new positions in international society. Before the War, these two countries were considered as new participants who had recently become independent from the United Kingdom in 1931. International society did not treat Canada and Australia, two newly independent young countries, as actual members of the international community. However, due to the war, while European countries had been seriously damaged during the war both economically and physically, the Canadian and Australian economies had rapidly developed in the armaments boom<sup>25</sup>. As for Canada, it became the second major provider of war supplies and food; furthermore, Canada financially supported the Marshall Plan. Based on these facts, Canada and Australia

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<sup>24</sup> David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1943), 27-28.

<sup>25</sup> As for the Canadian relative rank in the world in 1945, see R.J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation," in J. L. Granatstein, ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?* (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1970), 23.

insisted on their right to be major members almost as significant as great powers and claimed to institutionally assure such positions in the new world order. In fact, the Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King feared for the Canadian position in the new international organizations and stated that Canada would be “relegated to the same rank as the Dominican Republic or El Salvador”<sup>26</sup> comparing to each country’s war effort. PM King wished Canada to be recognized as a more important and influential member of international society than other smaller countries. Francis Forde, the Australian Deputy Prime Minister of the day, also emphasized his country’s war effort:

Certain powers, not classified as great, have proved by their record in two world wars that they not only have the capacity but also the will to fight in resistance of aggressors threatening the world with tyranny. These powers are in a sense proved veterans in the security of the world. They are in truth security powers. They have a claim to special recognition in any security organization<sup>27</sup>.

Despite these countries’ efforts, none of the middle powers achieved their goals of assuring recognition and special positions within the United Nations. Although the regional and functional principles, which were suggested by Australia and Canada in the negotiations, survived in the United Nations, these did not ensure these countries’ positions in the organization. Article 23 of the UN Charter gave priority to the

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<sup>26</sup>Stephane Roussel and Charles-Philippe David, “Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 28 (1998): 8.

<sup>27</sup> Halbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, 61.

functional principle in the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council. However, shortly after the first election, in which Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, Poland, the Netherlands and Australia was chosen to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, some groups of countries, such as the Eastern European, Latin American and Commonwealth countries, made claims for continuous representation from their groups<sup>28</sup>. In addition, by the early 1950s the General Assembly and the Security Council frequently become immobilized because of the Cold War. The increasing number of members of the United Nations from the later 1950s made the assembly more disjointed. Eventually, the bloc system introduced in the Security Council in 1963 eliminated the functional principle because the blocs in the system were based on regional bases<sup>29</sup>.

As the United Nations started off, so-called middle powers played active roles in various committees and councils in the first few years. Although middle powers could not receive any official status, they actually occupied significant positions in international organizations in the beginning. For example, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Poland were members of the committee of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1946<sup>30</sup>. The final 1946 resolution of the Atomic Energy Commission widely reflected middle powers' opinions and was based on a Canadian

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 63.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 63.

<sup>30</sup> Glazebrook, "The Middle Powers in the United Nations System," 313.

proposal<sup>31</sup>.

There are three reasons why these middle powers failed to gain recognition and official positions in the new international organization. Firstly, unlike in the case of the League of Nations, the great powers opposed the creation of middle-power positions in the United Nations. Even though France occasionally supported Australia's argument in the negotiations, the great powers were consistently against making special positions for middle powers. Holbraad analyzed that the great powers considered that positions for middle powers might weaken their own rights and dominance as great powers<sup>32</sup>. Secondly, self-professed middle powers neither formed a coalition group nor united their claims.<sup>33</sup> Even Canada and Australia, the leading promoters of the idea of middle powers, suggested different principles to classify themselves as middle powers. The Netherlands argued that middle powers consistently deserve adequate representation<sup>34</sup>. Mexico suggested responsibility-based elections for the non-permanent members in the Security Council<sup>35</sup>. The would-be middle powers did not even recognize each other because they barely had common grounds for their claims as middle powers. Furthermore, each possible middle power was also a member of various bloc-voting

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 313.

<sup>32</sup> Halbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, 64.

<sup>33</sup> Glazebrook, "The Middle Powers in the United Nations System," 314

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 310

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 310

groups, such as Canada and Australia in the British Commonwealth; Mexico in the Latin American States; and Poland in the Soviet Bloc. Thirdly, lack of a shared definition of middle power made it difficult to recognize the existence of that group of countries for both self-proclaimed middle powers and other countries.

## **2. “Middle Power” in the Cold War**

### **2.1 Changing Usages of the Term**

Both the usages of the term and the countries assumed to be middle powers changed during the Cold War. After the San Francisco Conference, it became more difficult for self-described middle powers to establish formal positions in the United Nations. Lack of officially recognized middle power countries made the meaning of the term more flexible. Once the Cold War began, bloc politics and the stagnating United Nations made formal middle power status in the United Nations less important. Self-professed middle power countries started to show their presence not only in the United Nations, but also in other international activities.

Politicians’ intentions behind the use of the term middle power were also becoming varied at this point. Politicians and diplomats had desired to obtain recognition as major members of, and particular positions in, these international organizations during the negotiations for the setup of the League of Nations and the

United Nations. Their claims were based mainly on war effort in the previous war or national power, which consisted of such factors as population, economic resilience, military strength, and geographical size.

During the Cold War, the focus in defining middle powers was slowly shifted to a country's roles in international organizations, such as its ability and willingness to mediate in conflicts, as well as military power, size of territory, or population<sup>36</sup>. For example, in a 1965 conference, Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson described Canada as a middle power based on its diplomacy as well as its military power, size, and geographical location:

We are "middle" in the sense, I suppose, of possessing the average of the conventional ingredients of power. We are big in geography --- both in geographical size and geographical location, but that is reduced by our comparatively small population. We are powerful in trade, in resources, in living standards. We have relatively little military power of our own, but the use of what we have has been important because of the way we have used it: in association with others; in time of peace, in combination with others or with the United Nations. I think in a sense, and we can say this without boasting, we have in the last 20 years or so at times been powerful in our diplomacy. Our country is just about the right size and of the right importance to be powerful in diplomacy in the world in which we live.<sup>37</sup>

In addition to the Canadian example, director of a Mexican think tank Mario

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<sup>36</sup> John W. Holmes, "Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?" in J. King Gordon ed. *Canada's Role as a Middle Power*, Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1965, 13-38, 15-16

<sup>37</sup> *Canada's Role as a Middle Power*, p.197.

Ojeda Gomez provided an interesting example of a new focus for defining middle power. In his article, he delivered the idea that Mexico is a possible middle power because of its capability and willingness to be a mediator.<sup>38</sup> Although, he admitted that Mexico did not have military and economic capabilities to be a middle power, he considered Mexico as a mediator- middle power.

## **2.2 Self-professed “Middle Power”**

During the Cold War, Canadian international mediating activities in the 1950s had a significant impact on the usages and images of the term “middle power”. After the San Francisco Conference, Canadian politicians and diplomats continued to describe their country as a middle power.

The Cold War narrowed the scope of middle powers’ policies because most self-professed middle powers at the time of the San Francisco Conference were tied to either of the superpowers. Even with the limited policy options as an ally of the United States and a member of the Commonwealth, Canadian mediating efforts achieved a certain level of success on some occasions, such as the 1956 Suez Crisis, the divisions between East and West related to new memberships in the United Nations, the

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<sup>38</sup>Mario Ojeda Gomez, “The Role of Mexico as a Middle Power,” in J. King Gordon ed. *Canada’s Role as a Middle Power*, Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1965, 13-38, 144.

conflicting perspectives of North and South on development aid issues.<sup>39</sup> In particular, Canadian contributions to avoiding war between Great Britain, France, Egypt, and Israel and the establishment of the basis for the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) in the 1956 Suez Crisis were two of the landmarks in the history of international relations.

Based on these diplomatic achievements and the reputation they brought to Canada, some Canadian politicians and scholars at the time considered these international mediational, institutional-based activities to be the best argument for describing and defining middle power diplomacy in the 1960s. John Holmes, a Canadian diplomat at that time, called international mediations “Canada’s middle power role”<sup>40</sup>.

Starting with these arguments in Canada, politicians in various other countries began to apply the term “middle power” to identify their own countries in various contexts as well as those referring to international mediational activities or contributions to PKOs. The idea of “being middle” could mean being in a moderate or neutral position in the tensions between the West and East, being in the middle and bridging developed and developing countries in North-South issues, being a regional

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<sup>39</sup> These examples were achieved during the time of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and Minister of Foreign Affairs Lester B. Pearson in 1950s. Their diplomatic style is called “internationalism” and also considered to be “Golden Ages” by some researchers such as for example, Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*, (Toronto: McClelland Stewart Limited, 2003)

<sup>40</sup> John W. Holmes, in J. King Gordon ed. *Canada’s Role as a Middle Power*.

leader, and playing meditational roles between countries in conflicts. These meanings of the idea of middle power were employed both in combination and separately. For example, the Australian External Affairs Minister in 1964, Sir Garfield Barwick, defined his country as a middle power based on various aspects:

[Australia] is clearly [a middle power] in the general sense in which the expression is used. But also it has common interests with both the advanced and the underdeveloped countries; it stands in point of realized wealth between the haves and the have-nots. It is at one time a granary and a highly industrialized country. It has a European background and is set in intimate geographical propinquity.<sup>41</sup>

As another example, Takakazu Kuriyama, officer of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described Japanese diplomatic strategies as “one of the most successful cases of foreign policy of a minor states.<sup>42</sup>” Speeches at the time show that Japanese policy practitioners thought Japan was a middle power because of their country’s high position in the group of minor countries even though Japan had neither shown interest in PKOs or international meditational acts nor been famous for these diplomatic efforts in the world stage until the 1990s<sup>43</sup>.

In addition to the changing meaning of the term, the countries applying the idea

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<sup>41</sup> Ping, *Middle Power State Craft*, 40.

<sup>42</sup> Alex McLeod, “Japan: Great Power Despite Itself,” in Philippe G. Le Prestre ed., *Role Quest in the Post-Cold War Area*. (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 1997), 92.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, 92.

of middle power also changed during the Cold War. India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, and Yugoslavia are good examples of these new middle power countries. Some of those countries were newly emerged middle powers because of becoming independent, economic development, or policy direction changes. Some states or non-aligned groups also played mediators' roles in international conflicts.

### **2.3 Recognized “Middle power”**

The shift of the focus for defining middle power caused a significant change in the political usages of the term. Before the Cold War, middle power, as a political term, was applied to claim for particular countries their own rights or positions in international systems. However, during the Cold War, some of middle powers were not self-professed ones but were nevertheless recognized as such. India provides one clear example of this unique usage of the term middle power. A Canadian diplomat, John H. Holmes, praised India and its Prime Minister Nehru for their international meditational activities and called India a middle power, although Nehru himself desired India's future world role to be that of a great power<sup>44</sup>. Two examples of his writing before the independence of India from Britain demonstrate his wish.

A free India, with her vast resources, can be a great service to the world and to humanity. India will always make a difference to the

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<sup>44</sup> Halbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, 71.

world; fate has marked us for big things. When we fall, we fall low; when we rise, inevitably we play our part in the world drama.<sup>45</sup>

Leaving these three big countries, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China, aside for the moment, look at the world. There are many advanced, highly cultured countries. But if you peep into the future and if nothing goes wrong, wars and like-- the obvious fourth country in the world is India.<sup>46</sup>

One case from Canadian political rhetoric change provides another example of middle power not self-professed but recognized as such by others. Once, the Canadian government officially stopped describing itself as a middle power during the Cold War. In the times of Prime Minister Trudeau, the government suggested a retreat from middle power diplomacy: “Familiar notions of Canada’s Role as a middle power, middleman or “helpful fixer” or of influence as a policy objective were to be questioned.”<sup>47</sup> However, scholars and a lot of academic work still considered Canada as a middle power based on its international roles and diplomatic behavior.<sup>48</sup>

### **3. “Middle Powers” and End of the Cold War**

The end of the Cold War changed the world system and diplomatic strategies of most countries in the world. In this international situation, the usages and meanings of

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<sup>45</sup> J.W. Mellor ed., *India: A Rising Middle Power*, (Boulder: Col Westview Press, 1979), 123.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, 123.

<sup>47</sup> Hawes, *Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite?*, 6.

<sup>48</sup> John W. Holmes, “Most Safely in the Middle,” *International Journal* 39 (1984): 90.

the term middle power were modified again. Witnessing the cooperation among the great powers in the Gulf War, both policy practitioners and scholars thought international power politics would change drastically. Many countries started seeking their new roles and positions in the coming new world system after the Cold War.

Because of the drastic change of the international bipolar system, many countries expected more active multinational co-operations. Without the tension between superpowers, other countries including “middle powers” expected more opportunities for their international activities and wider policy options. For example, a former Canadian diplomat stated that “world conditions have changed radically, at least for the moment. Superpowers are more likely to welcome middle power mediation.”<sup>49</sup>

Self-professed middle powers in the Cold War period, such as Canada and Australia kept applying the term middle power to describe their international roles and positions. For example, the Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney emphasized that Canada had the will and capability to act in the United Nations after the Gulf War:

As middle powers, we must ensure our interests will continue to be protected by the international legal system. We must use our strength to support a revitalized United Nations system, to improve the position of those less well-equipped to help themselves”<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Stephane Roussel and Charles-Philippe David, “Middle power Blues: Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 28, 1998, 8.

<sup>50</sup> Andrew F. Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough,

Also, South Africa was thought to be newly 'emerged' as a middle power in terms of its mediating and bridging roles in international society. Foreign Minister Nzo stated as follows:

South Africa is a developing country with certain of the attributes of a developed or industrialized country. This enables us to understand, and relate to, the concerns of both the South, as well as the North, and therefore to play a pivotal role in drawing them closer together to promote international development.<sup>51</sup>

At the same time, the term of middle power obtained other political meanings after the Cold War. The term appeared in the contexts of "soft" security issues as well as PKOs or meditational acts in the times of the Cold War. The first background to this change was shifting international interests. Relatively new "soft" security issues such as human rights, protection of the environment, prevention of conflict and human security started to receive international attention as well as core security issues after the Cold War. Because many self-professed middle powers had been advocating these "soft" security issues even during the Cold War, addressing these new issues became one of the ways to distinguish "middle powers" with a "moral" foreign policy<sup>52</sup>. The fact that

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Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1997), 21.

<sup>51</sup> Janis Van Der Westhuizen, "South Africa's Emergence as a Middle Power," *Third World Quarterly* 19 (1998): 450.

<sup>52</sup> Veronica Kitchen, "From Rhetoric to Reality: Canada, The U.S. Ottawa Process to ban

Canada and Norway, which were often mentioned as typical middle power in various contexts, took initiative in the Ottawa Process in 1997 enhanced this image of “middle power.” Also, Lloyd Axworthy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, built a link between Canadian “middle power” diplomacy and human security issues. According to his article, Canadian middle power diplomacy, which always “stressed the importance of coalition-building,” enhanced Canadian leadership in moral issues in the international stage<sup>53</sup>.

Recently, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper advocated Canada’s role as a “middle power” and the importance of co-operation with other “middle powers” in September 2007:

Working with other middle powers Canada can and is making a real contribution to protecting and projecting our collective interests, while serving as a model of a prosperous, democratic and compassionate society -- independent, yet open to the world.<sup>54</sup>

#### **4. Analysis of the Political Usages**

This chapter reviewed the political discourse surrounding the idea of “middle power.” The term was first introduced in the negotiations for establishment of the League of Nations in international politics. In both of the preparation meetings for the

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Landmines,” *International Journal* (2001-2002):38.

<sup>53</sup> Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership,” *International Journal* 52 (1997): 193.

<sup>54</sup> Speech is available from Office of the Prime Minister of Canada. <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1830> (accessed April 5, 2009)

League of Nations and the United Nations, the term middle power was employed by self-professed middle powers to gain official recognition and positions in the new international organizations.

In the Cold War period, the term was connected to the images of contributors to PKOs or mediators in international conflicts. These images were based on several prominent achievements in these issues made by self-professed middle powers such as Canada and Australia. Because of the high recognition of diplomatic achievements of self-professed “middle power” and the positive images of the term “middle power,” some other countries newly describe themselves as “middle power” to obtain its status and positive reputation. At the same time, because of these images of the term “middle power,” some active small countries were called “middle power” even if those countries themselves did not describe themselves as such. The end of the Cold War and changed international situations added new meaning to the term which is a country actively involved in soft security issues, such as environmental issues, arms control, and human security.

The term “middle power” as a political term employed by self-professed middle powers did not have a specific or shared definition in political contexts. Because each policy practitioner employed the idea with various political intentions and

individual definitions, the meanings of the term have been changing throughout its history depending on the user and context. The main motivations of using this concept in political contexts is to obtain international recognition as an influential actor in international politics and also to identify themselves as bigger contributors than other minor countries in international society, organizations or alliances.

The second point to note is that the political meaning and images of the “middle power” were constructed mostly around Canadian activities in the world. As the history of the term in political contexts revealed, the image of middle power strongly connected to active participation in PKOs and mediations started by the Canadian activities in the Suez Crisis. Also, Canadian and Norwegian diplomacy at the Ottawa Process is one of the most influential factors connecting the term “middle power diplomacy” to “soft” security issues including human security.

Thirdly, a lot of academic research on the idea of middle power is motivated by the political usages of the term. However, the interpretations of the idea of “middle power” in academia and in politics are not always the same. Some academic research assumes certain countries based on that country’s self-description; however, both the users and intentions of the phrase are changing even in the same country. The various usages and ambiguous definitions of the term in political contexts threw many

researchers into confusion.

As a last point, because of the uncertainty of the idea, academic literature especially after the 1990s emphasized that political discourses and academic usages of the term middle power should be clearly distinguished<sup>55</sup>. The political usages of the term can be considered as a diplomatic strategy which controls images and employs reputations in world politics. However, it has to be separated from countries with middle strength national power or middle positions in the world because not all the political usages are representing that country's national power or relative position. In some recent cases, the usages of the idea of "middle power" in academic work and politics are becoming less interconnected. For example, although the Canadian government never officially applied the term "middle power" in the context of human security policies, many academic studies on this issue assumed Canada as "middle power" and Canadian policy on human security as "middle power diplomacy."<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> For example, Adam Chapnick, "The Middle Power," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 7 (1999): 73-82; Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal* 55 (2000) 188-206; David R. Black, "Notable Exceptions?" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 26 (1993):745-774; Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, Or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 1 (1990): 77-96; Denis Stairs, "Will and Circumstance and the Postwar Study of Canada's Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 50, (1994): 9-39; Hawes, *Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite?*, 1989.

<sup>56</sup> There are a lot of examples of such academic work. For example, David Bosold and Sascha Werthes, "Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese Experiences," *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* (2005):85; Stephane Roussel and Charles-Philippe David, "Middle power Blues," ; Kitchen, "From Rhetoric to Reality: Canada, the United States, and the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines," 38 ; Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, "The Axworthy Revolution," in Fen Osler Hampson et al. ed., *Canada among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 75.

## **Chapter 2**

### **The “Middle Power” in Academia**

In the beginning of the study of “middle power,” there was no clear distinction between the political and academic term for “middle power.” The underlying reason is that discussions over the idea of middle power after the Second World War in academia were motivated by the frequent political usages of the term. Also, many researchers of the term in early middle power studies used to be advocates of these political usages, such as Canadian diplomats and politicians who employed the term in political contexts to describe Canadian diplomacy. As the studies of the middle power concept developed, objectivity-oriented research and research outside of Canada have accumulated; however, because of this origin of the academic studies, the concept of middle power in politics and academia is still confused. The concept of middle power still involves two coexisting dimensions; as an instrument for academic analysis and an ideology or rhetoric of foreign policy.

## 1. The Concept of “Middle”

In the very beginning, the concept of “middle power” was used in the academic attempt to understand international society in hierarchal order. The concept of “middle” has been randomly found in some studies of international relations from the fifteenth century, however; the literatures of “middle power” in the first period were neither systematic nor related to each other<sup>57</sup>.

The concept of “middle power” in its infancy can be found in the studies of politics mainly in modern Europe. For example, in eighteen-century Europe, some studies classified political actors into three groups: big, middle, and small<sup>58</sup>. As another example, in some work in political science in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the concept of “middle power” was applied to Germany at that time, due to its geographically middle location and the relatively middle strength of its national power.<sup>59</sup>

In this period, middle power countries were assumed to act strategically because of the insecurity of being in the “middle” position in international society<sup>60</sup>. Countries in the middle place in international hierarchy were thought to be declining powerful countries or growing small countries<sup>61</sup>. In addition, from other countries’ point

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<sup>57</sup> Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, 3.

<sup>58</sup> Hiroshi Momose, *International Politics among European Small Countries (Europe syoukoku no kokusai seiji)*, Tokyo: Tokyo University Publishers, 1990, 3.

<sup>59</sup> Carsten Holbraad, “The Role of Middle Powers,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 1 (1971): 78.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, 69.

<sup>61</sup> Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, 3.

of views, middle power countries are easier to be invaded than powerful countries and more beneficial than small countries for invading countries.

## **2. Confusion with the Political Term**

The basis of middle power studies after the Second World War was created by Canadian policy practitioners who worked for the Canadian Government mainly during the ‘the Golden Age’<sup>62</sup> of the 1950s and 1960s. For example, a publication titled *Canada: A Middle Aged Power* by Canadian diplomat John H. Holmes, which advocated the international roles of Canada as a “middle power”, has been one of the most frequently cited pieces of literature in middle power studies.<sup>63</sup> Other than this publication, a lot of Canadian publications issued by politicians and diplomats, such as Lester B. Pearson, Paul Martin, G.P. Glazebrook, and Lionel Gelber constructed the basic form of the concept of “middle power” in early age of middle power studies. During these two decades in the post war period, Canadian diplomacy and published work released by Canadian policy practitioners established basic images of “middle power” in academia and politics.

In the beginning of the study of middle powers, many publications argued about international roles Canada was playing or had to play. Some papers employing

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<sup>62</sup> Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, 39.

<sup>63</sup> John Holmes, *Canada: A Middle Aged Power* (Ottawa: McClelland and Stewart, 1967)

this usage of the term were part of political advocacy rather than academic policy analysis at the time. Publications and speeches in this perspective shared the notion that Canada, as a middle power, had particular roles in the international community based on its own interest and capability. Typically, Paul Martin described the support of peace-keeping operations as “Canada’s role” in his book.<sup>64</sup> This perspective of the idea of middle power is called the functional/role model.

This early approach defined the idea of “middle power” with three basic features: functionalism, international mediations, and active support for international organizations. This perspective put emphasis on the international functions and roles carried by “middle powers” in the international community.

The functionalism principle is one of the basic ideas of “middle power.” Although his functionalism in middle power studies partly refers to the functionalism suggested by David Mitrany, the meaning is fairly different. After World War II, Canadian policy practitioners insisted Canada’s and other middle powers’ roles and rights should be determined “on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries large or small which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question.”<sup>65</sup> Canadian policy practitioners stressed that influential

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<sup>64</sup> Paul Martin, *Canada and the Quest for Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 1.

<sup>65</sup> Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, 57. For the difference between Canadian functionalism and Mitrany’s functionalism, see John W. Holmes, “Canadian External Policies Since

positions in international organizations had to be based not only on overall size or power, but also on functions and contributions to each issue.

After the successful implementation of the peace keeping plan in the 1956 Suez Crisis, Canada recognized itself as a “model peacekeeping power.”<sup>66</sup> In reflection of these international meditational efforts, the term middle power was connected to the meditational actors in conflicts and peace-keepers in academic and political contexts; “the middle powers found themselves frequently cast in mediatory positions.”<sup>67</sup> In addition to such peace-keeping activities, Canada put emphasis on international institutions such as the United Nations and international alliances in accordance with its international activism, which were considered to be “the dominant characteristics of behavior” of Canada and other middle powers.<sup>68</sup>

In most studies of this perspective in the early post war period, Canada is the middle power in question. Most research focused on explaining Canadian international activities. As Michel K. Hawes indicated, of most publications issued by policy practitioners at the time, “no matter how cleverly constructed, most of those works are

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1945,” *International Journal* 58 (Spring 1963): 137-139.

<sup>66</sup> Maureen Appel Molot, “Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit,” 79-80; Andre P. Donneur and Caroline C. Alain, “Canada: A Reassertion of Its Role as a Middle Power,” in Philippe G. Le Prestre ed., *Role Quest in the Post-Cold War Area*, 226

<sup>67</sup> Holmes, “Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?”, 15.

<sup>68</sup> Michel Tucker, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes* (Toronto: Mc Graw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1980), 1

essentially political memoirs.<sup>69</sup> Also, they hardly had theoretical examinations on Canadian foreign policies; thus, analysis in this perspective cannot generalize to other countries or other issues. Although some publications applied this approach of putting emphasis on middle powers' functions and roles to other countries, such as Mexico and Australia, these attempts are a minority at this stage.<sup>70</sup>

The image of “middle power” had symbolic functions to unite the various domestic communities of Anglo Canadian, French Canadian and new increasing immigrants inside Canada. These functions encouraged the policy practitioners of Canada to advocate domestically the term through publications in academia in the post war period. In addition, especially after the Suez Crisis, the symbolic term of “middle power” role or responsibilities attracted the domestic support and attention to the foreign policies. The image of middle power Canada as a responsible member of the international community “was crucial in creating a domestic consensus in support of extensive involvement in the maintenance of the international order.”<sup>71</sup> In fact, John W. Holmes' argument against Prime Minister Trudeau's rejection of the “middle power” rhetoric demonstrated that some researchers believed the domestic political impacts of

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<sup>69</sup> Hawes, *Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite*, 4

<sup>70</sup> Mario Ojeda Gomez, “The Role of Mexico as a Middle Power,” in J. King Gordon ed. *Canada's Role as a Middle Power*, Toronto: the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1965, 144.

<sup>71</sup> Mark Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: the Case of Canada as Middle Power,” in Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 99.

the idea of middle power. The Trudeau government issued *Foreign Policy for Canadians* which was considered to be “designed to revise the terms in which foreign policy was understood”<sup>72</sup> in academia. In fact, PM Trudeau took a different approach to international activities, such as his leadership for “Peace Initiatives” which aimed to construct peaceful communications between East-West countries without applying the term “middle power.”<sup>73</sup> In Holmes’s article advocating the political usefulness of the term of “middle power,” he clearly assumed the term not as an academic concept but as a political symbolic term. He noted that the image of Canada as a middle power “[encouraged] a wallflower people to get responsibly involved in keeping the peace and unleashing the world economy.”<sup>74</sup>

### **3. The Separation from Political Rhetoric**

The academic discourses of “middle power” became varied with the accumulation and development of academic studies of the concept. In addition to the earlier perspective on the idea of middle power, the functional/role model, three more perspectives on the concept of middle power emerged in middle power studies literature.<sup>75</sup> These three perspectives were constructed mainly by researchers unlike the

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<sup>72</sup> Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis”, 100.

<sup>73</sup> J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 372-376, 379-380.

<sup>74</sup> Holmes, “Most Safely in the Middle,” 90.

<sup>75</sup> There are a few studies categorizing literature of middle power. Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A.

first perspective which was constructed mainly by policy practitioners.

### 3.1 Hierarchical Model

The first new perspective is based on national power and called “hierarchical model.” In many cases, relative ranking of countries based on national power is one of the guidelines for categorizing countries. For example, in Carsten Halbraad’s 1984 book, he listed eighteen countries, including Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, and Brazil, as middle powers based on population and GNP.<sup>76</sup> Bernard Wood applied GNP as an indicator in his 1990 research<sup>77</sup>. Some other research applied objective indicators and other factors in combination. For instance, R.G. Riddell defined middle powers by “their sizes, their material resources, their willingness to accept responsibility, their influence and their stability.”<sup>78</sup>

Although the use of middle power based on national power is different from its use as political rhetoric, few academic research projects attempted further analysis employing the concept of middle power based on national power. Moreover, because the national power indicators were different in each, these research projects were hardly

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Higott and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), 17-19; Adam Chapnick, “The Middle Power,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 7 (1999): 73-82; Ping, *Middle Power Statecraft*.

<sup>76</sup> Halbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, : 89-90.

<sup>77</sup> Bernard Wood, *The Middle Powers and the General Interest*, (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1988):70.

<sup>78</sup> R.G. Riddell, “The Role of Middle Powers in the United Nations,” *Statements and Speeches* 48, (1948): 40.

compatible. Also, the national power itself is contextual and changing.

### 3.2 Normative Model

The second perspective pays attention to domestic political culture and normative aspects of middle power diplomacy and is called the “normative model.” This approach considers that being in the middle based on the national power and political culture of some middle powers result in humanitarian international activities including foreign aid. For example, *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty* examined foreign aid policy in Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark.<sup>79</sup> These studies, particularly *Middle Power Internationalism*, assumed middle powers, at least some of them, are “more responsive to humanitarian values than most, particularly larger states.”<sup>80</sup> From this view, the notion of “good citizenship” was often emphasized. This vision of “good citizen” countries in the international community is attached to liberal and humanitarian norms, and also contributions “to preserving the peace and advancing the cause of social justice and prosperity in the international community.”<sup>81</sup>

Literature in this group was not exactly based on political usages of the term

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<sup>79</sup> Olav Stokke et al., *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1989)

<sup>80</sup> David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, “Notable Exceptions?,” 763.

<sup>81</sup> Stephane Roussel and Charles-Philippe David, “Middle power Blues,” 8.

“middle power”; however because of the notion of “good citizenship” and emphasis on the normative diplomacy of middle powers, this approach is often confused with the political rhetoric. Also, the reason why certain middle power countries have normative political culture and values unlike other countries has yet clarified in these research projects.

### **3.3 Behavioral Model**

The last perspective focuses on the behavioral patterns of middle power countries. As this view after the 1980s is called “new breed,” this perspective is different from others in several points. In this understanding of middle power, the observations of international behaviors underlie the definition of “middle power”<sup>82</sup>. Middle power countries’ own ways of leadership, which are different from those of big countries in international relations, are emphasized as “middlepowermanship”. In the perspective of “middlepowermanship”, the concept of leadership is the foundation of its argument. The term of “international leadership” can be found in studies of other issues in political science. Leadership can be defined as “the power of one or a few individuals to induce a group to adopt a particular line of policy”<sup>83</sup>.

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<sup>82</sup> Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy*; Cooper, Higott and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers*; Ping, *Middle Power State Craft*.

<sup>83</sup> *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science*, p.321. This definition is applied also by Raino Malnes

This view attempted to distinguish the political term and the academic concept. The studies of this view are “largely comparative, creating the basis for more secure generalizations and new insights concerning middle power behavior.”<sup>84</sup> The studies accepting this view compare several case studies of different countries and have theoretical orientations to understand general characteristics of middle powers. For example, Andrew F. Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Richard Nossal conducted case studies of Canada and Australia in *Relocating Middle Powers*, Cooper also edited *Niche Diplomacy* which consists of eight case studies of nine countries, and *Middle Power Statecraft* written by Jonathan H. Ping has the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia. In this view, the term middle power “shifted from being an expression of a specific role in the international community to a descriptor for specific ‘middle-state’ behavior.”<sup>85</sup> Typically, *Relocating Middle Powers* applied Bernard Wood’s definition of the middle power behavior: “their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their diplomacy.”<sup>86</sup>

Major criticism of this approach pointed out that this perspective has a circular

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<sup>84</sup> David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, “Notable Exceptions?”, 761.

<sup>85</sup> Chapnick, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth,” 199.

<sup>86</sup> Cooper, et al., *Relocating Middle Power*, 19; Bernard Wood, *Middle Power and the General Interest* (Ottawa: North–South Institute, 1990), 20.

reasoning for the middle power behavior.<sup>87</sup> These research projects examine and define general middle powers' characteristic behavior by analyzing several countries which they assumed to be "middle powers." In fact, most of the research did not show the reason underlying the case selection clearly.

#### **4. "Middle Power" in Canadian Academia**

As a perspective for understanding Canadian diplomacy, middle power studies are one of the three perspectives: which are "principal power," "middle power," and "small power." Although, middle power studies were basically independent in their infancy, two other approaches for Canadian foreign policy were born as counter-arguments against the view that assumes Canada as a "middle power." As Kim Nossal named these series of perspectives as the "power image approach," these three categories are not based on exact national power<sup>88</sup>.

In the series of three perspectives, the perspective to see Canada as a middle power is also called the liberal internationalist perspective<sup>89</sup>. Because of the constraints on its capability, middle power Canada is more likely to co-operate and compromise with other actors.

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<sup>87</sup> Chapnick, "The Middle Power," 74.

<sup>88</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* Third Ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1997), 52.

<sup>89</sup> Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, 29.

The first approach assuming Canada as a “small power” puts emphasis on vulnerabilities in Canadian foreign policy. This approach is called the peripheral dependence perspective which has a negative view on the Canadian dependency upon the United States. According to this argument, Canadian political and economic autonomy is declining because of the powerful neighbor United States. In this situation, Canada is becoming a country with small impact on the world or a “satellite” country of the U.S. For example, too much direct investments from United States could reduce Canadian capability and productivity, and also erodes Canadian political autonomy<sup>90</sup>. Although close military co-operation and membership in US-led alliances helps to secure Canadian national defense, at the same time, they limit Canadian diplomatic options. After this concern was officially stated in the *Report of the Royal Commission of Canada's Economic Prospect* in 1985, this perception has been shared among economists, political scientists, and policy practitioners<sup>91</sup>.

The other approach assuming Canada as a “principal power” considers Canada as an independent and autonomous country. This approach is called the complex neo-Realist perspective which suggests Canada's growing ability and the decline of U.S. hegemony put Canada as a major power in the world<sup>92</sup>. In this view, Canada has a high

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid, 67.

<sup>91</sup> Hawes, *Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite?*, 21.

<sup>92</sup> Dewitt and Kirton, *Canada a Principal Power*, (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983, 40-44.

capability based on natural resources, advanced technology and a highly skilled and educated population<sup>93</sup>. As a principal power, Canada is conducting autonomous foreign policies in accordance with its interests and values. The basis of this argument was presented in James Eayrs' 1975 article "Defining a New Place for Canada in the Hierarchy of World Power" which insisted that Canada had more capability than was viewed in other perspectives<sup>94</sup>. In response to the situation that U.S. hegemony was declining, more scholars supported this view, assessing Canadian high international position and autonomous foreign policy for Canada<sup>95</sup>.

Table 1 below summarizes the three perspectives for understanding Canadian foreign policy. The Peripheral Dependence Perspective assumes Canada as a small country and concerns Canadian economic and political dependency on U.S. The Liberal Internationalist perspective assumes Canada as a middle power; thus this perspective is partly overlapping with middle power studies. In this perspective, Canadian diplomatic skills and patterns derived from its relative international position are mainly examined. The last perspective is Complex Neo-Realist Perspective, which considers Canada as a principal power based on its capability.

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<sup>93</sup> Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, 83.

<sup>94</sup> Hawes, *Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite*, 37; James Eayrs, "Defining a New Place for Canada in the Hierarchy of World Power" *International Perspectives* (1975):15-24.

<sup>95</sup> For example, Norman Hiller and Garth Stevenson eds., *Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977)


**Table 1 Three perspectives for Canadian Foreign Policy Studies**

Assumption	Perspective	Focus
Small Power	Peripheral Dependence Perspective	Canadian dependency on U.S.
Middle Power	Liberal Internationalist perspective	Canadian diplomatic skills
Principal Power	Complex Neo-Realist Perspective	Canadian capability

Source: author

Middle power studies and power image approaches can be located as Figure 1 below. Middle power studies handling Canadian foreign policy can be considered as one approach in power image approaches to Canadian foreign policy. Some other approaches such as Canadian diplomatic history studies are not part of the “power image approach.” Also, there are some researches in middle power studies which focus on other countries or only general characteristics of middle powers.

**Figure 1 “Power Image Approach” and Middle Power Studies**



Source: author

## 5. Analysis of the Academic Usages

Originally, the concept of “middle power” was the idea and, in some cases, political rhetoric for understanding Canadian international policies. Until the present day, the term “middle power” has been defined and used in various ways depending on the contexts and users both in academia and politics.

In academic contexts, there are four approaches to the idea of “middle power.”

Table 2 summarizes the four approaches in academia<sup>96</sup>.

**Table 2 Four Approaches and Their Focus on the Idea of “Middle Power”**

<b>Approaches</b>	<b>Focus to define “middle power”</b>
Functional/Role model	International/regional roles and functions.
Hierarchical model	Middle ranked countries based on calculated national power or imagined strength.
Normative model	Humane and normative diplomacy.
Behavioral model	Particular behavioral patterns in international relations.

Source: author

The first functional/role model focuses on particular countries’ functions and roles in international community. This understanding of middle power was shared in academia and politics in the early period of middle power studies. The second hierarchical model

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<sup>96</sup> This classification is based on Ping’s 2007 research. There is another way to organize, which has four categories suggested by Cooper et al. and Chapnick. Ping, *Middle Power State Craft*, 51; Cooper, et al., *Relocating Middle Powers*, 17-19; Chapnick, “The Middle Power,” 73-82.

was based on national power. This view attempted to categorize countries into three groups judging from national power. In this approach the political term of middle power and the term of middle power based on national power were distinguishable. The third normative model put emphasis on the humane international policies of middle powers. According to this understanding, middle powers have original political culture and values unlike great or small powers. Because the grounds of this argument are still unclear, this approach is often confused with the political term of middle power describing particular countries as helpful or humane foreign aid donors or peace-keepers. The last perspective focuses on behaviors of middle powers. Research projects in this view attempted to separate the academic term and political term and construct a theory of middle power behavior. However, many case studies in these projects did not clarify the underlying reason for the case selection. Therefore, these studies still could confuse the political usages and academic usages through case selection. In fact, some research fell into circular arguments because of the case selection.

This review of literature revealed the fact that most of the middle power studies still have double confusions and preconceptions regarding the underlying two reasons. Firstly, there is confusion surrounding the political term and the academic analytical tool because of the origin and beginning of middle power studies. Middle power

studies in the post war period were motivated by the political usages and even some of publications at the time are a part of political advocacy claiming Canada's role and right as a "middle power".

Secondly, there is certain confusion about middle power diplomacy and Canadian diplomacy. In most of the middle power studies, Canada is a typical example of a middle power because the early studies of middle powers were presented to describe and explain Canadian status and role as a middle power. Bases of middle power studies were created by Canadian policy practitioners who advocated the idea of the "Canadian role as a middle power". Early middle power literature did not clarify the general "middle power diplomacy" and Canadian diplomacy. These early studies are the basis of most research and the confusion of early studies was passed on to the next generation. These tangled confusions are partly obstructing the further development of theoretical and objective approaches to the idea of "middle power".

## Chapter3

### **Hierarchical Assumptions in International Relations Studies<sup>97</sup>**

The middle power studies are one academic subject of IR although middle power studies hardly locate themselves in international relations studies (IR). The very basic idea underlying middle power studies is that each state's relative rank and capability in the world determine the board patterns or direction of the country's international behavior<sup>98</sup>. This assumption is widely shared among IR research to some extent. Not only middle power studies, but also much IR research assumed hierarchical system in international society and labeled countries applying terms such as "great power," "super power," "middle power," and "small power." IR has three ways of classifying states into hierarchical order: national power, international institutions, and perceptions. These classifications have certain commonality with the ways to define middle powers in middle power studies although they hardly tried to find them. However, any of the three approaches classify countries in IR cannot categorize countries objectively. Therefore, this research assumes classifications of states are

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<sup>97</sup> This chapter contains arguments similar to those of author's own published paper with permission from publisher. Michi Yamasaki, "Rethinking Hierarchical Understanding of International Society," *International Public Policy Studies* 13(2009): 169-182. See appendix 5.

<sup>98</sup> Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in Changing World*, 53.

flexible and changing along with issues and time periods and focuses on understanding the behavior.

## **1. Hierarchical Understandings of International Society in IR**

As examined in chapter 1 and 2, the term “middle power” has been frequently used both in political and academic contexts with various definitions and aims. In academia, both middle power studies and IR in general has attempted to classify and label countries in hierarchical order in various contexts. In fact, terms such as “great power,” “super power,” “middle power,” and “small power” are frequently found in both IR and middle power studies, although these two academic group are not interconnected enough.

### **1.1 “Great Powers” as Major Players in International Politics**

In the history of IR, “great powers” have been thought to be the main players in world politics. Theoretical studies, particularly studies on polarity, have a tendency to focus on great powers because “[c]oncern with international politics as a system requires concentration on the states that make the most difference.”<sup>99</sup> On the contrary to the attention on “great powers” as main players in international relations, other countries have not received equivalent attention in IR.

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<sup>99</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979), 73.

Many theoretical studies in IR attempt to explain influential actors “great powers” and the politics among them. For instance, the “balance of power” suggested by H.J. Morgenthau is a framework to understand the political balance and international order kept by great powers. According to his work, smaller countries are merely tools for exchange in order to maintain stability<sup>100</sup>. Furthermore, polarity debates assume that only a limited number of countries maintain world order. Scholars who insist on the peace of a bipolar world, such as Kenneth Waltz and John J. Mearsheimer, do not concern with middle and small powers<sup>101</sup>. There are no vital roles for small states in the logic of hegemonic stability.

Within the category of great powers, there are various sub-groups of countries. Theoretical work on international relations has diverse definitions of “great countries,” on which they mainly focus. The term “great powers” can mean hegemony, bipolar super powers during the Cold War and the permanent members of the Security Council in the United Nations. In a broader sense, all the countries that are “less affected in conducting their own international policies than others, and affect others’ international policies more than others” can be assumed as great powers.<sup>102</sup> Researchers especially

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<sup>100</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* 4th edition. (New York: Alfred.A.Knopf, 1969), 187.

<sup>101</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: WW Norton & Co Inc, 2003)

<sup>102</sup> Yoshinibu Yamamamoto, *Kokusaiteki Sougoizon (The International Interdependence)* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1989), 113.

those who concerned with polarity debates, attempt to draw a clear line between great powers and super powers. For example, Barry Buzan and Kenneth Waltz distinguished super powers from great powers by the range of the specific countries' capabilities. In their argument, super powers are assumed to be all-round players in international politics; on the other hand, great powers need not necessarily have significant capabilities in all sectors.<sup>103</sup>

### **1.2 “Middle Powers” and “Small Powers” as Other Powers**

Apart from these “great powers,” countries less powerful than great powers can be classified as “small power” in a broad sense. In this broad interpretation, the term “small power” could include any countries with relatively small populations, territories or economies in comparison to great powers. Some researchers apply this two tier classification which is “great powers” and “others” or “major powers” and “minor powers”. Others have three-tier classifications which have “great power,” “middle powers,” and “small powers.” Even in these three-tier classifications, the distinction between “middle powers” and “small powers” remains unclear.

The countries that are not great powers are many and diversified. The variety of possible states in the “others” category resulted in little academic work which attempt to

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<sup>103</sup> Barry Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 69.

systematically examine the general characteristics of such powers' diplomacy.<sup>104</sup> There are no shared definition of "small power," or distinctions between "small powers" and "middle powers" within "minor power" category. However, most research had minimal agreement that failed states, weak states, and least developed countries (LDCs) are typically considered as small states in many cases.<sup>105</sup> Thus, in "minor power" category, failed states, weak states, and LDCs are small powers in narrow meaning, and others are possibly other "small powers" depending on the definitions and "middle powers."

The United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS) describe the LDCs as follows:

[T]he poorest and weakest segment of the international community. Extreme poverty, the structural weaknesses of their economies and the lack of capacities related to growth, often compounded by structural handicaps, hamper efforts of these countries to improve the quality of life of their people. These countries are also characterized by their acute susceptibility to external economic shocks, natural and man-made disasters and communicable diseases.<sup>106</sup>

UN-OHRLLS currently lists 49 LDCs states, such as Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Ethiopia

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<sup>104</sup> Jeanne A. K. Hay, ed., *Small States in World Politics* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc., 2003), 5.

<sup>105</sup> Hay, ed., *Small States in World Politics*, 2.

<sup>106</sup> The United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked developing Countries and Small Island Developing States.(UN-OHRLLS) <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/> (accessed on November 5, 2008)

and Bangladesh comparing them in terms of their three-year average of their gross national income per capita, their individual Human Assets Index, and their composite Economic Vulnerability Index.<sup>107</sup>

The annual index of failed states issued by the policy journal *Foreign Policy* listed 60 countries as failed states, including Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe and Chad.<sup>108</sup> According to the “*Failed States Index 2008*,” failed or failing states have the following attributes:

One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.<sup>109</sup>

In addition to these states, micro states are frequently considered as small powers. Countries with small population, small territory, or small economy are often assumed as micro or small state even if they are well developed and industrialized. In

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<sup>107</sup> The UN-OHRLLS’s web site. <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/> (accessed on November 5, 2008) For the list of LDCs, see Appendix 1. Since the countries in the list of LDCs, failed states and micro states are partly overlapping each other, Appendix 1 also has the list of total number and member of the countries considered as “small power” in narrow definition.

<sup>108</sup> *Foreign Policy* conducted a four-step research method on 177 countries for the index. Firstly, it rated 12 social, economic, political and military indicators. Secondly, it assessed the capabilities of five essential state institutions. Thirdly, it identified idiosyncratic factors and surprises. Lastly, it analyzed the risk of conflict of each country. For detailed information, see [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?page=1&story\\_id=4350](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?page=1&story_id=4350) (accessed on November 5, 2008) For the list of failed states, see Appendix 1.

<sup>109</sup> *Foreign Policy* web site, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?page=1&story\\_id=4350](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?page=1&story_id=4350) (accessed on November 2, 2008)

the definition presented by the UN in 1969, countries with populations of less than one million are assumed to be micro states. This definition is widely accepted although the categorization of micro states is still a contested topic in IR.<sup>110</sup> According to the *United Nations Statistics Yearbook* issued in 2008, 50 countries such as Cyprus, Qatar, and Iceland are examples of micro states with small populations<sup>111</sup>.

Several distinctive reasons underlying academic and political attention to small countries demonstrate the general characteristics of small powers. Firstly, because some small states are newly decolonized or became independent countries, they have different political characteristics such as ways of decision making and also require support to manage domestic issues and develop economically in some cases. Studies on such small countries attempt to reveal these countries' situations and needs for international support. For example, as Christopher Hill observed, models and theories applied in the context of developed or "old" countries cannot always apply to all of the developing or "new" countries because of the economic situation, lack of foreign policy resource, or immaturity of the government and elites<sup>112</sup>. Also, the motivation behind research

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<sup>110</sup> Sheila Hardon ed., *Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World* (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1985), 9; UNITAR, "Status and Problems of Very Small Territories" (Mieno: UNITAR, 1969)

<sup>111</sup> *United Nations Statistics Yearbook 2008* is available online, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/Demographic/products/dyb/dyb2006.htm>. (accessed on May 22, 2009) For the list of micro states based on the data *United Nations Statistics Yearbook 2008*, see Appendix 1.

<sup>112</sup> Christopher Clapham and William Wallace ed., *Foreign Policy Making in Developing States* (West Mead: Saxon House Limited, 1977), 2.

projects and publications by international organizations such as UNDP, World Bank or the Joint Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Task Force were that such projects “help inform continuing analysis and debate as small states themselves and multilateral and other institutions that provide external support and influence their development address the challenges they face.”<sup>113</sup>

Secondly, some small countries are receiving financial or humanitarian aid. Economic vulnerability is considered a general characteristic of small states.<sup>114</sup> Smaller countries with smaller economies are more likely to face higher risks to their economy by external economics and incidents.<sup>115</sup> Thus, in case of economic crises, natural disasters, or conflicts in neighboring areas, small countries are more likely to require external assistance. Some research projects are conducted to examine receivers of international aid in order to recognize the impacts of the support and develop more effective responses. For example, *Assessing Aid* issued by the World Bank studied small countries and stated that sound economic policy from the local government is an

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<sup>113</sup> David Peretz et al. ed., “Small States in the Global Economy” (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001), 1.

<sup>114</sup> H. Armstrong et al, “A Comparison of the Economic Performance of Different Micro-states, and between Micro-states and Lager Countries,” *World Development* 26 (1998): 640; Lino Briguglio, “Small Island Developing States and Economic Vulnerabilities,” *World Development* 23(1995): 1615-1632.

<sup>115</sup> Goedon Cordina, “The Microeconomic and Growth Dynamics of Small States: Stylised facts based on a survey of the literature and statistical observation,” in *Small States: Economic Review and Basic Statistics* 12, (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007): 21- 40, 23-37. Lino Briguglio, “Small island developing states and their economic vulnerability,” *World Development* 23(1995): 1615-1632.

essential condition for efficient financial aid.<sup>116</sup>

Thirdly, continuing conflicts in or between some small states or un-functioning governments in small states have the potential to destabilize neighboring areas or even the world. There is a notion that “nation-building has become an unavoidable burden, that its practitioners need to do a better job of applying the lessons from prior missions.”<sup>117</sup> In addition, Sheila Harden indicates that small countries or other countries’ conflicts over small countries could contribute to local or regional concerns.<sup>118</sup> The threats of local and regional conflicts help motivate governments and organizations to arrange research institutes on small states including failed or failing states.

In sum, combining the existing literature’s view, small powers are microstates, failed states, Least Developing Countries and domestically unstable or un-functioning countries because they were newly decolonized or became independent. Also many small powers were receivers of the international aid rather than donors for its economic development, reconstruction after natural disaster or conflicts.

As this chapter revealed, widely accepted definitions of terms “great power,” “super power,” “middle power,” and “small power” have not yet been established in IR.

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<sup>116</sup> World Bank, “*Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why*,” (New York: Oxford University Press and World Bank, 1998).

<sup>117</sup> James Dobbins et al., *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building* (California: the RAND Corporation, 2007), xvii.


<sup>118</sup> Harden, *Small is Dangerous*, 1.

The existing images of hierarchical classification in international society can be summarized in Figure 1 below. Less than 20 countries in total out of 192 United Nations member states are great powers by a narrow definition. Research applying two tier classifications categorizes the other countries as “others.” Other research assuming three layers in international hierarchy distinguishes “middle power” and “small power.” Currently, 49 states are thought to be least developed countries according to UN-OHRLLS.<sup>119</sup> Based on the research conducted by *Foreign Policy*, 60 countries are assumed to be failed and failing states. Based on the data issued by UN Statistics and UNITAR, 50 countries are micro states with one million or less populations. Because some of the countries of each category overlap, in total small powers are 125 countries. Thus, about 20-30 countries could be classified as middle powers.

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<sup>119</sup> UN-OHRLLS’s web page. <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/> (accessed on November 10, 2008)

**Figure 2 Hierarchical Image of the International Society**



(Source: author)

## 2. Ways of Classification

Labeling countries as “great power,” “middle power,” and “small power” means that users of these terms are categorizing countries into a few groups. However, IR researchers and policy practitioners are not always conscious that they are intentionally and unintentionally assuming hierarchy when they are referring to the phrases “super power,” “great power,” “middle power,” or “small power.” Thus, the users of the phrases do not always clearly present or not be conscious on how they classify states. Most of the usages are applicable to one of the three coexisting ways of

classification. The most basic hierarchical classification is based on national power. The second one is an international institutional classification. The third classification is derived from perception and recognition. Each method of classification has advantages and disadvantages and two of them are common to the ways in the middle power studies.

## **2.1 National Power**

The most basic classification is based on “national power”. Some research applied single indicator of power, such as population, military power, or GNP to classify countries<sup>120</sup>. Other research applies some indicator in combination. However, “national power” is one of the most contested concepts in IR. Even leading IR textbooks had seventeen different definitions of power although it was usually explained as a basic concept.<sup>121</sup> Power in IR is considered to have three basic features. The first one is power as capabilities, which are power resources including military power, economic power, population and natural resources.<sup>122</sup> The power resources are conceived as the means to affect the behavior of others. The second form of power is influence, which is the power exercised in relationship between actors. The third one is structural power.

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<sup>120</sup> For example, R.P. Barston ed., *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 15, applied population as the single indicator.

<sup>121</sup> Mary Nowe Ransom, “International Relations,” *Journal of Politics* 30 (1968): 368.

<sup>122</sup> David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” *World Politics* 31(1979): 163.

Susan Strange defined structural power as the power to decide how things shall be done and the power to shape frameworks in which states conduct international policies.<sup>123</sup>

For international comparison of power, power has to be measured quantitatively. However, there are three remaining problems in measuring power in IR. Firstly, two of the basic aspects of national power, which are influence and structural power, have inherently subjective and immeasurable natures. Recently, Joseph Nye presented the concept of soft power which he defined as the ability to attract others to affect sense of value and ways of thinking.<sup>124</sup> To observe how these aspects of power work, detailed qualitative research has to be done on each case. It is difficult to objectively measure their effects because they are psychological relations existing only between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.<sup>125</sup>

The second reason underlying the difficulty of defining and measuring power is multiplicity of capabilities and unavailability of accurate data. For example, Hans J. Morgenthau listed eight elements of national power: geography, natural resources, and industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy.<sup>126</sup> Among those, power resources, such as military

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<sup>123</sup> Susan Strange, *States and Markets* (London: Pinter, 1988), 25; Susan Strange, *The Retreat of The State: The Diffusion of Power in the Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

<sup>124</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*.

<sup>125</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 14.

<sup>126</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 80-108.

power, populations, and GNP, are more visible and recognizable than others and thus have received central attention.<sup>127</sup> However, measuring and comparing those elements of capabilities all across the world have technical obstacles. For instance, even if data for the annual national defense budgets of particular countries were available they do not always fully represent the military strengths of these countries because military strength was the result of many components, such as the budget, the number of personnel, equipment, and even alliances. Furthermore, measuring and comparing capabilities is often hampered by the unavoidable bias of data that comes from different statistical methodologies depending on countries, organizations, and time.<sup>128</sup> The data of less developed countries are typically less available or reliable.

The last point to be noted is the contextual and changeable nature of power. Fungibility of power, which is the ability to transfer or work as a replacement for other power resource, is one of the biggest contentions regarding the nature of national power. For instance, if the fungibility of military power is high, a state possessing military strength could have advantages even in non-military areas. Conversely, from the standpoint of assuming low fungibility, strong military force does not always affect other areas. Thus, a country's strength would vary depending on issues. Literature

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<sup>127</sup> Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics," 192.

<sup>128</sup> Gordon Cordina, "The Microeconomic and Growth Dynamics of Small States": 21- 40, 23.

which assumes a low fungibility of power resources is likely to focus on the contextual nature of power. One power resources' effects differ from age to age as well as from issue to issue. Many researchers agree that power has fungibility as well as a contextual nature in greater or lesser degrees.

Although there is no common agreement on the way to estimate national power, many research projects attempted to calculate and compare countries' respective power<sup>129</sup>. Among the various academic work, the equation form devised by Ray S. Cline is the most frequently cited in contemporary IR. Cline created the following well-known formula for measuring national power and used it in the ranking of more than 70 countries in his research.

$$PP = ( C + E + M ) \times ( S + W )$$

PP = Perceived Power,  
 C = Critical Mass = Population + Territory  
 E = Economic Power,  
 M = Military Power,  
 S = Strategic Purpose,  
 W = Will to Pursue National Strategy

Table 1 is R. S. Cline's attempt to compare and rank states based on national

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<sup>129</sup> For example, Correlates of War projects' Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC); Ashley J. Tellis, et al., *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age* (California: Rand Corporation, 2000); Ping, *Middle Power Statecraft*; Lewis W. Snider, "Identifying the Elements of State Power: Where do we Begin?" *Comparative Political Studies* 20 (1987): 314-356; Michael P. Sullivan, *Power in Contemporary International Politics* (Columbia: University of South California Press, 1990).

power in 1978 and 1991 in accordance with his formula.<sup>130</sup> These two studies by Cline are one of the few works estimating and comparing the national power of more than 70 states. Other than Cline's work, Correlates of War Projects at University of Michigan has a set of data<sup>131</sup>


The longitudinal axis and numbers on the axis of Table 2 represent evaluated value of national power. The numbers at the latitudinal axis represents the ranking of each state. The figures of national power in each study are better adapted to make comparisons with other counties in the same year than the same country in different years.

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<sup>130</sup> There are several points to be noted in his studies. Firstly, his experience in U.S. government and the Central Intelligence Community (CIA) provide him practical idea about national power in foreign policy; however, it also affected his perception to measuring national power. For example, Cline weighed nuclear weapon so heavily in the research in 1978 that nations which have nuclear weapons were extremely overstated. Secondly, measuring "strategic purpose" and "will to pursue national strategy" in Cline's formula is inevitably subjective although these elements are thought to be important in the formula. Thirdly, the data used in the research were partly revised by Cline. There was uncertainty of the data because of the world affairs during the Cold War.

<sup>131</sup> Correlates of War Projects at University of Michigan <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (accessed on May 22, 2009)

**Table 3 Dispersion of Evaluated National Power in 1978 and 1991.**



(Source : R.S. Cline, *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s; The Power of Nations in the 1990s.*)

The results of Cline’s two research projects show an even and continuous distribution of countries. The possible “great powers,” which occupy the top half of the table, are few in number in both 1978 and 1991. Other than these distinguishable few great powers, almost all states are dispersed evenly. Thus, a clear division between middle and small states cannot be observed in Table 1. If there were two or three distinct clusters, states could be categorized clearly and objectively as to their national power. Therefore,

because of the even distribution of states in terms of national power, three hierarchical classifications have unavoidable tendencies to be arbitrary, judging from the results of Cline's research.

A lot of previous IR work attempted to classify states based on power distribution. However, power has been one of the most important and contentious concepts because of the absence of a common standard. In addition, there are remaining methodological problems for measuring power. Despite of these problems, if Cline's studies of calculating national power are applied, grouping states into three categories based on national power cannot be objective. The hierarchical classification applying national power can be neither objective nor systematic as a basis of further research.

With awareness of those problems and limitations, this classification is still useful for specific aims. Broad comparisons of countries based on national power gives overall pictures of the world and general positions of particular countries<sup>132</sup>. Also, even research with subjective categorizations or definitions could make a significant contribution as long as possible bias and problems are clearly noted. Robert Koehane summarized such views as presented by David Vital, in that "a definition should be judged not only on the relevance of its categories but also on the power of the

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<sup>132</sup> R.P. Barston, Introduction in *The other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*, 18.

explanations that it suggests.”<sup>133</sup> Furthermore, a country’s strength in particular issues and time are measurable with specific aspect or indicators of national power although national power as a whole is immeasurable and contextual. For example, judging from GNP in 2007, United States, China and Japan are the three most powerful countries; however, Russia, Canada and Norway, the three biggest exporters of natural gas, thus in the issues of natural gas export, these countries could prove to be more powerful.<sup>134</sup> These facts are certainly useful in international economy for specific research aims.

## **2.2 International Institutions**

The second classification is based on international law and institutions. Some international institutions and treaties provide clear divisions between each group in the international hierarchy. The membership of the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) is a typical example of this second classification. The permanent membership with the veto power creates obvious differences in terms of political rights in the United Nations. Other than the UNSC’s membership classification, possessing nuclear weapons within the system of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty institutionalizes international hierarchy between the haves and the have-nots in terms of nuclear weapons. In the

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<sup>133</sup> Robert Keohane, “Lillputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” *International Organization* 23 (1969): 294; David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 9

<sup>134</sup> CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (accessed on November 20, 2008)

economic area, the membership of the G8 has rights and statuses for member states. For example, the members of the G8 have the right to attend and make remarks at regular meetings. Even if it is not clearly regulated by international law or institution, positions and achievements in international institutional activities often authorize a country as a major power in particular areas.

**Table 4 Examples of Great Powers in Institutional Classification**

UNSC	G8	NPT
USA	USA	USA
UK	UK	UK
France	France	France
Russia	Russia	Russia
China	China	China
	Canada	
	Italy	
	Japan	

(Source: author)

Essentially, these categorizations are created by states, mostly powerful or influential states at the time in a particular area. As Patrick A. McCarthy indicated, many international organizations officially differentiate the major powers from others in particular way.<sup>135</sup> Those categorizations inevitably represent power distributions among

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<sup>135</sup> Patrick A. McCarthy, *Hierarchy and Flexibility World Politics* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 1998), 55-56.

countries at one time and in one area in accordance with the major powers' will. Therefore, those classifications are not applicable throughout time and issues. In fact, at the peace conference of Paris in 1919, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan obtained great power status and its exclusive rights; however, after 26 years, during San Francisco conference the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China established exclusive positions in the Security Council.

This categorization presents clearer groups of states than the other two methods of categorization. However, institutional classifications represent only one specific aspect of international hierarchy and are also affected by politics at some point in time. Therefore, those issue- and time-specific features of classification are not expandable into other issues or time.

Based on the advantages and disadvantages of this particular type of classification, positions in international organizations can explain how authority and effective influence in particular issues were constructed and worked in specific areas and time. Membership in one exclusive committee provides certain authority and influence to member countries in particular areas. Moreover, because institutional positions are stable in many cases, they offer practical understandings of back grounds of international politics to analyze particular issues. For example, information regarding

the members, observers and chair country of a G8 meeting makes it easy to interpret the selections of topics discussed in the meeting.

### **2.3 Perceptions and Discourses**

The third classification is based on perceptions and discourses. In this third way of classification, the discourses and understandings of the country in question determine its international position. There is surprisingly a lot of IR work which avoids presenting clear classification and relies on international and domestic perception or discourses.

The first group of researchers who apply this third way of classification stresses the role of social agreement or shared image in categorizing states. From historical IR perspectives, Martin Wight put emphasis on social agreement defining great powers.

It is easier to answer [the question ‘what is a great power?’] historically, by enumerating the great powers at any date, than by giving a definition, for there is always broad agreement about the existing great powers.<sup>136</sup>

Even some of neo-realists who advocate scientifically precise research methods in IR

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<sup>136</sup> Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Carsten Holbraad, Jack Spence, *Power Politics* (London:Continuum, 2002), 41.

leave the classification of nations to perceptions.<sup>137</sup> For example, as a representative of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz indicated the hierarchical understandings as follows:

Historically, despite the difficulties, one finds general agreement about who the great powers of a period are, with occasional doubt about marginal cases... Counting the great powers of an area ...[is an empirical question ‘what is a great power?’] historically, by enumerating the great powers at any date, than by giving definitions, for there is always broad agreement about the existing great powers.<sup>138</sup>

The second standpoint of the third way of classification pays attention particularly to perceptions of domestic actors and self declarations. For example, Robert Keohane typically framed a small state as “a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system.”<sup>139</sup> Jeanne A. K. Hey’s statement also represents this view: “states are deemed small not by any objective definition, but by their perceived role in the international hierarchy.”<sup>140</sup> Robert Rothstein defined a small country as “a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of others.”<sup>141</sup> In addition to research focus on national

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<sup>137</sup> Buzan, *The United States and Great Powers*, 58-59.

<sup>138</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 131.

<sup>139</sup> Keohane, “Lillputians’ Dilemmas”: 296.

<sup>140</sup> Hay, ed., *Small States in World Politics*, 3.

<sup>141</sup> Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 27.

identity, the role theory suggested by K. J. Holsti also put emphasis on policy practitioners' perception of national role.<sup>142</sup>

The last group of researchers in this view focuses on others' recognition or international mutual understandings to classify countries. For example, Hedley Bull defined great power as a country which is "recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties."<sup>143</sup> Laurent Goetschel also described the small powers as "a state perceived as no danger to neighboring states."<sup>144</sup> According to Barry Buzan's recent work, the key idea of this view is "not just what states say about themselves and others, but how they behave in a wider sense, and how that behavior is treated by others."<sup>145</sup>

Despite the fact that a lot of researchers employed the categorization based on perceptions and recognitions, one categorization can hardly expand to other research because this classification is inevitably arbitrary and fluctuating depending on time and person. In fact, a research conducted by Norman Z. Alcock and Alan G. Newcombe showed that the perception and images of great powers are different between people in

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<sup>142</sup> K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, (1970):243

<sup>143</sup> Buzan, *The United States and Great Powers*, 58-59. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 200-202.

<sup>144</sup> Robert Laurent Goetschel, "The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today's Europe," in Laurent Goetschel Dordrecht, ed., *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union: interests and Policies* (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic), 13.

<sup>145</sup> Buzan, *The United States and Great Powers*, 67.

Canada and Latin America because of the difference in histories and backgrounds of these two countries.<sup>146</sup> Various research methods, including the application of the psychological research methods and discourse analysis, to observe perceptions, are still in progress.<sup>147</sup>

In addition to these academic usages, political leaders also employ the classification based on perceptions to describe their countries' international positions or status. However, distinctively, political usages are not always based on political leaders' or domestic perception. In politics, classifications of states are applied to construct the social agreements of international positions and status in some cases.

This classification has various usages although it also requires further research as well as the other two classifications. Policy practitioners' and domestic actors' perceptions on their countries' international positions play significant roles in the policy-making process and international negotiations. For example, countries with confidence in being a key player in a particular area, such as a key exporter of a rare natural resource or being a leading supporter of an international committee, are more likely to take initiatives and less likely to compromise in those particular issues. Moreover, by focusing on one specific point, such as self-recognition as a leading

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<sup>146</sup> Norman Z. Alcock and Alan G. Newcombe, "Perceptions of National Power," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14 (1969): 339-342.

<sup>147</sup> For example, Allen M. Shinn, Jr., "An Application of Psychophysical Scaling Techniques to the Measurement of National Power," *The Journal of Politics* 31(1969): 932-951.

county in a certain area, it might be possible to compare several countries' international activities or a county's policy in several issues.

### **3. Hierarchical Assumptions in IR and Middle Power Studies**

As this chapter revealed, not only middle power studies classify and label countries based on hierarchical assumptions, but many IR studies also categorize countries. In IR, "great powers" are relatively distinguishable because they have been the major focus in IR. Other than "great powers," "small powers" and "middle powers" have not received equivalent attention in IR and do not have clear categorizations. Thus, although phrases such as "super power," "great power," "middle power," or "small power," are found in IR often, they remain unclear both in IR and middle power studies.

There are three coexisting ways of classifications and each one includes arbitrariness problems although they have certain benefits as Table 8. The very basic hierarchical classification is based on national power using various data. The second one is an international institutional classification. The third classification is derived from perception and recognition among policy practitioner and people. Each way of classification has problems although they also have effective way of usages. The first approach, national power approach provides researchers an overall picture of international society. On the other hand, there is no widely shared and agreed definition

or ways of measurement of power. Secondly, the approach is based on international institutions presents clear distinctions between groups; however, the fact that these international institutions were affected by the international politics especially influential actors' interests at the time when these institutions were established. The last approach based is on perceptions and recognitions suited for close decision making process analysis. However, because this classification is based on policy practitioners' recognitions and speeches, the categories are contextual and changing depends on time, issues, and person.

**Table 5 Three Ways of Hierarchical Categorization**

	National Power	International Institutions	Perceptions and recognitions
Resource	Data on national power factors	Systems and structure of institutions	Policy practitioner's speech, official documents
Usage	Grab a big picture	Shows clear distinction	Suited for decision making process analysis
problem	Unclear definition of national power. National power is difficult to measure.	International institutions are made by great powers at the time.	Contextual and changing depending on cabinets and person.


Comparing middle power studies' four ways of defining "m" (Source: author)

IR's hierarchical classifications of countries, three of the approaches are overlapping.

(Figure 8) Many middle power studies have hardly tried to locate themselves in IR.

However, judging from the basis of the middle power studies, most of them are overlapping with the IR classifying countries.

**Figure 3 Middle Power studies and Hierarchical Understanding**



(Source: author)

The attempts of middle power studies to define middle power based on national power can be seen a part of IR’s attempt classifying countries in hierarchical order. Secondly, the functional model in middle power studies approaches to the idea “middle power” from the point of the roles in international organizations and society. In this

sense, functional model has the same view as the IR's classification of countries focusing on international institution. At the same time, the functional model includes policy practitioners' self descriptions of their countries and recognitions of roles in international organizations and society. Thus, the functional model could also be a part of perception and recognition approach to the international hierarchy in IR. The third approach, normative model in middle power studies are based on subjective perceptions and interpretations of political culture and self-images. As another feature of the "middle power" concept, the political usages of the idea and term could be integrated to the perceptual and recognition approach to the international hierarchy in IR.

As this research revealed so far, not only middle power studies, but many IR research projects assume international hierarchy and the concept of "middle power" is a part of such assumptions. However, any of the three approaches classify countries cannot categorize countries objectively. Therefore, this research assumes classifications of states are flexible and changing along with issues and time periods to understand the behavior.

As Figure 3 indicates, the behavioral approach to middle power is unique to middle power studies and different from other IR approaches. IR research projects attempt to classify and label countries in hierarchical order, hardly moved to examining

the general characteristics or behavioral patterns of each category. IR literature had hardly examined how and why relative rank and capability affect international behavior. Considering the aim of this research to understand the middlepowermanship, this research focuses on this behavioral approach as the basis of analysis.

## **Chapter 4**

### **“Middle Power” and “Middlepowermanship”**

This chapter suggests a modified theoretical framework to understand secondary powers' international leadership. As this research has revealed so far, both middle power studies and IR research projects assume international hierarchy and the concept of “middle power” is a part of such assumptions. However, the behavioral approach to middle power is different from other IR approaches because behavioral model in middle power studies attempted to explain the behavioral patterns of middle powers and the reasons behind those. Based on this fact, this research suggests a framework that modifies the behavioral approach in middle power studies.

This chapter starts with an examination of the general characteristics of each category's international behavior. As chapter 3 indicated, existing studies examining the behavioral patterns of each category of countries have certain limitations because classifications are based on national power, international institutions or recognitions are not always corresponding to the behavioral pattern. More specifically, “middle powers”

do not always adopt the same diplomatic patterns of “middlepowermanship.” Governments are always examining available options and “middle power diplomacy” is merely one such option. To understand secondary powers’ active diplomacy and leadership in some cases, this decision making process considering these options has to be investigated. Chapter 4 theoretically examines the general factors affecting these decisions and link domestic policy making processes to behavioral patterns.

### **1. “The Scheme of Gradation” and “Possible Middle Powers”**

As chapter 3 indicated, it is almost impossible to objectively categorize countries as great, middle, and small powers throughout issues and timespans. In addition, as this research examined in chapter 3, the relative positions of countries in international society are influential but not genuine factors in determining their international behavior. Also, defining these categories is not the main goal of this research.

David Mitrany divided international community into two classes: the great powers and the other powers, which can be called “small powers” in a broad sense. Based on the recognition that some of these “small powers” were becoming stronger, he proposed to recognize these emerging states through “scheme of gradation”<sup>148</sup>.


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<sup>148</sup> David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, (London: George Allen and Uniwinn Ltd., 1933): 107.

Applying this view, this research suggests a flexible categorization of international hierarchy.

As Figure 4 below shows, this research is setting the assumption that the hierarchy in international society is essentially a flexible gradation and not a clear cut grouping. This research applies a flexible categorization view depending on the issues and contexts because countries in the same category could conduct different international policies depending on the issues and contexts.

**Figure 4 “Possible Middle Powers”**



(Source: author)

In the very narrow meaning employed in existing literature, hegemonic

countries, super powers, bipolar countries, UNSC members, nuclear states in the NPT system, and G8 countries are most likely to be categorized as great powers in recent years and in various contexts. In this sense, the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, Japan, Canada, and Italy could be considered great powers. However, even these countries do not always share the same behavioral patterns. For example, the countries' policies for the Iraq War in 2003 were remarkably varied: the United States and United Kingdom sent troops to the war; in the contrast, China, France, Russia and Italy opposed it; Japan partly backed the war; Canada sent troops for reconstruction.

As for small powers, this research applies the narrow definition of small powers in IR as a basis and adjusts categorization flexibly depending on issues and contexts. As a basic categorization of small powers, the small power category consists of 125 countries which are micro states, failed states and LDCs. Also, countries which do not have any extensive international involvement can be categorized as small powers from the perspective of international behavior<sup>149</sup>. However, even those small powers in the narrow definition are varied in terms of their behavior. For example, the Netherlands is the sixth biggest donor of the ODA in 2007 although the Netherlands is considered to be a micro state. Also, some countries such as Israel, North Korea and Pakistan are

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<sup>149</sup> R.P. Barston, Introduction in *The other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*, 19.

known for their military power and for receiving considerable attention from the world although they are listed as failed states<sup>150</sup>.

In this research, “possible middle powers” are not clearly great powers; however, they are still distinguishable from other smaller powers because of their basic capabilities and frequent active involvement in international relations. These “possible middle powers” are changeable and contextual depending on issues and times. These “possible middle powers” have capabilities and the potential to choose middle power leadership in certain issues and times. On this point, this research is different from existing literature, which simply assumes the diplomacy conducted by “middle powers” as “middle power diplomacy” or “middlepowermanship” This research focuses on the conditions and motivations for “possible middle powers” to choose middle power leadership in international relations.

To set the flexible category of “possible middle power,” this research take integrate three approaches in IR which are national power, international institutions, and recognition and perceptions into account. As indicators for national power, large data sets, such as the National Material Capabilities data issued by the Correlates of War projects at the University of Michigan, can be applied because this data set is widely gathered throughout 1816 to 2001 and it contains various indicators. The international

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<sup>150</sup> See appendix for the list for failed states and micro states.

institutional approach provides clear distinction between great powers and others. The membership of the UNSC and the nuclear power in NPT system show that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China have exclusive status. Also, the frequency of being elected as a non-permanent UNSC member represent recognition from others and institutional status. Only three countries, Japan, Brazil, and Argentina, have been elected more than eight times. Next to these three states, eight countries have been elected five times, 17 countries four times, and 18 countries three times.

**Table 6 Indicators for “Scheme of Gradation”**

Approach	Indicators	References in this research
National Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Military power</li> <li>■ Population</li> <li>■ Economic power</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ National Material Capabilities (v3.02) in Correlates of War Projects at University of Michigan</li> </ul>
International Institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The frequency of being elected as UNSC member.<sup>151</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The Web page of UN Security Council.</li> </ul>
Recognitions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Activities in regional organizations.<sup>152</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The web page of each regional organization</li> </ul>

(Source: author)

## 2. “Middle Power” and Leadership

This research is trying to explain some intermediate countries’ remarkably


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<sup>151</sup> See Appendix.

<sup>152</sup> See Appendix.

active involvement and leadership in some cases of international politics. In other words, to understand “middlepowermanship” is the main focus of this research. To understanding middle power diplomacy starts the analysis with an examination of the overall characteristics of each category’s international behavior. The basic assumption that relative capabilities and ranks of countries affect the overall patterns of international behavior is widely shared in IR. In general understanding, each category of countries has rough behavioral patterns, due to the capability, as Figure 5 below.

**Figure 5 Each Category’s General Behavioral Patterns**



(Source: author)

Great powers have large capabilities and middle and small powers have less capability than great powers. The bigger capability makes it possible for countries to act unilaterally and less likely to compromise with others because they do not always need other actors' agreements and support to achieve their goals in international relations. However, "large states, even hegemonic states, need institutions to legitimate their power, to deal with shared problems, and to spread the risks and burdens of leadership" in some cases<sup>153</sup>. Once powerful countries decide to take international leadership, they can take a wider scale and stronger leadership due to their capabilities.

On the contrary to these powerful countries, less powerful countries are more likely to join multilateral activities and compromise with other actors, otherwise, it would be more difficult to achieve their goals by themselves. Indeed, the traditional source of influence for intermediate countries has been positions and presence in international institutions and coalitions<sup>154</sup>. For small powers with very limited capabilities, it is more practical to be a follower to other countries leadership in many cases. If middle and small powers seek to show strong influence and leadership, they have to select, more deliberately than other countries, issues and timing which their limited diplomatic resource can accomplish.

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<sup>153</sup> Andrew Hurrell et al., "Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States." A Working Paper published by Latin American Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2000): 10.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid, 8.

The theoretical characteristics of each category's style of leadership can be summarized as in Table 7 below. The vertical axis represents the tendency of becoming a leader or follower. The horizontal axis stands for the tendency to act through unilateralism or multilateralism. The area A represents a policy that unilaterally pursuing its own goal. For example, one country could invade others unilaterally or resist existing international systems. The area B stands for taking leadership in multilateral co-operations. Achieving a leadership through an alliance or constructing international co-operations are the examples of this policy. The area C means actively participating neither the international co-operations, systems, decision making. Simply staying away from international movement led by others in particular issues and also Neutralization and Non-alignment policies could be the examples. Lastly, supporting other actors' multilateral leadership is categorized into the area D. For instance, joining the multilateral alliance or co-operations means becoming a follower of that particular international system.

**Table 7 Leadership of Each Category**

	<b>Unilateralism</b>	<b>Multilateralism</b>
<b>Leadership</b>	<p><b><u>A: Available for Great Powers.</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To pursue own diplomatic goal unilaterally.</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>B: Available for Great and Middle powers.</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To take leadership through or in making alliance, multilateral cooperation, and international organization.</li> <li>• To take leadership with other actors.</li> </ul>
<b>Followership</b>	<p><b><u>C: Available for Great, Middle, and Small powers.</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Neutralization/Non-alignment</li> <li>• Not participate in international agreement/decision making.</li> <li>• Not participate international cooperative activities.</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>D: Available for Great, Middle, and Small powers.</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To become a member or supported of multilateral alliance or cooperation.</li> <li>• To follow other actors.</li> </ul>

(Source: author)

Great powers have all four options because of their large capabilities. Great powers can take leadership roles and also support others' leadership as a one of the followers. Also, they can choose whether to act by themselves or to co-operate with other actors. Great powers could stay away from international movement led by others as well.

On the other hand, small powers, with their strictly limited capabilities, are not

always capable of taking leadership. They are more likely to be a follower as a member of multilateral activities. In these cases, small powers' policy options are in area D in the Table 7. In addition, area C includes some small countries' neutralization or non-alignment policy. Neutralization and non-alignment policy is one of the common strategies employed by newly independent states<sup>155</sup>. Non-alignment is "a means of establishing a diplomatic identity distinct from the great powers or other small states which have become subsumed in great power alliance network."<sup>156</sup> Neutralization is also one of the strategies for small powers to play international roles such as mediator, or international conference centers<sup>157</sup>.

Because middle powers have relatively larger capabilities than small powers, middle powers theoretically have more policy options than small powers. Middle powers could become followers in multilateral co-operations led by other actors (area D below). At the same time, a middle power could be a leading actor in some cases; however, because of their limited capabilities, they can hardly pursue their policy unilaterally. Thus, middle powers' possible policy options are areas B, C, and D.

Focusing on leadership, the general characteristics and strategies of international leadership are different between great powers and other minor powers.

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<sup>155</sup> R.P. Barston, Introduction in *The other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*, 25.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid*, 25.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid*, 26.

Leadership can be defined as “the power of one or a few individuals to induce a group to adopt a particular line of policy<sup>158</sup>”. Thus, leadership is not always backed up by the absolute power of the leading actors or countries. Many research projects provide close analyses on the concept of “leadership” in international regimes, hegemony and international negotiation. According to these research projects, there are three categories of leadership which are structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership and intellectual leadership<sup>159</sup>.

Firstly, structural leadership based on material resources and positions empowered or authorized in formal and/or informal ways, such as prime ministers and superpowers<sup>160</sup>. Structural leadership is often coterminous with superpowers, great powers or hegemony in international relations studies because they can take advantage of structural power and/or their overwhelming capabilities to exercise leadership in international issues<sup>161</sup>. These structural leaders could obtain followers based on coercion

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<sup>158</sup> *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science*, p.321. This definition is applied also by Raino Malnes

<sup>159</sup> This classification is based on Oran Young’s 1991 article in *International Organization*. This is one of the most basic categorization in international relations studies, although there are various understanding of leadership. Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: on the Development of Institutions in International Society," *International Organization* 45(1991): 281-307.

<sup>160</sup> Raino Malnes calls structural leaders as “positional leaders”. In Young’s argument, structural leaders does not necessary include individuals in power. Raino Malnes, "'Leader' and 'Entrepreneur' in International Negotiations: A Conceptual Analysis," *European Journal of International Relations* 1 (1995): 92.

<sup>161</sup> Most of early studies on international leadership focus on hegemon or big countries. Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Charles Kindleberger, *The international Economic Order* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988). Richard Rosecrance and Jennifer Taw, "Japan and the Theory of International Leadership," *World Politics* 42,

or threats using their strong power. However, their positions and preponderance of power are not always sufficient conditions for structural leadership, even though they are necessary sources of this leadership<sup>162</sup>. Therefore, structural leadership is available mainly for great powers; however, not all great powers can take structural leadership.

Secondly, entrepreneurial leadership rests on the basis of negotiation skill or “cognitive resources<sup>163</sup>”, such as technological innovation and knowledge, in the bargaining process. Unlike the structural leadership, the entrepreneurial leadership does not necessarily require structural power or authorized position. The role as an entrepreneurial leader, such as in the coordinating bargainers’ behaviors in a mutually agreeable fashion, is based on persuasion rather than coercion or threats<sup>164</sup>. Because of these characteristics of entrepreneurial leadership, it is available for not only powerful countries but also less powerful countries. In addition to governments, international organizations and individuals, such as prime ministers or foreign ministers, can also play roles as entrepreneurial leaders<sup>165</sup>.

Thirdly, intellectual leadership involves offering fresh ideas, new perspectives

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(1990): 184-209.

<sup>162</sup> John G. Ikenberry, "The Future of International Leadership." *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 3 (1996): 391.

<sup>163</sup> Raino Malnes, “ ‘Leader’ and ‘Entrepreneur’ in International Negotiations: A Conceptual Analysis." *European Journal of International Relations* 1 (1995): 98.

<sup>164</sup> Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” 293.

<sup>165</sup> For the leadership conducted by international organizations, see Moravcsik, Andrew. "A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurial Cooperation," *International Organization* 53 (1999): 267-306.

and creative ways of conceptualizing problems<sup>166</sup>. New perspectives or new concepts can be offered by various actors. Therefore, this methods of leadership is also available not only to great powers but also other powers or other non-state actors, such as international organizations, non- governmental organizations and epistemic communities.

Therefore, not only great powers but also other powers can take some types of leadership in international relations under the certain conditions. Because of the limitations of national power, other powers' leadership is more likely to be entrepreneurial or intellectual leadership in some issues in which they accomplish negotiation skills, cognitive resources, or new ideas.

In addition, as this research indicates above in Table 7, other powers usually achieve leadership in multilateral activities co-operating and compromising with other members. "Possible middle powers" need agreement and support from other international actors, such as countries and international organizations, to take international initiatives. Great powers with structural power and huge national power do not always need agreement and support from other countries. However, less powerful countries have to persuade others to give support and co-operate to exercise

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<sup>166</sup> Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, "Canada's Human Security Agenda: Walking to Talk?" *International Journal* 60 (2005):1068.

international leadership because of their limited capabilities. This persuasion will partly determine if they can achieve international initiatives.

In sum, combining the examinations in this chapter, middle power diplomacy or middlepowermanship in this research theoretically has four main features. Firstly, middlepowermanship is to take leadership employing cooperation with other actors, including countries, international organizations and international institutions rather than its own national power. Secondly, middle power leadership tends to be entrepreneurial or intellectual leadership, which does not always require massive national power and resource input. Thirdly, this diplomatic option is basically available to very wide range of countries, classified as “possible middle powers” in this research, as one of the policy options. Fourth, the country applying middle power diplomacy does not always describe itself as “middle power”; in addition, the country calling itself “middle power” is not always conducting middle power diplomacy. The political rhetoric “middle power” and middle power diplomacy is not always inter-related. Lastly, only under certain conditions, this policy is chosen and successfully practiced.

### **3. Agenda Setting Process Choosing “Middlepowermanship”**

These theoretical examinations above illustrate the general contours of the international leadership taken by intermediate powers. The next question involves how

they choose to take leadership policy and successfully achieve it. “Possible middle powers” do not always attempt to take leadership. Decision-makers in each country always examine available options at the time and the leadership policy of “middle power diplomacy” is merely one such option for them. To understand why middlepowermanship is chosen in certain cases, the decision making process eliminating other options has to be investigated. To examine how the middle power diplomacy option was organized into practice while other options were organized out will build the linkage between the behavioral patterns and domestic policy making process for those international policies. As Steven Livingston wrote, domestic agenda politics is “the intermediate” between “the actual substantive focus of international behavior and foreign policies”<sup>167</sup>. To understand the decision making process choosing middlepowermanship for international policies will solve the circular argument problem in the existing behavioral approach in middle power studies.

This research is applying John Kingdon’s the so-called “policy windows model” to understand the agenda-setting process because it is suitable to clarify the factors affecting the policy style selections among the one as a great power, middle power and small power<sup>168</sup>. Originally, his work presented a model focused on the United

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<sup>167</sup> Steven G. Livingston, “The Politics of International Agenda- Setting: Reagan and North-South Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992): 314.

<sup>168</sup> John K. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. (New York: Longman,

States federal government's agenda-setting process for domestic public policies. Many studies applied his model to other policy areas and countries<sup>169</sup>.

In this view, new policy changes take place as a result of a "policy window" joining three separated streams; the problem stream, policy stream and political stream<sup>170</sup>. Policy windows are the precious opportunities to implement policy ideas and proposals. First, in "the problem stream," participants with recognition that there are certain problems to handle is essential to start a new policy or change policy directions. Policy entrepreneurs, crisis, feedback about the operation of existing programs, and accumulation of knowledge can bring problems to officials' attention. Second, the "policy stream" is the development of policy proposals and the availability of alternatives and options for the recognized problem. Third, the "political stream" is political timing which is brought by elections, shift of national mood, change of administration, renewal of programs and crisis. When these separated streams are joined, the policy window is open.

Policy windows open only when the three streams join together and do not stay open for a long time. These windows close for four reasons. First, "participants may feel

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2003).

<sup>169</sup> For example, Jefferey Checkel, *Idea and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian and the End of the Cold War* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1997) applied to international relations; Michael Howlett, "Predictable and Unpredictable Policy Windows: Institutional and Exogenous Correlates of Canadian Federal Agenda-Setting," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 31 (1993): 495-524 applied to Canadian federal government.

<sup>170</sup> Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition., 166-168.

they have addressed the problem through decision or enactment.” Second, “participants may fail to take action.” Third, the events, such as crises, that prompted the window to open may pass from the scene. Fourth, people in key positions for the opportunity may change<sup>171</sup>.

As previous section indicated, middlepowermanship is one of the options for wide range of countries. One country could apply middlepowerapproach to commit one international issue and take leadership, at the same time, the same country could take a small power approach not to be involved to other issues. This Kingdom’s framework is suitable to understand how a country selects such approaches to take leadership and exercise strong influence in international issues.

The “policy stream,” which represents the availability and variety of policy options the particular country has for the issue, makes a vital difference in the approaches a country takes for an international leadership and strong influence in certain issues. The capability relating to the issue and available diplomatic resource result in the availability and variety of policy options in the policy stream. Even if participants of agenda-setting process recognized the problem, some countries still do not have enough capability or diplomatic resource to practice certain policy proposals to handle the problem and international influence through it. A country possessing huge

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<sup>171</sup> Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition., 169.

capability and resources available for the issues usually have more policy proposals than other countries without them. All three approaches, great, middle, and small power approaches, to the issue are available for a country with considerable capability and resources for that particular issue. Other countries with more limited capabilities and resources to put for the issue are carefully choosing the most effective and practicable approach which what they have can accomplish. As Barston indicated in his book, “the range of choice open to a government may in practice be severely limited.”<sup>172</sup> Therefore, “possible middle powers” will try to take leadership only in some selected issues because their diplomatic resources and issue areas are strictly limited depending on issue areas and time. .

For example, in case of a large scale natural disaster in other countries or region, countries with certain resources have various options and approaches. As a great power leadership, a country can actively support the countries in question by sending rescue or reconstruction personnel's, goods or financial aid more than others and directly gain leadership in this issue. Instead of these direct and bilateral commitments, the middle power approach to lead multilateral support and share part of the physical task with others could be available, too. Also, they have options as a small power, which is not to be involved in this issue. On the other hand, for a country without such


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<sup>172</sup> R.P. Barston, Introduction in R.P. Barston, ed. *The other Powers*, 14.

personnel or affordable goods, sending a lot of personnel may not be a practicable option for its leadership and influence in this. However, even without sending personnel or goods, coordinating multilateral cooperation to support reconstruction after natural disasters might bring an influential diplomatic accomplishment to the country. One country might have to choose not to be involved in any international acts for that particular natural disaster because they cannot afford their resource at the time because of internal conflicts, slow development of its own economy or recession. These selection of approaches to international leadership and influence and availability of policy options for these are based on capability and diplomatic resource which are affordable for the issue at the time. They are the important factors influencing whether certain intermediate powers actively involved and take initiatives and how they do.

Figure 6 below summarizes the modified three-stream framework based on Kingdon's policy windows framework to understand approach selections. In general, policy changes or new policies take place as a result of the three separated streams which are the problem stream, policy stream, and political stream, joining together.

**Figure 6 The Modified Three-Stream Framework to Understand Approach Selections**



(Source: author based on Kingdom's Policy Windows framework)

One of these three streams, the “policy stream” typically affects on the decision of the approaches a country takes for an international leadership and influence in that issue in the agenda-setting process. Even if participants of agenda-setting process recognized the problem aim to take international leadership role at the right domestic political timing, some countries still do have limitation on available capabilities and policy resources. The government is selecting approaches and policies to implement to

handle the problem and obtain the international influence in accordance with the limitation they have.


The capability relating to the issue and available diplomatic resource at the time determine the availability and variety of approaches and policy options. When the government recognized the issue at the right political timing, if a country has enough resources and capability available for the taking initiative in an international issue at the time, it would usually have all three approaches, great, middle, and small power approaches and choose the most effective one from three. A country with more limited capabilities and resources for the issue being discussed would carefully choose the most effective and practicable approach from middle power approach and small power approach. Shortage of necessary resource or too small capability to commit international issues would lead the country to take small power approach.

In the implementation of the policy decision, especially secondary powers with limited capability need agreement and support from other actors. As explained in Figure 5 in page 88, intermediate powers have greater tendencies to act in multilateral co-operation. Especially for successful leadership or influencing the world, reliable multilateral support is necessary for possible middle powers.

As Figure 7 shows below, there are two levels of conditions for possible middle

powers to take international leadership and show strong influence through middlepowermanship. The first domestic conditions can be explained using Kingdon's policy window theory. Possible middle powers will try to take leadership only in the issues for which they can find practicable policy proposals with their limited capabilities and resources. Only in such areas can the three streams for agenda-setting join and open the policy window.

**Figure 7 Two Levels of International Leadership Policy Conditions**



(Source: author)

#### **4. Case Selections for Case Studies**

This research conducts case study that apply the modified framework to understand the factors lead a “possible middle power” to take middlepowermanship. The case study in this thesis particularly focuses on the factors affected in agenda-setting

and the policy decisions process choosing middle power approach to particular issues.

The case study is conducted on Japanese diplomacy on advocating the idea of human security and exporting the Japanese interpretation on the concept.

Japan is one of the two leading countries that advocated the concept of “human security” in the late 1990s and 2000s. Japan and Canada accepted the new concept of “human security” even before the definition and understandings of the concept were widely accepted in the world. Their policies promoting and practicing the idea gave momentum to the idea of “human security” to widely spread in international relations. The Japanese government’s support of the Commission of Human Security promoted understanding of the concept and established the Trust Fundation of Human Security in the United Nations and the Friends of Human Security Network. Also, the other committee to define the concept, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was hosted by the Canadian government and leadership in the Ottawa Process and the Human Security Network were started by the government of Canada.

These international leaderships advocating human security are typical examples of entrepreneurial leadership in world politics. Human security was a new concept in world in the 1990s. Japanese leadership advocating this new concept through its

international policies.

In addition, there are three methodological reasons underlying this case selection. The first objective is to show that the framework which this research suggested effectively help to understand actual policies in case study.

Secondly, Japan is a good example to demonstrate the validity of the flexible categorization of the “possible middle power” framework. The second case study on Japanese “middlepowermanship” will be the “crucial case study” to show flexibility of categorization.<sup>173</sup> Judging from total national power, Japan is usually assumed to be a “great power” in most of the research classifying countries. However, with the lack of the military combat power for international issues, it has limitations in policy options in certain areas. Thus, Japan cannot act as a “great power” in all international issues required military contribution. Thus, it applies “middlepowermanship” as one of its diplomatic strategies on case by case basis. The Japanese government policy for advocating the idea of human security policies is an example of such a strategy. The Japanese case effectively demonstrates that international behavior is not entirely determined by the total national power of a country, as well as how a particular country selects middle power approach to international leadership and influence.

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<sup>173</sup> As for the importance of “crucial case study” in testing theories, see Gary King, Robert O. Koehane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 209. In their argument, single observation of crucial case study is not always enough to test theories.

As the third aim of this case selection, the case study of Japanese diplomacy will provide a new perspective as a study of middle power diplomacy. Until the present day, only a few researchers such as Robert Cox and Yoshihide Soeya have mentioned some Japanese international policies as “middlepowermanship”. This research will be a novel contribution to middle power studies and Japanese studies by applying the concept of “middle power” to Japan.

This research has some limitation on its argument due to the limited number of case studies. Japan is a good example to show the flexibility of the distinction between middle and great powers. However, to examine the flexible division between small powers and middle powers other examples will be necessary.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Japanese Diplomacy for “Human Security”**

Japan is known as one of the major contributors to the concept of human security and for its leadership in many issues relating to human security. The idea of human security was a new and popular concept in the late 1990s. It is suitable for entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership, which does not always require huge capability or structural power. The Japanese government took initiative in some issues relating to human security. This chapter examines three streams affected the Japanese government’s decision to choose middlepowermanship approach for human security policies.

#### **1. Japan and Middle Power Diplomacy for “Human Security”**

##### **1.1 The Concept of Human Security**

The basis of the concept of “human security” was introduced into the world politics by the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report*. This Report advocated broadening the concept of security from

the traditional framework of national security: “for too long, security most has been equated with the threats to a country’s border....For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event.<sup>174</sup>” In this understanding of security, security is threatened not only by international wars and conflicts, but also the lack of appropriate infrastructure, natural disasters and even nonfunctioning government on individual level. The report listed seven categories of human security: economic, food, environmental, personal, community, and political security.<sup>175</sup> In the beginning, when the report presented the idea, human security was a broad and vague concept advocating the new idea of “security of each human’s life.”

This vagueness and expansiveness can be both the problems and advantages of the concept of human security. As for the problematic aspect, Roland Paris threw doubts on the effectiveness of a too-broad definition of human security: “if human security means all these things, what isn’t it?<sup>176</sup>” He also pointed out that “if human security means anything, then it effectively means nothing.<sup>177</sup>” However, at the same time, the

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<sup>174</sup> United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report 1994*. New Dimensions of Human Security. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994: 3.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>176</sup> Paris, “Human Security,” 92.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid, 93. The author made this argument based on the article of Giovanni Sartori. Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 4 (1970): 1033-1053.

ambiguity also worked as an advantage that the concept is flexibly adjustable to various contexts. As Paris indicated, “human security is powerful precisely because it lacks precision and thereby encompasses the diverse perspective and objectives of all the members of the coalition.<sup>178</sup>” The wide range of meaning of human security allows entrepreneurial actors to customize the idea according to the needs and interests of actors involved in each case<sup>179</sup>.

Discussion came after the UNDP report’s presentation of the concept narrowed down the idea of human security into two approaches which are “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want.” The first approach, “freedom from fear” is a narrower interpretation than “freedom from want.” The first approach puts emphasis on protecting people from physical violence and the conservation of basic human rights. The other approach, “freedom from want” covers much more than “freedom from fear”. It has a much broader range to apply policies for the satisfaction of basic human needs for well-being and sustainable human development.

There had been a long discussion over these interpretations among governments, scholars and international organizations. Especially in the 1990s and early 2000s, countries supporting different interpretation were conducting strikingly different

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<sup>178</sup> Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security* 26 (2001): 88.

<sup>179</sup> Yoshihiro Nishida, "Human Security(Ningen no Anzen Hsyou)," *Reference* (2004): 35-36.

policies separately. For example, Canada, Australia, and Norway supported the “freedom from fear” approach and took initiatives to build the international system to enforce human security on “freedom from fear” such as the Ottawa Conventions on Antipersonnel Land mines, the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and the Human Security Network. Conversely, the Japanese government supported “freedom from want” and established the Trust Foundation for Human Security, the Commission on Human Security, and the Friends of Human Security Network.

In academia, IR scholars such as Krause put emphasis on “basic security needs” and supported the idea of “freedom from fear.”<sup>180</sup> On the other hand, Gary King and Christopher J.L. Murray’s research on human security pays considerable attention to human well-being.<sup>181</sup> However, because it is apparent that both physical protection and economical development are essential for a truly secure world for people, recent official documents and speeches addressed to the UN respect both faces of human security<sup>182</sup>.

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<sup>180</sup> Keith Krause, "Is Human Security "More than Just a Good Idea"?" *Promoting Security: But How and for Whom?* Bonn: Bonn International Center for Convention, Brief 30, 2004,45.

<sup>181</sup> King, et. al, op.cit, : 585-610.

<sup>182</sup> For example, *Millennium Development Goal; For Larger Freedom; 2005 World Summit Outcome*.

## 1.2 Japanese Policies for Human Security

The Japanese government put weight on economic aspects human security “freedom from want.” Japan applies the definition of the World Commission on Human Security: “creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”<sup>183</sup>

The Japanese government listed four main achievements in promoting and practicing the idea of human security on a global basis along with its understanding of human security on the web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>184</sup>. Firstly, Japan provided about three hundred million dollars to establish The Trust Fund for Human Security in the United Nations, which is one of the biggest foundations in the United Nations since 1999<sup>185</sup>. According to the speech given by Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi announcing the establishment of the foundation, the primary purpose of this foundation is “to construct ‘century of peace and prosperity built on human security’ in Asia”<sup>186</sup>. The Trust Fund for Human Security supported 179 projects until 2008

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<sup>183</sup> Commission of Human Security, *Human Security Now*, New York: Commission of Human Security, 2003.

<sup>184</sup> Web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan  
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/hs/index.html> (accessed on June 10, 2009)

<sup>185</sup> See the web pages of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan.  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human\\_secu/t\\_fund21.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21.pdf) (accessed on January 27, 2008.)

<sup>186</sup> The full text of this speech “Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia” in Japanese is available at following address. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/10/eos\\_1216.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/10/eos_1216.html) (accessed on March 7, 2008)

“directed towards developmental concerns including key thematic areas such as health, education, agriculture and small scale infrastructure development,” in over 60 countries.<sup>187</sup>

Secondly, the Japanese government supported and hosted the Commission of Human Security in 2001 in response to the UN Secretary-General’s call at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world “free of want” and “free of fear” in January 2001.<sup>188</sup> Prime Minister Mori proposed to set up an international committee in his speech at the Millennium Summit:

Japan also intends to establish an international committee on human security, with the participation of world renowned opinion leaders, and to further develop and deepen the concept of this human-centered approach.<sup>189</sup>

This commission had Professor Amartya Sen and Mrs. Sadako Ogata as co-chairs and ten other major members. The three major goals of the committee were announced as

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<sup>187</sup> The web page of The Trust Fund for Human Security, <http://ochaonline.un.org/TrustFund/ProjectProfiles/tabid/2110/language/en-US/Default.aspx> (accessed on January 27, 2008.)

<sup>188</sup> The ten members in the committee were Lakhdar Brahimi (Former United Nations Secretary-General), Lincoln Vhen (the Director of the Global Equity Center at Harvard Kennedy School of Government.), Bronislaw Geremek (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland from 1997 to 2000), Frene Ginwala (member of the United Nations Advisory Panel of High-Level Personalities on African Development to the UN Secretary-General), Sonia Picado (the Chair of the Board of Directors of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights), Surin Pitsuwan (Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1992-2001.), Danna Shalala (the fifth President of the University of Miami), Peter Sutherland (non-executive Chairman of BP p.l.c.), Albert Tevoedjre (the Special Envoy for the United Nations Secretary-General in charge of Ivory Coast) and Carl Tham (Chairman of the Board of the Swedish Institute for Future Studies). <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/about/profile/index.html> (accessed on 27 June, 2009)

<sup>189</sup> Statement by the Prime Minister Mori Yoshihiro at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 7<sup>th</sup> September, 2000. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/summit2000/pmstate.html> (accessed on June 28, 2009)

follows:

1. to promote public understanding, engagement and support of human security and its underlying imperatives;
2. to develop the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation; and
3. to propose a concrete program of action to address critical and pervasive threats to human security<sup>190</sup>.

The Japanese government financially and operationally supported this committee because the government was started to pursue policies defining and advocating the idea of human security itself as well as accumulating operations along the idea<sup>191</sup>. This commission presented its report to Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan on 1st May 2003.

Thirdly, the ODA and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) projects are planned in accordance with the idea of human security.<sup>192</sup> Japan's ODA Charter provides the concept of human security as a key perspective.

## (2) Perspective of "Human Security"

In order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, disasters, infectious diseases, it is important not only to consider the global, regional, and national perspectives, but also to consider the

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<sup>190</sup> <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/about/Establishment.html> (accessed on 27 June, 2009)

<sup>191</sup> Hiroshi Minami, "Human Security and the Japanese Diplomacy," *International Issues (Kousai Mondai)* 530 (2004): 46-47. Also, other than the Government of Japan, the Rockefeller Foundation, the World Bank (Africa Region), the Greentree Foundation, the Government of Sweden, and Japan Center for International Exchange, and is carried in close collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Harvard Kennedy School of Government supported the Commission.

<sup>192</sup> Japan's ODA Charter is available in Japanese, English, French and Spanish from MOFA's web site. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/charter.html> (accessed on March 10, 2009)

perspective of human security, which focuses on individuals. Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity of local communities through human resource development. To ensure that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages, Japan will extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals.<sup>193</sup>

Lastly, the Japanese government established and supported the “Friends of Human Security” network from 2006. According to the chair’s summary at the first meeting, “the purpose of the meeting was to provide an informal forum for member states as well as relevant international organizations to discuss the concept of human security from different angles in order to seek a common understanding of human security and explore collaborative efforts for mainstreaming it in United Nations activities.<sup>194</sup>” The Friends of Human Security network is essentially based on the definition of human security provided by the Commission of Human Security and focuses on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), humanitarian assistance, climate change, peace-building, and the protection of children<sup>195</sup>. Representatives from Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana,

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<sup>193</sup> <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/sector/security/action.html> (accessed on March 10, 2009)

<sup>194</sup> The chairs summary is available from web page site.

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human\\_secu/friends/index.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/friends/index.html) (accessed on January 27, 2008.)

<sup>195</sup> A speech presented by Yukio Takasu, Ambassador of Japan in charge of Human Security at 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, May 2007.

<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/2007-ministerial-meeting-11-takasu.doc>. (accessed on January 27, 2008.)

Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and Viet Nam attended the first meeting. Japan sent diplomats as chairs to all three meetings until now.<sup>196</sup>

These active Japanese policies under the name of human security have the following three features. Firstly, the government was seeking to take leadership and achieve strong influence in these policies. The Human Security foundation is a trust foundation in the United Nations; however, the Japanese government has intentions to control the usage of the funding within the foundation<sup>197</sup>. Hence, the foundation is not truly independent. In addition, Japan sent diplomats as chairs to all three meetings of the Friends of Human Security Network as the chair<sup>198</sup>. Secondly, the government consistently put emphasis on the aspect of “freedom from want” of human security and consistently avoided applying the phrase of “freedom from fear”. In fact, even when Japan signed the Ottawa Treaty which is considered to be a typical example of the case of “freedom from fear”, the Japanese government announced it as the movement to “protect the weak”, not to “protect the weak from fear,” in its official speech<sup>199</sup>. Thirdly,

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<sup>196</sup> This is observable from the web site of the meeting.

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human\\_secu/friends/index.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/friends/index.html) (accessed on March 2, 2009)

<sup>197</sup> Makoto Katsumata, Sadako Ogata, and Takahide Shioya. "Human Security: What Japan Should Do Now? ('Ningen no Anzen Hosyō' — Ima, Nihon ni naniga motomerarerunoka?)," *NIRA policy research* 14, (2001): 65.

<sup>198</sup> This is observable from the web site of the meeting.

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human\\_secu/friends/index.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/friends/index.html) (accessed in March 2nd)

<sup>199</sup> PM Obuchi's opening remark at the Symposium to celebrate the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Japan.

Japanese human security policy has been shaped more by accumulating programs, mainly through ODA focusing on economic development and community empowerment, than by seeking and presenting a clear definition of the concept of human security<sup>200</sup>.

### **1.3 Options for Japanese Diplomacy**

Japan is not promoting itself as a “middle power” by employing the political term of “middle power.” The exact term of “middle power” was not found in official speeches delivered by Japanese Prime Ministers or Minister of Foreign Policy in the contexts of human security. However, as an option for diplomatic strategies, middle power diplomacy has been one of the options for Japan.

Japan had all three approaches of policies as a small power, a middle power and a great power after the Second World War. Right after the Second World War, the Japanese government’s mainstream policy options were typically those for “small powers” which means focusing on domestic issues and not interested in the active involvement in international issues. Right after the Second World War, control and political influence of the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces strictly limited Japan’s autonomy. In this situation, it had neither will nor enough capability to commit

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<sup>200</sup> David Bosold and Sascha Werthes, “Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese Experiences,” 95.

international issues and also it was relying its national security on others, typically the U.S. at the time.

After regaining the sovereignty in 1952, the government still concentrated on its own domestic issues, which was mainly reconstruction and economic development, and heavily relied on the U.S for its national security. This policy direction was reflected in “Yoshida Doctrine” established by the government led by the 48<sup>th</sup> Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida from 1946 to 1954.<sup>201</sup> Yoshida prioritized economic reconstruction and development over buildup of Japan’s defense capability. He facilitated economic growth of Japan by minimizing the expense to maintain military force. From the 1950s, Japanese national security has been heavily relying on the U.S. This security situation and the East-West division in the Cold War did not leave much room for Japan to other multilateral international activities apart from the U.S. or strong bilateral relationship with other countries other than the U.S.<sup>202</sup>. Throughout the Cold War, this policy direction as a small power prevailed as the major policy option for Japan.

After Japanese economy rapidly grew in the 1960s and 1970s, the policy options available to Japan became varied from the 1980s. Japan became a country with

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<sup>201</sup> For each Prime Minister’s time of office, see Appendix.

<sup>202</sup> Akiko Fukushima, “Japan’s Emerging View of Security Multilateralism in Asia,” Working paper presented at the NEACD in 2009 in Moscow, Russia: 25, 27.

second biggest economy in the world in 1968 and a member of G8, which started as G6 with six members in 1975, and Japanese assessed financial contribution to the U.N sharply increased. Reflecting the increasing Japan's economic power, the U.S started to demand "burden sharing" for Japan's national defense and international affairs. Based on the economic growth of Japan and the recognition of the declining U.S. hegemony, Japanese people's self image of Japan in the world and international policy options were changing in the 1980s.

Firstly, the previous major policy direction as a small power was not the sole option to Japan any more. Autonomy came to the new discussion in the 1980s. Powerful advocates of "autonomous defense," such as the 71<sup>st</sup> PM Nakasone Yasuhiro, inspired a lot of people in Japan, although the U.S.-Japan alliance policy had to remain to be the main pillar of defense policy during the Cold War in his opinion<sup>203</sup>. The changes in the international environment also raised doubts and concerns on over the national defense of Japan relying on the U.S. Firstly, the relative decline of U.S. global power and presence in Northeast Asia raised question about the U. S's capability to defend Japan. Secondly, the economic frictions between Japan and the U.S. and the criticism of

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<sup>203</sup> Richard J. Samuels, "Securing Japan: The Current Discourse," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 33(2007): 137; Keiko Hirata, "Nihon no anzenhosho seisaku to kokunai giron (Japan's security policy and domestic discourse)," in Kimie Hara ed. *Zaigai Nihonjin kenkyusha ga mita nihon gaiko (Japanese Diplomacy through the Eyes of the Japanese Scholars Overseas)* Fujiwara-shoten, 2009: 65.

Japan's "free or cheap ride" on the U. S. protection appeared with intensity<sup>204</sup>.

Secondly, Japan was gaining policy options as a great power based on its economic power. In economy relating issues, the Japanese government began to show remarkable international contributions. For example, financial contribution to the U.N. and ODA rapidly increased. The world started to recognize Japan's power in various ways, such as membership in the G8 and non-permanent seat in the Security Council in the U.N.<sup>205</sup> In this situation, some people, such as Ikutaro Shimizu, expand their thought beyond the "autonomy."<sup>206</sup> They insisted to maintain an equal security partnership with the U.S. and pursue policies for Japan's own interests even unilaterally because they considered "Japan's subordinate position to the U. S. [was] an affront to Japan's prestige."<sup>207</sup> The discussion over revising the U. S.-Japan security treaty and the more active international roles of Self Defense Force was started among advocators who were insisting that "appropriate" military power was necessary for a great power to pursue policies and keep the prestige and national pride.

Thirdly, the idea of middle power diplomacy through issue limited international contribution was also found in Japanese policies from the 1980s. This momentum

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<sup>204</sup> Mike Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Security," *International Security* 8 (1983): 157.

<sup>205</sup> Japan was elected as non-permanent member in 1958 – 1959 for the first time. From 1966, it was elected almost once in four or five years. In comparison to other countries, this is very frequent, and also Japan has been most frequently elected. See Appendix.

<sup>206</sup> Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Security," 166.

<sup>207</sup> Richard J. Samuels, "Securing Japan: The Current Discourse," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 33(2007):138.

reflected Japan's own development, as well as criticisms of Japan's "free or cheap ride" because Japan appeared no longer a weak or small country that requires U.S.'s and international aid or protection<sup>208</sup>. The government sought its international roles mainly in the economic issues. For example, the 78<sup>th</sup> PM Kiichi Miyazawa insisted that Japan had to take active international roles in the world in economic issues not the ones in military area.<sup>209</sup> In addition, the Japanese government has been putting emphasis on international regimes and organizations, especially the UN.

After the Cold War, new policy options and views on Japanese policies emerged in accordance with the change of international situations. Japan was seeking new diplomatic strategies to effectively commit the world affairs that suitable for the new international situation after the Cold War. From the late 1990s, discussion on middle power diplomacy and great power diplomacy widely took place on in Japan. The policy direction as a small power lost momentum in Japan because of the economic development and lost of the major supporter of such policies, such as Social Party<sup>210</sup>.

In the contexts of promoting middle power diplomacy, diplomatic strategies based on multilateral activities including PKOs, maximizing Japanese "soft power," and multilateral cooperation with other countries and international organization including

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<sup>208</sup> Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Security," 157.

<sup>209</sup> Hirata, "Japan's security policy and domestic discourse," 59.

<sup>210</sup> Richard J. Samuels, "Securing Japan," 136.

the U.N. was emphasized<sup>211</sup>. Firstly, participation in the U.N. peace-keeping operations gathered attention from politicians and officials especially after the Cold War. Japan had a frustrating experience being criticized for not effectively contributing to the ally in the Gulf War in 1991 despite its 14 billion dollars financial contribution. This incident made the government seek more effective policies to commit the world affairs and fairly recognized by those in the world<sup>212</sup>. Not only financial contributions but also taking roles in security issues were considered to be necessary after the traumatic experience in the Gulf War. After the fierce discussion, the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992 enabled the Japanese government to send Self-Defense Forces personnel to UN peace-keeping operations for the first time.

Also, in the context of peace-keeping operations, Canadian diplomacy along with the term of “middle power” received attention in Japan in the 1990s. As a “novice” of peace-keeping operations, Japanese officials and politicians drew upon Canadian experience. The number of research projects on Canada’s participation to peace-keeping operations and “middle power diplomacy” conducted by the government and academia

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<sup>211</sup> Samuels called the policy option that denies military roles of Japan including the participation to the PKOs “middle power internationalism” and distinguish from the one agrees with the participation to PKOs, which was called “Normal Nation” policies. This research applies Soeya’s view and includes both policy options as strategies as a middle power because both options share the point that Japan has to take certain roles in the world in the way Japan can do. Yoshihide Soeya, “Japanese Security Policy in Transition: The Rise of International and Human Security,” *Asia Pacific Review* 12 (2005): 105.

<sup>212</sup> Hirata, “Nihon Japan’s security policy and domestic discourse,” 79, 81.

was increased in the 1990s.

Secondly, the Japanese government recognized this “soft power” and started to develop this strength through the overseas public relations and cultural exchange policies because Japanese pop culture, such as animations, comic books, and fashion, were becoming popular in the world. The phrase of “soft power” appeared in the Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 for the first time in the official policy statement as follows,

[T]here has been a growing recognition in recent years that soft power, or the ability to attract another country through promoting the attraction of traditional values or culture, can improve the country’s image, enhance its diplomatic resources and lead to national security in a broader sense. Moreover, international cultural exchange can revitalize Japanese society by bringing in both intellect and talent from abroad and can bring economic benefits such as increased sales of Japanese<sup>213</sup>

The Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 also expected promoting policy using traditional culture and pop culture to improve images and “lead to the revitalization of Japan’s economy, society and culture.<sup>214</sup>” The idea of soft power became popular among policy practitioners and academics in Japan in the 1990s. In many contexts, softer power represents overall positive images on Japan and not strictly limited to cultural aspects.

For example, a diplomat Zyuzo Yabunaka advocated “middle size and high quality

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<sup>213</sup> Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-e.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2009)

<sup>214</sup> Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-e.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2009)

nation (Tyukibo kou-hinshitu Kokka)” as an international strategy to construct positive image of Japan in the world<sup>215</sup>.

On the other hand, the argument advocating Japanese international policies as a great power was also growing. It was supported by uncertainties of security in Asia and growing nationalism from the 1990s in Japan. Security issues relating to North Korea have been strongly affecting to Japan’s attitude and view to national security from the 1990s. North Korea appeared as dangerous and obvious security threat to Japan both in national and individual level. In 1993, North Korea suddenly withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and started to declare it a nuclear armed state. Its test of the missile deployment in 1998 demonstrated the possibility of attack by North Korea. In 2002, the North Korean government admitted that North Korean agents kidnapped Japanese citizens. These security threats accelerated the view that supported the maintenance of stronger defensive power and, more importantly, Japanese general public was overcoming its “military allergy” and started to openly discuss a military threat for the first time after the War because of these visible security threads<sup>216</sup>.

The rise of China had significant impact on the Japanese international views and policy options. The Chinese economy remarkably grew in the 1990s and China

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<sup>215</sup> Zyuzo Yabunaka, “Style of Japanese Diplomacy (Nihon Gaikou no Katachi),” *Gaiko Forum* (2009): 14.

<sup>202</sup> Richard J. Samuels, “Securing Japan,” 135.

developed its military power. This rapid develop of Chinese economic and military power became the focus of the U.S.'s, as well as Japanese, attention as "China threat."<sup>217</sup> The "China threat" argument contained diverse view of China from the point that an increasingly powerful China was changing the regional power balance and destabilizing Asian security in the near future to the point that China could be a superpower based on its population, technology and military power in the future<sup>218</sup>.

In Japan, although China was recognized as one of the most important economic partner, rising China also provoked a sense of rivalry and insecurity<sup>219</sup>. From 1992, modernization and expansion of military power of China has been receiving considerable and increasing attention in the Annual White Paper of Defense of each year<sup>220</sup>. The sense of rivalry revived and strengthened Nationalism in Japan in the 1990s and 2000s led by advocates, who were influential particularly on public, such as politician Shintaro Ishihara, academics Sukumu Nishibe and Terumasa Nakahashi. This nationalism made the historical issues between Japan, China, and Korea more complex and difficult for the government to handle. For example, the 87<sup>th</sup> PM Koizumi was

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<sup>217</sup> For example, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," *Foreign Affairs* 76(1997): 18-32; Denny Roy, "The "China Threat" Issue: Major Argument," *Asian Survey* 36(1996): 758-771; Emma V. Broomfield "Perceptions of Danger: the China Threat Theory," *Journal of Contemporary China* 12(2003): 265-284.

<sup>218</sup> Denny Roy, "The "China Threat" Issue: Major Argument," *Asian Survey* 36(1996): 758.

<sup>219</sup> Richard J. Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly* 29 (2006): 114, 120.

<sup>220</sup> [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w\\_paper/index.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html) and <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/wp/> (Japanese ) The Defense White Paper 1992 is the first White Paper mentioning Chinese military expansion as a security concern. After 1992, the amount of information and tone of cautions were increasing every year.(accessed on July10, 2009)

harshly criticized for officially visiting the Yasukuni Shrine by China and Korea and led to worsened diplomatic relations between them<sup>221</sup>. Also, the more Chinese leaders and citizens criticized these pilgrimages, the more the Japanese general public indignant at Chinese interference in domestic affairs<sup>222</sup>. On the other hand, when he did not visit it, he was also criticized by nationalist in Japan in 2005<sup>223</sup>.

By foreign policy officials and practitioners in Japan, the rise of China was accepted with more equanimity than the public. Most of the officials of Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to view calmly the quick expand of Chinese economic power and the relative decline of Japan's position. They were seeking effective policies in such environment<sup>224</sup>. For example, a Japanese diplomat Hitoshi Tanaka admitted that the Japanese presence in the world was relatively declining because of the growing Chinese presence. He also explained that relatively weakening presence in Asia does not always harm the national interest if the government handles the situation collect<sup>225</sup>.

Recently, the world wide discussion on U.N. Security Council reform based on

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<sup>221</sup> Yasukuni Shrine is one of the prominent historical issues between Japan, Korea and China. Although the Japanese believe it as "a place to mourn the war dead," the Chinese and the Korean consider it as "a symbol of militarism." Thus, the official visits of Japanese Prime Minister always met controversy because visiting Yasukuni Shrine presented respect for the dead in wars for Japanese and also militarism for Chinese and Korean.

<sup>222</sup> Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan's shifting strategy toward the rise of China," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30 (2009): 757.

<sup>223</sup> Hirata, "Japan's security policy and domestic discourse," 73.

<sup>224</sup> For example, Zyuzo Yabunaka, "Style of Japanese Diplomacy," 14.

<sup>225</sup> Round Table Discussion, Hitoshi Tanaka, Masaru Honda, Nobukatsu Kanehara, "For Realistic Diplomatic Dispute from Desk Law Theory (Kizyou no Houritsuron kara genzitsu no Gaikoron he)," *Gaiko Forum* 250 (2009): 35. Tanaka was working for Japan Center for International Exchange, when he took part in the round discussion.

provoked Japanese international position especially in the U.N in 2004<sup>226</sup>. Japan was promoting itself as the prime candidate for the additional permanent member of the council. However, during this period of time, the main focus of the domestic interest was on how Japan should be treated and recognized, but not exactly on the relative position of Japan itself. After the certain period of time, the discussion on the Japan's relative position in the world itself slowed down.

Figure 8 below summarizes the three international policy directions to Japan sorted along with two axes. The longitudinal axe is a measure of the emphasis on bilateral relationship with the U.S. The other axe represents willingness and interest on involvement to international issues.

The policy directions as a great power require more involvement to international issues including the international deployment of Self Defense Force. The strong economic power of Japan is emphasized in this context. In this view, Japan has to keep distant from the U.S. to maintain its autonomy, international prestige and national pride. As a middle power, Japan takes certain international roles in international issues, such as ad hoc participation in PKOs under the U.N. and economic contribution to the world issues. Although the security cooperation with the U.S. is still one of the pillars of

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
<sup>226</sup> About the Security Council's reform, see Yehuda Z. Blum, "Proposals for UN Security Council Reform," *The American Journal of International Law* 99 (2005): 632-649.

the national defense, Japan acts in multilateral cooperation with others at the same time.

The last policy direction as a small power put strong emphasis on the security treaty

with the U.S. and does not show the enthusiasm to be involved in international issues.

**Figure 8 Three International Policy Directions for Japan**



(Source: author)

As examined above, after the Second World War, Japan used to have small power policies, which was to concentrate on the economic development leaning on the security alliance with U.S. for national defense. In the 1980s, it gained other options as

a middle power, which was selective international activism through multilateralism and the international organizations, and those as a great power, which was seeking autonomy and pursuing international policies for Japan's own interests even unilaterally. These three overall policy directions were available and the government selected from them on case by case basis depending on the available resource and constraints at the time. In the particular policies relating to human security, Japan decided to take middle power approach as this research examined in this chapter. The following part clarifies these available resource and constraints affected this policy decision using the framework presented in the previous chapter.

## **2. Agenda-Setting Process for Middle Power Diplomacy**

Japan put emphasis on the economic and developmental aspects of human security and took initiative in four international projects: establishing The Trust Found for Human Security in the United Nations, supporting the Commission for Human Security, Official Developmental Aid projects in accordance with the idea, and established and supporting the "Friends of Human Security" network. This section examines three streams affecting the Japanese government's decision to promote and practice the concept of human security in its middlepowermanship initiatives. In the

agenda setting process, the participants chose the ways and policies carefully based on the strength and constraints for these human security relating policies they had at the time.

## 2.1 Problem Stream

Two influential international problems in the 1990s attracted Japanese politicians' and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials' attention and created the "problem stream". The first one is the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the other is the Ottawa Process in 1997.

The Asian Financial Crisis is "the financial crisis that erupted in Asia in mid-1997 [which] led to sharp declines in the currencies, stock markets, and other asset prices of a number of Asian countries" such as Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines<sup>227</sup>. International organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank, along with many countries other committed to the affected countries 117.9 billion US dollars in 1997 and 1998<sup>228</sup>. However, as a result of this financial crisis, the real growth of GDP in Thailand was estimated to be -7 to -8, Indonesia's to be -16, and Korea's to be -7<sup>229</sup>. The Japanese government contributed 44 billion dollars to support

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<sup>227</sup> This definition is based on the one presented by IMF.

<http://www.imf.org/External/np/exr/facts/asia.htm> (accessed on June 22, 2009.)

<sup>228</sup> IMF fact sheet <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.pdf> (accessed on July 2, 2009)

<sup>229</sup> IMF fact sheet <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.pdf> (accessed on July 2, 2009)

countries in question from July 1997 to November 1998.

The Asian Financial Crisis was one of the major concerns of the Government after 1997 because the Japanese industry and the investment were closely interconnected in the Asian economy. In PM Obuchi's speeches at the time, the Asian Financial Crisis and the domestic recession were the most frequently mentioned topics<sup>230</sup>. Especially in the times of the long recession from 1995 in Japan, the crisis and the downward speed of the Asian economy was the significant concern.

As Dan Wood and Jeffery Peake's research showed, policy makers' attention toward problems tends to stay long and consistent in agenda setting for foreign policy until certain measures would be done.<sup>231</sup> In particular, the influence of prominent incidents in the world, such as the Asian Financial Crisis, is likely to remain long and strong in foreign policy making because governments have to prevent the next occurrence as well as handle the impact of such impressive incidents in medium- and long-term policies. In fact, even 12 years after the crisis, current Japanese PM Aso Taro still mentioned Japanese ongoing policies dealing with the impact of economic and financial crisis in Asia in his speech<sup>232</sup>. The external evaluation report on the ODA and

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<sup>230</sup> Based on 66 available speeches from his web site.

<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/obutisouri/speech/index.html>(accessed on June 23, 2009)

<sup>231</sup> B. Dan Wood and Jeffrey s. Peake, "The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting," *American Political Science Review* 92(1998): 174.

<sup>232</sup> Speech "Overcoming the Economic Crisis to Rekindle a Rapidly Developing Asia" presented by PM Taro Aso, May 21, 2009. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/future/speech0905.html>

Japanese response to the Asian financial crisis issued in March 2002 assumed similar economic or financial crises could happen in the future and recommended the government to prepare<sup>233</sup>.

Other than the Asian financial crisis, the Ottawa Process drew Japanese attention to the idea of human security. In December 1997, 133 countries, including Japan, signed the Ottawa Treaty, formally the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction<sup>234</sup>. Characteristically, the Ottawa Process had a strict time framework and a clear goal shared by the participating countries, which were called “like-minded countries.”<sup>235</sup> Cooperating non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International Red Cross and International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL) network, had a great role in advocating the humanitarian aspect of the landmine issue through their campaigns. Portraying civilian victims, especially women and children, in

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(accessed on July 2, 2009)

<sup>233</sup> The external evaluation report on ODA and Japanese response to the Asian financial crisis, March 2002. Japanese full text is available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://search.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/?q=%8Co%8D%CF%8A%EB%8B%40&x=0&y=0> (accessed on June 23, 2009)

<sup>234</sup> The Ottawa Treaty is formally “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.” This treaty is signed in 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1997 and became affective from 1<sup>st</sup> March 1999. The full text is available at the web site of ICBL, <http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaties/MBT/Treaty-Text-in-Many-Languages/English> (accessed on June 23, 2009)

<sup>235</sup> Mark Gwozdecky and Jill Sinclair, “Landmines and HumanSecurity,” in Rob McRae and Don Hubert, *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 28-40.

the campaign transformed the landmine issue from an arms control issue to a humanitarian issue<sup>236</sup>. Because the idea of protecting civilians shared the basis with the idea of “human security”, the Ottawa Process is often connected to it. The remarkable movement to ban anti-personnel landmines around the world at the time made Japanese politicians and officials to realize the power and possibility of approaching security issues from humanitarian viewpoints including the idea of “human security”<sup>237</sup>.

In the short time during the time set for the Ottawa Process, the Japanese government had to decide on its position and whether sign the Ottawa Treaty or not. This caused active discussions on landmines and the humanitarian issues in Japan. Anti personnel land mines are considered to be imperative to defend Japan’s coast-line by the Japan Defense Agency<sup>238</sup>. Politicians in the parliament, Foreign Ministry officials and the Hashimoto cabinet at the time were slowly convinced to ban anti personnel land mines by the advocacy of the humanitarian viewpoint on the land mine issue<sup>239</sup>. The accession of the new foreign minister Keizo Obuchi and his support for the growing

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<sup>236</sup> John English, “The Ottawa Process: paths followed, paths ahead,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 52 (1998), 130; Kitchen, “From Rhetoric to Reality,” 39, 48.

<sup>237</sup> Kenki Adachi, “Why Japan Signed the Mine ban Treaty: The Political Dynamics behind the Decision,” *Asian Survey* 45 (2005): 397-413.

<sup>238</sup> *Nihon no Bouei 1990* (Defense of Japan) Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 126-132; *Nihon no Bouei 1996* (Defense of Japan) Tokyo : Japan Defense Agency, 171-178 ; The Japan Defense Agency was reorganized to the Ministry of Defense in 2007. <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/about/index.html> (last access on 22th June 2007)

<sup>239</sup> Adachi, “Why Japan Signed the Mine ban Treaty,” 402 -406; Fukushima Tadamasu, Yanase Fusako, and Osa Yukie, eds., *Jirai wo Nakusou: Jirai dehanaku Hana wo kudasai 50man Dokusya Karano Shitsumon (Get Rid of Mines: Questions from the half millions of Readers, Not Mines but Flowers)* (Tokyo: Jiyu kokumin sha, 2000), 204.

public voices marked a turning point and accelerated the momentum to sign the treaty. He stated, “Japan is helping with the clearance of land mines in Cambodia. For Japan not to recognize the [Ottawa] treaty does not make sense to me....We must observe the trends of the world and do the things that we have to do.”<sup>240</sup>

Also, Japan witnessed Canada’s remarkable leadership through the Ottawa Process. During and after the Ottawa Process, the argument claiming the efficiency of the “Canadian way” for Japan quickly grew in Japan. Also, one of the key leading people in the Ottawa Process, Lloyd Axworthy, met Obuchi for the first time during the 1996 Summit<sup>241</sup>. Axworthy introduced the idea of human security to Obuchi at this time and they kept exchanging opinions after that meeting.

## **2.2 Political Stream and Policy Entrepreneurs**

For the “political stream,” Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and his policy advisors had vital roles.<sup>242</sup> PM Obuchi’s personality and his beliefs are considered to have had important influence towards accepting the idea of middle power and applying policies in accordance with the idea. Also, his policy advisors played a role as policy

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<sup>240</sup> Adachi, “Why Japan Signed the Mine ban Treaty,” 410.

<sup>241</sup> Fukushima, “Japan’s Emerging View of Security Multilateralism in Asia,” 19.

<sup>242</sup> Keizo Obuchi was Prime Minister from 1998 to 2000. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1997 to 1998. As for the time table, see Appendix.

entrepreneurs.

Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama is the prime minister presented to international society that the Japanese Government was supporting the concept of human security as a policy option<sup>243</sup>. After the Murayama government the idea of human security did not receive fair attention during the time of PM Hashimoto's government<sup>244</sup>. PM Obuchi's policy advisors brought his attention to the issues of human security and resulted in Japan's active international policies applying the idea of human security during and after the Obuchi government.

PM Tomiichi Murayama is thought to be the first policy-maker who had mentioned the concept of human security in an international and official scene.<sup>245</sup> He applied the idea of human security in his address to the World Summit for Social Development in March 1995. In the following speech at the summit, he described an ideal society as a society with opportunities for self-realization for each individual.<sup>246</sup> In addition, he insisted that social development support should be people-centered.

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<sup>243</sup> The Cabinet of Prime Minister Murayama is from 1994 to 1996. The Cabinet of Prime Minister Obuchi is from 1998 to 2000.

<sup>244</sup> Prime Minister Hashimoto was in position from 1996 to 1998.

<sup>245</sup> D. Bosold and S. Werthes, "Human Security in Practice," 92; Hiroshi Minami, "Human Security and Japan's Diplomacy (Ningen no Anzen Hoshyou to Nihon gaiko)," *International affairs (kokusai mondai)*, no. 530 (2004): 46. Hiroshi Minami was a Japanese diplomat at the time.

<sup>246</sup> The full text of this speech in Japanese is available from Japanese Government's web page at following address. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/murayamasouri/speech/kaihatu.html>. The English full text of the same speech is also available from UN's web page. <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf166/gov/950311074922.htm> (accessed on June 23, 2009)

As head of the Japanese Government, I seek the creation of a "human-centered society," a vision of Japan in which each individual citizen is treated equally, endowed with opportunity to fully develop his or her potential, and enabled to utilize fully his or her capacity through employment and participation in society. I consider that such political beliefs of mine are in line with the central goal of this Summit - the realization of social justice.<sup>247</sup>

Although he did not mention this idea using the exact term "human security" at the time, his interpretation of "human-centered society" is very similar to "freedom from want."

After the 1995 World Summit, he explained in the Standing Committee on Budget in 1996 that he avoided employing the exact term "human security" because the idea was not established and shared in the world yet<sup>248</sup>.

The exact term of "human security" was employed officially in the speech of Prime Minister Murayama at the UN General Assembly on 22<sup>nd</sup> October in 1995. He illustrated human security as a concept for respect of the human rights of each person.<sup>249</sup> In addition, he stated that the Japanese government will support this idea and international co-operation based on this idea.

A new concept of 'human security,' in addition of national security, has emerged as a major challenge for the United Nations. This concept,

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<sup>247</sup> <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf166/gov/950311074922.htm> (accessed on June 23, 2009)

<sup>248</sup> In the statement made by PM Murayama at The Standing Committee on Budget in the House of Representatives, 24<sup>th</sup> February in 1996.

<sup>249</sup> Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama at the Special Commemorative Meeting of the General Assembly on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/archive\\_3/sp.htm](http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/archive_3/sp.htm) ; Bosold and Werthes, "Human Security in Practice," 92.

which embraces respect for the human rights of every citizen on this earth and protection of each of us from poverty, disease, ignorance, oppression and violence, is consonant with my own political principles.<sup>250</sup>

The basis of the idea of human security suited PM Murayama's general policy direction and his beliefs. He had already paid attention to individuals' security and development from the beginning of his term as a prime minister in the contexts of domestic policy. PM Murayama's general-policy speech delivered in July 4<sup>th</sup> in 1994 stated that constructing "human centered-society" was one of his goals as a Prime Minister<sup>251</sup>. PM Murayama and other politicians already discussed the idea of human security several times in the House of Representatives and special committees<sup>252</sup>. Also, because the idea of "people-centered social development" was mentioned in the context of ODA in Diplomatic Blue issued in 1996, the rough idea for economic and social development was shared among politicians and the Ministry.<sup>253</sup>

The very definition of development now includes not only "economic development" (often the subject of conferences sponsored by the U.N. but also sustainable development, which makes much of environmental conservation and "people-centered development" that focuses on human and social advancement.

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<sup>250</sup> Bert Edstrom, "Japan's Foreign Policy and Human Security," *Japan Forum* 15, (2003): 213.

<sup>251</sup> PM Murayama's general policy speech delivered in the House of Representatives on 18<sup>th</sup> July 1994.

<sup>252</sup> For example, research meeting for international issues in the House of Representatives on 15<sup>th</sup> February 1995.

<sup>253</sup> <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1996/index.html> (accessed on June 25, 2009)

Therefore, the similar idea of human security had been receiving certain attention from politicians and officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the time of PM Murayama. However, political support and specific policy proposals were still limited because the idea of “human security” was just introduced to the world at the time and there was a lot of discussion among scholars and politicians. Therefore, even if the political stream could occur at this time, detailed policy proposals were not ready yet and there was no remarkable problem stream to encourage these movements.

Based on the rough idea of human security PM Murayama brought to the Japanese government, PM Keizo Obuchi applied the idea to the policies and made the political stream with his policy advisors. PM Obuchi’s personality and his own belief, along with his policy advisors who played the role of “policy entrepreneurs,” brought the political stream.

Firstly, Keizo Obuchi as a politician had a characteristically strong interest in developing countries and supporting the weak. This attitude to the world was considered to be derived from his own nine-month backpacking experience in the world when he was 25 years old<sup>254</sup>. This rare back-ground is made Obuchi have original opinions as a Japanese politician on developmental issues. Also, PM Obuchi explained that seeing

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<sup>254</sup> PM Obuchi’s own homepage is describing his backpacking experience was part of the origin of his attitude to international affairs. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/obutisouri/profile/index.html> (accessed on June 20, 2009)

people's lives through this trip led him to the idea of human security.

36 years ago, when I was just a student, I traveled around 38 countries in Asia, Middle East, Africa, Europe, North America, Central and south America as a “backpacker” which was very rare at the time. I think I learned the importance of ties between people and each individual through this travel and this experience eventually led me to the idea of “Human Security”<sup>255</sup>

As he himself described in the speech above, his interest coincided with the idea of human security in terms of helping the weak and paying attention to individuals' security.

Secondly, Obuchi was known as a good listener because he took policy advisors' and people's opinions and advice very seriously. These characteristics resulted in his policy advisors' entrepreneurship advocating the idea of human security. For taking specialists' and other politicians' opinion, Former PM Nakasone along with the mass media called PM Obuchi as “a vacuum tube.” This joke positively and negatively meant that he listens to others and “vacuums” the advice and opinion. At the same time he is also known for his habit of keeping close communication with people. He held remarkably frequent meetings with citizens and delivered messages to people. One of the most popular words in 1999 in Japan is the “Butchi-phone” (short form of “Obuchi

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<sup>255</sup> PM Obuchi's opening remark at the Symposium to celebrate the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIJA) in 11<sup>th</sup> December in 1999. Author translated the text. 36 years ago, Full text in Japanese available at [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/11/eos\\_1211.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/11/eos_1211.html) (accessed on March 10, 2009)

phone”) showed his habit of calling people, including scholars and citizens, very frankly, and was well known and appealed to people in Japan<sup>256</sup>.

His advisory group had a strong influence on Obuchi’s policy directions. They played the policy entrepreneurs-roles. When Obuchi was assigned as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997, the policy advisor group was organized. The major members were Tadashi Yamamoto from the Japan Center for International Exchange, Yoichi Funabashi and Akira Kozima from mass media, Makoto Iokibe and Akihiko Tanaka from academia, and Keizo Takemi a member of the House of Representatives. This advisory group affected Obuchi’s policy directions by holding frequent meetings and close communication through phone calls during his time as a Minister of Foreign Minister and Prime Minister.

In particular, Keizo Takemi, a member of the House of Representatives, was considered to bring the idea of human security to Obuchi. Takemi used to be a researcher in the Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute in Tokai University. According to himself, Takemi encountered research on human security by Lincoln Chen and had been interested in the idea from the early stages<sup>257</sup>. He was selected as a member of the House of Representatives in 1995 and a member of the

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<sup>256</sup> This most popular word of the year award started in 1994 and given to 10 words or phrases which represent the year and widely favored every year. <http://singo.jiyu.co.jp/>

<sup>257</sup> Keizo Takemi, “Human Security,” in Yasuhide Soeya ed., *The View of the Internatinal Politics in 21th* (21 seiki kokusaiseizi no tenbou), (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 1999): 121-122.

advisory group for Obuchi. After a few years of service in the board, he was assigned as the parliamentary vice-minister of foreign affairs in the Obuchi government in July 1998, which demonstrated Obuchi's trust in Takemi.

### **2.3 Policy Streams**

There were certain strengths and constraints of Japan in terms of policy options that affected selection of middle power approach for the Japan's leadership in human security issues. From the perspectives of the overall national power on Japan in the late 1990s and 2000s, Japan was often assumed to be a great power and to take great power initiatives in the world. However, in the issues relating to human security, Japan took middlepowermanship and limited the approach and policies to "freedom from want" issues. As chapter 4 theoretically indicated, Japan had limited capabilities and policy resources for the human security relating issues at the time. The available resource and policy options for this issue based on strengths and constraints led Japan to take the middle power approach to international leadership.

Japan has strong constraints on international activities because of its constitution and relationships with its neighboring countries. These restraints limited Japanese policy options to take leadership only on the interpretation of human security as "freedom from want." This constraint even prevented Japan from officially working

with other countries and networks on the interpretation of human security as “freedom from fear.”

### **Constraints: Use of Force**

Japan has strict restraints in military activities in the world because the Japanese constitution rigidly limits the military's role to self-defense. The Japanese constitution has been thought to forbid “use of force” in Article 9.<sup>258</sup>

#### Chapter II Renunciation of War

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Especially among political parties, even among legal scholars, various debates surrounding this Article 9 and fierce arguments on the role of Self Defense Force are continuing in Japan. The interpretation of this part of the constitution is still varied; some people consider Japan should not have any military power, some insist the Self Defense Force should not participate in any activities outside of Japan, some agreed to send personnel only for peace-keeping operations or supporting reconstruction

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<sup>258</sup> The English version of Japanese constitution is available from the web site of National Diet Library of Japan. <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2> (accessed on February 3, 2009)

operations, some believe that Japan need more military power for defense itself.

Because of various conflicting opinions within Japan, the Japanese government has to apply ad hoc law and rules for each case to send Self Defense Force personnel. In fact, the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992 enabled the Japanese government to send Self-Defense Forces personnel to UN peace-keeping operations and it limited the activities strictly such as the electoral observation and humanitarian aid. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which established in October 2001 as one of Japan's measures in response to the 9/11 simultaneous terrorist attacks, allowed Japan to participate only replenishment activities for various countries' vessels carrying out Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean. The Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in 2004 enabled the Japan to join reconstruction support only in noncombat area.

### **Apprehensions for the Antipathy from Neighboring Countries**

Second, because of the apprehensions that trust and concord especially with neighboring Asian countries could be endangered, Japan refrained from taking initiatives in human security policy applying the "freedom from fear." The government took a cautious attitude to the "freedom from fear" to be a "non-threatening security

actor” in human security paradigm<sup>259</sup>. Japan has been very careful not to provoke any antipathy from neighboring countries over historical issues during World War II. The remaining suspicions feared militarization of Japan and occasional antipathy from Asian countries have been a concern among Japanese political leaders and diplomats for long time. For instance, the Japanese government did not officially participate in the Human Security Network’s meeting, which supports “freedom from fear,” because of the concern of antipathy from neighboring countries among officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>260</sup>. Also, the government avoided applying the term “human security” in the contexts of sending Self Defense Force personnel to PKOs.

### **ODA Policies**

Other than these constraints, the Japanese government had several policies in progress and policy proposals accessible to connect to the idea of human security. These available policy options made the decision to take leadership employing the idea of human security possible for the government. In addition, Japan placed its human security policies as a part of the promotion of itself in the continuing discussion over

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<sup>259</sup> Yoshihide Soeya, "Japanese Security Policy in Transition: The Rise of International and Human Security," *Asia Pacific Review* 12, (2005): 111,114.

<sup>260</sup> Yukio Sato, "Japan's UN policy and Human Security: The Path to UN Millennium Summit (Nihon nogaiko to Ningen no Anzenhosyuu: Kokuren Millenium Summit no kiseki)," *International affairs (Kokusaimondai)*, no. 530 (2004): 11.

establishing new permanent members on the Security Council. These situations allowed officials and politicians to invest diplomatic resources on human security policies to take initiative and show influence in this area in the world.

Japan had existing ODA policy as strength supporting the decision to take leadership in human security policies on “freedom from want”. Japan is the biggest supplier of ODA, which have been focusing on the economic developmental and poverty issues in the world, from 1989 to 2001. In fact, in 2003, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi put emphasis on that the ODA policies which have been long conducted from 1954 by Japan, shared basic idea with the human security even before the concept of “human security” appeared and received attention as a “new” concept.

Japan has in recent years been moving toward an approach to global problems that focuses on the issues affecting individual humans, and this concept of “human security” has been gaining ground internationally. Japan’s official development assistance has long served as an effective means of promoting human security.<sup>261</sup>

The on-going ODA policy shared basic focus, such as support of self-help of the recipients, attention on basic human needs and respect of human rights, with the “freedom from fear” aspect of human security. This fact supported Japan’s leadership

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<sup>261</sup> Yoriko Kawaguchi, “A Foreign Policy to Consolidate Peace (Henka suru anzen hoshô kankyô to Nihon gaikô,” Ronza, (March 2003): 180–89. English version is published in Japan Echo30 (2003), available from <http://www.japanecho.com/sum/2003/300209.html> (accessed on 18th July, 2009)

oriented policy on human security issues. At the same time, in regard to Japanese ODA policy itself, introducing the new idea to combine and re-labeled the existing policy directions and principles accumulated from 1954<sup>262</sup>.

Japanese ODA policies started as a part of war reparations to Asian countries in 1954. In 1958, Japan provided yen loan to India apart from the war reparations. In the beginning, “ODA was first driven by political motivations to rebuild disrupted political and economic relations with Asian countries”<sup>263</sup>. As Japanese economy developed, the yen loan was increased motivated by “expanding export markets for Japan and securing imports of important raw materials, and there were high expectations of a beneficial effect from these actions for the Japanese economy”<sup>264</sup>. Thus, the government placed ODA as the main pillar of international contribution of Japan and, at the same time, one of the international trade strategies.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the World Bank and World Health Organization proposed to put higher priority on “Basic Human Needs (BHN)” in global aid programs. This idea shifted the focus of the foreign aid to issues of poverty in developing countries

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<sup>262</sup> Toshiyuki Nasukawa, Doctorial Dissertation “The History and Development of “Human Security” in Japanese Foreign Policy, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University: 75.

<sup>263</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Reshaping of Japan's ODA Charter,” presented by Kazuo Sunaga, Minister of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, (November 2004):9. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/paper0411.pdf> (accessed on 7th July, 2009)

<sup>264</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs , “50 Years of Japan's ODA.” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/cooperation/anni50/pamphlet/progress1.html> (accessed on March 10, 2009)

from supporting such countries to develop their economy<sup>265</sup>. In response to this international momentum, the Japanese ODA policies also widened the view to the BHN from developmental aid<sup>266</sup>.

The amount of the ODA increased almost ten times larger from a total of US\$115.8 million in 1964 to US\$1.1049 billion in 1976. Also, the government realized the political and diplomatic impact of ODA, not only impacts on Japanese international trade. This recognition could be observed in the four ODA Guidelines announced in 1991:

- a) Environmental Conservation and development should be pursued in tandem,
- b) Use of ODA for military purposes should be avoided,
- c) Full attentions should be paid to trends in recipient countries' military expenditures and productions of weapons of mass destruction,
- d) Full attention should be paid to efforts for democratization, market-oriented economics, human rights and freedom in recipient countries.

The ODA Charter presented basic aims and principals of the ODA policies in June 1992.

In this Charter, the growing attention on political and diplomatic effects became definite.

It stated the expectation of political effect, which is to establish and promote friendly

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<sup>265</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "50 Years of Japan's ODA." <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/cooperation/anni50/pamphlet/progress2.html> (accessed on March 10, 2009)

<sup>266</sup> Toshiyuki Nasukawa, Doctorial Dissertation "The History and Development of "Human Security" in Japanese Foreign Policy," Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University: 75.

relationship with the recipient countries, as a result of the ODA<sup>267</sup>. Therefore, the existing ODA policies were ready to be combined and support the Japan's political leadership on human security as diplomatic resource.

At the same time, existing ODA policy needed principles to improve its quality and political effectiveness in the late 1990s. Despite the position as the biggest contributor of ODA, the recognition of Japan's commitment from the world was not as great as the government desired in the late 1980s and 1990s. "Japan's initiatives, while commendable in their size and potential impact, [did] not herald the rise of a new aid leader."<sup>268</sup> Also, while Japan suffered from recession in the late 1990s, Japan's budget for ODA was reduced by 30% in seven years from 1997. The emphasis of the ODA policy had to shift from quantity to quality and political effectiveness. The idea of human security, which appeared in the various contexts in Japan from the late 1990s, was considered to provide the thematic unity and be an appealing label for the ODA policy in transition.

### **New ODA Guideline**

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<sup>267</sup> ODA Guideline in 1992 in Japanese is available from the web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/taikou/sei\\_1\\_1.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/taikou/sei_1_1.html) (accessed on March 10, 2009)

<sup>268</sup> Alan Rix, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity for Leadership?" *Pacific Affairs* 62, (1989-1990): 473.

The Japanese government could combine the renewed ODA guideline, which was presented in 2003, and its human security policies. Official foreign aid in accordance with the famous concept of human security is expected to be the niche for Japan in an international society<sup>269</sup>. The concept of human security is one of five the five key concepts in the new guideline that expected to attract people both in and out of Japan.

- 1, Supporting self-help efforts of developing countries
- 2, Perspective of “Human Security”
- 3, Assurance of fairness
- 4, Utilization of Japan's experience and expertise
- 5, Partnership and collaboration with the international community<sup>270</sup>

The ODA guideline was revised in 2003 for the first time in 11 years after it had been made. This revise widely reflected the global changes, such as the end of Cold War, growing globalization, the 9.11, and shifts of international focus on developmental issues, and the domestic criticism of ODA policies regarding the lack of consistent strategies and effectiveness as a diplomatic tool<sup>271</sup>. At the same time, reorganizing the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was in progress due to the challenging

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<sup>269</sup> Minami, Hiroshi, Akiko Yuge, Masanori Yamauchi and Yuzo Waki, "As The Mobile Power of Japan's Diplomacy: Why we need Human Security(Nihongaiko no kidouryoku tosite: naze ningen no Anzenhosyou Nanoka)," *Gaiko Forum* 12, 2003: 28-31.

<sup>270</sup> Japan's Official Developmental Assistance Charter  
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf> (accessed on March 10, 2009)

<sup>271</sup> Japan's ODA Charter is available in Japanese, English, French and Spanish from MOFA's web site. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/charter.html> (accessed on March 10, 2009)

financial situation. The government applied the new concept of human security as a symbol of a new ODA policy direction. Japan's new ODA Charter presented in 2003 provides the concept of human security as a key perspective.

## (2) Perspective of "Human Security"

In order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, disasters, infectious diseases, it is important not only to consider the global, regional, and national perspectives, but also to consider the perspective of human security, which focuses on individuals. Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity of local communities through human resource development. To ensure that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages, Japan will extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals.<sup>272</sup>


The appointment of Mrs. Sadako Ogata, who was the co-chair of the World Commission on Human Security, as the president of the JICA was expected to support the implement of ODA policies featuring the concept of human security, and also domestically and internationally appeal the new ODA in accordance with the idea of human security. The concept of human security is closely connected to ODA in Japan. Generally, the government of Japan puts the concept in the context of ODA policies, not in the whole international policies<sup>273</sup>.

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<sup>272</sup> <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/sector/security/action.html> (accessed on March 10, 2009)

<sup>273</sup> Bert Edstrom, "Japan's Foreign Policy and Human Security," *Japan Forum* 15 (2003): 219.

**Figure 9 Three Streams in Human Security Policy Making Process in Japan**



(Source: author based on Kingdon's Policy Windows framework)

### 3. International Conditions

As chapter 4 indicated, secondly powers require certain support from international actors to take initiative and/or show strong influence in international politics. Firstly, the United Nations was moving toward accepting the new concept of human security and including the idea as one of main ideas and worked in cooperate with Japan and other human security advocates. The Fund is administered by the several UN agencies in cooperation; UNDP, the United Nations Educational, Scientific

and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Health Organization (WHO).

In addition to this operational support, mentioning Japan as an active supporter or the attendance to meetings by the UN officials and the Secretary enhances Japanese policies' legitimacy. For example, Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan gave a speech at the Diet of Japan in February 4th 2004 and mentioned the contributions of Japan; "The world will not achieve the Millennium Development Goals without Japan's technological prowess and its focus on "human security."<sup>274</sup> Dr. Kemal Dervish, the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also visited Japan in 2005 and 2006 to attend symposium on human security held by Japan.

Secondly, the Japanese policies, which put emphasis on the "freedom from want," and the flexible attitude regarding the definition was welcomed by developing countries and Asian countries. The idea of human security made some developing countries anxious about the possibility that the idea might invite frequent interference in the internal affairs and "humanitarian interventions" from developed countries' view. Knowing this apprehension, the Japanese government took a very cautious attitude to the "freedom from fear" aspect of the idea of human security and deliberately put

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<sup>274</sup> The speech is available from web site of UN. <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=789> (accessed on January 27, 2008.)

emphasis on its focus on the developmental and economic aspect. For example, diplomats and politicians representing Japan intentionally mention “poverty” every time whenever they were listing threats for human security up in their speeches in the UN. This was previously arranged with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs back in Japan to clarify Japan’s position and ease the developing countries’ apprehension<sup>275</sup>. Also the simplified images of the contrast between Canada which was promoting the “freedom from fear” and Japan which was promoting “freedom from want” made it easy to understand that Japan was supporting the developmental and economic aspect of the idea of human security<sup>276</sup>. Thus, in developing countries mind, Japanese policies led to economic aid but intervention<sup>277</sup>. Japan received a favorable response from Non-Aligned Movement members and developing countries for these position and attitude<sup>278</sup>.

Thirdly, the human security concept in the new ODA guideline was welcomed by ODA receivers. Japan held workshops and meetings in several countries which were receiving ODA from Japan. These meetings resulted in exporting the idea of human security under the Japanese government’s initiative and incorporated the idea of human

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<sup>275</sup> Yukio Sato, "Japan's UN policy and Human Security," 7.

<sup>276</sup> Despite the simplified contrast, these two countries were showing understanding and respect to each other and also acknowledged that they share some thoughts. Sato, "Japan's UN policy and Human Security: The Path to UN Millennium Summit," 9.

<sup>277</sup> Sato, "Japan's UN policy and Human Security: The Path to UN Millennium Summit," 9-10.

<sup>278</sup> Yukio Sato, "Japan's UN policy and Human Security: The Path to UN Millennium Summit," 9-10.

security into the ODA plans. For example, the Japanese government held a workshop discussing the ODA for the Republic of Bolivia in 2004. After the meeting, the President Carlos D. Ness Gisbert announced a new social development plan of the Bolivian government in accordance with the idea of human security Japan had advocated<sup>279</sup>.

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<sup>279</sup> Nasukawa, “The History and Development of “Human Security” in Japanese Foreign Policy,” 197-198.

## Conclusion

The main aim of this research is to clarify the concept of “middle power” and to employ the idea to understand the conditions that allow intermediate powers, particularly, “possible middle powers” in this research’s definition, to exercise strong influence and take initiative through international co-operation, regimes, or organizations on certain issues.

This research involved three processes of examination presented in five chapters. Part I of the thesis which consists of Chapter 1 and 2, contains history and literature review of the idea “middle power”. The review indicates that there is confusion surrounding the political term and the academic analytical tool because of the origin and beginning of middle power studies. In addition, there is certain confusion surrounding middle power diplomacy and Canadian diplomacy because Canada was describing itself as a “middle power” while it was conducting the middlepowermanship policies in the 1960s. Based on these facts, this research suggests to strictly distinguish middlepowermanship as one diplomatic strategy from policies conducted by “middle power,” as a country with middle ranked national power, and those by self-indicated

middle powers. Certain countries have middlepowermanship strategy as one of the strategy to take leadership in international issues.

In Part II, chapter 3 located the idea of middle power and middle power literature in IR. Both middle power studies and IR research projects attempt to classify and label countries in a hierarchical order based on national power institutional systems and recognition; however, IR hardly moved to examining the general characteristics or behavioral patterns of each category. In addition, any of the three approaches classify countries shared in IR and middle power studies cannot categorize countries objectively. Therefore, this research assumes classifications of states are flexible and changing along with issues and time periods and focuses on understanding the behavior. Also, The behavioral approach to middle power is unique to middle power studies and different from other IR approaches. Moreover, the behavioral approach in the middle power studies appeared to be the most suitable basis for the analysis in this research to understand the middlepowermanship.

Chapter 4 presented modified analytical framework to understand middlepowermanship based on behavioral approach in middle power studies and studies of agenda setting process. This research assumes the middle power diplomacy or middlepowermanship in this research has theoretically four main features. Firstly

middlepowermanship means taking leadership employing cooperation with other actors, including other countries and international organizations, international organizations and international institutions rather than just its own national power. Secondly, this type of leadership tends to be entrepreneurial or intellectual leadership, which does not always require massive national power and resource input. Thirdly, this diplomatic option is basically available to very wide range of countries, classified as “possible middle powers” in this research, as one of the policy options. Fourth, the country applying middle power diplomacy does not always describe itself as “middle power”; in addition, the country calling itself “middle power” is not always conducting middle power diplomacy. The political rhetoric “middle power” and middle power diplomacy is not always inter-related. Lastly, only under certain conditions this policy is chosen and successfully practiced. One distinguishable feature of this research is that it is not assuming the neither “possible middle powers” nor self-indicated middle powers always apply middle power diplomacy. The “possible middle powers” have middlepowermanship strategy as an available option.

The “possible middle powers” have middlepowermanship strategy as an available option and decide whether middlepowermanship strategy is practicable and effective or not on a case by case basis. This research suggested that if “possible middle

powers” seek to show strong influence and leadership, they have to select issues and approaches which their limited diplomatic resource can accomplish. For this selection of issues, firstly, there needs to be domestic agreement. In other words, domestic support and available diplomatic resource have to become available on the right political timing. Particularly for “possible middle powers” the constraints and available resources strongly affect the countries’ approaches to the large scale international policy and new projects. Secondly, “possible middle powers” need to persuade other international actors for support and co-operation to exercise international leadership because of their limited national and diplomatic capability.

As Part III of this thesis, Chapter 5 presented a case study on Japanese diplomacy on human security. Japanese active policies under the name of human security were middlepowermanship because of the three following features. Firstly, Japanese human security policy has been conducted in cooperation with the United Nations and other countries. Secondly, the Japanese government was seeking the entrepreneurial leadership and influence in these policies. Thirdly, the government consistently put emphasis on the aspect of “freedom from want” of human security and limited its initiative to economy related issues.

This case study focuses on factors underlying the policy decision choosing

middlepowermanship. Prime Minister Obuchi's leadership backed up his intellectual advisors who were supporting the idea of "human security" was matched by the political timing brought by the Asian financial crisis and the Ottawa Process in 1997. The constraints and available diplomatic resources led the Japanese government to take the middlepowermanship approach for international leadership.

The government had certain constraints due to the on constitutional restraints in military activities and complexity of relationships with neighboring countries. These restrictions on the approaches resulted in Japanese policies to have limited initiative only on economy related issues even though the idea of human security contains "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear." Combining with the existing Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) policies and upcoming ODA policy reform realized the human security as a large scale international initiative, such as the Trust Found for Human Security. In the international sphere, support from other countries and the UN made it possible for Japan to conduct such large scale international policy conducted by Japan.

In conclusion, integrating the three steps of examination above, this research clarified conditions and background for "possible middle powers" to apply middlepowermanship to exercise strong influence and take initiative through

international co-operation, regimes, or organizations in certain cases. Although the case study on Japan showed the framework this research presented is applicable to understand the one particular Japan's case of middlepowermanship, this research has some limitation on its argument due to the limited number of case studies. Japan is a good example to show the flexibility of the distinction between middle and great power diplomacy. However, to examine small power diplomacy and middle power diplomacy, other examples will be necessary.

## Appendix

### 1. The List of “Small Powers” in narrow definition

The list of micro states based on the definition “countries with populations of less than one million” and data available at the UN Statistics, failed states based on the *Failed States Index 2008*, and Least Developed Countries based on UN-OHRLLS.

Micro States (46)	Failed States (60)	LDCs(50)	Total(124)
Åland Islands	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
American Samoa	Angola	Angola	Åland Islands
Anguilla	Balarus	Bangladesh	American Samoa
Aruba	Bangladesh	Benin	Angola
Bahamas	Bhutan	Bhutan	Anguilla
Bahrain	Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso	Aruba
Barbados	Bolivia	Burundi	Bahamas
Belize	Bosnia	Cambodia	Bahrain
Bermuda	Burma	Cape Verde	Balarus
Bhutan	Burundi	Central African Republic	Bangladesh
Brunei Darussalam	Cambodia	Chad	Barbados
Cape Verde	Cameroon	Comoros	Belize
Cayman Islands	Central African Republic	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Benin
Channel Islands: Guernsey	Chad	Djibouti	Bermuda
Channel Islands: Jersey	Colombia	Equatorial Guinea	Bhutan
China: Macao SAR	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Eritrea	Bolivia
Cook Islands	East Timor	Ethiopia	Bosnia
Cyprus	Egypt	Gambia	Brunei Darussalam
Faeroe Islands	Equatorial Guinea	Guniea	Burkina Faso
Fiji	Eritrea	Guinea-Bissau	Burma
French Guiana	Georgia	Haiti	Burundi

French Polynesia	Guinea	Kiribati	Cambodia
Gibraltar	Guinea-Bissau	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Cameroon
Greenland	Haiti	Leaotho	Cape Verde
Guadeloupe	Israel/West Bank	Liberia	Cayman Islands
Guam11	Indonesia	Madagascar	Central African Republic
Guyana	Iran	Malawi	Chad
Iceland	Iraq	Maldives	Channel Islands: Guernsey
Liechtenstein	Ivory Coast	Mali	Channel Islands: Jersey
Luxembourg	Kenya	Mauritania	China: Macao SAR
Maldives	Kirgistan	Mozambique	Colombia
Malta	Laos	Myanmar	Comoros
Marshall Islands	Lebanon	Nepal	Cook Islands
Martinique	Liberia	Niger	Cyprus
Netherlands Antilles	Malawi	Rwanda	Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Niue	Martitania	Somoa	Democratic Republic of the Congo
Northern Mariana Islands	Moldova	Sao Tome and Principe	Djibouti
Qatar	Nepal	Senegal	East Timor
Saint Lucia	Niger	Sierra Leone	Egypt
Samoa	Nigeria	Solomon Islands	Equatorial Guinea
San Marino	North Korea	Somalia	Eritrea
Sao Tome and Principe	Pakistan	Sudan	Ethiopia
Seychelles	Papua New Guinea	Timor-Leate	Faeroe Islands
Solomon Islands	Philippines	Togo	Fiji
Turks Caicos Islands	Republic of Congo	Tuvalu	French Guiana
United States Virgin Islands	Rthiopia	Uganda	French Polynesia
Vanuatu	Rwanda	United Republic	Gambia

		Tanzania	
	Sierra Leone	Vanuatu	Georgia
	Solomon Island	Yemen	Gibraltar
	Somalia	Zambia	Greenland
	Sri Lanka		Guadeloupe
	Sudan		Guam11
	Syria		Guinea
	Tajikistan		Guinea-Bissau
	Togo		Guyana
	Turkmenstan		Haiti
	Uganda		Israel/West Bank
	Uzbekistan		Iceland
	Yemen		Indonesia
	Zimbabwe		Iran
			Iraq
			Ivory Coast
			Kenya
			Kirgistan
			Kiribati
			Lao People's Democratic Republic
			Laos
			Leaotho
			Lebanon
			Liberia
			Liechtenstein
			Luxembourg
			Madagascar
			Malawi
			Maldives
			Mali
			Malta
			Marshall Islands
			Martinique
			Martitania

			Mauritania
			Moldova
			Mozambique
			Myanmar
			Nepal
			Netherlands Antilles
			Niger
			Nigeria
			Niue
			North Korea
			Northern Mariana Islands
			Pakistan
			Papua New Guinea
			Philippines
			Qatar
			Republic of Congo
			Rthiopia
			Rwanda
			Saint Lucia
			Samoa
			San Marino
			Sao Tome and Principe
			Senegal
			Seychelles
			Sierra Leone
			Solomon Island
			Somalia
			Somoa
			Sri Lanka
			Sudan
			Syria
			Tajikistan
			Timor-Leate
			Togo

			Turkmenstan
			Turks Caicos Islands
			Tuvalu
			Uganda
			United Republic Tanzania
			United States Virgin Islands
			Uzbekistan
			Vanuatu
			Yemen
			Zambia
			Zimbabwe

## 2. The list of Non-Permanent Member of the UNSC

Country	Times	years
Japan	10	1958 – 1959, 1966 – 1967, 1971 – 1972, 1975 – 1976, 1981 – 1982, 1987 – 1988, 1992 – 1993, 1997 – 1998, 2005 – 2006, 2009 – 2010
Brazil	9	1946 – 1947, 1951 – 1952, 1954 – 1955, 1963 – 1964, 1967 – 1968, 1988 – 1989, 1993 – 1994, 1998 – 1999, 2004 – 2005
Argentina	8	1948 – 1949, 1959 – 1960, 1966 – 1967, 1971 – 1972, 1987 – 1988, 1994 – 1995, 1999 – 2000, 2005 – 2006
Belgium	5	1947 – 1948, 1955 – 1956, 1971 – 1972, 1991 – 1992, 2007 – 2008
Canada	5	1948 – 1949, 1958 – 1959, 1967 – 1968, 1977 – 1978, 1989 – 1990, 1999 – 2000
Colombia	5	1947 – 1948, 1953 – 1954, 1957 – 1958, 1969 – 1970, 1989 – 1990, 2001 – 2002
India	5	1950 – 1951, 1967 – 1968, 1972 – 1973, 1977 – 1978, 1984 – 1985, 1991 – 1992
Italy	5	1959 – 1960, 1971 – 1972, 1975 – 1976, 1987 – 1988, 1995 – 1996, 2007 – 2008
Netherlands	5	1946, 1951 – 1952, 1965 – 1966, 1983 – 1984, 1999 – 2000
Pakistan	5	1952 – 1953, 1968 – 1969, 1976 – 1977, 1983 – 1984, 1993 – 1994, 2003 – 2004
Panama	5	1958 – 1959, 1972 – 1973, 1976 – 1977, 1981 – 1982, 2007 – 2008
Australia	4	1946 – 1947, 1956 – 1957, 1973 – 1974, 1985 – 1986
Chile	4	1952 – 1953, 1961 – 1962, 1996 – 1997, 2003 – 2004
Costa Rica	4	1974 – 1975, 1997 – 1998, 2008 – 2009
Denmark	4	1953 – 1954, 1967 – 1968, 1985 – 1986, 2005 – 2006
Egypt	4	1946, 1949 – 1950, 1984 – 1985, 1996 – 1997
Germany	4	1977 – 1978, 1987 – 1988, 1995 – 1996, 2003 – 2004
Mexico	4	1946, 1980 – 1981, 2002 – 2003, 2009 – 2010
Norway	4	1949 – 1950, 1963 – 1964, 1979 – 1980, 2001 – 2002
Peru	4	1955 – 1956, 1973 – 1974, 1984 – 1985, 2006 – 2007
Polippines	4	1957, 1963, 1980 – 1981, 2004 – 2005
Poland	4	1946 – 1947, 1960, 1970 – 1971, 1982 – 1983, 1996 – 1997
Romania	4	1962, 1976 – 1977, 1990 – 1991, 2004 – 2005
Spain	4	1969 – 1970, 1981 – 1982, 1993 – 1994, 2003 – 2004
Turkey	4	1951 – 1952, 1954 – 1955, 1961, 2009 – 2010

Venezuela	4	1962 – 1963, 1977 – 1978, 1986 – 1987, 1992 – 1993
Yugoslavia	4	1950 – 1951, 1956, 1972 – 1973, 1988 – 1989
Algeria	3	1968 – 1969, 1988 – 1989, 2004 – 2005
Austria	3	1973 – 1974, 1991 – 1992, 2009 – 2010
Bulgaria	3	1966 – 1967, 1986 – 1987, 2002 – 2003
Cuba	3	1949 – 1950, 1956 – 1957, 1990 – 1991
Ecuador	3	1950 – 1951, 1960 – 1961, 1991 – 1992
Ghana	3	1962 – 1963, 1986 – 1987, 2006 – 2007
Indonesia	3	1973 – 1974, 1995 – 1996, 2007 – 2008
Ireland	3	1962, 1981 – 1982, 2001 – 2002
Malasia	3	1965, 1989 – 1990, 1999 – 2000
New Zealand	3	1954 – 1955, 1966, 1993 – 1994
Nigeria	3	1966 – 1967, 1978 – 1979, 1994 – 1995
Sweden	3	1957 – 1958, 1975 – 1976, 1997 – 1998
Syrian Arab Republic	3	1947 – 1948, 1970 – 1971, 2002 – 2003
Tunisia	3	1959 – 1960, 1980 – 1981, 2000 – 2001
Uganda	3	1966, 1981 – 1982, 2009 – 2010
Ukraine	3	1948 – 1949, 1984 – 1985, 2000 – 2001
Zambia	3	1969 – 1970, 1979 – 1980, 1987 – 1988
Bangladesh	2	1979 – 1980, 2000 – 2001
Benin	2	1976 – 1977, 2004 – 2005
Bolivia	2	1964 – 1965, 1978 – 1979
Burkina Faso	2	1984 – 1985, 2008 – 2009
Cameroon	2	1974 – 1975, 2002 – 2003
Congo	2	1986 – 1987, 2006 – 2007
Cote d'Ivoire	2	1964 – 1965, 1990 – 1991
Czechoslovakia	2	1964, 1978 – 1979
Democratic Republic of Congo	2	1982 – 1983, 1990 – 1991
Ethiopia	2	1967 – 1968, 1989 – 1990
Finland	2	1969 – 1970, 1989 – 1990
Gabon	2	1978 – 1979, 1998 – 1999
Greece	2	1952 – 1953, 2005 – 2006
Guinea	2	1972 – 1973, 2002 – 2003

Guyana	2	1975 – 1976, 1982 – 1983
Hungary	2	1968 – 1969, 1992 – 1993
Iraq	2	1957 – 1958, 1974 – 1975
Jamaica	2	1979 – 1980, 2000 – 2001
Jordan	2	1965 – 1966, 1982 – 1983
Kenya	2	1973 – 1974, 1997 – 1998
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	2	1976 – 1977, 2008 – 2009
Mali	2	1966 – 1967, 2000 – 2001
Maritius	2	1977 – 1978, 2001 – 2002
Morocco	2	1963 – 1964, 1992 – 1993
Nepal	2	1969 – 1970, 1988 – 1989
Nicaragua	2	1970 – 1971, 1983 – 1984
Portugal	2	1979 – 1980, 1997 – 1998
Senegal	2	1968 – 1969, 1988 – 1989
United Republic Tanzania	2	1975 – 1976, 2005 – 2006
Zimbabwe	2	1983 – 1984, 1991 – 1992
Angola	1	2003 – 2004
Bahrain	1	1998 – 1999
Belarus	1	1974 – 1975
Botswana	1	1995 – 1996
Burundi	1	1970 – 1971
Cape Verde	1	1992 – 1993
Croatia	1	2008 – 2009
Czech Republic	1	1994 – 1995
Djibouti	1	1993 – 1994
Gambia	1	1998 – 1999
Guinea-Bissau	1	1996 – 1997
Honduras	1	1995 – 1996
Iran	1	1955 – 1956
Kuwait	1	1978 – 1979
Lebanon	1	1953 – 1954
Liberia	1	1961

Madagascar	1	1985 – 1986
Malta	1	1983 – 1984
Mauritania	1	1974 – 1975
Namibia	1	1999 – 2000
Niger	1	1980 – 1981
Oman	1	1994 – 1995
Paraguay	1	1968 – 1969
Qatar	1	2006 – 2007
Republic of Korea	1	1996 – 1997
Rwanda	1	1994 – 1995
Sierra Leone	1	1970 – 1971
Singapore	1	2001 – 2002
Slovakia	1	2006 – 2007
Slovenia	1	1998 – 1999
Somalia	1	1971 – 1972
South Africa	1	2007 – 2008
Sri lanka	1	1960 – 1961
Sudan	1	1972 – 1973
Thailand	1	1985 – 1986
Togo	1	1982 – 1983
Trinidad and Tobago	1	1985 – 1986
United Arab Emirates	1	1986 – 1987
United Arab Republic	1	1961 – 1962
Uruguay	1	1965 – 1966
Viet Nam	1	2008 – 2009
Yemen	1	1990 – 1991

Source: The Web page of UN Security Council. [http://www.un.org/sc/list\\_eng5.asp](http://www.un.org/sc/list_eng5.asp) (accessed May 23. 2009)

### 3. List of Prime Ministers of Japan after the Second World War

45 <sup>th</sup>	Shigeru Yoshida	May 1946-May 1947
46 <sup>th</sup>	Teatu Katayama	May 1947-March 1948
47 <sup>th</sup>	Hitoshi Ashida	March 1948-October 1948
48 <sup>th</sup>	Shigeru Yoshida	October 1948-February 1949
49 <sup>th</sup>		February 1949-October 1952
50 <sup>th</sup>		October 1952-May 1953
51 <sup>st</sup>		May 1953-December 1954
52 <sup>nd</sup>	Ichiro Hatoyama	December 1954-March 1955
53 <sup>rd</sup>		March 1955- November 1955
54 <sup>th</sup>		November 1955-December 1956
55 <sup>th</sup>	Tanzan Ishida	December 1956-February 1957
56 <sup>th</sup>	Nobusuke Kishi	February 1957-June 1958
57 <sup>th</sup>		June 1958- July 1960
58 <sup>th</sup>	Hayato Ikeda	July 1960-December 1960
59 <sup>th</sup>		December 1960- December 1963
60 <sup>th</sup>		December 1963-November 1964
61 <sup>st</sup>	Eisaku Sato	November 1964-February 1967
62 <sup>nd</sup>		February 1967-January 1970
63 <sup>rd</sup>		January 1970-July 1972
64 <sup>th</sup>	Kakuei Tanaka	July 1972-December 1972
64 <sup>th</sup>		December 1972- December 1974
66 <sup>th</sup>	Takeo Miki	December 1974-December 1976
67 <sup>th</sup>	Takeo Fukuda	December 1976-December 1978
68 <sup>th</sup>	Masayoshi Oohira	December 1978-November 1979
69 <sup>th</sup>		November 1979-June 1980
70 <sup>th</sup>	Zenkou Suzuki	July 1980-November 1982
71 <sup>st</sup>	Yasuhiro Nakasone	November 1982- December 1983
72 <sup>nd</sup>		December 1983-July 1986
73 <sup>rd</sup>		July 1986-November 1987
74 <sup>th</sup>	Noboru Takeshita	November 1987-June 1989
75 <sup>th</sup>	Sousuke Uno	June 1989- August 1989
76 <sup>th</sup>	Toshiki Kaifu	August 1989-February 1990
77 <sup>th</sup>		February 1990-November 1991

78 <sup>th</sup>	Kiichi Miyazawa	November 1991-August 1993
79 <sup>th</sup>	Morihiro Hosokawa	August 1993-April 1994
80 <sup>th</sup>	Tsutomu Hata	April 1994-June 1994
81 <sup>st</sup>	Tomiichi Murayama	June 1994-January 1996
82 <sup>nd</sup>	Ryutaro Hashimoto	January 1996-November 1996
83 <sup>rd</sup>		November 1996-July 1998
84 <sup>th</sup>	Keizo Obuchi	July 1998-April 2000
85 <sup>th</sup>	Yoshiro Mori	April 2000-July 2000
86 <sup>th</sup>		July 2000-April 2001
87 <sup>th</sup>	Zyuiichiro Koizumi	April 2001-November 2003
88 <sup>th</sup>		November 2003-September 2005
89 <sup>th</sup>		September 2005- September 2006
90 <sup>th</sup>	Shinzo Abe	September 2006-September 2007
91 <sup>st</sup>	Yasuo Fukuda	September 2007-September 2008
92 <sup>nd</sup>	Taro Aso	September 2008-present

**4. Time table of Japan's Human security Policies from 1994 to 2007.**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Japan</b>			<b>World</b>
	Prime Minister	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Policies relating to human security	Influential incidents in the world
1994	Tomiichi Murayama (Jun 30)	Yohei Kouno (Jun. 30)		UNDP Report
1995			Summit/UN speech	
1996	Ryuutaro Hashimoto (Jun. 11 )	Yukihiko Ikeda (Jan. 11)		
1997		Keizo Obuchi (Sep.11)	Sign the treaty banning the anti-personnel landmine	Asia Financial Crisis/ Ottawa Process
1998	Keizo Obuchi (Aug. 30)	Masahiko Takamura (Jul.30)		
1999		Kouno Youhei (Oct. 5)	Human Security Foundation	
2000	Yoshiro Mori (Apr. 5)			
2001	Zyunichiro Koizumi (Apr. 26)	Makiko Tanaka (Apr. 26)	Human Security Commission	9.11 attack/ Afghanistan war
2002		Yoriko Kawaguchi (Feb.1)		
2003				Iraq War
2004		Nobutaka Machimura (Sep.27)		Indian Ocean Tsunami
2005				
2006	Shinzo Abe (Sep.26)	Taro Aso (Oct. 31)	Friends of Human Security	
2007	Yasuo Fukuda (Sep. 26)	Nobutaka Machimura (Sep.27)		

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
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