

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND MEMORIES OF INJUSTICES INVOLVING INGROUP:

WHAT DO WE REMEMBER AND WHY?

by

Baljinder Kaur Sahdra

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Author's Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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Abstract

Motivational changes due to individual differences and situational variations in ingroup identification can influence accessibility of memories of ingroup violence, victimization and glories. In Study 1, high identifiers recalled fewer incidents of ingroup violence and hatred than of ingroup suffering. As well, they recalled fewer incidents of ingroup violence and hatred than did low identifiers. In Study 2, a manipulation of ingroup identity produced shifts in memory. Relative to those in the low identity condition, participants in the high identity condition recalled fewer incidents of violence and hatred and more good deeds by members of their group. Participants in a control condition recalled more positive than negative group actions; this bias was exaggerated in the high identity condition and eliminated in the low identity condition. With respect to memories of ingroup tragedies, Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that experimental reminders of ingroup suffering enhanced participants' sense of connectedness to the ingroup. The findings suggest that memories of ingroup aggressions threaten ingroup identity whereas memories of ingroup suffering enhance ingroup identity. Societal implications of the findings are discussed. The present research informs the literature on reconstructive memory by extending previous findings on the flexibility of personal memories to historical memory.

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Dedication

The present research is dedicated to those who suffer due to violence, hatred and discrimination, those who spread violence, hatred and discrimination, and those who promote tolerance, understanding and kindness.

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Introduction

The present research focused on the link between social identity and memories of historical incidents in which ingroup members were aggressors or victims. Participants of the four studies were members of the groups involved in the injustices, but they had no personal involvement in the incidents. The first two studies tested the proposition that people are motivated to “forget” memories of ingroup’s wrongdoings because such memories are threatening to their social identity. The last two studies tested the hypothesis that people commemorate ingroup suffering because such memories help to maintain social identity by enhancing group cohesion.

Social Identity Theory and Historical Memory

Social psychologists conceptualize social identity as an extension of the self beyond the level of the individual. A social identity is a categorization of the self into more inclusive social units (Brewer, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). People have both personal and social identities, and when social identities are activated, the most salient features of the self-concept become those that are shared with other members of the ingroup (Tropp & Wright, 2001), and the basic motivation becomes the collective welfare (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). People have multiple social identities (e.g., gender, nationality, ethnicity and professional identities), and different identities become salient in different contexts (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). As well, each social identity has several dimensions (e.g., perceptions of interdependence or mutual fate, importance of the social group to the self, emotional attachment to the group), and different dimensions become important in different contexts (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004).

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987) suggests that individuals are motivated to maintain a favorable image of their group. The major theme of the theory is that ingroup identification is causally related to intergroup bias and intergroup discrimination (e.g., Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Kelly, 1993). As predicted by social identity theory, people evaluate the groups to which they belong more favorably than groups to which they do not belong, both when the basis of group categorization is meaningful and when it is arbitrary or trivial (Brewer, 1979; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Hewstone et al., 2002; Mullen et al., 1992). Those who identify strongly with an ingroup are especially likely to value it (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Oakes, 2001; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999; Wann & Branscombe, 1993).

Social identity theory predicts that individuals who identify highly with their ingroup are particularly threatened by its harmful actions (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002), and may feel guilty “on behalf of” their group even if they, themselves, are innocent of wrongdoing and the incident happened decades earlier (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). In research especially pertinent to the present research, Dutch participants read that Dutch colonizers behaved despicably, benevolently, or ambiguously (positively and negatively) toward Indonesians (Doosje et al., 1998). Those who identified highly with being Dutch differed from low identifiers only in the ambiguous condition, whereas high identifiers reported less collective guilt and less support for compensation. In a related study, Dutch participants read a description of either the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands during WW II or the Dutch colonization of Indonesia. Participants who identified highly with being Dutch attributed negative historical

actions more internally to German occupiers of the Netherlands than to Dutch colonizers of Indonesia (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). These biased attributions suggest that people interpret the wrongs of their own group more benignly, presumably to counter the threat to their social identity. The findings are somewhat difficult to interpret, however, because participants judged markedly different historical episodes in the two experimental conditions.

The claim that high identifiers are particularly threatened by their group's harmful actions needs to be qualified. An important variable from social identity theory's perspective is whether or not people perceive the actions of their group members as legitimate. Note that Doosje et al. (1998) found differences between high and low identifiers only in the ambiguous condition, indicating that such events are open to interpretation. Thinking about the harmful actions of one's group can sometimes lead to feelings of pride and acts of remembrance to the extent that such acts are perceived as legitimate. Another important variable is the source of information of ingroup wrongdoings. As Doosje et al. (2006) have recently shown, high identifiers, relative to low identifiers, are less threatened by information of ingroup members' harmful actions if the information comes from an outgroup source rather than an ingroup source. Presumably, high identifiers view an outgroup source as less credible than an ingroup source, and can therefore dismiss the information that comes from outsiders more easily.

There has been virtually no social psychological research examining the connection between group identity and historical memory. There is some research on how groups react soon after the tragedies: for example, studies conducted shortly after 9/11 investigate heightened nationalism (Li & Brewer, 2004), the desire for revenge as a function of just-world beliefs (Kaiser, Vick, & Major, 2004), identification with various social groups (Moskalenko,

McCauley, & Rozin, 2006), and the “rally ‘round the flag effect” of increased support for the American presidency (Schubert, Stewart, & Curran, 2002). However, I could find no social psychological research on how perpetrator or victim groups remember violence in the long run. The absence of memory research is surprising: social psychologists are interested in individuals’ evaluations of their ingroup members’ actions (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Doosje et al., 2006); and biases in historical remembering are an important means by which group members maintain their favored view of their ingroup (Blight, 2001). Historical memories have become a significant issue for major historians, such as Blight (2001). I argue that such memories should also be of major importance to social psychologists.

Memory is also important because the psychological consequences of intergroup violence can linger among members of victimized groups for generations after peace is restored (Barkan, 2000; Cairns & Lewis, 1999; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005; Yehuda et al., 2000). Even when people recover from the actual atrocities, they do not necessarily forget and move on; instead, they commemorate the events (Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997). Despite the pain associated with remembering past suffering, victim groups keep the memory alive (Hein & Selden, 2000; Novick, 1999). Interestingly, members of victimized groups often differentiate between forgiveness and forgetting (McLernon, Cairns, Lewis, & Hewstone, 2003; Mellor & Bretherton, 2003). Even the most steadfast proponents of forgiveness (e.g., Tutu, 1999) agree that injustices should not be forgotten.

Social identity theory would seem to predict that individuals should preserve memories of past ingroup achievements, and most groups and nations do commemorate past glories. Why, however, might groups commemorate and preserve memories of tragedies? One answer is that

commemorations can boost ingroup members' efforts to pursue justice. Memories of ingroup's suffering presumably pose a threat to people's beliefs that the world is just and that individuals get what they deserve and deserve what they get (Hafer & Olson, 1998; Hafer, 2000; Lerner, 1980). One way to counter this threat is to restore justice, and many victimized groups do seek legal justice (e.g., war crime trials, and claims of compensation for the descendents of actual victims). Commemorations can help victimized groups to mobilize their resources to initiate and sustain their fight for justice. Despite legal sentences and settlements, closure at the societal level is often not possible; even if it were, some scholars argue, "it [closure] would insult those whose lives are forever ruptured" (Minow, 1998, pp. 5). Contemporary members of victimized groups often feel an obligation or duty to remember the past suffering of their comrades (Eyerman, 2004), beyond purely justice-related concerns.

From the perspective of the present research, commemorations can increase ingroup identification and thus bind members to the group. This hypothesis is derived from social identity theory and related research. Although social identity theorists have not directly addressed the issue of why groups commemorate and preserve memories of tragedies, the theory could predict that such memories help people to maintain their social identity. As Tajfel (1981) noted with respect to mistreated minority groups, "a common identity is thrust upon a category of people because they are at the receiving end of certain attitudes and treatment from the 'outside'" (p. 315). Memories of common fate can lead to self-categorization at the group level (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994).

In line with these views, recent research demonstrates that information about injustices suffered by ingroup members can lead to heightened perceptions of ingroup homogeneity as well

as outgroup homogeneity ("we are all victims"; "they have all harmed us"), and perceptions of the self as similar to the ingroup and different from the outgroup (Rothgerber, 1997).

Conceivably, reminders of ingroup's suffering might also enhance ingroup identification. This prediction is consistent with the following findings of the research on the psychology of stigma (e.g., Major & O'Brien, 2005; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002): there is a positive association between group identification and perceptions of prejudice among members of stigmatized groups (Eccleston & Major, 2006; Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003); individuals exposed to current discrimination against their group become more identified with their group, especially if they are highly identified initially (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; McCoy & Major, 2003); as well, recalling incidents of special (positive or negative) treatment of ingroup members by outsiders can accentuate individuals' group identity relative to their personal identity (Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995). Finally, the prediction of enhanced identification is in line with the findings that a group can be seen as a coherent entity by virtue of having a common history or facing a common problem (Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004; Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 1998).

Consistent with the above research, historians and social observers have argued that memories of ingroup suffering and associated rituals can provide temporal continuity and cultural coherence (Bar-Tal, 2003; Frijda, 1997; Jacobs, 2004; Staal, 1990). Commemorations (e.g., Holocaust Memorial Week) are often organized by groups to increase support among their members. Memories of ingroup suffering can articulate and enhance ingroup solidarity (Devine-Wright, 2003; Irwin-Zarecka, 1994; Novick, 1999; Roe, 2003). To use Schwartz and Bayma's (1999) terms, "remembering of common suffering is the stuff of which national unity is made" (p. 959). Memories of loss and crises can be as important as memories of triumphs in the

formation of group identity (Eyerman, 2004). The tragedy is a shared history that all ingroup members have in common, and they might not have all that much else in common. The tragedy unites ingroup members while distinguishing them from other groups (Novick, 1999). If concerns for the preservation and cohesion of the ingroup motivate remembering, then high identifiers should be especially likely to commemorate and remember ingroup tragedies.

Memory of past tragedies should have a quite different impact on members of the group that perpetrated the harm. Recollections of wrongdoing by members of an ingroup could undermine group cohesion, because individuals tend to dissociate themselves from the agents of unjust acts (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Members of perpetrator groups¹ sometimes maintain their social identity and group cohesion by developing “blind spots” for earlier harms committed by ingroup members (Frijda, 1997, pp. 109). For example, Blight (2001) documents efforts to erase slavery from American history. In situations in which external constraints prohibit such “forgetting” (e.g., when contemporary members of the victim group publicize their side of the story), perpetrator groups may choose to interpret the reprehensible episodes in a manner that minimizes the blame ascribed to current members of the ingroup (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). They may selectively distort the memory of those events to maintain a positive image of the group (Dresler-Hawke, 2005). For example, slave owners are portrayed as kind and generous and slaves as happy, child-like individuals who love to sing and dance (Blight, 2001). When the effects of past wrongdoing persist, such memory distortions help members of perpetrator groups to justify the status quo and minimize feelings of discomfort or guilt (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). As Blight (2001) remarked with respect to memory of the American Civil War, “deflections and evasions,

careful remembering and necessary forgetting, and embittered and irreconcilable versions of experience are all the stuff of historical memory” (pp. 5).

Overview of the Present Research

The primary purpose of the first two studies was to investigate the influence of identification on memories of ingroup wrongdoing. In Study 1, Hindu and Sikh participants were asked to freely recall incidents in which their own group members were victims or perpetrators of violence against the other group. I examined how Hindu and Sikh respondents’ memories of intergroup violence differed as a function of their identity with their ethnic group and the role of ingroup members in the violence. Relative to low identifiers, participants who identified highly with their group were expected to recall fewer incidents in which members of their ingroup perpetrated harms against the outgroup. As well, high identifiers were expected to show poorer memories of ingroup harms than of ingroup suffering.

In Study 1, identity was an individual difference variable. Study 2 was designed to provide experimental evidence for an inverse relation between identification and memories of ingroup harm doing. It also included a control condition, making it possible to assess the direction of any effects of identity.

The inspiration for the experimental manipulation of identity in Study 2 came from Pickett, Silver & Brewer’s (2002) research, which demonstrated that inclusive identities, such as nationality and ethnicity, are perceived as more important when assimilation needs are aroused and less important when differentiation needs are aroused. In Study 2, Canadian participants’ assimilation or differentiation needs were aroused to manipulate their identity with Canada. Some participants were asked to recall personal memories of times when they felt very different

from others. These memories of feeling dissimilar should increase assimilation needs, which, in turn, should lead to feelings of high identity with Canada. Other participants were asked to recall personal memories of times when they felt overly similar to others. Such memories should arouse differentiation needs, leading to decreased identification with Canada. Since this manipulation of assimilation or differentiation needs was not directly connected to Canada, any change in identification with Canada is unlikely to be due to experimental demands. After the manipulation of identity, participants in Study 2 freely recalled incidents of harms done by ingroup members to outgroup members. I hypothesized that an experimentally induced increase in identity with Canada would reduce the accessibility of memories of harms perpetrated by ingroup members. High identifiers should exhibit reduced memory of incidents in which their own group members were harm doers because these episodes threaten their social identity.

Study 2 also included a measure of good deeds performed by ingroup members to benefit outgroups. Assessment of positive memories allowed tests of whether the differential memory in the high identity condition reflected enhanced memory of positive incidents, reduced memory of perpetrator incidents, or both. I could not investigate memories of victim events because a pre-test of the study showed that a vast majority of Canadian undergraduates could not recall any incidents in which Canadians were victimized by outsiders.

Although differential memory could reflect memory accessibility, it could also reflect a reporting bias. For example, high and low identifiers might remember incidents of ingroup harm doing to the same extent, but high identifiers might be reluctant to report events that reflect poorly on their ingroup to the researchers. Both of these accounts – memory accessibility and

reporting bias – are consistent with social identity theory, since the underlying motivation could be people’s concern with maintaining a favorable private and public image of their group.

Because of my interest in memory biases, I attempted to reduce self-presentational concerns in Study 1 by stressing that violence among religious groups is common. The instructions for the free recall task included the statement that “almost all religious groups have seen at least some of their members commit acts of violence or hatred against members of other religions.” In addition to providing similar instructions for the recall task in Study 2, I added explicit accuracy demands in an effort to further minimize reporting biases.

Whereas Studies 1 and 2 investigated why people “forget” harms committed by ingroup members against outgroups, Studies 3 and 4 examined why people remember and commemorate ingroup suffering. Consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987), researchers (e.g., Rothgerber, 1997; Simon et al., 1995) have shown that information about threats to ingroup can highlight individuals’ group identity relative to their personal identity. In line with this research, various social observers (e.g., Devine-Wright, 2003; Eyerman, 2004; Frijda, 1997; Novick, 1999) have speculated that memories of ingroup suffering enhance ingroup cohesion. Based on these converging perspectives, I expected reminders of ingroup victimization to enhance participants’ feelings of connectedness to the ingroup. This hypothesis was tested in Studies 3 and 4. Study 3 experimentally manipulated reminders of women’s suffering and assessed women participants’ sense of connectedness to women. To show that the effects of reminders of ingroup suffering on ingroup identity are not limited to female gender identity, Study 4 conceptually replicated Study 3 by targeting the ethnic identity of Hindu participants, both males and females. Study 4 also tested whether a reminder of ingroup

suffering leads individuals to draw closer to *any* social identity at their disposal, and not just the identity they share with actual victims.

Study 1: Hindu-Sikh Violence Study

In Study 1, I examined how respondents' memories differed as a function of their identity with their ethnic group and the role of ingroup members in the violence. Participants were Sikhs and Hindus, two groups with a history of retaliatory, extremely violent acts against each other in India and elsewhere. The 1980s was a particularly violent decade, in which many innocent and unarmed individuals were targeted solely because of their religious affiliation. At least retrospectively, there is probably little likelihood that individuals of either group would regard ingroup violence against unarmed civilians as particularly admirable. I confirmed this judgment in pilot interviews conducted prior to the study reported here. When asked to freely remember incidents of their group's history, the interviewees reported very few episodes of ingroup wrongdoings. However, when I reminded them of incidents in which their group members had aggressed against unarmed innocent outgroup members, they invariably admitted that those acts were "horrible," "cruel," "foolish," and "really bad."

In Study 1, participants' memory of Hindu-Sikh violence was assessed in a free recall task. Participants were asked to recall up to 3 events in which Sikhs committed acts of violence or hatred against Hindus and up to 3 events in which Hindus committed similar acts against Sikhs. As far as can be established, no other published social psychological study has examined free recall of intergroup violence. Instead, researchers have typically studied people's reactions to experimentally crafted descriptions of events (e.g., Doosje et al., 2006; Doosje et al., 1998). The advantage of experimental descriptions is that researchers can establish a high degree of control. The absence of free recall measures is a serious omission, however, because free recall

provides the most direct assessment of whether people's personal knowledge of their ingroup's history is biased. Ingroup identification was hypothesized to moderate biases in free recall: If an increase in identification is associated with an increase in the motivation to maintain a positive image of the ingroup, then high identifiers should recall fewer incidents of ingroup violence and hatred than low identifiers.

After reporting free recall of past incidents, participants read descriptions of four actual episodes of severe, tit for tat Sikh/Hindu violence that occurred in the 1980s. The descriptions were brief and omitted critical details (e.g., the number of victims, motives of the perpetrators) to allow sufficient ambiguity for psychological variables, such as identification to affect participants' appraisals. By focusing all participants on exactly the same episodes, I could examine how participants were influenced by their group's role as either perpetrators or victims of the violence, as well by their identification with their religious group. Participants responded to questions assessing how frequently they thought about each incident in the recent past, whether the victim group should forget and move on, and their emotional reactions to the incidents.

Consistent with the theorizing that commemorations of ingroup's suffering are important to ingroup identity, I expected individuals who identified more highly with their group to report thinking more frequently about incidents in which their own group members were victims. As well, high identifiers were expected to report thinking less frequently about incidents in which ingroup members were perpetrators than incidents in which ingroup members were victims. The remaining questions were designed to assess the current psychological significance of the events to respondents. When the events involved ingroup suffering rather than harm doing, participants,

and especially high identifiers, should be less inclined to agree that the victim group forget and move on and more likely to experience a negative emotional reaction.

Method

Participants

Fifty Hindu and 50 Sikh participants who completed the online study received a \$20 honorarium for their participation. Participants were recruited through Hindu and Sikh newspaper and radio ads, distribution of flyers in places of worship, announcements on community internet sites, and postings on internet group and discussion forums. The ads described the study as a “survey assessing people’s memories of, and reactions to, historical events.” The data from four participants who did not complete the question assessing strength of ingroup identification were excluded from the analyses, leaving 96 participants, 49 Hindus (21 females and 28 males), and 47 Sikhs (19 females and 28 males). The mean age of participants was 31 years, with a range from 18 to 69 years. Of the participants, 85% were residents of Canada, 5% of India, and the remaining 10% of various other countries; 55% were born in India, 30% in Canada, and the remaining 15% in several other nations.

Procedure

The ads directed participants to a website that contained the online questionnaire. The researcher named in the experimental materials was Michael Ross, a name not readily associated with either of the religious groups. Participants were first asked to indicate their age, gender and religion. Religion was solicited at the outset to ensure that only those who classified themselves as Hindus or Sikhs participated in the study. The few members of other religious groups who

attempted to participate were thanked and informed that participation was restricted to people who matched certain profiles. The website was programmed to record the total number of participants who attempted to complete the survey, but to record responses of only those participants who finished the study and consented to use of their data. The dropout rate was 31%, consistent with the average dropout rate of 34% in internet experiments (Musch & Reips, 2000).

Participants began the survey by recalling up to 6 events of Hindu-Sikh violence. They recalled up to 3 events in which Hindus committed acts of violence or hatred against Sikhs and 3 events in which Sikhs acted similarly toward Hindus. The order of the two kinds of questions was counterbalanced. The Sikh perpetrator question was worded as follows:

“...we’d like you to think about the history of different religious groups. By history we mean events from the distant and recent past. Almost all religious groups have seen at least some of their members commit acts of violence or hatred against members of other religions. Think of Sikhs. Can you think of any acts of violence or hatred that Sikhs have committed against Hindus?”

Participants were asked to provide a title and brief description of 3 events.

In the second phase of the survey, participants read short descriptions based on history texts and news media reports of 4 episodes of Hindu-Sikh violence that occurred within a 13 month period in 1984-1985 and completed measures assessing their reactions to each event. Although the events differed in many ways, the variable of current interest is which group perpetrated the violence and which group was victimized. The events described were as follows:

- 1) The June 5, 1984 attack on the Golden Temple, the holiest of Sikh shrines in Punjab, India;
- 2) The October 31, 1984 assassination of Indira Gandhi, the Hindu Prime Minister of India;
- 3) The

November 1984 massacre of Sikhs in Delhi, the capital city of India; and 4) The June 23, 1985 bombing of an Air India Flight that originated in Canada and blew up over Ireland, killing all 329 aboard most of whom were Hindus. (See Appendix A for the complete descriptions of the events used in the survey.) In Events 1 and 3, the alleged perpetrators were primarily Hindus and the victims were mainly Sikhs. In Event 2, the victim was a Hindu Prime Minister and the perpetrators were her Sikh bodyguards. In Event 4, the alleged perpetrators were Sikhs and the victims were mostly Hindus. The events were presented in chronological order and the tone of the descriptions was as neutral as possible. The number of words and degree of detail was fairly comparable across descriptions ($M = 114$ words, range = 98 – 140).

The same set of dependent measures was repeated for each episode, with minor changes in wording to make the items congruent with the target event. Participants rated the extent to which they had thought about the event in the past 5 years on a scale ranging from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*very frequently*). Next, participants rated the extent to which they agreed that members of the victim group should forget about the event and move on. The response scale ranged from 1 (*not at all agree*) to 9 (*agree very much*). In addition, participants indicated the degree to which they experienced various emotions while reading about each event. They responded to 14 negative emotion terms (e.g., *anger*, *hatred*, and *disgust*) and 4 positive emotions (*happiness*, *satisfaction*, *gratefulness* and *relief*) on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*very much*). The positive emotions items were reverse scored. The internal consistency of participants' responses to the various emotion terms was high (Cronbach's $\alpha = .84$). Consequently, the analyses were conducted on a composite score for each participant, with higher numbers reflecting more negative emotion.

Finally, participants completed a measure of the strength of ingroup identification. They rated the degree to which they identified with their religious group on a 3-point scale, with 1 labeled as *not at all*, 2 as *somewhat*, and 3 as *strongly*.

Results

Preliminary analyses including gender, age, birthplace, number of months living in Canada, and number of months living in the Diaspora (outside of India). These variables did not qualify any of the effects and are omitted from the analyses reported below. Victim and perpetrator events were collapsed over religion, so that we examined victim vs. perpetrator episodes and not Sikhs vs. Hindus. Thus, ingroup victim events include Sikh victim events for Sikhs, and Hindu victim events for Hindus; similarly, ingroup perpetrator events include Sikh and Hindu acts of violence. I collapsed across religion because it is impossible to equate the historical events that happened to the two groups in terms of severity or other variables. Therefore, any contrast of Sikhs vs. Hindus is confounded with the nature of the event(s). As well, the theoretical focus of the study concerns memory of events in which ingroup members were victims or perpetrators, not religious differences.

The data were analyzed in a repeated measures general linear model (GLM) with role (ingroup victims vs. ingroup perpetrators) as a within-subjects variable and strength of ingroup identification as a continuous predictor. Simple slopes analyses testing the influence of identification on the dependent measures were conducted by regressing the dependent variables on ingroup identification. As well, analyses were conducted to test the differences between recall of, or reactions to, ingroup victim and ingroup perpetrator incidents at 1 standard deviation below and above the mean of identification. A difference score of ingroup victim and ingroup

perpetrator incidents was regressed on identification, and tests were conducted to determine if the points 1 standard deviation below and above the mean differed from zero. The degrees of freedom varied slightly across measures because not all participants answered all measures.

Phase 1: Free Recall of Violent Episodes

Participants more readily recalled events in which ingroup members were victims rather than perpetrators. Whereas 68% of the participants recalled at least one ingroup victim event, only 49% recalled at least one ingroup perpetrator event. On average, participants recalled a significantly greater number of episodes in which their ingroup members were victims ($M = 1.44$, $SE = 0.11$) rather than perpetrators ($M = .94$, $SE = 0.11$), $F(1, 94) = 14.68$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .14$. This Role main effect was qualified by a Role x Identification interaction, $F(1, 94) = 5.06$, $p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$. Separate regression analyses showed that high identifiers recalled fewer ingroup harms than did low identifiers, $\beta = -.23$, $t(94) = 2.25$, $p = .03$. High and low identifiers did not differ in their recall of ingroup victim episodes, $\beta = .06$, $t(94) = .54$, $p = .59$. The simple slopes are plotted in Figure 1.

Finally, I examined the effects of identification on recall at 1 standard deviation below and above the mean of identification. High identifiers recalled significantly more incidents of ingroup suffering than of ingroup violence or hatred, $t(94) = 5.98$, $p < .001$. Although the difference was in the same direction for low identifiers, it was not significant, $t(94) = 1.54$, $p = .13$.

Of the 96 participants, 32% freely recalled the attack on the Golden Temple, 22% recalled Gandhi's assassination, 32% recalled the massacre in Delhi, and 19% recalled the Air India Bombing. These are the four events to which participants responded in Phase 2.

Phase 2: Appraisals of the Experimentally Provided Episodes

Participants' appraisals were averaged across episodes to create two scores for each measure, a score for ingroup perpetrator events and a score for ingroup victim events.

Frequency of Thinking. Ratings of frequency of thinking yielded significant main effects for role, $F(1, 92) = 32.76, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .26$, and identification, $F(1, 92) = 4.85, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$, that were qualified by a marginal Role x Identification interaction, $F(1, 92) = 2.84, p = .09$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$. Both low identifiers, $t(92) = 4.01, p < .001$, and high identifiers, $t(92) = 7.36, p < .001$, reported thinking more often of ingroup victim episodes than ingroup perpetrator episodes. Relative to low identifiers (at 1 standard deviation below the mean), high identifiers (at 1 standard deviation above the mean), reported thinking more frequently about ingroup victim episodes, $\beta = .25, t(92) = 2.43, p = .02$. High identifiers also tended to report a greater frequency of thinking about ingroup harm doing, $\beta = .18, t(92) = 1.72, p = .09$. The simple slopes are plotted in Figure 2.

Willingness to Forget and Move On. Endorsement of the proposal that members of the victim group should forget about the event and move on yielded significant main effects for role, $F(1, 86) = 14.70, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .15$, and identification, $F(1, 86) = 7.98, p = .006$, partial $\eta^2 = .09$, that were qualified by a Role x Identification interaction, $F(1, 86) = 4.69, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$. High identifiers were more likely to support the proposition that the victim group should forget and move on, $t(89) = 5.89, p < .001$, when their ingroup members were perpetrators rather than victims. A difference in the same direction did not attain significance among low identifiers, $t(89) = 1.63, p = .11$. As Figure 3 shows, when ingroup members were victims, high identifiers were less likely than low identifiers to agree that victims should forget

the episodes and move on, $\beta = -.36$, $t(89) = -3.73$, $p < .001$. When ingroup members were harm doers, high and low identifiers did not differ in their belief that victims should forget the incidents and move on, $\beta = -.17$, $t(89) = -1.65$, $p = .10$.

Emotional Reactions. A main effect of role, $F(1, 90) = 28.88$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .24$, was qualified by a significant Role x Identification interaction, $F(1, 90) = 6.65$, $p = .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$. High and low identifiers did not differ in their emotional reaction to either ingroup victim episodes, $\beta = .12$, $t(90) = 1.17$, $p = .24$, or ingroup perpetrator episodes, $\beta = -.08$, $t(90) = -.72$, $p = .47$. The simple slopes are plotted in Figure 4. Although both high identifiers, $t(90) = 7.71$, $p < .001$, and low identifiers, $t(90) = 2.72$, $p = .008$, reported greater negative emotional reaction to ingroup victim than ingroup perpetrator incidents, the difference in emotional reaction is greater among high identifiers.

Discussion

Consistent with the predictions of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), high identifiers freely recalled fewer of the episodes that would be most threatening to their social identity, incidents in which ingroup members were perpetrators. Low and high identifiers did not differ significantly in recall of the ingroup victim events presumably because victim episodes do not threaten the group image in the same way. Moreover, high identifiers showed differential memory for ingroup victim and perpetrator events. High identifiers freely recalled more events in which ingroup members were victims rather than perpetrators of violence. A trend in the same directions was non-significant among low identifiers. The data indicate that individuals' memories of past conflicts involving their ingroup depend both on their identity with the ingroup and the role of the ingroup in the conflict.

The free recall measure provides an indication of the accessibility of memories – how readily individuals can retrieve different events from their memory store. Research on memory indicates that the accessibility of memories is directly related to the frequency with which people think about the target information (Schacter, 1996). Consequently, high identifiers' reporting of more events in which ingroup members were victims rather than perpetrators could reflect a tendency to commemorate victim episodes. A relative inattention to episodes in which members of their group perpetrated violence would, in turn, help high identifiers preserve a favorable social identity.

If relative to low identifiers, high identifiers are generally less attentive to episodes of ingroup violence, then one might expect this difference to manifest itself in the frequency of thought measure in Phase 2 of the current study. It did not. Compared to low identifiers, high identifiers reported thinking more often about ingroup victim events and, if anything, more rather than less often about ingroup perpetrator events. As the freely recalled and experimentally provided events did not generally overlap, there is no reason to suppose that the recall and reminiscence measures would be totally in sync. However, the findings suggest that frequency of thought might not completely account for the free recall findings. I return to this issue following Study 2.

The remaining two measures of Phase 2 indicated that memories of ingroup victimization had greater psychological significance for high identifiers. When ingroup members were victims, high identifiers, relative to low identifiers, were less likely to agree that victims should forget the incidents and move on. The measure of negative emotional reaction showed that both high and

low identifiers reacted more negatively to ingroup victim than perpetrator events, but that difference was greater for high identifiers.

The identification results in Study 1 are correlational and hence cannot establish causality. For example, although I propose that identity affects recall, it is also possible (and likely) that recall influences identity. As well, all comparisons are made between low and high identifiers and there is no “control” group. Consequently, it is not clear whether an increase in identification leads to a decrease in recall of ingroup perpetrator events, an increase in recall of victim events, or both. The absence of a control group is an inevitable consequence of measuring identification as opposed to manipulating it.

Study 2: Experiment on Canadian Identity and Memories

Study 2 was designed to provide an experimental replication of Study 1. Canadian participants were randomly assigned to control, high Canadian identity, and low Canadian identity conditions and then asked to freely recall episodes of Canadian suffering as well as Canadian good deeds. The experimental manipulation was inspired by optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991), according to which social identity comprises a reconciliation of opposing needs for assimilation and differentiation from others. Pickett, Silver & Brewer (2002) demonstrated that inclusive identities, such as nationality and ethnicity, are perceived as more important when assimilation needs are aroused and less important when differentiation needs are aroused.

I conducted a pilot test of a manipulation derived directly from Pickett et al. (2002) in an attempt to manipulate the perceived importance of Canadian identity. Participants' assimilation or differentiation needs were aroused by asking them to recall memories of times when they felt overly dissimilar (assimilation need arousal) or overly similar (differentiation need arousal) to people around them. Arousal of the assimilation need was expected to temporarily increase the importance of Canadian identity and thus increase motivation to maintain a favourable image of Canada. Arousal of the differentiation need was expected to temporarily lower the importance of Canadian identity and lower the motivation to maintain a favourable image of Canada. The control condition instructions required participants to think of situations of optimal distinctiveness in which they experienced equilibrium between the two needs, leading to no need arousal.

Immediately after the experimental manipulation, participants in Pilot 1 were asked to complete a measure of identification with Canada (Cameron, 2004; Obst & White, 2005). The pilot study also assessed participants' state self-esteem (McFarland & Ross, 1982) to test if changes in identification were attributable to changes in state self-esteem.

Pilot 1: Test of the Experimental Manipulation of Canadian Identification

Participants and Procedure

Sixty undergraduate students (28 males and 32 females) in a student cafeteria completed a survey on "personal memories and thoughts about Canada" in exchange for a chocolate bar. They were handed a survey package and were instructed to complete it individually. The experimenter was blind to the condition while distributing the survey packages. Each package contained four tasks in the following order: 1) a "personal memories" task, which comprised the experimental manipulation of identification with Canada; 2) a scale assessing participants' identification with Canada (Cameron, 2004; Obst and White, 2005); 3) a measure of state self-esteem (McFarland & Ross, 1982); and 4) a background questionnaire.

The "personal memories" task was adapted from Pickett, Silver & Brewer's (2002) experimental manipulation in their Study 1: Participants in the low identity condition were asked to recall memories of times when they felt over similar to others; these memories were expected to increase differentiation need, which, in turn, were expected to decrease identification with Canada. Participants in the high identity condition were asked to recall times when they felt overly dissimilar to others; such memories were expected to increase assimilation needs and thus expected to lead to an increase in identification with Canada. Participants in the control condition

recalled memories of times when they felt similar to some people but different from others, leading to feelings of optimal distinctiveness and hence no need arousal.

Pickett et al. (2002) used the following instructions for each of the three need arousal conditions in their Study 1:

Low Identity (Differentiation Need Arousal) Condition: Please take a moment and think of times when you felt overly similar to other people. In other words, think of times and situations where you felt that you were so much like other people around you that you did not have your own identity. Please write a brief description of two memories of such times.

High Identity (Assimilation Need Arousal) Condition: Please take a moment and think of times when you felt very different from people. In other words, think of times and situations where you did not feel that you fit in with other people around you and that you “stuck out”. Please write a brief description of two memories of such times.

Control (No Need Arousal) Condition: Please take a moment and think of times when you felt that you were similar to some people around you but different from other people. In other words, think of times and situations where you knew that there were some people around who were very much like you but that there were other people around who were different from you. Please write a brief description of two memories of such times.

A small pre-test of the difficulty of these three tasks revealed that participants rated the assimilation need task and the control task as *easy*, and the differentiation need arousal task as *very hard*. Consequently, I modified the wording of the differentiation task to make it easier:

Modified Low Identity (Differentiation Need Arousal) Condition: Please take a moment and think of times when you felt overly similar to other people. In other words, think of times and situations where you felt that you were so much like other people around you that you could not "stick out". Please write a brief description of two memories of such times.

Of the 60 individuals who participated in the pilot study, 2 in the low identity condition indicated that they could not do the personal memories task, and 7 (4 in the low identity condition, 1 in the high identity condition and 2 in the low identity condition) reported the wrong types of personal memories (see Appendix B for examples of both correct and incorrect memories). Additionally, 5 participants (all in the high identity condition) reported positive memories (see an example in Appendix B). The task in the high identity condition was expected to remind people of times when they were *uncomfortably* different from others so that the opposite need to be similar to others could be aroused. If one feels positively about being different from others, it is hard to imagine how that might arouse the need to be close to others. Consequently, these 5 participants and the others mentioned above were excluded from the final analyses, leaving 43 participants (17 males and 26 females).

Immediately after the experimental manipulation, participants completed a measure of Canadian identity, a 12-item, three-dimensional scale of identification (Cameron, 2004; Obst and White, 2005). The scale has been shown to have three independent factors: 1) *Ingroup ties*: the sense of connection or bond to the group (e.g., "I feel strong ties to other Canadians"). 2) *Ingroup affect*: the emotions that arise from group membership (e.g., "In general I'm glad to be a Canadian"). 3) *Centrality*: the importance of the group to self-definition (e.g., "Being a Canadian

is an important part of my self image”). Each factor was measured by four items and the order of items was randomized. (See Appendix C for the entire scale.) Participants rated their agreement with the 12 items on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*very much*). The negatively worded items were reverse coded. A factor analysis of the data yielded a rotated solution that was fairly consistent with the three-factor model of identity initially proposed by Cameron (2004) and later confirmed in a confirmatory factor analyses by Obst and White (2005). (See Appendix C for the factor loadings of the rotated solution.)

Five participants commented that they had difficulty responding to the following item: “I don’t feel a strong sense of being connected to Canadians” – one of the negatively worded items of the ingroup ties factor. The rotated factor solution showed that this item’s factor loading was lower than the other loadings on the ingroup ties factor (See Appendix C). As well, a reliability analysis of the four items of ingroup ties revealed that this particular item had a low item-total correlation, .39. Consequently, this item was removed from the composite score of ingroup ties, leaving 3 items with high internal consistency (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .78$). Reliability analyses of the remaining subscales also yielded satisfactory alpha levels: centrality (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .76$) and ingroup affect (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .79$). The experimental manipulation was expected to influence all the factors, but especially ingroup ties and centrality.²

Next, participants completed McFarland & Ross’s (1982) measure of state self-esteem. The scale consisted of 20 pairs of adjectives (e.g., *Bad/Good*, *Stupid/Smart*, *Satisfied/Dissatisfied*), and each pair was accompanied by a scale ranging from -3 to 0 to 3 (e.g., *Bad* -3 to 0 to 3 *Good*). Reliability analyses showed high internal consistency (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .96$).

Results

The data were analyzed in analysis of variance (ANOVA) with identity (high vs. low vs. control) as a between-subjects variable. The interaction means for all dependent measures are reported in Table 1.

Ingroup Ties. The analyses of the ingroup ties factor revealed a significant effect of the experimental manipulation of identity, $F(2, 37) = 5.53, p = .008$, partial $\eta^2 = .23$. Tests of simple effects revealed that participants in the high identity condition did not differ from those in the control condition, $t(37) = .21, p = .83$. However, those in the low identity condition reported fewer ties with Canadians than did those in the control, $t(37) = 3.22, p = .003$, and high identity, $t(37) = 2.87, p = .007$, conditions.³

Centrality and Ingroup Affect. There was no significant effect of the experimental manipulation on either the centrality factor of identification, $F(2, 40) = 1.99, p = .15$, partial $\eta^2 = .09$, or the factor of ingroup affect, $F(2, 36) = 1.60, p = .22$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$.

State Self-Esteem. The analyses of state self-esteem revealed that participants in the three experimental conditions did not significantly differ from each other, $F(2, 37) = 1.31, p = .28$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$.

Discussion

The analyses revealed a significant effect of the experimental manipulation on the ingroup ties factor of identification with Canada. As expected, the Low Identity (Differentiation Need Arousal) manipulation lowered participants' ties with Canada; participants in the low identity condition, compared to those in the high and control conditions, reported significantly lower ties with Canada. Contrary to expectations, the High Identity (Assimilation Need Arousal)

manipulation failed to increase participants' ingroup ties. The failure to find a difference in ingroup ties between the control and high identity conditions is probably due the fact that participants in the control condition express a quite high degree of ties with Canadians. Because of possible ceiling effects, it appears to be easier to lower identity than to raise it. There was no effect of the experimental manipulations on the centrality and ingroup affect factors of identification. Finally, participants in the three conditions showed no difference in their state self-esteem levels indicating that the change in ingroup ties cannot be attributed to temporary changes in self-esteem.

The fact that an alarming number of individuals – 17 in total – were excluded because they could not complete the experimental manipulation task in the expected manner, called for modifications in the instructions of the high and low identity conditions to make the tasks easier and to reduce irrelevant and positive memories. The changes were implemented to ensure that participants in both these conditions could easily access *uncomfortable* memories leading to arousal of the opposing needs – the memories of excessive distinctiveness (high identity condition) leading to arousal of the assimilation need, and the memories of too much similarity (low identity condition) leading to arousal of the differentiation need. These modifications were tested in Pilot 2.

Pilot 2: Test of the Revised Manipulation and the Revised Measure of Ingroup Ties
Participants and Procedure

Fifty three undergraduates completed an online survey on “personal memories” in exchange for a chocolate bar. The study was conducted near a student cafeteria in a booth with 4 laptops set up facing away from each other. The experimenter was present in the booth at all

times but was blind to the experimental conditions of the participants. The study's website was designed to randomly assign participants to the various conditions. Of the participants, 2 did not report any memories and were therefore excluded from the analyses, leaving 51 participants (29 males and 22 females) in the final analyses. The instructions of the experimental manipulation task were as follows:

Low Identity (Differentiation Need Arousal) Condition: Please take a moment and think of times when you felt too similar to other people, so similar that you felt uncomfortable. In other words, think of times and situations where you felt that you were so much like other people around you that you could not "stick out", that your own self was hidden. Please write a brief description of two memories of such times.

High Identity (Assimilation Need Arousal) Condition: Please take a moment and think of times when you felt too different from people, so different that you felt uncomfortable. In other words, think of times and situations where you did not feel that you fit in with other people around you and that you "stuck out". Please write a brief description of two memories of such times.

Control (No Need Arousal) Condition: Please take a moment and think of times when you felt that you were similar to some people around you but different from other people. In other words, think of times and situations where you knew that there were some people around who were very much like you but that there were other people around who were different from you. Please write a brief description of two memories of such times.

As a survey control, a fourth condition was introduced in which participants did not report any personal memories. Participants then completed a 4-item scale assessing ties to Canada. The

scale was identical to the ingroup ties subscale in Pilot 1 with the exception of one negatively worded item that was excluded in Pilot 1 due to low item-total correlation. That item was worded positively in Pilot 2: “I feel a strong sense of being connected to Canadians.” Reliability analyses of the 4 items indicated high internal consistency (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .88$). Since the ingroup affect and centrality factors of identification showed no effects of the experimental manipulation in Pilot 1, they were excluded in Pilot 2.

Results

Ingroup Ties. The data were subjected to analyses of variance (ANOVA) with identity (high vs. low vs. memories control vs. survey control) as a between-subjects variable. The analyses of the ingroup ties scale revealed a marginal effect of the experimental manipulation of identity, $F(3, 47) = 2.17, p = .10$, partial $\eta^2 = .12$. The means are reported in Table 2. The two control conditions did not differ from each other, $t(47) = .50, p = .62$. The contrast between those in the low identity condition to those in the two control conditions combined showed that participants in the low identity condition reported marginally fewer ties with Canada, $t(47) = 1.78, p = .08$ (two-tailed). The comparison of the low identity condition to the high identity condition revealed that those in the low identity condition reported fewer ties with Canada, $t(47) = 2.44, p = .02$. The high identity condition did not differ from the combined controls, $t(47) = -.98$.

Discussion

The modified instructions of the manipulation task helped to reduce incorrect memories. The modified ties measure showed improved reliability. The analyses indicated that participants

in the low identity condition reported lower ties with Canada relative to those in the high identity condition and to those in the two control conditions.

The experimental manipulation of Study 2 was identical to that of Pilot 2. Participants completed an online study in which they completed the personal memories task first. They were then asked to freely recall incidents in which Canadians acted with violence or hatred toward outside groups and incidents in which Canadians acted positively toward outside groups (order counterbalanced). A pre-test of the group memories tasks included a measure of free recall of incidents in which Canadians were victims, but a vast majority of the respondents had difficulty remembering such events. Evidently, Canadian undergraduates do not see Canadians as victims. Consequently, the victim incidents task from Study 1 was replaced with a positive memories task in Study 2. The recall of negative incidents was included to replicate experimentally the free recall finding of Study 1, in which high identifiers reported fewer perpetrator memories than did low identifiers. The instructions for recalling negative and positive ingroup actions included accuracy demands to minimize reporting bias. Participants were told that the study was testing their knowledge of Canadian history. The researchers would compare their responses to a list of incidents that they had compiled from Canadian history. I assumed that participants would feel less motivated to intentionally withhold reporting of negative events if the researchers were already aware of the episodes. As well, the study's website measured participants' response times on the group memories tasks to assess whether they spent comparable amounts of time answering the questions in the different conditions.

In the pilot studies testing the effectiveness of the manipulation used in Study 2, I found that participants in the low identity condition reported weaker ties with Canadians than did those

in the high identity and control conditions. Drawing on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and consistent with Study 1, I expected the low identity manipulation in Study 2 to free participants from the impetus to maintain a positive image of Canada, which should render negative historical events more accessible. Therefore, participants in the low identity condition, compared to those in the high identity and control conditions, were hypothesized to recall a greater number of negative events.

Study 2: Method

Participants

Sixty two Euro-Canadian undergraduates completed the online study on “personal memories and group memories” in exchange for \$8. Three participants in the low identity condition did not complete the experimental manipulation task and 3 participants in the control condition failed to follow the instructions in reporting personal memories (see Appendix B for an example). Consequently, these 6 individuals were excluded from the analyses, leaving 56 participants (30 females and 26 males). All participants were born in Canada.

Procedure

Undergraduates were invited to complete an online study investigating “personal memories and memories of a group’s history.” Interested individuals were sent a login and a password to enter the study’s site. Participants first completed the “personal memories” task and ingroup ties measure identical to the ones used in Pilot 2. The measure showed high internal consistency (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .86$). They then completed two “group memories” tasks: They were asked to freely recall “specific negative acts (e.g., violence, hatred, discrimination) that

Canadians have committed against non Canadians” and “specific positive acts (e.g., kindness, bravery, achievement) that Canadians have performed to benefit non Canadians.” The order of the two kinds of tasks was counterbalanced. Participants were asked to recall up to 5 incidents in each category. To encourage maximum reports and to preclude incidents with personal connection, the following instructions were included:

You can report ongoing or past negative (positive) acts that Canadians have committed against (performed for) outside groups. These events can be relatively major or minor. The episodes simply have to involve one or more people. These events should not involve you or someone you know personally. Also, the events can be recent or far away. As well, the instructions for the group memories tasks included accuracy demands. Participants were told (truthfully) that “we have examined Canadian history and created a list” of incidents to “compare participants’ responses to our list.” (See Appendix D for the complete instructions). I assumed that participants would feel less motivated to intentionally withhold reporting of negative events if the researchers were already aware of the episodes. For each group memories task, the study’s website was programmed to measure response time by recording the time from the load of each page to its submission. Finally, participants completed a background questionnaire.

Results

Gender and order of negative and positive reports did not qualify the effects reported below and are therefore omitted from the final analyses. The data were analyzed in a mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA) with type of free-recall task (type of recall: negative vs. positive)

as a within-subjects variable and identity (low vs. high vs. control) as a between-subjects variable.

Manipulation Check. Unlike in the two pilot studies, the analyses showed no effect of the identity manipulation on the ingroup ties measure, $F(2, 53) < 1$. The means are reported in Table 3.

Free Recall of Negative and Positive Canadian Incidents. Participants recalled fewer Canadian harms ($M = 2.27$, $SE = .21$) than Canadian positive deeds ($M = 3.32$, $SE = .21$), $F(2, 53) = 29.06$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .35$. Although the main effect of identity was non-significant, $F(2, 53) < 1$, the interaction between type of free-recall and identity was significant, $F(2, 53) = 3.10$, $p = .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .11$. The means are reported in Table 4.

As predicted, participants in the low identity condition recalled more negative incidents than did participants in the high identity $F(1, 53) = 6.01$, $p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .11$, and control conditions, $F(1, 53) = 5.13$, $p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .10$. Participants in the high identity condition did not differ from those in the control condition in number of negative memories recalled, $F(1, 53) < 1$. With respect to positive memories, comparisons between participants in the low identity and the other two conditions were non-significant, $F_s(1, 53) < 1$. Participants in the high identity condition did recall a significantly greater number of positive incidents than did those in the control condition, $F(1, 53) = 4.14$, $p = .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$.

Within participant comparisons revealed that those in the control condition recalled significantly more positive than negative incidents, $F(1, 53) = 5.54$, $p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .11$. This preference for recalling positive events was exaggerated in the high identity condition, $F(1, 53)$

= 14.78, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .28$, and eliminated in the low identity condition, $F(1, 53) = 1.11$, $p = .30$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$.

Response Time. The analyses were conducted on square root transformations of the raw data. The main effects of type of free recall task and identity were non-significant, $F_s < 1$. The interaction of type of free-recall and identity was also non-significant: $F(2, 53) = 1.61$, $p = .21$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$. Evidently, participants in the three identity conditions invested equivalent degrees of effort in the free recall tasks.⁴

Discussion

The experimental manipulation of identification with Canada comprised a task in which participants recalled two personal memories that did not have any direct connection to Canada. This subtle manipulation of identity should not have produced explicit experimental demands to feel closer or further away from Canadians. The manipulation showed significant effects on the ingroup ties measures in the pilot tests. It is not clear why the manipulation check failed in this study. Nevertheless, the manipulation impacted the primary dependent variable as predicted. Consistent with the predictions of social identity theory and the findings of Study 1, participants in the low identity condition, relative to participants in the remaining conditions, appeared to be less motivated to view their country's history favourably. They recalled more incidents reflecting poorly on Canada and as many negative as positive memories. Participants in the high identity and control conditions recalled more positive than negative memories. These effects occurred in the presence of strong demands for memory accuracy, suggesting that the findings reflect a memory bias rather than self-presentation.

Based on the pilot tests, there was no reason to predict differences between the high identity and control conditions. Yet, participants in the high identity condition reported more positive incidents than did those in the control condition. This result supports the proposal that participants in the high identity condition are motivated to maintain a favourable view of their ingroup. The finding is difficult to interpret, however, because participants in the high identity condition did not recall significantly more positive incidents than did those in the low identity condition.

Note that as indicated by comparable response times in the various conditions, participants in the three identity conditions invested equal degree of effort on the free recall tasks. As well, the experimental manipulation did not change participant's state self-esteem, a judgment confirmed in Pilot 1. These findings suggest that the memory mechanism at work with respect to the free recall findings is most likely to be schema consistent recall, rather than mood congruent recall or differential effort.

Comparisons within participants showed that participants in the control condition, who presumably felt optimal distinctiveness, reported fewer negative than positive incidents. Interestingly, this differential free recall was exacerbated in the high identity condition. These findings are consistent with the finding of Study 1 in which participants, especially high identifiers showed a bias against ingroup perpetrator memories, such that they reported fewer ingroup harm doings than ingroup victim episodes. Furthermore, the finding that participants in the low identity condition in Study 2 reported equal numbers of positive and negative memories is comparable to the finding of Study 1 in which low identifiers reported equal numbers of ingroup victim and negative (ingroup perpetrator) memories.

As mentioned in the Discussion section of Study 1, the memory bias in Study 1 could also be explained by a tendency of low and high identifiers to engage in differential reminiscence prior to participating in the study. Perhaps, low identifiers are more likely to think spontaneously about the harms perpetrated by their ingroup members; such differential reminiscence could, in turn, contribute to the memory findings in Study 1. The replication of the findings with random assignment to conditions in Study 2 renders a differential reminiscence interpretation implausible.

Study 3: Women's Suffering Study

Study 3 was designed to answer a related but different question. I focus on why people remember rather than why they forget. Specifically, I ask the following question: Why do groups remember and commemorate ingroup suffering? For example, why do Sikhs preserve the memories of torture and murder of Sikhs by Moguls (See Appendix E for examples of paintings depicting Sikh suffering found in most Sikh temples and museums)? Why do Jews organize Holocaust Memorial Week? Why do Canadian women commemorate the Montreal Massacre (an incident in which 14 female engineering students were murdered by a man with a machine gun who was denied entry into their program of study)? There can be multiple reasons for commemorations. For instance, Canadians memorialize the Montreal Massacre not only to acknowledge and remember the suffering of the actual victims, but also to bring Canadian women together, to increase awareness of violence against women, and to promote tougher laws against guns.

From the perspective of the present research, an important consequence of commemorations can be enhanced camaraderie. Whether it is intended or not, commemorations can bind members to the ingroup. This hypothesis is consistent with the findings that individuals exposed to current injustices against their group show enhanced perceptions of ingroup homogeneity (Rothgerber, 1997), enhanced ingroup identification (McCoy & Major, 2003), enhanced group identity relative to personal identity (Simon et al., 1995), and enhanced perceptions of entitativity (Hamilton et al., 1998). The ingroup binding hypothesis is also in line with the speculation of various social observers that commemorations of ingroup victimization

enhance ingroup cohesion (Devine-Wright, 2003; Frijda, 1997; Irwin-Zarecka, 1994; Novick, 1999; Roe, 2003). If commemorations bind members to the group, then one should expect an experimental manipulation of the salience of ingroup suffering to enhance participants' sense of connectedness to the group. Studies 3 and 4 tested this prediction.

In Study 3, Canadian women read about violence committed against women in either Canada or Africa and were asked to rate their identification with Canadian women. Identification with a group was defined as a feeling that one has a lot in common with other members of the group, and that one has a strong sense of connection with the group. It was hypothesized that compared to the control condition, in which participants did not read any passage, and the African women suffering condition, women in the Canadian women suffering condition would report greater identification with Canadian women. Note that the condition of African women suffering controls for the effects of reminding about suffering, essentially testing whether the suffering has to happen to the ingroup.

Salience of ingroup suffering can conceivably lead to a recognition that one's personal outcome is related to ingroup's outcome ("It could happen to me too"). Hence, any changes in ingroup identification might simply be reflections of perceptions of personal threat. To test this possibility, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they themselves could be victims of violence, abuse and gender inequalities at any time in their lives. As well, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they thought that Canadian (African) women generally suffered from violence, sexual abuse and gender inequalities. Participants' general beliefs about Canadian (African) women's suffering were assessed to test if changes in identification with Canadian

women, as a function of reminders of Canadian (African) suffering, were attributable to participants' general beliefs about suffering of women in Canada (Africa).

Finally, note that the boundary between the victimized group and the perpetrator group is not as clear-cut as it is, for instance, between two religions with a violent history. When Canadian women are victims of violence, a subset of Canadians (mostly but not always men) commits violence against another subset of Canadians (women). The extent to which female Canadian participants identify with Canadians, a category including the perpetrators of violence, can influence the degree to which they identify with Canadian women, a subcategory of Canadians including the victims of violence. As a final dependent variable, I assessed participants' identification with Canadians in general. In the data analysis, I then examined the impact of the manipulation on participants' identification with Canadian women, controlling for individual differences in participants' general feelings about Canadians.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Ninety six Euro-Canadian female students in an undergraduate psychology class at University of Waterloo completed an online "Survey about Women" for a course credit. They were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. Participants in the Canadian women suffering condition ($n = 31$) read a passage describing violence against Canadian women, which was defined as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life." (See Appendix F for the entire experimental passage.) Participants in the African women suffering condition ($n =$

33) read an identical passage, except the violence against women in the passage occurred in Africa, rather than Canada. Participants in the control condition ($n = 28$) did not read any passage.⁵

The primary dependent variable was a single item measure of identification with Canadian women. Participants were told, “if you identify highly with Canadian women you feel that you have a lot in common with them and you feel a strong sense of connection with them,” and then asked to rate their connectedness with Canadian women on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 6 (*somewhat*) to 11 (*very much*).⁶

Next, on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*very much*), participants indicated the extent to which they felt that they could be victims of the following at any time in their life: 1) domestic violence, 2) sexual abuse, and 3) gender inequalities in society. Participants’ responses to the three items were internally consistent (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .80$). Consequently, the analyses were conducted on a composite score for each participant, with higher numbers reflecting greater perceived risk of personal suffering.

The survey also assessed participants’ general beliefs about violence against Canadian (African) women. Those in the Canadian women suffering condition and roughly half of the participants in the control condition rated the extent to which they felt that Canadian women are 1) victims of domestic violence, 2) sexual abuse, and 3) gender inequalities in society. Participants responded to each of the three items on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*very much*). Participants in the African women suffering condition and the remaining participants in the control condition responded to a similar measure regarding perceived African women’s suffering. Participants’ responses to the three items were internally consistent (Cronbach’s $\alpha =$

.88), and therefore averaged to create a composite score for each participant, with higher numbers reflecting greater perceived suffering of Canadian (African) women.

Finally, on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 6 (*somewhat*) to 10 (*very much*), participants responded to the following single-item measure of identification with Canada: “How strongly do you identify with Canadians?”

Results

Identification with Canadian Women. A 2-step hierarchical regression procedure was employed, in which participants’ ratings of identification with Canadian women was regressed on identification with Canada and a dummy code contrasting the Canadian women suffering condition (coded as zero) with the African women suffering and the control conditions (both coded as one): to control for individual differences in participants’ general feelings about Canadians (a category including the perpetrators of violence), identification with Canada was entered on the first step. The dummy code was entered on the second step to test the increment in R^2 due to the experimental manipulation.

The analysis showed that the R^2 of the first step was .32 and highly significant, $F(1, 90) = 42.67, p < .001$. The R^2 of the full model including the dummy code was .36, and the increment in R^2 was significant, R^2 change = .04, $F(1, 89) = 6.01, p = .02$. Evidently, after controlling for identification with Canada, there was a significant effect of the experimental manipulation on participants’ identification with Canadian women. Not surprisingly, identification with Canada was positively related to identification with Canadian women, $\beta = .60, t(89) = 7.00, p < .001$. The standardized regression coefficient of the dummy code contrasting Canadian women suffering condition with the other two conditions was negative and significant, $\beta = -.21, t(89) = -$

2.45, $p = .02$; compared to women in the control condition and African women suffering condition, women in the Canadian women suffering condition expressed greater identification with Canadian women.

To assess whether the Canadian women suffering condition and the African women suffering condition differed, two dummy codes were used, one contrasting the African women suffering condition with the Canadian women suffering condition, $\beta = .18$, $t(88) = 1.84$, $p = .07$; and another contrasting the African women suffering with the control, $\beta = -.08$, $t(88) = -.74$, $p = .46$. To assess whether the Canadian women suffering condition differed from the control, another set of dummy codes were used that yielded the following betas: the dummy code contrasting the control condition with the Canadian women suffering condition, $\beta = .25$, $t(88) = 2.45$, $p = .02$; and the dummy code contrasting the control condition with the African women suffering condition, $\beta = .08$, $t(88) = .74$, $p = .46$. The tests showed that participants in the African women suffering condition and the control condition did not differ in terms of their identification with Canadian women. More importantly, participants in the Canadian women suffering condition reported greater identification with Canadian women than did those in the control condition. As well, participants in the Canadian women suffering condition tended to report greater identification than did those in the African women suffering condition.⁷

Perceived Personal Threat. To assess the effect of the experimental manipulation on participants' ratings of perceived personal risk, these ratings were regressed on the dummy codes of the experimental conditions. The test was non-significant, $F(2, 93) = .42$, $p = .66$, $R^2 = .01$, indicating that participants in the three conditions did not differ in terms of their perceived personal risk of being victims.

General Beliefs about Group Suffering. To test if participants' general beliefs about suffering of Canadian (African) women were influenced by the manipulation, participants' ratings of their beliefs were regressed on the dummy codes of the experimental conditions. The test was non-significant, $F(3, 91) = 1.56, p = .21, R^2 = .05$, indicating that participants in the various conditions did not differ in their general beliefs about Canadian (African) women's suffering.⁸

Discussion

Relative to participants who received no reminder and those who received a reminder of violence against African women, participants who received a reminder of violence against Canadian women showed greater identification with Canadian women. This effect emerged after controlling for individual differences in identification with Canadians, a category that includes perpetrators of violence against women. The analyses revealed that compared to participants in the control condition, participants in the Canadian women suffering condition showed a greater sense of connectedness with Canadian women. As well, compared to participants in the African women condition, participants in the Canadian women suffering condition tended to show greater identification with Canadian women. Evidently, reminding participants of their group's suffering made them feel closer and more connected to their group. These results support the hypothesis that commemorations of ingroup suffering can effectively bind members to the group, thus contributing to group cohesion. Note that participants' perceived personal threat and their general beliefs about suffering of Canadian (African) women did not differ as a function of the reminder manipulation, indicating that the differences in identification cannot be attributed to these constructs.

Conceivably, what might be critical about the finding of enhanced ingroup connectedness in Study 3 is *that* people felt connected and not to *whom* they felt connected. In other words, when faced with a reminder of ingroup's anguish, people could conceivably draw closer to *any* of their social identities regardless of whether they share that identity with the victims or not. Study 3 does not allow a test of this notion because it did not include measures of identification with social categories other than the one targeted by the experimental manipulation, for instance, participants' identification with their university. As well, Study 3 does not allow a test of gender effects because it focused on female gender identity. To examine whether males and females would respond similarly to a reminder of ingroup suffering, a social identity shared by both males and females needs to be targeted. Finally, note that in Study 3, African women suffering condition was employed to control for the effect of suffering per say, as opposed to suffering of ingroup members. The results were a bit equivocal, however, in that the difference between the two conditions was marginal.

Study 4: Air India Bombing

Study 4 was designed to conceptually replicate the finding of Study 3, and to address the issues raised in Study 3. Hindu Canadians and non-Hindu Canadians of both genders were reminded (or not) of an unrequited aggression perpetrated against Hindus by Sikhs, namely, the Air India bombing and its judicial outcome. Twenty years after the incident, a Canadian judge found the two men charged in the case not-guilty of bombing the plane. After the reminder manipulation, participants were asked to rate their identifications with Hindus, Sikhs and Canadians. Measures of identification with Sikhs and Canadians were included to assess change in identification with social categories not targeted by the reminder manipulation. Based on the predictions of social identity theory and the results of Study 3, it was hypothesized that Hindu Canadians would show an increase in identification with Hindus as a function of a reminder of Hindu suffering. In contrast, the reminder manipulation was expected to have no effect on Hindu Canadians' identification with Sikhs and Canadians because participants were not expected to draw closer to social identities other than the targeted one. In other words, the effects of the reminder manipulation were hypothesized to be specific to the targeted identity, namely, the identity shared with the actual victims.

To address the issue of whether the critical element in the manipulation was anyone's *suffering* or *ingroup's* suffering, non-Hindu Canadians were recruited. This allowed an assessment of the impact of the reminder manipulation on uninvolved, neutral outgroup members' feelings about their own group, namely, Canadians. If the critical element of the reminder manipulation is suffering and not ingroup's suffering, then when reminded of the

suffering of Hindus, non-Hindu Canadians should show an increase in identification with their own group, namely, Canadians. If ingroup's suffering is the key, however, then these participants should show no change in their identification with Canadians.

The survey also assessed non-Hindu Canadians' identification with the perpetrator group, Sikhs and the victim group, Hindus. Note that in contrast to just-world researchers (e.g., Hafer & Bègue, 2005), who have typically focused on people's reactions to *actual victims* of injustices, the focus in the present study was on outgroup members' feelings about the *social category* of the victims, which includes contemporary members of the group who did not suffer directly. No change was expected on non-Hindu Canadians' identification with either Hindus or Sikhs because these participants were not expected to be psychologically invested in the two social categories. Even among ingroup members, a minimal level of identification is assumed to be necessary before participants would exhibit any compensatory responses to identification threat (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). There is no reason to suppose that outgroup members, non-Hindu Canadians, would have the minimal level of identification required with Hindus and Sikhs, and hence no reason to predict a compensatory change in their identification with Hindus and Sikhs.

To increase the generalizability of the enhanced ingroup identification finding of Study 3, a different measure of identification was employed in Study 4. All participants completed three pictorial measures of identification, one for each of the three groups, Hindus, Sikhs and Canadians. The measures were adapted from the Inclusion of Ingroup in the Self (IIS) measure of Tropp and Wright (2001).

Method

Participants

Hindu Canadians and non-Hindu Canadians were recruited from internet groups, on-line discussion forums, and student associations in universities across Canada. Of the total 166 participants, 95 were Hindus and 71 were non-Hindus, including atheists, agnostics and people of several other religions (other than Sikhism). All the non-Hindu participants lived in Canada. Three Hindu participants lived outside of Canada. To keep the two groups as comparable as possible, these 3 non-Canadian Hindus were excluded from the analyses, leaving a total of 163 participants, 92 of whom were Hindu Canadians (50 males and 42 females) and 71 were non-Hindu Canadians (38 males and 32 females). The mean age of Hindu Canadians was 27 and range was 18 to 67 years; the mean age of non-Hindu Canadians was 28 and range was 18 to 58 years.

Procedure

The ads for the study provided potential participants with a link to “a web-based survey assessing people’s views on the outcome of the trial associated with the Air India bombing case.” The study’s website was programmed to record the total number of participants who attempted to complete the survey but to record data of only those participants who finished the study and consented to use of their data. The dropout rate was 10 %, much lower than the dropout rate of Study 1 (31%), possibly because this study was much shorter than Study 1. The study began 10 days after the verdict and the data were collected for 30 days.

The website was programmed to randomly assign participants to the experimental conditions. Reminder of the Air India bombing and its verdict was manipulated by presenting a

brief passage of the incident to participants either before identification measure (reminder condition) or after them (no reminder condition). The following passage was used:

A few days ago, a Canadian judge found two men not guilty of bombing the Air India jet almost 20 years ago. Flight 182 blew up in mid-air over the Atlantic Ocean off the Irish coast in 1985 while it was traveling from Canada to India, killing 329 people. The judge said the prosecution, which alleged that the men were seeking to punish India for its crackdown on Sikhs, had failed to prove its case. The accused, who are both Sikhs born in India and currently living in British Columbia, denied any involvement in the crime. Many of the victims of the bombing were Hindus.

To assess participants' identification with Hindus, Sikhs, and Canadians, participants were given three single-item graphical measures of identification adapted from the Inclusion of Ingroup in the Self (IIS) measure of Tropp and Wright (2001). The single-item measure of identification was preferred to a scale to keep the online survey as short as possible.

Tropp and Wright (2001) used two circles of the same size, one representing the self and the other representing the group, and used the degree of overlap between the circles as representing the degree of closeness or connectedness between the self and the group. Instead of using the same sized circles as in Tropp and Wright's measure, I followed Schubert and Otten's (2002) modification of the pictures by making the circle representing the self smaller than the circle representing the group, by including the self circle completely in the group circle at high level of overlap, and by placing the two circles on a horizontal line symbolizing the comparison context. As well, to simplify interpretation of the pictures, 5 instead of 7 pictures were used. The pictures were exactly the same for all three measures except the label for the larger circle varied

depending on the measure. For example, in the measure of identification with Hindus, the larger circle was labeled as *Hindus*. The circle representing the self was labeled as *Self* in all three measures. (The Hindu identification measure is included in Appendix H.) Participants were asked to indicate how “close and connected” they felt to each of the three groups by selecting the picture best describing their feelings. The study’s website was programmed to randomize the order of presentation of the three pictorial measures for each participant.

Results

Preliminary analysis with gender as a factor revealed no effects of gender. Consequently, gender is excluded from analyses reported below. The data were subjected to an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with group (Hindu Canadians vs. non-Hindu Canadians) and reminder (no reminder vs. reminder) as between-subjects variables and age as a covariate. Unlike in Study 1, age significantly predicted the primary outcome measure in this study and hence was included in the model.

Identification with Hindus. The analyses revealed a main effect of group, $F(1, 153) = 564.54, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .79$. Not surprisingly, Hindu Canadians ($M = 4.54, SE = 0.09$) reported greater identification with Hindus than did non-Hindu Canadians ($M = 1.44, SE = 0.10$). This main effect, however, was qualified by a significant reminder x group interaction, $F(1, 153) = 9.84, p = .002$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$. (Interaction means are presented in Table 5.) Compared to the Hindu Canadians in the no reminder condition, the Hindu Canadians in the reminder condition reported feeling closer and more connected to other Hindus, $F(1, 153) = 5.57, p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$. Non-Hindu Canadians showed an opposite pattern of results: Compared to those in the no reminder condition, those in the reminder condition reported feeling less close and

connected to Hindus, $F(1, 153) = 4.76, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$. The effect of the covariate was significant, $F(1, 153) = 9.80, p = .002$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$.

Identification with Sikhs and Canadians. The ANCOVA of the Sikh identification data revealed a main effect of group, such that Hindu Canadians ($M = 2.61, SE = 0.11$) felt closer and more connected to Sikhs than did non-Hindu Canadians ($M = 1.34, SE = 0.12$), $F(1, 153) = 62.12, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .28$. The reminder manipulation did not qualify this effect, $F < 1$. The effect of the covariate was non-significant, $F_s < 1$. The ANCOVA of the Canadian identification data yielded null effects of reminder, age as well as all interactions, $F_s < 1$.

Discussion

As hypothesized, the reminder of Hindu victimization increased Hindu Canadians' identification with Hindus but made no difference in their feelings about either Sikhs or Canadians. The finding of increase in Hindu identification replicates the results of Study 3 in which Canadian women showed an increase in identification with Canadian women as a function of a reminder of Canadian women's suffering. The results of both studies consistently support the proposal that memories of ingroup suffering boost people's social identity. The data suggest that when religious, national and social groups memorialize the suffering of ingroup members, such memories bring the group together and serve to maintain and enhance social identity.

Study 4 goes beyond Study 3 by showing that the effect of the reminder manipulation was specific to the targeted identity. The lack of effects of the reminder manipulation on Hindu Canadians' identification with Sikhs and Canadians suggests that participants did not draw closer to other social identities at their disposal. Finally, the lack of gender effects suggests that

enhancement of ingroup identity as a function of a reminder of ingroup suffering occurs for both women and men.

Contrary to expectations, the reminder manipulation decreased non-Hindu Canadians' identification with Hindus. It seems that these participants were not as psychologically uninvolved as was initially supposed. Conceivably, they might have felt somewhat implicated in the failure of the Canadian justice system to bring the culprits of Canada's largest mass murder to justice. As well, reading about a horrible terrorist attack on the innocent passengers of the plane probably threatened their beliefs that the world is just and that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get (Hafer, 2000; Lerner, 1980). Just-world beliefs researchers have shown that people often respond to threats to their just-world beliefs by restoring justice through cognitive strategies, such as, convincing themselves that the victims deserved their fate and derogating them (e.g., Lerner & Miller, 1978; Olson & Hafer, 2001). However, to my knowledge, the present finding provides the first hint that people might shield themselves from a threat to their just-world beliefs by distancing themselves from the *social category* of the victims as opposed to the actual victims. Note that the social category of the victims includes contemporary members of the group who did not suffer in the actual atrocity.

General Discussion

The present research focused on the following questions: Why do ethnic, religious and national groups exercise memories of ingroup wrongdoings? Why do they preserve memories of tragedies suffered by ingroup members? Studies 1 and 2 tested the hypothesis that people are motivated to “forget” memories of ingroup harms because such memories threaten their social identity. Studies 3 and 4 tested the proposition that groups commemorate ingroup suffering because such memories bind members to the group and thus promote ingroup cohesion.

Why “Forget” Ingroup Wrongdoings?

Various social observers have noted that ethnic and national groups suppress memories that dishonor their ingroup (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Hein & Selden, 2000; Novick, 1999). Similarly, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987) predicts that individuals, and particularly high identifiers, are motivated to protect the images of groups to which they belong. Based on these perspectives, I expected high identifiers in Study 1 to show worse memory of episodes in which members of their group were perpetrators rather than victims of violence. The study employed a free recall measure to assess the accessibility of participants’ memory of extremely violent incidents in which their ingroup members had been victims or aggressors. Only high identifiers showed worse memory for ingroup perpetrator than victim events; as well, in comparison to low identifiers, high identifiers were particularly unlikely to recall events in which ingroup members were aggressors. Evidently, people’s memories of past conflicts involving their groups depend both on which side they are on and how strongly they feel about belonging to that side.

Study 2 experimentally replicated some of the correlational findings of Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to a control, high identity, or low identity condition, and then asked to freely recall negative (harms) and positive (good deeds) actions of ingroup members. To minimize reporting bias, accuracy demands were included in the instructions for the free recall tasks. Participants were told that researchers had a list of the negative and positive actions of the ingroup and were testing participant's memories. Consequently, there should have been little reason for participants to intentionally not report harms committed by their ingroup members – allegedly the researchers already knew about them. Participants in the low identity condition reported more negative incidents than did those in the high identity and control conditions. This finding is in line with the predictions of social identity theory and the findings of Study 1: a decrease in ingroup identification leads to an increase in ease of recall of negative memories.

Comparisons between positive and negative memories within the three identity conditions of Study 2 also revealed an interesting pattern of results: Participants in the control condition reported fewer negative than positive memories, a memory bias that was exacerbated in the high identity condition. These results are consistent with the finding of Study 1 that participants, especially high identifiers, reported fewer incidents of ingroup wrongdoings than of ingroup victimization. As well, participants in the low identity condition in Study 2 reported equal numbers of positive and negative memories, a finding comparable to the finding of Study 1 in which low identifiers reported equal numbers of ingroup victim and ingroup perpetrator memories.

There are several reasons why individuals might not readily recall past wrongdoing by members of their group. Most obviously, perhaps they never learned about the episodes in the first place. Evidence for suppression of ingroup wrongdoing can be garnered from schoolbooks. Stories of atrocities and wrongs committed by compatriots are often omitted from a nation's history textbooks and censored from popular culture and scholarship (Hein & Selden, 2000). Political leaders often enforce such societal level "searing of memory" (Blight, 2001, pp. 32). From the perspective of the present research, however, psychological factors, namely, social identity related concerns importantly contribute to blind spots in memory. Social identity theory would predict that even when information of past violence or hatred by ingroup members is available, ingroup members are motivated to suppress it (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1986); the harm disgraces their group and therefore their social identity.

The present studies cannot fully distinguish between the two possibilities of societal level "hiding" and individual level "forgetting." The absence of a memory bias among low identifiers in Study 1 and participants in the low identity condition of Study 2 argues against an availability interpretation. Ingroup perpetrator information is potentially as available as information about ingroup victimization or glories. The strongest evidence of individual "forgetting", however, comes from Study 2. Since participants were randomly assigned to low and high identity conditions, on average, individuals in the two conditions should have comparable knowledge of Canadian history. Yet, participants in the low identity condition recalled a greater number of negative events than did those in the high identity condition.

From the results of Study 1 alone, then, one might wonder whether low identifiers, relative to high identifiers, showed better memory of ingroup harms primarily because they knew

or were exposed to such information. However, as Study 2 showed, shifts in memory followed experimentally induced motivations to view the ingroup more or less favorably, suggesting that differential knowledge or exposure cannot be the whole story. The two studies show that motivational changes due to individual differences and situational variations in ingroup identification can render negative information about the group differentially accessible.

Why Commemorate Ingroup Suffering?

With respect to memories of ingroup suffering, the free recall data of Study 1 support the hypothesis that victimized groups preserve memories of past suffering in comparison to memories of past harm doing. High identifiers reported greater number of ingroup victim than ingroup perpetrator episodes. However, it is noteworthy that even highly identified participants were able to retrieve, on average, fewer than half of the three victim episodes requested. Most of the participants lived in Canada and most of the Hindu-Sikh violence occurred in India (the Air India bombing being a prominent exception). Conceivably, Sikhs and Hindus living in the Diaspora are less informed of their group's violent histories in India. Although I cannot address this possibility conclusively, I did examine whether number of months in Canada influenced recall in the study; it did not.

The link between social identity and memory of ingroup suffering was more systematically studied in Studies 3 and 4. In Study 3, female Canadian participants were reminded (or not) of suffering of women in Canada or Africa and then asked to rate their identification with Canadian women. Participants in the Canadian suffering condition showed greater identification with Canadian women than did those in the African suffering and control condition. Study 4 conceptually replicated this finding by targeting Hindu Canadians' ethnic

identity. Hindu participants were reminded (or not) of the Air India bombing and the ensuing not-guilty verdict, and then asked to rate their identification with Hindus. As in Study 3, participants in Study 4 showed an increase in their feelings of closeness and connectedness to their ingroup as a function of the reminder manipulation.

One possible explanation of the increased identification findings could be that when reminded of ingroup suffering, individuals may feel personally threatened and may draw closer to their group to find refuge in it. However, the results of Study 3 argue against this interpretation: the experimental manipulation of identification increased participants' identification with their ingroup but had no impact on participants' perceptions of risk of personal suffering. Also, the self-preservation interpretation seems faulty on conceptual grounds: if self protection is the goal, rather than feeling more connected to the group, a more effective strategy would be to distance the self from the group that suffers from violence and hatred.

A more compelling explanation of the enhanced identification finding is that memories of ingroup victimization are important for social identity and contribute to group cohesion. The awareness of negative treatment of ingroup members highlights common fate and thus provides a meaningful basis for self-categorization at the group level (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1987). Since the self-concept is depersonalized in this process, it is unlikely that the basic motivation of ingroup members is protection of the self. When social identities are highly salient, the motivational focus becomes collective welfare (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). In other words, when people are reminded about the suffering of their group members, they draw closer to the group in solidarity.

Religious, national, and ethnic groups commemorate ingroup tragedies. They hold memorials (e.g., Holocaust Memorial Week) and vigils (e.g., Sikh annual vigils of 1984 atrocities). They erect monuments (e.g., The Canadian National Vimy Memorial) and shrines (e.g., The Yasukuni Shrine in Japan). They produce movies (e.g., “Pearl Harbor”), and publish books (e.g., *Lest We Forget* (Thomas, 1997)). Whether intended or not, such acts of commemoration are likely to increase support among ingroup members. The findings of the present research suggest that commemorations can effectively bind members to ingroup by enhancing their feelings of connectedness to the group.

Although I argue that memories of ingroup suffering can have a positive impact on the group, I am not suggesting that the downstream consequences of enhanced identification are always positive. A heightened sense of identification with ingroup can be positive if it is independent of outgroup derogation (Brewer, 2001), but it can be negative if it is accompanied by intolerance for outgroup members (Li & Brewer, 2004). In worst case scenarios, memories of victimization, when mobilized on behalf of relatively powerful groups with ulterior motives, can lead to devastating consequences (e.g., Bosnia, Rwanda, Northern Ireland, 9/11, and Sudan).

Comments on Participant Samples

In considering the generality of the current findings, it is important to take into account the limitations of the samples. In Studies 1 and 4, participants were recruited from the community at large through ads in primarily Hindu and Sikh media in Canada and ethnic student organizations in Canadian Universities. In Study 1, most respondents were residents of Canada. Although birthplace did not qualify any of the effects obtained, it remains unclear how representative the sample is of Sikhs and Hindus in Canada or of their counterparts in India and

other countries. Also, most of the participants were quite highly identified, in part because high identifiers are probably more inclined to search out ethnic media and belong to student organizations. Such issues are perhaps inevitable consequences of relying on descriptions of actual events, as well as real groups with violent histories.

In Studies 2 and 3, participants were all undergraduates. Although these studies do not suffer from the self-selection problems of the other studies, the samples are admittedly limited to a particular demographic profile: educated young adults from a relatively high social class. It is not clear how the findings would generalize to Canadians of other demographics. Nevertheless, the community samples studies and the undergraduate studies have complementary strengths. The major advantage of the community samples research is that it investigates what people remember and how they evaluate events of great importance to themselves and their groups. The major strength of the undergrad samples studies is that they are highly controlled experiments. Together, the four studies reveal a link between social identity and historical memory that generalizes across social groups and past episodes.

Unanswered Questions

Although I have attributed the findings of reduced memory of ingroup harms to memory accessibility, there is another factor that might have contributed to fewer memories of ingroup harms among high identifiers. Conceivably, high identifiers were aware of incidents of ingroup violence and hatred but might have previously categorized some of the events in more positive terms, for example, by virtue of their explanations for the events (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). Although I cannot conclusively rule out this possibility, there is probably little likelihood that individuals in Study 1 would retrospectively regard the actions of ingroup aggressors as

praiseworthy. This judgment is partly supported by pilot interviews conducted prior to Study 1, in which interviewees described ingroup harms in clearly negative terms (e.g., “horrible,” “despicable”). But the interviewees reported very few incidents of ingroup harms, possibly because they might have recategorized many other ingroup wrongdoings in positive terms.

In Study 2 as well, participants’ descriptions of ingroup harms showed no indication of a tendency on their part to put a positive twist on horrible acts. Their descriptions were very brief, however – a sentence or two on average. Perhaps, the tendency to view ingroup harms positively might have emerged, if participants had to provide lengthier explanations. Also, it is conceivable that participants might not have mentioned ingroup harms that they already successfully recategorized in a positive light; the instructions of the task clearly asked for negative incidents and they might not have seen at least some of ingroup harms as negative.

The idea that participants differ in their prior (pre experiment) categorization of events as a function of their identity is plausible and worthy of further research. It does not, however, explain effects of the experimental manipulation in Study 2. Participants were randomly assigned to low identity and high identity conditions, and those in the low identity condition showed greater accessibility of ingroup harms than did those in the high identity condition. Instead of prior categorization, the findings in Study 2 possibly reflect recategorization of group harms immediately following the manipulation. In particular, participants whose identity has been lowered might be more willing to regard past episodes as uncomplimentary to the ingroup.

Further research is needed to assess the degree to which recategorization or legitimization explains biases in people’s memories of ingroup harms. One way to assess the tendency to legitimize ingroup harms would be to vary the instructions for the free recall task: in one

condition, the instructions could be the same as in previous studies, and in another condition, the instructions could explicitly stress that participants should report actions of ingroup members that harmed other groups, even if in their personal opinion those actions were necessary or legitimate. Another possible manipulation could be as follows: before assessing recall of ingroup harms, participants could be given examples of harms committed by other groups (as long as these harms are not directed at participants' ingroup). The actual harm done (e.g., number of casualties and property damage) should be held constant, but the events could be legitimized (or not) by framing the descriptions of the events in a positive light (or not). Learning about others' harms that are legitimized by researchers might give participants, especially high identifiers, a green light to report ingroup harms that they might not report otherwise. Finally, another way to study recategorization could be to manipulate ingroup identity (e.g., as in Study 2), and then have participants categorize ingroup harms into various categories (e.g., aggression vs. defense), and evaluate intentions of the actors (e.g., malicious intention of harming others vs. noble intention of protecting ingroup members). High identifiers may be especially likely to engage in motivated reasoning (e.g., Kunda, 1990) to legitimize the actions of ingroup members.

With respect to Studies 3 and 4, one might wonder about the processes underlying the identity boost. I have argued that the enhanced identification effect reflects feelings of a common bond. In some cases, the shared history of victimization may be the only thing common among members of the group (Novick, 1999). It is also likely that reminders of ingroup victimization boost identity by generating feelings of empathy with the actual victims. Other processes may also be involved: The extent to which the harm done by outsiders to the ingroup was justified (e.g., a self-defense attack vs. an unprovoked attack) might be of relevance; a less justified harm

may be particularly likely to enhance ingroup identity. A related but different construct, deservingness, might also be important: reminders of an undeserved attack on the ingroup might generate stronger identification than a deserved attack. Finally, reminders of unrequited injustices might boost identity to a greater degree than required injustices.

One might also wonder about the extent to which self-motives influence responses to reminders of ingroup victimization. As mentioned earlier, Study 3 demonstrates that the effect of the reminder manipulation on ingroup identification in that study cannot be attributed to perceptions of personal threat. There may be cases, however, in which reminders of group victimization might lead to feelings of personal threat. If individuals feel personally threatened, would they pull away from the group or draw even closer to the group when they are reminded of ingroup victimization? Future research could directly manipulate personal threat to assess the importance of this variable in responses to reminders of ingroup suffering.

Perceptions of personal threat may also be related to the extent to which ingroup victimization is a thing of a past or an ongoing experience of ingroup members. A past injustice might generate a uniform response of enhanced identification among all members. A continuing injustice, however, might polarize the group, such that low identifiers might become even less identified and high identifiers might become even more identified with the group. Such divergent responses would have important implications. The injustice comments on the social value of the group. The extent to which individuals value their group is likely to influence the degree to which they fight for reparations. Since high identifiers value the group more than low identifiers, they may be more likely to fight for the group's cause. This claim is consistent with the finding that high identifiers, compared to low identifiers, tend to "stand by" their group in that they are

less likely to ward off a reflected failure of their group (e.g., a lost sports game; Wann & Branscombe, 1990).

There are other unanswered questions with respect to the enhanced identification finding: Are there individual differences (e.g., initial level of identification, social dominance orientation) that might moderate this effect? Are there group level moderators of this effect (e.g., minority vs. majority status)? Are there circumstances (e.g., when the suffering is inflicted by ingroup members) under which reminders of ingroup suffering might lead to a decrease rather than an increase in identification with the group? Future research is needed to address these issues.

As well, it would be interesting to study reactions of outgroup members to commemorations of a group. Study 4 showed that when reminded of the Air India bombing and its not-guilty verdict, outgroup members, non-Hindu Canadians distanced themselves from the social category of the victims, namely, Hindus. The reminder probably threatened their just-world beliefs (Hafer, 2000; Lerner, 1980), and they might have psychologically pulled back from the social category of the victims to minimize the threat. It is also possible that the reminder enhanced their perceptions of intergroup differences (e.g., “my people have never experienced something like that”). Although the finding calls for replication (as it was not predicted initially), it has interesting societal implications. At the minimum, it indicates that commemorations of a group’s suffering can influence outgroup members’ perceptions of the victimized group. In some cases at least, acts of commemorations of a group might psychologically push outsiders away from the group. This effect may not be in the best interest of the victimized group, if, for instance, members of the victimized group hope to elicit support from other groups to strengthen their fight for justice. Future research should further examine responses of outsiders, and should

also investigate the circumstances (e.g., when the outside group has suffered similar atrocities) under which reminders of a group's suffering could bring outsiders closer to the victimized group.

Finally, one might ask whether reminders of positive ingroup events would increase ingroup identity to the same degree as reminders of ingroup victimization. It would be valuable to investigate the connection between group identity and reminders of ingroup achievements and glories. Comparisons between positive and negative events, however, are likely to be problematic because it is difficult to equate positive and negative events. For instance, it is not clear if a very positive incident involving the ingroup (e.g., winning the greatest number of Olympic gold medals) is as significant or affectively potent as a very negative incident (e.g., genocide). Also, reminders of positive and negative incidents are likely to influence identification via different processes. Positive ingroup incidents may enhance identification by generating feelings of pride and allowing individuals to bask in the reflected glory of their group members (Cialdini et al., 1976), whereas negative incidents, as mentioned earlier, are likely to engender other kinds of psychological states, such as, empathy, a sense of a common bond, a sense of undeserved and unjustifiable harm. These claims, however, are highly speculative and require further research.

Final Reflections

The present research falls within the broader field of research on reconstructive memory (e.g., Ross, 1989; Schacter, 1996). Researchers have shown that individual differences, such as self esteem (Christensen, Wood, & Barrett, 2003) and situational variables, such as time and distraction (Estes, 1997) can increase or decrease accessibility of positive or negative

autobiographical memories. The present research informs the literature on reconstructive memory by extending previous findings of “fluidity” of memories to the domain of memories of an ingroup’s history. The results of Study 1 and Study 2 show that individual differences and situational variations in ingroup identification can increase or decrease accessibility of memories of ingroup aggression, ingroup victimization and ingroup glories.

Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that high identifiers recall their group’s history in a manner that limits the damage to their social identity. High and low identifiers do not appear to differ in their recall of other aspects of their group’s history that are less threatening to their social identity. These results are reminiscent of findings from studies of personal memories and self-perceptions. Memories of negative personal outcomes often engender greater attributional and cognitive activity than do recollections of positive outcomes (Taylor, 1991). For example, people are more motivated to dissociate their present selves from earlier negative outcomes than to connect their present selves to past positive outcomes in their lives (Ross & Wilson, 2002). The parallels between personal and group memory suggest additional support for a fundamental assumption of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986): Personal self-regard is intimately connected to people’s feelings about the groups to which they highly identify.

Research on autobiographical memory suggests that memory for self-evaluative information is reconstructed to reflect more positively on the self (Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Individuals often deliberately tailor self-reports to portray a desired self-image. However, memory distortions are not always deliberate. As Gramzow (2005) has shown, under conditions of reduced accessibility of specific information about the self (e.g., test scores), more global thoughts and beliefs about the self can influence reconstructive memory; in other words,

the self-positivity bias in autobiographical memory occurs “by default.” The present research shows that a default positivity bias exists for group related memories as well. In the second study reported in the present research, participants in the control condition, who presumably felt optimal distinctiveness, recalled more positive than negative group actions. This default bias toward positive ingroup incidents was exaggerated in the high identity condition, suggesting that the motivation to maintain a positive image of the group rendered positive memories more accessible.

A parallel can also be drawn between the present research and the research on the link between self esteem and autobiographical memory. High self esteem individuals, compared to low self esteem individuals, tend to recall their experiences in self-aggrandizing ways (Christenson, et al., 2003). As well, after a negative experience, high self esteem individuals are more likely than low self esteem individuals to recall positive memories (Smith & Petty, 1995). These findings suggest that the general bias toward positivity that high self esteem individuals show may help them to recruit positive memories when they need them to boost their self esteem. In other words, memory differences due to self esteem suggest a possible mechanism through which self esteem may be maintained (Christenson, et al., 2003).

Finally, memory differences due to group identification suggest a possible mechanism through which social identity can be maintained. An important lesson from the present research is that, like positive group memories, memories of ingroup suffering may serve to enhance and maintain social identity. Most remarkably perhaps, victim memories can exert these effects long after the actual atrocities, and in many cases, long after peace is restored. These persistent effects attest to the power of collective memory.

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Footnotes

¹ I use the terms perpetrator and victim groups as shorthand labels to reflect present-day individuals' degree of association with the two categories.

² The intercorrelations among the three subscales of identification were quite high: ingroup ties and centrality, Pearson r ($N = 40$) = .64, $p < .001$; ingroup ties and ingroup affect, Pearson r ($N = 36$) = .51, $p < .001$; and ingroup affect and centrality, Pearson r ($N = 39$) = .63, $p < .001$. These high intercorrelations are consistent with the intercorrelations that Obst & White (2005) reported with respect to the identification of self-selected interest groups generated by participants (e.g., sports clubs, student associations, and religious groups). Obst and White (2005) assessed several identities but found no consistent pattern of intercorrelations between the three factors across all the social categories they examined, lending support to the independence of the three factors. Therefore, based on previous research (Cameron, 2004; Obst & White, 2005), I decided to report the three factors separately. I did, nevertheless, analyze a composite score of all items of the scale: $F(2, 33) = 2.80$, $p = .08$, partial $\eta^2 = .14$. Participants in the low identity condition (differentiation need arousal) reported less identification with Canada ($M = 6.80$, $SD = 1.13$), $t(33) = 2.16$, $p = .04$, than participants in the high identity ($M = 7.52$, $SD = 1.31$), and control conditions ($M = 7.96$, $SD = 1.15$), which did not differ significantly from each other, $t(33) = -.90$, $p = .37$.

³ The analyses of a composite score of all four items of the ingroup ties subscale, including the troublesome negatively worded item, was also significant, $F(2, 37) = 3.83$, $p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .17$. Simple effects showed that those in the high identity condition ($M =$

7.29, $SD = 1.67$) did not differ from those in the control condition, ($M = 7.60$, $SD = 1.60$), $t(37) = .50$, $p = .62$. However, those in the low identity condition ($M = 6.04$, $SD = 1.16$) differed significantly from those in the control, $t(37) = 2.82$, $p = .008$, and from those in the high identity condition, $t(37) = 2.15$, $p = .04$.

⁴The analyses of the raw timing scores also yielded non-significant effects of type of free-recall, identity and the interaction, $F_s < 1$.

⁵Twenty three Euro-Canadian males participated but the n s in the three cells were low: $n = 7$ in the control condition, $n = 6$ in the African women suffering condition, and $n = 11$ in the Canadian women suffering condition. They also completed the measure of connectedness with Canadian women. For exploratory purposes, a regression analyses was conducted in which male participants' ratings of their identification with Canadian women were regressed on their identification with Canada and two dummy codes, one contrasting the Canadian women suffering condition with the control condition and the other contrasting the African women suffering condition with the control condition. The beta weight of identification with Canada was non-significant, $\beta = .21$, $t(19) = 0.93$, $p = .36$. The beta of the dummy code contrasting the Canadian women suffering condition with the control condition was very small and non-significant, $\beta = .05$, $t(19) = 0.20$, $p = .84$. Finally, the beta of the dummy code contrasting the African women suffering condition with the control was also small and non-significant, $\beta = .16$, $t(19) = 0.60$, $p = .55$. Due to the small n s, no substantive claims can be made.

⁶Participants also completed a 12-item, three-dimensional scale of identification with Canadian women (Cameron, 2004; Obst and White, 2005). A factor analysis of the data of

the present study yielded a rotated solution that was generally consistent with the three-factor model of identity initially proposed by Cameron (2004) and later confirmed by Obst and White (2005). See Appendix G for the factor loadings of the rotated solution. However, there was no effect of the experimental manipulation on any of the three subscales – ingroup ties, centrality and ingroup affect. Since the single-item measure of identification with Canadian women and the ingroup ties factor of the scale measured the same construct, namely, closeness and connectedness to the ingroup, these items were standardized and then averaged to create a composite measure of ingroup ties. The composite score of ingroup ties showed a marginal effect of the manipulation, such that participants in the Canadian women suffering condition showed greater ties with Canadian women than did participants in the African women suffering condition and the control condition. It is clear, however, that the effect was largely driven by the single-item measure. See Appendix G for the details of these analyses.

⁷ Analyses of identification with Canadian women as a function of the reminder manipulation, *without* controlling for individual differences in identification with Canada, yielded the following beta for the dummy code contrasting the Canadian women suffering condition with the African women suffering condition and the control condition: $\beta = -11, t(88) = -1.09, p = .28$. The negative sign of the beta indicated a trend in the predicted direction, but the effect was not significant. This result confirmed that it was necessary to partial out the impact of general identification with Canadians (including perpetrators), before assessing the impact of the experimental manipulation on identification with Canadian women.

⁸The experimental manipulation had no impact on perceived personal threat and general beliefs about group suffering, even after controlling for identification with Canada. For perceived personal threat, the 2-step regression analysis showed that the R^2 of the first step was .01 and non-significant, $F = 1.06 (1, 90), p = .31$. The R^2 of the full model including the dummy code was .01, showing little increment in R^2 , R^2 change = .002, $F (1, 89) < 1$. For general beliefs about group suffering, the analysis showed that the R^2 of the first step was .001, $F (1, 89) < 1$. The R^2 of the full model including the dummy code was .01, showing negligible increment in R^2 , R^2 change = .01, $F (1, 88) = 1.14, p = .29$.

Appendix A: Experimental Passages of Study 1

Event 1: The Attack on the Golden Temple

On June 5, 1984, a large force of the Indian army, equipped with artillery and tanks raided the Golden Temple to capture Bhindranwale, a prominent Sikh figure, and his followers. Thousands of men, women and children were present in the Golden Temple to celebrate the anniversary of the martyrdom of Guru Arjun Dev, fifth Sikh guru. Although there is no accurate count of how many people died, estimates range from 2000 to 10,000, including army deaths. The Golden Temple and the surrounding ancient buildings were damaged. The Sikh library with its many ancient, hand-written religious works was destroyed.

Event 2: The Assassination of Indira Gandhi

On October 31, 1984, Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India was assassinated by her own bodyguards, a pair of Sikhs, Beant Singh and Satwant Singh. Beant Singh, Sub-Inspector in Indira Gandhi's security, with his service revolver shot Indira Gandhi in the abdomen 5 times. In less than a minute, Satwant Singh also shot her in the abdomen with his automatic carbine. Indo-Tibetan Border Police arrived on the scene soon after the shooting. Both bodyguards threw down their weapons and they were shot at by the police. Beant Singh died immediately but Satwant Singh survived. Indira Gandhi was taken to the hospital but she did not survive. Satwant Singh was charged and hanged to death on January 6, 1989. Two other Sikhs were also charged in the case; one of them was acquitted and the other was hanged with Satwant Singh.

Event 3: The Delhi Riots

In November 1984, in Delhi, capital city of India, mobs of Hindus killed Sikh men, women, and children, and burned and looted Sikh homes, businesses, and places of worship. The Sikh neighborhoods in trans-Jammu area of Delhi were surrounded and their Sikh inhabitants were burnt alive. No protection came from the police. The police seized the licensed weapons of the Sikh inhabitants of these areas before the mob's entry. The army was confined to barracks. Following the riots, thousands of Sikhs gathered in the relief camps. A few individuals were charged for their role in the riots but nobody has been convicted.

Event 4: The Air India Bombing

On June 22, 1985, an explosion in a Japanese airport killed two baggage handlers. Just over an hour later, Air India flight 182 exploded in the air near the coast of Ireland; 329 people were killed. In 1991, a Sikh from B.C., Canada, named Inderjit Singh Reyat was convicted in the Japanese airport explosion; he is serving 10 years for manslaughter. In 2000, charges were laid against two Sikhs in B.C., Ajaib Singh Bagri and Ripudaman Singh Malik in the case of the Air India bombing; they are currently on trial. In 2001, Inderjit Singh Reyat was also charged in the Air India Bombing and he was sentenced to five years in jail for his role.

Appendix B: Examples of Personal Memories in Study 2

Examples of correct memories in the experimental manipulation tasks from Pilot 1:

Low Identity Condition (too similar to others):

“When I play in an orchestra among many other violinists, while there are soloists and other instruments like brass that stick out more than me.”

High Identity Condition (too different from others):

“During my co-op work term, lunch time discussions often had to do with sports, specifically the Junior Olympics. Since I do not know much about televised athletics, I felt out of place during those situations.”

Control Condition (similar to some but different from others):

“I was at a baseball tryouts and I knew that I was among players that were better than me and players that weren’t as good as me. I ended up making the team.”

Examples of incorrect memories in the experimental manipulation tasks from Pilot 1:

Low Identity Condition (too similar to others):

“The fact that I don’t know anything about sports. I feel left out when people are talking about the big game or a popular sports tournament that is going on.”

High Identity Condition (too different from others):

“In my apartment when B-Dawg keeps farting, I did not fit in cuz I did not have these farting fits.”

Control Condition (similar to some but different from others):

“If I wasn’t in the rap game I’d probably have a key knee deep in the crack game cuz the streets is a short stop, either you sleighing crack rock or you gotta wicket jump shot.”

An example of a positive memory from Pilot 1:

“Last term my house mates thought I was too happy all the time and I guess that bugged them. They bonded over TV watching which I didn’t do much because I had homework and I really care about marks.”

An example of an incorrect control task from Study 2:

“I feel similar to my friends in a few ways but still feel very different from them, such as at the solstice party last night. I don’t really feel that very many people are very much like me. I generally feel very separate.”

Appendix C: The Three-Factor Measure of Canadian Identification Used in Pilot 1

Using the scale below, please rate your agreement with the following statements.

Not at all									Very much
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

1. I don't feel a strong sense of being connected to Canadians. (Ingroup Ties reversed)
2. Generally I feel good about myself when I think about being a Canadian. (Ingroup Affect)
3. Being a Canadian has little to do with how I feel about myself in general. (Centrality reversed)
4. I feel strong ties to other Canadians. (Ingroup Ties)
5. Being a Canadian is an important part of my self image. (Centrality)
6. In general I'm glad to be a Canadian. (Ingroup Affect)
7. The fact I am a Canadian rarely enters my mind. (Centrality reversed)
8. I don't feel good about being a Canadian. (Ingroup Affect reversed)
9. I find it difficult to form a bond with other Canadians. (Ingroup Ties reversed)
10. I often regret being a Canadian. (Ingroup Affect reversed)
11. I often think about being a Canadian. (Centrality)
12. I have a lot in common with other Canadians. (Ingroup Ties)

Rotated Component Matrix of the Factor Analysis of Three-Factor Scale of Identification with Canadian used in Pilot 1.

	Components		
	1 - Ties	2 - Centrality	3 - Affect
Ties reverse - I don't feel a strong sense of being connected to Canadians.	.482	-.050	.411
Ties - I feel strong ties to other Canadians.	.544	.730	-.019
Ties reverse - I find it difficult to form a bond with other Canadians.	.828	.162	.244
Ties - I have a lot in common with other Canadians.	.657	.383	-.053
Centrality reverse - Being a Canadian has little to do with how I feel about myself in general.	.200	.504	.189
Centrality - Being a Canadian is an important part of my self image.	.717	.309	.153
Centrality reverse - The fact I am a Canadian rarely enters my mind.	.012	.845	.306
Centrality - I often think about being a Canadian.	.205	.840	.113
Affect - Generally I feel good about myself when I think about being a Canadian.	.491	.261	.675
Affect - In general I'm glad to be a Canadian.	.641	.121	.402
Affect reverse - I don't feel good about being a Canadian.	.283	.123	.765
Affect reverse scored - I often regret being a Canadian.	-.025	.273	.801

Notes:

1. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
2. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Appendix D: Instructions For the Group Memories Tasks in Study 2

Group Memories Task 1: Negative Acts Committed by Canadians toward Non Canadians

Almost all groups have seen at least some of their members commit negative acts against members of other religious, ethnic, or national groups.

Think about Canadians. Can you think of specific negative acts (e.g., violence, hatred, discrimination) that Canadians have committed against non Canadians? You can report ongoing or past negative acts that Canadians have committed against outside groups. These events can be relatively major or minor. The episodes simply have to involve one or more people. These events should not involve you or someone you know personally. Also the events can be recent or far away.

We have examined Canadian history and created a list of negative acts that Canadians have committed against non Canadians. We would like you to recall 5 specific incidents of this sort. We are interested in how well people know this aspect of the history of their own country. To assess people's knowledge, we will compare participants' responses to our list.

Please use the textboxes below to provide brief descriptions of negative acts that Canadians have committed against specific outside groups. Record the specific events in the order in which you remember them. If you cannot remember 5 specific events, just record as many specific events as possible and proceed to the next part of this survey.

Group Memories Task 2: Positive Acts Performed by Canadians for Non Canadians



Almost all groups have seen at least some of their members perform positive acts for members of other religious, ethnic, or national groups.

Think about Canadians. Can you think of specific positive acts (e.g., kindness, bravery, achievement) that Canadians have performed to benefit non Canadians? You can report ongoing or past positive actions that Canadians have performed for outside groups. These events can be relatively major or minor. The episodes simply have to involve one or more people. These events should not involve you or someone you know personally. Also the events can be recent or far away.

We have examined Canadian history and created a list of positive deeds that Canadians have performed for non Canadians. We would like you to recall 5 specific incidents of this sort. We are interested in how well people know this aspect of the history of their own country. To assess people's knowledge, we will compare participants' responses to our list.

Please use the textboxes below to provide brief descriptions of positive actions that Canadians have performed for specific outside groups. Record the specific events in the order in which you remember them. If you cannot remember 5 specific events, just record as many specific events as possible and proceed to the next part of this survey.

Appendix E: Examples of Paintings Depicting Suffering of Sikhs



Appendix F: Experimental Passage of Study 3

We'd like you to consider violence against women in Canada/Africa. Domestic violence and sexual assaults are daily occurrences for thousands of Canadian/African women.

The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993) defines violence against women as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life." This definition refers to the gender-based roots of violence, recognizing that "violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men."

Women in Canada/Africa suffer from various forms of violence, including abuse perpetrated by intimate partners, other family members, and co-workers. Violence against Canadian/African women and girls is manifested through various means:

- Physical abuse, such as slapping, beating, arm twisting, stabbing, strangling, burning, choking, kicking, threats with an object or weapon, and murder.
- Sexual abuse, such as coerced sex through threats, intimidation or physical force, forcing unwanted sexual acts or forcing sex with others, and forcing pregnancy.
- Psychological abuse includes behaviour that is intended to intimidate and persecute, and takes the form of threats of abandonment or abuse, confinement to the home, surveillance, threats to take away custody of the children, destruction of objects, isolation, verbal aggression and constant humiliation.
- Economic abuse includes acts such as the denial of funds, refusal to contribute financially, denial of food and basic needs, and controlling access to employment and salaries, etc.

It should be noted that although the categories above are listed separately, they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they often go hand in hand. Violence against women in one or more forms causes much suffering to Canadian/African women.

Appendix G: Analyses of the Three-factor Scale of Identification Employed in Study 3

Study 3 also included the three-factor scale of identification, similar to the one used in Study 2, but adapted for identification with Canadian women. The three subscales of identification showed high internal consistency: ingroup affect (Cronbach's $\alpha = .83$); ingroup affect (Cronbach's $\alpha = .80$), and centrality (Cronbach's $\alpha = .76$). Intercorrelations were as follows: ingroup ties and centrality, Pearson $r (N = 94) = .41, p < .001$; ingroup ties and ingroup affect, Pearson $r (N = 94) = .31, p < .001$; and ingroup affect and centrality, Pearson $r (N = 94) = .42, p < .001$. Note that the pattern of intercorrelations was not consistent across Studies 2 and 3. This inconsistency is in line with Obst & White's (2005) reports. They examined the social identification of participants' memberships in very different categories ranging from an ascribed group membership to a group membership based on personal interest. They found no consistent pattern of correlations between the three factors across all the social categories, lending further support for the multidimensionality of social identification.

Ingroup Ties. The 2-step regression analysis of the ingroup ties measure showed that the R^2 of the first step was .49 and highly significant, $F = 86.51 (1, 91), p < .001$. The R^2 of the full model including the dummy code was .49, indicating negligible increment in R^2 , R^2 change = .004, $F (1, 89) < 1$. Evidently, after controlling for identification with Canada, there was no effect of the experimental manipulation on the ingroup ties factor of identification with Canadian women. Not surprisingly, identification with Canada was positively related to identification with Canadian women, $\beta = .70, t (90) = 9.33, p < .001$. The standardized regression coefficient of the

dummy code contrasting Canadian women suffering condition with the other two conditions was negligible, $\beta = .07$, $t(89) = .88$, $p = .38$.

Since the single-item measure of identification with Canadian women and the ingroup ties subscale of the 12-item scale measured the same construct, namely, closeness and connectedness to the ingroup, these items were standardized and then averaged to create a composite measure of ingroup ties (Cronbach's $\alpha = .87$). A regression analysis of the 5-item composite measure of ingroup ties yielded the following beta weights: identification with Canada, $\beta = .70$, $t(89) = 9.00$, $p < .001$, and the dummy code contrasting the Canadian women suffering condition with the two control conditions, $\beta = -.14$, $t(89) = -1.82$, $p = .08$.

Centrality. The test of the centrality factor showed that the R^2 of the first step was .11 and significant, $F = 10.45(1, 88)$, $p = .002$. The R^2 of the full model including the dummy code was .14; the increment in R^2 was marginal, R^2 change = .03, $F = 2.99(1, 87)$, $p = .09$. The test indicates that after controlling for the contribution of identification with Canada, the experimental manipulation contributed a little to the prediction of the dependent variable. As one would expect, the standardized regression coefficient of identification with Canada was moderate and significant, $\beta = .36$, $t(87) = 3.51$, $p = .001$, but that of the dummy code was positive but only marginally significant, $\beta = -.18$, $t(87) = 1.73$, $p = .09$, indicating that participants in the Canadian women suffering condition showed a slight tendency to report greater importance of ingroup to the self than did those in the other two conditions.

Ingroup Affect. The 2-step regression analyses of the ingroup affect factor yielded a small but significant multiple correlation in the first step, $R^2 = .11$, $F = 10.95(1, 88)$, $p < .001$. The R^2 of the full model including the dummy code was .12, and the increment in R^2 was non-

significant, R^2 change = .01, $F = 0.41$ (1, 87), $p = .52$. The ingroup affect factor had a small positive relation between identification with Canada, $\beta = .32$, $t(87) = 3.15$, $p = .002$, but no relation with the dummy code of the experimental manipulation, $\beta = .07$, $t(87) = 0.64$, $p = .52$.

Rotated Component Matrix of the Factor Analysis of Three-Factor Scale of Identification with Women used in Study 3.

	Components		
	1 - Centrality	2 - Ties	3 - Affect
Ties - I have a lot in common with other Canadian women.	.211	.880	-.097
Ties - I feel strong ties to other Canadian women.	.208	.850	.053
Ties reversed - I don't feel a strong sense of being connected to Canadian women.	.126	.726	.351
Ties reversed - I find it difficult to form a bond with other Canadian women.	.008	.651	.491
Affect - Generally I feel good about myself when I think about being a woman.	.603	.055	.380
Affect - In general I'm glad to be a woman.	.577	.274	.472
Affect reversed - I don't feel good about being a woman.	.246	.096	.834
Affect reversed - I often regret being a woman.	.126	.141	.876
Centrality - Being a woman is an important part of my self image.	.823	.238	-.001
Centrality - I often think about being a woman.	.679	.329	-.365
Centrality reversed - Being a woman has little to do with how I feel about myself in general.	.653	.186	.208
Centrality reversed - The fact I am a woman rarely enters my mind.	.721	-.057	.232

Notes:

1. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
2. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Table 1: Mean response as a function of identification manipulation in Pilot 1.

	Control (no need arousal)	High Identity (assimilation need arousal)	Low Identity (differentiation need arousal)
Ingroup Ties**	7.49 _a (1.59)	7.36 _a (1.64)	5.72 _b (1.15)
Centrality	6.70 _a (1.97)	5.41 _a (2.09)	5.46 _a (1.87)
Ingroup Affect	9.40 _a (.88)	9.42 _a (.62)	8.85 _a (1.20)
State Self-esteem	1.55 _a (1.04)	0.87 _a (1.32)	0.93 _a (1.30)

Note: Higher means reflect a higher level of each variable. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Within a row, means not sharing the same subscripts differ significantly from each other.

** interaction $p < .01$

Table 2: Mean response as a function of identification manipulation in Pilot 2.

	Survey Control (no memories)	Control (no need arousal)	High Identity (assimilation need arousal)	Low Identity (differentiation need arousal)
Ingroup Ties+	7.71 (1.44)	7.41 (1.26)	8.06 (.94)	6.68 (1.96)

Note: Higher means reflect a higher level of each variable. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

+ interaction $p = .10$

Table 3: Manipulation check of Study 2: Mean response as a function of identification manipulation.

	Control (no need arousal)	High Identity (assimilation need arousal)	Low Identity (differentiation need arousal)
Ingroup Ties	7.72 (1.25)	7.72 (1.56)	7.50 (2.25)

Note: Higher means reflect a higher level of each variable. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table 4: Mean response as a function of identification manipulation and type of memories in Study 2.

	Control (no need arousal)		High Identity (assimilation need arousal)		Low Identity (differentiation need arousal)	
	Negative Memories	Positive Memories	Negative Memories	Positive Memories	Negative Memories	Positive Memories
	Number of Incidents Reported*	2.05 (.33)	3.00 (.33)	1.94 (.36)	3.67 (.36)	2.81 (.38)

Note: Higher means reflect a higher level of each variable. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

* interaction $p = .05$


Table 5: Mean response of Hindu Canadians and non-Hindu Canadians as a function of reminder of Hindu victimization in Study 4.

	Hindu Canadians		Non-Hindu Canadians	
	No reminder	Reminder	No Reminder	Reminder
Identification with Hindus**	4.34 _a (0.12)	4.75 _b (0.13)	1.66 _c (0.14)	1.22 _d (0.14)
Identification with Sikhs	2.66 _a (0.14)	2.56 _a (0.16)	1.32 _b (0.17)	1.36 _b (0.17)
Identification with Canadians	3.61 _a (0.19)	3.74 _a (0.21)	3.83 _a (0.23)	4.00 _a (0.22)

Note: Higher means reflect a higher number or level of each variable. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Within a row, means not sharing the same subscripts differ significantly from each other.


** interaction $p < .01$

Figure 1: Ingroup identification as a predictor of free recall of ingroup victim and perpetrator episodes in Study 1.




Note: Low identification is plotted at one standard deviation below and high identification is plotted at one standard deviation above the mean of identification.

Figure 2: Ingroup identification as a predictor of frequency of thinking of the experimentally provided episodes of ingroup suffering and wrongdoing in Study 1.




Note: Low identification is plotted at one standard deviation below and high identification is plotted at one standard deviation above the mean of identification.

Figure 3: Ingroup identification as a predictor of willingness to forget and move on with respect to the experimentally provided episodes of ingroup suffering and wrongdoing in Study 1.



Note: Low identification is plotted at one standard deviation below and high identification is plotted at one standard deviation above the mean of identification.

Figure 4: Ingroup identification as a predictor of negative emotional reaction to the experimentally provided episodes of ingroup suffering and wrongdoing in Study 1.



Note: Low identification is plotted at one standard deviation below and high identification is plotted at one standard deviation above the mean of identification.