In the face of the escalating North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002-2003, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) – a trilateral security mechanism established in 1999 by the United States, Republic of Korea and Japan – failed to coordinate the diverging policy approaches to North Korea among the three governments. Why was the TCOG effectively dissolved instead of being used to cope with the North Korean nuclear threat? Despite common values, interests, and regional security concerns, the United States, Japan and South Korea were unable to formulate a comprehensive policy approach toward North Korea. What about the regional security context and domestic political factors drove the three governments to form the TCOG in the first place, and what changed among these factors to drive them apart? This thesis argues that diverging threat perceptions of North Korea created different policy approaches to the DPRK that could not be reconciled within the trilateral framework. At a time when trilateral cooperation was essential, the three countries defined the North Korean threat in different ways to cater to their individual domestic security concerns, which produced divergent policy options and preferences. The TCOG thus lost its function as a policy coordination mechanism and ultimately dissolved into a multilateral consultative framework within the Six Party Talks.
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The Incomplete Journey of U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Cooperation