Coordinating Compromise: Information Manipulation and Bicameral Bargaining in the European Union

European Union;Bicameralism;Bargaining;Information Asymmetry;Legislative Influence

Pemstein, Daniel B.

关键词: European Union;    Bicameralism;    Bargaining;    Information Asymmetry;    Legislative Influence;   

Others  :  https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/18536/Pemstein_Daniel.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

美国|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

The European Union relies on a complicated—some would say arcane—set of institutions and legislative rules to develop public policy that affects millions of Europeans. Actors within these institutions must effectively navigate this convoluted institutional structure in order to legislate. Crucially, government ministers in the Council of the European Union and members of the European Parliament seek to forge bicameral bargains in a complex information environment. This study examines how European politicians construct such compromises and explores how political elites coordinate around particular proposals when crafting policy. It highlights the ways in which European lawmakers manage and share information to encourage—and hamper—legislative coordination, and emphasizes the role that the European Commission—the Union’s bureaucratic arm—plays in transmitting information between lawmakers, modulating legislative efficiency.