Analysis of the United States pediatric immunization market: A game theoretic approach

Game Theory;Operations Research;Immunization;Public Health;Vaccine Pricing

Behzad, Banafsheh

关键词: Game Theory;    Operations Research;    Immunization;    Public Health;    Vaccine Pricing;   

Others  :  https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/49720/Banafsheh_Behzad.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

美国|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

Immunization against infectious diseases is the single factor that has had the most considerable impact onworld health. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is the primarypublic health organization responsible for research, analysis, and fulfillment of immunization programs. Asmall number of vaccine manufacturers produce all the pediatric vaccines required to fully immunize a childagainst infectious diseases. To ensure adequate societal immunization coverage levels, the CDC negotiates theprices of the vaccines sold in the public sector with vaccine manufacturers. The economic competition betweenvaccine manufacturers and the impact of the negotiations between the CDC and the vaccine manufacturersare of particular interest. This dissertation applies game theory and operations research techniques toanalyze the pricing strategies in the United States Pediatric vaccine market. The market is studied from fourdifferent aspects. First, integer programming is applied to analyze pricing strategies for pediatric combinationvaccines by comparing the lowest overall cost formularies for a fixed cost of an injection. Specific emphasisis placed on examining the price of combination vaccine Pentacel under different conditions. Second, themarket factors that impact the uptake of pediatric combination vaccines in the United States public sectorpediatric vaccine market are analyzed. Particularly, the direct competition between Pediarix and Pentacelis studied considering the indirect presence of several market factors. Next, Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlinprice game is used to examine the prices of the monovalent vaccines in the United States pediatric vaccinemarket. The proposed game captures oligopolistic interactions between symmetric, capacity-constrainedmanufacturers (i.e., manufacturers with equal and limited production capacity) in a differentiated, single-product market with linear demand. Vaccines are differentiated based upon the number of reported adversemedical events for that vaccine. Using the proposed game theoretic model, equilibrium prices are computedfor competing monovalent vaccines. Finally, The Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin price game is employedto analyze the competition between asymmetric capacity-constrained manufacturers (i.e., manufacturerswith unequal and limited production capacities) producing differentiated products in a market with lineardemand. The competing vaccines are differentiated based upon the number of reported adverse medicalevents, the number of different antigens, and special advantages of those vaccines. Using the proposed game theoretic model, equilibrium prices are computed for competing monovalent and combination vaccines. Theresults presented in this dissertation should appeal to the pediatric healthcare community, including federalgovernment officials (who negotiate the vaccine prices with vaccine manufacturers) and vaccine manufacturers(who seek effective pricing strategies).