The effects of contract framing on misconduct

Contract framing;Misreporting

Nichol, Jennifer Eve

关键词: Contract framing;    Misreporting;   

Others  :  https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/78388/NICHOL-DISSERTATION-2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

美国|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on two types of misconduct: misreporting and shirking. I conduct a 2x2 between subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds, and (3) even though misreporting occurs more with penalties, people shirk more in response to a bonus. Collectively, this study’s theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful.