Do tax aggressive executives influence corporate philanthropy?

tax aggressiveness, executives, corporate philanthropy

Jang, Hansol

关键词: tax aggressiveness, executives, corporate philanthropy;   

Others  :  https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/107909/JANG-DISSERTATION-2020.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

美国|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

This study examines whether personally tax aggressive executives pursue corporate philanthropy. Relative to a control group, corporate philanthropy increases by 3.0 percent, on average, following personal tax aggression events by executives. Put another way, every $1 of personal tax gain by executives is associated with $2.01 of corporate resources spent on corporate philanthropy. Further analyses suggest that the positive association between corporate philanthropy and executive-level tax aggression is consistent with a behavioral theory. In an environment where a social norm for paying a “fair share” of taxes exists, personally tax aggressive executives might experience disutility from violating the social norm, leading them to engage in compensatory activities to mitigate disutility. Consistent with this idea, personally tax aggressive executives pursue greater corporate philanthropy, presumably to “cleanse” themselves of such tax-related disutility.