Phenomenology of Moral Demand Experience

Philosophy, Ethics

Booker, Duncan Clark

University:University of Glasgow

关键词: Philosophy, Ethics;   

Others  :  http://theses.gla.ac.uk/76400/1/13834164.pdf

来源: University of Glasgow

【 摘 要 】

In this thesis I address a seeming component of objectivity in our experience of moral demands. I try to describe that experience as accurately as possible, and in order to do so employ a phenomenological mode of presentation. I especially look to see whether such demands are taken by us as emanating from an objectively prescriptive value realm, as some moral philosophers think that we do. My contention throughout the thesis is that no such signalling is given, either in immediate experience or on reflection on the experience's impress on one. Further work on my part goes on to see whether some sense of independence of the experience from the subject is necessary for it to be had at all by her. In the first chapter I set out the reasons for taking there to be an issue worth studying, and show how some representations of the demand experience leave open a number of interesting questions. I follow that with two methodological chapters in which the subject area is also refined and prepared: chapter 2 being concerned to elucidate the relevance of Husserl's 'formal' version of phenomenology to my area of study, and chapter 3 directed to what I call the 'informal' approach, as phenomenology is generally used in the ordinary run of Anglo-American philosophy. In chapter 4 I describe the strength and quality of the moral demand experience as it strikes one and compare it with other, non-moral demand experiences to find out if there is anything special about the former. Chapter 5 continues that comparative approach, arguing that the experience should not be seen as of objectively prescriptive values, but that it does include some objectivity component. In chapter 61 then identify different configurations of the experience in terms of 'self and 'not-self in order to check on the kind of independence felt by us to be possessed by the not-self element to the experience. And in the final chapter I cover certain reflective appraisals of putative necessary features of our moral demand experience, contending that these are not taken by us as involving an objective value realm.