The development of the SS-20: a case study of Soviet defence decision making during the Brezhnev era

JA Political science (General)

Cant, James Farquhar ; White, Stephen

University:University of Glasgow

Department:School of Social and Political Sciences

关键词: JA Political science (General);   

Others  :  http://theses.gla.ac.uk/4814/1/1998CantPhD.pdf

来源: University of Glasgow

【 摘 要 】

The latter part of 1976 witnessed the initial deployment of a new Soviet missile whichwas codenamed "SS-20" by the United States. The SS-20 was an intermediate-rangeballistic missile which could deliver each of its three nuclear warheads to within 400metres of their designated targets throughout Western Europe from launch sites deepwithin Soviet territory. In addition the S8-20 was a fully mobile system whichreduced significantly the likelihood of its detection and destruction by enemy forces.This, in conjunction with its accuracy and reliability, ensured that the SS-20 added asignificant new dimension to Soviet nuclear forces within the European theatre. TheSoviet Union's deployment of this new weapon system presaged a new era ofuncertainty and tensions in East-West relations. Its initial service history coincidedwith the beginning of the end of detente and within a few years it had come to hold aposition of pre-eminence as a focal point for superpower competition. Along with itsWestern counterparts - Cruise and Pershing II - the SS-20 became a name familiar tothe wider public and served as an effective litmus test of superpower relations.Throughout the Cold War era a host of analytical models were promulgated with thestated aim of rationalising, explaining and, ultimately, predicting the nature of stateweaponry procurement policy. Such models displayed a marked diversity of characterand were the cause of conjecture and debate among their various proponents. TheAction-Reaction model sought to explain weaponry procurement as a response to theactivities of a potential adversary. By contrast both the National Leadership andInterest Group models stressed the importance of studying internal political factors inthe pursuit of an explanation of such activities. A further alternative - the MilitaryMission model - contended that weaponry production was predicated upon theoperational demands of specific and predetermined defence requirements. A variantwhich was applied with increasing frequency during the period of the SS-20'sdeployment was the Military Superiority model. It interpreted the development of theSoviet nuclear arsenal as evidence of her desire to establish political dominancethrough military power. Given both its undoubted military significance and thepolitical symbolism it came to hold it is surprising that the development anddeployment of the SS-20 was never employed as a case study through which to testthe veracity and applicability of the hypotheses.New evidence gleaned during the course of this study from interviews with formerhigh-ranking Soviet officers and officials and from restricted-access sources hasnecessitated a significant revision of the history of the SS-20's development anddeployment. Consequently evolving Soviet theatre strategy and the United States'persistent refusal to include Forward Based Systems - medium-range aircraft andmissiles capable of carrying nuclear ordnance - within the constraints of the SALTtreaties are both reaffirmed as factors which did incline the Soviet Union towards thepursuit of a new missile system for the European theatre of operations. Significantlyhowever neither factor seems to have possessed the overt influence upon thedevelopment of the SS-20 that so many past analyses have accorded them. Theaccepted course of the SS-20's technical development, its institutional origins and itslinks with other ballistic missile systems are now subject to radical re-evaluation in thelight of the evidence which has emerged. Similarly the course and nature of thisweaponry system's development is shown to have been subject to the vagaries andcomplexities of inter-elite relations to an extent previously unsuspected by all but ahandful of analysts. The predominance of such bureaucratic interaction was arecurring theme in Soviet weaponry procurement throughout the period of the SS-20'sdevelopmental cycle. Analysts face considerable challenges when seeking to model apolicy which was so heavily reliant upon the complexities of personal relationships andbureaucratic rivalries.