Abstract:This thesis examines the evolution of institutionalized doctrine, strategy and tactics relating to, but not limited only to maneuver warfare as adopted by the United States Marine Corps during the post-Vietnam period in the United States. The United States Marine Corps also ingrained aspects of Asian warfare as offered by Sun Tzu; as well a return to its historical DNA in fighting “Small Wars”. The time frame studied spans the 1970’s through to 2010, using traditional as well as first person accounts by the prime movers of this perceived paradigm shift from attritional warfare to a maneuverist approach to warfighting. This evolutionary period of development for the U.S. Marine Corps was mistakenly referred to as a Revolution in Military Affairs by members of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus. It has also been mis-portrayed as a highly disruptive forced evolution. These two outliers were not the case. The following areas that were affected by this institutionalization of maneuverism were the Marine Corps’ educational system, the actual battle space prosecution of warfare; be it humanitarian assistance, regular set piece warfare or irregular guerrilla type warfare, and the role that the leadership cadre of the Marine Corps played in this evolutionary transition to maneuverism for the United States Marine Corps. Since Gulf War I the United States Marine Corps has utilized a non-attritionist demeanor on the battlefield whenever possible.