Being : a dialetheic interpretation of the late Heidegger

Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976--Criticism and interpretation;Dialetheism;Ontology;Nothing (Philosophy)

Casati, Filippo ; Cotnoir, A. J. ; Cotnoir, A. J.

University:University of St Andrews

Department:Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies (School of)

关键词: Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976--Criticism and interpretation;    Dialetheism;    Ontology;    Nothing (Philosophy);   

Others  :  https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/11353/FilippoCasatiPhDThesis.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

来源: DR-NTU

【 摘 要 】

In my thesis, I present a novel interpretation of the so-called secondHeidegger. In the first chapter I discuss the paradox of being, according towhich talking and thinking about being leads to a contradiction. I also showthat the late Heidegger endorses dialetheism, accepting the contradiction ofbeing as a true one. In the second chapter, I present a comparison betweenHeidegger and Meinong. First of all, I discuss some similarities betweenHeidegger’s account of intentionality and Meinong’s account of intentionality,and Heidegger’s ontology and Meinong’s ontology. Secondly, I interpretHeidegger’s being as a special case in Meinong’s ‘Theory of Objects’. In thethird chapter, after showing that, according to Heidegger, being is identical tonothingness, I present a paraconsistent mereological system that makesformal sense of Heidegger’s metaphysics. In this mereological system, thetotality is taken to be the mereological sum of everything that is and thecomplement of the totality is interpreted as nothingness, namely what weobtain removing all things from the totality. Since, according to Heidegger,nothingness is being, the complement of totality is taken to be being as well.Finally, in the fourth and last chapter, I discuss Heidegger’s theory ofgrounding. I show that the early Heidegger endorses a particularly strong formof foundationalism. Moreover, I present two paraconsistent versions offoundationalism (called para-foundationalism 1.0 and para-foundationalism2.0) that can accommodate the inconsistent views endorsed by the secondHeidegger.